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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

Preliminary note by the UNCTAD secretariat

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Preliminary note by the UNCTAD secretariat

1. In response to a recommendation made by the Sixth ECA/OAU Joint Meeting on Trade and Development, held in Geneva from 12 to 23 August 1971, and in the light of the understanding reached by the Trade and Development Board at its eleventh session,^{1/} the UNCTAD secretariat will carry out in consultation with the secretariat of ECA, a special study of the economic consequences of the closure of the Suez Canal for African and other countries. This study will be submitted to the Committee on Shipping of UNCTAD at its sixth session.

2. This preliminary note, which has been prepared subsequent to the eleventh session of the Board, sets forth briefly the nature of the issues and economic problems resulting from the closure of the Suez Canal ^{2/}. Owing to the short time available, it has not been possible for the secretariat to carry out extensive research and collect data on the economic effects of the closure of the Canal. However, statistical information which was readily accessible has been taken into account.

3. While not being exhaustive, this preliminary note discusses the main direction in which the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 has affected world shipping, the economies of countries whose imports or exports were shipped via the Canal, and the operations of ports at which ships no longer call because they follow alternative routes. It also discusses the economic impact on the countries lying along alternative routes, and mainly along the Cape of Good Hope route, through the heavier sea traffic resulting from the closure of the Canal. Reference is also made to the impact which the closing of the Suez Canal has had on technological developments in shipping, especially as regards the construction of giant tankers.

A. The importance of the Suez Canal as an international sea route

4. The importance of the Suez Canal to world shipping lies in the fact that it provides a link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and it thus provides a valuable short cut for ships plying between ports of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and of South East Asia and the Far East, on the one hand, and ports on the Eastern Seaboard of North America, in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, on the other hand. The usual alternative sea route around the Cape of Good Hope is substantially longer for nearly all the trades concerned. The additional distance involved varies according to the geographical location of the ports concerned.

^{1/} See the Report of the Trade and Development Board, Eleventh Session, TD/B/385, Chapter IV, section D.

^{2/} Ibid. paragraph 266.

The following table illustrates the differences in distance between a number of ports according to the route taken.

Table I : Examples of maritime distances between ports east and west of the Suez Canal via the Canal and around the Cape of Good Hope

Journey	Distance (nautical miles)	
	via Suez	round the Cape of Good Hope
Bombay - Odessa	4,174	11,814
Abadan - London	6,500	11,300
Yokohama - Rotterdam	11,114	14,450
Sydney - London	11,529	12,962

Source : World Wide Marine Distance Tables, published by BP Tanker Company, Ltd, London 1958.

5. The Suez Canal has also been very important in respect of the volume of trade passing through it. Table II gives relevant data for total cargoes, moving through the Canal in 1966, broken down into dry and liquid cargoes.^{1/} For purposes of comparison the corresponding figures for world international seaborne trade are also given.

Table II : Volume of cargoes moving through the Suez Canal and of the world international seaborne trade, 1966

Cargoes	Cargoes carried through the Suez Canal a/ (million metric tons)			World international seaborne trade b/ (million metric tons)
	Total	Southbound	Northbound	
Liquid cargoes	175.7	8.9	166.7	950
Dry cargoes	66.2	38.8	27.4	820
Total	241.9	47.7	194.2	1,770

a/ Source: Suez Canal Report, 1966, Suez Canal Authority, United Arab Republic.

b/ Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 1969. United Nations publication, Sales Number : E.70.11.D.5., Table I, page 3.

^{1/} An appendix to this preliminary note gives statistical data on the volume of southbound and northbound traffic through the Canal by commodities and by areas of origin and destination.

6. Thus, the total volume of cargo moving through the Canal during 1966 amounted to nearly 14 per cent of total world international seaborne trade. For liquid cargoes the proportion was nearly 18.5 per cent while for dry cargoes it was 8 per cent. It is worthy of note that, while the bulk of cargoes moving southwards through the Canal consisted of dry cargoes, in northbound traffic the greater part were liquid cargoes.

B. The effects of the closure of the Suez Canal on freight rates

7. From the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that when the Suez Canal is not open to world shipping, many sea routes which are important for international trade are substantially lengthened.^{1/} Consequently, the total cost incurred at sea by vessels serving these routes is also increased, with resulting higher freight rates and surcharges.

8. Furthermore, the total time taken by vessels serving these routes is also lengthened and more shipping space is needed in order to carry round the Cape of Good Hope the cargoes which are normally transported through the Suez Canal. In other words, when the Canal is closed demand for shipping space increases with the result that until the supply of vessels is adjusted to the higher level of demand, there is a substantial increase in freight rates.

9. Important increases in freight rates took place after the closure of the Canal throughout the entire shipping market. The following paragraphs examine briefly the increases recorded in liner shipping, in the dry cargo tramp market, in the tanker market for voyage charters and in the time-charter market. These increases varied according to route, and were bigger in the trades directly affected by the closure.^{2/}

(i) Liner trades

10. Immediately after the closure of the Canal, individual lines and conferences whose vessels were affected by the closure imposed a special deviation surcharge, which varied according to destination. This surcharge was applicable to all commodities, was calculated on gross freight, and was not subject to any rebate. The following table gives some examples of surcharges imposed by liner companies serving routes between the United Kingdom, Continent, and countries east of Suez.

^{1/} The additional sailing time required varies according to the extra distance and the speed of the vessel. For example, in the Europe - Far East routes, sailing around the Cape adds between six and ten days to a single voyage, depending on the speed of the vessel.

^{2/} Relatively minor increases were made also in the form of fuel surcharges in liner tariffs in trades not depending on the Suez Canal, owing to the higher cost of bunkers, which arose, among other factors, from the closure of the Canal. These surcharges were in addition to general increases in tariffs which may have been made in these trades for other reasons.

Table III : Suez surcharge imposed on tariffs applying to trades between UK/Continent and selected ports

	(Per cent increase on gross tariffs)
India, Pakistan and Ceylon	17.5
Persian Gulf	25.0
Aden	35.0
Djibouti, Assab, Massawa	40.0
Jeddah	45.0
Port Sudan	50.0
Far East	10.0
Akaba	50.0
Burma	17.5
East Africa	15.0
Madagascar, Comores, Reunion, Mauritius	15.0
Red Sea ^{1/}	20.0
Indonesia	10.0
Australia	05.0

Source : Journal pour le transport international, 16 June 1967(p.2485).

Individual lines and conferences serving trades between the United States and the Middle East, or other destinations which necessitated by-passing the Suez Canal, imposed surcharges amounting in most cases to 25 per cent of the existing gross tariffs.

11. As mentioned above, apart from surcharges imposed by lines directly affected by the closure, the increased price of fuel oil, caused, in part, by the disruption of supplies when the Canal was closed, led lines serving other parts of the world to impose a special fuel surcharge during the third quarter of 1967. For example, conferences serving destinations between the Americas and Europe or West Africa imposed a fuel surcharge of 2.5 per cent and on occasions, 3 per cent.

12. The deviation surcharges referred to in paragraph 10 above are in general still in force, though in some cases reductions were made after June 1967. These reductions, however, were mostly of a token nature and thus did not lead to any **substantial** decrease in the extra cost of transport of the imports and exports of the countries whose trades had been affected. For example, in September 1967, the Suez surcharges applying to tariffs between the UK/Continent and India and Pakistan was reduced from 17½ per cent to 15 per cent. In October 1967, the lines serving ports in the UK/Continent and the Persian Gulf reduced the surcharge from 25 per cent to 17½ per cent. In some cases, although the surcharge was reduced, the gross freight rate was increased by an equivalent amount. For example, the Conference serving UK/Continent and Madagascar and Reunion, reduced the Suez surcharge from 15 per cent to 8 per cent, but applied a new increase of 7 per cent on the gross freight.

^{1/} From the port of Genoa.

(ii) Dry cargo tramp market

13. The closure of the Suez Canal had important effects also on the dry cargo tramp market, where rates increased in the entire market and not only in trades using the Canal.^{1/} It has not been possible to collect sufficient data, in the time available, regarding the precise impact on the dry cargo tramp freight rates of the trades which were using the Canal. However, the upward movement of various tramp freight index numbers for dry cargoes after June 1967, the greatest part of which can be safely attributed to the disruption of navigation through the Canal, gives a partial indication.

14. The United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping index number of freight rates for voyage charters for dry cargoes, averaged for the third quarter of 1967, registered an increase of 18 per cent over the same period in 1966; over the same period, the Norwegian Shipping News index number of trip charter for dry cargoes rose by 29 per cent, while the dry cargo tramp index number published by the Ministry of Transport of the Federal Republic of Germany rose by 15 per cent.^{2/} The impact of the closure of the Canal on dry cargo tramp freights in general, and on tramp freight rates for individual dry cargo tramp commodities in particular, is also reflected in the increase registered for the months of June and July 1967 by the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping freight index number for voyage charters. The monthly movement of this index number in 1967 and of the commodity sub-indices which are used for its compilation, is given in Table IV.

1/ The major movements of dry cargo tramps passing through the Canal involve vessels carrying grain from United States ports to India and ores from India to European ports.

2/ See also "Review of recent developments and long-term trends in world shipping 1967": Report by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/31 and Corr.1 and Add.1).

Table IV : Index numbers of tramp shipping freights (1960 = 100)
Voyage Charter

1967

Months	Commodities							
	Coal	Grain	Sugar	Ore	Fertilizers	Timber	Sulphur	All Items
	Weight	Weight	Weight	Weight	Weight	Weight	Weight	Weight
	125	316	150	112	132	135	30	1,000
Jan.	75.1	108.9	86.6	77.2	132.6	107.6	-	100.5
Feb.	81.4	103.7	92.9	-	136.8	101.2	100.2	103.1
Mar.	81.5	118.7	93.0	68.9	145.4	106.9	-	106.2
Apr.	77.4	113.7	93.8	67.1	146.6	104.1	-	103.7
May	82.0	113.8	99.9	-	140.8	107.1	-	109.8
June	93.4	131.7	98.4	-	-	106.3	-	113.5
July	110.4	133.8	105.2	-	242.5	106.3	143.8	138.0
Aug.	-	126.5	97.4	-	-	95.9	130.8	113.2
Sept.	117.3	147.5	103.7	-	-	104.6	139.8	125.8
Oct.	144.4	141.8	105.5	115.3	240.9	118.7	-	139.8
Nov.	117.0	144.2	108.5	-	242.8	126.3	-	146.3
Dec.	112.1	150.5	104.6	-	237.5	121.9	-	145.8
Av. Year								
1967	96.5	127.9	99.1	82.1	185.1	108.9	128.7	120.5

Source : Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, Annual Report
 1967-1968.

15. It must be noted that because of the averaging of different freight rates which takes place when freight indices are compiled and because of the different weights applied to different trades, the impact on the tramp freights in individual trades directly affected by the closure of the Canal may not be fully reflected in these index numbers. It is therefore, possible that the rise in freight rates on these trades was much greater than is suggested by the above index numbers.

(iii) Tanker market

16. The brunt of the closure of the Suez Canal, so far as freight rates are concerned, was borne by the tanker voyage charter market, where rates rose sharply immediately after June 1967. An indication of the sharp response of voyage charter freight rates for tankers is given in Table V, which shows monthly movements of the "Norwegian Shipping News" tanker freight index during 1967. It can be seen that the rate rose

from 49 in May to 145 in June, reaching 191 in September.^{1/} The yearly average of this index number for 1966, 1967 and 1968 was 62, 114 and 104 respectively.

Table V : "Norwegian Shipping News" tanker freight index

<u>Month</u>	<u>1967</u>
January	62
February	50
March	49
April	39
May	49
June	145
July	184
August	187
September	191
October	161
November	140
December	107
Yearly average	<u>114</u>

Source : "Norwegian Shipping News"

(iv) Time-charter market

17. Finally, substantial increases were recorded following the closure of the Suez Canal also in rates for time-charters. The movement of the index numbers of tramp time charter rates in the months following June 1967 compiled by the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping and the "Norwegian Shipping News", given in Table VI, reflect these increases.

^{1/} The index is expressed in terms of Intascale = 100 - For an explanation of the rate schedule "Intascale", see Level and Structure of Freight Rates, Conference Practices and Adequacy of Shipping Services, Report by the UNCTAD secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales Number : E.69.II.D.13.), paras.95-97.

Table VI : Time-charter rate index numbers, 1967

	UK Chamber ^{a/} of Shipping	"Norwegian Shipping News" ^{b/}
January	118	77
February	115	80
March	119	81
April	121	77
May	128	76
June	121	82
July	135	94
August	130	95
September	147	104
October	147	103
November	149	99
December	138	99
Yearly average	130	89

^{a/} Based on average rates for fixtures of motor vessels reported each month (1960 = 100).

^{b/} Based on average rates for all fixtures for oil-fired steamers and motor vessels in the 10,000 - 24,999 d.w.t. range, excluding charters of more than a year (July 1965-June 1966 = 100).

Source : Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom op.cit and "Norwegian Shipping News".

C. Impact of the closure of the Suez Canal on transport and other costs of international trade

18. It is not possible, on the basis of statistical information available to the secretariat at the time of the preparation of this preliminary note, to assess the additional cost to world international trade in general and to the trades of individual countries in particular, caused by the closure of the Suez Canal. It is clear, however, that the rise in freight rates which, as was seen in previous paragraphs, followed the closure of the Canal, have meant higher total transport costs for the trades which have had to be deviated from the Canal. Further, to the extent that such increases have permeated through the whole shipping market, they have involved higher costs for non-Suez trades too. The additional burden resulting from higher transport costs and delays has been heavier for countries whose trade has had to be carried along substantially longer sea routes because of the closure of the Canal. Among these are a great number of developing countries of the Middle East, of Africa and Asia. Some of these countries are among the least developed ones.

19. Apart from the extra costs due to higher freight rates, the closure of the Suez Canal has also raised the total cost of commercial credit for that part of international trade which must by-pass the Canal. The lengthening of the sailing time required between ports of loading and discharging means that goods remain longer in sea transit. Consequently expenses, such as total interest payable on credit necessary to finance this trade, are bigger.

20. Further, a number of countries may have been obliged to raise the minimum stock levels of imports, the supply of which has been affected by the closure of the Suez Canal. These countries must have incurred considerable additional expenses in respect of cost for financing, storing and insuring the higher stocks required.

D. Impact of the closure of the Suez Canal on international trade

21. The closure of the Suez Canal has meant that the regularity of supplies of essential goods to certain countries has been disrupted. Such a disruption of supplies may have been temporary, restricted to a short period immediately after the closure. Insufficient information is available at present on the extent and the consequences of such disruptions. It is known, however, that supplies of fuel oil to some European countries which satisfy a great part of their fuel oil requirements mainly from sources in the Persian Gulf have been affected, although not to an extent that would necessitate rationing. There may also be cases where supplies of vital products to developing countries became difficult immediately after the closure of the Canal. Disruption of the smooth flow of the trade of some countries may have also been experienced in cases where the frequency of liner shipping services, or the availability of space on tramp vessels, was reduced as a result of the closure of the Canal.

22. Another important consequence of the closure of the Canal is that the higher transport costs, to the extent that they have affected market prices, and the longer delivery dates involved in sailing round the Cape of Good Hope have caused a loss of competitiveness of commodities which, in order to reach export markets, must now by-pass Suez. As a result, the share in certain export markets for some commodities of the countries which formally used the Canal has been reduced to the benefit of other suppliers, who are closer to these markets 1/.

1/ Higher prices of goods resulting, among other factors, from the closure of the Suez Canal, may have also made economically possible the substitution of other commodities in their use. For example atomic energy may have been substituted to fuel oil in some of its uses.

23. Apart from the effects on the volume of their exports, countries formerly using the Canal may also have suffered losses due to a decline in the profitability of their exports if, in order to maintain the relative position of their exports in foreign markets, they preferred to absorb themselves, wholly or partly, the extra costs involved in taking the Cape of Good Hope route. Loss of competitiveness and adjustments of sources of supply appear to have been relevant to exports of primary commodities from Eastern African countries to Europe, of oil from sources of supply east of Suez to Europe and North America, of minerals from India to European markets, as well as of exports of European countries to markets east of Suez.

E. Impact of the closure of the Suez Canal in the field of economic development and balance-of-payments

24. For developing countries whose external trade has faced higher costs, or whose exports have become uncompetitive in foreign markets, the closure of the Suez Canal has also implications for their economic development and their balance-of-payments. Thus any reduction of the export earnings of these countries, through loss of export markets or reduced profitability of their exports, aggravates the shortage of foreign exchange from which they usually suffer. Apart from the deterioration of the position of their balance-of-payments, the reduction of foreign exchange earnings diminishes also their ability to pay for imports necessary for their economic development. The price of such imports has increased due to higher transport costs as a result of the closure of the Canal.

25. The closure of the Suez Canal and the consequential increases in transport costs and delays has put an extra burden on the balance-of-payments and in general on the economies of developed countries, too. Countries in Europe which depended to an important extent on sources of supplies east of Suez for vital import commodities (in particular oil) have been especially affected.

26. An additional loss of foreign exchange earnings is suffered by those countries whose ports are now by-passed by vessels which, prior to the closure of the Suez Canal, used to visit those ports in order to load or discharge cargoes, or to stop for bunkering, victualling or repairs. These ports, especially those on the Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean, have seen a general decline of their economic activity. On the other hand, the economies of countries lying across the Cape of Good Hope route, and especially the Republic of South Africa, must have benefited from the increase in economic activity and the higher earnings of their ports visited by vessels by-passing the Suez Canal.

27. For the Arab Republic of Egypt in particular, closure of the Suez Canal has meant an end of the revenues from dues paid by vessels transiting the Canal. These revenues totalled during the twelve months up to June 1967 U.S. Dollars \$224.1 million^{1/}.

^{1/} Source: "Options for the Suez Canal", Westinform Shipping Report No.290, page 4. (Westinform Service, London).

28. Furthermore, the continued closure of the Canal has led to its physical deterioration through silting and because the installations remain idle. To reopen the Canal, therefore, will necessitate heavy expenditure which will be the heavier the longer it remains unused.

F. The closure of the Suez Canal and technological developments in shipping

29. The closure of the Suez Canal has stimulated technological developments in shipping. In particular, it has contributed to an acceleration of the tendency of tanker owners to reduce their dependence on the Canal by constructing tankers of a large dead-weight capacity. Owing to economies of scale which such vessels enjoy, the cost per ton/mile of transporting oil in large tankers is reduced. For example, it is more economical to transport oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe in a vessel of 250,000 dwt which goes round the Cape of Good Hope than in one of 75,000 dwt which transits the Suez Canal. Increases in the size of dry cargo bulk carriers, especially of oil - bulk - ore combination carriers, have also taken place, but have not been as important as in the case of tankers.

30. The tendency to increase the dead-weight capacity of tankers was already observable after the brief closure of the Canal in 1956, but has acquired a completely new dimension since June 1967. There are at present about 130 tankers of the 200,000 dwt class in service, most of which had been ordered since 1967, while tankers as big as 477,000 dwt are on order.

31. The increase in the size and draught of tankers has serious implications for the future trade in oil through the Suez Canal. In June 1967, the maximum permissible draught for southbound vessels transiting the Canal was 37 feet, and for northbound vessels 38 feet. Such draughts do not allow vessels of dead-weight capacity exceeding 50,000 tons to transit fully loaded. Consequently, if the Canal is reopened and restored to only its pre-1967 draught, many tankers will be unable to pass through it. This tendency to construct large tankers, and of a draught exceeding that of the Canal, might well continue and even accelerate, even if the Canal is re-opened. The result will be that an increasing proportion of oil moving from the Persian Gulf and other sources of supply east of Suez to Europe and North America would have to follow the Cape of Good Hope route, and the relevant importance of the Suez Canal for the transport of oil would further decline.

32. In view of these technological developments, the Suez Canal Authority has made plans to deepen the channels of the Canal, when re-opened, to a maximum draught of 67 feet, which would allow tankers of up to about 260,000 dwt to transit fully loaded and tankers of about 300,000 dwt to transit partly loaded. In view of the time required to put these plans into effect, it is obvious that the earlier work can start on re-opening and deepening the Canal, the greater will be the

benefits to the economies of the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf and South East Asia and of the consuming countries in Europe and North America.

33. Another development which is likely to reduce the importance of the Canal, is the construction of pipelines in some countries of the Middle East to the Mediterranean Sea. These pipelines will compete with the Canal for the carriage of crude oil from sources of supply east of Suez. Finally, routes combining sea and land transport, as well as air transport, may be developed and become important competitors for the traffic of goods which would normally move via the Suez Canal.

G. Concluding remarks

34. The closure of the Suez Canal has affected the economies of many countries, both developing and developed, by increasing sea transport costs as well as the overall cost of international trade. In addition it has had an impact on the geographical pattern and commodity composition of world trade, which, in part, is likely to prove to be of a permanent nature. Finally, it has stimulated technological changes in maritime transport which are likely to reduce the future importance of the Canal. These developments have far-reaching consequences on developing countries with weak and vulnerable economies, and especially the least developed of them.

APPENDIX

Table I: Southbound Goods Traffic through the Suez Canal
(In thousand tons)

Commodities	1965	1966
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS:		
Crude Oil	2,140	2,893
Fuel Oil	1,887	1,703
Kerosene	1,445	1,661
Gas Oil and Diesel Oil	1,800	1,645
Motor Spirit	368	567
Others	268	484
TOTAL	7,903	8,953
CEREALS:		
Wheat (milled and unmilled)	7,082	8,013
Maize	315	1,198
Rice	512	412
Barley	28	13
Others	105	102
TOTAL	8,042	9,738
FERTILIZERS:		
Phosphates	2,047	2,498
Ammonium Sulphate	1,595	2,264
Potash	370	418
Ammonium Nitrate	382	402
Others	774	1,166
TOTAL	5,168	6,748
FABRICATED METALS:		
Iron and Steel	1,722	1,662
Pig Iron	1,173	1,487
Plates and Sheets	963	1,003
Others	859	863
TOTAL	4,727	5,015

Southbound Goods Traffic through the Suez Canal (cont'd)
(In thousand tons)

Commodities	1965	1966
OTHER PRODUCTS:		
Machinery and Parts	1,506	1,464
Cement	1,215	1,407
Sugar	1,695	1,231
Chemical and Products	1,040	1,017
Ores	404	925
Wood Pulp and Paper	681	675
Coal and Coke	265	605
Lubricating Oils	493	577
Salt	544	412
Wood, Timber and Lumber	263	289
Minerals and Rocks	255	250
Military Stores	161	216
Drinks	178	184
Cotton	147	173
Textile	168	150
Glass and Glassware	122	123
Railway Materials	168	104
Paints	94	94
Asphalt	122	64
Others	6,635	7,311
TOTAL	42,001	47,725

Source: "Suez Canal Report, 1966", op. cit.

Table II: Northbound Goods Traffic through the Suez Canal
(In thousand tons)

Commodities	1965	1966
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS:		
Crude Oil	143,664	154,092
Fuel Oil	4,140	4,856
Gas Oil and Diesel Oil	3,244	3,656
Moto Spirit	1,807	1,721
Kerosene	804	873
Others	1,427	1,520
TOTAL	155,086	166,718
ORES AND METALS:		
Iron Ore	3,516	2,859
Manganese Ore	1,192	887
Bauxite	357	748
Ilmenite and Rutile	445	420
Zinc, Metal and Ores	327	369
Chrome Metal and Ores	295	259
Lead Metal and Ores	311	237
Copper Metal and Ores	209	222
Tin Metal and Ores	155	135
Others	309	354
TOTAL	7,116	6,490
CEREALS:		
Wheat (milled and unmilled)	1,425	683
Rice	637	595
Barley	168	180
Maize	115	126
Oats	197	103
Others	87	100
TOTAL	2,665	1,787

Northbound Goods traffic through the Suez Canal (cont'd)
(In thousand tons)

Commodities	1965	1966
OIL SEEDS:		
Coprah	742	940
Ground Nuts	165	152
Soya Beans	159	132
Castor	25	79
Cotton	102	76
Sesame	38	41
Palm Nuts	31	38
Linseeds	19	11
Others	86	89
TOTAL	1,367	1,558
OIL SEED CAKES:		
Ground Nuts	655	609
Cotton	319	372
Coprah	235	267
Linseeds	26	35
Others	201	201
TOTAL	1,436	1,484
TEXTILE FIBRES:		
Jute	695	692
Wool and Wool Waste	467	447
Cotton	234	279
Sisal	223	200
Hemp	42	34
Others	200	186
TOTAL	1,861	1,838

Source: "Suez Canal Report, 1966", op. cit.

Table III: Southbound Main Good Traffic through the Suez Canal^{1/}, 1966.
(in thousand tons)

	Cereals	Fertil- izers	Fab Metals	Machines	Cement	Sugar	Chem- icals	Wood pulp and paper	Coal and coke	Lub oils	Salt
<u>Loading Regions</u>											
West and N.W. European Ports	398	2,281	2,267	824	237	220	515	387	502	181	104
Mediterranean European Ports	298	785	431	108	79	104	53	40	11	63	22
African Ports	120	1,771 ^{2/}	23	2	13	-	5	5	5	6	272
Black sea Ports	29	224	1,468	80	1,020	444	47	48	74	20	10
American Ports	8,841	1,488	284	156	4	416	214	54	9	289	-
Other and un- specified re- gions	62	199	542	294	54	47	183	141	4	18	4
TOTAL	9,738	6,748	5,015	1,464	1,407	1,231	1,017	675	605	577	412
<u>Unloading Regions</u>											
East Africa and Red Sea Ports	439	224	247	96	407	393	57	40	25	70	7
Arabian Gulf ports	177	87	758	155	692	248	94	54	-	34	2
South and S.E. Asian Ports	8,181	3,686	1,009	344	195	170	425	210	210	386	5
Far Eastern Ports	820	2,421	2,265	149	12	359	117	100	368	6	337
Australia and Pacific Islands	7	99	88	245	50	1	95	161	-	11	6
Other and un- specified regions	114	231	648	475	51	60	229	110	2	70	5
TOTAL	9,738	6,748	5,015	1,464	1,407	1,231	1,017	675	605	577	412

Source: "Suez Canal Report, 1966", *op.cit.*

^{1/} According to Captains' declarations.

^{2/} Including 1,214,000 tons from Casablanca.

Table IV: Northbound Main Good Traffic through the Suez Canal^{1/}, 1966
(thousand tons)

	Metals and ores ^{2/}	Text. Fibres	Cereals	Oil Seeds	Oil Seed Cakes	Rubber	Sugar	Fruits	Timber	Fertil- izers,
LOADING AREAS										
East Africa and Red Sea Ports	444	325	72	253	258	2	533	160	31	458
Arabian Gulf Ports	211	74	46	5	22	-	2	103	2	1
South and South East Asian Ports	4,056	858	428	299	952	1,147	260	129	534	97
Far East Ports	1,134	78	263	911	147	66	139	104	181	28
Australia and South Pacific	1,480	381	943	64	9	-	400	355	14	1
Other and un- specified regions	86	122	35	26	96	172	4	90	129	4
TOTAL	7,411	1,838	1,787	1,558	1,484	1,387	1,338	941	891	589
UNLOADING AREAS										
West and North West European Ports	3,306	867	1,021	1,039	1,050	361	855	546	481	192
Mediterranean European Ports	1,959	173	251	217	141	76	106	178	164	202
African Ports	52	5	69	6	-	3	95	7	2	1
Black Sea Ports	870	67	152	19	94	301	-	24	2	154
American Ports	799	133	94	12	8	238	219	51	43	6
Other and un- specified regions	425	593	200	265	191	408	63	135	199	34
TOTAL	7,411	1,838	1,787	1,558	1,484	1,387	1,338	941	891	589

Source: "Suez Canal Report, 1966", op.cit.

^{1/} According to Captains' declarations.

^{2/} Including fabricated metals.

Table V: Southbound traffic in crude oil and products through the Suez Canal, 1966 (in thousand tons)

<u>Loading countries:</u>	
USSR	5,618
Rumania	1,207
Italy	852
Netherlands	398
Others	878
TOTAL	<u>8,953</u>
<u>Unloading countries:</u>	
Japan	4,352
India	1,404
Pakistan	557
Ceylon	515
Malaysia	475
Others	1,650
TOTAL	<u>8,953</u>

Source: "Suez Canal Report, 1966", op.cit.

Table VI: Northbound traffic in crude oil and products through the Suez Canal, 1966 (in thousand tons)

<u>Loading areas:</u>	
Arabian Gulf Countries	158,849
Others	7,869
TOTAL	<u>166,718</u>
<u>Unloading areas:</u>	
European countries	153,500
American countries	10,700
African countries	1,882
Other areas	636
TOTAL	<u>166,718</u>

Source: "Suez Canal Report, 1966", op.cit.