PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

UNITED NATIONS

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Your Excellency,

I have the honour and pleasure to transmit to you the report of the Economic Commission for Africa on economic integration in West Africa, pursuant to the decision taken by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at their Sixth Conference in Conakry, the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea in May 1983. This decision called on ECA to finalize the report as quickly as possible and to submit it to the ECOWAS authorities, with a view to its being circulated to the member States and intergovernmental organizations of the subregion for study and consultation so that appropriate action can be taken by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS in May 1984.

Your Excellency will recall that, as I indicated in my statement to the Sixth Conference of Heads of State and Government, this study was embarked upon by ECA in fulfilment of a resolution adopted by the fifth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the ECA MULPOC for West Africa held at Banjul, the Republic of Gambia in February 1982. That resolution called upon ECA to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the activities, plans and programmes of West African Intergovernmental Organizations with a view to identifying areas of duplication and neglect and making proposals designed to rationalize and co-ordinate their activities more effectively in order to accelerate the process of economic integration in West Africa, in conformity with the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos.

To undertake this task, ECA constituted a study team of eminent West Africans with extensive academic and practical knowledge and experience in the field of economic development and integration in West Africa in particular and in Africa and the Third World in general. The team was headed by Dr. O. Adewoye, former Minister of Planning of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and presently Reader in History at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. Other members of the team were Professor M. Diouf at the Faculty of Economics, University of Dakar, Dr. C. Atta-Mills at the Institute of Economic Development and Planning in Dakar, Mr. M. Camara, formerly Governor of the Central Bank of the People's Revolutionary Government of Guinea and presently Senior Economic Affairs Officer at ECA, Dr. A.A. Jalloh, Director of the ECA MULPOC for West Africa, Mr. I. Thiam, Agriculture Expert at the ECA MULPOC for West Africa, and Mr. A.R. Bonsu, Trade Expert at the ECA MULPOC for West Africa.

This team visited all West African countries between July and October, 1982 and had thorough-going discussions with government officials as well as with officials of almost all West African Intergovernmental Organizations. The draft report prepared by the team was thoroughly examined at a special workshop of distinguished west Africans which I convened and which took place at ECA Headquarters from 25 to 29 July 1983. The highly perceptive and useful comments on the draft report by the participants were fully and faithfully taken into account in finalizing the report. Taking part in their individual capacities in this workshop were the Chief Executives and senior officials of several West African intergovernmental organizations as well as other distinguished and highly qualified West Africans.

The discussions and exchange of views during the workshop were frank, objective, and of a very high calibre. Very useful and pertinent comments were made on how the report could be improved, and these have been fully taken into account by the team in preparing the final report. Most gratigfying, however, was the high degree of consensus at the workshop on the diagnosis of the obstacles to economic integration in West Africa and on the remedial measures for putting the economic integration process in West Africa on a solid footing. This bodes well for the reception that will be given to this report and more importantly, for the task of making and energetically implementing decisions on the restructuring of the economic integration process in West Africa, which is the principal theme of the report.

The goal of economic integration in West Africa, as, indeed, in the other subregions of Africa, is now the priority of priorities, given the catastrophic impact of the international economic system on economic growth and development in West Africa during the last decade, and the consensus that West

African countries cannot and should not count on a more favourable international economic environment in the foreseeable future for the realization of their economic objectives. Given the slow progress towards economic integration and therefore the unsatisfactory and very limited economic gains from economic integration in West Africa, nothing less than a radical restructuring of the entire framework for economic integration process will do.

What is called for, in essence, is the creation of a framework for building a genuine community of West Africa, something the ECOWAS Treaty regrettably failed to provide. The key features of this new framework will be four major Community Institutions - The West African Economic Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Economic Integration Planning Commission, and several sector Commissions. With the assistance of the ECOWAS Secretariat and the ECA MULPOC for West Africa, these institutions will stimulate, orient, decide on plans, policies and programmes, and assign tasks for the whole process of economic integration in West Africa. They will also co-ordinate, supervise and monitor the implementation of their decisions by intergovernmental organizations such as the CEAO, the Mano River Union, and the Niger Basin Authority which will be transformed into developmental organs responsible for executing the decisions of the Community Institutions within their member-States. The Community Institutions are to be buttressed by similarly strong and effective institutions for decision-making,co-ordination,and execution at the national lelvl. Many of the existng technical and service organizations will be transformed into specialized agencies of ECOWAS covering the whole subregion, while the secretariats of all West African Intergovernmental Organizations including that of ECOWAS will be thoroughly revamped in order to make them more efficient and effective actors within the new framework. Finally, the new economic integration strategy will lay stress on the integration of production rather than markets and the reduction of external dependency.

Your Excellency, I am quite confident that you will agree with me that the recommendations of the report are indeed far-reaching. At the same time, no time should be lost in making the necessary political decisions on them. Accordingly, if, as was agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS at Conakry in May 1983, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS is to be in a position to take appropriate action on the recommendations contained in the report, the process of consultations among West African governments and among West African intergovernmental organizations on the proposals of the report should begin as soon as possible and well before the Seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS.

Your Excellency may, therefore, wish to consider the convening of a special meeting of Chief Executives of West African Intergovernmental Organizations to examine the report, after each organization has had time to study it in depth. Equally, Your Excellency may think it advisable to organize a special meeting of Ministers of Planning and/or other senior and appropriate Ministers of West African countries for the purpose of exchanging views on the findings and recommendations of the report, after each government has thoroughly studied the report. Should Your Excellency decide to act along these lines, ECA will be happy and ready to assist the ECOWAS Institutions in the convening and servicing of the special meetings of Chief Executives of West African intergovernmental organizations and of Senior Ministers of West African Governments.

Whatever procedure Your Excellency may follow in having the report distributed and discussed, I wish to assure you of my readiness and that of my colleagues in the ECA Secretariat to assist in every way possible.

In order to assist Your Excellency and your brother Heads of State and Government by drawing attention to the main highlights of the analysis and recommendations contained in the report, I have taken the liberty to prepare an Executive Summary which incorporates my own personal assessments of the merits and importance of the conclusions and proposals contained therein. This Executive Summary will be found at the beginning of the report.

Professor Adebayo Adedeji
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and
Executive Secretary of ECA

His Excellency Ahmed Sekou Toure
Current Chairman of the Authority
of Heads of State and Government
Economic Community of West
African States

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The task assigned to ECA of preparing this report is a very important one indeed, with serious ramifications for the economic, social and political future of West Africa and for the economic welfare of its people. Accordingly, the ECA secretariat and the authors of the report have exerted all their efforts to ensure that it is as comprehensive, balanced, and objective as possible. The concern is not so much with the past, except in so far as useful lessons can be drawn from it, but with the future and what actions should be taken if it is to conform with the aspirations and expectations of the leaders and people of West Africa. In this spirit, the report expresses its conclusions frankly, and its recommendations boldly.

The report starts with an analysis of the economic crisis that has affected the economies of West African countries since the early seventies, with particular attention to the growing rural crisis and the increasing reliance on external sources for food, the failure of meaningful industrialization to take place, the accentuation of balance-of-payments problems and foreign indebtedness, and the increasing levels of unemployment and underemployment. While domestic policies and poor economic management have certainly contributed to the crisis, the report concludes that the impact of external forces have played a decisive role in increasing both absolute and relative poverty and dependence in West Africa. It is the view of ECA as well as the authors of the report that West African countries cannot count on a favourable international economic climate to reverse the negative trends of the last decade. Consequently, the governments of the subregion have no choice but to strengthen collective self-reliance among themselves if they are to escape the nightmarish economic and social future that faces West Africa if present trends continue.

Regrettably, the analysis of the more than thirty economic co-operation and integration arrangements in West Africa leads to the conclusion that they have not, taken individually as well as collectively, contributed as much as was hoped for and expected to collective self-reliance and self-sustaining growth and development in the subregion. This is true despite the fact that eight of the countries of West Africa belong to twelve or more West African intergovernmental organizations, with three of them belonging to twenty or more West African intergovernmental organizations (Senegal = 20; Upper Volta = 22; Niger = 25).

Taking into account the substantial financial, human and other sacrifices West African governments have been making in order to maintain these intergovernmental organizations, their less-than-satisfactory contribution to economic development and integration in the subregion is a source of considerable regret and concern. The meagre gains from economic integration efforts also call for bold and energetic decision and actions, if disillusionment with economic integration is not to set in, thereby putting this process back for decades, if not for generations. In order to help the leaders of West Africa in making and implementing such decisions, the report devotes considerable attention to exploring what went wrong with the process of economic integration in West Africa.

A major explanatory factor advanced by the report for the disappointing results from efforts at economic integration in West Africa is the absence of a coherent over-all design or framework for achieving this objective in the subregion as a whole. Unfortunately, even when ECOWAS was established in 1975, such a design or framework was missing. As a result, the more than thirty intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in West Africa are characterized by heterogeneity in objective and diversity in membership, with many of them active in the same economic sector. Lacking any effective central co-ordinating mechanism to ensure that they all pull together in the same direction, they often work at cross-purposes and end up wasting scarce financial and human resources, stalemating their individual efforts at promoting the socio-economic transformation and integration of their member States.

The absence of an effective central co-ordinating mechanism at the sub-regional levels is reflected at the national level, and this aggravates the problem of an integrated approach to economic integration in West Africa. Many ministries are responsible for making and implementing policies *vis-a-vis* the West African intergovernmental organizations, but these ministries vary from one intergovernmental organization to the other, and from one country to the next. With very few exceptions, no governmental body has the responsibility or the authority of ensuring that the government speaks with one voice at these different subregional fora. Thus the governments of the subregion fail to fill the vacuum prevailing at the subregional level. Worse still, they have no clear-cut and consistent criteria for monitoring and evaluating the costs and benefits of their membership of West African intergovernmental organizations. In these circumstances, it is clearly impossible for them to streamline and rationalize their membership in these intergovernmental organizations, ensure that the IGOs make efficient use of the resources they supply, or translate their rather diffuse political commitment to subregional economic integration into tangible support for the intergovernmental organizations of which they are members. Nor are they able to effectively politicize, and mobilize subregional voluntary associations and the public at large in support of subregional economic integration.

Given the above two factors, serious deficiencies inevitably follow at the level of the secretariats of West African intergovernmental organizations. One such deficiency stressed by the report is the inadequacy of both financial and human resources - in quantity and in quality - available to these secretariats. As a result, the efficiency and effectiveness of these secretariats invariably fall short of the expectations of their members. Further, the heads of these secretariats cannot individually or collectively provide the leadership of the economic integration process either for their respective organization or for West Africa as a whole.

Finally, the report analyzes the strategy of economic integration being implemented by West African intergovernmental organizations and comes to the conclusion that it is inappropriate for the socio-economic conditions of West Africa. This strategy lays too much stress on the integration of markets as compared with the integration of production and is too heavily oriented towards external sources both for markets and for factor inputs. As a result, as Chapter V demonstrates very clearly, balanced intra-subregional trade has not occurred, nor has the integration of the critical productive sectors such as industry, agriculture, and transport and communications taken place. Dependency, on the other hand, has been reinforced, with most of the limited gains from economic integration being reaped by transnational oligopolies.

What should be done to eliminate the above negative factors? The report responds to this question courageously, with bold, imaginative and logically consistent recommendations. I share the view of the report that putting economic co-operation on a new footing and within a new framework is the most urgent task that must be performed now by the political leaders of the subregion. That done, other desirable developments such as a common currency, common transnational and social and economic organizations among the people of the subregion, and even a common parliament are bound to follow in due course. But first the structure of economic co-operation must be put right; the correct framework must be established.

The subregional institutions and their role within this new framework recommended by the report are (a) a West African Economic Summit responsible for stimulating, directing and deciding on policies affecting the entire process of economic integration; (b) a Council of Ministers to advise and assist the Summit; (c) an Economic Integration Planning Commission for preparing comprehensive and internally consistent intersectoral plans and programmes; and, (d) Sectoral Commissions to assist the Planning Commission and translate its decisions into concrete programmes and projects. These four institutions will constitute the Community Institutions for policy-making. The IGOs in the new scheme of things will serve as monitoring and executing agencies.

In this revised framework for subregional economic integration, the ECOWAS secretariat will serve as the Secretariat of the Community Institutions and assist in the monitoring and implementation of the Community projects. ECOWAS will also directly control the activities of the technical and services organizations that are to become its specialized agencies. The remaining West African intergovernmental organizations will become developmental organs whose tasks will be limited to a few clearly identified areas and whose essential role will become that of implementing decisions made by the Community Institutions. For the present the developmental organs will retain their policy-making organs, albeit with reduced authority in that they will only operate in conformity with the decisions of the Community Institutions. The ECA MULPOC for West Africa will assist the Planning Commission, the Sectoral Commissions, the developmental organs, and the ECOWAS Secretariat itself in the execution of their respective tasks and in the mobilization of resources from the United Nations system.

At the national level the report recommends the creation of dynamic supporting administrative structures, such as a National Commission on Economic Co-operation chaired by the President, Vice-President, or Prime Minister, with sufficient political leverage to ensure that the government pursues a consistent policy on regional economic integration and that its broad commitment to economic integration in West Africa is translated into prompt and whole-hearted implementation of the decisions of the Community institutions and into tangible and active support of *all* the isntitutions that play a role in the adoption and implementation of these decisions. Furthermore, voluntary associations and the public at large should be permitted, encouraged, and even assisted to become fully associated with the process of building a genuine community of West African States.

In order to buttress the remodelled institutions at the subregional and national levels, the report recommends the reinforcement of the secretariats of ECOWAS, MULPOC and those of the developmental organs by substantially increasing the financial and human resources available to them and by ensuring that these institutions are endowed with the leadership commensurate with the challenging and innovative role they are being called upon to play within the new economic integration framework.

Finally, the report recommends the adoption of a new economic integration strategy characterized by a greater emphasis on the integration of production and a determined and sustained attack on dependency in favour of collective self-reliance and self-sustaining growth and development. In this way, integration will take place not only at the level of structures, but also at the level of infrastructure where production occurs. The gains from economic integration will then flow to those who struggle, sacrifice, and have a direct interest in it.

Clearly, the new framework cannot be created full-blown over-night. The first step that has to be taken is the political decision to rectify and remodel the existing framework of economic integration in West Africa. Once this decision is made, committees should be set up to (a) review the treaties of ECOWAS, the developmental organs and the technical services organizations so as to make sure that their legal authority and the functional scope of their activities are compatible with their role in the new framework; (b) prepare modifications in the organizational setup, personnel, finances and management practices of all these organizations; (c) constitute the Planning Commission and the Sectoral Commissions so that they could begin working as soon as possible; and, (d) elaborate the modalities of phasing out these West African intergovernmental organizations that are being disbanded and the process of transforming the technical services organizations into technical agencies of ECOWAS. For the time being, the ECOWAS-Summit and the ECOWAS Council of Ministers will act as the West African Economic Summit and the Council of Ministers of the Summit respectively. The expectation of the report is that with dedicated and determined efforts by all concerned, the structures of the new framework should be fully functional within three to four years.

The ECA Secretariat and I are whole-heartedly in agreement with the conclusions and the recommendations of the report and we commend them to the Heads of State and Government of West Africa. It is our strong and most sincere belief that if the recommendations of the report are fully and vigorously implemented, a major thrust will be given to dynamic and accelerated secio-economic transformation and economic integration in West Africa, thereby enabling the subregion to respect the deadline of strengthening subregional economic integration by the year **1990**, as prescribed by the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. We in ECA will do whatever we can to facilitate the achievement of this objective.

The commitment of West African leaders and governments to economic integration is not in doubt. The time has now come, however, for them to cast a serious look at the results of their efforts over the past two decades, and take stock for the future. For it is certain that the present international economic crisis and its negative effects on the growth and development of African and other Third World countries will persist for some time to come. It should be equally clear that now and in the future, African countries cannot count on a favourable international climate to rescue them from their economic plight. Only relentless effort and determination in pursuing a policy of collective self-reliance at the subregional level, as a first step towards creating an African Common Market, will save them from economic catastrophe and the political instability and social upheavals that could result from it.

That is the pressing challenge to the present political leaders in West Africa. The extent to which it is met will determine the happiness of the future generations of West Africans, or even their position and relevance in a world economy that is daily growing more complex.

Professor Adebayo Adedeji
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and
Executive Secretary of ECA

ensure that the envisaged secretariat and other organs of ECOWAS are fully seized with the process of building an economic community of West African States.

In order to buttress the rationalized institutions at the subregional and national levels, the report recommends the reinforcement of the secretariats of ECOWAS, MRU, CEAO and those of the developmental organs by substantially increasing the financial contributions of member States. It recommends that these institutions are equipped with the necessary competence to cope with the complexity and dimensions of the tasks which are being placed upon them within the new economic integration framework.

Finally, the report recommends the adoption of a new economic integration strategy characterized by a strong emphasis on the integration of production and a determined drive towards the adoption of policies in favour of collective self-reliance and self-sustaining growth and development. In this new integration process, integration will take place not only at the level of structures, but also at the level of infrastructure where production takes place. The goods from production integration will then move to those who need them, not from distant markets.

Clearly, the new framework cannot be created full-blown overnight. The first step that has to be taken is the political decision to rationalize and reorient the existing framework of economic integration in West Africa. Once this decision is made, committees should be set up to deal with the details of ECOWAS, the development bodies and the technical and scientific organizations so as to make sure that their legal authorities and the financial bases of the institutions are consistent with the new framework; (b) prepare modifications in the organizational setup, personnel, financial and management practices of all these organizations; (c) examine the nature of the relationship between the organizations so that they could begin working as soon as possible; and (d) prepare the necessary changes to allow West African intergovernmental organizations to become, over a period of time, the organs of the Economic Community of West Africa. The political organs of CEAO and the one being the ECOWAS Summit and the ECOWAS Council of Ministers will become, the West African Economic Community Summit and the Council of Ministers of the Community respectively. The expansion of the single integration with dedicated and determined efforts by all concerned, the structures of the new framework should be fully functioning within three to four years.

The ECA Secretariat and I are whole-heartedly in agreement with the conclusions and the recommendations of the report and we commend them to the leaders of States and Governments of West Africa. It is our strong and most sincere belief that if the recommendations of the report are fully and vigorously implemented, a major factor will be given to dynamic and self-sustaining socio-economic transformation and economic integration in West Africa, thereby enabling the subregion to be one of the leading or progressing subregional economic integration in the year 2000 as proclaimed in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. We in ECA will do whatever we can to facilitate the achievement of this objective.

The commitment of West African leaders and governments to economic integration is not in doubt. The time has now come, however, for them to cast a critical look at the results of their efforts over the past two decades and take stock for the future. For it is certain that the present integrational experience will lead to negative impact on the growth and development of African and other Third World countries will persist for some time to come. It should be equally clear that it is in the interest of African countries to pool together their efforts, ultimately to lessen them from their economic plight. Only through effort and determination to pursue a policy of collective self-reliance at the subregional level, as a first step towards greater pan-African Common Market, will save them from economic catastrophe and the political instability and social upheavals that could result from it.

This is the greatest challenge to the present political leaders in West Africa. The extent to which it is met will determine the happiness of the future generations of West Africans, or even their survival and relevance in a world economy that is daily growing more complex.

Under-Secretary-General and
Executive Secretary of ECA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. In the evolution of man, each generation defines, or should define, its own task. For the earlier generation of Africans, the central task was to fight against colonial rule, and create independent nation-states. The task of the present generation of African leaders is clearly to take off from where the earlier generation left off, and work for the consolidation of political independence by promoting economic growth and development through self-reliance.

2. Regrettably, from the look of things, the indications of success in this vital sphere so far, are not promising. For most African countries, the hope that political independence would usher in an era of prosperity and "life more abundant" for the citizenry has been sorely disappointed. Between 1960 and 1975 only nine African countries achieved a fairly reasonable rate of economic growth, ranging between 5 and 7 per cent a year, and with per capita income of between US$300 and US $400. Twenty-two other countries achieved only 1.4 per cent annual growth rate over the same period, with per capita income of between US$100 and US$300. Yet fourteen other countries achieved practically no economic growth at all, having less than US$100 per capita income. Since 1960 the overall performance of African economies has been deteriorating steadily. It is no surprise, according to ILO criteria, that 69 per cent of the African population were living in conditions of extreme poverty in 1973, or that between 1963 and 1973 the number of people living in extreme poverty has increased by 10.8 per cent in Africa, as against 0.8 per cent in Latin America. Indeed, the future of the continent, based on the present established trends, is to say the least, inauspicious, unless strong measures are taken now to reverse the trends.

3. There are other sombre facts about African poverty and lopsided development. Agriculture has been sadly neglected over the years, and the rate of food importation is increasing annually at an alarming rate. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated that while the demand for food would increase in Africa at an annual average rate of 3.8 per cent up to 1985, the supply would increase only at an annual average rate of 2.5 per cent. On account of inadequate investment in the social sectors, the cities are becoming congested, with problems of unemployment, underemployment, assuming grave proportions. According to recent ILO estimates, 10 million Africans are unemployed, while 53 millions are underemployed. The social problems attendant upon unemployment and underemployment are compounded by great inequalities in income distribution, threatening social stability in most countries of the continent.

4. What has gone wrong ? The answer is surely not want of ambition or good intentions. No sooner was independence achieved than African governments embarked on planned development aimed at accelerated socio-economic transformation of their respective countries. Many African countries are now implementing their third or fourth five-or four-year development plans since the attainment of independence.

5. As far as West Africa is concerned, a lot that was wrong with the economies of the subregion and the approach of its governments to economic development has been highlighted in this report. The arguments simply amount to this: in spite of some structural changes in the economies of African countries within the past two decades, the approach of African governments to the management of their economies is not meeting the challenges of the times in a rapidly changing international economic situation.

6. In the present situation when African countries should genuinely practise self-reliance, the whole orientation of economic management is externally directed. The accent is on consumerism, rather than productivity; on pandering to appetites for foreign goods, rather than looking within to live by one's resources to the maximum extent possible. Scarcity is hardly ever seen as a challenge to productivity and creativity, but as an excuse for more imports or for more loans to bring in the imports. To borrow Gunnar Myrdal's phraseology, African countries are, in varying degrees, "soft states", lacking in rigorous social discipline.

7. Management of industrialization - the engine of economic growth and development - similarly lacks rigorous discipline. In West Africa, as in the rest of the continent, industrialization has generally not been planned and executed with a view to developing local enterpreneurship, galvanizing creativity or, more mundanely, solving the problem of unemployment. The objective is simply to produce consumer goods; how they are produced would seem to be of little moment. Not surprisingly, industrialization has continued to depend largely on foreigners in most countries. The foreigners bring in their technologies which are invariably out of tune with the real needs of the level of development of the economies in which they are made to operate. Rather than aid development, such technologies stunt it by strengthening the outward orientation of the economies of the particular countries. Besides, because the industries employ technologies that are capital-intensive and utilize little amount of local materials, they constitute a major source of capital outflow.

8. If African countries do not seem to be making the necessary sacrifice which the socio-economic transformation of their societies would entail, it is also not sufficiently appreciated that for the most part, truly viable economies cannot be built on the parameters of the existing nation-states. Consider the West Africa subregion, the most balkanized subregion of the continent. Only one of the sixteen countries, Nigeria, has a sizeable population of more than 70 million people. The population of six other countries ranges between 5 and 10 millions, while that of the remaining nine ranges between 600,000 and 5 million. In the context of today's world economy and given the extent of their under-development, it is obvious that most West African countries do not have the optimum size for meaningful development, and that they have no alternative, but to pool their resources if they would break the vicious circle of poverty and dependency.

9. The necessity for pooling resources for economic development is now generally accepted in West Africa, even though the political will to translate this into reality has not been sufficiently demonstrated. Since independence West African countries have entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements *inter se* to promote economic co-operation. Apart from numerous bilateral trade agreements, there are today some 35 Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) in the West African subregion - all aimed at promoting co-operation in diverse fields.

10. Unfortunately, the subregion is yet to achieve any major breakthrough in economic co-operation. Most West African political leaders have expressed their dissatisfaction with the limited achievements of the IGOs. Leaders of opinion in the subregion are wondering whether co-operation is worth the financial contributions the countries are making to support the IGOs. We, too, at ECA, having devoted considerable energy within the past 25 years to the promotion of economic co-operation in Africa, are not satisfied, with the little that the IGOs can show to justify their existence. The Niamey-based MULPOC was established in June 1978 as an operational arm of the ECA, partly to co-ordinate the activities of the IGOs and to help in harmonizing their programmes of activities. Neither the activities of the MULPOC in this direction, nor the initiatives of the Chief Executives of the IGOs themselves in holding occasional meetings to discuss common problems and highlight possible areas of co-operation, have yielded any tangible results. More and more it was becoming obvious that something had to be done to make the IGOs more effective agencies of economic co-operation.

11. It was at the Fifth Meeting of the Council of Minstiers of the MULPOC for West Africa which was held in Banjul, Republic of the Gambia, 12-13 February 1982, that the ECA/MULPOC was asked to undertake a comprehensive review and evaluation of multinational economic co-operation arrangements in the subregion; their structure, objectives, and their effectiveness in promoting subregional economic co-operation.[1] The underlying objective was to draw lessons from past experience, identify obstacles to the process of subregional economic integration, and think out measures to enable the IGOs make the maximum impact in promoting subregional economic co-operation in West Africa.

12. In line with the decision of the MULPOC Council of Ministers, a study team was set up in July 1982 with the following terms of reference:

(a) examine in the context of the West African political economy, the origins, evolution and objectives of the intergovernmental organizations in the subregion;

(b) attempt a classification of the IGOs according to their objectives and programmes of activities with a view to identifying similarities, interrelationships and possible areas for co-operation;

(c) determine the effectiveness of the IGOs in the promotion of subregional economic co-operation;

(d) attempt an analysis of costs and benefits of economic co-operation to the countries of the subregion;

(e) consider any new measures that would accelerate the process of economic integration in the subregion; and

(f) make appropriate recommendations.

13. This report embodies the findings of the study team. It contains an analysis of recent trends in economic development and economic integration in West Africa and the role of IGOs in this process. It is clear from the report that, on the whole, the IGOs have not contributed as much as they could have to the process of integration. Consequently, there has been little or no progress towards creating a full-fledged economic union in West Africa as called for in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. Certainly the various economic groupings have not resulted in greater unity among their members; nor have they, in fact, stimulated economic growth and development in the respective member countries.

14. Many reasons are advanced in the report for this poor record. Among these are the multiplicity of IGOs and the inevitable overlap and duplication in their programmes and memberships, the limited resources available to them, the wrong priorities of the IGOs, and the externally oriented strategies of economic development pursued by them. The report has laid particular stress on the lack of effective co-ordination of the activities of the IGOs at each national level, and at the level of the IGOs themselves. There is a dire necessity for rebuilding the machinery of economic co-operation in West Africa. The present arrangements are fraught with a lot of frustrations, and are not likely to take the subregion far along the road to economic integration.

15. Incidentally, as if in response to the call in the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) for a re-doubling of efforts at sub regional economic co-operation, other subregions of the African continent are putting on their priority agenda programmes for re-furbishing their machineries of economic co-operation. The ECA since 1981, has been working for the revitalization of the principal intergovernmental organization in Central Africa, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC). An evaluation of UDEAC has been undertaken, and the recommendations of the ECA for reinforcing the organization have been examined by the four governments concerned - Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon. At their request, further studies are being undertaken to enable UDEAC play a more effective role in promoting the economic integration of the subregion.

16. Similarly, the countries of Eastern and Southern Africa are in the process of building one common organization for economic co-operation. On December 21, 1981, nine countries of the subregion signed the Treaty creating the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) at Lusaka, Zambia. Five more countries of the subregion have signed the Treaty, which is already in force. ECA is now concerned with helping the PTA secretariat get off the ground.

17. Thus it is high time West African countries examined critically their relatively long and somewhat varied experience in economic co-operation - to see why little progress has been made towards economic integration so far, and how things could be done differently in order to accelerate the process. We believe there is a lot in the present report that will assist the governments of the subregion in their reflections on these two vital issues.

(a) examine in the context of the West African political economy, the origins, evolution and objectives of the intergovernmental organizations in the subregion;

(b) attempt a classification of the IGOs according to their objectives and main areas of activities with a view to identifying specific programmes of action and to [illegible];

(c) determine the effectiveness of the IGOs in the promotion of subregional economic co-operation;

(d) carry out an analysis of forms and patterns of economic co-operation in the countries of the subregion;

(e) consider any new measures that would accelerate the process of economic integration in the subregion; and

(f) make appropriate recommendations.

13. This report embodies the findings of the study team. It contains an analysis of recent trends in economic development and economic integration in West Africa and the role of IGOs in this process. It is clear from the report that, on the whole, the IGOs, for several [illegible] reasons, they could have to the process of integration. Some suggest there has been little progress in regards to economic integration and economic union in West Africa as called for in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. Certainly the various economic groupings have not resulted in greater integration among their members, nor have they, in fact, stimulated economic growth and development in the respective member countries.

14. Many reasons are adduced in the report for the poor record. Among these are the multiplicity of IGOs and the inevitable overlap and duplication in their programmes and membership, the limited resources available to them, the over-ambitious objectives of the IGOs, and the externally oriented strategies of national development pursued by them. The report has also noted the areas in the relative [illegible] of the [illegible] of the IGOs, at each national level, rather than the level of the IGOs themselves. There is little capacity for ensuring the coordination of economic co-operation in West Africa. The present arrangements are thus beset with a lot of weaknesses and are not likely to offer a solution as far as the road to economic integration [illegible].

15. Incidentally, as if in response to the call in the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) for a re-doubling of efforts at sub-regional economic co-operation, a number of groups of the African countries are pulling on their priority agenda programmes for re-inforcing their mechanisms of economic co-operation. The ECA, since 1981, has been working for the rationalization of the IGOs and intergovernmental organizations in Central Africa, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC). An evaluation of UDEAC has been undertaken, and the recommendations of the ECA study on how the organization may have been examined by the four governments concerned – Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon. At their request, further studies are being undertaken to enable UDEAC play a more effective role in promoting the economic integration of the subregion.

16. Similarly, the countries of Eastern and Southern Africa saw in the needs of building one common organization for economic co-operation. On December 21, 1981, nine countries of the subregion signed the Treaty creating the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) at Lusaka, Zambia. Five more countries of the subregion have signed the Treaty which is already in force and it is now concerned with setting up the PTA secretariat of the council.

17. Thus it is high time West African countries examined critically their relatively long and inconclusive experience in economic co-operation. The progress made so far in the process has been made towards economic integration and how things could be done differently in order to speed up the process. We believe there is a lot in the present report that will assist the governments of the subregion in their reflections on these two vital issues.

CHAPTER II

THE CURRENT STATE OF WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIES

I. The Economic Crisis in West Africa

18. The decade of the sixties was not particularly brilliant from the point of view of the economic performance of West African countries, but, at least in most of them economic growth rates kept up with the increase in population. Ten of the countries had average annual GDP growth rates of nearly 3.0 per cent or more with Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, Ivory Coast and Togo having average annual GDP growth rates of 4.3 per cent, 5.1 per cent, 5.4 per cent, 8.0 per cent, and 8.5 per cent respectively.

19. In contrast, the seventies have been a decade of unrelenting crisis for the economies of the subregion The main manifestation has been the tapering off of economic expansion in virtually all the countries. Some have actually witnessed dramatic decline in per capita output. This is the case with at least 10 out of the 16 countries of the subregion. These have recorded negative average annual per capita income growth rates over the last half of the decade. The exceptions - Cape Verde, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria and Togo - are rather notable for the very special circumstances of their relatively better performance.

20. The crisis has hit hardest the primary and secondary sectors. Since virtually all the countries of the subregion are dependent on the primary sectors as the main earners of foreign exchange, this has had a dramatic impact not only on the balance of payments and external indebtedness, but also on all the productive sectors as well. Unemployment, including that of skilled manpower, is everywhere a major problem despite the expansion of the tertiary sectors, the 'informal' sectors and the attempts by governments to keep unemployment within manageable limits by rapidly expanding public services and maintaining overmanning in most parastatals.

21. The crisis has also played havoc with public finances. Huge and rising deficits are a major and continuing feature of government accounts. Since most governments are dependent on indirect taxes (on exports and imports) as the main source of revenue, the stagnation in the export sectors and the consequent decline in import capacity coupled with the rigidity downwards of governmental expenditure (especially in times of crisis) has made it impossible to balance government budgets. This not only feeds the inflationary process but puts even more pressure on the already over-valued national currencies. Except for the countries of the CFA zone, there is in every country of the subregion, a brisk parallel market for foreign currency, attesting to the inability of governments to defend the official rates of national currencies, in the wake of stagnation of the export sectors and rapid domestic inflation. The existence of these parallel markets has further worsened the economic situation as more and more trade is carried on through unofficial channels leading to loss of taxes on exports as well as imports.

22. From all indications, the present crisis does in part attest to the failure of economic management policies, but it also has deep, fundamental roots related to the role of the economies of the subregion in the international division of labour.

23. What is striking about the economies of the subregion, is that virtually *all* the countries thrive on exports of primary commodities to the developed market economies. In most countries, with the exception of Niger and Nigeria, the export sectors are dominated by agricultural commodities such as cocoa, coffee and timber as in the case of Ghana, Ivory Coast, Benin and Togo. Basic foodstuffs such as ground-

nuts are exported in large quantities by Gambia and Senegal which also thrive substantially on tourism and fishing. Niger's foreign trade sector is dominated by the exports of uranium which contributes about 80% of export earnings. Minerals such as gold, diamonds, bauxite and iron ore are also exported in significant quantities by Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana and Liberia. Nigeria's foreign trade sector is dominated by the export of petroleum.

24. The market structure of the export sectors is worthy of attention. The marketing of export crops is, almost everywhere, understandably, monopolized by state trading organizations, since this is the lifeline of the government, the source of government revenues. In colonial times, state control (monopoly) of the export sector was a means of surplus extraction. In post colonial times it is still largely the case: agriculture still contributes to accumulation in the subregion. There are, however, emerging aberrations. In some countries, given overvalued currencies, downward trend in commodity prices, rapid domestic inflation and the resulting downward trend in producers' earnings, governments increasingly find themselves subsidizing the export sectors.

25. Mining and the nascent industrial sectors (which thrive on imported inputs to produce consumer goods) are dominated by transnational corporations working hand in hand with transnational banks, thereby ensuring massive capital outflows. Added to this is the emergence and consolidation of the commercial classes in the subregion, who contribute marginally in agriculture and construction, but for the most part are engaged in the tertiary sectors-real estate, transport and distribution - either in their own right or, more often, as agents of foreign capital. It is this class (not necessairly indigenous) which through its links with the state, gets conferred import licences for a whole variety of goods - consumer goods, including footdstuffs which the subregion finds itself increasingly obliged to import, intermediate and capital goods - and obtains contracts for construction as well as bank loans for housing. Given overvalued currencies as the general phenomenon in the subregion, this class plays a major role in capital flight and currency manipulations and frustrates all attempts by the states to control prices.

26. Given the fundamental nature of the crisis, therefore, it is obvious that it cannot be solved by the preferred IMF-World Bank policies of fiscal and monetary measures. Devaluations coupled with elimination of government subsidies on basic consumer items may make export sectors seemingly more viable but would inevitably make it more difficult to protect the standard of living of the majority of the people. Elimination of state monopolies in the marketing of export crops may make marketing more 'efficient', but by itself it offers no protection to the producers of export crops while making taxation difficult if not impossible.

27. Such basically short-term measures to cope with immediate crisis balance-of-payments and budgetary deficits - will have a lasting impact only if they are accompanied by other measures which address themselves to the more basic and fundamental issues. Among these are:

(a) Greater, not less, national control over the external sector to make it respond to the needs of internal economic transformation. This is the very antithesis of liberalization of export and import marketing structures;

(b) A frontal attack on the problem of economic dependence, that is, national control over mineral resources and their rate of exploitation, and over industry. This would require *inter alia* control and direction of the activities of transnationals with a view to reducing outflows of capital. It will also be necessary to supervise very closely the operations of the commercial sector;

(c) A remodeling of the socio-economic incentive system so as to favour directly productive activities. In this regard, there is every need for an industrialization strategy which responds to needs for the modernization of agriculture and other productive sectors;

(d) Evidently, the restructuring of the economies of the subregion cannot be successfully done at the level of each country in isolation, but would require greater, not less, co-operation at the subregional level. This idea is developed further in subsequent chapters of this Report.

II. The State of Economic Co-operation in West Africa

28. Preoccupation of governments with short-term economic management policies may make it difficult for them to appreciate the gains from economic co-operation at the subregional level. Yet, this is

the only effective way of tackling the problems of distorted development and socio-economic dependence. Even during the mission there were dramatic indications of failure to grasp the imperative need for inter-state co-operation. Some countries, for example, have closed their borders to all terrestrial transport; others are concentrating on inward-looking economic policies to the exclusion of 'foreigners' from neighbouring territories.

29. In discussions with some officials in some states of the subregion, some misapprehension was expressed concerning the uncontrolled and uncontrollable exports of livestocks and unprocessed agricultural commodities especially local foods to neighbouring countries. This is in spite of the fact that ECOWAS trade protocol agreements call for free movement of such commodities. The expressed misapprehensions were understandable. Stagnation of agriculture, leading to the inability of most states to control local food prices, increasing resort to imports of food, further worsening the balance-of-payments, have obliged most states to resort to micro-nationalism in the area of food self-sufficiency. To this end, a whole array of instruments are brought to bear:subsidies to agricultural inputs, national grain storage programmes, coupled with producer price policies and control of local food prices. Further, these policies are not harmonized, thus creating conditions or possibilities for some countries to solve their food problems at the expense of their immediate neighbours.

30. The opinion was expressed in more than one country, that given the stagnation of the productive sectors of the subregion it was useless to emphasize trade liberalization when 'most countries of the subregion have nothing to trade with anyway'. The task ahead, according to the proponents of this view, is to emphasize production at the national level and joint production at the subregional level whenever economies of scale or the size of the necessary Resources needed to be mobilized for a given project necessitate co-operation between two or more countries. We address ourselves to this issue later in the Report.

31. The current economic crisis being faced by virtually all the countries of the subregion weakens efforts for the promotion of inter-state co-operation. Disarray in public finances and balance of-payments problems make it increasingly difficult for member states to honour their obligations to the functioning of the secretariats of the IGOs which are charged with the promotion of regional integration, or to provide the means to the national organs charged with the implementation of protocols, for example, the immigration and customs departments. Differing balance-o-fpayments difficulties, differing pressures on the national currencies as well as differing gaps between the official and the parallel market rates for foreign currencies, provide an atmosphere *not* for economically rational exchange of commodities but rather for smuggling, currency speculation and trade manipulations. Even for the financing of subregional projects (in the areas of transportation, telecommunications etc.) the countries increasingly (not to say exclusively) have to resort to external financing, thereby increasing their dependency.

32. On the other hand, the fact of the crisis, the inability of most states to meet their financial obligations to the various inter-governmental Organisations (IGOs) and economic compensation schemes, has obliged a number of countries of the subregion to critically evaluate their participation in the IGOs. This may have positive aspects. Such evaluation could have a positive effect if, as a result, the proliferation of IGOs and duplication in their activities are arrested. Secondly, the crisis has put on the agenda - more forcefully than ever - the need to closely examine the criteria for definition of indigenous or community enterprises in order to avoid states being called upon to subsidize enterprises (under trade liberalization and compensation schemes) which are local or indigenous only in name. Finally, the crisis has also obliged member states to put on the agenda, the need for the search for forms of co-operation which are more likely to enhance the process of socio-economic development and collective self-reliance in the subregion as opposed to co-operation agreements which are mainly expressions of political will or solidarity. It is no exaggeration that it is becoming increasingly realized in the subregion that economic co-operation leading to eventual integration is primordial if the countries of the subregion, individually and collectively, are to reduce their external dependence and at the same time embark on the process of transformation necessary for the creation of autonomous self-reliant economies. Subsequent chapters of the Report deal more exhaustively with this point, and attempt to chart a programme for the future.

the only effective way of tackling the problems of distorted development and socio-economic dependence. Even during the mission there were dramatic indications of failure to grasp the imperative need for inter-state co-operation. Some countries, for example, have closed their borders to all commercial transport, others are concentrating on inward-looking economic policies to the exclusion of imports from neighbouring territories.

29. In discussions with some officials in some states of the subregion, some grave reservations were expressed concerning the unco-ordinated and uncontrollable export of livestocks and other basic agricultural commodities especially local foods to neighbouring countries. This is in spite of the fact that ECOWAS trade protocol agreements call for free movement of such commodities. The expressed misgivings however were understandable. Stagnation of agriculture, leading to the inability of most states to control local food prices, increasing resort to imports of food, further worsening the balance-of-payments, have obliged most states to resort to micro-approaches in the area of food self-sufficiency. For this, a whole array of instruments are brought to bear including farm subsidies, national green revolution programmes, coupled with producer price policies and control of local food prices. However, these policies are not harmonized, thus creating conflicting possibilities for some countries to solve their food problems at the expense of their immediate neighbours.

30. The opinion was expressed in more than one country that given the structure of the productive sectors of the subregion it was useless to talk of trade liberalization unless the first priorities of the subregion were not to make some progress. The task ahead, according to the proponents of this view, is to emphasize production at the national level and joint production at the subregional level where ever economies of scale or the size of the necessary resources needed to be mobilized for a given project make such inter-state co-operation between two or more countries. We address ourselves to this issue later in the Report.

31. The current economic crisis being faced by virtually all the countries of the subregion weakens efforts for the promotion of inter-state co-operation. The lack of funds and severe balance-of-payments problems make it increasingly difficult for member states to honour their obligations to the functioning of the secretariats of the IGOs which are charged with the promotion of regional integration, or to provide the means to the national organs charged with the implementation of protocols, for example, the immigration and customs departments. Diverging balance-of-payments situations, differing policies on the national currencies as well as differing gaps between the official and the parallel market rates for foreign currencies, provide an atmosphere not for complementary regional exchanges of commodities, but rather for smuggling. Currency speculation and trade restrictions even the execution of subregional projects (in the areas of transportation, telecommunications, etc.) for example, increasingly (but by no means exclusively) have to resort to external financing, thereby increasing their dependence.

32. On the other hand, the fact of the crisis, the inability of most states to meet their financial obligations to the various Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs), and their own compensation schemes, has obliged a number of countries of the subregion to critically evaluate their participation in the IGOs. This may have positive effects. Such evaluation could have a positive effect if, as a result, the proliferation of IGOs and duplication in their activities was stemmed. Secondly, the crisis has brought to the notice – more forcefully than ever – the need to eliminate waste in the efforts and efficiency of programmes of community enterprises, in order to avoid states being asked to make substantial contributions to other (trade liberalization and compensation schemes) which are local or short-term only in nature. Finally, the crisis has also obliged member states to put on the agenda, the need for the search for forms of co-operation that are more likely to enhance the level of self-reliant development and collective self-reliance in the subregion as opposed to co-operation schemes which are mainly exercises in political diplomacy. It is no exaggeration that it is becoming increasingly evident to the subregion that economic co-operation leading to eventual integration is essential if the economies of the subregion, individually and collectively, are to reduce their external dependence and at the same time address the issue of transformation necessary for the creation of self-sustained, self-reliant, economies. Subsequent chapters of the Report deal more exhaustively with this point, and attempt to chart a programme for the future.

CHAPTER III

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN WEST AFRICA

33. Attempts at regional co-operation in West Africa are not new; they date back to the years immediately preceding the achievement of independence in the early 1960s. Initially, there were two schools of thought as to how co-operation should be promoted. On the one hand, there were the advocates of immediate political unification, entailing the full surrender of sovereignty to a new central entity. Opposed to this were the advocates of gradualist functional co-operation, which may lead to a merging of sovereignty at some distant date. With the collapse of the Mali Federation in 1960 and the failure of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union to get off the ground, it became obvious by 1963 that only incremental functional co-operation had a chance of succeeding in West Africa.

34. Functional co-operation in West Africa has taken a multiplicity of forms, ranging from bilateral arrangements on specific projects to multilateral multi-purpose organizations. If the Nigeria-Benin cement project stands at one end of the continuum characterized by only two states co-operating on one very specific projects, ECOWAS stands at the other extreme, embracing all the sixteen states in West Africa and having as its task the promotion of co-operation in all economic sectors. While bilateral arrangements of the Nigeria-Benin type are numerous and important, the main agencies for promoting economic integration in West Africa are intergovernmental organizations, (IGOs).

35. IGOs are distinguished from most bilateral arrangements by the existence of formal and permanent structures for adopting and implementing decisions. The organizational format of West African IGOs is essentially the same. The main policy organ is usually a Council of Heads of State or a Council of Ministers though some IGOs have both of these organs. A Committee of Experts responsible for making recommendations to the Heads of State and/or Council of Ministers is to be found in all West African IGOs. Finally, there is the Secretariat which functions as the executing agency of the IGO.

36. In spite of the similarities of the organizational structures of West African IGOs, there are major differences in the motives that led to their creation, their membership composition, the ultimate objectives they are designed to achieve, and in the specific tasks that they undertake. It is these differences that make the map of West African IGOs a very complex one. The result is lack of co-ordination of efforts and, in the absence of any central co-ordinating organ for all the IGOs, the absence of a workable integrated strategy for economic integration in West Africa. The end result is a waste in the use of resources and a slow-down in the process of economic development and integration.

37. An examination of the discussions and events preceeding the establishment of IGOs in West Africa provides evidence that the actors involved had several motives in mind. Five such motives can be identified. They are (a) belief in African Unity; (b) the importance of maintaining and consolidating previous ties; (c) diplomatic and security considerations; (d) size constraint and the requirement of 'development'; and (e) the desire to secure foreign aid for development. It must be made immediately clear that with respect to almost all IGOs, several motives were usually present. Secondly the motives were hardly ever the same for all the members. Finally, the motives for the actors and therefore the combination and ranking of motives within the organization have tended to change over time, due to changes in membership or in the situation prevailing at the time the IGO was created.

38. With multiplcity and variety of motives, difference in motives among the participants and even changes in motives over time, the IGOs are indeed complex instruments of co-operation in West Africa. Few of them have developed a consistent central thrust or orientation and the result of their operations at the subregional level is disparate, inchoate and unco-ordinated strategies for economic co-operation.

39. One motive that influenced the creation of almost all the West African IGOs is the belief in African Unity which has its origins in the Pan-African Movement. The feeling was that it was through Pan-African unity that self-reliant and self-sustaining development could be achieved, and, hence, delinking from old colonial ties and excessive dependence on metropolitan countries. But because of differences in political and economic arrangements, lack of adequate transport links, a second strategy, that of cooperation within a rather limited scope, was considered more realistic. The motive to achieve an accelerated level of development through co-operation among particular groups of countries, was present in virtually all the West African IGOs.

40. A second motive that led to the establishment of the IGOs is the realization that the economies of all West African states are underdeveloped, that almost all of them are too small in size to be able to develop the broad range of complex industries that characterize a modern economy, and that they therefore need to co-operate if they are to emerge from the situation of underdevelopment. This motive was central in the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the *Communaute economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), the Mano River Union, river basin oranganizations such as the Niger Basin Authority, the *Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Senegal* (OMVS), regional development groupings like the Authority for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gourma Region, and the numerous functionally specific intergovernmental organizations like the African Groundnut Council, the *Organisation Commune de lutte antiacridienne et de lutte antiaviaire* (OCLALAV), the *Organisation de coordination et de cooperation pour la lutte contre les grandes endémies* (OCCCGE), and the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA). Considerations of size and development needs were also the determining factors in the creation of monetary and financial institutions like the West African Clearing House and the *Banque Ouest-Africaine de developpement* (BOAD).

41. If considerations of size and development needs have influenced the creation of IGOs, they have not resulted in any coherence of motives or orientation within and among the IGOs. The truth is that while all African countries are underdeveloped, some are economically better-off than others. This fact has resulted in conflicts over the distribution of possible economic gains from economic co-operation within the organizations. Again, given difference in size, factor endowments, and economic prosperity, some countries feel the need to co-operate less than others. Similarly, there is no common ground on the strategy for economic development. For some, econoomic development entails a radical restructuring of the economies, a sharp reduction in external dependency, a reorientation of the economy towards internal resources and needs, redistributive policies at home, and the strengthening of the role of the public sector in the domestic economy. Others, however, have continued to pursue a growth strategy led by the export sector and dependent on direct foreign investments. In sum, the motive of size and development needs, rather than being a force for cohesion and coherence within and among West African IGOs, has often been a factor for divergence and disunity.

42. Related to this last motive is the desire to secure foreign aid for development. Substantial amounts of funds and technical assistance went to the developing countries in the 1960's and early 1970's in the form of aid for development from the United States and Canada, Europe, the Commonwealth, and particularly the agencies of the United Nations. Research and service-oriented IGOs (some of which like OCLALAV, CIEH, emerged straight from the recent colonial past) were recipients of such assistance. As a Minister indicated to us during this mission, it was expedient in the era to join IGOs precisely because, through them, directly or indirectly, one might be able to secure necessary additional funds for development. An IGO was in this context simply a collective vehicle for securing foreign aid. On the other hand, the anxiety not to be left out of what might turn out to be a viable means of securing assistance led countries to join as many IGOs as they considered expedient for their needs. A cost-benefit analysis hardly ever entered into the calculation.

43. It is noteworthy too that some international organizations dierctly sponsored or fomented the creation of many an IGO, to direct world attention to particular areas of dire needs and consequently secure assistance. Three outstanding examples of such organizations are the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), the Authority for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gourma Region, and the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA).

44. Interestingly, most of the technical and service-oriented IGOs in West Africa are fairly heavily dependent on external donors for the funding of their research or service programmes. If one may judge by the records of members States' contributions to these organizations, it is evident that many countries still see IGOs from the perception of receiving aid, rarely as vehicles for collective self-reliance. It is a perception which has ominous implications for the effective operation of the IGOs themselves.

45. The fourth motive takes the form of attachment to previous ties (either traditional or colonial), and the desire to maintain and reinforce them. Often, it is more latent than manifest, but this fact does not reduce its significance. The close traditional ties between the Senegalese and the Gambians have enhanced the coming together in economic co-operation of Senegal and the Gambia - in spite of an obvious language barrier erected by colonial rule. Similarly the strength of Mano River Union derives partly from the similarities in the history of the founding of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and, more importantly, from the traditional ties and substantive movements of peoples in the region now broken in to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory Coast.

46. Ties derived from colonial rule have been particularly important. The fact that the French-speaking countries of West Africa were joined together in the Federation of French West Africa clearly played a vital role in the establishment of the *Union Douanière de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (UDAO) which became the *Union Douanière des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (UDEAO) in 1966 and the *Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO) in 1972. Attachment to ties derived from colonial rule also influenced the creation of the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (UAM) in 1961 which later became the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (OCAM) in 1966 and still more recently the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne* (OCAM), most of whose members are former French colonies. Equally, this motive is present in the case of the functionally specific organizations embracing French-speaking West African countries, such as the *Union Monétaire Ouest-Africaine* (UMOA), OCLALAV, OCCGE, and the *Comite inter-Africain des Etudes Hydrauliques* (CIEH). In fact, most of the functional areas now being handled by these organizations were formerly the responsibility of the French Union, the French Community, or the Federation of French West Africa. Lastly the creation of river basin organizations, such as the present OMVS, was influenced by this motive as plans for the development of these river basins date back to colonial rule.

47. Two things need to be said about this motive. The first is that being restrictive, it is more defensive in nature, serving as a unifying element against those who are not regarded as members of the group. However, because the group itself is usually heterogeneous, it is fragmented within and cannot play a dynamic and positive role in advancing the economic integration of its members. Secondly, with the passage of time and the emergence of a new generation of leadership, ties that derive from colonial rule are becoming less salient. Urbanization and the mobility of persons at the sub-regional level are also likely to undermine the importance of ethnic ties.

48. The last motive relates to diplomatic and security considerations. It is the usual motive of countries wanting to group together in order to augment their diplomatic influence, or in order to assist each other in defending themselves against threats to their national sovereighty or internal stability. This consideration was clearly upper-most in the minds of many actors when the UAM was created in 1961 and OCAM in 1966. It was also highly salient in the establishment of the *Conseil de l'Entente* in 1959, which was seen as an alternative and counter-weight to the Mali Federation and a mechanism for maintaining and reinforcing the leadership of Ivory Coast in French-speaking West Africa.

49. With the creation of the OAU in 1963, and with a decrease in perceived threats to sovereignty and internal stability in the late sixties and early seventies, diplomatic and security considerations become increasingly less important for many West African countries. As a result, organizations, such as OCAM and the *Conseil de l'Entente* began giving more importance and attention to problems of economic development, although the earlier diplomatic and security considerations have not completely disappeared. The coexistence of the previous political motives and the more recent economic ones in these organizations has brought about dissipation of efforts and limited accomplishments. Further, since they are rather exclusive in their memberships, they tend to constitute pockets of special interests, and, to this extent, hinder the promotion of subregional economic co-operation.

50. It is evident from what has been said that the motive that led to the creation of West African IGOs are multifarious and divergent. To say the least, the multiplicity and divergence of motives have not

helped the cause of economic co-operation in West Africa. Economic, cultural and political motives may not always be compatible; yet there are organizations in West Africa that do harbour such disharmonies. In order to accelerate the process of integration at the sub-regional level, a greater harmony of motives is clearly indispensable. It is also equally evident that only motives related to development needs can provide the necessary thrust for economic co-operation.

51. Given the multiplicity and complexity in the motives that led to the establishment of West African IGOs, the inevitable result has been a proliferation of IGOs, with different members and some over-lap in membership, with some countries belonging to many IGOs. Table 1.1 demonstrates these points. The table is derived in large part from the Directory of West African intergovernmental Organizations compiled by the ECA MULPOC for West Africa based in Niamey.

Table 3.1 - Date of creation and composition of West African Intergovernmental Organizations.

	8 Organization	Date of Creation	Tot. No. of memb.	No. of memb. from W/Africa	Members
A.	*Multilateral IGOs Whose members are exclusively from West Africa*				
1.	Council of understanding	1959	5	5	Benin, Ivory Coast. Niger, Togo Upper Volta
2.	Organisation for co-ordination and co-operation in the Fight Against Endemic Disease (OCCGE)	1960	8	8	Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta.
3.	Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)	1962	6	6	Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta
4.	Authority for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gourma Region	1970	3	3	Mali, Niger, Upper Volta
5.	Economic Community for Livestock and Meat CEBV	1970	5	5	Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta
6.	West African Rice Development Association (WARDA)	1970	14	14	Benin, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta

	Organization	Date of Creation	Tot. No. of memb.	No. of memb. from W/Africa	Members Members
7.	Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO)	1972 (but dates back to the UDAO created in 1960)	6	6	Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta
8.	Organisation for the development of the Senegal River (OMVG)	1972 (but dates back to the OERS)	3	3	Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
9.	West African Development Bank (BOAD)	1972	6	6	Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta
10.	West African Health Community (WAHC)	1972	6	6	Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberi Nigeria, Sierra Leone
11.	Mano River Union (MRU)	1973	3	3	Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone
12.	West African Monetary Union (UMOA)	1973	6	ù	Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta
13.	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	1975	16	16	Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia' Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau' Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta
14.	West African Clearing House (1975)	1975	15	15	Central Banks of all six BCEAO countries, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone
15.	Organization for the Development of the Gambia River (OMVG)	1978	3	3	Gambia, Guinea, Senegal
B.	*Bilateral IGOS with members exclusively from West Africa*				
16.	Benin and Niger Common Organization for Railways and Transport (OCBN)	1959	2	2	Benin and Niger
17.	Senegambia Permanent Secretariat	1967	2	2	Gambia and Senegal
18.	Electricity Community of Benin (CEB) *with half or more of their members from West Africa*	1970	2	2	Benin and Togo

	Organization	Date of Creation	Tot. No of memb.	No. of Memb. from W/Africa	Members
20.	International Organization Against the African Migratory Locust (OICMA)	1952	17	11	Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, S/Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Uganda, Zaire.
21.	Agency for Air Transport Security in Africa (ASECNA)	1959	14	8	Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Madagascar.
22.	Inter-State Committee for Water Studies (CIEH)	1960	12	8	Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon.
23.	Cocoa Producers Alliance	1962	7	4	Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon,
24.	African Groundnut Council (AGC)	1964	7	6	Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Upper Volta, Sudan
25.	Lake Chad Commission	1964	4	2	Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad.
26.	Common Organization for the Fight Against Locust and Fowl Pests (OCLALAV)	1965	10	8	Benin, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Chad.
27.	African and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)	1966 (but dates back to UAM created in 1961)	9	6	Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Mauritius, Rwanda.
28.	African Society for the Development of Millet and Sorghum-based Food (SADIAMIL)	1972	5	4	Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Sudan
29.	Inter-State Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS)	1973	8	7	Cape Verde, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Chad.
30.	Niger Basin Authority (NBA)	1980 (but goes back to the Niger Basin Commission Created in 1963)	8	7	Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Cameroon.

D.	*Multilateral IGOS with many members from West Africa and with their Headquarters in West Africa*				
31.	African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education (CAMES)	1968	17	7	Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Zaire.
32.	African Solidarity Fund	1976	16	7	Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, France, Gabon, Mauritius, Rwanda, Zaire.

52. It should be immediately pointed out that the above list of West African IGOs is far from complete. The list will be substantially longer if bilateral arrangements with no permanent fixed structures such as the Nigeria-Benin Commission and the Nigeria-Ghana Commission, and multilateral or bilateral projects such as the Cement Project (CIMAO) among Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo and the Cement and Sugar Projects between Nigeria and Benin are included, all of which are important in the process of sub-regional economic integration. Nonetheless, the above table on West African IGOs lends itself to several conclusions.

53. The first conclusion one may be tempted to draw is that there are too many IGOs in West Africa. Indeed, it is true that there are more IGOs in West Africa than in any other sub-region in Africa or perhaps in the world for that matter. But one must be cautious here. The list is certailny long, but there is no way of determining how many IGOs are sufficient for West Africa. What one can say with a reasonable degree of confidence is that given the existence of this many IGOs, the fact of their overlapping memberships and objectives, the fact that they were created at different points in time with some dating back to the fifties (ASECNA, Council of the Entente, OICMA) and others dating back to the second half of the seventies (African Solidarity Fund, ECOWAS, OMVG, WACH), and the fact that there is no over-all policy or mechanism for ensuring that their activities are harmonious and co-ordinated, prevent these organizations rom reinforcing one another or advancing the process of development and sub-regional economic integration.

54. It is also clear from the above table that the West African IGOs have different memberships, some of which are in other sub-regions and even in other regions of the world. The presence of non - West African countries in these IGOs is certainly a complicating factor in that they have to take into account the objectives of the non-sub-regional members and cannot devote their energies and adapt their policies towards meeting the exclusive needs of the sub-region. Further, it is more difficult for these organizations to co-ordinate their activities with other IGOs in the sub-region.

55. In subsequent pages, it will be shown that many West African IGOs engage in activities in the same or closely related sectors. This is sometimes implicit in their names. Table 3.2 highlights the complexity of the West African integrationist scene.

Table 3.2

Organization	Benin	Cape Verde	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Gninea Bissau	Ivory Coast	Liberia	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Siera Leone	Togo	Upper Volta
African Groundnut Council			X						X		X	X	X			X
CAMES	X						X		X		X		X		X	X
OCAM	X						X		X		X		X		X	X
SADIAMIL									X	X	X					X
African Solidarity Fund	X						X		X		X		X		X	X
ASECNA	X						X		X	X	X		X		X	X
LIPTAKO-GOURMA Authority									X		X					X
OCBN	X										X					
BCEAO	X						X				X		X		X	X
Cocoa Producers Alliance				X			X		X						X	
OCLALAV	X		X				X		X	X	X		X			X
Council of Understanding	X						X				X				X	X
CEBV	X						X				X				X	X
CEAO							X		X	X	X		X			X
ECOWAS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CEB	X														X	
CIEH	X						X		X	X	X		X		X	X
OICMA			X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CILSS		X	X						X	X	X		X			X
Lake Chad Basin Commission											X	X				
Mano River Union					X			X						X		
Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for co-operation											X	X				
OCCGE	X						X		X	X	X		X			
OMVG			X		X								X			
OMVS									X	X			X			
Niger Basin Authority	X				X		X		X		X	X				X
Senegambia Permanent Secretariat			X										X			
West African Clearing House	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BOAD	X						X				X				X	X
WAHC			X	X	X			X			X	X		X		
UMOA	X						X				X		X		X	X
WARDA	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Total	18	2	10	5	6	3	19	5	17	12	25	10	20	6	17	22

56. From Table 3.2, the following ranking of membership by West African countries in IGOs emerges:

Niger	—	25
Upper Volta	—	22
Senegal	—	20
Ivory Coast	—	19
Benin	—	18
Mali	—	17
Togo	—	17
Mauritania	—	12
Gambia	—	10
Nigeria	—	10
Guinea	—	7
Sierra Leone	—	6
Ghana	—	5
Liberia	—	5
Guinea-Bissau	—	3
Cape Verde	—	2

The picture that emerges from the table is indeed striking. First, the range in membership in IGOs is very wide indeed, from the high of 25 in the case of Niger to a low of 2 in the case of Cape Verde. Secondly, the former Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau could hardly be said to be part of the web of West Africans IGOs. Thirdly, it is striking to note that with the exception of Guinea, the former French colonies in West Africa belong to significantly more West African IGOs than other West African countries.

57. The difference between English and French-speaking West African countries becomes even sharper when we note that of the 32 West African IGOs analyzed above, the membership of 17 is made up exclusively of French-speaking countries. These are CAMES, OCAM, SADIAMIL, African Solidarity Fund, ASECNA, Liptako-Gourma Authority, OCBN, BCEAO, Council of Understanding, CEBV, CEAO, CEB, CIEH, OCCGE, OMVS, BOAD, and UMOA. This situation is partly a result of the geographical contiguity among the French-speaking countries. It is also a reflection of the greater unity among the French-speaking countries during colonial rule and their desire to maintain many of their previous ties. It is worth noting, however, that the existence of so many West African IGOs which draw their membership from only one linguistic group cannot but be a hindrance to economic integration at the sub-regional level. Almost invariably, these IGOs would tend to reinforce the linguistic division among West African countries. If economic integration is to be achieved in West Africa, it will clearly be necessary for the membership of at least some of these IGOs to be expanded to include all or most of the countries in the sub-region. There is no reason why organizations such as CEBV, CIEH, and OCCGE for example, which deal with functions that can most effectively to be tackled on a sub-regional basis, should have their membership limited to one linguistic group.

58. A final point that needs to be made with respect to Table 1.2 relates to the imperative of co-ordinating the activities of these IGOs. It has already been noted that many of them operate in the same or related sectors. It has also been shown that many countries belong to many IGOs with over-lapping activities. The fact has also emerged that seven or nearly half of the countries in West Africa belong to seventeen or more of the thirty two West African IGOs. It is also the case that five of these seven countries are among the poorest countries in the sub-region. Such a high incidence of membership in IGOs cannot but impose enormous human and financial burdens on these countries. Moreover, in order to ensure that the activities of these IGOs at the national level are coherent and fit into the over-all national objectives, tremendous efforts will have to be made at the national level to co-ordinate national policies *vis-a-vis* those of the IGOs. Such co-ordination has not in fact been taking place at the national level in most countries of West Africa.

59. In sum, then, in order to reduce the human and financial burdens that derive from membership in many IGOs by West African states, to ensure that the IGOs adopt policies that are consonant with national objectives, and to simplify the task of co-ordinating the policies of the IGOs at the sub-regional level, a great deal of stream-lining in the number and linkages among West African IGOs is necessary. This kind of stream-lining will undoubtedly contribute towards the acceleration of the process of development and economic integration in West Africa.

III. Typology, Programmes, and Integration Strategy

60. If the divergent motives that have underlain the establishment of the IGOs and their composition have hindered the process of economic co-operation in West Africa, the tasks that have generally been assigned to them, and the strategies of co-operation that they have sometimes adopted have not helped matters.

61. There are several ways of classifying inter-governmental organizations, depending on the objective one has in mind. Our basic concern is with the compatibility or lack of compatibility in their activities. Accordingly, the most useful criterion of classification is the ultimate goal of the IGO, and hence we have the following classifications. First, there are those organizations we have chosen to refer to as Economic Communities whose aim is the establishment of an economic union characterized by a free trade area, a customs union, free mobility of factors of production, and the harmonization of policies in almost all economic sectors. Second, there are the developmental organs whose objective is the harmonization of policies in several economic sectors, such as agriculture, transport and power. The ultimate goal however falls short of a full economic union as defined above. There are also those IGOs whose activities are limited to the co-ordination of policies in one specific sector or project. We have chosen to refer to these as technical and services organizations. Then, there are the monetary and financial institutions. In a sense, they too are technical and services organizations, but we prefer to group them together for purpose of analysis in a later chapter. Finally there are the professional and quasi-professional bodies with sub-regional outlook and orientation. Strictly, these are not IGOs, although they have a useful role to play in promoting economic co-operation in the sub-region. That role will be discussed in a later chapter.

62. In West Africa, three organizations are Economic Communities. They are ECOWAS, CEAO, and the Mano River Union. IGOs that are developmental organs are the river and lake basin IGOs (Niger Basin Authority, OMVS, OMVG, and the Lake Chad Basin Commission), multilateral and multifunctional organizations such as CILSS, the Authority for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gourma Region, the Council of Understanding, and bilateral organizations like the Senegambia Permanent Secretariat, the Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation and the many other bilateral commissions existing in West Africa. Notable among the technical and services organizations are WARDA, CAMES, CIEH, OCCGE, ASECNA, African Groundnut Council, OICMA, OCLALAV. Financial and Monetary institutions are CEAM, the West African Clearing House, BOAD, ECOWAS Fund, FOSIDEC (CEAO Fund), OCAM Fund, Council of Understanding Fund, African Solidarity Fund, African Development Bank. The professional and quasi-professional bodies we would discuss later, are the West African Chamber of Commerce, the West African Health Community, and the West African Economic Association.

63. A major weakness in the coexistence of these types of IGOs in West Africa is that their activities tend to over-lap and are not co-ordinated. The technical IGOs undertake projects for which the economic communities and the developmental organs also have mandates. The same observation can be made in respect of the developmental organs *vis-a-vis* the economic communities. A situation in which every one is active in the areas in which others are also active cannot but result in some duplication of efforts and an uneconomic use of scarce human and financial resources. Such a situation cannot but hinder the process of development and economic integraion at the subregional level. Although Table 3.3 may tend to overdramatize the point, it reflects the situation in which many IGOs are engaged in diverse aspects of economic developmentwithout any serious attempt at co-ordination.Their efforts, as we found in the field, are not exactly duplicative, since each IGO has its own jurisdiction. But the necessity for co-ordination of efforts is evident enough from the table. How such co-ordination could be effected would be taken up in chapter 6 of this Report.

Tagle 3.3: Sectors in which West African IGOs have Programmes

Sector	IGOs with activities in this sector
Agriculture	African Groundnut Council, OCAM, SADIAMIL, Liptako-Gourma Authority, Cocoa Producers Alliance, OCLALAV, CEBV, CEAO, ECOWAS, OICMA, CILSS, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mano River Union, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia Permanent Secretariat, WARDA (Total = 19)

Natural Resources	OCAM, Liptako-Gourma Authority, CEAO, ECOWAS, CIEH, CILSS, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mano River Union, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation, OCLALAV, OCCGE, OICMA, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia Permanent Secretariat (Total = 16)
Industry	OCAM, SADIAMIL, Council of Understanding, CEAO, ECOWAS, CEB, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Liptako-Gourma Authority, Mano River Union, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia Permanent Secretariat (Total = 14)
Transport and Communication	ASECNA, Liptako-Gourma Authority, OCBN, CEAO, ECOWAS, Mano River Union, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia Permanent Secretariat. (Total = 12)
Manpower Development	CAMES, CEAO, ECOWAS, CILSS, Mano River Union, OCAM, OCCGE, WAHC, WARDA (Total = 9)
Trade Liberalization and Customs Union	CEAO, ECOWAS, Mano River Union (Total = 3)
Finance	OCAM, African Solidarity Fund, Council of Understanding, CEAO ECOWAS, BOAD (Total = 6)
Money	BCEAO, WACH, UMOA (Total = 3)

64. Table 3.3 brings out the fact that in every sector of the economy, several IGOs are active. In agriculture for example, there are 19 West African IGOs with projects in this area; in natural resources there are 16; in industry 14; in transport and communications 12; in manpower development 9; and in finance 6. Only in the trade and monetary areas does one find only three organizations operating. Even here, having three organizations with different membership trying to promote trade liberalization and the establishment of a customs union will certainly not facilitate the creation of a free trade area and a customs union among all the members of the sub-region. This is confirmed by the different trade liberalization regimes of ECOWAS, CEAO and Mano River Union and the difficulties being encountered in harmonizing them.

65. There is proof that the West African IGOs are themselves persuaded of the need for a formalized and comprehensive approach in co-ordinating their activities. The annual meeting of the Association of Institutions for Financing Economic Development in West Africa, is one such proof. Another is the Agreement Regarding Regional Co-operation signed by the Chief Executives of Mano River Union and the CEAO in 1980. This Agreement provided for annual meetings of the Secretaries-General of the two organizations and identified the following areas in which co-operation was to take place: exchange of information and studies; exchange of experiences and experts; organization of seminars, colloquia, and training programmes; consultation on the formulation and harmonization of policies on major international economic issues; request for funding of feasibility studies; design and execution of projects; and mobilization of funds for the implementation of projects. Up till now, the Agreement has remained a dead letter. At a more general level, the West African IGOs decided at a meeting in Monrovia in 1978 to draw-

up a charter of co-operation for all West African IGOs. Mano River Union was assigned the task of preparing the charter and presented a draft to the Sixth Meeting of West African IGOs at Cotonou in March 1983. The West African ECA MULPOC, at the request of this Meeting of West African IGOS, is now working on the draft for the Seventh Meeting of West African IGOs.

66. In spite of the absence of a legal framework for co-operation, the major West African IGOs have, since 1980, been meeting fairly regularly under the auspices of ECOWAS and the Niamey-based MULPOC, to discuss mainly the possibility of co-ordinating their activities. The MULPOC has, in a number of ways, also tried to link the IGOs together. This very mission, originating in the discussion of officers and representatives of the IGOs in 1982 at a meeting of the MULPOC, is also a reflection of the general appreciation of the need for streamlining and co-ordinating the activities of the IGOs.

67. But even from what has been said earlier, it is easy to appreciate why attempts by the IGOs to co-ordinate their own activities and programmes have not been successful and are not likely to be successful. They were established in different historical circumstances, each one a response to particular common felt needs of their member States. Except in the case of a new IGO like ECOWAS Fund, or the CEBV of the Council of the Entente States which sprang up from some other "parent" organizations, the IGOs of West Africa were not established with a view to their working with one another. Each has its own mandate in the form of a Treaty, Declaration, Protocols or clearly defined work programmes. Each also has its own supervisory body, usually a Council of Ministers which meets from time to time to review the activities of the IGO and issue fresh instructions in respect of its programme of work. For all practical purposes the IGOs are autonomous institutions. In the face of this reality the purported Agreement between the Mano River Union and the West African Economic Community (CEAO) is, in strict legal terms, a nullity - unless formally ratified at least by their respective Councils of Ministers.

68. The legal mandates of the IGOs in West Africa are at the core of the problem of attempting to co-ordinate their activities. The problem is clearly beyond the IGOs themselves. Our proposals for getting around it are contained in chapter 6 of this Report. In essence what will be required is a restructuring of the IGOs in their working relationships from a sub-regional perspective. We are reinforced in this conclusion by our practical experience of what the IGOs are doing in the field, as will be related in the immediate chapter that follows.

CHAPTER IV

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR COOPERATION

69. As noted in Chapter Two, the IGOs in West Africa can be classifed into four: the Economic Communities, the Developmental organs such as the River Basins and Lake Commissions, the functionally specific organizations dealing with research and/or providing technical services to their member States, and, finally, the financial institutions. In this chapter we shall examine more closely the current activities of selected, but representative, IGOs in each of the four categories.

70. What is attempted is not a cost/benefit analysis of economic co-operation. Our terms of reference require us to undertake that exercise, but it soon became clear to us in the field that it was not feasible within the time available for our mission. In no single country was there a central point for collecting financial and other data relating to economic co-operation with other countries - a poor reflection indeed of the state of administrative support for economic co-operation. We would have had to spend an average of one month in each of the countries of West Africa to gather the relevant data from the diverse organs of government which are responsible in various ways for economic co-operation. Besides, some of the 'costs' are not really quantifiable. There are such hidden costs as the cost of hosting a meeting of an IGO- and the cost, in terms of temporary loss of manpower to national service, of sponsoring an official delegation to a meeting of an IGO.

71, The problem of assessing the benefit of economic co-operation to the constituent members of an IGO is even more intractable. Economic integration is, by its very nature, a slow process and one whose benefits are best perceived in long, rather than short, terms. Economic integration, comparatively speaking is still in its infancy in West Africa. Too calculating an approach to assessing its benefits at this stage, as the Minister of Hydrology in Niger Republic warned, would do more harm than good. It is, of course, trite to point out that some of the benefits of economic co-operation - like the hidden costs of such co-operation - cannot be quantified in monetary terms. The exercise of restraint by two Heads of State in a state of diplomatic tension, for instance, could be directly attributable to the existence of a bond of economic co-operation between them.

72. The intention of this chapter, then, is not to draw up a balance sheet of the IGOs, but to attempt to evaluate their programmes and their strategies. We cannot pretend that we have carried out an exhaustive study of the various facets of the operations of the IGOs. Such a study for an IGO like ECOWAS, Mano River Union, or the CEAO alone would require some three to four months. Thus, on account of severe limitation of time, we have not dealt at any great length with the finances, the administration, or the management of each individual IGO. These are in themselves large issues which, we presume, are engaging the attention of the Councils of Ministers superintending the operations of the IGOs. For this mission, our major preoccupation is establishing a workable *modus operandi*, if not a structure of relationships, that would make them more effective as co-ordinating agencies of development.

73. Thus we decided to look at the IGO's only in relation to the future. The major thrust of our enquiry is: what can we learn from their present activities to make them more effective for the future ? This attitude does not, of course, preclude a critical assessment of what we observed.

I. Economic Communities

74. We begin with the existing economic communities. West Africa has three economic communities: ECOWAS, CEAO, and the Mano River Union. These are organizations which, as we said earlier, aim at the harmonization of policies and programmes in almost all sectors of the economies of their respective member States, including trade.

75. Since its inception ECOWAS has conducted at least twelve major studies on various aspects of economic co-operation in the sub-region. These include studies on trade and customs, monetary issues and fiscal matters, industrial development, agriculture, transport and telecommunications and immigration.[1] Recommendations based on these studies have formed the bases of decisions that have thus far been taken by the policy organs of ECOWAS. It is the view of the ECOWAS Secretariat that in some specific areas the organization is already making an impact.

76. According to the Secretariat, the organization has played a positive role in facilitating the creation of a "constructive political climate that has reigned within the subregion since the effective take-off of the Community and which has already led to the resolution or the avoidance of very delicate problems in the subregion".[2] With regards to specific programmes and projects, it is asserted that some progress is being made towards trade liberalisation within the subregion, free movement of persons across state boundaries, and implementation of the programme on the ECOWAS telecommunications system, the PANAFTEL Telecommunication scheme.[3] The Secretariat has also given priority to data gathering, "so as to get a global picture of the West African situation in the relevant areas of interest to the Community". Whether ECOWAS has succeeded in establishing an active presence . . on the international scene", as it has also claimed, is clearly a matter of opinion.

77. Notwithstanding the views of the Secretariat, the impression gathered by this mission during its visits to member States in the subregion and from an examination of the programmes and activities of the Secretariat, is that the impact of ECOWAS is, thus far, marginal. The reasons are not far to seek. ECOWAS has severely limited financial and human resources to work with, and the member states would not seem to be fully committed to making it succeed.

78. A careful analysis of the studies conducted by the Secretariat reveals an element of tardiness. In general, the Secretariat commissions experts or consultants to undertake studies and there is little involvement by the core staff of the Secretariat. Few members of staff of ECOWAS, if any at all, have personal knowledge of the problems of development in the countries of the subregion. Such personal knowledge can only come from active and intelligent interaction with officials and ministers in the field. One way of increasing the personal knowledge of the staff of an IGO is to send them on study missions to the participating countries at varying times. This suggestion should apply particularly to those who are directors of departments. These officers should be in the position (from their intimate knowledge of the problems of the countries of the subregion) to be able to pronounce confidently on the findings and recommendations of any expert, indigenous or foreign.

79. In August 1982, ECOWAS embarked upon a programme of sending its senior staff on "know - your - subregion" tours. An officer or a team of officers is expected to spend about four or five days in a country and submit a report. While this programme may be welcome, one should caution against superficiality. A period of five days is too short a time to enable an officer or a team of officers to gather adequate information and learn about the economy of a member state. A more beneficial result is likely to be achieved by senior members of staff being involved in studies of aspects of the economy of a particular country or countries. Besides, such participation in studies necessarily provides useful practical training for the staff.

80. Of the specific programmes and projects, the area in which ECOWAS seems to have made moderately significant progress is the area of co-operation in trade and customs. Uniform trade and customs documents have been devised as a means of facilitating trade. They include common statistical standards and definitions, Customs Declaration Forms (for domestic use for exportation, re-exportation, warehousing and so on), Certificates of Origin (for industrial products, unprocessed products and traditional handicrafts) and Movement Certificate.

81. Important as the harmonization of trade and customs documents is to the development of intra-subregional trade, the work done on this sector has had little practical impact. Decisions have been taken

but the problem with ECOWAS is not so much the taking of decisions, but their implementation. The harmonized trade and customs documents were all supposed to come into use as from January 1, 1981, but no member country of the Community has so far done anything about any of them. In any case, as will be discussed in chapter 5, it is arguable that even when all the trade and customs documents have been put into effect by all the member States, the impact of these measures by themselves on the level of intra-subregional trade and co-operation would be insignificant. However, to presume that certain measures would not achieve their maximum impact is not an excuse for failure to implement those measures, especially when they have been commonly agreed upon. If ECOWAS is said to be "non-operational", as a number of ministers complained to us in the field, the member States are, in large measure, to blame.

82. In the view of this mission, the root cause of the failure to implement decisions is, undoubtedly, the disparate loyalities to diverse IGOs among the States of the subregion. The states are turningECOWAS into a grand debating forum for mere expression of views, while they seem to be relying in varying degrees on the smaller Economic Communities and what we have called the development organs for the real task of trying to coordinate their development. The general belief seems to be that the smaller Economic Communities and the developmental organs are more intimate, more manageable and more dependable. It is partly this attitude that is rendering ECOWAS "non-operational".

83. In view of this attitude we would suggest that when drawing up its work programme in a subregion with over thirty IGOs, ECOWAS should take full account of the work programmes of other IGOs. This would be more realistic than the present approach of assuming that the other IGOs have no relevant operational programmes. A work programme should be an agenda for action, and should be as detailed as possible. That kind of programme can only evolve from consultations between ECOWAS and the other IGOs. We appreciate the difficulties which stand in the way of this approach. Hence chapter 6 is primarily concerned with suggestions for a new structure which might facilitate coordinated programmes by ECOWAS and the other IGOs. In the absence of this collaborative element, it is extremely doubtful if ECOWAS would achieve much in implementing the most important aspects of its Priority Work Programme in transport, industrial and agricultural co-operation.

84. We come to an examination of the activities of sister organizations to ECOWAS, the other Economic Communities, CEAO and Mano River Union (MRU).

85. On the face of it, CEAO, relative to ECOWAS, seems be have made some noticeable progress. Free exchange among member States of all primary goods, raw and unprocessed products, has been agreed upon and available statistics suggest that trade in these goods is taking place. Industrial products with at least 60% of local raw materials or having at least 40% value added, are now traded within the Community under the RCT (regional co-operation tax) scheme. The RCT, tax paid by an exporting country on a product, is less than the customs duty which the same product could have attracted if imported from outside the Community. The next stage in the development of the customs union is to devise a scheme for trading in industrial products not embraced by the RCT.

86. A major attraction of the CEAO is its compensation scheme. The rationale behind it is to alleviate the financial burden (arising from loss of customs revenue) of countries importing industrial products made by the relatively more advanced member States. Such countries are compensated from the Community Development Fund (CDF), contributed largely by the relatively more industrialised members of the Community. Importing countries collect two-thirds of what are due to them for their revenue losses; the remaining one-third is retained by the CDF for the financing of "Community" projects, which are oriented towards the development of the relatively backward member States.

87. The Solidarity and Intervention Fund for Development (FOSIDEC) of the CEAO can also be seen in the context of the Community's compensation scheme. Its primary objective is to guarantee loans borrowed by member States, especially the relatively less developed ones, for financing their development programmes.

88. The noticeable impact of these arrangements may be illustrated by reference to statistical data. The number of firms whose products have been approved under the RCT scheme has increased from 91 in 1975 to 222 in 1980 - an increase of 143%. During the same period, the number of products traded within the framework of the scheme increased from 129 to 403 - an increase of 125%. These data suggest a significant increase in intra-community trade. In value terms, trade in industrial commodities increased from 4,243,854 CFA francs (US$14,000) in 1976 to 14,469,637 CFA francs (US$48,000) in 1979 - an

increase of 241%, reflecting a very low initial base. It should also be noted that the CEAO has instituted a common nomenclature and has harmonized entry duties. The same type of duties now exist in all the member countries: fiscal and excise duty of 5% plus value added tax on the total amount of business.

89. Compensatory payments of more than 7 billion CFA francs between 1976 and 1979 have been made as follows: Upper Volta, 27.6%; Mauritania, 9.9%; Senegal, 22.9%; Mali, 14.5%; Niger, 13.8%; Ivory Coast 11.3%. During the same period, the CDF carried out in member States a number of small-scale development projects: production of certified groundnut seeds, rural water schemes, livestock markets and so on.

90. In October 1978, the CEAO began what may be referred to as a programme of institution-building: African Centre for Higer Management Studies (in Senegal); a CEAO company dealing in fishery products (in Mauritania); Higher Institute for Halieutic Science and Techniques (in Mauritania); School of Mines and Geology (in Niger); Higer Institute for Textile Industries (in Mali), and Regional Centre for Solar Energy (in Mali).

91. FOSIDEC, the Fund for Solidarity and Development, has guaranteed loans for financing some thirty projects in member States since its inception. Most of these are industrial projects: construction of a mechanical workshop in Mali, a shoe factory as well as a unit for improving mineral water supply in Mauritania, extension of a cement factory in Senegal, the building of non-alcoholic drink factories in Niger. It has similarly guaranteed loans for projects in Upper Volta and Ivory Coast. Thus every member State of CEAO is benefitting from FOSIDEC. FOSIDEC has also been instrumental in financing certain Community projects: Higher Institute for Halieuti sscience and Techniques, and the Community Company dealing in fishery products.

92. These achievements notwithstanding, it should be noted that CEAO, unlike ECOWAS, is receiving massive financial assistance from France and French companies have invested in virtually all sectors of the economies of these countries. In the next chapter, we discuss the impact of foreign investments, especially those of transnationals, on the West African economic co-operation arrangements.

93. It should also be noted that the practical achievements of CEAO may easily be exaggerated if one bases one's judgement purely on the publications of the organization. For instance, the actual state of trade actually belies the volume of RCT approvals. Products approved for RCT may not necessarily feature in intra-Community trade. In 1979, Niger had 20 products approved, of which not a single one was exported. Similarly for Upper Volta, only 5 out of 50 products approved entered into intra-Community trade.

94. Doubts can also be raised as to how much, in terms of economic transformation, the member States of the Community are benefitting from the intra-Community trade. Trade statistics may be impressive on paper, but the question may be legitimately raised, who is really benefitting from intra-Community trade? The industrial products, as we hope to show in the next chapter, are from light industries that are dominated by transnationals in the member States: textiles, processed foods, light chemical industries (soap, detergents, perfumes & candles etc.) and similar industries. It is also noteworthy that the same industrial plants are replicated in practically all the countries of the Community. The market for each product is therefore inevitably narrow. There is no Community market for any product. The market has been segmented by the transnationals to such an extent that the existence of the Community is irrelevant as far as co-operation in the productive sectors is concerned. In the absence of specialisation in industrial development and the complementarity that should flow from it, one finds that the industrial scene in the CEAO countries is one of competitive high-cost production, and cannot spark off the economic restructuring in member States which is the *raison d'être* for economic co-operation schemes in developing countries.

95. Moreover, the RCT system does not really benefit the member States. The rule is that the more industrial products are imported by a state from within CEAO, the more compensation that state receives from the CDF fund; and the more a country exports to CEAO countries, the more she contributes to the CDF. In practice Ivory Coast and Senegal are CDF's principal contributors. The two countries have contributed 95.1% of the resources of the Fund between 1974 and 1980. But the exporting companies in the two states are mostly foreign owned. Thus the RCT taxes paid by the two states are no more than subsidies to foreign companies. Nor is there any advantage accruing to local consumers of the Community in the form of lower prices for the RCT industrial products.

96. The RCT system has other weaknesses. For a given imported product, the RCT is supposed to replace all other charges, although. pre-consumption taxes are still applicable in each country. But the internal tax rate applicable to an approved RCT product is not expected to exceed the tax rate levied on a similar product manufactured locally. Where thre is no such similar local product, the tax on an approved RCT product can be arbitrarily high.

97. Another observation which should be made about the RCT system is that it operated at its best when the two principal financial contributors, Ivory Coast and Senegal, were able to meet their financial obligations with revenue accruing from exports. But with the impact of drought in Senegal, and the fall in cocoa prices in Ivory Coast, contributions have become less regular and arrears are now beginning to accumulate. As a result, dissatisfaction is being expressed by the four beneficiaries of the CDF, the four other members of the Community, and they may decide to apply the common law regime of customs duties to products from Senegal and Ivory Coast. Indeed the Community is seriously contemplating replacing the RCT with another compensation mechanism, the Community Solidarity Tax (CST).

98. Events of the recent past do show that member States of CEAO are attaching priority to what they consider to be in the immediate interests of national states rather than to long-term Community interests. For example, in the production of animal and agricultural products, the CEAO is a region of considerable diversity, and the Community has always taken advantage of this fact. Thus Upper Volta and Niger were exporting their livestock to Ivory Coast, while Mali and Mauritania were exporting theirs to the Senegalese market. But recently Mauritania and Mali have signed preferential trade agreements to supply Algeria and Libya with meat, as if CEAO did not exist. During the last Muslim *tabaski* festival in September 1982, the herds of cattle and ram expected from Mauritania and Mali simply did not arrive! Similarly, in the same vein of catering to national interest, Senegal has increased her custom rate from 5% (the uniform CEAO rate) to 15% because of national economic problems. It is therefore not possible to implement the external tariff agreed upon in 1976 with a view to making CEAO a customs union by 1986.

99. It is clear from the foregoing paragraphs that CEAO is not really a success story. For one thing, its institutional structure does not permit of self-reliant transformation of the economies of member States through the creation of locally based and locally controlled productive sectors - industry and agriculture. The present technique of industrialization in the CEAO, as in the rest of West Africa, is not likely to lead to any major economic break-through. It is the technique of import substitution which entails importation of capital goods and processed raw materials, export of foreign reserves, dwindling use of indigenous manpower, and absence of backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy. The existing industries in the CEAO are not such that could galvanize the economies of the member States, and raise them from the present morass of poverty.

100. For another, emphasis given to intra-Community trade has not yielded positive results in terms of increased intra-Community trade, generation of inward-oriented productive capacities, and equitable distribution of the benefits of co-operation among all the member States of the Community. In the event, the Community is externally oriented and externally dependent with consequential outflows of resources and benefits to metropolitan countries.

101. This mission, therefore, would argue that the solution for the economic ills of CEAO lies, not in merely tinkering with the economies of the six member states, but in engineering a self-reliant development process in co-operation with other countries of the West African subregion. The economic plight of the subregion calls for bold, imaginative plans co-ordinated at the subregional level and executed by all concerned with absolute sense of commitment. CEAO and the other Economic Communities should begin to see themselves in this context. For that is the only context that is meaningful in the light of the present economic circumstances. This theme is elaborated upon further in chapters 6 and 7 of this Report.

102. We shall now focus attention on the third West African Community, the Mano River Union (MRU). MRU originally comprised Liberia and Sierra Leone; a third member, the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, Joined the Union on 25 October 1980.

103. Since its inception in October 1973, MRU has engaged in a variety of activities, and it has recorded a number of concrete achievements in specific areas. The most observious achievement was the construction of the Mano river bridge (linking Sierra Leone and Liberia) which was officially commissioned on 27 February 1976. The Economic Community has also succeeded in establishing some common institutions

and common programmes:[4] Union Forestry Training Institute (Bomi Hills, Liberia); Union Marine Training Institute (Marshall, Liberia); Union Telecommunications and Postal Training Institute (Freetown, Sierra Leone); Union Customs, Excise and Trade Statistics Training Programme (Monrovia, Liberia). Under the Union Scholarship and Fellowship programme administered by the Union's Secretariat, 16 Liberians and 16 Sierra Leoneans had studied or were studying at institutions of higher education in both Sierra Léone and Liberia by 1980.[5]

104. In the field of training the Union is also working towards an "integrated" use of member states' higher institutions with Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea specialising in Medicine, Engineering and Pharmacology respectively, for the training of Union sponsored students. Another important programme in the field of education is harmonizing the curricula of the school systems of the member states, beginning with technical subjects. The objective is to develop common text books and produce instructional materials for the use of secondary schools in the member States.

105. Two planned major projects are the harnessing of the Mano river for hydroelectric power and irrigation purposes, and the construction of highways to link Freetown and Monrovia, and later, Conakry. These latter projects have attracted substantial foreign grants for feasibility studies. The Monrovia-Freetown highway was estimated to cost US$ 97 million, "of which there are commitments of about US $40 million".[6]

106. With regards to intra-Union trade, the Community now claims to have harmonized the tariffs of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the words of the Community's Secretary-General,"all tariff barriers to trade between the member states have been eliminated and the joint market of Liberia and Sierra Leone have become available to producers in the two countries, providing them with a substantially larger and protected domestic market".[7] As for the third member, Guinea, some transitional arrangements were said to have been worked out "to enable manufacturers in the member states of the Union to trade in the joint market of the three member states".

107. Having grown from a mere customs arrangements to an organization aiming at the "total integration" of the economies of the member states, MRU would appear to have succeeded in earning "the confidence and faith of the member states" - to use the words of the Minister of Agriculture of Sierra Leone.

108. MRU, like ECOWAS and CEAO, however, has its failings and shortcomings. Although tariffs are supposed to have been harmonized, "administrative bottlenecks" or non-tariff barriers are still left intact. Consequently, intra-MRU trade is very small. Officials at MRU and at the Ministry of Commerce, Freetown, Sirera Leone, stated that the Union had resulted in an increase in the volume of trade among the member States. But intra-Union trade is still less than 1% of the total volume of trade of the member countries. In addition to the usual obstacles to intra-regional trade in West Africa-multiplicity of currencies, poor transport and communications systems and others-there are problems peculiar to the MRU. Customs and police posts are more numerous on the Monrovia-Freetown road, and administrative procedures for export and import of goods more vigorously enforced than ever before. It is as if the officials of the two countries have been instructed to deliberately discourage flow of trade.

109. The programmes for the harmonization of the Union training institutions are not making much headway. The contents of their course have not been modified to ensure that they adequately serve the needs of the member countries. Thus, the forestry training course at Bomi Hills, Liberia, is not considered by Sierra Leone's Ministry of Agriculture as meeting their requirements. It will therefore be necessary to modify or in some cases, overhaul the programmes of institutions earmarked for joint training of staff if progress is to be made in this direction.

110. In the field of industrial development, MRU is developing the concept of "Union industries" under which industries considered to be of relevance of the Union will be licensed and provided with incentives, and the market of the whole Union. Such industries will be distributed among member States on the basis of economic criteria, but their operations will be organized in such a manner that forward and backward linkages will be spread to other member States. For instance, the fruit processing plant being proposed for Sierra Leone might be served partly by the glass container industry being projected for Liberia and partly by a packaging plant that might be located in Guinea or Liberia.

111. The members of this mission were not, however, enthused about the practical implementation of these proposals. We discovered a lot of "planning in the air" at MRU. The industrial programme was not being evolved in consultation with the Ministries of Industries or Planning of the respective member States. If the programme is to be relevant for the Union and receive the support of the member States, the planning and the executing Ministries of each member State and MRU must work in close collaboration.

112. The gap in communication in industrial matters between MRU and the member States could be at least partly, a structural problem. We consider it rather anomalous that the Industrial Development Unit (the focal point for promoting Union industries) should be located in the office of the Secretary-General of the Union, rather than being a department of the Economic Planning Division.

113. MRU seems to be paying the least attention to agriculture, limiting itself to a few projected studies. And yet, the member States of the Union are not self-sufficient in food.

114. As a general observation, MRU has the potential of succeeding after a fashion as an integrated economic unit. But, for really meaningful self-reliant development in agriculture and industry, its future, like that of the CEAO, lies in wider co-operation arrangements with the rest of West Africa.

II. The Developmental Organs

115. The developmental organs are those IGOs aimed at the co-ordinated development of their respective member States, usually in specific sectors of the economy. Unlike the Economic Communities, they fall short of a customs union, although arrangements might conceivably be made to facilitate trade exchanges among their members. The various river basin authorities in the sub-region and the Lake Chad Commission fall into this category; so do the Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authority, the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Co-operation, and the Senegambian Permanent Secretariat.

116. The Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS), established in 1968, is made up of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. It is primarily a co-ordinating organization focussing on the promotion of irrigation schemes, and the harnessing of water resources for the production of energy and river navigation. Once irrigation schemes are completed, their management is turned over to national governmental agencies: the SONADER in Mauritania, the SAED in Senegal, and the OVSTM in Mali. The same pattern is adopted with regards to projects on generation of electricity and river navigation. Thus OMVS co-ordinates the programmes of the three member States in specific areas, but the actual management of the projects, once completed, is the responsibility of the respective governments. This is the ideal posture of an IGO, and one that the IGOs in the subregion should constantly keep at the back of their minds in drawing up their programmes.

117. OMVS has a lesson to impart too in the funding of projects. While the operating budget of the organization involves equal contributions by the three member States, the investment budget, say, for the dam projects, is contributed on the basis of the area of land to be irrigated in each state. Thus it is the states themselves which incur the loans and are responsible for servicing them - a method of financing which might suit the requirements of financial institutions and the current temper of donors.

118. Although OMVS was established in 1968 its impact has not been felt until recently, due mainly to lack of political commitment among the member States. The three member States have defaulted in the payment of their contributions to the tune of some 800 million CFA francs. Nevertheless, in terms of concrete achievements, it has co-ordinated the irrigation of about 11,000 hectares of land in Senegal, 5000 hectares in Mauritania, and 4,000 hectares in Mali An anti-silt dam combining a hydro-electric project in Diana, Senegal, and an irrigation project on the Manantali river in Mali are being built. It is expected that by 1986 some 375,000 hectares of land would have been irrigated in the three countries and 800,000 kilowatts of electricity generated.

119. The structure of the OMVS is being transformed into that of an integrated development agency It has been reorganized into four departments: Development and Co-ordination, Regional Infrastructure, Investment, and Training and Human Resources. Its policy organs are a Council of Ministers and a Permanent Committee which co-ordinates sectoral programmes. The OMVS is thus evolving into a multipurpose Development Agency, not unlike the Economic Communities.

120. In the same neighbourhood as OMVS is the OMVG, the Organization for the Development of the Gambia River. It is perhaps the youngest IGO in the subregion, established by Senegal and Gambia in 1978. The People's Revolutionnary Republic of Guinea joined as a third member State in 1981.

121. From all indications, OMVG is still trying to find its feet. It is undertaking feasibility studies for the construction of an anti-silt dam in Balingo, Gambia. A reservoir dam is planned for the eastern Senegal and a hydro-electric dam for Guinea. It is expected that the feasibility studies for these projects would be completed by 1983.

122. The OMVG is located in the same capital city and has the same objectives as its older sister organization, the OMVS. The two organizations are operating in the same geographical area. It is therefore strongly recommended that the activities of the two organizations should be co-ordinated. The Ministers responsible for the two organizations should seek to enlarge the area of co-operation, and work out terms for their eventual merger.

123. The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) was established in 1980 to replace the Niger River Commission which had achieved practically nothing since its creation in 1963. It comprises nine countries Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. The last two countries are outside the subregion. The Authority is a more ambitious undertaking than the Commission. It aims at a co-ordinated development of the resources of the river Niger basin.

124. It is rather too early to assess the NBA, but it seems to have a potential for becoming the nucleus of an energy agency in the subregion. In August 1982 it organized at Cotonou, the People's Republic of Benin, a one-week intergovernmental conference on the harmonization of hydro-energy programmes in West and Central Africa. The thrust of the papers considered at that conference and the tone of the discussions demonstrated clearly that there can be no viable long-term solution to the energy problems of the West African States other than by planning and executing hydro-electric projects at subregional level. On account of the huge costs and necessarily large size of hydro-electrical installations, there is need for creating an integrated energy market in West and Central Africa. The objective should be to establish a dense network of electricity inter-connections which could be achieved through co-ordination and harmonization of programmes of member states and development agencies such as OMVS and OMVG.

125. The Niger Basin Authority has the potential for being the focal institution for the development of an interconnection of electricity network not only to serve the countries of the basin, but other countries like the Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo, which are not directly connected with the Niger Basin Authority. An electricity scheme on the Niger can be linked to the equatorial countries of Central Africa, which are rich in hydro-electricity resources, and to the far West African countries. which are not as well endowed in energy resources as the rest of West and Central Africa.

126. A harmonized and regional electricity programme in West and Central Africa, proposed by NBA, can be realized in two phases:

Phase I: Building of hydro-electric dams according to specified priorities.

Phase II: Building electric interconnecting links

(i) Interconnection lines of production sites

(ii) Feeder lines to States. This is intended to supply electricity to States of the subregion from a harmonized grid at points they would have previously selected.

(iii) Inter basin junction lines aimed at establishing in due course a network of interconnected high voltage lines embracing the whole subregion of West and Central Africa.

127. The development of a scheme like that projected by the NBA is crucial for the economic and social transformation of the subregion. This mission commends it for serious consideration in West Africa within the framework of ECOWAS in co-operation with appropriate organisation and agencies in Central Africa. Furthermore, efficient integration of efforts in the harnessing of water resources in West Africa strongly suggests that:

(a) Such institutions such as the CIEH, CILLS as well as its subsidiaries, the institut du Sahel and AGRHYMET, work in close collaboration with the Niger Basin Authority, and

(b) The Niger Basin Authority, in matters of hydro-energy, should always ensure, through adequate consultations, that the programmes and activities of the other Basin Authorities and even of individual states are harmonized with the overall subregional hydro-energy programme.

128. The Lake Chad Commission was established by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The scope of the activities of the Commission has not changed much since its inception in 1964. It is still largely a consultative body playing a regulatory role "to ensure that the exploitation of water in the lake basin does not adversely affect the rate of flow of water in the basin". The Commission has sponsored a number of studies related to the development of agriculture, irrigation, fishing and transportation in the countries bordering the lake.

129. The Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authority evolved out of the defunct River Niger Commission. It was established on the recommendation of the UNDP in 1970 for the development of the mineral, energy, hydraulic, agricultural, pastoral and fishing resources of the Liptako-Gourma zone common to Mali, Niger and Upper Volta. Liptako-Gourma region covers some 370,000 sq. Kilometres astride the river Niger bend, stretching as far north as Timbuctoo in Mali and bordering to the south on the northern frontiers of Ghana, Togo and Benin. Its major drainage system is the river Niger. The zone has a population of some 4.5 million people.

130. The rationale for the establishment of the Authority was to co-ordinate the development of what is essentially a depressed area of West Africa. Economically, the area is characterised by a rural population engaged in primary subsistence production. Income per capita is "extremely low"; and the major part of it lies in the Sahel. The zone is, however, reported to be well endowed in mineral deposits: manganese, phosphates, copper, lead, zinc, antimony, molybidenum, kaolin, manazite, uranium, lithium, gold, iron, lignite and limestone.

131. The Liptako-Gourma Authority has a comprehensive programme for the development of roads, railways and communication lines; exploitation of mineral resources; harnessing of the resources of the river Niger for irrigation purposes and hydro-electric power.

132. The concrete achievements of the Authority are minimal. Thus far it has only undertaken studies on road links, railway links, and survey of the hydraulic and mineral resources of the zone.

133. As the Authority falls squarely within the ambit of the Niger Basin Authority, we would recommend that the two Authorities should co-ordinate their activities. One can see the Liptako-Gourma Authority more and more taking on the function of an executing agency for the Niger Basin Authority in the latter's programmes for exploiting the resources of the Niger.

134. The Nigeria - Niger Joint Commission for Co-operation (NNJCC) is the organ of co-operation between Nigeria and Niger Republic based in Niamey. Established in March 1971, the Commission has been charged with "co-ordinating and harmonizing the economies of the two countries in all fields with a view to increasing and making more effective their co-operation". To this end, various bilateral agreements have been signed between them relating to air and road transportation, trade, health, cultural and technical matters.

135. As a bilateral multipurpose organisation the Commission seems to be performing its functions satisfactorily. Specific on-going programmes of co-operation include the joint exploitation of the iron deposits at SAY, near Niamey, in Niger, and of the resources of the Komadougou - Yobe rivers. The technical studies relating to the PANAFTEL communication links between the two countries have been completed, and work is in progress on actual installation.

136. The Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat like the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission, for cooperation, is a bilateral, multipurpose organisation. Established in April 1967, the Secretariat is handling all matters of co-operation between Senegal and the Gambia in virtually all sectors of economic and cultural life. About twenty-three agreements, protocols and conventions have been signed by the two countries to cover diverse subjects for co-operation.

137. The Secretariat has played a major role in the establishment of direct telecommunication lines between the Yoff (Dakar) and the Yyundum (Banjul) Airports in March 1977 and in the building of a Senegalese primary school in Banjul, Gambia. The major project on hand is the construction of Dakar-Banjul-Bissau road for which the Secretariat has secured EEC's financial commitment to the tune of 10 million Europeean Units of Account. Guinea Bissau is participating in the project.

III. Technical and services Organisations

138. The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) was established in September 1970 by all the countries of the West African subregion (excepting Cape Verde) with the assistance of three United Nations agencies, UNDP, FAO and ECA. The Association has a precise mandate: "to promote and increase the quantity and quality of rice produced in West Africa" through research, training programmes and advisory services to the member states.

139. By and large WARDA has succeeded in establishing "a viable and operational structure through which it is successfully promoting technical and economic co-operation and pursuing the implementation of its mandate"[9]. It has operated in three principal areas - research, development, and training. For its research WARDA maintains experimental stations at Rokpur in Sierra Leone, (for mangrove rice) Bouake in Ivory Coast (for upland rice); Mopti, in Mali, (for deep water and floating rice) and at Richard Toll in Senegal (for irrigated rice). The overall objective is to breed and produce highyielding rice varieties adaptable to different ecological systems in the subregion. Concurrently with these projects, researches are also undertaken in weed control, soil chemistry, pest control, seed improvement, and so on.

140. WARDA's Seed Centre at Fendall, 30 km from Monrovia, comprises a seed testing/storage laboratory and seed processing and treatment facilities. Over the years, the Centre has expanded the scope of its activities to include handling of the importation of rice varieties into the subregion, seed testing for member states on request and diagnosis of rice diseases. A major function is now the multiplication and distribution of seed varieties to member countries. Between 1973 and 1979, the number of countries served by the Centre ranged between 13 and 15, while the number of seed packages sent to member countries increased from 320 to 9,855.[10]

141. The Development Department of WARDA is the direct link between the institution and the member countries - to supplement their efforts and their expertise in their rice development programme and projects. For this purpose the Department has expertise in Agronomy, Rural Engineering and Irrigation, Economics and Financing, Storage and Processing. These experts are at the disposal of the member countries which can call on the Department to carry out surveys and establish projects aimed at removing technical, socio-economic or institutional constraints to rice production. To enhance the work of the Department, subregional co-ordinating offices are now being established in Gambia, Niger, Ghana, Upper Volta and Guinea "to ensure that all the activities (of WARDA) will have a more direct and significant impact on rice research, production and training".

142. The Fendall Farm Centre is the veritable training institution of WARDA. It mounts bilingual courses in seed multiplication, quality control, water management, post harvest technology, post harvest losses. These courses are intended to produce field assistants, research assistants, production specialists, extension workers, teachers and agricultural trainers. As the following table indicates, WARDA has produced 699 trainees for the member countries between 1973 and 1981.

Table 4:1 WARDA COURSES, 1973 - 1981 (number of trainees)

COURSES	1973	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	TOTAL
Rice Production									
Specialist course	23	—	22	24	30	31	28	32	190
Field Assistant Course	37	20	30	30	33	28	28	—	206
Research Assistant course	—	—	—	—	—	—		22	22
Post Harvest Technology	—	—	—	27	—	19	28	23	97
Refresher Course on Milling	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	—	14
Seed multiplication Certification	—	—	—	—	30	—	23	—	53
Rice Project Management	—	—	—	—	—	23	29	23	75
Rice Water Management	—	—	14	—	—	28	—	—	42
TOTAL	60	20	66	81	93	143	136	100	699

143. By WARDA's own estimates, West Africa will still not be self-sufficient in rice production by 1990. But member countries, on the whole, expressed their satisfaction with the research and training programmes of WARDA, although a number were concerned about the management of its finances. The Gambia, for example, has attributed her 20-25% increase in rice production to her use of WARDA's

high-yielding varieties of rice seedlings.[11] Even a country like Nigeria with her numerous facilities for agricultural research and extension services acknowledged the good work being done at WARDA.[12]

144. In order to increase the effectiveness of WARDA it has been suggested that WARDA should undertake direct production of rice, or at least, in the words of an official in the Ministry of Agriculture, Accra, "set up a production apparatus". This is an interesting line of thought which raises the fundamental question of what the role of a technical IGO should be. The mission is not persuaded that a subregional Technical IGO should take the kind of direct action that is being suggested for WARDA. That approach would raise more problems than it would solve. WARDA would require a colossal level of investment to be able to meaningfully supplement the efforts of the states in rice production, assuming that the intractable problems of land acquisition and management could be resolved.

145. What is required to make West Africa self-sufficient in rice is not turning WARDA into an agency of production, but a determined, concerted effort by the states of West Africa to meet the challenges of a deteriorating agricultural sector. WARDA can then supplement the activities of the states with its basic researches and training programmes.

146. In this connexion, should WARDA continue to be preoccupied with just one cereal? The possibility of the institution extending the scope of its research to cover other cereals like maize, millet, sorghum, or at least those that can be "inter-cropped" with rice, should be seriously examined. The ideal to aim at for the future is to make WARDA a major centre for agricultural research for the subregion of West Africa. If it is realized that the present research and training programmes of WARDA are being funded, largely, if not entirely, by external donors, then, one appreciates how much it would take to achieve that ideal.

147. The Economic Community for Livestock and Meat (CEBV), set up in 1970 by the Council for Mutual Understanding (comprising Benin Republic, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Togo), aims at creating a livestock common market among the member States. Livestock raising zones are situated in Upper Volta and Niger, while Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin to the south constitute the major markets in the Community.

148. How far has CEBV succeeded in creating a livestock common market among the member states The answer is not particularly encouraging. It is true that CEBV has created a passport for livestock which has now been adopted by ECOWAS. The organisation also has a number of projects under execution: establishment of secondary slaughter slabs in Ivory Coast and Benin; equipping the livestock routes and markets of central and western Niger; establishment of two ranches in Ivory Coast; creation of livestock routes and markets in Togo. Yet the objectives of building a livestock common market is far from being achieved. The drought of the 1970s hampered the efforts in this direction; but this is only part of the problem. There are problems of transport, quality of stock, and preferences of member states. Since 1973 Ivory Coast has increased her importation of meat from Argentina. In 1979/80 the meat imported from Upper Volta and Niger was not up to 2% of her total meat imports.[13] This highlights the observation elaborated upon elsewhere in this report that preoccupation with trade arrangements is not enough to bring about increase in trade among the countries involved in a scheme of economic co-operation. Problems of production, transport, quality, and storage, etc., should take precedence over measures for trade liberalisation.

149. The InterAfrican Committee for Water Studies (CIEH) which was established in 1960 is a common technical organ of twelve states: Benin, Cameroon, Togo, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad. Six other countries maintain an observer status in respect of the organisation: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria. Thus membership of it transcends the West African subregion. The Committees objectives are to compile studies in the hydraulic sector, to liaise between participating states, in order to facilitate the exchange of information, to harmonize the programmes of studies of a regional nature, and to offer, on request, technical assistance to member states.

150. To date CIEH has conducted and published some 200 studies. It has also created a Documentation Centre with about 11,000 works. Besides, it has organised seminars, and advised member states on the construction of wells, boreholes and dams.

151. Yet there is considerable frustration at CIEH. The reason is that in the recent past their services and facilities were hardly used by member states. This apparent neglect is being reflected in the shrinking level of financial contributions from the member States. Indeed, but for the infusion of funds from outside, particularly France, and other forms of aid from the United States and elsewhere, CIEH would have ceased to be operational. In appreciation of the necessity for more prudent management of water resources than in the past, most, if not all, the states served by CIEH have set up their own Ministries of Water Resources or agencies. Each state now seems preoccupied with the development of its own water resources and the only organisation capable of taking a global, subregional view is being starved of funds and moral support. Ironically, the so-called foreign experts on water management are the ones who now use CIEH's resources extensively to produce "expert" studies for states of the subregion who invariably pay highly for them.

152. The mission considers that it would be a mistake to allow the CIEH to be moribund. The existence of national agencies or departments for the development of water resources should not detract attention from the need for a subregional body to take a global view of developing the water resources of the subregion. Combatting the problem of desertification in the subregion, for example, requires nothing short of a subregional joint effort. A body like the CIEH should have a large input in that effort. Similarly, a subregional body like the Niger Basin Authority which aims at stimulating the development of the whole river basin of the Niger and its tributaries, requires the services of such a body like the CIEH. Indeed the two should be working hand in hand. In this regard we commend the initiatives of CIEH directed towards forging professional links with bodies like the CEAO, Liptako-Gourma Authority, and the Inter-State Permanent Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS).

153. In our view, CIEH ought to be in the same position as WARDA in West Africa, a subregional body whose services should be at the disposal of all the countries. For this reason we suggest that all countries of the subregion should be affiliated to CIEH and provide it with financial and moral support. This recommendation would, of course, necessitate adjustments in the structure and perhaps the programme orientation of the present CIEH. The possibility of CIEH embarking upon a training programme for the member states should be considered. The organisation would also need some political leverage (which it would secure by being a truly subregional agency of development) to enable it to approach donors for financial assistance.

154. The Inter-State Permanent Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) was created following the great drought of 1973 which adversely affected the Sahelian countries. Thus membership of the organisation is limited to countries of the Sahelian belt: Cape Verde, Gambia, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad. In the 1970's it received world-wide financial support. The primary objective of CILSS remains finding long-term solutions to the problems of drought in the Sahelian part of the subregion. Its research and training programmes are being funded almost entirely by external donors.

155. In addition to research, CILSS organises conferences and seminars on aspects of combatting drought and devising common programmes. For its research activities it has two institutions: the Sahel (Research) Institute at Bamako (Mali), and the Regional Agrometeorological and Hydrological Centre (AGRHYMET) at Niamey, Niger Republic.

The AGRHYMET Centre is charged with co-ordinating research activities in member states in the fields of meteorology and hydrology. The Centre also serves as a data bank for hydrological information for West Africa. For weather forecasting the Centre has got a powerful computer (DEC 1160) and is erecting smaller models in the member states for purposes of co-ordinating data.

156. AGRHYMET has a two-year training programme, which includes practical work of agricultural nature in relation to different meteorological conditions. The courses lead to some form of specialisation in climatology, agrometeorology, and operational hydrology. Only one out of the present (1983) staff of twenty one is an African. The Council of Ministers of CILSS, has, however, taken a decision on a rapid indigenization of the staff, assuming the member states would be able to pay for such staff.

157. The Institute of Sahel at Bamako (Mali) is charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating, harmonising and promoting research and training activities among the member states. Although critics have argued that the Institute's research programmes "offer nothing new compared with those undertaken

by less expensive institutions operating at the national level", it must still be admitted that the research programmes are broader in outlook, and, from the point of view of subregional planning, certainly more useful.

158. On balance CILSS is playing a useful role. The major worry is its heavy dependence on external sources of funding. CILSS has been regarded as a club of the poor primarily to attract foreign assistance for drought stricken countries of the Sahel. The funds (and the sympathy of the world for the Sahel's pligth) are drying up. When one surveys the impressive scope and the level of sophistication of computer-backed research being conducted at AGRHYMET, one is bound to wonder for how long they would run, given the fact that the drought no longer commands the same degree of world attention as in 1973. We hope that the United Nations system, especially the United Nations Sahelian Office (UNSO), would continue to mobilise the funding required for the organisation.

159. It would be a pity if such subregional research facilities as those of CILSS could not be maintained in the future. The relevance of the researches to subregional planning is easy to demonstrate. In the event of CILSS being unable to maintain its present elaborate arrangements on account of shortage of funds, it should be possible to salvage its research and training programmes by making some structural adjustments. For instance, AGRHYMET, Sahel Institute, and CIEH can conceivably be merged into one institution located in Niamey in the Republic of Niger and maintained by the sixteen countries of the subregion.

160. One of the most successful technical and services organisations in the subregion is the Common Organisation for the Campaign Against Locusts and Fowl Pests (OCLALAV) established in May 1965. There are ten member states: Benin, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad, the majority of them in the Sahelian belt.

161. The thrust of OCLALAV's activities has been to wage a preventive war on locusts by destroying their larvae, and to destroy depredatory birds at all stages. As Table 3.2 shows, OCLALAV has made an impact on the subregion.

Table 4:2: OCLALV: OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN

	ANTI-ACRIDIAN						
Operations (Years)	Surface Locusts	Treated (hectares) Grasshoppers	Total	Insecticides Used	Number of birds killed (millions)	Products explosive (kg.)	Used avicacides (Litres)
1966	—	—	—	—	1,170	44,000	87,200
1967	30,400	—	30,400	62,300	1,250	51,800	152,100
1968	30,800	—	59,800	46,700	990	51,300	123,300
1969	27,700	—	27,700	15,700	1,370	45,200	114,000
1970	150,200	10,500	160,700	99,500	1,480	14,800	97,900
1971	1,100	1,300	2,400	1,400	850	22,000	82,000
1972	—	—	—	—	700	7,200	18,300
1973	—	—	—	—	680	12,000	44,000
1974	27,700	194,100	222,100	156,400	420	9,000	19,500
1975	16,400	328,000	344,400	309,400	1,190	19,600	32,500
1976	21,200	34,100	155,300	78,600	487	30,200	27,000
1977	—	54,400	57,400	58,400	525	24,900	23,000
1978	12,400	232,400	244,900	123,800	148	27,700	12,200
1979	NIL	51,100	51,100	25,800	279	19,400	15,200
1980	98,400	75,600	174,000	52,600	97	22,500	12,200
1981	4,600	58,600	65,200	20,000	70	8,700	5,900

The success can be explained partly by the resources at the disposal of OCLALAV: six PIPER and CESSNA planes, a variety of jeeps and all-purpose vehicles, two-way radios, camping equipment, security and signals equipment, pulverizers and control products. Again, like many other IGOs in the subregion, OCLALAV enjoys considerable financial and material support from outside. Ironically, the organisation success is proving to be its undoing. The member states no longer feel threatened and have tended to neglect the institution.

162. A sister organisation, the International Organisation Against the African Migratory Locust (OICMA), based at Bamako, has recorded similar success in fighting against locust since its establishment in May 1962. There are seventeen member countries: Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo, and Zaire.

163. Intense campaigns have been carried out in the inland delta of the Niger in Mali and in the Lake Chad Basin. At the same time OICMA has carried out biological and ecological research on the African migratory locust in the Lake Chad Basin.

164. Both OCLALAV and OICMA have proved beyond doubt the value of co-operation, especially in tackling common problems. The success of the current co-operation arrangements between the two organisations has encouraged the mission to recommend their merger.

165. The only serious obstacle to such a move is the divergence in the memberships of the two organisations. OCLALAV has ten member states belonging to it; OICMA has seventeen. A merger may concetvably be effected under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which would then regard the resulting organisation (with possibly an enlarged membership) as one of its specialised agencies. Unfortunately, on the present showing, OAU, for some time, may not be able to play this role.

166. The African Groundnut Council (AGC) comprises the Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and, until recently, Upper Volta. It was established in 1964, with its headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria.

167. The Council is supposed to act to ensure adequate prices for groundnuts on the world market and to facilitate exchange of technical and scientific information on the production of groundnut.

168. Since the drought of the 1970s has paralysed the production of groundnut in most of the member states, the AGC has been an IGO in search of a role. There is little to show for the contributions made to it by the member states except the maintenance of an administrative structure in Lagos, and a European office in Brussels, Belgium. It has also participated in a number of international conferences. Upper Volta has withdrawn her membership of the organisation.

169. From our discussion with the Secretariat of the Council in Lagos, it is clear that the AGC is changing its gear. It is moving in the direction of measures aimed at boosting groundnut production among the member states. To this end, the secretariat is commissioning a number of studies.

170. The mission is not persuaded that any such studies at this stage would help much in reviving the production of groundnut. Two of the member states, Nigeria and Senegal, are known to be making serious efforts to gear up production. It is possible that other member states are doing the same. We are not convinced that fresh studies being commissioned by the Council would add much to these efforts.

171. Until production can be raised to such a level again that would require world-wide marketing strategy, we believe that the AGC can usefully suspend its major activities. The Council's office in Brussels should be closed down. The rounds of EEC-ACP negotiations in Brussels in which all the member states of the Council are usually involved, would surely not leave out groundnut. The Lagos office, the headquarters, should be reduced to a more co-ordinating centre - if, indeed, any such centre is required - for exchange of information on problems of groundnut production, and to facilitate summoning of occasional meetings to discuss such problems.

172. AIR AFRIQUE is an IGO with a difference. It is a joint stock company governed by an international treaty signed on 28 March 1961. Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Congo, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, Togo and Niger are the African shareholders. Two French companies have 28% of the equity, the largest share holders. The company employs some 5,160 persons.

173. The airline is in a reasonably sound financial position, its turnover having increased from 5 billion CFA francs in 1961 to about 83 billion in 1981.[14] Unlike most national airlines in the subregion, it is not being subsidized.

174. **Air Afrique is a pointer to the future. We have it on the authority of the African Civil Aviationt Commission (CAFAC), based in Dakar, Senegal, that most of the existing national airlines, on account of rising costs, will be incapable of holding their own in competition in the airline business of the 1980s and beyond.**

175. **We suggest elsewhere in this report that efforts be made to transofrm Air Afrique into a West African Airline with or without foreign participation. Given the limited resources of many African countries a subregional airline would be a sound economic propostion.**

176. Two IGOs dealing with air traffic control deserve mention: Flight Information Region (FIR) Roberts Monrovia, and the Agency for Security in Air Navigation (ASECNA). FIR Roberts is the facility for air traffic control (entailing aircraft guidance, transmission of technical information, weather forecast etc) shared by Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. ASECNA is a similar arrangement shared by the CEAO countries in West Africa, Chad, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo and Gabon.

177. All that need be said about these air traffic control arrangements is that member states involved have found them extremely useful in achieving air safety at minimum cost. Besides, they do generate their own funds.

IV. Financial and Monetary Institutions

178. A few general remarks about financial and monetary institutions in the subregion will suffice for the purpose of this report. Among them are the West African Clearing House (WACH) based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the African Centre for Monetary Studies (Dakar, Senegal), Mutual Aid and Loan Guarantee Fund of the Council of Understanding(Abidjan, Ivory Coast), African Solidarity Fund (Niamey, Niger), ECOWAS Fund (Lome, Togo), African Development Bank, (Abidjan, Ivory Coast), the West African Development Bank (BOAD), (Lome, Togo), Fund for Solidarity and Development (FOSIDEC of CEAO), (Ouagadougou, Upper Volta), and the OCAM Fund (Cotonou, Benin).

179. By and large we are satisfied with their general orientation and their perception of themselves as agencies of economic co-operation and development. Most of them, either in their studies and research or in their practical operations, are anxious to promote economic co-operation; some are already active in the field. The West African Development Bank (servicing Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta) has by March 1982 for example, financed 66 projects, 34 of them of "regional" nature. Similarly, ECOWAS funds are already being used to finance the West African portion of the Pan-African telecommunications network (PANAFTEL).

180. When the African Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1963, it was expected to make loans available for economic and social development generally, with special emphasis on multinational projects. The Bank was enjoined in its charter specifically to promote multinational projects. Unfortunately as at December 31, 1981, multinational projects financed by the Bank amounted to only about 3% of total commitments. The reason advanced by officials at the Bank is a reflection of the generally low level of political commitment to economic co-operation as a strategy for development. In their observation, they said, (West) African states tend to regard national projects "as being of a higher order of priority than multinational projects".

181. The West African Clearing House, established in June 1975 by the Central Banks of the subregion has had a similarly disappointing experience. The objective of the clearing House is central to the efforts at subregional economic co-operation: "to provide a facility through which the participants can use national currencies for imports from the region, thereby economising on the use of foreign exchange reserves and transfer costs".[15] The varying degree of the use of the clearing facilities of the House by the member States does not reflect any serious commitment to financial co-operation. Very few countries use the clearing House for all eligible transactions. The majority use it for part of their transactions, while some use it only sparingly. Admittedly, transactions through the clearing House could sometimes occasion some delay; but it is not in the interest of the subregion to render ineffective an institution that is capable of playing even a greater role in the future in the economic integration of the subregion.

V. Professional and Quasi-Professional Associations

182. The last group of organisations in the subregion are the professional and quasi-professional voluntary bodies with subregional orientation. The notable ones are the West African Health Community,

the West African Chamber of Commerce, the West African Economic Association and the Association of West African Universities. More such bodies will surely be established. We learnt during this mission, for instance, that architects in the subregion were making arrangements to launch their own West African Federation.

183. The emergence of these professional and quasi-professional bodies on the West African scene should be welcome as a healthy development. It is a reflection of a growing consciousness among the professional classes of West Africa of the need for a concerted effort in promoting development. We suggest in the next chapter how they could be made to foster the cause of economic co-operation in the subregion.

VI. Conclusion

184. The West African IGOs are discussed in this chapter as single entities. Assessed as such, they could not, on the whole, be said to have performed brilliantly. The reasons are obvious from what has been said above: lack of serious political commitment, inadequate funding, lack of proper orientation, inadequacy of staff. One should also not underplay the hampering effect of the 'atmosphere' in which many of them do operate. Inadequacy of office accommodation is an acute problem with almost all the IGOs, excepting perhaps the CEAO with its sumptuous premises. Poor communication and transport facilities - a bane of West African socio-economic life - are known to have frustrated serious efforts at co-ordination of programmes. There is the air of uncertainty, too, evident at many IGOs, created by irregularity of flow of funds from member States.

185. The IGOs present an even worse picture in terms of their performance when one looks at them in totality. They lack a central direction; consequently, each is preoccupied with its own programme, and its own mode of doing things. It is not surprising that an appreciable number of them have changed, and are changing their focus. Some that started off as mere co-ordinating secretariats have metamorphosed into development organs as we have defined them. Others that were basically developmental organs, like the river basin authorities, are assuming the character of Economic Communities. If they are all properly co-ordinated and aligned, they are capable of transforming the economies of the subregion. For now they represent unharnessed energies, and there is a lot of motion without progress. Diverse and disparate, the IGOs see themselves each as a wheel of co-operation and development. But, to press the analogy further, what is required in the circumstances of West Africa, is not a multiple of wheels of co-operation, but a composite machinery with every part having a definite task to fulfill. How that machinery can be established is the theme of chapter 6 of this report.

FOOTNOTES

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2. ECW/CM/IX/2 Rev. 1, Economic Community of West African States, "Annual Report of the Executive Secretary, 1980 - 1981", p. 41.
3. ECW/DEVE/C/7781, "Development of the Community: The First Five Years, 1977 - 1981", (Lagos, 1981), pp. 22-23
4. Mano River Union, Annual Report, 1978 - 79.
5. Mano. River Union: Annual Report, 1980 - 81.
6. Mano River Union, Annual Report 1980 - 81, p. 10.
7. Ibid, p. 8
8. *The Liptako-Gourma Authority for Regional Development, Organisation and Objectives (April* 1979*).*
9. WARDA: *Five Year Development Plan* 1981 - 1985 (Monrovia, 1980), p. 2.
10. WARDA: *The WARDA Seed Centre* (Monrovia, n.d.) p. 4.
11. Banjul, Gambia, Inter-Ministerial Meeting, 17 September 1982.
12. Discussion with the Ministry of Agriculture, Lagos, 11 October 1982.
13. ECOWAS, Co-operation and Trade in Cattle Products in ECOWAS subregion (1980).
14. Discussion with M. Guibril N'diaye, Technical Direztor, Air Afrique, Abidhjan, Ivory Coast, 14 August 1982.
15. *The West African Clearing House* (Freetown, n.d.), p. 3.

CHAPTER V

SECTORAL INTEGRATION: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

186. As noted in Chapter IV the work programmes of the major West African IGOs straddle the two key productive sectors of agriculture and industry as well as transport and trade. This Chapter focuses on these sectors. It is intended as the complement of the last Chapter. While the last Chapter deals with economic co-operation from the point of view of the role of the IGOs, the present one examines integration itself: the extent of it in specific sectors of the economy, its problems and opportunities for the future, and what measures are required to promote it at an accelerated pace in the interest of the peoples of the subregion.

I. The industrial sector: An overview

187. We shall begin with the industrial sector. The decade of the sixties in West Africa was a period of the widening of the industrial base. The rapid industrialization experience, was largely the result of import substitution strategies undertaken behind high protective tariff walls. The drive was led by Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Senegal, which still continue to dominate the scene.

188. The initial stimulus was provided by the consumer goods industries, notably food processing, tobacco and textiles. These industries were heavily dependent on the imports of intermediate and raw materials. Fully twenty years after the initial spurt, it can be said that the logical next stage of import-substitution of intermediate inputs has been prematurely aborted in West Africa. In some countries, notably Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ghana, the processing of agricultural raw materials in order to reduce deterioration as well as to upgrade traditional exports followed the initial drive. Dramatic increases in manufacturing output were, as a result, observed in Ivory Coast. In Senegal and Ghana, the results were less dramatic due to a much narrower export agricultural base.

189. But if the sixties can be characterized as a period of dynamic industrial activity the decade of the seventies (and especially the latter half) was a decade of crisis in industrialization. At very low levels of the development of productive forces, industrialization (and especially manufacturing activity) either threatened to come to a halt or the process of dramatic decline had already started.

190. Global (West African) trend growth rates for industrial activity for the decade of the seventies are deceptive. They show for example an average annual growth rate of 8.1% for 1975-80 as compared to a GDP growth rate of 7.1% for the same period at 1970 constant factor costs. When manufacturing is isolated, however, the picture becomes much gloomier. Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal experienced a fall in manufacturing activity between 1979 and 1980. In Ghana and Senegal, manufacturing activity declined consistently between 1975 and 1980. Even Ivory Coast experienced a decline in the growth rate of manufacturing activity between 1979 and 1980 (the latest years for which the mission had reliable data). Further, in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Ivory Coast, there were few indications of manufacturing activities.

191. If we take the next five countries in the subregion in terms of the importance of the manufacturing sector (i.e. countries who in 1970 had a manufacturing output of $20 million or more: namely Upper Volta, Mali, Sierra Leone, Togo and Niger) the picture is the same. Sierra Leone, Togo and Mali experienced significant declines in manufacturing output from 1978 to 1980. Only Upper Volta and Niger maintained reasonable rates of growth in manufacturing output. Liberia, a late-comer in the manufacturing

sector, experienced dramatic growth rates in the early seventies. By 1978, however, stagnation and decline had already set in.

192. The crisis in industrialization (and of manufacturing in particular) in the West African subregion is due to three main features of the industrialization process: (a) the nature of the manufacturing sector itself, being geared primarily to the narrow urban market; (b) the dependence of the manufacturing sector on imported capital, intermediate inputs and raw materials;and (c) the domination of the industrial sectors (mining, manufacturing and construction) by transnational corporations.

193. Trade in manufacture within the subregion is marginal. This is partly due to the slowing down of the industrialization process. But in addition to this, the domination of the industrial sectors by transnationals and the duplication of manufacturing establishment in the subregion (itself not unrelated to domination by transnationals), account for the low levels of 'economically rational' trade in manufactures between the countries of the subregion. The significant amount of unrecorded trade in manufactures, both locally produced and imported, is a testimony to the multiplicity of currencies, different levels of currency overvaluations, variations in domestic pricing policies and more generally, to the unharmonized subregional economic management policies.

II. Nature of Industrial production

194. The industrial sector can be classified into four main subsectors: Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity and construction. Mining and quarrying are non-existent or relatively insignificant in Benin, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Upper Volta, Mali, Senegal and Togo. They are of some importance in Ghana, while they are dominant in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mauritania, Guinea and Niger. The last two countries are, however, relatively newcomers in the sense that the major expansion in this sub-sector took place only since 1974. Excepting in Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia and Sierra Leone (where output has declined over the latter half of the 1970s owing to declining investments), this subsector has experienced the most consistent expansion in output. But it is a reflection of the rudimentary state of industrialization in West Africa that the mining and quarrying subsector is almost wholly dependent on extra-subregional markets to which minerals are exported unprocessed. Consequently, in terms of earnings, this subsector is highly vulnerable to international price fluctuations, as Niger and Nigeria have experienced with their exports of uranium and petroleum.

195. For the most part the electricity subsector witnessed consistent positive growth over the decade. The exceptions were Gambia where there was a considerable drop between 1978 and 1980 and Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Liberia, where there were slight drops in production between 1979 and 1980. On the whole, the steady growth in the consumption of electricity has resulted more from increasing urbanization, rather than any accelerated industrialization.

196. The range of manufacturing activities in West Africa can be categorized into nine:

(a) Food processing industries intended for the domestic markets - flour mills, rice (grain) mills, meat processing (slaughtering and refrigeration), dairy, sugar refineries, salt;

(b) Beverages and tobacco for the domestic market - soft drinks, beer breweries, alcohol distilleries, cigarette manufacture under licence from transnational corporations, processing of tea, coffee and cocoa for export;

(c) Transformation of agricultural products - edible oils, processing of fishery products (smoking for the domestic market, canning and freezing for export);

(d) Clothing, textiles and leather products (footwear) - mainly for the internal market and for export to neighbouring countries in the subregion;

(e) Forestry products - saw mills, furniture (primarily for the domestic market and partly for export), rubber manufacture by transnationals (tyres and other rubber products for the local market);

(f) Chemical industries - petrochemicals and related products (plastics, insecticides, pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceutical products, including soap and cosmetics, paints, matches and so on);

(g) Mechanical industries - basically assembly of vehicles and other appliances;

(h) Metal-working industries - mainly aluminium pots and pans, and some minor production of agricultural implements;

(i) Construction materials.

197. These nine categories together with the nascent iron and steel industry in Nigeria practically exhaust the range of manufacturing activities in the subregion.

198. From the point of view of economic co-operation, a number of observations are pertinent. Firstly, it is notable that the range of manufacturing activities is dominated by light consumer goods industries requiring very little processing.

199. Secondly, the same range of industries is encountered with uncanny repetitiveness throughout the sub-region. The exceptions here are the mechanical industries (assembly plants) which are found mainly in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Senegal. The duplication of virtually the same range of manufactures throughout the sub-region highlights the economically non-rational approach to industrialization in the sub-region arising from lack of co-ordinated planning. Since the range of manufactures has been, in most cases, geared to serve the domestic market, which is usually relatively small, most of the existing industrial establishments are condemned to low capacity utilization.

200. Ghana, because of her current economic problems, may represent an extreme case of underutilization of installed manufacturing capacity (estimated at 15-20 %), but the picture elsewhere in the subregion is not any more encouraging. In the Ivory Coast, for instance, according to the country's Ministry of Planning, the 85 most important Ivorian products accepted under the Regional Co-operation Tax (RCT) of the CEAO, come from factories with varying degrees of underutilization.

201. Of the most important Ivorian products accepted under the Regional Co-operation Tax (RCT), utilization of productive capacity was as follows: for 19 products, less than 25 % capacity utilization; for 41 products, capacity utilization was between 25 and 50 %; for 16 products, between 50 % and 75 %. Only 10 had a capacity utilization of 75 % or more.

202. It should be noted that each country, in spite of the existence of organs of economic co-operation, is trying to protect her own 'infant' industries. Since these industries are for the most part in the same range, trade in manufactures is, and will continue to be, at minimal level, even when all the known obstacles to trade are removed. This is at once a result of lack of co-ordination in regional planning and the overly 'nationalistic' economic policies being pursued by the states of the sub-region.

203. This point is crucial enough to justify concrete illustrations, and the examples of cement and sugar industries would serve our purpose. Within the CEAO there is duplication of cement plants amongst the member States. Cement can be manufactured either directly from calcium deposits, where such exist or alternatively, from a semi-finished product called clinker which can be imported. Three CEAO countries with calcium deposits - Senegal, Togo and Mali - have established cement factories. Instead of the Ivory Coast (also belonging to the CEAO) importing her cement from these factories, she has built three pulverizing plants for clinker which she imports from abroad, mainly France and Spain.

204. There is nevertheless notable collaboration of efforts in cement production among a number of countries in West Africa. There is the CIMAO (West African Cement Company) built in Togo with most of its registered capital held by the governments of Togo, Ivory Coast and Ghana, each having 30.7 % of shares. CIMAO produces only clinker which each country takes to feed her pulverizing plant. Another example of notable collaboration of efforts in cement production is the Onigbolo cement plant in the Republic of Benin built by Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. These projects are at present facing administrative and managerial problems, but they are the few instances of collaboration in a region characterized by lack of co-ordination in economic development.

205. But the CIMAO and Onigbolo projects notwithstanding, it is still true that the majority of countries in the subregion can boast of, if not a cement factory, at least of a plan to build one. More than half of the cement factories in the subregion are in fact, pulverizing plants using imported clinker.

206. The same policy of unco-ordinated development and unhealthy petty nationalisms obtains in the sugar industry in a probably more serious fashion. In 1979 Ivory Coast set up SODESUCRE, a complex of six sugar-processing units. Initial production was to be 180,000 tonnes in 1980-81, half of which was intended for export. The raw material for the industry was sugar-cane grown in the north of the country with excellent soil and rainfall conditions. Total investment in the project was 300 billion francs or approximately 10 million US dollars. Annual output of sugar from the plant was estimated at 280,000 tonnes as from 1985. The plant was capable of expansion to a level that could satisfy the demands of the entire CEAO market, if the other member States of the CEAO were willing to participate in the venture.

207. Unfortunately, almost every other country in the sub-region has taken up sugar production including the Sahelian countries with chronic problems of drought. In Senegal in 1972, land traditionally used by peasant farmers for cultivation (the river basin area in the north of the country) was taken over for sugar-cane growing in order to feed the sugar refinery that had been set up. However, the amount of sugar-cane produced has been insufficient to feed the refinery, and the difference is made up by importation of brown sugar (a semi-processed product) from Europe ! The refinery is built in an enclave 370 km from Dakar port, a location which had necessitated high transportation costs that are, of course, passed to the consumer.

208. This duplication of sugar production by Senegal and the failure of Senegal and Ivory Coast to harmonize their industrial programmes have had detrimental effects on the economies of the two countries. For two months in 1981 Senegal experienced acute shortage of sugar. It was precisely during this period that Ivory Coast was confronted with the problem of overproduction of sugar, arising from the failure of the European Economic Community (EEC) to honour an earlier agreement in the Lome Convention to purchase sugar from the African;Carribean and Pacific (ACP) countries at higher than current world prices. It is an ironic situation indeed that a situation of acute shortage and overproduction of the same basic consumer good could exist in the same sub-region and within the same organization, the CEAO, that is supposed to serve as their common umbrella for development.

209. Duplication of plants among the member States arising from failure to co-ordinate industrial policies and their autarkic attitude to industrialisation will not contribute to balanced and accelerated industrial development. Indeed, in West Africa, industrialization has failed to live up to its promise of serving as an engine of growth and structural transformation and of modernizing agricultural production. Rather than stimulating rapid structural transformation, industrialization may already be constituting a brake on development. The present range of industries, for the most part, continue to absorb more and more surpluses generated in other sectors of the economy while contributing virtually nothing to the modernization of these same sectors. Virtually all capital equipment and the (intermediate) inputs for most of the industries are almost wholly imported.

TABLE 5.1

TRANSNATIONALS IN 10 ECOWAS COUNTRIES

Host Country	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Switzerland	W. Germany	Denmark	France	U.K.	Hong Kong	Italy	India	Japan	Netherlands	Norway	U.S.A.	Sweden	Other	Total	Industrial value added in 1980 $ million (1970) constant factor costs
Benin						3		11	3		2			1		1			21	29.3
Gambia						4		1	2					1		1			9	10.4
Ghana			1	2	2	9	1	5	48		2			9	1	14			94	428.3
Ivory Coast	1		5		5	19		61	6		2		2	5		12	1		119	582.3
Liberia			1	2	1	16	1	9	26	10	9		6	8	1	86	4		180	147.1
Nigeria	1	1	1	7	9	39		24	171	2	8	3	15	16	1	81		9	388	5,917.7
Niger						3		9	2							1		1	16	85.8
Senegal			4		2	13		47	3				4	2		6		1	82	225.2
Sierra Leone					1				11		1					3			16	91.3
Upper Volta					1	2		11	1					1		3			19	71.4

Source: Joint ECA/CTNC Unit on TNCs (E/ECA/CTNC/9) 1982; and ECA Socio-Economic Research Division.

210. The total dependence of the industrial sector on imports of capital goods and intermediate raw materials explains why industrialization in West Africa is subject to periodic debilitating crises. It also explains why industrialization in the sub-region has had limited scope for employment opportunities or has failed to stimulate through backward and forward linkages, the growth of other sectors.

211. Moreover, absence of harmonized industrial development in West Africa has heightened dependence on transnational corporations and the consequential outflow of resources from the sub-region to developed countries. The number of transnational corporations in the sub-region engaged in mining, banking (finance), insurance, petroleum industries (mining and exploration), food processing, transport especially air transport and shipping, construction, vehicle assembly, hotel management, retail distribution and even plantation agriculture is simply staggering. Table 4.1 compiled by the joint ECA/CTNC unit on transnationals, covering ten ECOWAS countries, is revealing.

212. It is clear from the table that the United States and the United Kingdom maintain a presence in each of the ten countries. For historical reasons the United States has particularly strong links with Liberia, while Britain maintains strong presence in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone. France also has a presence in almost all the countries of the sub-region, (excepting Sierra Leone), with the largest number of her transnationals in Ivory Coast, Senegal and Nigeria in that order. France is closely followed by West Germany which also maintains strong presence in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ghana the four most industrialized countries of the sub-region.

213. Time did not permit an exhaustive investigation into the involvement of transnationals in all branches of industrial activity in the sub-region. But there are enough indications of their involvement on the basis of which judgement can be made. Compare Tables 4.2 to 4.6 (taken from *l'Industrie Africaine en* 1979) of the involvement of transnationals in the industries of five French-speaking countries - Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Senegal and Niger.

TABLE 5·2 (NIGER)

Type of Activity (1)	Social Capital 2 (million CFA)	National share per cent Total	National share per cent Public	Foreign share per cent Total	Foreign share per cent French
Extractive industries	7,885	32	32	68	45
Vegetable oil and animal fats	865	45	38	55	—
Food industries	170	100	98	-	—
Beverage industries	577	7	—	93	83
Textile industries	102	27	17	73	12
Chemical industries	454	36	31	64	29
Construction materials	972	97	91	3	
Engineering industries	152	100	55		—
Electricity and water	2,300	100	100	—	—
General total (estimate)	13,480	50	48	50	31

(1) Account not taken of Agro-industries. (2) Account not taken of national companies without social capital (OLANI; Abattoir frigorifique; ONPPC; ONERSOLO).

TABLE 5.3 (SENEGAL)

Type of Activity	Social Capital (million CFA)	National Share per cent Total	National Share per cent Public	Foreign Share prr cent Total	Foreign Share prr cent French
Extractive industries	9,862	50	50	50	36
Processing of sea products	1,712	60	10	40	39
Vegetable oil and animal fats	7,026	46	46	54	54
Agro industries	9,645	8	7.5	92	92
Food industries	2,544	23	17	77	73
Beverage industries	1,520	—	—	100	100
Tobacco industries	1,314	—	—	100	100
Textile industries	3,358	23	23	77	77
Footwear industries	1,155	—	—	100	—
Chemical industries	5,345	11	3	89	70
Construction materials	2;132	75	3	25	22
Engineering industries	2,855	11	2	89	86
Paper industry	667	2	—	98	79
Electricity and water	2,600	99	99	1	1
General total (estimate)	51,735	32	25	68	58

TABLE 5.4 (TOGO)

Type of activity	Social Capital (million CFA)	National Share Per cent Total	National Share Per cent Public	Foreign Share Per cent Total	Foreign Share Per cent French
Extractive industries	3,722	99	99	1	1
Vegetable oil and animal fats	1,320	100	100	—	—
Food industries	1,117	71	71	29	29
Beverage industries	665	39	36	61	19
Textile industries	540	37	25	63	—
Footwear industries	187	2	—	88	—
Chemical industries	4,586	62	59	38	4
Construction materials	19,790	32	32	68	6
Engineering industries	640	87	84	13	13
Electricity and water	879	100	100	—	—
General total (estimate)	33,446	50	49.5	50	5.5

TABLE 5.5 (UPPER VOLTA)

Type of activity	Number of companies	Social Capital (million CFA)	National share Per cent Total	National share Per cent Public	Foreign share Per cent Total	Foreign share Per cent French
Agro-industries	2	4,215	70	69	30	30
Food industries	5	385	74	16.5	26	26
Beverage industries	2	1,125	20	—	80	80
Tobacco industries	1	230	15	—	85	85
Textile industries	1	1,500	79	65	21	19
Footwear industries	1	112	35	—	65	345
Chemical industries	9	1,178	50.5	4.5	49.5	—
Construction materials	2	82	100	41	—	—
Engineering industries	4	340	50.5	5.5	49.5	49.5
Paper industries	1	100	100	—		
Electricity	1	130	100	100	—	—
General total (estimate)	29	9,398	61	43	39 %	36

TABLE 5.6

SHARE OF IVORIAN AND FOREIGN INTERESTS IN THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES

Type of Activity	Number of companies	Social Capital (million CFA)	Ivorian share per cent		Foreign share per cent	
			Total	Public	Total	French
Extraction of ores and minerals	1	50	—	—	100	50
Milling	131 (1)	3,544	14.5	8.70	85.5	51
Food preservation and preparation	21	10,225	41.3	31	58.7	19
Beverage and ice block	8	4,164	24.8	3.8	75.2	42.5
Manufacture of vegetable oils and animal fats	5	8,292	50.5	36	49.5	40
Other food and tobacco industries	10	13,712	94.3	93.2	5.7	5
Textile and clothing industries	36	16,011	38.2	25.5	61.8	28
Leather and footwear industries	13	684	0.7	—	99.3	50
Wood industries	108	10,000	24	—	76	55.5
Petroleum refining and manufacture of byproducts	3	2,170	29.5	29.3	70.9	25
Chemical industries	51	5,560	25.5	14.9	74.5	56
Rubber industries	5	4,522	51	46.7	49	49
Construction materials industries	19	2,418	32.6	25.5	67.4	40
Steel and preliminary transformation of metals	1	400	100	40	—	—
Construction and reparation of transport equipment	20	2,857	12	8.5	88	86
Other engineering and electrical industries	40	4,472	23.8	9	74.2	21
Other industries	79 (2)	2,048	58	35	42	21
Electricity and water	2	3,902	74	58	26	26
General total	553	95,031	44.66	33.01	55.34	33.98

(1) of which 125 are bakeries
(2) of which 67 are printing plants

214. In Ivory Coast, foreign companies controlled 55.3 % of share capital in industrial establishments with the highest concentrations in mining (100 %), leather and footwear (99.3 %), mechanical industries (88 %), petroleum refinery and related products (70.9 %), chemical industries (74.5 %). In Senegal, the control by foreign companies of Senegalese industries was even higher (68 %) with the highest concentrations in leather and footwear (100 %), beverages and tobacco (100 %), agro-industries (92 %), chemical and mechanical industries (89 %), and paper products (98%). In the relatively less industrialized countries of Togo and Niger, foreign control of industries was 50 % in each case while it was 43 % in Upper Volta. In virtually all the five countries foreign control was most dominant in mining, beverages and tobacco, textiles, leather and footwear, construction materials, chemical and mechanical industries. The conclusion is obvious. The transnational companies have dominated industrial production in the five countries. From all indications, the picture is not very different elsewhere in the sub-region.

215. The continuing dominant position of transnationals in the control of industries in countries of the sub-region is detrimental to the economic welfare of the countries and the process of sub-regional economic integration. The transnationals engage in industries which use imported intermediate raw materials. Since these are usually supplied by subsidiaries of the same transnationals, the existing range of industries in West Africa lend themselves too easily to transfer pricing and exploitation. This is of course, the common practice of transnationals the world over. It is a practice which is bound to accentuate the

problems of balance of payments being experienced by the countries of the sub-region. In the areas of mining and other resource-based industries (tropical hardwood processing in Ivory Coast, bauxite in Sierra Leone, aluminium industry in Ghana), studies already carried out by the joint ECA/CTNC unit have shown the extent of capital outflows that are easily attributed to the dominant position of the transnationals in these industries.[2]

216. The domination of a group of national economies by transnationals augurs ill for economic integration schemes. This point has been amply demonstrated by a recent study of UDEAC, the integration scheme for Central Africa.[3] The findings of that study are equally applicable to the West African sub-region.

217. Transnationals flock to the relatively more developed areas to take advantage of local capital markets and good infrastructure, thus exacerbating intra-regional inequality, leading to further polarization within the subregion. Within an integration scheme, the countries that are less able to attract transnationals are increasingly doomed to be net importers. For their imports, they would be paying higher prices than would have been the case without an integration scheme, due to over-invoicing of imported goods and high cost production within high protective walls and oligopolistic market structures. The seeming advantages of hosting transnationals - employment opportunities and tax revenues - viewed against the disadvantages of importing from neighbouring countries at high cost in the absence of satisfactory compensation mechanisms, tends to encourage the duplication of industrial productive facilities. Thus as in Central Africa, countries would tend to produce the same range of goods, and the regional market is thus effectively segmented.

218. The conclusion of a recent mission to the UDEAC countries would seem to apply with equal force to the ECOWAS subregion:

> "In the absence of more thorough going regional planning and regulatory mechanism . . . efforts at co-ordinating production in agriculture or industry are likely to fail as pressures from transnational corporations reinforce the nationalism of UDEAC member States, thereby encouraging the duplication of productive capacity and vertical linkages to the advanced industrial countries, induce the continued disarticulation of the national economies[4]".

219. In sum, it is clear from our study of the pattern of industrialization in West Africa that the sub-region is facing a serious crisis in industrialization. Not only has industrialization failed to aid development, it continues to occasion capital outflows, largely as a result of domination by transnationals. The import substitution approach to industrialization has reached its limits in the sub-region. West Africa stands in need of a new approach to industrialization that will help the sub-region break the vicious circle of poverty and dependence that is vitiating her efforts at development.

220. We would suggest a two-pronged approach. First, emphasis in industrialization must shift away from import-based consumer goods to what are being referred to as 'new wave' industries. These are heavy industries based on local resources, that entail backward and forward linkages to other sectors of the economy. The list of such industries that can be drawn up is almost endless: iron and steel complexes, petro-chemicals, production of pesticide active substance, ammonia plants and so on. If such industries would serve their purpose, participation in them by transnationals must be kept to the barest minimum.

221. These industries would however, require substantial investments. The establishment of any 'new wave' industry is beyond the individual financial capacity of most countries of the West African sub-region. Here, once again, the pointer is to the necessity for co-operation among the countries of the sub-region. There is clearly no alternative if they would not remain in perpetual penury or forever tied to the apron-strings of transnational corporations.

222. We note with considerable satisfaction that some of these industries are already emerging or are being planned either single-handedly or on the basis of co-operation among member countries of the sub-region. Nigeria is establishing iron and steel complexes, some of which are already going into production, and is participating in proposed heavy industrial projects in Guinea. A fertilizer plant is being proposed to be established in Senegal, with Ivory Coast, Niger and Cameroon participating. In the area of (industrial) infrastructure, Ghana, as far back as 1960, built the Akosombo dam to supply electricity not only to Ghana, but also to her neighbours, Togo and Benin. These two countries now enjoy constant electricity supply at a rate that is probably the lowest in the sub-region. There is also a plan between Ghana and Nigeria on the one hand, and between Ghana and Ivory Coast on the other to hook up their electricity distribution networks to facilitate the use by one country of any surplus in another.

223. These are no more than initial faltering steps in the direction of reorienting the economy of the sub-region. It is a trend in development that, of necessity, must be actively encouraged.

224. The other aspect of the suggested approach to industrialization is the urgent necessity for collective action in dealing with transnationals. Transnationals "bestride the narrow world" like colossi, and no country can single-handedly deal with them effectively. As we have seen, and as many other studies have demonstrated, they thwart efforts at economic co-operation. There is therefore a necessity in West Africa for a "frontal attack" on the transnationals in the sub-region. Their activities must be monitored throughout the sub-region for a continual close study of their modes of operation. Uniform laws and regulations must be set up throughout the sub-region to cover a range of their activities - investment policies, capital transfers, development of technology, employment of indigenes, marketing of manufactures, and the like.

225. In all this, as well as in the development of "new wave" industries, the organs of co-operation that have been set up in the sub-region face a most arduous task indeed. They, more than the individual States, or any organizations outside the sub-region, must keep the eyes of the governments and peoples of West Africa constantly riveted on the high goals that they now must set for themselves in the area of industrialization, and, more importantly, plan towards their achievement.

III. Trade in West Africa

226. Valiant efforts are being made in the sub-region to increase intra sub-regional trade, and, thus, to change the traditional North-South pattern of trade. It is no accident that most of the IGOs in the sub-region put great premium on trade, and are, indeed, in some cases, primarily oriented towards increasing trade. There are numerous bilaterial agreements among the countries of the sub-region intended to serve the same purpose.

227. But the increase in the volume of intra sub-regional trade has been far from being commensurate with the efforts at promoting it. At present, total recorded intra-sub-regional trade is estimated at 4% of total external trade of the countries of West Africa. But the relative value of intra-sub-regional trade to overall trade between the sub-region and the rest of the world has declined over the past eight years. Thus even though the value of intra sub-regional exports increased from 240 million US$ in 1973 to over 600 million US$ in 1976, the corresponding share of intra sub-regional exports in overall exports declined in percentage terms from 4% to 3.2% over the same period. The share of intra-sub-regional imports in overall imports also declined over the same period from 5% to 3.8%.

228. These figures refer only to official recorded trade. A recent research has estimated the value of unrecorded trade within the sub-region to be over US$ 2 billion for the year 1976, involving all categories of primary products, local manufactured goods and foreign imported products. Also entering into this trade are millions of dollars worth of gold, diamonds and local narcotics and drugs.

229. Smuggling is, of course, the medium of unrecorded trade. It has reached notorious proportions in recent years, partly as a result of multiplicity of currencies within the sub-region. Currency over-valuation and imprudent pricing policies of a number of states, trade restrictions, multiplicity of trade facilitation documents, ethnic affiliation across common borders have compounded the problem.

230. Smuggling is vitiating the economies of the countries of the sub-region. It should be remembered that about 30% of the principal agricultural produce and precious metals such as gold and diamond produced in the sub-region are involved in unrecorded trade. It is estimated, for instance, that Ghana lost about 30,000 tons of cocoa through smuggling into neighbouring states during 1977 at a time when the world market price of cocoa was over US$2,400 per ton. Similarly, Mali was said to have lost $1,318,200 in 1979 through smuggling activities in her trade in cattle, sheep and goats with Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia and Senegal.[5]

231. Generally speaking, as Table 4.7 indicates, intra sub-regional trade has increased over the years since 1964. But the increase is not proportional to the potential of the sub-region for intra sub-regional trade. The natural positioning of the countries within the sub-region (i.e. land-locked *vis-a-vis* coastal countries, rain-forest region *vis-a-vis* Sahelian region) favours trade. Again, the sub-region exhibits disparities in levels of industrialization, and endowments in natural resources. Thus, there exist tremendous prospects for intra-sub-regional trade. Because of the ecological diversities in the sub-region, the staples of trade (recorded and unrecorded) are, in the main, food and live animals, locally produced agricultural products, handicrafts and manufactured goods.

232. But the volume of the present sub-regional trade is only a very small fraction of what is possible. For instance, in the case of food and live animals, the net import potential of Nigeria was estimated at US$3,500 million with an annual growth rate of 10%. On the other hand, the net export potential of Niger and Mali in live animals (basically cattle) was estimated at just over US$ 120 million for the same year - far less than what Nigeria alone could consume. Similarly, for fish and fish products, the net import potential of both Nigeria and Ivory Coast exceeded US$ 250 million in 1980, while net export potential of Senegal and Ghana amounted to US$ 100 million in the same year - again, far less than the consumption level required by the two countries.

233. Why have the potentials in intra-subregional trade not been realized ? Earlier on, we discussed the problems of industrialization in the sub-region, and why it could not lead to any appreciable intra-sub-regional trade.

234. But there are other obstacles to trade. Mention was made of the multiplicity of currencies in the sub-region. Apart from the CFA franc (used by Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta), there is the Liberian dollar, the Malian franc (with fixed parity to the CFA franc), the Mauritanian Oumguilla, the Nigerian Naira, the Ghanaian Cedi, the Sierra Leonean Leone, the Gambian Dalasi, the Pesetos of Guinea-Bissau, the Escudos of Cape Verde and the Guinean Syli.

TABLE 5.7
PATTERN OF INTRA-WEST AFRICAN TRADE (EXPORTS), 1964 - 1975
(in million US dollars)

Country	1964	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
Benin	1	1	2	2	5	6	6	4	4	4	6*	10*
Gambia	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	—	0	1	2*
Ghana	4	3	3	1	2	2	2	4	5	1	5	8*
Guinea	—	—	—	—	0*	0*	0*	0*	0*	0*	1*	1*
Guinea-Bissau	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liberia	—	1	0	2	3	2	3	2	4	3	5	6*
Mali	8	14	12	13	6	12	20	18	18	22	20	4*
Mauritania	0	0	0	0	1*	2*	2*	4	0*	0*	0*	0*
Niger	7	8	9	7	8*	7	11	14	18	20	18	4*
Nigeria	14	9	8	8	5	8	7	31	30	53	160	151
Ivory Coast	11	12	14	18	21	23	26	24	37	64	114	150
Senegal	1	2	4	7*	12	15	29	29	27	48	66	64*
Sierra Leone	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	4
Togo	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	4	7
Upper Volta	8	11	11	12	15	12	9	9	12	12	17	19*
Total West African Trade	55	62	65	73	78	90	117	142	158	243	420	430
Total West Trade	1,860						2,959			6,040		12,864
West African Trade as % of World Trade	2.9						4			4		3.3

Source: *A Statistical Handbook, April 1977*; Trade among Developing Countries, 1964-1975. Research Centre for Co-oper ation with Developing Countries Ljubljane, Yugoslavia.

241. A poor state of transport and communication system in a sub-region as large as West Africa is a real disincentive to trade. The Liberian Deputy Minister of Planning, informed this mission about how trade between Liberia and Sierra Leone, two contiguous countries, is being hampered by the prohibitive costs of transportation. According to her, motor transport owners in Monrovia were charging anything up to about US $600 for a full wagon of commercial goods going to Freetown!

242. Related to the problem of transportation is that of lack of information about the trade possibilities of the countries of the sub-region. West African States keep themselves ignorant of one another and follow the traditional colonial pattern of their trade by seeking markets for their goods in Europe and the United States. There is clearly a vacuum here yearning to be filled. A trade review of ECOWAS countries, which could be published annually by, say, the ECOWAS Secretariat, would serve a useful purpose indeed to promote trade in the sub-region. Such a "Review" could indicate what items or commodities each country could offer for trade and their prices for export. Conversely, a country could place in the "Review" what her requirements are of particular commodities.

243. It is only proper to comment on the position, and possibly, the achievement of the three principal organs in the sub-region that have been set up at least partly to promote trade. The first, in time sequence, is the West African Economic Community (CEAO), established on 17 April 1973, comprising Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Senegal. The next is the Mano River Union (MRU), established on 3 October 1973, comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia and (since 25 October 1980) Guinea. The youngest, but the most all-embracing of them is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established on 28 May 1975, comprising all the sixteen countries of the sub-region. They were all conceived by their respective founding fathers as developmental organs, and a cardinal objective of each of them has been the liberalization of trade among the member states comprising them.

244. How have they fared in this task? Against the background of what has been said earlier about the obstacles to intra-regional trade, it is easy to appreciate that the organizations have sought to promote trade among the member states in the face of great odds. One should therefore not be surprised if not much concrete achievement in this direction can be credited to them. It is also a point officials and Ministers were quick to highlight during our investigations in the field. It is hard to forget the pithy remarks in respect of ECOWAS of the Director-General of Customs, Praia, Cape Verde: "There are no goods, and we cannot integrate or trade without exchange of goods".[8] That is a fair summing up of the state of things in matters of trade in West Africa.

245. But the organizations have one achievement to their credit. Within the ambit of their respective treaties, they have striven to pave the way for liberalization of trade. For instance, between 1979 and 1980, ECOWAS took some far-reaching decisions on the liberalization of trade within the Community. Although the decisions are yet to be implemented by the member states, the organization has instituted for the whole sub-region common customs nomenclature, common customs declaration forms, common statistical standards and definitions, and ECOWAS certificate of origin. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment in its first phase (which unfortunately has been ratified by only nine of the sixteen member states) can also be seen as a measure of promoting intercourse and trade in the sub-region. A number of other measures have been adopted, although none has been implemented: classification of a list of non-tariff barriers, adoption of inter-state transit regime, and liberalization of trade in locally produced goods.

246. Similarly within the CEAO the following programmes are being implemented: assistance for the establishment and development of national organs for promoting trade; provision of livestock markets in the six member states. Again, at least in theory, trade has now been liberalized in handicrafts and wholly produced agricultural products. Some measures of liberalization of trade in industrial products have also been achieved through the institution of a Regional Co-operation Tax (TCR) to repalce customs duties. A limited degree of harmonization of customs regulations and documentation has also been achieved. A Protocol has now been adopted on the definition of "Community enterprises".

247. The Mano River Union has also taken notable steps in paving the way for liberalization of trade. It has established a common external tariff for the member states, and has harmonized the rates of import duties applicable to goods of local origin.

248. Largely for historical reasons, the three organizations have not worked *in tandem*; each has struck out on its own, doing what it considers best within the framework of its treaty, to liberalize trade or adopt other measures to promote economic co-operation among its members. It is therefore not surprising that there are actual and potential areas of conflict in the measures so far adopted to liberalize trade. If they are not resolved now, they are bound to compound further the problems of intra-sub-regional trade in West Africa. If the three organizations continue to pursue their different ways, they would certainly end up with policies and programmes which would seriously militate against the achievement of a harmonized trade liberalization scheme in the sub-region as a whole.

249. It is true that on the platform of ECOWAS, the three organizations have agreed to the use of common harmonized trade documents, customs nomenclature, statistical standards, customs declaration forms, certificates of origin and movement of persons. But some fundamental differences still exist. First, the time-tables for tariff liberalization in the three organizations are different as can be seen from Table 5.8.

TABLE 5.8

COMPARATIVE TIME-TABLES FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN WEST AFRICA

Economic Programme and Activity	ECOWAS	CEAO	MRU
Agricultural and wholly produced goods			
(1) Removal of all non-tariff barriers	Beginning May 1981	already in effect	already in effect
(2) Removal of all tariff barriers	Beginning May 1981	already in effect	already in effect
Industrial Products			
(1) Removal of all non-tariff barriers	By 28 May 1981	already in effect	already in effect
(2) Removal of all tariff barriers	By 28 May 1989	No specific date for elimination of TCR	already in effect except for Guinea
Common External Tariff	By 28 May 1989	By mid-1986	already in effect except for Guinea

Thus, whereas MRU countries have, at least in theory, reached zero tariff levels with respect to Union trade in industrial products, ECOWAS has not as yet started reducing tariffs. CEAO on its part has reached an advanced stage in her programme of tariff reductions, but it does not intend to reach zero tariff level by the logic of its *modus operandi*. Within CEAO, loss of revenue through trade in manufacured goods is, at least in theory, compensated for by the relatively more industrialized exporting states. To abolish all tariffs would thus increase the amount of financial burden which the relatively less industrialized states would bear. Within CEAO, customs duties have been reduced (but not totally abolished), and a Regional Co-operation Tax (TCR) instituted for the benefit of the less industrialized states importing industrial goods from the more industrialized.

250. The implications of the disharmonies in the time-tables and programmes of trade liberalization of the three organizations is simply that ECOWAS member States who are not members of either the CEAO or MRU cannot trade with either group. Already MRU and CEAO are insisting that ECOWAS should catch up with them in its own scheme of tariff reductions before the three organizations would begin to embark upon a common programme of further liberalization in trade matters.

251. A second fundamental difference is in the area of compensation schemes for loss of revenue by member states in trading in industrial goods. ECOWAS compensation scheme covers revenue losses in respect of industrial goods only. The loss in revenue of any member state is based on the difference between what the consolidated duties would have yielded, and the amount collected on the preferential rates. Contribution to the compensation budget is based on the share of each member state in the total intra-community export trade in industrial products. One fifth of the entitlement of the four relatively more industrialized countries - Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ghana - is intended to be redistributed to the remaining twelve member states for an initial period of five years only.

252. The CEAO compensation scheme is similar to that of ECOWAS, and it is based on the TCR and the Community Development Fund (FCE). A major difference from the ECOWAS scheme is that the CEAO reimburses only to the tune of two-thirds of a member state's contribution. The one-third held back was once reserved by the Secretariat for the exclusive use of the four less developed States (Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta), but is now used for purposes of general development.

253. The MRU has no compensation schemes as such for loss of revenue by its member states occasioned by trade liberalization.

254. There is also the question of degree of indigenous participation in the manufacture of products to be traded in within each Community - a matter on which the three organizations have not reached any agreement. ECOWAS has drawn up a progressive scheme of indigenous participation in the manufacture of articles entering into Community trade:

20% indigenous participation by May 1981;
35% indigenous participation by May 1983;
51% indigenous participation by May 1989,

The CEAO and MRU countries have no such schemes.

255. Philosophies of development are in conflict. In the view of ECOWAS, the benefits of sub-regional economic co-operation should, in the main, accrue to the citizens of the community. A situation where the entire sub-regional market will be open to goods made within or outside the sub-region without substantial indigenous contribution, we agree, is analogous to a colonial system. Both the CEAO and the MRU, on the other hand, have argued that their economies are underdeveloped; that they lack the abundant natural resources of some of the ECOWAS countries; and that they require as much financial and other resources as they could muster from the wider world. The introduction of any 'indigenization' scheme, in their view, is therefore bound to deter the flow of foreign investment and hamper their economic development.

256. For the future, the consequences of this conflict of philosophies of development between ECOWAS on the one hand, and MRU and CEAO on the other, can easily be predicted. The industrial products emanating from both the CEAO and the MRU countries, if they held on to their philosophies, are not likely to meet the indigenization requirements of ECOWAS, and would not be admissible as "Community products" for trading purposes in ECOWAS.

257. We were impressed by the efforts being made by the three organizations (in collaboration with the Niamey-based MULPOC) to resolve these differences in the trade liberalization schemes. More rounds of discussions have been scheduled and it is hoped that a common harmonized institutional. framework for intra-sub-regional trade would eventually emerge. Such a common framework is a necessity, The alternative is a negation of economic integration, unhealthy rivalries, a segmented sub-regional market and exploitation by foreigners.

258. Whether the three organizations can, in collaboration with MULPOC, come up with such a common harmonized framework is, in our view, open to doubt. Unless there is a common view and working relationship among them, each is likely to continue to maintain its position armed by its Treaty and Protocols. We take up this issue in the next chapter.

259. Following the establishment of a common framework for trade liberalization in the sub-regions, the task of creating an effective West African common Market can then begin in earnest. We would suggest, the implementation of a two-staged programme:

(a) total liberalization of trade in locally produced agricultural products and industrial raw materials as indicated in the treaties of the three organizations. This would involve the total elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in such products;

(b) gradual liberalization of trade in industrial products. This would entail drawing up a new list of approved industrial products, consolidation of new tariff levels for each category of products, taking into consideration the existing levels in the three organizations. It would also entail determination of a new range of tariff preferences by categories of products with necessary adjustments in favour of goods from the relatively less developed countries. If the countries of the sub-region are seriously committed to economic co-operation, it should be possible to achieve a common external tariff by 1990, and total tariff liberalization within the sub-region by 1995.

260. In our investigation in the field, we encountered considerable skepticism in a number of states, particularly the relatively less developed ones, about what real benefit they could derive from trade. Nor were they enthusiastic about the value of monetary compensation for loss in trade.

261. We very much share this skepticism. Co-operation in trade can only be useful as an instrument of integration among a group of states, if and only if it is supported by related measures which would ensure the strengthening of the productive capacities of the states, and redress any imbalance in the existing levels of development among them. To be sure, the gains from common trade cannot be evenly distributed in the short run; but serious efforts must be made to ensure that every member has some tangible returns from its participation.

262. It is in this connection that we would advocate a comprehensive scheme of compensation to run parallel with the efforts at trade liberalization. This could involve the creation of a support fund for the infrastructural and industrial development of the less developed countries of the sub-region, in particular, the land-locked countries. Community projects in the area of transport and communications could also be geared to the peculiar needs of the less developed countries so as to accelerate their development. On the whole, a compensation scheme which aims at the physical development of the relatively underdeveloped states, if executed with a sense of commitment, is much preferable to one which merely seeks to reimburse their coffers.

IV. Transport and Communications

263. There is not much that can be added to what has been said earlier about the serious problems posed by the inadequacy of transport and communication networks in West Africa. We note with satisfaction the progress being made on the PANAFTEL communication network. But a lot of work needs to be done as far as road, rail and air transport are concerned. The West African road haulage is not sufficiently well organized to constitute an instrument of economic integration. Existing railway lines need rehabilitation, and the construction of new lines should be linked to a sub-regional mining policy. For only a community mining policy can serve as the basis for a proper West African railway network. This is the time to adopt a common railway gauge. Unilateral national decision by any country on this vital issue will do an irreparable damage for the future.

264. Air transport has a major role to play in both inter-regional and intra-regional trade. Unfortunately most national airlines are in financially bad shape, having to be dependent on government subsidies from time to time. The challenge to West Africa is building a sub-regional airline capable of competing effectively with major airlines of the world.

V. Agriculture in West Africa

265. It is perhaps trite to observe that agriculture is the nerve of the economies of the different countries of West Africa. About 70-89 % of the active population of the various countries depend on it for their livelihood; it contributes the major portion of the gross domestic product (GDP) in all the countries, excepting Cape Verde and Nigeria. For the vast majority of the countries of the sub-region, it is the major foreign exchange earner.

266. Yet it is this sector that has been most hit by the current economic crisis which is plaguing the countries of the sub-region. The indications are many: extremely low levels of income for the rural populations; very slow growth rate of food production (1.5 % as against a population growth rate of about 2.7 %); unprecedented increases in imports of food (rice, wheat and maize) resulting in increasing dependence on the external world for the most basic needs of the population. Agricultural exports have diminished or have ceased altogether in many countries - witness the dramatic disappearance of the once-flourishing groundnut pyramids in Kano. The 'Sahelian' countries of the sub-region have become recipients of food aid. Annexes II - VII portray all this unpleasant picture in statistical terms.

267. Much was said in chapter II of this Report about the poor performance of the agricultural sector in the 1970s. The problem the sub-region is facing is not simply inadequacy of food production, but a general agrarian crisis. The general picture is that of rural areas of the sub-region gradually, but steadily, being depopulated. Shortage of agricultural manpower is quite real, resulting from mass exodus of the young into the urban centres. Is it any surprise that imports of food continued to increase in most of the countries of the sub-region throughout the decade of the 1970s?

268. The major reasons for the present agrarian crisis in the sub-region can be summed up in one word: neglect. Most countries place emphasis in their development plans on the agricultural sector, but

this has generally amounted to little more than lip service. Agricultural development plans are not usually implemented with the seriousness that they deserve. Financial allocations that go to agriculture are usually inadequate, nor are development strategies in other sectors designed to enhance its modernization. Thus in spite of the predominant role of agriculture, industries with forward linkages to agriculture are hardly developed. It is also a reflection of the history of neglect which agriculture has suffered that proper attention has, in the past, not been given to the supply of agricultural inputs-fertilizers, insecticides, farm implements, storage facilities, spare parts for agricultural machinery. Few countries have embarked upon a programme of effectively opening up the rural areas by a network of motorable roads to facilitate internal domestic trade in agricultural products.

269. Other factors have contributed to the poor state of agriculture in the subregion. The recurrent droughts of the 1970s' have hit agriculture hard, especially in the countries of the Sahel. The problem of the drought is still with us, as no permanent solution has been found to the increasing desertification of the area.

270. A number of writers have also blamed the agricultural pricing policies of the governments of the sub-region. According to a recent World Bank Report,[9] the institution, by most governments, of marketing boards or agricultural parastatals that operate with similar effect, has meant high taxation of agricultural exports. But while farmers receive depressed prices for their products, they pay highly for industrial goods. This decline in rural-urban terms of trade would explain shortage of agricultural manpower and the mass exodus to the urban areas.

271. The ovevalued exchange rates of some of the countries have also served as a disincentive to agriculture. In many countries, what is received officially for agricultural exports is pitifully at variance with the real value of the currency in the open market. Hence the phenomenon that is very common in West Africa of smuggling of agricultural products across neighbouring borders.

272. What should be done for the future? We are convinced beyond doubt that a subregional global approach to the problem of agricultural production has the best chance of success in this sector.

273. Developments in the agricultural sector are already pointing to the necessity for such an approach. Take, for instance, the problem of drought and the continuing desertification of the northern belt of the sub-region. The recurrent drought in the Sahel is not althogether an act of God; carelessness and mismanagement of the forest zone have been a contributory factor. As an official of an IGO in Benin has rather forcefully put the point, the countries in the forest zone of the sub-region "cannot do whatever they want with the forests and expect that their actions would have no repercussions on the climatic conditions of the interior". The forest zone, he argued, is the common heritage of all Africans in the sub-region. For this reason "the drought is our collective responsibility".

274. Similarly pointing to the necessity for a sub-regional approach to agricultural production is the current problem of smuggling. The existence of disparate agricultural price policies especially in the area of food crops, has led to substantial clandestine trade in these crops, thus neutralizing all attempts at national self-sufficiency. The solution is not only in forging a common policy for accelerated food production, but also in harmonizing agricultural prices in the sub-region.

275. Contrary to the view repeatedly pressed on us at many places during our investigations in the field, joint agricultural production by countries will raise many more problems than it would solve. We believe that the best strategy is to allow each country to execute its own agricultural programme within the framework of a Master Plan that is centrally co-ordinated and effectively monitored.

276. It is clearly beyond the scope of our mission to draw up a detailed Master Plan for agriculture in the sub-region. Such a task calls for a concerted effort of experts in many areas of agriculture. But one can easily envisage many programmes in such a Plan:

(a) Afforestation;
(b) Research - including research into the food requirements of the sub-region;
(c) Agricultural inputs - fertilizers, insecticides, etc.;
(d) Development of agricultural machinery;
(e) War against pests;
(f) Agro-meteorology;
(g) Irrigation;
(h) Animal health;
(i) External trade in commodities: harmonization of policies.

277. In drawing up and executing the Master Plan, the IGOs in the sub-region have a vital role to play The task of drawing up the Plan, and of general coordination, for reasons which are made explicit in the following chapter, should be assigned to ECOWAS. Fortunately, most of the IGOs are already involved in one aspect or the other of the programmes suggested above. WARDA, CEBV, OCLALAV, AGHRYMET are making commendable contributions to agriculture in research, agro-meteorology or pest-control. In the same manner, OMVG, OMVS, are making appreciable efforts in their domain to put of more land under irrigation.The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) has on its drawing board a programme afforestation intended to counter the endemic problem of drought in the Sahel belt of the sub-region.

278. What is required then is proper organization and co-ordination of efforts. This should entail specific allocations of programmes and/or functions to particular IGOs or states in the sub-region. Research clearly belongs to WARDA, which as we suggested earlier should be funded to enlarge its research activities beyond rice to cover other cereals. WARDA's programme should also include a thorough study of the farming systems in the sub-region. Part of its research should also be a continual assessment of the food requirements of the sub-region. The institution should be able to provide information about the potentials of each ecological zone of the subregion for food production and how to ensure a measure of complementarities among them.

279. Irrigation is a function of the river basin authorities which should see to it that increasing number of hectares of land are put under cultivation from year to year. The Niger Basin Authority can, in the Master Plan, be assigned the specific duty of afforestation. That Authority should then draw up a programme of afforestation for each country, the execution of which it must seek to monitor.

280. As to agricultural inputs - machinery, fertilizers, insecticides - the same global approach is in the best interest of the sub-region. Senegal has a Centre for the fabrication of simple agricultural implements. Nigeria has planned to establish a similar centre at Ilorin in Kwara State, Nigeria. There is no reason why these two centres should not be made to serve the whole sub-region for the development of technology for agricultural mechanization. ECOWAS should not find it difficult to find foreign support (in money and expertise) for the development of the centres.

281. We mentioned earlier the development of 'chemical' industries in a number of countries in the sub-region, notably Senegal and Nigeria. The Senegalese fertilizer plant, as we mentioned earlier, is being set up with a combined 28.2% equity participation by Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Cameroon. This is a most welcome trend which ECOWAS should encourage the member States of the Community to replicate elsewhere in industries that are closely related to agriculture.

282. Although much is being done within the framework of ACP - EEC to bargain for better prices for the sub-region's agricultural products, more impressive results could still be achieved if West Africa could present a united front in international negotiations on commodities. West Africa would be negotiating from strength. Such a move would not have failed to register a serious impact on the rest of the so-called Third World. A major forward step would have been taken in the continuing struggle for a better international economic order.

283. In concluding this chapter the point should be reiterated that the scope for economic co-operation in the West African sub-region is vast indeed. The long-term gains from economic co-operation are equally immeasurable. But painful adjustments are required - adjustments in planning strategies, in the economic relations of one State to another, in the working of structural relations of one IGO to another, even in the political outlook of the leaders of the subregion. As we learn from the example of Europe, in the area of development, nationalism is becoming an anachronism. For West Africans to hold on to their petty nationalisms and refuse to make the adjustments that meaningful development today requires, is to hinder progress and condemn future generations to a state of servitude in relation to the developed nations of the world.

1. *Deuxieme Colloque*, p. 218.
2. E/ECA/CTNC 11/1982, *Transnational Corporations in the Production and Processing of Tropical Hardwood in Ivory Coast*; *Report on Transnational Corporation activity in the Bauxite Industry of Sierra Leone*. (Working paper of the ECA/CTNC unit on Transnationals, No. 7); *The impact of Transnational Corporation in the Aluminium Industry in Ghana*, (Working paper, No. 4, 1979).
3. ECA, *Report of the ECA Mission on the Evaluation of UDEAC and the Feasibility on Enlarging Economic Co-operation in Central Africa* (1981).
4. *Ibid*, p. 67.
5. *Office du betail et de la viande*, Mali, 1979.
6. *The West African Clearing House*, (Freetown, n.d.), p. 5.
7. Compare "Economice Community of West African States, Study on the Co-ordination of Transport and Communications," Vols I, and II.
8. Discussion with Hon. Francisco M. Correia, Praia, Cape Verde, 29 September 1982.
9. The World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (Washington, D.C. 1982) pp. 55 - 58.

CHAPTER VI

ON REBUILDING THE MACHINERY OF CO-OPERATION

284. The picture of economic co-operation in West Africa that emerges from the preceding chapters is not a happy one. In spite of volumes of words of commitment to the ideal of co-operation expressed at many international conferences, since 1968, it is rather obvious from what has been said so far that member countries of the West African subregion are not yet fully committed to the ideal of economic co-operation and collective self-reliance.

285. We saw in the previous chapters the limited achievements of many of the IGOs in the subregion. But lack of serious commitment is being reflected in other subtle ways. Except in the Republic of Cape Verde and, to some extent, the Republic of Senegal, nowhere did our mission come across any development plan making direct reference to collaborative efforts in the achievement of national economic goals. West African governments are still, by and large, "isolationist" in their economic thinking - a situation which is at once a reflection of the minimal impact of the existing IGOs and the limited nature of the governments' own commitment to the ideal of economic co-operation and collective self-reliance.

286. Lack of serious commitment to the ideal is also reflected in two phenomena which we observed in the field. First, there seems to be a lag between political will and what one may call 'official' will - the will of officials to execute decisions made at the political level. This is a point that was highlighted in our discussions with officials of various Ministries in many countries of the subregion. Nowhere was the impression created that officials were deliberately sabotaging efforts at economic co-operation. But it is true that in the scheme of things in most countries matters of economic co-operation are not accorded the same priority in the official mind as primarily national issues. The incident of an official in a member country of ECOWAS keeping in his file for one and a half years (as we were told by a senior official of ECOWAS) a protocol that had been ratified, instead of sending it to Lagos, could have been replicated in other intergovernmental organizations in West Africa. The "administrative bottlenecks" still plaguing the efforts at trade liberalization in Mano River Union, the persistence in using existing national customs declaration forms by customs officials in all the member countries of ECOWAS, instead of the one designed for common use by ECOWAS; the lack of response on the part of all the member States but one in the same organization to the questionnaire from ECOWAS Secretariat on trade statistics - these are all demonstrations of inertia on the part of official will.

287. The other phenomenon we observed was the apparent lack of a focal point in most countries for dealing with issues of economic co-operation. In all the countries of the subregion, excepting the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, responsibility for matters relating to economic co-operation is usually assigned to the Ministry of Economic Planning or shared between that Ministry and a number of other Ministries. Usually, the Ministry of Planning or Finance is assigned the responsibility of "co-ordinating" the activities of other Ministries or agencies involved in any aspect of economic co-operation.

88. But "co-ordination" bristles with problems. It is important to bear in mind that the "co-ordinating" Ministry is usually at par with other Ministries whose activities (in matters of external economic relations) are being co-ordinated. Interministerial meetings are called by the co-ordinating Ministry to discuss national positions in preparation for an international conference. Rarely do senior officials of other Ministries attend such meetings. The situation invariably occasions loss to the cause of economic co-operation in terms of the contributions such senior officials could make. In Nigeria, for instance, we were struck by the dynamism and breadth of vision demonstrated by the Director of Water Resources

in the Ministry of Water Resources, and the Director of Finance, Ministry of Finance, on the whole question of economic integration in West Africa. But thanks to the structure of official responsibility among Ministries, their connection with the all-embracing organ of economic co-operation in the subregion, ECOWAS, is peripheral.

289. The complaint in some countries by non-co-ordinating Ministries is worth noting, too, that administrative officers tend to "monopolize" attendance at international economic conferences at the expense of technical officers. The complaint may or may not be founded, but it represents a diminution of the official will in the implementation of decisions taken at such conferences.

290. Again, the Ministries whose activities in matters of external economic relation are being co-ordinated are supposed to furnish information to the co-ordinating Ministry about their activities. In parctice, interministerial jealousies preclude such flow of information.

291. Co-ordination, ideally, doesentail monitoring of activities and providing direction. Given the present way in which responsibility for economic co-operation is shared among various Ministries in most countries of West Africa, it is impossible for any 'co-ordinating' Ministry to indicate to another Ministry what position to take on any issue at an international conference as being in the best national interest. Nor can a 'co-ordinating' Ministry call to book any Ministries or agencies of government found wanting in the execution of decisions taken at an international conference.

292. Thus, in many countries of the subregion, co-ordination, in terms of providing a focal point for galvanizing economic activities in relation to co-operation with other countries, or charting a national course of action or providing a long-term perspective in matters of economic co-operation, is really non-existent. The "co-ordinating"role of the present Ministries of Planning in many countries, as a number of officials were honest enough to admit, is really an artificial affair.

293. The absence of such national focal point for economic co-operation in many countries explains many features of the West African scene in the field of economic co-operation. It explains why stock is rarely taken in any country, of the costs and benefits of membership in organizations concerned with economic co-operation. Contributions are made to organizations almost as a matter of routine without regard to the continued relevance of the objectives of such organizations to national needs.

294. Absence of a national focal point would also explain the lag, noted earlier, between official will and political will in the implementation of decisions. In the absence of a strong, central body systematizing national involvement in international economic co-operation, and monitoring the implementation of decisions taken collectively to enhance such co-operation, an officer may, without inconvenience to any one, choose to 'sit' on a decision without implementing it. "If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who will obey the call to battle?"

295. The irregularity with which contributions are made to intergovernmental organizations in West Africa is also a result, at least in part, of the same phenomenon. The promptness with which contribution is remitted to an international organization in the absence of a national system of serious co-ordination may depend on the political leverage of a particular Minister having the responsibilty for such organization.

I. The obligations of national governments in West Africa

296. From the foregoing, it is obvious that at each national level a lot is yet to be done to make existing intergovernmental organizations serve as effective engines of development - particularly in relation to the goals of the *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000.* Greater commitment to the ideal of co-operation would need to be expressed, not in words, but in concrete action, in prompt implementation of decisions collectively arrived at.

297. In this process and with the accent on action, we hope there would be greater interaction between political leaders and officers in charge of the implementation of such decisions. Constant interaction is certainly called for between political leadership and officialdom. We would endorse the view expressed by a top-ranking officer in the Ministry of Economic Planning in Ghana (who has been very much involved in the affairs of ECOWAS since about 1977) that the vision of what is intended to be achieved through the inter-governmental organizations has not always been clear. Constant interaction between officials and

political leaders charged with the responsibilities for economic co-operation would be useful for mutual education. The charge made by Dr. J.L.S. Abbey in an earlier report, [1] that officials were wont to (unwittingly) conceal information from their Ministers on issues of economic co-operation should no longer arise. Constant interaction would also facilitate occasional reassessment of national objectives vis-à-vis the goals of particular intergovernmental organisations and, in this way, stimulate creative thinking about the right approach to economic co-operation. Most importantly, in an atmosphere of mutual confidence between political leadership and officialdom and common appreciation of the need, indeed the necessity, for collective self-reliance in these trying times, it would be easy to draw up national economic goals and programmes in line with the perspective or immediate plans of an intergovernmental organization.

298. The cultivation of a new, positive attitude towards economic co-operation is not enough. There is also a crying need at each national level for a more dynamic supporting administrative structure than now exists. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS has, understandably, recently called for establishment in each of the 16 member countries of the Community of an ECOWAS Secretariat - "a well established machinery . . . to co-ordinate and monitor the implementation of ECOWAS decisions and programmes".[2] The National Secretariats "would be the focal point in member States for the preparation of country positions on Community issues and would also act as the link between member States and the institutions of the Community".

299. In our view, the establishment of national ECOWAS Secretariats as conceived would not meet the complexity of the problems of economic co-operation in the West African subregion today. One reality that must be faced is that, in spite of the primacy of ECOWAS as the most important, all-embracing intergovernmental organization, and the goodwill which it seems to enjoy in the subregion, most member States, for historical reasons that have been earlier analysed, do belong to other organizations, in some cases, performing the same functions as ECOWAS. A realistic structure that need be devised at each national level, at least for now, must be such that could take an over-view of the problems of economic co-operation, orchestrate at national level the programmes of the various intergovernmental organizations so as to ensure their harmonization and implementation, and, on the whole, serve as the national focal point for all activities related to economic cooperation in the subregion.

300. It would be presumptuous on our part to prescribe for all the countries of the subregion a common or rigid structure to sustain efforts at international co-operation. A number of structures are already being experimented with, even though they may not be quite adequately geared up to the tasks they should be performing. Upper Volta, for instance, has created by law a National Commission for ECOWAS and CEAO under the joint chairmanship of the Ministers of Finance and Economy and Planning. We were in Guinea for too short a period to be able to appreciate the efficacy of that country's bold experiment of erecting a whole Ministry for economic co-operation, both internal (within the subregion) and external (the wider world). But certainly there is much to be said for that kind of structure, and the level of commitment to the ideal of co-operation which it symbolizes.

301. In terms of structure, there are all kinds of possibilities. A country could have a National Commission on Economic Co-operation under the chairmanship of the President of the country, or the Vice-President or the Prime Minister. As in the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, there can also be a Ministry of Economic Co-operation with two broad divisions, African Region, and the Wider World. Another possibility is a National Economic Commission presided over by the President to consider broad issues of economic development, including economic co-operation in the West African subregion (After all, economic cooperation as a means to an end, cannot be divorced from the broad issues of economic development which must take into account the internal socio - political factors in a given country).

302. Whatever the structure that is adopted, the guiding principle is that *it should have sufficient political leverage*. Our ideal is a National Commission on Economic Co-operation under the chairmanship of the country's President or the Vice-President or the Prime Minister. Such a Commission, for instance, should be able to:

(a) Draw up broad policies and guidelines on economic co-operation that are consistent with national economic objectives, but positive and flexible enough to facilitate fruitful collaboration of efforts at the subregional level;

(b) Discuss from time to time the agenda of meetings of various intergovernmental organizations, take appropriate decisions or give any necessary *broad* directives to national representatives at such meetings;

(c) Ensure that the country takes a *consistent* position on issues of economic co-operation at the meetings of the various intergovernmental organizations;

(d) Give directives to particular Ministries or agencies of government as to the implementation of economic decisions taken by the west African IGOs.

(e) Monitor the implementation of such decisions by calling for regular progress reports, and by seeking to remove all obstacles to implementation;

(f) Call to book any officer in any Ministry or agency of government responsible for implementing any decision who may be shirking his or her duties;

(g) Align national economic goals with the broad objectives of intergovernmental organizations, especially ECOWAS, and ensure a reflection of such alignment in National Development Plans;

(h) Review from time to time the achievements of all functional intergovernmental organizations and seek ways of maximizing national gains therefrom;

(i) Relate the programmes of the various intergovernmental organizations, one to another, with a view to minimizing areas of duplication, and pointing out at the appropriate forum or fora possible areas for collaboration between two or more intergovernmental organizations;

(j) Create or sustain in the general population of the country an awareness of the necessity for economic co-operation among developing countries, and encourage nationals, especially those in the private sector of the economy, to take advantage of any beneficial programmes or policies (e.g. expanded market for industrial products, free movement of persons, right of establishment in other countries, right to borrow from a common fund to finance industrial projects, and so on) that may arise from efforts at economic co-operation.

303. The rationale for two of the tasks we have assigned to the National Commission should be made explicit. The task that the Commission should ensure that the country take a consistent position on issues of economic co-operation stems from the experience of the working of intergovernmental organizations in West Africa. It has happened in the past, especially at the meetings of ECOWAS and CEAO, that member countries take positions on issues at the meeting of one organization which are diametrically opposed to the positions they have maintained at the meetings of another organization on the same issues. Inconsistency of this nature has not helped the cause of economic co-operation in the subregion.

304. Awareness of the efforts at international co-operation in the West African subregion is generally very low among the generality of the population in the various countries. For instance, during our missions we found among what one may call the common run of workers in a number of countries very amusing interpretations of "ECOWAS": a football team, a department of government (in the particular country), an organ of the Organization of African Unity based in Accra, Ghana, a movement to fight *apartheid* in South Africa. Thus, it is fair to say that international efforts at economic co-operation in the sub-region are, for now, largely an affair of government, and not quite of the people. Yet in the long run economic co-operation is for the people. The efforts of the governments in the subregion to erect various kinds of framework for co-operation do not amount to more than paving the way. It is the people through their economic activities transcending existing national boundaries who would give real meaning to co-operation. It is in the light of this observation that they ought to be closely associated with the thinking of each government of the sub-region on issues of economic co-operation.

305. A word about the composition of the National Commission on Economic Co-operation. Here again, it would be presumptuous on our part to be dogmatic; each country should decide on the composition that would give the Commission the kind of political weight that would constitute an important leverage for implementing decisions. Obvious members would probably be Ministers of Economic Pla-

nning, Finance and other Ministers having responsibility for any aspect of economic co-operation. Top ranking officials of these same Ministries and Directors of agencies having direct responsibility for implementing programmes in specific sectors of the economy like agriculture, livestock, or water resources should also be members.

306. In the light of the observation made earlier, attention should be paid to the private sector in the composition of the Commission. There ought to be on the Commission representatives of the Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture. Knowledgeable individuals and industrialists with potentials for growth and possible expansion within the West African subregion can also be considered for membership of the Commission.

II. Relations among the Intergovernmental Organizations

307. As governments in the subregion build up the proper structure at the national level to sustain efforts at economic co-operation, they ought to turn their attention to the various intergovernmental organizations and seek collectively to re-align them. For the picture of these organizations that seems to emerge is one of great disharmonies among the organizations. What is fundamentally wrong with the organizations is not that they are too many, but that they are operating parallel to one another and sometimes at cross purposes. In theory each organization is a law unto itself - with its own specific mandate and functions. The primacy which ECOWAS enjoys on account of the sheer number of member countries belonging to it, is one of convention, not of law. The founding fathers gave it no legal primacy over the other organizations.

308. One must pay tribute to the Chief Executives of these organizations. They realised the disharmonies hampering their effectiveness, and within the past four years have, on their own initiative, sought to minimize their harmful effects. The Chief Executives of the organizations instituted among themselves fairly regular meetings at which they sought to harmonize their programmes and activities. A senior official of ECOWAS, once summed up the rationale for their initiative: "We have no right to fail in our duty to serve the course of horizontal cooperation in Africa (we would promote co-operation) by searching in consultation the ways and means of optimizing our actions or respective activities . . . it is only by coming together and working hand in hand that we can build a prosperous West African economy."[3]

309. The first meeting of the Heads of the West African Intergovernmental Organizations took place on 17 and 18 January 1980 in Monorovia, Liberia, attended by 31 organizations. It was at this meeting that a structure was devised for co-operation among the intergovernmental organizations. There was to be a Technical Committee of Experts of the organizations, which was to discuss from time to time issues of common concern, and make recommendations to a Council of all the Heads of the Organizations on measures aimed at promoting co-operation. The Council of Heads of the Organizations was to meet once a year. ECOWAS was designated the sub-regional co-ordinator.

310. Two other important decisions were taken at the first meeting. Mano River Union was to draw up a charter of co-operationa-legal framework "that would facilitate the organization of their co-operation". Secondly, a Programme of Co-operation was also drawn up. Various organizations in related areas of activities were to group together for collaborative efforts in agricultural produce, pest control, co-ordination of animal health programmes and co-ordination of training facilities.

311. Since January 1980, and up to February 1982, five meetings of the Experts of the Intergovernmental Organizations and three meetings of the Heads of the Organizations, have been held.

312. The Niamey based Multinational Programming and Operational Centre (MULPOC), an arm of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has since 1978 commendably played a facilitating role in bringing together the intergovernmental organizations. It has co-ordinated the meetings of the organizations. At the request of the organizations themselves, MULPOC in 1980 published the "Directory of West African Intergovernmental Organizations" as a means of enhancing their co-operation. MULPOC has also published a "model issue" of *Liaison*, a bulletin of news and commentaries intended to be a quarterly organ of communication for the organizations. Hopefully, the magazine would "oil the intricate machinery" of co-operation by serving as "the window looking at the diverse action undertaken by the different organizations of the region", and by bringing to their attention from time to time those of their studies or projects "which are a duplication of efforts".

313. Mention should also be made of the role MULPOC has played in undertaking studies, especially in trade and agriculture, of direct relevance to the activities and programmes of the organizations. MULPOC's most outstanding contribution in this direction is perhaps the assistance it has given to ECOWAS, Mano River Union and CEAO in reducing to the minimum the differences in their trade liberalization programmes.

314. How far have the organizations succeeded in "working hand in hand"? The simple truth is that very little has been achieved in terms of genuine co-opeagtion. The programme of co-operation drawn up at the inaugural meeting of the Heads of the organizations has virtually remained a dead letter. There have been instances of concerted efforts in research (for example, between WARDA and OCLALAV), but these have certainly not resulted from the Programme of Co-operation. On account of operational, and financial constraints, ECOWAS has not been able to fulfil its obligations to publish the first number of the *Liaison* Bulletin. Nor has a charter of co-operation been adopted. If one may read meaning into the fact that the Chief Executives of the Organizations are themselves no more personally attending meetings, enthusiasm for co-operation may be waning.

315. It is fair to suggest that the series of meetings among the intergovernmental organizations have created a good atmosphere for future, more purposeful, collaboration of efforts. It was within the framework of the Monrovia meeting of the organizations that ECOWAS has been organising series of colloquia on the problems of economic integration in West Africa. Note should also be taken of the primacy which the other organizations have been according ECOWAS. They have consistently insisted on a "co-ordinating" role for ECOWAS, even though, their concept of "co-ordination" may be such that it would not detract much from the autonomy they now enjoy.

316. It would have been most surprising if genuine co-operation has been brought about by the mere agreement among the intergovernmental organizations. The legal structure of most of them, as they now stand, preclude any such co-operation. Most of them have their specific legal mandates, and in their operation, are responsible to their respective councils of Ministers. Certainly, their Chief Executives have no authority to commit the organizations to any course of action without clearance from their Councils of Ministers. Implementation of the Programme of Co-operation drawn up in Monrovia inevitably would involve questions of policy and finance over which the Chief Executives of these organizations have no exclusive authority. This was the legal thorny point which the Mano River Union could not resolve in drawing up a charter of co-operation for the intergovernmental organizations. It was for the same reason that the Agreement between the West African Economic Community (CEAO) and the Mano River Union, separately signed by the Chief Executives of the two organizations on 25 July 1980, has remained inoperative.

317. Non-legal factors could also be at work. Officials of a number of organizations we spoke to in the field were honest enough to talk about the inter-personal jealousies still prevailing among some of the Chief Executives.

318. On the whole, the existing level of co-operation among the inter-governmental organizations leaves much to be desired. It is impotrtant that they have realized "the absolute necessity" (in their own words) for close collaboration among them. But one thing is clear: the organizations themselves cannot, of their own, evolve a framework that would effect on a perpetual or continuing basis for any genuine collaboration of efforts. The way the organizations have developed as more or less independent, autonomous entities precludes that kind of development. The task of evolving such a framework of co-operation will not be easy. It would require the exercise of political will at the highest level.

319. Yet the task must be done if the governments of the subregion are sincere about their declarations in the *Lagos Plan of Action*, and about using the mechanism of economic co-operation to realize the objectives of that Plan. The situation can no longer be tolerated where the intergovernmental organizations are working in disharmony or where scarce human and material resources are being dissipated through lack of co-ordinated planning and implementation of programmes.

320. It is in the light of this observation that we would like to make the following proposals to effect some rationalization of functions among the various intergovernmental organizations. For ease of understanding, we start with our categorization of the intergovernmental organizations in the context of our scheme for their operation:

(1) *The Subregional Economic Community*: ECOWAS;

(2) *Developmenta Organs* (DOs): CEAO, MRU, NBA, OMVS, OMVG, Lake Chad Commission, Liptako-Gourma Authority, CILSS, NNJCC, OCAM, Senegambian Permanent Secretariat. (Note that CEAO and MRU will cease to be "Economic Communities" as defined in Chapter III above; they will operate as Developmental Organs (DOs) in the new scheme of things.);

(3) *Financial and Monetary Institutions* (FMIs): ECOWAS (Fund) FOSIDEC (CEAO) Mutual Aid and Loan Guaranty Fund (Council of understanding), African Solidarity Fund, OCAM Fund, West African Development Bank, WACH, ACMS, BCEAO;

(4) *Technical and Services Organizations* (TSOs): ASECNA, WARDA, CEBV, OCLALAV, OICMA, AGC, SADIAMIL, CIEH, Air Afrique, OCCGE;

(5) *Professional, Quasi-professional and Business Associations* (P & OPAs): WAHC, WAEC, WACC.

321. A word about the general characteristics of each group of organizations, as they should operate in the new scheme of things. ECOWAS will become the only sub-regional Economic Community. We have indicated earlier why we believe that for effective co-operation in the sub-region, it should enjoy primacy over other organizations. Hence, for effectiveness of co-ordination and harmonization of development programmes in West Africa:

(a) ECOWAS should have the primary duty, in collaboration with the organisations in group 2 above, of drawing up perspective and detailed plans for the whole subregion;

(b) ECOWAS should, in collaboration with the ECs and DOs, decide on specific projects to be implemented by itself and by the ECs and DOs - all drawn from a master plan of development for the whole subregion;

(c) ECOWAS should enjoy exclusive powers and jurisdiction in *all* matters relating to the regulation of intra-and extra-regional trade;

(d) As the leading agency for development in West Africa, ECOWAS should encourage the exchange of staff and experts among all the organizations in the subregion;

(e) In the same spirit, ECOWAS should maintain positive and active relations with all external developmental agencies, especially those within the United Nations system, to be able to draw on their expertise for and on behalf of other organizations in the subregion;

(f) ECOWAS should develop equally weighty leverage with external financial institutions or agencies to be able to raise financial resources for the funding not only of its own projects, but also those of other organizations that fit into the master plan of development;

(g) ECOWAS should establish and up-date from time to time an inventory of research programmes and research findings for use by all the organizations within the sub-region;

(h) ECOWAS should, at the end of every other year, present to the Heads of State through the ECOWAS Council of Ministers a report on implementation of Development Programmes by all the organizations in the subregion.

322. The role of ECOWAS, as we picture it, is, in short, that of the leader. It is a large role indeed, requiring on the part of whoever heads the organization a very large measure of organizing capacity and resourcefulness.

323. The second group of organizations is made up of Developmental Organs (DOs). There is justification for their continuing existence in our scheme of things as agencies of implementation of development programmes. It is a fair presumption, where they do exist, that they are closer to the specific needs of their member States than ECOWAS can be. It must be admitted that ECOWAS is too large an organ-

ization, however competentits administrative and planning machinery may be, to be able to cater adequately for the needs of every area of the subregion.

324. Again, the DOs can be good grounds for trying out programmes in integration. At Mano River Union, for instance, we were impressed by a programme in curriculum development which the Union would soon embark upon. The programme would cover the three member States of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. At the end of it, the Union, hopefully, would come up with a curriculum in a number of technical subjects (to begin with), for use in the respective secondary schools of the member States. Whatever textbooks might be produced as a result of this experiment in curriculum development would obviously be suitable material for adoption or adaptation in the wider community of ECOWAS.

325. A similar programme in the development of energy for the members of the Niger Basin Authority is being carried out by that Authority (An international colloquium, as was mentioned earlier, was held on the programme in Cotonou, in the People's Republic of Benin, in August 1982). The perspective which the Authority has been able to articulate of energy development in the West African sub-region, is one which is worthy of being adopted by ECOWAS.

326. It is on account of these considerations, that one can justify the continuing existence of the DOs in the new scheme of things. Thus, in terms of functions, they should be able to:

(a) Help ECOWAS draw up meaningful development programmes that are relevant to the specific needs of the various sections of the sub-region;

(b) Implement Development Programmes in line with the specific needs of their member States. In doing so, however, they should be able to draw on the expertise and, possibly, the financial resources that could be made available through ECOWAS. More specifically, they should be able to draw on the research findings and technical knowledge and experience of any of the specialized institutions ofECOWAS;

(c) Assist their member States in drawing up their national Development Plans with a view to ensuring that such plans would enhance the effective implementation of their own (the DOs) programmes and that they are in line with the master plan of ECOWAS. Here again, nothing should preclude their using the resources of ECOWAS, or calling on any of its institutions for assistance.

327. Alongside these functions, we envisage a growing degree of specialisation (which is, in fact, becoming evident) among the IGOs as the new system becomes more and more efficient. Thus we expect that the Niger Basin Authority will specialize in river basin development and energy, WARDA in cereals; OCLALAV/OICMA in agricultural pest control; CEBV in cattle and meat; CIEH in Hydrology; and CILSS in ecological and environmental problems.

328. The position and membership of the developmental organs within the ECOWAS system may require modification with time. It is observable that both MRU and CEAO constitute roughly two economic zones; one largely a Sahelian zone, the other, basically a forest zone. Another economic zone may be created to comprise Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. This may be called the Benin Union; which for purposes of subregional planning, may be treated as another (forest) zone. No administrative structure need be set up now, but the ECOWAS Secretariat should begin to conceive of it as one of the three major developmental organs of the sub-region, for the purpose of planning and execution of projects. The question of a separate Secretariat for the Benin Union can be left for the future.

329. If the three major developmental organs are being conceived as agencies of ECOWAS, then the remaining other countries should join one or the other. We believe that Cape Verde Islands and the Gambia should be associated with the CEAO, while Guinea-Bissau should join the Mano River Union (MRU).

330. One Developmental Organ (DO) we are not particularly enthusiastic about is the Liptako-Gourma Authority. Its establishment, as was pointed out earlier, was sponsored by the UNDP, and at a time when it was relatively easy to secure funds from donors. Numerous studies have been conducted by the Authority, but the prospects of extraregional financing of projects are not particularly bright. Unless the Authority can be turned into an executing agency of the Niger Basin Authority, as we suggested in a preceding chapter, we are convinced that the continuing existence of the Authority as it is presently

oriented, is not justified. For the integrated development of the Liptako-Gourma region can be achieved at three possible levels:

(a) Through the work of the Niger Basin Authority to which the three members of the Authority (Niger, Mali and Upper Volta) belong (The Region itself falls squarely within the sphere of influence of the Niger Basin Authority);

(b) Through the CEAO;

(c) Through the co-ordination of the development plans of the three contiguous member States even without a permanent administrative Structure.

These are suggestions for the three member States to consider.

331. The financial and monetary institutions of West Africa are the third group. They too should be made to function as part of the emerging ECOWAS system. Fortunately, the institutions themselves are already seeing themselves in that light. In October 1977, ECOWAS Fund took the initiative to organize a meeting of the following financial institutions: African Development Bank, West African Development Bank, CEAO Fund, Entente Fund and ECOWAS Fund. Since then, the meeting has become an annual affair and a third meeting was held in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, in February 1979. That meeting was attended for the first time by OCAM Fund. It was at that meeting that a formal charter of co-operation among them was drawn up.

332. We are persuaded that more teeth should be given to the Charter (at the highest political level in the sub-region, and under the aegis of ECOWAS) to enable the Financial and Monetary institutions to:

(a) Develop common policies on the funding of projects in the subregion;

(b) Make it possible for two or more financial institutions to jointly finance the implementation of projects or jointly guarantee the funding of projects through external sources on the basis of an agreement that would be drawn up for such joint financing or joint guaranteeing;

(c) Develop common positions *vis-à-vis* extra-sub-regional financial institutions.

333. The Technical and Services Organizations, the fourth group of organizations, should also, as much as possible, operate within the new ECOWAS system. Membership in the bigger organizations that set them up varies. Membership of some is limited to West Africa or a section of West Africa; in some instances, membership of such organizations transcends the subregion.

334. The strength of these organizations is that they are engaged in technical services, or research programmes, that are of direct relevance to the developmental needs of the countries of the sub-region WARDA in rice culture; CIEH in hydrological studies; AGRHYMET in metereology related to agriculture; ASECNA in air transportation; OCCGE in endemic diseases; OICMA in studies of migratory locusts; OCLALAV in the fight against locusts and fowl pests. The functions and operations of some of these organizations do overlap; but, happily, there is an active spirit of co-operation among them which tends to minimize the effect of such overlap.

335. The valuable contribution of some of these organizations, especially in the area of agriculture, was freely acknowledged in various countries of the subregion in the course of this mission. WARDA has been warmly commended for its research work in rice culture and its training and seed-multiplication programmes, from all of which member States have benefited in terms of increase in rice production in their respective countries. OCLALAV has had impressive achievements to its credit in the past in spite of serious financial handicaps arising from member States falling in arrears in the payment of their subscriptions. We were at the premises of AGRYHMET and were impressed by the amount of sophisticated research and experiments being carried out on meteorology in relation to agriculture, especially for the benefit of the Sahel belt of the subregion.

336. In the new ECOWAS system a number of the technical organizations should, ideally, be transformed into ECOWAS institutions. There are considerations for this recommendation. The first is that directly or indirectly all the West African countries do benefit from their researches and operations.

Secondly, the work of most of them is best planned and executed on a subregional basis. Locusts and desertification, for instance, recognize no national boundaries.

337. Thirdly, the transformation of the institutions would help towards the breaking down of the linguistic barrier (between the Anglophone and the Francophone States) still bedevilling the efforts at integration in West Africa. As we noted earlier, about half of the intergovernmental organizations in West Africa belong to one exclusive linguistic group. We are convinced that it would be a step in the right direction, if the technical institutions now servicing one linguistic group could be made to serve member States of the other group.

338. Fourthly, although the institutions are performing useful functions, their financial resources are usually fragile. "Since its creation in May 1965", we were told, "OCLALAV has constantly been facing financial difficulties which regularly weakened its effectiveness". What is true of this organization is also true of others. For instance, about half of the total annual budget of WARDA comes from external donors. As a general observation, the research activities and field operations of the technical institutions are being funded largely by external donors.

339. Yet the once-flourishing external sources of financing, for a number of reasons we need not examine here, are drying up. This fact is already having a telling impact on the operations of some of the technical institutions. Promotion for research staff has been frozen in some instances for four or more years. Moreover, technically handicapped to carry on their research work for lack of financial resources, the staff may begin to lose faith in their mission.

340. It is clear to this mission that West Africa cannot, for long, evade her responsibility in funding research for development. Now is the time to begin to think of strengthening the existing institutions to serve common purposes in the sub-region.

341. There would be initial difficulties in converting some of the existing technical organizations into ECOWAS institutions on account of the fact that the countries now jointly contributing to their operation do not all belong to ECOWAS. Nonetheless we would recommend that the following technical organizations serving exclusively the ECOWAS region, (though are maintained by not all the members of ECOWAS) should be immediately transformed into ECOWAS institutions.

(a) West African Rice Development Association (WARDA);

(b) Common organization for the Fight Against Locusts and Fowl Pests (OCLALAV);

(c) Organization for Co-ordination and Co-operation in the Fight Against Endemic Diseases (OCCGE).

342. Other technical organizations that should ultimately be transformed into ECOWAS organizations, after negotiations with members who do not belong to ECOWAS, are:

(a) Inter-African Committee for Water Studies (CIEH);

(b) *Air Afrique* - an exclusively Francophone airline (with 28 per cent share-holding by two French air lines), which we see as possible nucleus of an ECOWAS airline.

343. There are a number of these organizations which are best regarded as African common institutions. The scope of their research and operations is continental:

(a) Agency for Air Transport Security in Africa (ASECNA);

(b) International Organization Against the African Migratory Locust (OICMA);

(c) African Centre for Monetary Studies (ACMS)

These organizations need not be taken over by ECOWAS. Their services should, of course, be open to it, as to other organs of co-operation on the continent. Earlier we suggested a merger between

OICMA and OCLALAV under the aegis of the OAU, if the latter would be strong enough to provide financial support for the resultant organization.

344. The effective transformation of WARDA, OCLALAV and OCCGE into ECOWAS institutions would not be a simple process to achieve; it would require a detailed study by an expert in Public Administration and Finance. A few implications of the transformation are obvious. The transformation implies, for example, that their funding would henceforth become the common responsibility of all ECOWAS countries. We would then need to know the size of their budgets and the cost of their programmes to be able to assess by how much member States of ECOWAS would have to increase their annual contributions.

345. Their transformation also implies that the States now directly controlling the organizations would have to relinquish such control. ECOWAS would then have to appoint a new Board of Management to supervise their activities on behalf of the Community (The Board may comprise representatives of all the member States of ECOWAS, or a few States, depending on the scope of the activities of the particular technical organization).

346. The organizations themselves would have to be directly related to the ECOWAS system. While they would continue to enjoy a large measure of autonomy in the management of their internal affairs and research programmes, (subject to the general directives of their Boards of Management), they would be accountable to the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, through the Executive Secertary of the Community.

347. As time goes on, and as perhaps more institutions are built or taken over, the structures of the existing organizations now being transformed might also change. For instance, WARDA might be expanded to take on research programmes in cereals other than rice-sorghum, millet, maize, cow-peas, etc. with a view to making the institution a veritable agricultural centre for West Africa. On the contrary, some of the institutions might be fused for greater effectiveness.

348. The last groups of organizations in the new ECOWAS system are the voluntary professional, quasi-professional and business associations. A number of them have emerged-the West African Chamber of Commerce, the West African Health Community, and the West African Economic Association. In a way, they are a response on the part of the educated or professional elite to the yearning for unity in the su-bregion which has been given political expression since the 1960s. At least one of them, the West African Chamber of Commerce, has formally been granted "observer" status to attend the meetings of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers.

349. It is the considered view of this mission that the formation of many more such voluntary associations should be actively encouraged. They are a way of associating the people with the efforts of the governments in building one Community. The more fora that can be created to bring people together in various fields to enable them to appreciate the oneness of West Africa, and reinforce their faith in the efforts at economic integration, the better.

350. Again, some of the associations can make immediate substantial contributions to the building of the Community. Historically, the West African Federation of Chambers of Commerce played a major role in the foundation of ECOWAS, and can still be very useful in the future. The Federation as a body can be made to put subtle pressure on any government of the subregion to do what it is perhaps unwilling to do to facilitate, say, the flow of trade. Furthermore since the Chambers of Commerce of West Africa are made up of people involved in industries, they are likely to have their own ideas about any proposals for economic co-operation being contemplated by ECOWAS.

351. In the same vein, a body like the West African Economic Association (comprising professionals in Economics, Social Sciences, Engineering and Management drawn from all the countries of the subregion) has a great potential for good. Even at this stage of the development of the Community, the Association has, since its inauguration in 1978, held a series of conferences and colloquia dealing with the problems of economic transformation, and economic integration of the West African subregion. Given the pool of expertise within the Association, it is in a position to carry out studies on diverse aspects of the economic development of the subregion for use by the ECOWAS secretariat. All that the Association requires is adequate encouragement.

352. How should these organisations operate within the ECOWAS system ? Since they are voluntary organizations, all that ECOWAS needs to do, at least for now, is simply to take an intelligent interest

in their activities. They should be formally recognized as ECOWAS associations, and should all be accorded "observer" status, and be invited to participate at the annual meetings of ECOWAS. From time to time they could be given assignments befitting the nature of their associations. As time goes on, and as the financial resources of the Community improve, ECOWAS could subsidize any meetings or seminars of theirs which it considers important and of great value to the development of the Community. It is a practical demonstration of interest that whoever is the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, should find time to address them at their annual general meetings, using the occasion to stress what he expects of their association in terms of the development of the Community.

III. The Operation of the New ECOWAS Structutre

353. Organizational Charts have a way of masking reality, and Fig. 6.1 is no exception.

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA



But it is the nearest approximation to our concept of how the new ECOWAS structure should operate. At the apex is the West African Economic Summit of Heads of State and Government whose duty it is to decide on broad policies that affect the entire scope and processes of economic integration in West Africa. The choice of the name is deliberate. In contrast with the existing ECOWAS Summit, the West African Economic Summit, shall be in the position to decide on policies affecting all the Intergovernmental organisations, at least those that are exclusively within the West African subregion. Always the scope of operation of the Summit is the entire economy of the subregion, and how it can be reoriented, though the choice of appropriate strategies to serve the best interest of West African peoples.

354. The Council of Ministers is to advise and assist the Summit. In composition, the Council of Ministers shall not be different from the existing Council of Ministers of ECOWAS, but it shall be expected to develop a new orientation towards its work. The focus of its attention is no longer ECOWAS *per se,* but the economy of the subregion, and the role that the IGOs and the member States of the subregion are playing (and should be playing) in it. The Council should have the power to recommend policies and programmes for particular IGOs. Through an appropriate Committee, if need be, the Council should be in the position to arbitrate between two or more IGOs in the performance of their duties. The major function of the Council is, of course, to draw up annually (for consideration by the Summit) specific programmes of economic development for various IGOs. It is the expectation of this mission that the member States would, as much as possible in their own national plans, take into account such plans and programmes as are finally approved by the Summit.

355. The basic task of research and planning for economic integration falls on three institutions in the new scheme of things: ECOWAS secretariat, the sectoral commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission. ECOWAS secretariat serves the seven proposed Sectoral Commissions:

(a) Agriculture and Natural Resources,
(b) Trade and Industries (Chemical, Engineering, Mechanical and Metalurgical),
(c) Energy and Water Resources,
(d) Transport and Communications,
(e) Monetary and Financial Affairs,
(f) Science and Technology (including Research and Development),
(g) Social and Cultural.

356. In serving the Commissions, ECOWAS takes the initiative to prepare detailed position papers relevant to the task of each Commission. Such papers should take account of the work programmes of the IGOs.

357. The Commissions shall comprise appropriate IGOs and Ministries or Departments of the Governments of the member States. Where appropriate experts in various fields may be coopted for the benefit of their specialized knowledge. The primary task of each Commission is to see how best to integrate the economies of the member States in its particular sector, and draw up workable work programmes accordingly as much as possible.

358. Considering the substantive work or general orientation of the IGOs, we would propose the following arrangement for the headship of each Commission.

Commission:	Headship
(1) Agriculture and Natural Resources	WARDA
(2) Energy and Water Resource	Niger Basin Authority
(3) Trade and Industries	ECOWAS
(4) Transport and Communications	ECOWAS
(5) Monetary and Financial Affairs	BOAD
(6) Science and Technology	CEAO
(7) Social and Cultural	Mano River Union

359. For the Economic Integration Planning Commission we would propose the following composition:

(a) Chairman: Executive Secretary, ECOWAS
(b) Chief Executives of Developmental Organs
(c) One high-level official representative of each member State from the Ministry of Economic Development or Economic Planning
(d) One representative each of ECA, OAU, ADB and BOAD.
(e) 4 members coopted from the subregion solely on the basis of their expertise.

360. The Integration Planning Commission shall be charged with the duty of synthesizing the programmes of the various Sectoral Commissions, and draw up broad prospective plans, with appropriate targets set, for the whole subregion. It is hoped that the members of the Commission in categories (d) and (e) above would lend colour to the quality of the work of the Commission.

361. West African MULPOC has a role to play in all this. It is to assist the ECOWAS, the Sectoral Commissions, the Economic Integration Planning Commission and even the IGOs in various ways it can. Hopefully, too, MULPOC should be able to bring to bear on the efforts at integration in West Africa the resources of the United Nations System.

362. The IGOs stand between the machinery of economic planning at the subregional level and the member States. They shall continue to perform their major function of coordinating the programmes and activities of their respective member States through research and/or implementation of specific projects. They are expected to participate actively in the work of the Sectoral Commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission.

363. The dynamics of the whole machinery of economic integration is difficult to represent diagramatically. There is an upward flow of information and data from the IGOs to a Sectoral Commission. The Commission, in turn evaluates the data, takes cognizance of any problems, and, in the light of the latter, sets appropriate targets. From the Sectoral Commission, the flow of information and data is towards the Integration Planning Commission. That Commission relates the work and programmes of *all* the sectoral Commissions, evaluates their projections and targets, and from a synthesis of all, determine intersectoral linkages for the whole subregional economy. The work of the Planning Commission goes to the Council of Ministers and from there, to the West African Economic Summit for final consideration and approval.

364. We envisage a reverse flow of assignment of tasks from the Summit to the Council of Ministers and to the Planning Board. The Planning Commission informs each sectoral Commission what its growth targets should be for the year or period of planning. Each Commission, in turn, shall liaise with the appropriate IGOs. It is the IGOs who shall ensure that the targets are met by their member States individually or through their collective efforts. Appropriate action by the IGOs themselves, in terms of research or other support services, shall also be taken.

IV. Time-table for Action

365. A full time-table for the implementation of our proposals is difficult to draw up at this stage. For the proposals constitute an organism which, we believe, will develop its own momentum and evolve into a solid structure over time. The following time-table for the immediate years ahead may, however, be considered:

(1) May 1984: ECOWAS Summit may decide to set up two bodies
   (a) to review the legal instruments of the existing West African IGOs in the light of the proposals contained in this report; and (b) to consider the implications for overall management of putting the existing IGOs within one framework: what readjustments would be required; what additioal staff at the present ECOWAS secretariat; what realignment or re-assignment of programmes would be required, and so on.
   The work of the two bodies would take about two years to accomplish.

(2) 1984-86: In the meantime the Sectoral Commissions can start meeting in the spirit and with the objectives that have been highlighted in this report.

(3) This is also the period to constitute the Integration Planning Commission, and to set it in motion. The Commission should begin to evolve strategies for development - from the numerous studies already conducted. Hopefully, some broad perspective plans for economic development of the subregion, with appropriate targets, may begin to emerge by 1986.

(4) Beginning in 1986, a five-years periodic review (possibly through organized colloquia) of the process of integration and of the working of the structures for the implementation of programmes.

V. The new ECOWAS Structure: Some General Implications

366. We have sketched above what we consider a good working arrangement to sustain economic co-operation within the framework of one organization. The general principle on which our recommendation is based is that all the smaller organizations in their operation should be subsumed within the one large organization provided they enjoy considerable autonomy in the implementation of their programmes. In the spirit of co-operation, they should take their cue from the general orientation which ECOWAS

provides. ECOWAS, in turn, should be able to take from them whatever is valuable and can be generally applicable to the whole subregion. For effectiveness, we have also recommended that certain organizations be transformed into ECOWAS institutions.

367. Some general implications of the new structure should now be highlighted. They do merit further close study by experts in Law and Management.

368. One implication is that the legal structure of the existing organizations would have to be reviewed. ECOWAS, for instance, would have to be given the formal powers of co-ordination such as we have suggested. Similarly, the autonomy now being enjoyed by the DO's would have to be modified to facilitate their accepting the leadership role of ECOWAS in determining the general orientation of the subregion's collective efforts at co-operation. A mandate from the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of West Africa would be essential to initiate such a review. We have proposed a two-to-three year transitory period for the review, and the implementation of the new structure.

369. There are doubts about the capacity of the present ECOWAS secretariat to undertake effectively the co-ordinating role we have proposed for it. The staff and the material resources put at the disposal of the secretariat are far from being adequate. We have suggested above that the matter of the necessary resources for ECOWAS secretariat's new role be looked into by one of the two bodies to be set up by the ECOWAS Summit in May 1984.

370. The Councils of Ministers of the IGOs, especially the existing economic communities, would for some time to come, continue to function practically as they do now. But more and more they should ensure that the programmes and orientation of their IGOs correspond to those of ECOWAS. We envisage a time in the not-too-distant future when there would be no need for the separate Councils of Ministers for the IGOs. At that time the work of the Sectoral Commissions will assume a greater importance, and there will be only Council of Ministers to consider policies and make recommendations to the West African Economic Summit.

371. If the structure we propose would work, we envisage a vital role for the Multinational Programming and Operational Centre (MULPOC), the arm of the ECA based in Niamey. We made reference to the role it played in the past in facilitating the coming together of the IGOs and even helping a few of them to harmonize their programmes, especially in the area of liberalization of trade.

372. For the future, we envisage a close collaboration between the MULPOC, ECOWAS, and the DOs. MULPOC can play a vital role in helping ECOWAS draw up perspective and immediate plans for the subregion and integrate the separate plans of the DOs into the master plan of ECOWAS. MULPOC can also help in identifying obstacles to implementation of development plans. Through the MULPOC, the expertise and other resources of the ECA can be made available to ECOWAS and the DOs.

373. Unfortunately, MULPOC, for now, is not in the position to play this catalytic role in any effective way. Much has been written on the short-comings and inadequacies of the MULPOCs within the United Nations system, and about the Niamey MULPOC in particular. [4] We therefore need not cover the same grounds that have been effectively covered elsewhere.

374. The resources put at its disposal by the ECA are simply grossly inadequate. As at the time of the preparation of this report, MULPOC had, apart from the Director, one expert only in agriculture, industry and trade, and a co-ordinator for Women's programme. Nor does MULPOC enjoy any real autonomy in operating the limited budget that is put at its disposal. Certainly it cannot be now claimed that the Niamey MULPOC is serving as a avenue for bringing the intellectual resources of the ECA to the subregion.

375. The notion of "decentralizing" ECA is undoubtedly a very noble idea indeed, one that the African countries should struggle to see realized. But the idea has to be implemented in a serious manner. For instance, every staff at the MULPOC should be a regular staff of the ECA, with a direct, and indisputable professional links to a particular division at the headquarters. He or she serves in Niamey on secondment, as it were, and should be able to return to Addis Ababa after a spell of time to recharge his or her professional or intellectual battery and keep up with the latest developments in his or her field.

376. From the point of view of the ECA itself, the idea of "decentralization" in this serious manner is helpful. The staff in the field would invariably serve to counter any tendency at excessive intellectualiz-

ation of problems of development. The staff in the field, in Niamey, Gisenyi, Lusaka, and the other centres of the MULPOCs, are closer to the ground, and should be able to carry to the headquarters at Addis Ababa what one might call a pragmatic dimension to the problems of development. In short, the staff at the MULPOCs could be important "resource elements", and hence very useful inputs in the programmes being fashioned in the directors' offices at Addis Ababa.

377. It seems to us that the ECA Secretariat would need to develop a more positive, and a more welcoming attitude to its MULPOCs. Such attitude should be expressed in greater autonomy of operation for each MULPOC and, for their staff, the establishment of direct professional links to particular divisions of the ECA.

378. Finally, we would advise that the Niamey MULPOC should, for the immediate future, concentrate its activities on helping the intergovernmental organizations. Each MULPOC should operate within the circumstances of its environment. For West Africa, the pressing problem is how to achieve effective co-ordination of programmes among the numerous intergovernmental organizations. (Indeed this is the area where the Niamey MULPOC, so far, has made its most notable impact). Any attempt at "co-ordinating" subregional programmes on its own, in the context of West Africa, is mere farce. Where any country calls for the assistance of the MULPOC in any field, and it is in a position to render such assistance, an expert could be sent for a period of time to help on the ground. But for the most part, MULPOC should concentrate on playing a catalytic role among the IGOS. It is a very vital role - one that would assume greater and greater dimension as time goes on within the ECOWAS system that we have proposed. If adequate resources are put at its disposal, Niamey MULPOC's proper role is that of the "intellectual" arm of ECOWAS, helping it to draw up meaningful developme t programmes, and linking with it, the other intergovernmental organizations, in one harmonious system of economic co-operation in West Africa.

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1. J. L. S. Abbey, *Report on Impact on Budgets of Member States of the ir contributions to the Running of Intergovern mental Organizations in the West Africa subregion,* (Niamey, 1981), p. 12.

2. ECOWAS, ECW/CM/XI/2, *Annual Report of the Executive Secretary,* 1981 - 1982, May 1982, pp. 32, 44

3. ECA/MULPOC/NIA/IGO/IMR, *Final Report of the Fifth Meeting of Experts of Intergovernmental Organizations of West Africa,* 5 - 7 February 1982.

4. JIU/REP/82/1: „Report on the Economic Commission for Africa: Regional Programmiqg, Operations, Restructuring and Decentralization Issues", (Jan. 1982); „Report on thetJoint UNDP/ECA Evaluation of the Niamey based West African MULPOC", prepared by K. M. Bayo (March, 1982).

CHAPTER VII

ENHANCING THE PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN WEST AFRICA

I. New Orientation for IGOs

379. Success in the implementation of the recommendations put forward in the previous chapter will depend on the extent to which the idea of economic co-operation has been internalized in the member states of ECOWAS, and reflected in their respective socio-economic policies. It will also depend on the effectiveness and dynamism of the Chief Executives of the various inter-governmental organisations. Our experience in the field and what we know of the attempts at co-operation elsewhere, have convinced us, however, of the imperative need for a revised strategy and the adoption of new approaches if economic co-operation is to be enhanced in West Africa.

380. To begin with, it appears paradoxical that governments and IGOs in the subregion are not sufficiently adverting their minds to the primary objective of economic co-operation. Officials in economic Ministries and at the headquarters of many IGOs could wax lyrical about their multi-dimensional 'integrationist' activities, but a sense of direction is not always discernible. Statements about the objectives of co-operation enunciated in a treaty or declaration of an IGO are, in the final analysis, no more than indications of its hopes and aspirations. Of greater significance are the specific programmes discussed and agreed upon for implementation. Such programmes are the true index of an IGO's virility, a reflection, if any, of its thrust for the future.

381. From this perspective, it is not always clear what the Economic Communities in West Africa are trying to achieve. Is it the realization of common programmes in specific sectors of the economy? Is it the integration (in the full sense of the word) of the national economies of their member states ? Is it simply to help each national economy to develop maximally and at the highest level of efficiency? There is evidently much confusion of thought in many official quarters throughout West Africa as to the real objective of economic co-operation. The IGOs themselves have not helped matters by providing clear-cut leadership. By and large, programmes are still based on Pan-Africanist sentiments or on nebulous, vague ideas.

382. In our view, for the foreseeable future, the primary objective of economic co-operation in West Africa, should be to facilitate the maximum development of the economies of the states of the subregion. At least for now, each member state of an IGO should be able to see in the efforts of the IGO something to complement or enhance her own effort at development. Until the people of West Africa begin to see themselves and think as one people with one political will, there should be no illusion as to where the responsibility for development in the subregion *lies*. It *lies* squarely with the governments of the nation-states, as they are now, or may be in the foreseable future, consitituted. Any effort at integration which defies this basic observation is likely to fail.

383. To say this is not to underplay the importance of efforts at economic co-operation or to narrow the scope for leadership by the IGO's Let us at once reiterate our conviction that economic co-operation offers the only viable approach to the development of West Africa. The point at issue here is not co-operation, but the approach to it, the basic attitude that should govern decisions at the fora of various IGOs, and even influence the official posture of all those who are directly associated with running the various 'integrationist' organizations.

384. In the context of the problems of development in West Africa, the ideal orientation of an IGO, particularly an Economic Community, can be graphically depicted in four phrases - to conceptualize, to promote, to admonish and to arbitrate. Conceptualization is or should be a primary function of an IGO. Ideally it should constantly develop broad visions of the developmental needs of its member states, transcending the latter's preoccupation with the day-to-day problems of development, which as we stated earlier, is the usual priority of governments. These visions an IGO should sell to the member states. Perspective plans for the subregion (or any part of it) should flow from such visions. How the immediate plans of each member state would dovetail into the perspective plans of the whole requires efforts at persuasion by the IGO.

385. Promoting the establishment of common infrastructures and institutions for mutual benefit should be an aspect of the leadership role of an IGO. Promotion, of course, also implies monitoring the implementation of projects by the member States, and even the implementation of projects by the IGO itself, if need be. As the Mano River Union has amply demonstrated, securing funds from external sources for specific common infrastructures or institutions is part of the 'promotion'. As for institutions, they need not be new before they can serve a larger, common purpose. Most countries of West Africa have built institutions that can serve not only their own needs, but also those of their neighbours as well. For instance, we found out that Nigeria has about two hundred institutions offering training at degree, technical and vocational levels in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, livestock and veterinary sciences.[1] Efforts should be made by the appropriate IGOs, to study national institutions, evaluate their programmes for the needs of West Africa and encourage the governments to take advantage of their fields of specialization, with local financial arrangements made throuth the West African Clearing House. Accordingly, each nation state should open the doors of such institutions to nationals of other countries of the subregion.

386. Ideally, an IGO should operate at a higher vantage point than national governments in appreciating the problems of economic development - precisely because its vista transcends, or should transcend, the narrow, parochial preoccupations of a national government. An IGO should therefore be in the position to develop a long perspective of the economy, and, from such perspective, by way of admonition to the states, present from time to time cogent and reasoned arguments for or against particular economic policies. Such issues as the role of transnational corporations in the West African economy, the necessity for indigenizing the economy, the development and acquisition of technology, are a few samples of themes in economic development on which an IGO, particularly an Economic Community, could lead the thinking of its member states. It is obvious that what an Economic Community should aim at achieving in its admonishing role is to ensure a fair degree of uniformity of outlook in matters of economic development a state of affairs which would be conducive to the achievement of joint ventures and the adoption of common policies.

387. The role of an arbiter would arise for an Economic Community whenever there are difficulties between two or more states participating in a joint venture. An Economic Community like ECOWAS, if it has developed sufficient weight and leverage, should be able, for instance, to wade into the administrative and other problems now known to be plaguing the Nigeria-Benin cement project located in Benin or the Ghana-Togo-Ivory Coast CIMAO cement project located in Togo, and offer impartial possible solutions.

388. The four spheres of activities we have depicted above - to conceptualize, to promote, to admonish and to arbitrate - are intended to provide an orientation for an IGO, particularly an Economic Community. With that kind of orientation, it is clear that in the context of West Africa or indeed any other developing region, an Economic Community or a Developmental Organ in particular can play an active, positive role in "co-ordinating" the development of a given number of states. The orientation recommended is not incompatible with any known treaties or declarations of any Economic Community.

389. It is this orientation suggesting a catalytic, active, but unobstrusive role for the IGOs in West Africa which we found lacking in respect of one or two major IGOs. Indeed, the Chief Executive of one shunned an active initiator's role, insisting that he would not undertake any measure not backed by a specific mandate in black and white. Yet treaties and declarations are no more than embodiments of hopes and aspirations: to insist on a strict adherence to their letters without an appreciation of their spirit is really to frustrate those very hopes and aspirations. If West Africa is to make progress, the IGOs must

see themselves as a *positive* force for development, complementing the efforts of nation-states, drawing them together, presenting to them from time to time a vision of what the future could be - a vision that is compelling by virtue of its lucidity and reasonableness. The initial thrust of creative, positive collective thinking should come from the IGOs, particularly the Developmental Organs, provided they have the correct orientation. An Economic Community, or indeed any IGO, is not, or should not be, a mere bureaucracy; it should be a power-house of practical ideas, a source of inspiration, a beacon of light.

390. The orientation we are suggesting that the IGOs adopt, calls for a very high level of competence, experience and intellectual capacity on the part of those manning them. Unfortunately, generally speaking, this has not been the case in West Africa. Undoubtedly, there are competent hands at a number of IGOs but on the whole, one does not have the impression that the member states have contributed their best brains to these organisations. Yet, an intergovernmental organisation is as effective or as virile as the staff made available to it. In the recruitment of staff for the IGOs in West Africa, member states should give preference to experienced and competent hands for the organisations. Economic co-operation requires men of vision and experience, and of boundless energy, who are capable of inspiring others to share their glowing view of the future.

391. ECOWAS in particular would seem to be suffering from an acute shortage of high-level manpower - arising from a rather rigid adherence to the quota system. Member states are not uniformly endowed with manpower resources. Admittedly, all the member states should be represented at the "management" of the Community, but this idea should not be implemented at the expense of effectiveness. The best brains cannot be recruited for the service of the Community because their respective countries' quota have been exhausted'. In the alternative, member states are wont to have their eyes on certain positions in the bureaucracy to be filled by their nationals, whether or not they would be the right materials for the posts. In either case it is the Community that suffers.

392. Unless member states cease to regard administrative and professional positions as "benefits" of economic co-operation to be shared, it is not likely that much progress would be made in recruiting staff of high calibre for the services of the Community. While member states should be encouraged to contribute their best brains to serve the Community, a high-powered Appointments Committee should be able to determine, solely on the basis of requisite experience and qualifications, in what positions the recruits would best serve.

393. Stress was laid earlier on the leadership role of the IGOs, especially the Developmental Organs. Basically, they should inspire efforts at co-operation. But the IGOs themselves need to be properly managed if they would serve this purpose. And the task of managing them falls squarely on the shoulders of the respective Councils of Ministers. We heard a few unsavoury things said by officials of many IGOs concerning the attitudes of their Ministers to their work - all pointing to a need for greater dedication on their part. There is no substitute for Ministers actually reading the papers and documents presented to them to facilitate decision-making on particular issues. Not only must Ministers be broad in their thinking on common economic problems; they must also be on their guard to ensure that their IGOs take the proper decisions within approved budgets.

394. Part of the problem of the Ministers is the frequency with which they change portfolios in their home countries. Responsibility for the affairs of the IGOs changes frequently in the subregion. A new Minister on the scene must be particularly hard-working to be able to appreciate in a short time what the business of an IGO is all about. If he is not prepared to make the necessary efforts to understand things himself, he is at the mercy of his officials who may or may not help him take the right decisions.

395. There is thus a serious need for some continuity of representation by various countries at the IGOs. The value of such continuity of representation is too obvious to require any further elaboration.

II. A New Strategy of Economic Integration

396. The present strategy being adopted for economic co-operation in the subregion calls for drastic review. The thrust of the strategy is one of attempt at market integration, or integration through trade. It is a strategy of integration based on recent European experience, even though integration in Western Europe really started off with collaboration in the production of coal and steel. Incidentally, the CEAO treaty, which also served as a pattern for the ECOWAS treaty in many respects, was drawn up by a retired French Customs Administrative Officer, Jacques David. **He was working at the EEC headquarters in**

Brussels in 1973 when he drew up the CEAO Treaty, In 1965, in a book of which he was co-author, he explicitly suggested that the EEC approach to economic co-operation the market integration approach- serve as a model for Africa. In spite of warnings from economists from within and outside the subregion against the danger of reducing the facts about African economic integration to a simple problem of harmonizing customs duties,[2] the governments of West Africa persisted in seeing economic integration only in terms of creating free trade zones. The treaties of the existing Economic Communities in West Africa have been outlines for Customs Unions,as if customs duties have been the most serious or even the only obstacle to intra-subregional trade. While it is true that customs duties between, say, France and Luxembourg, would slow down trade between the two, it is equally true that should the customs barriers between, say,Upper Volta and Sierra Leone, be completely removed, no trade would necessarily result as long as the problems of production, transportation and disparities in currencies are not tackled. The simple truth which the countries of the subregion seem to be running away from is that the realities of West Africa are vastly different from those of Europe. The solutions of Europe cannot simply be adopted without serious moddfications. Yet the integrationist efforts of the Economic Communities in West Africa have been modelled on that of the EEC. Thus the provisions of their treaties hardly touch the real problems facing the subregion.

397. The drawbacks of the approach of market integration to economic co-operation are becoming more and more glaring in West Africa. Intra-subregional trade has not appreciably increased in volume, primarily because industry and agriculture are not developed, and transportation links are not adequate and integrated. At the same time member states are tending to embark upon nationalistic economic policies in the productive sectors, thus negating the spirit of co-operation. Indeed, as we observed earlier, member states of Economic Communities, even in trade matters, sometimes acted as if trade agreements with other states did not exist. In general, as we noted earlier, a great gap exists between arriving at decisions and implementing them. Governments seem to be taking decisions only to go back home to ensure they are not implemented.

398. The truth that seems to be dawning on West African governments - which may be making most of them tarry about implementing decisions regarding economic co-operation - is that the present approach is likely to accentuate the uneven development among the states rather than bridge it. When underdeveloped countries commit themselves wholly to the approach of market integration, external capital on which they largely depend tends to go first to "development poles", that is, countries with relatively more developed basic infrastructures and where investments are easier and more likely to generate the maximum profit. They tend to be the "industrial stars" around which the other states gravitate like satellites, reduced to supplying agricultural raw materials and serving as markets for industrial goods produced elsewhere. Monetary compensation, even when it is certain and regular, cannot in the long-run, make up eor the gap in development which would become more and more apparent with time.

399. The signs of uneven industrial development are already becoming discernible in the CEAO, relatively the most advanced Economic Community in West Africa. Ivory Coast and Senegal combined control 93.82% of the industrial products of the Community, Ivory Coast having 66.42%. Table 7.1 gives the picture of industrialization in the six countries between 1975 and 1980.

TABLE 7.1: GROWTH IN MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE CEAO. 1975-80

Country	1975	1976-77	1978	1979	1980
Ivory Coast	46	81	94	113	119
Senegal	30	52	58	64	66
Upper Volta	4	6	10	12	18
Mali	8	10	12	12	13
Niger	3	5	5	5	5
Mauritania	0	0	0	1	1

Source African Integration
Special Issue, September, 1981

400. There is, of course, nothing new in this kind of development if only West African Governments would learn from the failures of others. It has been the experience of other countries in the Third World who have experimented with economic co-operation through the approach of market integration: the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA), the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the

Andean Group countries. On the African continent, it was the fear of uneven development which made Chad to withdraw from UDEAC, (the Central African Customs and Economic Union) in 1968. The same fear led to the breakup in 1977 of the East African Economic Community which in its trade policies tended to favour Kenya at the expense of the other two members, Uganda and Tanzania. Within ECOWAS the fear of Nigeria dominating the subregional market is making some states reluctant to commit themselves to ensuring the success of the Community.

401. Experience in developing countries is already indicating that integration, conceived in terms of removing customs barriers, is not likely to contribute to any meaningful development. Indeed, merely freeing trade is likely to increase problems of inequality among member countries and a strengthening of foreign enterprises.

402. We are convinced that the countries of West Africa should shift their emphasis away from too much preoccupation with trade liberalization. They should start implementing policies aimed at the development of the infrastructure, the productive capacities, (both agricultural and industrial) and the educational and training facilities of the member states - all from the perspective of a subregional economy. We agree with the Higgins Committee that economic integration among developing countries "must restructure the existing patterns to build up a regional economy in place of the existing fragmented ties with metropolitan countries"3

403. A concrete programme of linking up countries by adequate transport systems has much to be said for it. It is the only way of breaking the physical bottle-neck that is hampering effective trade flows in the subregion. Rounds and rounds of customs negotiations, however painstaking, cannot. Secondly, it is the kind of programme that can have immediate impact on the consciousness of the common man and of governments. That impact cannot fail to generate a momentum of its own to stimulate further efforts in the direction of greater co-operation.

404. Transport is one area where the immediate impact of co-operation can be demonstrated; building common institutions is another. Mano River Union, although not quite satisfactorily, as we pointed out earlier, has led the way in the subregion. The opportunities are almost limitless for West African countries to share the benefits of their various institutions.

405. But we would want to enter a *caveat*. African common educational institutions have a way of becoming a burden on the countries hosting them. The initial enthusiasm for a common educational institution evaporates, member states tend to withdraw their financial support, and the host country finds on its lap an institution that is perhaps too big for her to maintain. Such has been the experience of the Republics of Togo and Benin in the subregion. The ECA's training programme in aerial survey located at Ile-Ife, Nigeria, has become, in terms of financial support, not an affair of all African countries (as was originally envisaged), but of Nigeria and a few other countries. In the face of this kind of development, and, equally importantly, on grounds of economy, a more viable alternative to building common institutions should be found.

406. Since 1978 ECOWAS has been talking of a common School of Management for the whole subregion. One is prompted to ask what would be the impact of one such institution wherever it may be located? What would it benefit such countries as Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast or even Togo, with similar institutions of their own, in some cases (as in Nigeria) offering different levels of training in management at universities, polytechnics, and professional institutes?

407. In our view, a more creative approach to establishing common institutions in training in Management - and this principle should apply in general to building common institutions - is to locate the best three or four institutions in the subregion and encourage them to expand the scope of their training facilities for the benefit of all through grants and subventions.

408. A subregional common institution that is inferior to any that may exist in a member state or a number of member states would be a waste of scarce resources, and a serious drag on efforts at co-operation. The institutions should be selected with a view to their serving particular zones: the expanded CEAO, the expanded Mano River Union, and possibly, the Benin Union as suggested in the preceding chapter. Expansion of training facilities at the selected institutions should include crash programmes in language-training to minimize the effect of language barriers.

409. Ultimately each country in the subregion should have at least one institution which is receiving some funding from ECOWAS for the enlarged role which it is playing in the context of the subregion. The institution may be in any field germane to the problems of development - agriculture, pharmacy, iron and steel development and so on.

410. Again, since all the countries can gain some expertise from one another's particular institutions, a programme of reciprocal grants of scholarships among the members can be seriously embarked upon in a genuine spirit of co-operation. It is assumed that ECOWAS can draw up an effective inventory of what each country can offer and in which fields. For instance, Liberia may require the technology of producing cheap, but durable, building materials which Togo has now perfected. She should be able to send, say, two students to Togo, in exchange for two Togolese who would study, say, forestry at Bomi Hills, Liberia to supplement Togo's effort at developing her own forest resources.

411. In establishing common institutions, West Africa cannot simply follow the example of the defunct East Africa Community which succeeded in establishing a number of common research, administrative and management institutions. The historical circumstances are simply different. The East African institutions were developed in a common colonial framework, and none was is existence which was comparable to the ones that were established to serve Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. Many West African countries have gone far in developing their own institutions for their own needs. The best strategy will be a carefully worked out programme of sharing the expertise which these institutions have to offer.

412. One common institution which ECOWAS can usefully build, is a Language Institute. Fully equipped with modern facilities for learning English, French and Portuguese, the Institute's primary purpose should be to provide intensive training in effective use of these languages. Prospective students desirous of studying in a country speaking a language different from their own, administrators, businessmen, university teachers and other categories of workers in the subregion, who may find themselves faced with the same language barrier in thier different concerns, should be able to benefit from the training offered by the Language Institute.

413. The Language Institute, of great practical value as it may be for the immediate future, should be an institution for the present and perhaps the next generation of West Africans only. If the governments of the subregion are serious about building one Community, there is no reason why they should not all make French and English compulsory examination subjects at, say, the West African School Certificate (or its equivalent in French-speaking West Africa) by the year 1990. Future generations of West Africans should be bilingual. A giant step would have been taken towards creating an atmosphere of true understanding among West African peoples. True, as the example of the European Economic Community would show, a common tongue is not essential for a successful integrationist organisation, but it does enhance its success by promoting true understanding among peoples and, on a more mundane level, by reducing overhead costs.

414. Integrated production is another way of refocusing the West African Community's energies towards more fruitful goals. There are two ways of implementing a programme of integrated production-by specialization and by joint production. In the first case, one country or a number of countries are made to produce for a common market the products they are best suited to produce on the basis of available raw materials or some other economic grounds. In the second case two or more countries pool their resources to produce a particular product or products destined for the Community market.

415. As we have seen in the Fourth Chapter of this Report, both approaches are being adopted by countries of the subregion with varying degrees of success largely outside the framework of existing organs of co-operation. Integrated production is an area of economic activity that the Economic Communities should actively stimulate. It requires a great deal of efforts on their part in planning and in articulating concrete industrial programmes for countries to buy or support.

416. Integrated production has some obvious advantages which should always be borne in mind by the IGOs' planners. It facilitates the development of trade relations, and it is, in the long-run, the quickest way of industrializing the subregion as a whole. Through integrated production, countries make their entry into different levels of industrialization in accordance with their natural endowments. If the subregion is turned into an effective common market, integrated production inevitably lessens dependence on the more industrialized parts of the world. With the West African Clearing House facilitating purchase of goods and services in the subregion with the local currencies, there is no reason why the subregion as a whole should not be self-sufficient and self-reliant latest by the second decade of the next century.

III. Policies Towards Foreign Investment

417. The area of foreign investment in the subregion is one major weakness of the present efforts at co-operation. It is one area in which practically no step is being taken to grapple with the problem. Indeed,

as it was pointed out in chapter 5 of this Report, there is a kind of ideological split on the whole question of foreign investment.

418. Yet on account of the dominant position of foreign capital in the subregion's economy, a common strategy regarding its future role is a prime necessity. The level of domination of the subregion's economies by foreign capital has been put at averaging 65% according to recent UN estimates, indicating the neo-colonialist state of the economies.

419. In addition, foreign capital practically enjoys a free hand in the subregion. It is true that a number of countries, notably Nigeria and Ghana, have passed "Indigenization" acts to control level and areas of operation of foreign investment capital, but ways are being devised to sabotage the intention of such acts by the transnational corporations and, unwittingly, by unpatriotic nationals of these countries.

420. The present situation where foreign capital enjoys a free hand in West Africa would inevitably paralyze efforts at co-operation; only the relatively developed economies in the subregion will continue to attract foreign capital and other inputs. The result will be greater polarization among the member states.

421. A starting point for effective control of foreign capital is the harmonization of the economic and developmental policies of the member states. This is a stupendous task which should be performed by ECOWAS, assuming that the political leaders are prepared to muster the enormous political will it entails. What specifically does harmonization mean? It means that the leaders of West Africa are agreed on a common 'self-image' for the future, and that they are also basically in agreement as to the means of realizing it. The obvious 'self-image' for the future is that of an economically self-reliant and self-sustaining geo-political entity, with technologies and other apparatus for development springing from the genius of the indigenous people. ECOWAS should be able to sell to its member states subregional master plans for development that are consonant with that self-image. National development policies and programmes could only be harmonized if they are consciously related to the master plans drawn up by ECOWAS.

422. A common subregional investment regime must be central to the ECOWAS master plans for development. Such a regime, based on a thorough study of the economies of the subregion, must deal with such issues as the specialization in agricultural production, location of basic and strategic industries, terms for the participation of foreign capital, the development of technology, transfer of profits abroad re-investment of profits, the use of local material resources, the development of human resources, integrated transport development, and monetary and fiscal affairs. ECOWAS, as the watchdog of the total subregional economy, must guard against market segmentation, cost transfers and similar practices of transnationals. In this connection it should be able to present to its Council of Ministers from time to time reports on the operations of transnationals in the subregion. Under the common investment regime ECOWAS should *inter alia*, aim at equitable distribution of costs and benefits of co operation in such a way that the "depressed" areas of the subregion receive preferential treatment as regards investment for industrial, agricultural and infrastructural development. The fact that the enlarged subregional market will be attractive to foreign investors, especially the transnationals, should enable ECOWAS to bargain from a rather strong position with donor countries and private foreign investors. This emphasizes the importance of a common investment regime. Terms of the so-called "partnership" between West African countries and the developed countries and their transnationals can only be tilted to the advantage of West Africa through collective and co-ordinated action. Relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and West African countries are a case in point.

IV. EEC-ACP Relations: A Study in Dependency

423. The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It now comprises nine member states- Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom. One of the most successful attempts at economic co-operation among developed countries, the EEC has certainly become a factor to reckon with in the world economic order. *Ipso facto*, it is exerting tremendous influence on the development of the economies of the Third World, particularly African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.

424. All the countries of the West African subregion are today associate members of the EEC, under a common umbrella, the Lome II convention - the latest in a series of four - signed on 31 October 1979 to link the EEC with some 58 ACP states. Lome II offers an interesting study in the evolving economic

relations between the industrialized and the developing nations of the world a curious mixture of trade, aid, and investment principles. A full-scale assessment of the impact of the convention is clearly beyond the scope of this Report. It is enough for our purpose to point out that, in relation to economic co-operation, it has hidden diversionary propensities.

425. The Lome Convention was designed to preserve the old pattern of economic relations between the metropolitan countries and the erstwhile colonies of European powers - a pattern of economic relations which condemned the ACP countries to an extractive role in the international division of labour. The convention was also designed to stimulate structural changes in European countries as well as a few selected ACP countries. The first of this dual objective is being pursued through a series of measures designed to regulate access to the EEC market for ACP manufacturers, to increase EEC direct investment in ACP countries, and to put EEC transnational corporations at an advantage over their Japanese and American rivals.

426. The short-term benefits of associate membership of the EEC are attractive. In 1979, for instance, thirteen of the sixteen countries of the West African subregion received a total of some 127,282,522.EUA in loans and grants from the STABEX Fund.[4] A number of the subregion's important IGO's like ECOWAS, Mano River Union, CEAO, WARDA, CIMAO (Cement project), have at one time or the other also received grants for their work programmes from the EEC. In the context of the prevailing world economic situation, the Lome regime is indeed too attractive to ignore. It is no accident that each West African country has her own ambassador to the EEC. Viewed against the background of uncertainty and dissatisfaction in North-South relations, the breakdown of the Paris North-South dialogue in June 1977, the failure of UNCTAD V at Manilla in June 1979, EEC-ACP relations seem to represent a significant step forward in the North-South Dialogue about a new international economic order. But the "partnership" between ACP and EEC countries is more to the advantage of the EEC. The Lome II convention is, on close analysis, a machinery for modernizing dependency. If it is called a "partnership", it is analogous to that between the horse and its rider.

427. The sixth annual meeting of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly in Luxembourg in 1980 was told that the structure of ACP-EEC trade still retains most of the features of colonial times".[5] That statement epitomises the whole complex of economic relations between the EEC and ACP. What are STABEX and MINEX, but measures to ensure that ACP countries continue to produce raw materials to feed European factories, to make good Europe's "pressing and chronic energy and mineral deficiencies"

428. It is true that under the new convention, more than 98% of the ACP exports are supposed to enjoy duty-free access to the EEC,[6] but in fact, some 80% of these products would have incurred no duties anyway under the EEC generalized preferences (GSP) which applies even to non-associate members and the GATT multilateral trade agreements. Again, manufactured goods from the ACP cournties, under certain conditions, are supposed to enjoy duty free access to the EEC. But this provision is vitiated by the Lome complex rules of origin which are too stringent to be of any real benefit. At the same time, the same rules confer a direct advantage to the EEC transnationals in setting up assembly or processing industries in ACP countries. EEC inputs in the form of expertise or intermediate raw materials, like the ACP mineral and agricultural products, are considered to be "originating products." Investments made by the transnationals in the ACP countries are also guaranteed against possible nationalization.

429. Theoretically, the benefits supposedly conferred by Lome on the ACP countries in the EEC-ACP trade relations can be withdrawn at will under the so-called "safeguard clauses" if the imports from any ACP countries threaten to put out of balance any sector of the European economy.

430. It is obvious that the Lome regime is a far cry from a new international economic order. Rather, it is a sophisticated arrangement to reinforce the existing structure of production in the ACP countries, and thus entrench their dependence on the developed EEC countries. The apparent short-term benefits in terms of loans and grants have the effect of maintaining the old division of labour between European and African countries, whereby Africa produced raw materials for European industries, and served as a market for their manufactures. To pin much hope on the Lome regime is to follow a recipe for perpetual underdevelopment.

431. "And it shall come to pass", says the Christian Holy Writ, "when thou shalt have the domination. that thou shalt break the yoke from off thy neck".[7] Having domination, in the context of the West African political economy, means precisely taking command of the resources of the subregion. This would only be possible through determined subregional economic co-operation.

V. Political Dimension to Economic Integration

432. Finally, we want to bring to the fore two issues that are not usually given their due weight in discussions about economic co-operation.

433. The first is political will. Enough has been said in this Report to underline the necessity for mustering political will to achieve co-operation. The EEC is political will in action, an example of how nations learn to subordinate their narrow nationalisms to a bigger vision of nations moving in unison in the achievement of a common goal. All that we have proposed in this Report hangs heavily on that kind of political commitment to an ideal. Nothing short of it will bring to an end the subregion's vicious circle of poverty and dependence.

434. The second is the need to provide a popular base for the process of economic integration, by drawing into it all the social strata of the countries of the subregion. Our concern is not ideology, but rather the harmonizing of the capacities of all our people to contribute to economic growth and development. Man is, after all, the most important causative agent of development precisely because he is endowed with creative energies. It is important always to bear in mind that a West African Economic Community will be built, not by governments alone, who can only provide the political umbrella for it, but also and mainly by individual citizens of the different countries of the subregion, moving freely across the existing national boundaries, and knitting the countries together in the enterprises that they organize and nurture.

435. We welcome in this connexion a decision of the last ECOWAS Summit, held in Conakry, Guinea, in May 1983, calling on each member State to ensure within its borders a full participation, and involvement of various mass organizations of youths, workers and women and professional groups in the process of economic integration. How this will be done - in terms of the political structures that will ensure its realization - is a matter for each state to decide. But one point we would want to stress: now is the time to begin to develop a Community sense of what is politically conducive to the promotion of subregional unity.

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1. J.A.B. Efionayi (compiler), *A Director of Nigerian Institutions offering Training at Degree, Technical and Vocational Levels in Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock, and Veternairy Science (Ibadan*, 1979).

2. Compare F. Perroux *L'Economie des Jeunes nations* (Paris, 1962) T. Jaber, "The Relevance of Traditional Integration• Theory to LDCs", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 9, March 1971; U. Ezenwe, "The Applicability of the Conventional Theory of Integration in West Africa: A closer look", *West African Economic Journal*, Vol. I. No. 2, September 1980.

3. Benjamin Higgins *et al, The Mano River Union*: *An Assessment of Past Pe formance and Some Guidelines for the Future*. (London, 1978), p. 11.

4. Peter A. Afolabi, "Lome II (2nd EEC-ACP Convention): Instrument of Aid or Partnership ?" Text of a lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, on 10-12 November 1980 Annex IV.

5. CA/CP/153, ACP-EEC
Consultative Assembly: *Joint Committee Draft Report on the annual report of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers.res.*

6. Chapter on Trade, Lome II.

7. Genesis, 27, 40.

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434. The second is the need to provide a "popular" base for the process of economic integration by drawing into it all the social strata of the economies of the subregion. Our concern here is not only with governments but rather the harnessing of the capabilities of all our people to contribute to economic growth and development. Man is, after all, the most important catalytic agent of development and only when he is endowed with creative energies. It is important always to bear in mind that a West African Economic Community will be built, not by governments alone, who can only provide the policies and the framework for it, but also and mainly by individual citizens of the different countries of the subregion, crossing freely across the existing national boundaries, and knitting the countries together in the enterprises that they create and nurture.

435. We welcome in this connection the decision of the last ECOWAS Summit, held in Dakar, in May 1979, calling on each member State to ensure within its borders a full participation and involvement of various mass organizations of youths, workers and women and professional groups in the process of economic integration. How this will be done - in terms of the political structures that will ensure its realisation - is a matter for each state to decide. But one point we would want to stress now is the time to begin to develop a Community sense of what is politically conducive to the promotion of subregional unity.

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1. A.B. Zahlan (compiler) and [illegible], *[illegible] Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry* [illegible] (London, 1979).

2. Compare F. Perroux, *L'Economie des Jeunes Nations* (Paris, 1962); Jaber, "The Relevance of Traditional Integration Theory to LDCs", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 9, March 1971; U. Ezenwe, "The Applicability of the Conventional Theory of Integration in West Africa: A second look", *West African Economic Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, September 1980.

3. Benjamin Higgins et al, *The Mano River Union: An Assessment of Past Performance and Some Guidelines for the Future*, (London, 1978), p. 11.

4. Peter A. Afolabi, "Lome II (2nd EEC-ACP Convention): Instrument of Aid or Exploitation?" Text of a lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, on 10-11 November 1979. Annex IV.

5. CA/CP/155, ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly Joint Committee Draft Report on the annual report of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers.

6. Chapter on Trade, Title II.

7. Op. cit., p. 40.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

436. This report sets out to evaluate the progress so far made towards the economic integration in West Africa, identify the factors which have retarded the process, and propose remedial measures for accelerating the achievement of collective self-reliant and, self-sustaining growth and development by the countries of the subregion.

I. Progress and Obstacles Towards Economic Integration

437. Economic integration has not made much progress in West Africa, even though attempts at co-operation by member States of the subregion date back to the 1960s. It is true that many of the over-thirty Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) in the subregion, particularly those dealing with research and technical services, have recorded some achievements here and there; but for West Africa as a whole there has been no major breakthrough in terms of a common, well-articulated programme of economic integration or even an effective machinery for its realization. Consequently, the impact of the IGOs on the development of the countries of the subregion has been marginal. West African countries are still basically poor. Their economies are externally oriented (just as they were before political independence), and the productive sectors of these economies, agricultural and industrial, are either stagnant or are dominated by transnationals in most countries of the subregion.

438. Perhaps the most fundamental obstacle to economic integration is that West Africans have not genuinely accepted it as the only viable weapon for fighting poverty and economic dependence. Evidence abounds in support of this view: failure by governments to implement decisions commonly arrived at in matters of economic co-operation; failure to meet, or irregularity in meeting, the financial obligations to IGOs, the absence at national level in most countries of any focal point for co-ordinating programmes and policies relating to economic co-operation and the propensity on the part of governments to disregard the economic targets or programmes of IGOs and pursue autarkic, nationalistic economic policies, even when they are not faced by any crisis of undue proportions.

439. The multiplicity of IGOs is often considered another obstacle to economic integration. These IGOs have emerged on the West African scene at different times and in different circumstances. They have overlapping memberships; their objectives and integration strategies are also varied. True, their efforts are not quite duplicative since many of them have their own areas of jurisdiction, and define programmes of work. But in the absence of any serious effort at ensuring that they work in harmony, they represent a considerable dissipation of energy. As they are now, they constitute a "multiple of wheels of co-operation," and not "a composite machinery, with every part having a definite task to fulfill."

440. The main thrust of the integration strategies of the IGOs in West Africa has also not been helpful. The accent has been on integration of markets, rather than of production. Much valuable time has been spent on measures at liberalization of trade with little or no impact on the volume of intra-subregional or even inter-state official trade. CEAO is an apparent exception; but even here the limit of integration by market would seem to have been reached. The compensation task scheme reinforcing it (the TCR) is breaking down, and skepticism is growing in the majority of the member States about the value of monetary compensation for loss in trade.

441. The truth is that the approach of market integration, in the context of developing countries, tends to accentuate uneven development, rather than bridge it. Monetary compensation cannot in the long-run make up for the gap in development which would become more and more apparent with time.

II Revitalizing the Process of Economic Integration

442. The task of revitalizing the process of economic integration in West Africa must begin at the national level of each country. Each country should now generate greater commitment to the ideal of subregional economic integration by encouraging more frequent, extensive and intensive interaction between political leaders and all categories of officers in charge of implementing programmes of economic co-operation.

443. A more dynamic supporting administrative structure is also required at each national level - a National Commission on Economic Co-operation, a Ministry of Economic Co-operation, or a National Economic Commission. In whatever form, the structure *should have sufficient political leverage* to be able (as stated in para 301 of the report) to:

(a) draw up broad policies and guidelines on economic co-operation that are consistent with national economic objectives, and the programmes at the subregional level for economic integration;

(b) give directives to particular Ministries or agencies of government as to the implementation of economic decisions taken at the meetings of the West African IGOs;

(c) monitor the implementation of such decisions;

(d) review from time to time the achievements of all IGOs and seek ways of maximizing national gains therefrom;

(e) create or sustain in the general population of the country in awareness of the necessity for economic co-operation among developing countries.

444. The ideal national structure for these and other tasks (fully spelt out in paragraph of the report) is a National Commission on Economic Co-operation under the Chairmanship of the country's President, Vice-President or Prime Minister.

445. At the subregional level, there should be a new re-alignment of functions between ECOWAS on the one hand and the other IGOs on the other. The objective is to put all the IGOs within one framework, to build "a composite machinery," of economic integration.

446. The ECOWAS Community should be the leading agency for development and economic integration in West Africa, and the watchdog, so to speak, of the total sub-regional economy. Its primary function should be to co-ordinate and harmonize, and to rationalize the use of the human and material resource of the subregion. For this reason ECOWAS should be given *de jure* and *de facto* primacy over all other West African IGOs. The task that should be assigned to it in its new capacity are stated in paragraph 321 of this report. They include:

(a) Drawing up of perspective and detailed plans for the subregion;

(b) Exercising exclusive powers and jurisdiction in all matters relating to the regulation of intra and extra-regional trade;

(c) Encouraging exchange of staff and experts among all the IGOs in the subregion;

(d) Ensuring implementation of development programmes (fashioned out at the subregional level) by IGOs and member States.

447. Then there are the Developmental Organs - that is, organizations whose objectives are limited to the implementation of specific programmes for the benefit of their member States. The river basin authorities in the subregion (OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority), Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission, Senegal-Gambia Secretariat, belong to this category. CEAO and Mano River Union will also belong here; they will cease to be ecoomic communities.

448. In general the tasks of the Developmental Organs will be limited to a few clearly identified areas and their essential role will become that of implementing decisions made at the subregional level. It is expected that they should collaborate with ECOWAS secretariat in drawing up meaningful development programmes relevant to the specific needs of the various sections of the subregion. They should also be

in the position to help their states in drawing up their National Development Plans so that they are in line with the Master Plans drawn up at the subregional level.

449. The main rationale for the position of the Developmental Organs in the new scheme of things is that West Africa is too amorphous a mass of territory to be developed from one centre. The Developmental Organs, scattered throughout the subregion, and in different ecological zones, can serve as useful vantage points for co-ordinating the development of the entire subregion, as long as they can take their bearing and orientation from one centre. Besides, they are closer to their respective member States than ECOWAS secretariat can ever hope to be. Consequently, they can better serve the special needs of their member States which may not be met at the level of ECOWAS secretariat.

450. It is on this account that the governments of Nigeria, Benin, Ghana and Togo may wish to constitute themselves into a Developmental Organ - for which the name "Benin Union" has been proposed to serve their ecological zone, and operate as other developmental organs in the subregion.

451. In the same vein of rationalizing economic integration in the subregion, the suggestion has been made that the governments of Niger, Mali and Upper Volta may wish to consider phasing out the operations of the Liptako-Gourma Authority. The region the Authority serves falls squarely within the sphere of influence of the Niger Basin Authority to which the three countries also belong. The three countries also belong to the CEAO. Again, nothing precludes these three contiguous territories from co-ordinating their economic development programmes without the necessity for any permanent structures.

452. The following IGOs belong together as Technical and Services organizations: WARDA, ASECNA OCLALAV, CEBV, CIEH; OICMA, CILLS, OCCGE, Air Afrique, and West African Clearing House. They will fit into the new scheme of things as institutions providing services of a technical or scientific nature for the benefit of the countries of the subregion: WARDA in agriculture (cereals); OCLALAV/OICMA incontrol of agricultural pests; ASECNA in air traffic; CIEH in hydrology; CILLS in environmental and ecological problems; CEBV in cattle and meat, the West African Clearing House, in facilitating intrasubregional trade; Air Afrique in air transportation.

453. These organizations do not all belong exclusively to West African countries. Negotiations will have to be entered into with other African countries outside the subregion before CIEH and Air Afrique can become ECOWAS institutions. (The suggestion has been made that Air Afrique be made the nucleus of a West African subregional air line). Some other organizations in the group, like ASECNA, OICMA and the African Centre for Monetary Studies have wide membership among African countries. They are best regarded as Pan-African institutions (hopefully, to be nurtured and maintained by the OAU) for the benefit of all subregions of the Africa, including West Africa.

454. A merger of some organizations has been suggested. The two research arms of CILLS - the *Institut du Sahel* in Bamako and AGRHYMET in Niamey - can be consolidated into one organ to be based in Niamey. OICMA and OCLALAV also lend themselves to a possible merger.

455. The financial and monetary institutions are performing satisfactorily. They seem to have appreciated their role in the context of the development of the subregion. To make them more effective, efforts should be made at the highest political level in the subregion to give teeth to the charter and the institutional framework for co-operation which they themselves have adopted and established. For the future they should be able to:

(a) develop common policies on the funding of projects;
(b) jointly finance the implementation of projects or jointly guarantee the funding of such projects;
(c) develop common positions *vis-à-vis* extra subregional financial institutions.

456. A new structure has been proposed in paragraphs 351-361 for the operation of the new system:
(a) West African Economic Summit of Heads of State and Governments to decide on overall policies governing the process of economic integration in the subregion;
(b) Council of Ministers - to advise and assist the Economic Summit;
(c) Economic Integration Planning Commission - to draw up broad perspective plans for economic development with appropriate targets. This body attempts a synthesis of the sectoral plans drawn up by the Sectoral Commissions.;

(d) Sectoral Commissions - to discuss various sectors of the West African economy, with a view to fashioning out work programmes for implementation by the IGOs and the member States of the subregion;

(e) The IGOs stand between the machinery of subregional economic planning and the member States. They shall continue to perform their major function of co-ordinating the programmes and activities of their respective member States through research and/or implementation of specific projects. They are expected to participate actively in the work of the Sectoral Commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission.

(f) The West African MULPOC has a catalytic role to play in all this - assisting ECOWAS in developing and reinforcing the links among the IGOs, helping ECOWAS, the sectoral commissions, and the Economic Integration Planning Commission to prepare development plans for the subregion.

III. The implications of the New Structure

457. Some general implications of the new structure can be spelt out:

(a) The legal structures of ECOWAS and other IGOs in the subregion would require review in the light of the new proposals;

(b) The management structure of the new proposals would have to be more closely examined than have been done in this report;

(c) If ECOWAS secretariat is to play the co-ordinating role envisaged for it in this report, the human and material resources at its disposal must be greatly increased by the member States;

(d) To enable the West African MULPOC to play the role assigned to it, its financial and human resources would also have to be considerably augmented. It should also enjoy greater autonomy than it now does;

(e) The existing separate Councils of Ministers of the IGOs should be phased out over time giving way to the Sectoral Commissions. Ultimately it is envisaged that there will be only *one* Council of Ministers for the subregion superintending over the work of the IGOs, the Sectoral Commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission - all from the perspective of one sub-regional economy.

(ii) The existing Councils should continue to function for some time to come. But if the proposals in this report are accepted, their major role in their respective IGOs would be to ensure that the programmes and activities of their IGOs conform to the guidelines and the prespective plans drawn up at the subregional level.

It is suggested that two bodies be set up by the ECOWAS Summit at its meeting in May 1984 to tackle (a) and (b) above.

458. In the meantime, between 1984 and 1986, the Sectoral Commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission can be constituted and begin to work in the spirit of the proposals set out in this report.

IV. Lessons from the Experience of Others

459. Finally, a few lessons of experience:

(a) Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) should have no illusions about where the responsibility for socio-economic development lies. It lies squarely with nation-states;

(b) It follows from this that the role of an IGO, is largely to conceptualize visions for the future, initiate programmes for joint implementation by nation-states, admonish, arbitrate and monitor processes of development from a higher vantage point than is possible at the level of nation-states;

(c) The present strategy being adopted for economic integration in West Africa, with its preoccupation with trade liberalization, calls for review. That approach is likely to accentutae the uneven development among the States, rather than bridge it. A more suitable approach in the context of developing countries is integration through joint production and structural and infrastructural linkages;

(d) Political will is a prerequisite for economic integration, and it must be constantly renewed and demonstrated in practical ways, especially in the prompt implementation of decisions jointly arrived at;

(e) It is easily forgotten that economic integration is for the people, and that it is the people who will give it meaning and scope. It is high time the peoples of West Africa were closely associated with the noble efforts at integration being undertaken by their governments. In the final analysis a West African Community would be built not by the Governments alone, but, more importantly, by individual citizens of the different countries of the subregion, moving freely across the existing national boundaries, and knitting the countries together in the enterprises that they organize and nurture.

460. In conclusion, the point should be reiterated that the scope for economic integration in the West African subregion is vast indeed. The long-term gains from economic co-operation are equally immeasurable. But painful adjustments are required - adjustments in planning strategies, in the economic relations of one State to another, in the working of structural relations of one IGO to another, even in the political outlook of the leaders of the subregion. It is rather obvious today that in the area of development, nationalism is becoming an anachronism. For West Africans to hold on to their petty nationalisms and refuse to make the adjustments that meaningful development requires is to hinder progress, and to condemn future generations to a state of servitude in relation to the developed nations of the world.

ANNEX I

AREA, POPULATION AND DENSITY OF THE WEST AFRICAN SUBREGION IN 1980

	Date and Year of Independence	Area km2	Area %	Population ,000 inhabitants	Population %	Growth* rate	Density per km2
Benin	Aug. 1, 1960	112,600	1.8	3.530	2.5	2.6	31.3
Cape Verde	July 5, 1975	3,929	0.1	332	0.2	1.9	84.5
Gambia	Feb. 18, 1965	11,295	0.2	601	0.4	2.7	53.2
Ghana	Mar. 6, 1957	238,537	3.9	12,275	8.7	4.5	51.5
Guinea	Oct. 2, 1958	245,856	4.0	5,006	3.5	2.5	20.4
Guinea Bissau	Sept. 24, 1973	36,125	0.6	570	0.4	1.9	15.8
Ivory Coast	Aug. 7, 1960	322,463	5.2	8,020	5.7	3.4	24.9
Liberia	July 26, 1847	111,369	1.8	1,837	1.3	3.2	16.5
Mali	Sept. 22, 1960	1,240,142	20.2	6,623	4.7	2.4	5.3
Mauritania	Nov. 28, 1960	1,030,700	16.8	1,480	1.0	2.3	1.4
Niger	Aug. 3, 1960	1,267,000	20.6	5,338	3.8	3.0	4.2
Nigeria	Oct. 1, 1960	913,073	14.9	76,982	54.6	3.2	84.3
Senegal	Aug. 20, 1960	203,793	3.3	5,641	4.0	2.5	27.7
Sierra Leone	Apr. 27, 1961	72,328	1.2	3,449	2.4	2.6	47.7
Togo	Apr. 27, 1960	56,785	0.9	2,540	1.8	2.7	44.7
Upper Volta	Aug. 5, 1960	274,200	4.5	6,814	4.8	2.3	24.9
WEST AFRICA		6,140,195	100.0	141.038	100.0	3.1	55.5

* Growth rate 1975 - 1980

STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION (IN 1970 CONSTANT MILLION US DOLLARS)

		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1980	
		Value Added	%	Value Added	%	Value Added	%	Value Added	%	Value Added	%	Value Added	%
BENIN	Agr.	103.0	39.4	127.6	47.1	109.2	45.0	125.5	49.7	132.7	48.7	137.0	50.2
	Ind.	36.8	14.1	30.9	11.4	29.5	12.2	29.3	11.6	29.2	10.9	29.3	10.7
	Serv.	121.8	46.6	112.4	41.5	103.5	41.8	97.5	38.6	105.1	39.4	106.4	39.0
	GDP	261.6	100.0	270.9	100.0	242.2	100.0	252.3	100.0	267.0	100.0	272.7	100.0
CAPE VERDE	Agr.	5.1	22.2	5.6	23.6	5.3	22.5	5.5	22.7	5.7	22.4	6.1	22.8
	Ind.	6.2	27.0	6.1	25.7	6.2	26.3	6.4	26.4	6.8	26.8	7.3	27.3
	Serv.	11.7	50.9	12.0	50.6	12.1	51.3	12.3	50.8	12.9	50.8	13.3	49.8
	GDP	23.0	100.0	23.7	100.0	23.6	100.0	24.2	100.0	25.4	100.0	26.7	100.0
GAMBIA	Agr.	24.2	35.4	22.8	31.1	18.7	28.1	27.4	32.9	17.1	25.1	16.4	24.5
	Ind.	8.3	12.1	9.0	12.3	10.1	15.2	9.7	11.6	10.5	15.4	10.4	15.6
	Serv.	35.9	52.5	41.4	56.6	37.8	56.8	46.3	55.5	40.6	59.5	40.0	59.9
	GDP	68.4	100.0	73.2	100.0	66.5	100.0	83.4	100.0	68.2	100.0	66.8	100.0
GHANA	Agr.	1,006.5	45.5	957.5	45.5	918.3	41.9	959.4	40.9	908.5	42.0	853.6	41.6
	Ind.	470.4	21.3	459.6	21.9	481.2	21.9	494.9	21.1	448.8	20.8	428.3	20.9
	Serv.	734.0	33.2	686.0	32.6	792.8	36.2	891.8	38.0	804.6	37.2	771.3	37.6
	GDP	2,210.9	100.0	2,103.1	100.0	2,192.3	100.0	2,346.1	100.0	2,161.9	100.0	2,053.1	100.0
GUINEA	Agr.	449.3	63.7	458.5	62.5	426.2	60.7	416.8	57.5	394.4	54.7	425.7	55.5
	Ind.	62.8	8.9	67.0	9.1	65.6	9.3	70.6	9.7	70.6	9.8	75.2	9.8
	Serv.	193.0	27.4	207.6	28.3	210.3	29.9	217.3	32.7	256.2	35.5	266.6	34.7
	GDP	705.1	100.0	733.1	100.0	702.2	100.0	724.7	100.0	721.2	100.0	767.5	100.0
GUINEA BISSAU	Agr.	39.6	59.9	41.5	62.2	36.0	57.7	39.4	60.4	40.1	60.4	37.3	58.8
	Ind.	2.0	3.0	1.9	2.8	2.1	3.4	2.4	3.7	2.5	3.8	2.5	3.9
	Serv.	24.4	36.9	23.3	34.9	24.3	38.9	23.4	35.9	23.8	35.8	23.6	37.2
	GDP	66.1	100.0	66.7	100.0	62.4	100.0	65.2	100.0	66.4	100.0	63.4	100.0

STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE WEST AFRICAN SUBREGION (IN 1970 CONSTANT MILLION US DOLLARS)

		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1980	
		Value added	%	Value added	%	Value added	%	Value added	%	Value added	%	Value added	%
IVORY COAST	Agr.	500.3	31.4	515.8	30.1	500.4	28.1	524.9	26.5	557.0	26.7	545.4	25.4
	Ind.	328.7	20.6	383.4	22.4	450.8	25.3	528.6	26.6	556.6	26.7	582.3	27.1
	Serv.	765.8	48.0	815.2	47.6	831.8	46.7	930.2	46.9	971.2	46.6	1,018.7	47.5
	GDP	1,594.9	100.0	1,714.4	100.0	1,783.0	100.0	1,983.7	100.0	2,081.8	100.0	2.146.4	100.0
LIBERIA	Agr.	171.3	27.1	130.6	28.3	135.0	29.0	138.4	29.1	111.2	28.8	143.4	29.7
	Ind.	159.2	35.6	152.5	33.1	149.7	32.1	144.5	30.4	152.3	31.0	147.1	30.5
	Serv.	166.8	37.3	178.2	38.6	181.1	38.9	192.2	40.1	197.5	40.2	192.5	39.9
	GDP	447.3	100.0	461.3	100.0	465.8	100.0	475.1	100.0	491.0	100.0	483.0	100.0
MALI	Agr.	125.3	43.2	130.0	43.6	123.2	41.5	130.0	41.3	135.6	41.6	133.9	41.9
	Ind.	45.4	15.6	46.0	15.4	47.7	16.1	52.9	16.8	55.0	16.9	52.2	16.3
	Serv.	119.5	41.2	122.5	41.0	125.7	42.4	131.6	41.9	135.2	41.5	133.2	41.7
	GDP	290.2	100.0	298.5	100.0	296.7	100.0	314.4	100.0	325.8	100.0	319.3	100.0
MAURITANIA	Agr.	54.8	25.8	55.1	25.2	45.5	21.8	46.1	23.8	38.3	19.2	43.0	20.3
	Ind.	70.5	33.3	73.9	33.7	68.1	32.6	49.8	25.7	59.8	29.9	69.0	32.5
	Serv.	86.6	40.8	89.9	41.1	95.0	45.5	97.6	50.4	101.9	51.0	100.2	47.2
	GDP	212.0	100.0	219.0	100.0	208.6	100.0	193.6	100.0	199.9	100.0	212.0	100.0
NIGER	Agr.	179.4	49.4	246.9	58.4	257.3	56.9	271.2	55.4	276.1	53.9	288.2	53.8
	Ind.	54.9	15.1	56.0	13.2	63.1	14.0	72.7	14.8	80.2	15.7	85.8	16.0
	Serv.	128.8	35.5	120.0	28.4	131.9	29.2	145.8	29.8	156.1	30.5	161.6	30.2
	GDP.	363.1	100.0	422.9	100.0	452.3	100.0	489.6	100.0	512.4	100.0	535.5	100.0
NIGERIA	Agr.	5,241.5	31.9	5,098.7	28.7	5,226.1	27.0	5,308.7	24.6	5,559.3	23.0	5,752.5	22.4
	Ind.	8,403.3	20.7	4,276.9	24.1	4,577.9	23.6	4,946.1	22.9	5,809.9	24.0	5,917.7	23.1
	Serv.	7,804.8	47.4	8,383.0	47.2	9,556.2	49.4	11,313.2	52.5	12,846.1	53.0	13,998.3	54.5
	GDP	16,440.7	100.0	17,758.6	100.0	19,360.2	100.0	21,568.0	100.0	24,215.3	100.0	25,668.5	100.0

SENEGAL	Agr.	237.2	27.5	264.7	28.8	242.6	26.4	199.1	25.0	232.2	27.2	203.7	25.3
	Ind.	215.8	25.1	232.9	25.4	243.7	26.5	209.7	26.3	234.3	27.5	225.2	27.9
	Serv.	408.4	47.4	421.0	45.8	431.5	47.0	387.6	48.7	386.1	45.3	377.0	46.8
	GDP	861.3	100.0	918.7	100.0	917.9	100.0	796.4	100.0	852.6	100.0	8005.9	100.0
SIERRA LEONE	Agr.	124.9	30.7	131.5	31.5	138.4	33.1	142.0	32.5	143.3	31.9	148.9	32.8
	Ind.	100.3	24.7	93.0	22.3	81.0	19.4	90.1	20.6	92.2	20.5	91.3	20.1
	Serv.	181.3	44.6	192.7	46.2	198.7	47.5	204.4	46.8	214.1	47.6	213.7	47.1
	GDP	406.6	100.0	417.3	100.0	418.1	100.0	436.3	100.0	449.5	100.0	454.0	100.0
TOGO	Agr.	80.3	30.3	78.2	30.7	72.5	27.0	73.3	25.1	71.9	23.6	73.2	23.6
	Ind.	46.3	17.5	43.8	17.2	47.5	17.7	57.1	19.6	64.0	21.0	59.1	19.1
	Serv.	138.3	52.2	132.6	52.1	149.1	55.4	161.7	55.4	169.5	55.5	177.8	57.3
	GDP	264.9	100.0	254.6	100.0	269.0	100.0	292.0	100.0	305.3	100.0	310.1	100.0
UPPER VOLTA	Agr.	126.4	41.5	121.9	40.0	120.2	40.7	114.1	37.5	117.9	36.9	119.8	36.7
	Ind.	67.0	22.0	67.6	22.2	58.0	19.6	63.0	20.7	69.6	21.8	71.4	21.9
	Serv.	111.5	36.6	115.2	37.8	117.1	39.7	127.4	41.8	131.9	41.3	134.8	41.3
	GDP	304.9	100.0	304.7	100.0	295.2	100.0	304.5	100.0	319.4	100.0	326.0	100.0
WEST AFRICA	Agr.	8,419	34.3	8,387	32.2	8,375	30.2	8,522	28.1	8,771	26.5	8,928	25.9
	Ind.	5,078	20.7	6,001	23.0	6,382	23.0	6,828	22.5	7,742	23.4	7,854	22.8
	Serv.	11,033	45.0	11,653	44.7	12,999	46.8	15,000	49.4	16,553	50.1	17,729	51.4
	GDP	24,530	100.0	26,041	100.0	27.756	100.0	30,350	100.0	33,066	100.0	34,511	100.0

THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF WEST AFRICA AS MEASURED BY PER CAPITA INCOME (1970 CONSTANT US DOLLARS)

	1975	1980	Average Annual growth rate 1975-80
Benin	95	85	-2.2
Cape Verde	83	88	1.2.
Gambia	142	119	-3.5.
Ghana	275	204	-5.8
Guinea	171	178	0.8
G. Bissau	136	122	-2.1.
Ivory Coast	300	356	3.5.
Liberia	296	273	-1.6.
Mali	52	51	-0.4.
Mauritania	179	164	-1.7.
Niger	88	115	5.5.
Nigeria	259	341	5.7.
Senegal	194	163	-3.4.
Sierra Leone	148	145	-0.4.
Togo	137	140	0.4.
Upper Volta	58	55	-1.1.
WEST AFRICA	218.7	260.9	3.6.

* Source: ECA Statistics Division

PRODUCTION OF CEREALS (1000 Tons)

Annex IV

	1969/71	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Bénin	266	299	310	346	419	389	459	459
Cape Verde	2	5	4	2	9	1	7	3
Gambia	91	94	68	48	71	57	80	91
Ghana	739	671	457	640	705	780	624	714
Guinea	808	685	770	704	758	468	481	468
Guinea Bissau	49	91	106	45	82	55	35	41
Ivory Coast	640	671	617	809	846	890	873	935
Liberia	184	229	245	256	280	249	243	216
Mali	1,058	1,012	1,150	1,070	1,419	1,236	955	1,204
Mauritania	94	38	69	29	26	44	29	80
Niger	1,272	871	1,539	1,508	1,530	1,629	1,797	1,442
Nigeria	8,054	8,433	8,489	8,778	9,233	9,236	9,651	9,967
Senegal	704	786	714	517	996	665	645	928
Sierra Leone	518	556	613	635	655	533	547	435
Togo	301	273	204	229	331	317	311	271
Upper Volta	987	1,257	1,107	1,055	1,208	1,212	1,036	1,299

* Source: Annuaire dela Produetion FAO.

IMPORTS OF CEREALS (QUANTITY 10 T - VALUE 10,000)

	Quantities						Value						
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total
Benin	1,227	2,991	7,398	2,317	4,837	7,188	313	518	1,355	491	1,086	1,725	5,488
Cape Verde	6,883	7,446	10,605	8,322	4,267	4,877	1,621	1,461	1,945	1,097	584	700	5,947
Gambia	1,547	4,991	4,217	6,109	4,504	4,655	565	1,047	791	1,003	925	1,080	5,411
Ghana	8,460	10,827	28,992	28,864	19,472	23,959	2,005	2,278	6,620	6,025	5,100	6,370	28,398
Guinea	6,728	4,078	5,703	9,276	11,550	16,773	2,000	860	1,249	2,410	3,220	5,320	15,059
Guinea Bissau	2,200	3,502	2,712	4,576	3,878	1,577	680	764	459	1,340	1,092	491	4,826
Ivory Coast	8,170	12,139	31,755	30,765	36,076	42,030	1,382	2,296	7,218	7,382	9,598	12,460	40,336
Liberia	4,148	4,703	6,714	7,699	9,193	10,052	1,651	1,526	2,257	2,589	3,058	3,883	14,964
Mali	11,978	5,914	5,965	6,891	4,012	5,496	3,369	1,103	1,110	1,836	1,305	1,765	10,488
Mauritania	9,859	12,531	14,049	15,042	8,703	16,160	1,653	2,203	2,543	2,783	1,662	3,550	14,424
Niger	1,886	6,944	3,739	7,743	3,960	5,815	398	1,475	767	2,030	970	1,915	7,555
Nigeria	47,747	86,160	139,807	200,766	133,256	176,190	10,074	19,813	35,265	54,424	33,372	50,915	203,063
Senegal	21,886	33,286	48,540	45,386	40,048	42,055	5,227	8,130	10,700	7,517	8,731	10,652	50,957
Sierra Leone	2,554	3,920	4,378	4,887	12,604	8,330	577	880	1,195	1,637	4,437	2,920	11,646
Togo	201	1,586	4,198	3,061	3,858	4,867	49	311	955	753	983	1,445	4,496
Upper Volta	2,590	2,860	4,384	6,330	8,186	9,499	790	730	963	1,784	1,989	2,724	8,980
Total	199,264	203,878	323,146	380,340	307,804	379,523							

* Source:

NET IMPORTS OF RICE - FOOD AID - 1000 Tons

Annex VI

	Average 1960-64	Average 1965-69	Average 1970-74	1975	1976	1977	1978	Average 1975-78
Benin	4.6	6.5	7.4	5.3	10.5	17	18	12.70
Cape Verde	—	—	—	46	2.74	—	—	—
Gambia	9.1	9.1	17.6	25.7	34.4	34	17.8	28
Ghana	42.1	35.1	41	0.4	0.3	43	129	43.2
Guinea	31.9	35.4	25.8	—	44.7	26.5	47.8	39.7
Guinea Bissau	3.9	10.7	24.6	14.3	10.9	13.3	28.1	16.7
Ivory Coast	39.4	57.6	94.7	1.6	(30.4)	144.4	141.5	64.3
Liberia	32.1	37.4	45.2	30.6	37.5	59.9	48.3	44.1
Mali	(8.5)1	3.3	38.7	20.1	(13.2)1	13.8	8.7	7.4
Mauritania	6.3	9	25.6	8	27.9	39.5	—	34.8
Niger	1.4	1.1	3.1	1	5.8	11.2	19	9.3
Nigeria	1.2	1	2.8	6.7	45.4	341.6	456.5	212.6
Senegal	119	165	177.9	102	236.2	201.2	237.5	194.2
Sierra Leone	16.2	21.3	34.3	—	3.5	16.5	18.2	9.6
Togo	3	2.6	3.7	6.6	5.5	17.7	2	8.
Upper Volta	3.2	3.5	6.8	16.5	20.4	28.4	27.7	23.3

* Source: Annuaire Statistique du riz (ADRAO* 1979) ( ) 1: Net exports

IMPORTS OF MAIZE

	Quantities (Tons)						Value (1000 US Dollars)					
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Benin	91	160	16,400	—	—	7,500	12	16	2,000*			1,100*
Cape Verde	32,861	22,674	32,000	66,215	30,000	30,000	4,280	2,646	4,000	8,161	3,400*	3,400*
Gambia	43	—	—	—	—	7	1	—	—	—	—	1,100*
Ghana	44	11,000	47,000	92,000	28,000	50,700	11	2,400*	9,000*	18,000*	5,900*	12,000*
Guinea	8,000	—	—	8,200	5,000	6,000*	1,600	—	—	1,400*	1,200*	1,200*
Guinea Bissau	6,015	12,490	5,000	6,000	6,000	1,077	900*	1,900*	900*	900	900*	143*
Ivory Coast	126	3,066	3,100	14,650	8,565	5,000	57	475	480*	2,524	1,764	1,000*
Liberia	315	343	380	894	890	930	127	94	97*	295	300*	330*
Mali	28,000	2	—	17,000	—	6,000	7,000*	3	—	3,400	—	1,500*
Mauritania	5,000	5,000	5,000	—	35	—	830*	830*	830*	—	13	—
Niger	3,000	6,000	6,000	10,000	—	—	600*	950*	950*	1,800*	—	—
Nigeria	2,211	9,861	90,000	46,975	111,000	168,000	690	2,270	18,000*	22,794	26,000	42,000*
Senegal	9,564	13,000	21,000	12,027	3,200	15,500	1,471	1,800*	3,000 *	1,255*	540*	2,900*
Sierra Leone	—	—	—	—	—	1,700	—	—	—	—	—	300*
Togo	677	700	9,500	1,874	20	5,000	43	40*	500*	287	9	1,200*
Upper Volta	164	501	510	—	1,809	3,000	23	94*	94	—	193	800*

* Source: Annuarie du Commerce FAO 1977-1980
(*): FAO estimat

IMPORTANCE OF FOOD AID

	Thousands tons (grain equivalent)					Kilogramme per person				
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Benin	8.8	6.4	6.3	11.5	5.0	2.9	2.0	2.0	3.5	1.5
Cape Verde	—	1	41	52	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gambia	9.0	2.9	5.7	19.6	9.4	17.2	5.4	10.3	34.3	16.0
Ghana	43.1	29.8	57.5	88.7	73.3	4.3	2.9	5.4	8.1	6.5
Guinea	48.9	34.9	14.3	36.9	33.0	10.4	7.2	2.9	7.2	6.3
Guinea Bissau	10.9	7.2	20.9	25.2	23.0	15.0	9.7	27.8	33.0	29.5
Ivory Coast	3.6	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.5	(.)	(.)	0.1	(.)
Liberia	3.4	1.9	0.6	1.3	1.1	2.1	1.1	0.3	0.7	0.6
Mali	113.6	39.1	4.2	32.8	24.8	18.8	6.3	0.7	5.0	3.7
Mauritania	47.9	25.1	28.9	51.0	31.1	33.7	17.2	19.3	33.0	19.6
Niger	74.8	90.5	53.1	21.5	23.2	16.3	19.1	10.9	4.3	4.5
Nigeria	7.3	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	(.)	0.0	0.0	0.0
Senegal	28.3	23.5	31.4	168.0	65.1	5.7	4.6	6.0	31.2	11.8
Sierra Leone	9.5	6.0	7.7	7.0	5.6	3.1	1.9	2.4	2.1	1.7
Togo	0.0	5.9	6.5	20.8	9.1	0.0	2.6	2.8	8.8	3.8
Upper Volta	0.0	17.2	5.6	51.8	49.1	0.0	3.2	1.0	9.3	8.7
Total	409.1	293.7	283.8	640.7	353.1					

BASIC INDICATORS

Annex IX

	Total population (1000)	Average annual rate of growth 1960-70	1970-1979	Projected population 2000 (1000)	Average annual index of food production per capita (1967-71 = 100) 1977-79
Benin	3,640	2.6	2.9	9,000	97
Cape Verde	329	—	—	—	—
Gambia	619	3.2	3.0	1,000	77
Ghana	12,063	2.4	3.0	21,000	82
Guinea	5,147	2.8	2.9	9,000	86
Guinea Bissau	583	2.6	1.6	1,000	94
Ivory Coast	8,298	3.7	5.5	15,000	102
Liberia	2,038	3.1	3.3	4,000	101
Mali	7,135	2.4	2.6	12,000	88
Mauritania	1,681	2.5	2.7	3,000	75
Niger	5,479	3.3	2.8	10,000	89
Nigeria	79,680	2.5	2.5	161,000	87
Senegal	5,811	2.4	2.6	10,000	88
Sierra Leone	3,571	2.2	2.5	6,000	87
Togo	2,705	2.7	2.4	4,000	81
Upper Volta	7,094	1.6	1.6	10,000	93

Source: Etude des Conditions e'conomiques et Sociales en Afrique, CEA-1980-1981

* at Factor Cost.

STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION
Distribution of GDP (%)

Annex X

	Real GDP* in Million 1970	1980	Agriculture 1970	1980	Industry 1970	1980	Manufacturing Industry 1970	1980	Services 1970	1980
Benin	224	273	45.9	50.3	12.5	10.7	8.4	6.3	41.6	39.0
Cape Verde	25	27	20.3	22.7	28.5	27.4	5.3	5.9	51.2	49.9
Gambia	55	67	30.7	24.6	9.6	15.6	5.1	2.6	59.7	59.8
Ghana	2,082	2,053	49.5	41.6	19.4	20.9	12.2	12.5	31.1	37.5
Guinea	612	768	66.7	55.5	7.7	9.8	2.9	3.0	25.6	34.7
Guinea Bissau	59	63	62.5	58.9	2.9	3.9	1.1	1.1	34.6	37.2
Ivory Coast	1,192	2,146	35.2	25.4	20.5	27.1	11.4	13.5	44.3	47.5
Liberia	380	483	24.8	29.7	30.7	30.5	4.0	5.6	34.5	39.8
Mali	255	319	48.2	41.9	16.2	16.4	10.5	10.8	35.6	41.7
Mauritania	192	212	29.3	20.3	38.5	32.5	4.9	6.3	32.2	47.2
Niger	382	536	60.4	53.8	9.9	16.0	6.0	5.7	29.7	30.2
Nigeria	11,700	25,668	44.3	22.4	15.9	23.1	4.4	5.2	38.8	54.5
Senegal	766	806	27.2	25.3	22.8	27.9	15.9	18.2	50.0	46.8
Sierra Leone	380	454	29.9	32.8	28.8	20.1	6.5	7.3	41.3	47.1
Togo	240	310	39.8	23.6	20.8	19.1	10.2	6.2	39.4	57.3
Upper Volta	290	326	45.5	36.7	16.6	21.9	10.9	14.6	35.9	41.4

Source: Annuaire de la Production FAO,Bangue Mondiale: Proggramme indicatif d'action