Towards a resilient, inclusive and prosperous Sahel region
SAHEL 2043
Towards a resilient, inclusive and prosperous Sahel region
To order copies of *Sahel 2043: Towards a resilient, inclusive and prosperous Sahel region*, please contact:

Publications and Conference Management Section  
Economic Commission for Africa  
P.O. Box 3001  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia  
Tel: +251 11 544-9900  
Fax: +251 11 551-4416  
E-mail: eca-info@un.org  
Web: www.uneca.org

© 2019 United Nations  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

All rights reserved  
First printing May 2019

Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted. Acknowledgement is requested, together with a copy of the publication.

The designations employed in this report and the material presented in it do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Designed and printed in Addis Ababa by the ECA Printing and Publishing Unit. ISO 14001:2015 certified.  
Printed on chlorine free paper

Cover and inside photos: Shutterstock.com
# Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures .................................................................................................................. v

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. vi

Foreword ................................................................................................................................................ viii

Acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................................. ix

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ x

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Past and present developments in the Sahel ................................................................. 4
  1.1 Diagnostic analysis of the Sahel system ...................................................................................... 4
  1.1.1 The geopolitical level ........................................................................................................... 4
  1.1.2 The economic level ............................................................................................................. 5
  1.1.3 Demographic dynamics ....................................................................................................... 8
  1.1.4 The social level ................................................................................................................... 9
  1.1.5 Environmental level ............................................................................................................ 11
  1.1.6 Profile of peace and security in the Sahel .......................................................................... 11
  1.2 Survey on the aspirations of the Sahel population .................................................................. 12
  1.2.1 Perceptions of the populations on the current situation of the Sahel ............................... 12
  1.2.2 Convergences between existing development plans and Sahelian peoples’ aspirations 14
  1.2.3 Long-term development aspirations of Sahel States ......................................................... 17
  1.3 Structural analysis ..................................................................................................................... 19
  1.3.1 Presentation and analysis of the Sahel system .................................................................. 19
  1.3.2 Structural analysis findings .............................................................................................. 20
  1.3.3 Key messages from the structural analysis ..................................................................... 22
  1.4 Major findings of the SWOT analysis of the Sahel system ..................................................... 24

Chapter 2: Possible futures for the Sahel ....................................................................................... 26
  2.1 Characteristics of the Sahel system ......................................................................................... 26
  2.2 Presentation of the scenarios for the future of the Sahel ........................................................ 27
  2.3 Description of Sahel scenarios ................................................................................................. 27
    2.3.1 “Tcheb Tcheb”: The business-as-usual scenario ............................................................... 27
    2.3.2 Pessimistic scenario: “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings” ......................................................... 28
    2.3.3 Optimistic scenario: “The Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah” ............................... 28
  2.4 Quantification of the scenarios ................................................................................................. 33
    2.4.1 Quantification results ....................................................................................................... 33
    2.4.2 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 33
    2.4.3 Assumptions for quantification of the scenarios ............................................................ 33
    2.4.4 Scenario quantification results ...................................................................................... 35
Chapter 3: Vision and strategic orientations for long-term development ...........................................44

3.1 The Vision ........................................................................................................................................44
   3.1.1 Peace and security .....................................................................................................................44
   3.1.2 Strong institutions ....................................................................................................................44
   3.1.3 Sustainable environment ..........................................................................................................45
   3.1.4 Managed demographic dynamics ..........................................................................................45

3.2 Strategic orientations to achieve the SDGs in the Sahel ...............................................................45
   3.2.1 Five strategic orientations ........................................................................................................45
   3.2.2 Strengths and threats to achieving the Vision ..........................................................................51

Chapter 4: Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................54

Appendix 1: Key Stakeholders’ Consultative Mechanism .................................................................55

Appendix 2: Summary of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals ......................................................57

Bibliography ...........................................................................................................................................58
List of Tables and Figures

List of Tables
Table 1: Value added by different sectors to the GDP of Sahel countries, 2000–2016.........................6
Table 2: World, African and Sahel populations (millions), 1950–2100.................................................10
Table 3: Summary of ranking of the seven themes in four Sahel countries........................................12
Table 4: Summary of aspirations of four Sahel countries..................................................................13
Table 5: Sahelian peoples’ aspirations, set against continental and international sustainable development agenda priorities....................................................................................................16
Table 6: Main socioeconomic development objectives of Sahel States.............................................18
Table 7: List of the 61 Sahel system variables .....................................................................................19
Table 8: Characteristics of the Matrix of Direct Influences (MDI) ......................................................20
Table 9: Summary of main findings of the SWOT analysis of the Sahel.............................................25
Table 10: Overview of possible trends in the 12 main variables, organised into three thematic categories.....................................................................................................................................................29
Table 11: Worldwide Governance Indicators: assumptions ............................................................34
Table 12: Income tax as a share of GDP ..........................................................................................34
Table 13: Fiscal Pressure Distribution ...............................................................................................34
Table 14: Synthesis of key strengths and threats for the achievement of the Sahel Vision..............52

List of Figures
Figure 1: Boundaries of the Sahel within the context of the United Nations .................................3
Figure 2: Mo Ibrahim Index of Sahel Governance, 2017 .................................................................5
Figure 3: Total factor productivity relative to the United States, 2012–2017 ..................................6
Figure 4: Employment by sector in the Sahel in 2017.....................................................................7
Figure 5: Manufactured product exports per capita, where data available ($ constant, 2014).......7
Figure 6: Total wealth per capita in the Sahel and its components ($ constant, 2014) ..............8
Figure 7: Income disparities in the Sahel......................................................................................10
Figure 8: Poverty ratio in Sahel countries, 2009–2014 ..................................................................11
Figure 9: Regrouping of variables in the indirect plane .................................................................21
Figure 10: Projected Sahel growth performances, 2015–2043 ......................................................36
Figure 11: Projected GDP share by productive sector, 2015–2043..............................................36
Figure 12: Projected domestic revenue as a share of GDP, 2015–2043 (%) ..................................37
Figure 13: Projected sectoral expenditure trends in the Sahel, 2015–2043....................................37
Figure 14: Projected population dynamics in the Sahel, 2015–2043.............................................38
Figure 15: Projected Sahel health and education trends, 2015–2043............................................39
Figure 16: Projected employment and poverty trends in the Sahel, 2015–2043................................40
Figure 17: Projected Sahel environment and biodiversity trends, 2015–2043..........................41
Figure 18: Projected Sahel water resources trend, 2015–2043....................................................42
Figure 19: Projected SDG performances in 2030 (%)......................................................................43
Acknowledgements

This *Sahel 2043* report was prepared under the overall guidance of Vera Songwe, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, and the leadership of Dimitri Sanga and Bakary Dosso, respectively former Director and acting Director of the ECA Sub-regional Office for West Africa.

The ECA and UNDP core team comprised Mamoudou Sebego, Amadou Diouf, Ahonado Ochozias Gbaguidi, Mundunge Ghitu, Allan Mukungu, Linus Mofo, Adrian Gauci, Ngone Diop, Gideon Rutaremwa, Emmanuel Ngok, Medhat Elhelepi, Jalal Abdel-Latif, Mustapha Sadni-Jallab, Isidore Kahoui, Malick Mamadou Bal, Mouhamadou Niang (UNDP) and Mireille Linjouom (UNDP).

The report benefited from contributions by Alioune Sall, Baba Top and Ruben Djogbenou from the African Future Institute (AFI), Professor Salih Mohamed from the International Institute of Social Studies at The Hague, Ambassador Abdoulaye Diop, and Carla Susana Assuad from the Millennium Institute. AFI was the lead consultant in the elaboration of the background materials on the aspirations survey, the structural analysis and the construction of scenarios. The Millennium Institute lent its support to the quantification of these scenarios.

The Structural Analysis Workshop was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in July 2018 to identify the main factors of change in the Sahel that will play a key role in shaping its future. It brought together multifaceted specialists on the Sahel. The participants were: Ambassador Ai Maanoun Keita, Aghali Abdoulkader, Bassole Wilfried, Damiba Pierre Claver, Garba Abdoulahi, Kodjo Essi, Mai Manga Boukar, Mohamed Taleb Isselmou, Momodu Rahemat, Nyobe Delphine, Sombie Issiaka, Top Baba, Suzanne Kala Lobe and Zonon Abdoulaye.

The following country experts actively participated as national focal persons: Abdoulaye Diallo and Mamadou Camara (Guinea), Kadidia Traore and Ahamadou Sidibe (Mali), Mahaman Saliou Adam and Issoufou Saidou (Niger), Cheikh Tidiane Ndour and Souleymane Cissé (Senegal), Alioune Gueye and Mariem Khatri (Mauritania), Ibrahima Kinteh and Mama Jarju (The Gambia), Mady Ouedraogo and Bamorifin Djane (Burkina Faso), Pierre Joubert Tegoum and Hamadou Saidou (Cameroon), Abdoulaye Abdramane and Abderahim Abbo (Chad).

The production of *Sahel 2043* would not have been possible without the valuable technical inputs and constructive feedbacks received during the two expert group meetings organised in Dakar in April 2018 and October 2018. Participants represented a constellation of regional governmental and non-governmental organisations, private sector entities and United Nations agencies. We are particularly grateful to the following bodies for their valuable comments, inputs and suggestions: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS), G5 Sahel, West African Development Bank (BOAD), Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), African Center for Trade, Integration and Development (CACID), ONE (the grassroots campaign and advocacy organisation), Office of the UN SG Special Adviser for the Sahel; African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP), International Labour Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Regional United Nations Development Group for West and Central Africa (RUNDG–WCA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Office for Projects and Services (UNOPS), United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and the World Food Programme (WFP).
Valuable contributions and comments were made by the ECA internal review panel, which consisted of Joseph Atta-Mensah, Mama Keita, William Muhwava, Eunice Ajambo, Selahattin Selsah Pasali, Zoubir Benhamouche and Hodane Youssouf. The following consultants provided valuable contributions to the ECA team: Takoubakoye Aminata Boureima, Ehouman Williams Ahouakan and Dieudonné Mignamissi. We would also like to thank Gohou Gaston, from the Development Solutions Institute, who provided expert critique and external review. A special mention also goes to the Publications and Documentation Section for translating, designing and printing the *Sahel 2043* report. The editor for the report was Sandra Jones (Consultant).
Foreword

The Sahel region is a priority for the United Nations Secretary-General and the United Nations system in their efforts to make the Sustainable Development Goals work for both the region and for Africa. The Sahel is faced with a plethora of challenges, including the increasing threats posed by conflict, terrorism and violent extremism, trafficking, irregular migration, food insecurity and vulnerability to climate change. Nonetheless, the prevalent “crisis narrative” tells only one side of the story. The reality is that the Sahel is endowed with an overwhelming abundance of natural resources, which, if managed equitably and sustainably, could turn the region’s fortunes around. Beyond its mineral resources, the Sahel’s wealth lies in the resilience and fortitude of its people. These are two major factors that should be harnessed to propel the Sahel towards a sustainable and inclusive development path that leaves no one behind in the region.

This report, entitled Sahel 2043, provides a comprehensive, forward-looking strategic orientation to build national and international partners’ effectiveness towards the structural transformation agenda of the region. It shows that the Sahel has, throughout its history, defied popular negative stereotypes and perceptions and has managed to surmount its challenges. However, there are several undercurrents or recurring themes that are constant in the political, economic, environmental and social trajectories of the Sahel that must be identified and circumvented for the realisation of the aspirations of the Sahelian people.

The study suggests that the Sahel of the future must choose a different route to maximise its growth and social development potentials. There are many steps to be taken along this path. The Sahel must promote inclusive governance to foster greater cohesion and harmony for its peoples, improve human capital and seize the opportunity of the demographic dividend, transform economic structures, promote inclusive development and build its resilience capacities. Finally, the Sahelian people, especially women and youth, must embrace their role as active transformative agents who can steer the region towards shared prosperity, growth and enduring peace.

These are crucial messages that highlight the potential of the Sahel region. The realisation of the high aspirations of the Sahel – the “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah” – could usher in a renaissance of the region, heralding an era of unparalleled economic and social development, of social cohesion, renewed dialogue and untapped synergies among the various social and political actors.

Understanding the challenges and seizing the opportunities offered by the unique qualities of the Sahel countries can open the door to major investments and support from development partners, including the private sector. Advocacy in this respect is critical, in order to spur far-reaching development initiatives that will help the region and its diverse and innovative people to build the prosperous, socially inclusive and sustainable future they both desire and deserve.

Amina Mohammed
Deputy Secretary-General
United Nations
Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aSDMS</td>
<td>Aggregated System Dynamic Model for the Sahel region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAU</td>
<td>Business-as-usual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Best case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Best performing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPII</td>
<td>Centre for Prospective Studies and International Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFA</td>
<td>International Fiscal Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iSDG</td>
<td>Integrated Sustainable Development Goals model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Less performing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDI</td>
<td>Matrix of Direct Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICMAC</td>
<td>Impact Matrix Cross-Reference Multiplication Applied to a Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MII</td>
<td>Matrix of Indirect Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDES</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLI</td>
<td>Red List Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAPP</td>
<td>Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Shared Prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPS</td>
<td>Socioeconomic Prospects for the Sahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>Total Fertility Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA-WCARO</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund – West and Central African Regional Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Worst case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGI</td>
<td>Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

1. Background

The Sahel comprises a semi-arid region of Africa extending from Senegal eastward to The Sudan – or from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. However, based on common development challenges, the United Nations (UN) limits the Sahel to ten (10) countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad.

For decades, the UN has recognized that, the Sahel has claimed its place in the global spotlight, largely as a zone of conflict and intractable development challenges. Worrying population dynamics, vulnerability to climate change, protracted conflicts, poor governance, and dependence on humanitarian and development aid are the megatrends that continue to inordinately shape the region’s economic and social landscape.

Indeed, Sahel is the fastest-growing population region in the world at 2.9 per cent per annum, and in 2017, its total population weighted 25.8 per cent (324.1 million people) of overall Africa population and will reach 28.7 per cent (724.2 million) in 2050. The region has the world highest total fertility rate established between 4.6 and 7.2 births per woman and the world highest fertility rate of teenage girls (152 ‰).

Human capital is of paramount importance to the region’s development. Developing this human capital entails harnessing demographic dynamics, ensuring access to basic social services such as education, quality care, clean water and a healthy living environment, strengthening social protection systems and ensuring diversified supply to the labor market.

In 2014, human capital represented 43 per cent of the total wealth of the Sahel countries compared to 71 per cent in OECD countries. Accordingly, Sahel countries experienced the poorest average year of children schooling. Human capital deficit is associated with low productivity and dysfunctional, weak and inefficient institutions. In addition, gender disparities need to be addressed, particularly at school entry levels and in main economic activities. Indeed, girls receive on average 2.4 years of schooling compared to 4.2 years for boys. These inequities are also apparent in economic activities and in productive resources, including low access to land, finance, and labor markets, which impede efforts to achieve inclusive growth and development.

The structural characteristic of lack of diversification of Sahel countries’ economies, contributes to low productivity and competitiveness, and reinforces the concentration of limited employment in low value-added primary and tertiary sectors. The economic model of the Sahel countries, based on their significant dependency on agricultural and mining proceeds as well as official development assistance (ODA1), poses structural limitations.

The Sahel countries are climatically, the most vulnerable in Africa with extreme weather conditions such as drought and floods occurring every five years on average (also known as El Nino effect), and exacerbating the prevalence of low and unpredictable precipitation. Climate change is and will remain a key phenomenon, compounding the problems of an already fragile environmental conditions, leading to food insecurity, human vulnerability, poverty and social unrest. The region is warming faster than the world, recording further warming of 2.27° C (1950-2018) and 3.88° C (1990-2018) per century compared to a global average of 2.2° C every 100 years. The average annual temperature in 2018 was the seventh warmest in the region since 1950. The year 2018 was also characterized by above-average seasonal precipitations, which resulted in devastating floods that affected 2 million people in the Sahel.

---

1 ODA in % of GNI (2017) in selected countries based on data availability: Guinea (4.4%), Mali (9.1%), Burkina Faso (7.4%), Niger (15.2%), The Gambia (18.5%)
The Sahel is one of the poorest regions in Africa and in the world. The headcount poverty ratio is estimated at 43 per cent in 2015 ranging from 38 per cent to 55 per cent against an average of 42.3 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 10.7 per cent in the world. This poverty stems from the Sahel vulnerability to multiple environmental, social and political shocks that not only undermine the region's productive capacity, but also increase its susceptibility to a breakdown in social order, food security and political stability.

One of the major challenges facing the Sahel region is the governance deficit. This deficit is epitomized by noticeable increase corruption, conflicts and extreme violence spurred by institutional weakness, and contestation of the legitimate power of the state. There is also an emergence of non-governable spaces, leading to geopolitical confrontation exacerbated by combined effects of resource conflicts and an erosion of social cohesion.

However, despite the negative mega trends outlined above, the Sahel is endowed with abundant natural resources (oil, bauxite, gold and uranium), lakes, river basins, underground water resources and aquifers, which, if managed equitably and sustainably, could turn the region's fortunes around. Also, in the current digital era, the region is experiencing a technological dynamic supported by a large penetration of mobile devices. The mobile cellular telephone subscription per 100 inhabitants is estimated at 88 per cent in 2018 against 76 percent in Africa. This positive move could lead to new economic opportunities, particularly in the trade and financial services, with the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Therefore, despite the multitude of adversities confronting the Sahel, this report is crafted with the purpose of assisting the African Union, UN and Development Partners efforts to mobilize the Sahelian peoples and governments' resilience, resources and creativity for overcoming these challenges and meeting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union Agenda 2063 promise.

2. Objective of the study

At the request of the UN Security Council, the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) was developed in 2013, as an integrated response to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel. The UNISS, targeting 10 countries namely Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, seeks to promote an integrated and regional approach of UN system activities to address structural problems in the Sahel that make the region vulnerable to conflict, poverty, underdevelopment and weak governance. It also seeks greater coherence of wider international interventions in the Sahel.

The UN has developed in 2018 the UN Support Plan for the Sahel, an instrument to foster coherence and coordination for greater efficiency and results delivery under the UNISS framework. The Support Plan, covering the period 2018-2030, will help implement identified priorities to achieve the SDGs and the African Union Agenda 2063.

Against this background, the United Nations Secretary-General requested ECA to conduct the present prospective study on the Sahel, by exploring its social, economic and environmental dynamics and by identifying the key structural drivers for priming the Sahel resilience and its sustainable development prospects. The study will ensure that the needs and aspirations of the Sahelian people are taken into consideration. It will further strengthen the partnerships between national governments and other stakeholders in bringing coherence in the ongoing efforts for sustainable and inclusive development of the region.

Moreover, this initiative fits in the African Union and the United Nations development cooperation framework signed in January 2018 between the President of the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretary General, with the main objective to priming the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the SDGs.

3. Approach and methods

Firstly, the study elucidated a socioeconomic diagnosis of the Sahel. This highlighted the paradox between the characteristics of the region (e.g. an
abundance of natural resources, economic growth potential, youth and women) and its sub-optimal economic development status. The insights gained through the diagnostic study inform the entire Report and offer the background information often required in framing this type of study.

Secondly, having identified the major challenges of the region that curtail economic and social advancement, the study progressed to the second step which comprised national consultations, where respondents were surveyed on their aspirations around seven topics, namely: (i) population and human capital, (ii) governance, (iii) economy and productive sectors, (iv) culture and social structures, (v) environment and natural resources, (iv) external environment and regional integration, and (vii) technological innovations.

Thirdly, the report analyses the key factors of change, or drivers, of the Sahel system. The findings of the structural analysis show that the Sahel is a highly resilient system, with several internal modalities for building its future. As a result, changes in influential variables or major drivers such as governance and institutions building appear to dominate the functioning of the Sahel system. These main determinants in this regard are political and institutional. This includes the State’s ability to steer and manage affairs, which is central to the development of the Sahel.

Fourthly, three contrasted scenarios were developed, based on the behaviour of the two-main group of actors in the Sahel system, namely the State and non-State actors. These are (i) the business-as-usual scenario or “Tcheb Tcheb”, in which neither the State nor the non-State actors reinvent themselves; (ii) the pessimistic scenario, or “Clipping of the Eagle’s Wings”, whereby non-State actors reinvent themselves, but the State fails to do so, and (iii) the optimistic scenario or “The Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”, in which both the State and non-State actors reinvent themselves.

Lastly, an Aggregated System Dynamic Model for the Sahel region (aSDMS) was developed and used to quantify the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals model in the three scenarios. The approaches and methods are described in detail in the respective relevant sections of the Report.

4. Key findings

The Sahel is a resilient region, with several domestic resources for building its future. It is endowed with abundant natural resources and workforce. The State and non-State actors (civil society organizations and the private sector), are the two main actors susceptible to unleash the potential of the region to bring the needed transformation changes.

- **States’ steering and management capacity is the preeminent** game changer for the Sahel. States must take ownership of their development, avoid the multiplicity of planning frameworks and have well-targeted interventions. They must ensure that countries take advantage of the emerging development opportunities on the continent including the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and technological changes. To ensure the growth and diversification of economies, the State has a fundamental role to play in maintaining public investment in infrastructure, education and health, correcting market failures and reducing inequality in income and opportunity. Added to that is the requirement to combat corruption and foster decentralization.

The study has also highlighted a group of priorities interventions without which the development initiatives would not be effective in the long run. These include issues related to internal and external security, security financing, and border management. Failing to fulfill these key enablers, the State will irrevocably lose its legitimacy, especially in the eyes of disadvantaged groups.

- **The participation/involvement of non-State actors in the development process and their relationship with State actors** are highly determinant for Sahel future. The study has identified the following priorities: social and organizational innovations; citizenship; State presence throughout the country; and multiparty politics. Those priorities refer to the need to establish a new social contract between the States of the
Sahel and their populations, so that they can contribute more effectively to the construction of the future of the region.

The study has revealed three main plausible futures for the Sahel: i) a business as usual scenario; ii) a pessimistic scenario, and iii) a best-case scenario:

- **Tcheb Tcheb** or business as usual scenario (BAU): This is a plausible scenario if neither the State nor society reinvents itself. It is characterized by the continuity of present megatrends with preeminence of informal sector and an increase in inequalities at the social level. In this scenario, no Sahelian country will reach the Sustainable Development Goals. Employment will continue to be a major challenge; a crucial issue being that demand is not in line with the absorption capacity of productive systems. There are also increasing vulnerabilities in terms of human security, slowness in the demographic transition, and populations that continue to grow. As a result, urbanization becomes a major social issue with infrastructure development often failing to keep pace with the growth in urban populations. Moreover, this does not signal an end to the rural population growth, but it operates in a context characterized by low industrialization and stagnant productivity. The State may want to change paradigms quickly, but it cannot do it alone even with external development partners support. The State must therefore understand the roles of other internal forces and establish appropriate forms of collaboration with them.

- **Clipping of the Eagle’s Wings** or worst-case scenario (WC): This is a plausible scenario if non-State actors reinvent themselves but the State fails to do so. The State ignores the clamours for reforms coming from non-State actors and fails to fulfil its potential in terms of leadership and social engineering. It contents itself with saving appearances of legitimacy and legality but does not control any strategic steering.

- **The Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah** or best-case scenario (BCS): This is the most expected plausible scenario where both the State and non-State actors reinvent themselves. They both recognize that there are opportunities out there that are not being seized, but to grasp them, they must act together. The State is agile and can set the course (vision), determine the orientation (strategic planning), accelerate the implementation of priority actions to create the conditions for a broad and inclusive development (participation). We are in the presence of a developmental State who is a facilitator and a regulator, capable of unleashing the potential of both the economic and human capitals. In this scenario, the State will fix its macroeconomic and structural policies to accelerate economic diversification; it will design and implement innovative ways to finance national development priorities; it will foster decentralization, external security and border management in line with regional and continental standards and norms. The relationship between the State and non-States actors (civil society and private sector) is based on trust which is built through a continuous debate on development priorities, the fight against corruption, accountability and transparency.

---

2 A Mauritania concept to describe the pre-eminence of informal sector workers in the economy
A quantification of the scenarios, indicates that all the sustainable development goals exhibit a higher performance by 2030 in the best-case scenario. In this scenario, the Sahel countries will increase the average size of their GDP per capita by 6 in one generation, from 1900 dollars today to 11000 in 2043. In addition, poverty will significantly decrease, both in depth and in severity, thanks to the acquisition of capabilities. On the monetary poverty dimension, the poverty rate will fall from an average of 43 percent in 2015 to almost 22 percent in 2043. The total fertility rate (TFR) will also decrease from 5.5 births per woman in 2015 to 2.5 by 2043, mainly due to additional expenditure in family planning but also because of improvement in years of schooling, income and health expenditure.

5. **A Vision and five Forward-looking Strategic Orientation Towards Achieving the SDGs**

Based on all these considerations, the Sahel Vision 2043 embodies the aspiration that: “The Sahel in 2043 will be a region of peace, strong institutions based on worthy cultural values, sustainable environment, and managed population dynamics that generate transformed economies for Sahelian prosperity.” Paraphrased in a strategic orientation, the following five orientations are critical for the development of a prosperous Sahel.

1. **Promoting inclusive governance for better community living**

Governance in Sahel context goes beyond the classical understanding by including not only the elements of the political competence of States, but also the State’s leadership capacity in self-organization and the legitimacy for strong institution. This also encompasses the nature of the relationship that exists between States and the other actors in the socioeconomic and sociocultural life of the region. Moreover, it enables citizens to become more accountable for their own safety with community security, prevention and conflict management strategies.

2. **Improving human capital and capitalize on the demographic dividend**

This strategic orientation aims to create the conditions for the demographic transition in the Sahel. The objective is to improve the quality of human resources to benefit from demographic dividend opportunities. It is consistent with the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals. Education, training and information must be prioritized by policy-makers because they are essential for building the skillsets and capacities of Sahel countries to have the quantity and quality of human capital needed for the structural transformation of the economies and societies of the region.

3. **Transforming economic structures**

The structural transformations remain one of the major challenges of the countries of the Sahel with the industrialization as the main channel to achieve it. This industrialization is associated with the emergence of new productive sectors and engines of growth capable of capturing regional and international market shares, as well as the improvement of sectoral competitiveness. It also involves the adoption of proactive and targeted industrial policies to support emerging industries.

4. **Priming inclusive development.**

This strategic orientation focuses on policies targeting the most marginalized and vulnerable areas and populations. These policies should make possible the elimination of obstacles specific to the various vulnerable groups, particularly through access to training, information and financing. Attention needs to be given to women’s economic empowerment to reduce economic inequalities and improve access to production resources, finances and social services. An effective implementation of ambitious city policies regarding housing and social protection for the most vulnerable should be considered.

5. **Enhancing resilience capacities.**

The fifth strategic orientation focuses on integrating emergency actions into development. It is an issue of finding the balance and capacities to prevent security and health crises or natural disasters leading to humanitarian crises that require external assistance. Moreover, Sahel States should prepare to respond to any form of shock (climate,
security, health, etc.) by applying a human security approach that takes into account all the threats to human life.

These five strategic orientations offer long-term goals to counter strategic gaps in the region’s current development trajectories. They form coherent and mutually reinforcing goals, complementary to the Sustainable Development Goals and Africa’s aspirations, as spelled out in Agenda 2063. These orientations significantly improve the attainments of SDGs which exhibit a higher performance by 2030 in the scenario where they are used to inform national development frameworks.
Introduction

Despite decades of international cooperation, making it one of the most assisted regions in the world, the Sahel is now perceived as one of the poorest regions (seven of its 10 countries are low-income countries, while the three others rank as lower-middle-income). At least 19 strategies and more than 23 special envoy missions have been carried out in the region by international cooperation and development agencies. These strategies were flawed in several ways. In addition to an absence of coordination in their deployment, owing largely to their lacking a common conceptual and analytical foundation or time horizon, most of these strategies were developed in response to crises (environmental, food, humanitarian and security), in an effort to rapidly limit their immediate negative effects. Consequently, many of these strategies were developed under emergency circumstances, often exclusively within the offices of cooperation agencies, and without serious consultations with the Sahelians themselves, who were the most affected. For other interventions, where outside consultations were conducted regarding the future of the Sahel, they were limited to government representatives. Although consultations with major stakeholders are of course vital, it should be remembered that governments comprise only one specific category of stakeholder, among many others.

These persisting traits of socioeconomic deprivation have given the lasting impression that in the Sahel, the present has no future. In other words, if the trends observed over the last decades are not reversed, the economic and social transformations sought by Sahelians will remain an illusion. In such a scenario, poverty will escalate, undermining solidarity mechanisms (intra-community, national and regional) as well as social cohesion and peace. Most probably, survival considerations in the short term will prevail over the imperatives of lasting solidarity for generations to come.

This study challenges some of these negative perceptions and stereotypes of the Sahel, and proposes a more positive, progressive and pragmatic alternative for growth and prosperity, while recognizing the related risks and challenges. The Sahel is endowed with an abundance of natural and human resources which, if managed effectively and sustainably, could reverse the current situation in the region. The region is home to some of the continent’s leading producers of oil, bauxite, gold and uranium. It is abundantly endowed with river basins, oases and groundwater aquifers. Ironically, it is these same natural resources that have made the region a theatre of geopolitical confrontations, at the frontline of conflict.

According to UNECA (2018), economic growth in the Sahel between 2009 and 2016 surpassed the African average. In addition, urbanisation is occurring at a very rapid pace in the region. An interesting point of discussion is that although population growth is extremely high in the Sahel countries, population density is low by African standards. Similarly, income inequality in the Sahel is below the African average, although gender inequality in the region is the highest in Africa. The high population growth rate and increasing number of young people in the region present a vital opportunity for the Sahel countries to seize this demographic dividend and to redress gender inequalities, thereby spurring economic growth.

The transformation of this economic and demographic endowment requires that humanitarian and short-term development programmes and policies be reformed and realigned. These programmes can provide sustainable solutions if they are integrated into a long-term strategic management framework. This entails designing realistic future pathways, compatible with the potential and aspirations of the region. It will also mean carrying out uncompromising diagnoses of the mechanisms.

---

3 The Sahel comprises a semi-arid region of Africa extending from Senegal eastward to The Sudan – or from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. However, based on common development challenges, the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) is limited to 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad. For the text of UNISS, see the Annex to the UN Security Council “report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel Region”, June 2103, pp. 14–25 available at: https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2013_354_sahel_strategy_en.pdf.
and variables to determine the current equilibrium of the Sahel, and to maximise its growth potential.

The purpose of the present study is to contribute to the formulation of national development policies, strategies and plans for the achievement of the Sahel structural transformation agenda by 2043. More specifically, it aims to advocate for the Sahel as an investment destination, by underscoring its dynamic social, economic and environmental potentials. To this end, a two-pronged approach will be used:

A resolutely prospective approach. Taking into consideration the dynamic nature of the challenges faced by Sahel countries during the last decades, a long-term prospective study will build a concerted Vision for the Sahel. This will provide relevant analysis and policy options for governments, key regional stakeholders and the UN system to better target their interventions and accelerate socioeconomic development and progress towards achievement of national, regional and international development programs. This approach also responds to challenges within and across borders.

A participatory approach. Such an approach accords importance to consultations with the populations of the region to glean their thoughts on the circumstances in the Sahel, their aspirations, and their own evaluations of the contribution they can make to build a future for the region in which they can engage and invest. This approach is fully justified, given that in the past, Sahelian populations have often been left on the sidelines of strategies and initiatives that directly affect them. This lack of ownership has played a large part in contributing to the ineffectiveness of strategies and programs.

It is therefore in consideration of all these elements that the need to “recalibrate” the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) received the backing of the United Nations Secretary-General.

The present report sums up the results of six intermediate products, namely:
- Socioeconomic diagnosis of the Sahel system;
- National consultations on the aspirations of the people;
- Change factors through structural analysis of the Sahel system;
- Exploration of possible futures through the exploratory scenario method;
- Quantification of the scenarios; and
- Definition of the Vision and strategic orientations of the Sahel.

The report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 discusses past and present developments in the Sahel, and presents the diagnostic analysis of the Sahel. It examines the strengths, constraints, opportunities and threats of the Sahel system and highlights the key development issues of the Sahel countries. Chapter 2 presents the possible developments of the Sahel system through alternative scenarios designed from hypothetical situations. These situations derive from key development issues, the diagnostic analysis, the findings from the aspirations survey of the Sahelian populations, and the structural analysis. Chapter 3 presents the Vision for Sahel 2043 and the five strategic orientations that offer the greatest potential for transforming the region. Chapter 4 summarises the key conclusions of the study.
Figure 1: Boundaries of the Sahel within the context of the United Nations

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Determining a better future for the Sahel entails identifying and conducting an in-depth analysis of the main socioeconomic, environmental and cultural factors. These factors have, in the past, influenced the major development trends of both the region and the continent as a whole, in the quest to ensure the well-being and prosperity of the Sahelian populations. This chapter presents the main findings of the socioeconomic diagnosis of the Sahel, the aspirations of the Sahelian populations and the main factors of change through structural analysis of the Sahel system.

1.1 Diagnostic analysis of the Sahel system

1.1.1 The geopolitical level

The Sahel has always been a land of long-distance trade, which assured the prosperity of great polities throughout its history. The Sahel forms a transition zone between the arid Sahara to the north and the humid savannas to the south. Geographically, the ten countries that make up the Sahel in this study are located within a continuum of different proximities, from the rich savanna in the south and the Sahara Desert in the north, bordering the southern frontiers of the countries of North Africa.

The Sahel countries belong to several overlapping regional economic and transboundary natural resource management organisations. The Sahel also operates as a geopolitical corridor linking West, Central and East Africa. Moreover, beyond the Sahara Desert, the Sahel is connected to North Africa through a network of roads and traditional camel caravan routes. Because of its geographical proximity to Europe, the Sahel comprises a transit zone linking Africa south of the Sahel, the Sahel, North Africa and Europe. Accordingly, the region’s geopolitics are an expression of multiple interdependent economic and political spaces and interests, integrated through legal global trade, but also through illicit transnational migration, and trafficking in narcotics, small arms and people (Raineri and Rossi, 2017; Molinaar and El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Shaw and Reitano, 2014).

From the pre-colonial era until today, the Sahel States and societies have exhibited considerable resilience and vigour, constantly reforming their systems of government. These parallel processes of continuity and change have culminated in the current political landscape, where multi-party competitive elections are held regularly. The quality of governance in these States varies, but the internal struggles to wrest the political are an ever-resounding cry for more freedoms and respect for the rule of law (LaVigne and others, 2002).

A striking feature of the Sahel is its persistent governance shortcomings. Governance denotes a framework of rules, institutions and practices. It is needed to set boundaries and provide incentives for individuals, organisations and businesses. It draws its rationale from the need to maintain, energise or reinforce these balances. Such exigencies are particularly evident in the areas of democracy building, resource management, the rule of law, transparency and accountability and gender inequality. Shortcomings in these areas have contributed to instability and conflict in the Sahel countries, which in turn have undermined the legitimacy of the State, weakened its institutional and administrative capacity, and hampered countries’ ability to address the structural vulnerabilities of the region.

The Sahel is a melting pot of coexisting cultures. For ages, this land has experienced relative peace, which has orchestrated well for the development of trade and a degree of prosperity. Despite the development challenges shared with other regions of the hemisphere since the 1960s, the Sahel has been
Chapter 1: Past and present developments in the Sahel

relatively spared from wars, especially civil wars or national liberation wars waged in other regions of Africa. Nevertheless, some countries in the region have experienced inter-State conflicts and secessionist movements. The situation has changed drastically in the last two decades, as the Sahel has faced the same development challenges and has become an area of intense and extreme violence. Systems that allowed people to live in peaceful coexistence have lost their effectiveness.

In the Sahel, just as in any other system, there are several powers jostling in play. They are poly-morphous, because they encompass differentiated spheres of interest: political, social, economic, religious, cultural and symbolic. Lastly, they have both endogenous and exogenous legacy and legitimacy.

Social cohesion, which denotes reinforcing social ties by intra- and inter-generational solidarity, depends highly on the intensity, frequency and quality of the interactions between these powers and the balances that are established (or not) between them.

One of the challenges of the Sahel region in this sense is the stagnation, or even deterioration in recent years, of some governance indicators. Data from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance in 2017 shows that in most countries in the Sahel region, the level of governance remains low and, for almost all countries in the region, it falls below the African average.

This has been the trend since 2000, and according to this indicator, governance in the Sahel countries has changed very little. According to the Sahelian populations, who participated during the aspirations survey of this study, corruption remains one of the main factors limiting the quality of governance in the region. It is encouraged in many cases by the concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch and by the absence of operational anti-corruption mechanisms to safeguard the principles of transparency and accountability.

Beyond the question of the nature and exercise of powers, another burning issue is ownership of the long-term development vision by the people. It is indeed crucial for the countries of the region to understand that development cannot solely derive from the activities and inputs of the political elite, it must result from the involvement of all the actors.

1.1.2 The economic level

At the macroeconomic level, the countries of the Sahel region are mainly characterised by low economic diversification and low levels of productivity and competitiveness in regional and global markets. The rentier models of the Sahel countries, based on the export of agricultural or mining commodities, have shown their structural limits whereby their economies have struggled to make any real progress in transformation processes, and in economic or sustained accumulation. This is despite the fact that all the countries in the region have successively implemented structural adjustment programmes and economic reform programmes.
since the 1980s, designed to bring about this structural transformation.

Despite the abundant arable land and surface water, the rich subsoil, vast amounts of untapped groundwater, and the immense agricultural, forest and pastoral potential, many Sahel countries have directed their focus to proceeds from oil, mining and agricultural products. While this approach produced major economic gains in the past, there has been major volatility in the markets in recent years, particularly for oil, metals and minerals. Even though agriculture contributes greatly to GDP in the region, it has remained rudimentary at the subsistence level.

The structural transformation of the economy can barely be discerned as yet, especially as total factor productivity is still very low in all Sahel countries compared to the levels achieved in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, or South Korea (Figure 3). Improving this economic indicator is therefore a major challenge for the countries concerned, as no structural transformation can begin without better productivity.

The region’s employment structure is also reflective of the poor economic transformation and low productivity. Most jobs in almost all the Sahel countries are concentrated in the primary and tertiary sectors (characterised as mainly low value-added and low productivity jobs). According to Figure 4, with the exception of Nigeria and The Gambia, the agricultural sector is the largest provider of jobs in the Sahel, with most of this employment being in formal.

| Table 1: Value added by different sectors to the GDP of Sahel countries, 2000–2016 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                 | Agriculture     | Manufacturing   | Industry (excluding | Services       |
|                                 | % GDP           | % GDP           | manufacturing)     | % GDP          |
| Burkina Faso                   | 32.8 | 35.6 | 30.8 | 13.2 | 7.9  | 11.0 | 8.4  | 15.1 | 15.1 | 45.7 | 41.4 | 43.0 |
| Cameroon                       | 18.2 | 15.1 | 16.7 | 19.3 | 14.5 | ..   | 13.2 | 14.6 | ..   | 49.4 | 55.8 | 56.7 |
| Chad                           | 42.3 | 53.4 | 50.1 | 8.9  | 1.0  | 3.2  | 2.4  | 11.3 | 11.6 | 46.3 | 34.3 | 35.1 |
| The Gambia                     | ..   | 30.7 | 17.8 | ..   | 5.0  | 4.8  | ..   | 8.1  | 8.5  | ..   | 56.3 | 68.8 |
| Guinea                         | 22.4 | 18.7 | 20.2 | 4.0  | ..   | ..   | 29.4 | ..   | ..   | 44.2 | 46.6 | 48.6 |
| Mauritania                     | 36.7 | 21.7 | 27.4 | 13.2 | 8.1  | 6.9  | 14.8 | 33.5 | 23.1 | 35.3 | 36.7 | 42.6 |
| Mali                           | 35.9 | 36.2 | 42.1 | ..   | ..   | ..   | ..   | ..   | ..   | 40.6 | 38.9 | 39.7 |
| Nigeria                        | 26.0 | 23.9 | 21.2 | 3.7  | 6.6  | 8.8  | 48.5 | 18.8 | 9.6  | 21.8 | 50.8 | 60.4 |
| Niger                          | ..   | 40.9 | 41.5 | ..   | 4.8  | 6.4  | ..   | 10.9 | 11.8 | ..   | 43.5 | 40.4 |
| Senegal                        | 19.1 | 17.5 | 17.5 | 14.7 | 13.8 | ..   | 8.6  | 9.5  | ..   | 57.6 | 59.2 | 59.3 |


Figure 3: Total factor productivity relative to the United States, 2012–2017

Source: CEPII, calculations by authors, 2018.
Chapter 1: Past and present developments in the Sahel

Trade in the Sahel region is poorly integrated into international trade. According to World Bank data, in 2016 the Sahel accounted for only 0.094 per cent of global exports and a mere 0.14 per cent of global imports. For the period 2010–2015, Nigeria alone provided nearly 80 per cent of the region’s exports, all products combined. It remained for a very long time the main exporter of the Sahel region and derives its leverage from high exports of mining products (essentially petroleum), which accounted for an average 87.9 per cent of the country’s exports for the same period.

A similar situation pertains to the region’s low level of trade integration. According to COMTRADE data, intra-regional exports accounted for only 2.9 per cent of total exports in the Sahel region in 2014. In that same year, Nigeria and Senegal were the two main players in intra-regional trade, recording a 62.7 per cent and 22.8 per cent share of intra-regional exports respectively. The weak development of intra-regional trade is a signal that integration is yet to be achieved in the Sahel region.

The region’s timid integration into the global market is reinforced by the fact that very few countries in the Sahel have diversified export structures. In addition, the countries concerned export very few value-added products, such as manufactured goods and services.

Another key factor relating to the structural transformation of the Sahel economies is the thorny issue of development financing. The countries of the Sahel region must contend with making the best choices for the structural transformation process, while ensuring that they have sufficient funds to cover all the costly investments this entails. So far,
the region has been highly dependent on official development assistance (ODA). According to World Bank data, in 2016 the Sahel region benefitted from a net total of $8.7 billion in ODA, making it one of the most assisted regions in the world. Although grants make up the bulk of this ODA, the debt situation in the Sahel countries is nonetheless a pressing issue. According to World Bank indicators for 2016, The Gambia, for instance, posted an external debt-to-exports ratio of 210.2 per cent, Mauritania, 227.2 per cent, Nigeria, 78.5 per cent and Senegal 159.5 per cent.  

### 1.1.3 Demographic dynamics

The economic dynamics of the countries of the Sahel region, as well as their capacity to create sustainable wealth and well-being, depend on several factors. The principal positive ones consist in their endowment of natural capital (energy sources, minerals, land, etc.), the size of various assets held by countries, and their human capital in terms of knowledge, skills and experiences of the labour force.

Human capital is a determining factor in all development processes. At the macroeconomic level, theorists argue that a higher stock of human capital contributes to endogenous growth and structural transformation by increasing the pace of innovation and the distribution rate of new technologies. At the micro level, improving human capital increases labour productivity and thereby income. Division of wealth per capita in the Sahel countries (Figure 6) shows that human capital represents the major component in Nigeria and the second most important component of wealth in the other countries of the region (except Niger and Guinea, where human capital ranks third among the wealth components).

Human capital represented 43 per cent, on average, of the total wealth of the Sahel countries in 2014, with a high of 56 per cent in Nigeria, compared to an average of 71 per cent in OECD countries.

Human capital, as a key factor of wealth, places population dynamics at the heart of the development concerns of the Sahel. In 2017, the population of the Sahel region was 324.1 million, or nearly 25.8 per cent of the total population of the continent. The Sahel region is growing the fastest in terms of population in the whole continent. Its total population is expected to reach 456.8 million by 2030, when the region will account for 26.8 per cent of the African population. It will continue to grow to 724.2 million, or 28.7 per cent of the total population of Africa, by the year 2050.

Another significant characteristic of the Sahel region, which lies at the core of the current population growth, is the total fertility rate (TFR), and in particular, the fertility rate of teenage girls. In 2015 the Sahel recorded an average of 152 live births

---

**Figure 6: Total wealth per capita in the Sahel and its components ($ constant, 2014)**

![Total wealth per capita in the Sahel and its components](image)

**Source:** World Bank, Wealth Accounting 2016.

---

6 Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, in particular, to whom we owe the concept.
7 Owing to a lack of available data, the average here does not include Niger and Guinea. If these two countries were included, the average would be 36 per cent.
per 1,000 teenage girls, compared to 117 in ECOWAS, 114 in ECCAS and 103 in Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^9\) This reflects gender inequalities and social norms, including early marriage, the poor take-up of modern contraceptive methods, and the low level of women’s empowerment across the ten Sahel countries. Indeed, the median age at first marriage across the region is 16.1 years and the use of modern contraception is only 9 per cent (SWEED, 2015). This carries major negative implications for the educational attainment of girls and the health of next generations.

The poor use of a modern contraceptive method is indicative of the inadequate reproductive health service delivery. In general, the health systems of the Sahel countries also encounter difficulties in responding effectively to the recurrence of epidemics and the phenomenon of malnutrition in some of the sub-regions. This situation is partly due to low coverage, coupled with low-quality service.

The population growth rate for the region as a whole averaged 2.9 per cent per annum, with the 3 per cent level surpassed by Chad (3.11 per cent), The Gambia (3.03 per cent) and Niger (3.82 per cent). Nearly 60 per cent of the region’s population is under 25 years old. The dependency ratio for those under 15 and over 64 years is 92 per cent of the working-age population. This situation will present a major challenge for the future if sound public policies are not put in place. However, this demographic dividend of a young population can also be a source of opportunity if appropriate investments and mechanisms are introduced to ensure human development, particularly in terms of high quality education, good health and decent jobs for young people. In this respect, the empowerment of young people in the 15–24 years age group is a crucial issue to set them on the path of social advancement, future prosperity, better living standards and job security.

Indeed, the three major stages of entry into adult life, namely leaving the family of origin, entering working life and marriage, are no longer as easy to achieve as before, owing to stagnant or deteriorating living conditions in many parts of the Sahel. While there is not much reliable information on entry into working life, it is well known that young people are the first to suffer from labour market deficits. In this respect, a permanently idle, diminished and disadvantaged youth can become a social and political “time-bomb”, in the worst cases sparking civil unrest, delinquency and extremism, while potentially falling prey to political and ideological manipulation.

1.1.4 The social level

The strong economic growth recorded by the Sahelian economies is diminished in its effectiveness by acute inequalities between social groups, sub-regions, genders, cultural communities, production methods, residential areas and age groups. Although the region’s average Gini index is below the African average, and remains relatively low, income disparities are high in some countries in the region (Figure 7).

In terms of gender disparities, the Sahel has the highest rates in Africa. There are disparities in access to schooling, with girls enjoying on average only 2.4 years of schooling, compared to 4.2 years for boys (UNECA, 2018). In several countries in the region, while boys attend school, girls are confined to domestic work. Worse still, as mentioned previously, girls are often pushed into early marriage. In 2016, the prevalence of child marriages exceeded 50 per cent in five of the ten Sahel countries.\(^10\)

Women are also highly marginalised in terms of economic opportunities. In almost all the countries in the region, they are confined to their traditional role within the family circle. The situation is even more critical among young people (aged 15 to 24). According to International Labour Organization (ILO) data, youth unemployment averages 11.8 per cent in the Sahel for women and 8.9 per cent for men.\(^11\) The *Africa Human Development Report 2016* estimates the annual average losses associated with gender disparities in Africa to be around $95 billion. More specifically for the Sahel, according to the OECD (2018), gender-based discrimination in social institutions is estimated to cost the region

---


\(^10\) Niger (76 per cent), Chad (68 per cent), Mali (55 per cent), Burkina Faso (52 per cent) and Guinea (52 per cent), according to the 2016 *Africa Human Development Report*.

\(^11\) Despite these low unemployment rates, the level of under-employment is chronically high in most countries of the region.
In addition, the poverty situation is fraught with spatial disparities. Rural areas are more severely affected by poverty than urban areas (Figure 8). Over the period 2009–2014, although the poverty ratio did not exceed 40 per cent for urban areas (a very high rate in itself), in rural areas it exceeded 60 per cent in Guinea, and even neared 74 per cent in The Gambia in rural areas.

Table 2: World, African and Sahel populations (millions), 1950–2100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
<th>2100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 536.3</td>
<td>7 550.3</td>
<td>8 551.2</td>
<td>9 772.8</td>
<td>11 184.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 404.1</td>
<td>4 504.4</td>
<td>4 946.6</td>
<td>5 256.9</td>
<td>4 780.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>549.4</td>
<td>742.1</td>
<td>739.5</td>
<td>715.7</td>
<td>653.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>228.7</td>
<td>1 256.3</td>
<td>1 703.5</td>
<td>2 527.6</td>
<td>4 467.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>324.1</td>
<td>456.8</td>
<td>724.2</td>
<td>1 440.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>192.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>190.9</td>
<td>264.1</td>
<td>410.6</td>
<td>793.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 7: Income disparities in the Sahel

Note: Years vary from country to country.

Sahel 2043: Towards a resilient, inclusive and prosperous Sahel region

$120 billion in terms of lost income (Bouchama and others, 2018). These gender disparities are linked to the low participation of women in economic activities and the labour market compared to men. This gender inequality is a setback to the many efforts made towards inclusive growth, structural transformation and development.
Chapter 1: Past and present developments in the Sahel

1.1.5 Environmental level
From an eco-climatic and bio-geographic standpoint, the Sahel is the semi-arid transition zone between the hyper-arid Sahara to the north and the wetter savannahs and woodlands to the south. The region is abundantly endowed with a variety of natural resources but is highly sensitive to natural and man-made environmental changes. For hundreds of years, human populations have been dispersed across the dynamic ecosystems of the Sahel and have depended on agriculture and grazing for their livelihoods. Since the start of the twentieth century, the human factor in the dynamics has changed dramatically owing to population growth and increasing environmental and climatic stresses, thereby contributing to insecurity in the Sahel countries.

Climate change is and will remain a key phenomenon, compounding the problems of an already fragile environment, leading to food insecurity, human vulnerability, poverty and social unrest in the region. The sensitive and fragile nature of the Sahel is well illustrated by the reducing water levels and fluctuations of Lake Chad over the years, which adversely impact the livelihoods of local communities that rely on the water resources of the Lake Chad Basin.

1.1.6 Profile of peace and security in the Sahel
Over the past decades, the Sahel region has been rocked by conflicts, political crises, ethnic violence, food insecurity and serious economic distress. The region still suffers from low institutional capacity, which is manifested by feeble governance regimes, with limited capacity to provide basic services or security (i.e. sovereignty, border integrity, and law and order systems) to its peoples. In recent years, destabilising factors such as terrorist attacks, food crises, religious clashes and drug trafficking have intensified in some of the Sahel countries. The resulting suffering has not only impacted economic activities and the lives of people in the region, but it has also undermined state legitimacy and compromised peace and regional security.

Several governance deficits have contributed to instability and conflict in the Sahel countries, ranging from issues of state authority and capabilities, the consolidation of democracy, resource management, the rule of law, transparency and accountability, to social exclusion and human rights violations. The ten Sahel countries have, at one point or another, found themselves in situations of political instability, whether in the form of a coup d’état, ethnic conflicts, rebellion or civil war. To name a few, Mali plunged into armed conflict and state collapse during 2011–2012; the Niger witnessed two ethnic rebellions (1990–1995 and 2007–2009); Mauritania experienced frequent military coup d’états and coup attempts (1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 2003, 2005, 2008); and the northern regions of Nigeria and Cameroon became the terrain of deadly attacks by the terrorist group Boko Haram (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2015).

---

Figure 8: Poverty ratio in Sahel countries, 2009–2014

![Graph showing poverty ratio in Sahel countries, 2009–2014](image)


---
1.2 Survey on the aspirations of the Sahel population

The second step in this report’s formulation comprised an in-depth socioeconomic analysis involving the Sahelian people themselves. Consultations were conducted to ascertain the aspirations of the populations in a sample of four Sahel countries. The countries targeted were a geographical representation of the 10 Sahel countries: east (Chad); south-west (Guinea), north-west (Mauritania) and central (Niger).

During these consultations, focus groups were used to bring together representatives of many diverse social groups in the four countries: women, youth, academics, the media, senior officials, political parties, private sector organisations (usually represented by employers’ organisations), trade unions, religious and traditional leaders, non-governmental and civil society organisations, farmer umbrella organisations, defence and security forces, etc.

With the exception of political parties that were met in only one country (Chad) and defence and security forces that were met in two countries (Mauritania and Niger), all other social groups were met in at least three of the four countries visited. In total, more than 400 people were interviewed in the various countries.

The discussions were structured around seven key themes:

i) Population and human capital,

ii) Economy and productive structures,

iii) Culture and social structures,

iv) Governance system,

v) Environment and natural resources,

vi) Technological innovations and

vii) External environment of the region.

After questioning the social groups on the relevance of these themes, as well as eliciting their views on them, their aspirations were collected. In addition to these focused interviews, literature was broadly consulted on the various topics, including national policy and strategy documents, national outlook studies, national development plans and their implementation reports. The following paragraphs present the main findings of these consultations.

1.2.1 Perceptions of the populations on the current situation of the Sahel

Peoples’ perceptions of these topics, and their ranking of them in terms of importance, varied from one group to another and from one country to another. For all the stakeholders interviewed in the four countries, the seven themes elucidated above were deemed relevant and cut across the main concerns of the populations. To better understand these main concerns, the topics were ranked from 1 to 7 (a score of 7 indicating that the topic was considered the highest priority and a score of 1, the lowest priority). After this, a simple addition of the scores assigned by each group provided the grade of the topic considered in the country concerned (Table 3). The theme with the highest rating appears as the highest priority according to this rating system.

Of the seven topics listed above, four topics stand out clearly for their perceived importance by the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Together</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population and human capital</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy and productive sectors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and social structures</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and natural resources</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External environment and regional integration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological innovations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sahelian respondents. They relate to issues of population and human capital, governance (with a strong emphasis on its security dimension), economy and productive sectors, and culture and social structures. The order of priority of these four topics was the same in all countries except Mauritania, where governance (security in reality) was given priority over economy and productive structures.

Table 4 aggregates the aspirations expressed by country. It shows areas of diversity as well as certain commonalities of issues and responses.

The consultations on the populations’ aspirations revealed remarkable convergences. There was broad agreement on the importance of the seven themes discussed in the focus groups, but also on the priority relationships between the different points of these themes.
Those “remarkable convergences” could not have been postulated at the start of the field consultation missions, particularly because of the deliberate choice made by the Sahel 2043 development team to have these consultations conducted in very different countries, not only in terms of their geographical locations but also their political, economic, social and cultural characteristics. The results of the mission carried out in the target countries, together with elements drawn from the literature review, corroborate the intuition that the aspirations of a carefully selected sample of Sahel countries might be extrapolated to the Sahel region as a whole.

However, the visible convergences tell us only half of the story. Beyond the convergences, there are significant disparities among countries. Indeed, each group articulates the following message in a very specific way: “The Sahel is a whole, and we are each ‘something of the Sahel’.” These disparities in the unity of the whole are valuable for dealing with a region as diverse as the Sahel. In fact, the nuanced differences — and sometimes even the contradictions — may serve to broaden the field of vision and analysis, expanding the vast field of aspirations of the Sahelians for their region. In addition, the disparities highlight the wealth of different levers of change which the Sahelians stand ready to employ to realise a better, more inclusive and prosperous Sahel.

1.2.2 Convergences between existing development plans and Sahelian peoples’ aspirations

This section focuses on the convergence of global, continental and national socioeconomic development agendas and plans, on the one hand, and the Sahelian peoples’ shared and independent aspirations, on the other. The purpose is to gauge the plans’ cumulative relevance to the Sahelian peoples’ aspirations.

Table 5 displays the convergences linking these multilayered aspirations. The first theme (Population and Human Capital) is reflected in the first aspiration of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, namely “A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development”. Social development issues such as education, health, gender equality, youth and women’s inclusion, and migration loom large across the Agenda and policy layers. Other relevant policy issues include targeted capacity-building programmes.

The second topic (Governance) is largely dominated by fighting corruption, upholding the rule of law, holding the state accountable to citizens’ tribunals, and combatting collusion between terrorist organisations and corruption. Generally, a governance deficit is one of the key factors explaining the low level of development achievement. The Sahelian aspiration on this theme is strongly reflected on the third aspiration of the Agenda 2063, namely “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. A peaceful and secure Africa”.

The third topic (Economy and the Productive Sectors) is also strongly reflected in the Agenda 2063 aspiration for “A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development”. It converges with peoples’ aspiration for structural transformation, infrastructure, open borders, the removal of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade, and the free movement of people, goods and services.

On the issue of the economy, the major concern expressed is the anachronism of their economic model and the need to make the structural changes required to lift their country out of underdevelopment. There is also the belief among some citizens that the economic model pursued by Sahel States is not conducive to the creation of economic opportunities for most of its citizens. A lack of diversification in the economy has strengthened the dominance of low value-added sectors, particularly in the extractive industries.

Unequal distribution of wealth is also a major obstacle to the social development of the countries of the region. The existence of large inequalities reinforces the levels of poverty in the different countries visited.

---

Lastly, the management of public finances is also a key issue. Corruption of State workers hinders the development of the productive sectors. In the absence of strong measures by leaders to overcome what is felt everywhere as a major scourge, corruption negatively affects the normal functioning of the State and institutions, as well as the state of the economy and business environment in the countries concerned.

The fourth topic (Culture and Social Structures) is dominated by peoples’ aspirations regarding gender inequality, violence against women and the negative role of extremist religious schools in the radicalisation of young people. There are no social policies to confront sub-nationalism and parochial identities, which generate dissension and social schism.

The three themes of environment and natural resources, external environment and regional integration, and technological innovations were ranked respectively in the fifth, sixth and seventh positions.

The analysis has shown that the Sahelian States’ and people’s development aspirations are consistent with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the United Nations SDGs development agenda.
**Table 5: Sahelian peoples’ aspirations, set against continental and international sustainable development agenda priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic aspirations of Sahelian peoples</th>
<th>African Union Agenda 2063</th>
<th>Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</th>
<th>Development priorities as expressed in Sahel States’ development strategies and plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population and human capital</td>
<td>A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.</td>
<td>No poverty, zero hunger, health and well-being, quality education, clean water and sanitation.</td>
<td>Improve the living standards of the population, poverty reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance, peace and security</td>
<td>An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. A peaceful and secure Africa.</td>
<td>Peace, justice and strong institutions.</td>
<td>Good economic, political and social governance; peace and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy and the productive sectors</td>
<td>A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.</td>
<td>Industry, innovation and infrastructure.</td>
<td>Job creation; accelerated sustainable economic growth; industrialisation; infrastructure development; export-led economies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and social structures</td>
<td>An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics. Where development is people-driven, unleashing the potential of its women and youth.</td>
<td>Gender equality; reduced inequalities.</td>
<td>Reduce inequality; cultural renewal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and natural resources</td>
<td>A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.</td>
<td>Climate Action; life below water and on the land.</td>
<td>Environmental regeneration and sustainable use of natural resources; sustainable urban development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological innovations</td>
<td>Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner.</td>
<td>Industry, innovation and infrastructure.</td>
<td>Improved higher education; technology; science and innovation. Industrial planning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2.3 *Long-term development aspirations of Sahel States*

None of the externally driven plans gave due consideration to the Sahel States’ development aspirations as expressed in the national development strategies and plans. This section is therefore intended to plug this gap and gauge the Sahel States’ own development plans and their relevance or lack thereof to continental aspirations (Agenda 2063 and the African Common Position on the 2030 Agenda) as well as the global development agendas.

The rationale for this approach is twofold: (i) to determine the relevance of the strategic orientations that will emerge from this study, in order to ensure their integration into the Sahelian countries’ existing development strategies; and (ii) as part of pan-African development strategies and in line with those of ECOWAS, it is important to gauge how these policies, together with the global development agenda, integrate the Sahel States’ objectives.

Table 6 shows that the socioeconomic development aspirations expressed in Sahel development plans and strategies are, by and large, informed by the global and continental development agendas, as described in the previous section. The following section builds on these findings and explores through a structural analysis methodology, the behaviour and influence of the most important socioeconomic variables that define the Sahel taken as a system.
### Table 6: Main socioeconomic development objectives of Sahel States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Development Strategy/Plan</th>
<th>Socioeconomic development objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES) 2016–2020</td>
<td>Reform the institutions and modernise the administration; develop human capital; and stimulate sectors with growth potential for the economy and employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Vision 2035</td>
<td>A united and solidified nation, with an economy based on sub-regional and regional integration as well as international cooperation. One nation asserting equality for women and men. A Cameroonian culture promoting the country as an attractive and safe destination at the international level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>National Development Plan 2017–2021</td>
<td>Strengthen national unity; strengthen good governance and the rule of law; develop a diversified and competitive economy; and improve the quality of life for the population of Chad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td>The Gambia National Development Plan 2018–2021</td>
<td>Restoring good governance, decentralisation; stimulating growth for transforming the economy; modernising agriculture and fisheries; poverty reduction; investing in people through improved education and health services; promoting an inclusive and culture-centred tourism; youth empowerment; and making the private sector the engine of growth, transformation, and job creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2016–2020 National Economic and Social Development Plan</td>
<td>Political, social, economic and environmental governance; agricultural and food and nutritional security; industrialisation; infrastructure, innovation, and research; trade, tourism; social development; sustainable management of ecosystems; and climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Malians secure a democratic, resilient and prosperous future 2016–2020</td>
<td>Stabilisation of conflict-affected areas reinforced (transition); public trust in government improved (governance); adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities and households (resilience); and socio-economic well-being advanced (prosperity).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Shared Prosperity (SCAPP), 2016–2030</td>
<td>Achieve continuous growth of at least 7 per cent per year on average that is increasingly green and inclusive through diversification and by fostering activities that generate high value added and require a large workforce such as fisheries, livestock-raising and crop-growing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Social and Economic Development Plan, 2017–2021</td>
<td>Cultural renaissance; social development and demographic transition; acceleration of economic growth; improved governance, peace and security; environmental sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), 2016–2020</td>
<td>Macroeconomic stabilisation of the macroeconomic environment; achieving agriculture and food security; ensuring energy sufficiency; improving transportation infrastructure; and greater industrialisation focusing on SMEs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Emergent Senegal: Priority Action Plan 2014–2018</td>
<td>Acceleration of economic growth or productivity; improving the business environment; improving the management of public finances; job creation; reducing inequalities; impact on local development; improving the living conditions of the populations; and sectoral good governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNECA (2018).*
1.3 Structural analysis

The rationale for the use of the structural analysis approach to identify the drivers of change is two-fold. Not only does the structural analysis enrich the diagnostic elements of the Sahel region and the survey on the aspirations of the populations, it also sheds light on the building of contrasting scenarios for the development of this region by 2043.

An underlying premise of the structural analysis exercise is that the Sahel region is a complex system and, as such, can be characterised by a set of relationships between its constituent elements. The objective is to reveal this “hidden” structure of the region and to identify the main factors that play an important role in shaping its future. The central question that the structural analysis attempts to answer is this: which of all the factors involved in shaping the future of the Sahel should be given priority in the development of the contrasting scenarios of the region and in the formulation of a relevant strategy?

1.3.1 Presentation and analysis of the Sahel system

The choice of the characteristic variables of the Sahel system underwent a rigorous and meticulous process by the Multidisciplinary Expert Panel. The process made use of the national prospective exercises, the 2020 regional prospective study (OECD, 1998), the findings of the retrospective diagnostic study, and the findings of the survey on the national aspirations of Sahelians carried out in the four Sahel countries.

Configuration of the system variables

The identification of the internal and external variables of the Sahel system as a prelude to the construction of the Matrix of Direct Influences (MDI) led to a long discussion, culminating in a consensus on a total of 61 variables, as set out in Table 7.

Filling the MDI

The process of identifying variables has been followed by the filling of the matrix by the multidis-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Long title</th>
<th>Short title</th>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Long title</th>
<th>Short title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Population dynamics</td>
<td>DynPop</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Communications and role of the media</td>
<td>ComMedia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Migr</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Role of religions</td>
<td>ReligRol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Urbanisation</td>
<td>Urba</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Sante</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>State relations and non-State actors (civil society organisations, private sector)</td>
<td>RelEtat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Educ</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Internal and external security</td>
<td>Securite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Emploi</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>GestFront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>CroiEco</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Efficiency of public sector</td>
<td>EffiGouv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Income distribution</td>
<td>RepRev</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>State leadership and management capacity</td>
<td>CapaPilEt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>ServFin</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Sport, arts and leisure</td>
<td>SpoArtLoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Private investment</td>
<td>InvPriv</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Security financing</td>
<td>FinSecur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Agricultural production</td>
<td>ProdAgri</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>ChangClim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Power generation and supply</td>
<td>ProdDisEne</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Environ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Public finance management</td>
<td>GesFinPub</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Research development</td>
<td>DevReche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Transport infrastructure</td>
<td>InfTrans</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Understanding of new technologies</td>
<td>NouvTech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Extractive industries (gold, oil, gas, etc.)</td>
<td>IndExtrac</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Development assistance</td>
<td>Aide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Training (skills acquisition)</td>
<td>Forma</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Regional and African integration</td>
<td>Integratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>Dette</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Global economic growth</td>
<td>CroiEcoMon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Industrial production</td>
<td>ProdIndus</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>External image of the Sahel</td>
<td>ImagSahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Output of market services</td>
<td>ProdSerMar</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Geopolitical situation</td>
<td>SitGeoPol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Domestic savings</td>
<td>EpInte</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Waste management</td>
<td>GestDech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Transfer of migrants</td>
<td>TransMigr</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Human resource management</td>
<td>GestResNat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Langues</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Natural disaster management</td>
<td>GesCatNat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Tribalism and communalism</td>
<td>TribComm</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>ICT infrastructure</td>
<td>InfTIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A disciplinary team of experts, who reviewed all the variables. The characteristics of the matrix of direct influences (MDI) are summarised in Table 8.

### Table 8: Characteristics of the Matrix of Direct Influences (MDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total size</td>
<td>3,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number from 0</td>
<td>3,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number from 1</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filling rate</td>
<td>6.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The filling rate of the MDI is 6.29 per cent. It falls short of the 20 to 25 per cent average for similar exercises. But in reality, there is no floor rate or minimum for this kind of exercise. If the exercise had opted for narrower definitions or if some indicators, such as population dynamics or economic growth, had been more detailed, the filling rate would have been higher. This low rate may also be due to how strictly the panel of experts assigns direct influences, a high rate generally indicating that the panel has considered influences that were not direct influences, as such.

#### 1.3.2 Structural analysis findings

The analysis was conducted using the MICMAC software to characterise the Sahel system from the influence position of the variables and their various interactions. Using the direct and indirect influence plane with an obvious grouping of variables, the exercise helps to design the relay variables and the most influential dependent and independent variables of the Sahel system.

**Most influential variables.** Located at the top left-hand side of Figure 9, the “State’s leadership and management capacity” variable is the most influential of the Sahel system. The two other influential variables are within the system: corruption and decentralisation. At about the same level as decentralisation, the Bretton Woods institutions, an external variable to the system, appears. These institutions remain highly influential, not so much by their intrinsic leverage as their ability to send signals to other external actors, be they development assistance partners or private external investors. Taken together, variables related to the State’s leadership and management capacity, the Bretton Woods institutions and decentralisation are characterised by political and economic governance. Nonetheless, important as these variables are, their effects may be stunted by corruption. The reasons for this are twofold. First, not only does corruption distort matters by putting personal interest over the general interest (something that should be guaranteed by the State), but it shows, or even trivialises, the dysfunctions of the system by institutionalising practices contrary to sound economic or political governance.

However, there are also variables without which (notwithstanding how effective they may be from the managerial standpoint) the State loses its legitimacy, especially in the eyes of disadvantaged groups. These variables are related to security financing and border management, which directly affect the capacity of the State to fulfil its mandate to protect the integrity of the country and its citizens. They can be considered as one of the pillars or one of the framework conditions; the term used is from the social and political contract that undergirds republican citizenship.

Taken together, these variables can be considered as the main determinants of the Sahel system and
as the input variables of the system. They act as a driving force in one direction or as a blockage in the other.

**Most dependent variables.** Located in the lower right-hand corner of the graph, the variables that can be grouped under “human development” appear to be the most dependent. These include population dynamics; health; education; and girls’ education. In addition to these, which can be considered as result variables, there is economic growth. The image of the Sahel from the outside also appears as the result of the impact of the other variables.

**Relay variables.** Located at the top right of the graph, these variables concern the role of the other actors; their relations with the State appear as relay variables or levers without which the actions of the fastest variables could not be effective. These variables include social and organisational innovations; citizenship; the presence of the State throughout the country; multi-party politics and the democratisation of the political space. These variables, which are aligned in a semicircle, could also be considered as major challenges for the Sahel system, especially since they are placed at the centre-stage. In building the scenarios, they cannot be ignored.

As shown above, a group of variables, including border management, internal and external security, and security financing, appear in between the most influential variables and the relay variables. The cloud formed by this group indicates the framework conditions to be fulfilled, so that the most driving variables and the relay variables can operate fully.

Independent or excluded variables. External variables such as global economic growth, climate change, remittances, official development assistance, and regional and African integration are located in the lower left-hand part of Figure 9 among the so-called excluded variables. The term “excluded” is, however, not completely correct because, in reality, these variables are part and parcel of the system. It would probably have been more accurate to call them independent variables, in that they are neither very influential nor very dependent. Other variables in the system have little impact on them.

On the other hand, the presence in this part of the factors constituting economic growth is unexpected, even counter-intuitive. It is indeed surprising, at first glance, to find agricultural products, industrial production, and the production of market services there. Does this mean that production systems in the Sahel are disconnected from policies? That agricultural production depends more on exogenous factors such as rainfall than on policies? It could appear so at first sight, but that would be contradictory to the observation made above regarding dependence on the external, biophysical environment. Fortunately, this result can be read differently: it may imply that agricultural policies have not translated into changes in production systems because they have not been backed or followed by social and organisational innovations, without which their effectiveness is diminished. This highlights the importance, as mentioned above, of the relay variables in the development of the Sahel system.

No doubt, the same reasoning could be made for industrial production, but with a substantial reservation because industrial production currently stems more from external investment than domestic investment, irrespective of national policies. The same applies to investments in the production of market services, which rely more on investment decisions taken by economic stakeholders outside the Sahel than by local investors. However, the outcome would probably have been quite different if the structural analysis group had included the production of market services provided by the informal sector in this variable.

1.3.3 Key messages from the structural analysis

Message 1: Stability of the Sahel system
The cloud of the variables in Figure 9 forms an L shape from the left-hand side top part to the bottom right of the influence/dependence plane. It shows a stable system. That is to say, any relevant action on the driving variables (input) is likely to cause rather predictable effects on the outcome variables (outcome). Hence, the overall L-shape of the cloud of variables makes a system fixed or stable.

“Stable” certainly does not mean uninteresting, neither is it synonymous with static. This is evidenced by the rise of the “social and organisational innovations” variable in indirect ranking as well as the “decentralisation” and “citizenship” variables, all of which are akin to institutional variables. Indeed, “stable” is not synonymous with simple. This is demonstrated by the sheer number of variables that characterise the Sahel and the number of actors involved, whether State or non-State, internal or external.

Such a result contradicts the general view of the Sahel as a chaotic region that resists rationality, where anarchy is the order of the day. Obviously, the Sahel system is not a challenge to reason, but it does not allow itself to be confined to the usual categories of analysis. One has to know how to decipher it.

Message 2: Predominance of political and institutional variables
The analysis of the influence/dependence plane reveals the predominance of variables related to governance and institutions. The main determinants of the system are political and institutional in scope. The leadership and management capacity of the State seems to dominate in the development of Sahel. Added to that is the requirement to combat
corruption and foster decentralisation, which also seems like a political and institutional vector. The position of the variable for States and non-State actors (civil society organisations and the private sector) reinforces the supremacy of the political and institutional variables over the system. The same is true of the role of the Bretton Woods institutions as an external determinant that should be taken into account.

Variables related to internal and external security, security financing or border management are also crucial in that they provide the necessary conditions without which the action of input variables would not be efficient.

**Message 3: Decisive character of organisational variables**

The variables relating to the organisation and participation/involvement of the people in the future of the Sahel form a cloud of points located in the upper right-hand part of the influence/dependence plane. The social and organisational innovations, citizenship, State presence over the entire territory, and multi-party system variables are worthy of special attention in that they serve as a relay between the input and output variables. The efficiency of the public sector – a variable located midway between the input variables, the relay variables and the outcome variables – is highly dependent on people’s ability to be demanding, and to be heard. The concept of citizenship as the ability to say no, in Spinozist language, as well as in that of Kouroukan Fouga\(^\text{13}\), is thus reinstated.

**Message 4: Paving the way for scenario building**

These variables, shown by the structural analysis, formed the basis of the formulation of key questions from which the long-term exploratory scenarios for the Sahel were developed. To that end, they were organised around the three major themes identified below: governance and institutions; security; and participation/involvement of the population.

- **Governance and institutions**
  1. State’s leadership and management capacity;
  2. Corruption;
  3. Relations between States and non-governmental stakeholders (civil society organisations and private sector);
  4. Decentralisation; and
  5. Role of the Bretton Woods institutions.

- **Security**
  1. Internal and external security;
  2. Security financing;
  3. Border management; and
  4. State presence over the entire territory.

- **Participation/involvement of the population**
  1. Social and organisational innovations;
  2. Citizenship; and
  3. Multiparty system.

To sum up: first, a different approach is used for the diagnostic and innovative analysis of the Sahel region. This confirms the conclusion that the Sahel is a stable and resilient system, with several domestic resources for building its future. The stability of this system ensures that any relevant action identified on the driving variables (input) is likely to cause fairly predictable effects on the (output) outcome variables.

Second, this exercise highlights several factors that explain the functioning of the Sahel system. The variables related to governance and institutions are the most prominent in the functioning of the Sahel system. Its main determinants are political and institutional. These include the leadership and management capacity of the State, which is crucial for the development of the Sahel. Coupled with this issue of capacity is the requirement to fight corruption and foster decentralisation, which also appears as a political and institutional vector.

---

13 Kouroukan Fouga, or the Manden Charter, was the constitution of the Mali empire and dates as far back as the reign of Soundiata Keita.
Other key variables define the functioning of the Sahel relate to the State’s relations with non-State actors and the role of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The structural analysis of the Sahel has highlighted a group of variables that are absolutely necessary and without which the action of input variables would not be effective. These include issues related to internal and external security, security financing, and border management.

The variables related to the participation/involvement of the population in the future of the Sahel are also decisive in the Sahel system. These are: social and organisational innovations; citizenship; State presence throughout the country; and multi-party politics. All these variables refer to the need to establish a new social contract between the States of the Sahel and their populations, so that they can contribute more effectively to the construction of the future of the region.

Lastly, the structural analysis exercise of the Sahel system provides 12 variables that will form the basis for the rest of the process. A detailed analysis of the future evolution of these variables will provide the essential inputs for building the contrasting scenarios of the Sahel region.

### 1.4 Major findings of the SWOT analysis of the Sahel system

Our findings are based on an analysis of the main results of the socioeconomic diagnostic study of the Sahel, the aspirations of the Sahel populations, and the key factors of long-term changes through structural analysis of the Sahel system. Before progressing to the formulation of strategic orientations that will help to bring about the desired future of the Sahel in 2043, it is informative to examine the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the Sahel system.

Table 9 summarises the main findings of the SWOT analysis, based on the structural analysis of the Sahel system and the socioeconomic diagnosis.
### Table 9: Summary of main findings of the SWOT analysis of the Sahel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Abundant renewable and non-renewable resources  
  • Young population  
  • Cultural diversity | • Unmanaged population growth  
  • Poor external image  
  • Significant weight of the Bretton Woods institutions  
  • High vulnerability to climatic vagaries  
  • Poor leadership capacity of States  
  • High dependence on ODA  
  • Poor economic diversification  
  • Wide disparities and acute levels of poverty |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Increased interest for regional integration  
  • Large number of bilateral and multilateral partners  
  • Development of middle classes | • Recurrent insecurities and crises in the region  
  • Climate variability and drought |

Chapter 2: Possible futures for the Sahel

This chapter presents the main results of the scenario building exercise, setting out the possible futures for the Sahel region.

The step of identifying and describing the scenarios capitalises on the entire scope of the process, the main results having been described in the previous sections. These include the strategic diagnosis, the survey of Sahelian peoples’ aspirations, and the structural analysis of the Sahel system. This is a decisive step because it serves as input to the quantitative modelling as well as to the definition of the Vision and the strategic orientations offering the greatest potential for the successful transformation of the region.

Before progressing to outlining possible scenarios for the Sahel region in the future, we must first take account of the composition and structural influential factors of the Sahel region.

2.1 Characteristics of the Sahel system

An analysis of the 12 variables described in Chapter 1 reveals two major players: the State on the one hand and the society at large (non-State actors) on the other.

The State, in popular imagery as in theory, is a government that effectively controls a territory and the population that lives there. In order to meet this traditional oversight function, the State holds “the monopoly of legitimate violence” necessary to preserve the common good, on behalf of a national community whose members are united by “a common will of common life”. It is also a government that has the capacity to steer development, understood as a set of structural transformations, characterised by bigger upheavals than the simple process of economic growth. On both these two major issues, Sahel States are currently experiencing serious difficulties.

Regarding the building of homogeneous nations, which is a recurrent theme in the speeches of the “fathers of independence”, it must be recognised that the project of constructing a national identity that transcends long-established racial, ethnic, tribal or clan schisms is no easy task. As a result, national integration is still far from perfect in the Sahel, where identity tensions are fuelling irredentist movements. In many places, the schisms inherited from the colonial and pre-colonial periods have not disappeared; they have even strengthened in some cases. The ongoing democratisation processes in the Sahel countries have not yet fundamentally changed this situation. Indeed, in many countries the results of a vote, which is supposed to be the most complete expression of citizenship, are superimposable to those of an ethnic census.

Regarding the steering of development by the State, this ambition has proven to be short-lived, particularly since the 1980s, when the slogan of “less state” gained traction among the citizenry. The acceleration of neoliberal globalisation, the development flows and cross-border networks, the power of multinational firms, the erasing of borders, together with the conditionalities of ODA, have defied the Sahel States’ ambitions to be planners, funders and evaluators of development. Under the effect of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), their role in steering development has been fundamentally reduced.

Although Sahelian societies have undergone rapid and sometimes profound changes, it is not always clear where these will lead. Although in many communities the dominant mode of production is still lineage-based, the functioning of these systems has been disrupted for quite some time by population growth, urbanisation, the monetisation of the economy (i.e. less reliance on the exchange of goods and services), and by the protests of the traditional order and its implications, notably in term of land ownership.

---

14 According to the classic definition by Max Weber.
The balances between native cultures and successive layers of cultures of Eurasian origin are nowadays subject to strong tensions, particularly in urban areas dominated by a youth cohort that is difficult to characterise sociologically. These youth, in urban fringes at least, maintain complex relations with African traditions, which give African societies their patriarchal and gerontocratic character. However, alongside this traditionalism, the youth also associate with Western modernism and no one can predict what will come out of this bubbling of urban cultures. The rejection of authoritarianism of political systems which, in the eyes of many young people, have lost their legitimacy.

2.2 Presentation of the scenarios for the future of the Sahel

Consequent to all these swirling social and political undercurrents, two pivotal questions emerge relating to the role and functions of the State and to society in the future:

1. Will the State be able to give itself a new role in nation-building and in promoting the economic and social development that characterised strategies and policies during the independence-era in all Sahel countries?
2. Will society be able to reinvent itself and develop innovative socialisation structures (family, lineage, community, school, religion, age groups, neighbourhoods, associations, as well as civic, political and cultural commitment, etc.) or will it cling on to norms and standards currently being challenged?

Depending on the answers given to these two questions, three contrasting future scenarios can be identified:

- **Scenario 1 – “Tcheb Tcheb” or Business-as-usual:** In this scenario, neither the State nor society reinvents itself. At most they make small adjustments, but these form part of the continuity of past trends; we therefore have a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.

- **Scenario 2 – “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”:** In this pessimistic scenario, society reinvents itself, but the State does not. Therefore the State’s ability to soar into a new era of social and political transformation in line with the aspirations of the Sahelian populations fails to materialise.

- **Scenario 3: “The Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”**. In this optimistic scenario, both the State and society reinvent themselves. This is the scenario that many consider ideal for the future of the Sahel region.

One might conceive a fourth scenario, in which the State reinvents itself but without exerting any impact on the society, which remains faithful to its secular norms and practices. However, the results of this scenario are very close to those of scenario 1 and not sufficiently differentiated; therefore only the three previously mentioned scenarios have been retained as the focal points of detailed description in the next section.

2.3 Description of Sahel scenarios

2.3.1 “Tcheb Tcheb”: The business-as-usual scenario

In the first scenario, called “Tcheb Tcheb”, neither the State nor society reinvents itself. At most they make adjustments, but these remain consistent with past trends. This is the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. In this configuration, the Sahelian system moves in close alignment with economic, social, political and environmental developments, although different countries in the region will exhibit divergences in their developmental trajectories. The informal sector still plays a major part in this scenario and there is an increase in inequalities at the social level. New forms of inequality emerge

---

15 “Tcheb Tcheb” is used in Mauritania to describe informal sector workers. While some of them may have made quite a fortune, usually through unorthodox means, the Tcheb Tcheb are mostly modest people, with a small group of them adopting a consumption pattern that puts them in the middle-class category.
related to education, health, access to training and to opportunities.

In this BAU scenario, employment continues to be a major challenge; a crucial issue being that demand that is not in sync with the absorption capacity of productive systems. There are also increasing vulnerabilities in terms of human security, slowness in the demographic transition, and populations that continue to grow. As a result, urbanisation becomes a major social issue with infrastructure development often failing to keep pace with the growth in urban populations. Moreover, this does not signal an end to the rural population growth, but it operates in a context characterised by low industrialisation and stagnant productivity.

This business-as-usual scenario is certainly not desirable, but it remains a very plausible response. This is because Sahel economies and societies have learned how to adjust and, despite their apparent structural rigidities, they know how to seize opportunities. However, in this scenario, the apparent equilibrium is in fact precarious and may break down under the weight of internal and/or external conditions. This could lead to a scenario less favourable to development.

The lesson to be learned from this BAU scenario is that although the State may want to change paradigms quickly, it cannot do it alone, even with significant external support. It does not have the capacity to be the sole driver of transformation. The State must therefore understand the roles of other forces and establish appropriate forms of collaboration with them. It is in this collaboration that the key to sustainability lies. Hence, the age-old proverb that “If you want to go fast, go alone, but if you want to go far, go together” is still applicable.

2.3.2 Pessimistic scenario: “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”

In this second scenario, dubbed “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”, non-State actors reinvent themselves but the State fails to do so. This is the calamity outlook for the Sahel region, whereby the State ignores the clamours for reforms coming from non-State actors and fails to fulfil its potential in terms of leadership and social engineering. It contents itself with saving appearances of legitimacy and legality, but does not control any strategic steering. It is incapable of soaring to a commanding position where it can lead the necessary structural transformation of the system. Non-State actors, for their survival in the system, even exclude the State from the development equation, no longer considering it in their decision-making and seeing it more as an obstacle than a partner.

In this disaster scenario, an insidious form of disorder develops. Society defines new norms in which the perceived incapacity of the State to strengthen the judicial system becomes a justification for the use of force (warlords; law of the jungle) as a preferred means of conflict resolution. This challenges the principle of the State as the rightful holder of the monopoly of legitimate violence. There is neither economic development nor social development in this pessimistic scenario.

The key point to be drawn from this scenario is that the worst is not impossible. This disaster scenario remains as plausible as the two alternative ones. The conditions for its occurrence are both internal and external, with current and future geopolitical changes being the main external drivers. This scenario, however, is totally at odds with development and it is crucial for the economies of the region to put in place the right mechanisms to prevent its occurrence.

2.3.3 Optimistic scenario: “The Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”

In the third scenario, dubbed “The Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”, both the State and non-State actors reinvent themselves. This is the scenario that many will consider the most favourable for the Sahel region. In this, both the State and non-State actors recognise that there are opportunities out there that are not being seized, but that in order to grasp them, they must act together. The idea that there is a common good at hand and that a better future is achievable is formed in the minds of the different actors.

This scenario is plausible and achievable for the Sahel, although it will demand fortitude and perseverance on the part of all actors. Decentralisation and African integration are two important levers to secure this future reality. This scenario, which some
consider ideal, is in alignment with the African Union’s Agenda 2063. It allows States to plan the interventions needed to accelerate achievement of most of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets by 2030. Therefore, the central issue for the United Nations system to consider is this: what kind of support could it bring to the region to fulfil the ambitions of its Agenda 2030?\(^{16}\)

Table 10 presents the possible evolution for the 12 main variables of the Sahel system, in accordance with each of the three posited scenarios. A quantification of the scenarios is presented in the following section.

**Table 10: Overview of possible trends in the 12 main variables, organised into three thematic categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major themes</th>
<th>Key variables</th>
<th>Scenario 1: “Tcheb Tcheb” or Business-as-usual</th>
<th>Scenario 2: Pessimistic: “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”</th>
<th>Scenario 3: Optimistic: The “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Governance and institutions</td>
<td>1. State’s leadership and management capacity</td>
<td>- Does not really change, despite calls from the private sector and cooperation agencies that expect the State to be able to create certain conditions, and society’s expectations notwithstanding.</td>
<td>- The State remains deaf to social demands, lives in a kind of bubble, just trying to present appearances of legitimacy and legality.</td>
<td>- Major variable, but this is much less an ability to set the course, to determine the orientation, than to create the conditions for the debate to be as broad and inclusive as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The State remains incapable of managing anything, and is estranged from society.</td>
<td>- The State remains incapable of managing anything, and is estranged from society.</td>
<td>- We are in the presence of a facilitator, and regulator or interventionist State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Investments made in non-priority social sectors, because the State is only driven by short-term priorities.</td>
<td>- Investments made in non-priority social sectors, because the State is only driven by short-term priorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The State cannot guarantee security; privatisation of violence has become the order of the day.</td>
<td>- The State cannot guarantee security; privatisation of violence has become the order of the day.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Corruption</td>
<td>- It persists, with more diverse sources.</td>
<td>- The bureaucratic caste in power has made corruption the order of the day.</td>
<td>- Corruption, which does not go away, will abate somewhat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Society can no longer bear the pervasive corruption, which has affected their morale and values.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- It will be condemned at such a point that corrupt people will exclude themselves from the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- It will become increasingly difficult to be corrupt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- If living conditions are improved and if social needs are better covered, household needs could decline significantly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10: Overview of possible trends in the 12 main variables, organised into three thematic categories (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major themes</th>
<th>Key variables</th>
<th>Scenario 1: “Tcheb Tcheb” or Business-as-usual</th>
<th>Scenario 2: Pessimistic: “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”</th>
<th>Scenario 3: Optimistic: The “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3. Relations between State and non-State actors (civil society organisations, private sector) | - These are just love/hate relationships.  
- The State continues to interfere where it should not, while failing to intervene where it is expected to.  
- The State is a parasite, which uses rather than serves. | - Society grows by excluding the State from the equation, i.e. society no longer considers the State and sees it as an obstacle and a danger rather than a partner.  
- A sort of chaos develops in which society defines new norms and forms of laws (warlords, law of the jungle), etc. | - Life is all about relationships built on new foundations: a new social contract in which everyone is aware of their role.  
- We no longer have this vision of the logic of the zero-sum game; we are in a positive sum game, in which we enrich ourselves by enriching others; we are each contributor and beneficiary, at the same time, to the improvement of society.  
- More restrictions on the freedom of the individual and the reason for living, respect for self and others is real.  
- Intra and inter-generational solidarity becomes a major concern. |
| 4. Decentralisation | - Decentralisation is not effective. At the very most, efforts are being made to deconcentrate, with one exception: that of Nigeria, which has a federal structure, where the states have a certain autonomy. The notion of decentralisation continues to stir up passions. | - Decentralisation is not achieved, and no effort is made to do so.  
- The current achievements in this area are threatened because of the separation wall erected between State and non-State actors who do not believe in the operational capacity of the State. | - Decentralisation is happening and cannot be avoided  
- Central power is strong and legitimate. Local capacities develop to manage, plan and bring in line local development (capacities that are currently absent). There is a will to be together.  
- Decentralisation per se is not possible before the end of the period because the framework conditions are not yet in place. |
| 5. Role of Bretton Woods institutions | - They continue to play their role not so much via their innate financial leverage (there are no programmes in countries like Senegal which has no plan with the IMF), but rather by continuing to send signals (reports, rankings, ratings), which act as a source of knowledge.  
- Their shareholders are essentially the countries of the North, who take their opinions into account, by issuing signs of encouragement or on the other hand, urging caution. | They leave their countries to their own fate. | - Their role has been watered down in terms of setting standards and rules.  
- There are other management mechanisms in place which impose self-discipline on States.  
- The era of financing at concessional rates is over, because there is now a wide range of instruments and financing solutions that make the role of the Bretton Woods institutions rather redundant. |
### Table 10: Overview of possible trends in the 12 main variables, organised into three thematic categories (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major themes</th>
<th>Key variables</th>
<th>Scenario 1: “Tcheb Tcheb” or Business-as-usual</th>
<th>Scenario 2: Pessimistic: “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”</th>
<th>Scenario 3: Optimistic: The “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (ii) Security | 6. Internal and external security | - Feeling of insecurity, taking on the form of racial and religious segregation, etc. Security becomes a recruitment pool, security companies thrive.  
- There is a kind of legal uncertainty. Justice is perceived to be weak because of corruption and the power of the State.  
- Other forms of human insecurity emerge and take shape: health insecurity, energy insecurity, food insecurity, etc.  
- New forms of vulnerability emerge: vulnerabilities to climate change and its impact on the food situation, agriculture is dominated by rain-fed rather than irrigation, low production, net food importers.  
- Sovereignty is a crucial issue. | - The State is incapable of ensuring internal and external security.  
- Privatisation of security services with the proliferation of private security companies. | - Internal and external security improves greatly as insecurity factors are reduced.  
- Social needs are now taken into account, reducing vulnerabilities related to these aspects. |
|             |                | 7. Security financing | - Current situation persists: lack of transparency in financing; defence budget is not open to discussion, with very little parliamentary control (limited control); this is one of the items with high vulnerability to corruption.  
- Heavy dependence (strategic information, geopolitics) in relation to foreign security forces. | - Regime where embezzlement is rife; there is corruption in the management of security funding.  
- The State is weakened and is unable to exert its authority to protect the borders and people. | - Establishing a peace dividend.  
- Security financing under discussion.  
- Reduction of military expenditure in the works. |
|             |                | 8. Border management | Situation persists: erratic and porous borders. | - Chaotic management by warlords.  
- The State is incapable of ensuring security at borders, which have become porous. | - Border management is coordinated by the countries; borders are no longer seen as obstacles but rather as zones of brisk business.  
- Decentralisation across borders with synergies among the various stakeholders. |
|             |                | 9. Presence of the State throughout the country | - There could be improvements, as the infrastructure will be in place to make the presence of the State more palpable.  
- The quality of the services will leave much to be desired.  
- Improvement in coverage but not in quality. | - The State does not care about maintaining a countrywide presence.  
- At best, it continues to try to set up basic infrastructure, but the lack of programming limits the quality of these and therefore does not guarantee the visibility of the State throughout the country. | - Infrastructure development will be a major feature of the Sahelian landscape.  
- It will be accompanied by changes in the conception of the role of States and new relations, new forms of social governance.  
- Rules pertaining to government workers will be redesigned and upgraded. |
Table 10: Overview of possible trends in the 12 main variables, organised into three thematic categories (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major themes</th>
<th>Key variables</th>
<th>Scenario 1: “Tcheb Tcheb” or Business-as-usual</th>
<th>Scenario 2: Pessimistic: “Clipping the Eagle’s Wings”</th>
<th>Scenario 3: Optimistic: The “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (iii) Participation / Involvement of the population | 10. Social and organisational innovations | - There are a few, but they are not powerful enough to change the situation: an ecosystem that is not favourable to their development, the existence of forces of inertia that limit their impact, or because these innovations are carried out by actors who are not sufficiently decisive in their decision-making.  
- Technological innovations bring about social innovations but are generally carried out by young people and women whose positions are limited by the gerontocratic and patriarchal character of society.  
- Innovation is driven by returnee migrants who do not have enough leverage to tilt the system.  
- Innovation continues, but at a pace that does not allow a shift to another scenario. | - While attempts at social and organisational innovations are ongoing, their full effect cannot be felt as the State is unable to support them, or at most, allow them to survive against a backdrop of deficit accumulation.  
- There will be innovations through-out the chain, from the design of projects to their impact assessment. | - Innovations are needed: this is a new relationship, a new social contract.  
- Innovations are multiple and affect both the demographic and qualitative dimensions of human capital.  
- In the formulation of public policies, there will be innovations: decentralised planning, organisational and institutional innovation, accountability, and transparency in the monitoring of budget systems.  
- There will be innovations throughout the chain, from the design of projects to their impact assessment. |
| 11. Citizenship | - Elections continue to be sources of anxiety as they always come with contestations, post-electoral disputes that become technical issues with a programmatic dimension of social legitimacy that counts for less than the personalities involved.  
- The aggrandisement of money in the elections (high electoral deposit expected from parties, high cost of elections) leads to a break from the days of independence.  
- Technocratic debates on issues of citizenship and sponsorship in some countries (Senegal).  
- The notion of citizenship is getting smaller, while it needs to be broader. | - The power of money grows and empties the political game from its core.  
- Elections continue to be sources of anxiety, disputes, etc. | - Citizenship is much broader; there is a richer definition of citizenship in this scenario that takes into account the need to ensure that there is a voice that counts.  
- It is no longer simply a question of joining a project proposed by another but partnering to create a joint and collective project. |
2.4 Quantification of the scenarios

This quantification exercise is based on the three scenarios presented in the previous section. It offers a complementary approach by creating a bridge towards an exploratory scenario schema. It operationalises those images of possible futures in order to visualise development trends and understand the dynamics involved in policy implementation.

2.4.1 Quantification results

The purpose of this section is to present the results of the quantification of the three scenarios discussed in the previous section. In the prospective study looking ahead to the year 2043, the assumptions of the scenarios are structured around 12 identified variables organised in three major themes, namely:

i) Governance and institutions;
ii) Security; and
iii) Participation of the population.

The scenarios in the prospective study utilise the current situation, as well as past and present trends, and make assumptions about environmental uncertainties and drivers of change in order to generate an envisioned picture of the future. The scenarios in the quantitative study then take that picture and make it conform to a set of parameters and variables to be modified in the model (aSDMS) and to make projections for the year 2043. In addition, the quantitative analysis tests a group of policy implementations regarding the achievement of the SDGs in the Sahel.

2.4.2 Methodology

The quantification of the scenarios was conducted with the Aggregated System Dynamic Model for the Sahel region (aSDMS). The aSDMS is an adaptation for the Sahel region of the Integrated Sustainable Development Goals model (iSDG) developed by the Millennium Institute. The aSDMS model is a System Dynamics based tool that is structured to analyse medium- to long-term development issues at the national and regional levels. The model integrates in a single framework the economic, social and environmental aspects of development planning. The Sahel region in the model aggregates the key economic, social and environmental variables of the ten countries.

Methodology for data aggregation. The data for the model are aggregated at regional level, using data from the individual countries. The data are collected in two stages. Stage one collects data separately for each Sahel country, using international databases as a source. Stage two consolidates the data for the region based on the data from the individual countries. In the consolidation process some data strings are summed, others are weighted proportional to values like population, land area, etc. All the currency values are converted to U.S. dollars.

Historical fit and calibration of the aSDMS. The aSDMS model starts its simulation from 1990, pauses in 2014, and then continues to 2043. Its baseline results were compared with historical data to calibrate and validate the model. A few indicators were chosen in each sphere to illustrate the baseline results compared to historical data. The fitness of the simulation is visualised to ensure that the model replicates well the historical trend of the data. Detailed presentation of the model and its results can be separately consulted in the working paper on the quantification prepared as part of this prospective study.

2.4.3 Assumptions for quantification of the scenarios

In addition to SDGs achievement by 2030, assumptions are formulated for some key variables highlighted under the three scenarios narrative as follows.

Governance

The aSDMS model uses the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) to represent the effect that variables like governance, institutional security and participation of the population, as used in the prospective scenario generation, have on the system. The index consists of six indicators covering the following dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ) and Rule of Law Control of Corruption (RL). The values of the index vary from -2.5 as a lower boundary for the worst-performing countries, to 2.5 as an upper boundary for the best-performing countries.
In order to visualise the best-case (BC) scenario, the WGI values in 2017 for best-performing (BP) country in Africa will be used as a benchmark for governance to be reached by 2043 in the Sahel region. For the worst-case (WC) scenario, the less-performing (LP) country in Africa will be used as a benchmark. Table 11 summarises the values of the WGI for the best and worst case scenarios and the Sahel region in 2017.

The transition from the governance picture in the SAHEL in 2017 to the expected image in 2043, for both the worst and best cases, is assumed to be non-linear.

**Macroeconomics**

The description of the scenarios in the prospective study is based on the interaction between the State and society. To reflect such interaction, some macroeconomic parameters and variables of the model (income tax revenue and fiscal pressure distribution) are assumed to change in the simulation period.

**Income Tax Revenue.** The average level of income tax revenue for the Sahel region in 2015 was 4.5 percent of GDP. In the BC scenario, it is assumed that an increase of the tax revenue will follow the same path as the WGI index. The same is assumed for the WC scenario, however, in this scenario the tax revenue decreases. The values for tax assumed refer to tax revenue and not tax rates, hence they refer to what is actually collected. Table 12 summarises the changes in tax revenue for both scenarios.

**Fiscal Pressure Distribution.** This assumption allows for the distribution of the effect of changes in income tax on the population. In the BC scenario, it is assumed that increases in income tax will affect most strongly the high-income population, while in the WC scenario the reduction of the tax will most affect the low-income population. Table 13 summarises the assumptions for the different scenarios.

**Development partners**

It is assumed that the amount of grants will keep to the current level by 2043, which is 0.75 per cent of GDP. This is consistent with the region’s aspirations to reduce dependency on official development assistance.

### Table 11: Worldwide Governance Indicators: assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WGI in 2017</th>
<th>Best Case (BC)</th>
<th>Worst Case (WC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Best performing Africa</td>
<td>Less performing Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Quality (RQ)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption (CC)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness (GE)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability (VA)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (RL)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability &amp; Absence of Violence (PS)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 12: Income tax as a share of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Best Case</th>
<th>Worst Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on income as a share of GDP 2015</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of taxes on income as a share of GDP 2043</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total income as a share of GDP 2043</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 13: Fiscal Pressure Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Best Case</th>
<th>Worst Case</th>
<th>BAU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1 – Low income</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P21 – Low income</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P41 – Middle income</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P61 – Upper middle income</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P81 – Upper income</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Achievement of the SDGs by 2030
To achieve the SDGs by 2030, it is necessary to design and implement interventions that are directed towards the 17 goals (as summarised in Appendix 2).

In the aSDMS model, interventions to achieve the SDGs are represented as investments as a percentage of the GDP. The investments are set every three years and they are related to different activities connected with the 17 SDGs.

For the quantitative analysis, the following areas of intervention were chosen:
- Expenditure in education: 30% of the total investment is directed to education;
- Expenditure in health: 15% of the total investment is directed to health;
- Expenditure in infrastructure: 15% of the total investment is directed to agriculture in irrigation systems;
- Expenditure in agriculture: 18% of the total investment is directed to agriculture water efficiency and expanding the irrigated harvested area;
- Expenditure on climate adaptation: 20% of the total investment is directed to climate adaptation; and
- Expenditure on family planning: 2% of the total investment is directed to family planning.

In order to avoid increasing a government deficit due to the extra investments needed to achieve the SDGs, it is assumed that the extra revenue generated by the increase in income tax and other income sources will be reinvested in the SDG interventions. This is valid for the BC scenario. In the WC scenario it is assumed that no interventions to achieve the SDGs will be implemented.

Moreover, to reflect the participation of society, the model assumes that the private sector will contribute 5 per cent of the additional expenditure generated by the interventions to achieve the SDGs by 2030.

An additional expenditure was added in the BC scenario regarding public investment for industrialisation, in order to stimulate the structural transformation of productive sectors. The extra expenditure has the same trend/shape as the expenditures regarding the SDG interventions and the same magnitude as the expenditure in education. However, it is financed by increasing public debt and not by increasing taxes. One additional policy intervention was assumed in order to incentivise the industrialisation of the region by making the industry sector much more attractive through preferred taxation, shifting taxation to other sectors like services.

2.4.4 Scenario quantification results
The quantification results of the three scenarios are presented for 2043 according to four dimensions: economic growth, social development, environment and biodiversity, and the SDGs.

Growth and key drivers
Economic growth. The behaviour of the GDP (Figure 10) in the BC scenario shows a rapid acceleration period between 2022 and 2033 necessary to reach growth goals in the long term. The goal is to enter into a stabilisation period up to 2039 and to finally stabilise at a growth rate of around 7 per cent by the end of the simulated period, which is consistent with the scenario description. This economic growth is no longer “impoverishing” in the sense defined by Bhagwatt (1958). On the other hand, the WC scenario performs at a much poorer level than the BAU scenario, with a GDP growth rate by 2043 almost half the rate reached in 2015. The WC scenario follows a phase of rapid decline because of poor governance and reinforcement loops created by low investment in both public and private sectors. The GDP per capita shows a similar behaviour. By 2043, the average value of this indicator would be multiplied by six in one generation, rising from $2,000 in 2015 to over $11,000 in 2043.

The trends for the agriculture, services and production sectors follow a similar path to that of the GDP for all the three scenarios (Figure 11). The productive sector that presents the highest growth rate is the services sector in all three scenarios, while agriculture exhibits the lowest growth rate.

The services sector exhibits a growth in its share of GDP for all three scenarios, while agriculture has a tendency to decrease its share (Figure 11). The interventions for stimulating industrialisation to spur the structural transformation of the region are countered by the tendency of the industrial sector to decrease its share in total production. The industrial sector’s share of GDP by the end of the simula-
tion in the BC scenario is estimated at 22 per cent. Meanwhile in the BAU and WC scenarios the share falls to around 14 per cent.

The policy could have been designed to be more aggressive and therefore have greater impact on the industry sector’s share of GDP, however this would require a very large amount of investment in addition to the right enabling environment. A stronger industrialisation policy is in line with the spirit of the scenario. However, higher industrialisation levels, such as the one achieved in China over the last decade, would require a level of transformation that would be challenging in the Sahel region. Besides, such levels of industrialisation are not necessarily desirable because while it is good to have a balanced economy, industry is also typically the most polluting and material-intensive sector, which would have strong negative effects in reaching several targets of the SDGs.

**Fiscal Policy.** The financing of development in the Sahel, based primarily on domestic resources, would be a reality in 2043. Public financial management would be based on the principles of transparency, performance and accountability. The application of the regional and international standards in public finances would reassure taxpayers and improve the mobilisation of internal resources. In 2043, the effectiveness of the dematerialisation of tax procedures (for example, by submitting online tax returns) would allow, on the one hand, the elimination of tax incivism, while increasing the competitiveness of businesses on the other hand. Budget information by that time would be accessible to everyone in real time. Overall, debt sustain-
Chapter 2: Possible futures for the Sahel

**Figure 12:** Projected domestic revenue as a share of GDP, 2015–2043 (%)

![Graph showing projected domestic revenue as a share of GDP, 2015–2043 (%).](image)


**Figure 13:** Projected sectoral expenditure trends in the Sahel, 2015–2043

- **Agriculture expenditure per capita**
- **Transportation infrastructure expenditure per capita**
- **Water and sanitation expenditure per capita**

![Graphs showing projected sectoral expenditure trends in the Sahel, 2015–2043.](image)

ability would be a key indicator of public financial management.

To this end, the average ratio of domestic revenues as a share of GDP is expected to increase by 13 per cent in 2017 and to reach 20.4 per cent in 2043. Also, the modernisation of the economy would enable States to develop incentive mechanisms for domestic revenue mobilisation. Thus, by 2043, the share of informal enterprises in the Sahel would be residual, with the tax base considerably broadened. In 2043, it is envisaged that the tax reform would be perfectly balanced, because it is based primarily on the criteria of efficiency and equity. By 2043 the Sahel would not be living beyond its means, past budget deficits being gradually cleared by the increase in revenues.

The quality of public spending would remain an essential factor for the realisation of the BC scenario in 2043. The sectoral investments would substantially increase in this scenario. Projections of expenditure per capita in 2043 show that those relating to agriculture will have multiplied by 20 compared to 2015. The same trend of investment effort can be seen in transport infrastructure, water and sanitation.

Social development
The social stressor indicators presented in this section depict the dynamics at play in demographics and human development for the three scenarios. The social stressors are categorised by: population, health and education, employment, and poverty and inequality.

Population. Following the current trend and accounting for the structural dynamics involved in demographics, the population of the Sahel region is expected to rise to 650 million people by 2043 in the BAU and WC scenarios. The BC scenario has less population than those of the BAU and WC, mainly due to the interventions in family planning. By 2043 the BC scenario would have about 100 million people less than the BAU and WC scenarios. However, the effects of high population growth are not necessarily negative because a well-educated population can play a key role as human capital for economic growth.

The difference in the total population among the three scenarios by 2043 is supported by the differences in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) (Figure 14), which are generated mainly by the additional expenditure in family planning but also by changes in years in schooling, income and expenditure in health. The TFR in the BC scenario shows a decrease from 5.5 in 2015 to 2.5 by 2043, while in the other two scenarios the differences by 2043 respect to 2015 are very marginal.

In the BC scenario for 2043, the majority of Sahelians would enjoy an improved standard of living and could control the birth rate, because of the progress made in the areas of reproductive health. The picture is of a growing population, but evolv-
ing in respect to the socioeconomic equilibrium. It is in perfect coherence with the creation of wealth, taking into account the needs of future generations. The drop in the fertility rate is perceptible, as women's level of education has improved significantly, their empowerment is evident, and their bargaining power has increased. Globally, by 2043, most Sahel countries will have capitalised on the demographic bonus.

**Health and education.** The Sahel of 2043 relies on educated and healthy men and women. The anticipated “Great Leap of the Cheetah” is fundamentally dependent on it. In the BC scenario the rate of access to basic healthcare in 2043 is on average 95 per cent compared to an average of 58 per cent in 2015 (Figure 15). This progress is accompanied by a drastic drop in infant and child mortality, and a sustained increase in life expectancy.

Projections based on the BC scenario estimate the infant mortality rate at 23.4 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2043, compared with more than 80 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2015 (Figure 15). This level is still high, but it shows the effects of a proactive health policy, even if it demands a high pressure on health expenditure.

In 2043, the expected education indicators in Sahel States are close to those of the industrialised countries. The picture is one of substantive progress. The average time spent in school has improved for both males and females. It has risen from about 4 years for females (6 years for males) in 2015 to al-

**Figure 15: Projected Sahel health and education trends, 2015–2043**

![Average access to basic health care](image1)

![Infant mortality rate](image2)

![Average years of Schooling - Female](image3)

![Average years of schooling - Male](image4)
most 10 years for females (more than 10 years for males). The proportion of the young population (15–24 years) in the education system has risen from 10 per cent in 2015 to more than 45 percent in 2043 (Figure 15).

This evolution is partly sustained by the various policies and measures implemented by the States. In 2043, the visualised education system of the Sahel is modern, characterised by infrastructure and programmed in line with international standards. Technical and vocational training are promoted to meet the growing skills needed in the industrial sectors. In the tertiary level, the system encourages the training of engineers.

Employment, poverty and inequality in the Sahel.
The weak job creation dynamic is one of the burdens that undermine the structural transformation of the Sahel. While the ILO generally cites historically (and paradoxically) low unemployment rates in Africa, these results remain significantly contrasted by exorbitant rates of underemployment in some countries. However, the Sahel of 2043 is one of full employment, characterised by the creation of decent jobs. In 2043, the average unemployment rate for the BC scenario has fallen to less than 3 per cent. This decrease is due to the reforms in the labour market and the various opportunities created by the structural transformation process.
In addition, poverty has significantly decreased, both in depth and in severity, thanks to the acquisition of “capabilities” (Sen, 1999). On the monetary poverty dimension, the poverty rate of the BC scenario has fallen from an average of 43 per cent in 2015 to almost 22 percent in 2043 (Figure 16).

This improvement would be facilitated by the active employment policies, made possible by the dividends of economic performance. In addition, the income distribution quintiles have narrowed with a substantial improvement in favour of the poorest.

Environment and biodiversity

The projections made in the BC scenario indicate that pollution generated by gas emissions could increase in the Sahel by 2043, although well below the global average observed in 2015. Between 2015 and 2043, CO² emissions in the Sahel under the BC scenario will have multiplied more than five-fold, from 0.48 to 2.60 metric tons per capita (Figure 17) against a global average of 4.97 metric tons per capita in 2015. Moreover, it is worth noticing that oil is considered as the principal energy source in all three scenarios, since no changes in the energy matrix of the region were contemplated in the scenario description. That is the main source of CO² emissions in the BC scenario, and accounts for the exponential increase, which is reinforced by the extra investment policy in industrialisation.

In addition, in 2043 the Sahel is in a situation where environmental policies are increasingly facing sanitation problems related to the emission of waste.

**Figure 17: Projected Sahel environment and biodiversity trends, 2015–2043**

- Per capita CO₂ emissions (metric tons)
- Average per capita waste generation, kg/capita/day
- Red List Index (%)
- Relative fish resources availability share (%)

*Source: Sahel 2043 Technical Committee, 2018.*
Due to the increased industrialisation, the Sahelian ecological footprint will have increased. Indeed, the emission of waste by Sahelians in 2043 will have tripled compared to 2015.

This dynamic is also observed at the level of biodiversity. Indeed, the Red List Index (RLI)\(^\text{17}\) in the Sahel (Figure 17) shows a situation that is deteriorating up to 2043 and beyond. This trend calls for adequate measures, otherwise fish and animal resources will become increasingly rare in the Sahel. In 2043 the Sahel will have reached the critical threshold of 50 per cent, signifying that half of the animals in the RLI’s four taxonomic groups will probably disappear.

In 2043, the expenditure in agriculture in order to achieve the SDGs will be directed towards irrigation in agriculture (on average 0.2% of GDP per year during the period 2016–2030). The introduction of irrigation methods increases the harvested area irrigated, enlarging the irrigation water withdrawal, which increases the total water withdrawal. Such an effect in the water demand is clearly seen in the Water Resources Vulnerability Index, which shows that the ratio of the total water withdrawal and the water supply are significantly higher in the BC scenario, in comparison with the other two scenarios (Figure 18).

**Sustainable Development Goals**

The performance of the goals among the three scenarios fluctuates according to the targets and scenario assumptions. However, all the goals exhibit a higher performance by 2030 in the BC scenario compared with the BAU and WC scenarios (Figure 19). The increase in performance of Goal 1 from 20 per cent in the BAU to 47 per cent in the BC is due to interventions that further increase government expenditures for health, education, agriculture, and adaptation to climate change. The last one is also the reason for the increase in Goal 13 from 0 per cent in the BAU to 91 per cent in the BC scenario. The improvement in Goal 2 for the BC scenario compared to the BAU and WC cases is related to the decrease in poverty and increased expenditure in agriculture irrigation projected for the BC. Better performance in Goal 16 is mainly due to improvements in governance. For a summarised listing of the 17 SDGs, see Appendix 2.

These results show important characteristics of the dynamics of the SDGs in the Sahel region. The complexity of the interlinkages among the goals requires an integrated understanding of the causal pathways between, on the one hand, changes in governance and expenditure on education, health, infrastructure, agriculture and climate change and, on the other, the performance of the SDGs.

---

\(^{17}\) The Red List Index (RLI), based on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species, is an indicator of the changing state of global biodiversity. It defines the conservation status of major species groups, and measures trends in extinction risk over time.
Figure 19: Projected SDG performances in 2030 (%)

Chapter 3: Vision and strategic orientations for long-term development

Defining the Vision and its strategic orientations emerged as logical steps in the process of formulating the Sahel 2043 study.

The Vision is defined based on the Sahelian peoples’ aspirations, past trends, major issues and challenges; in this process it favours the most plausible assumptions. In order to achieve the desired future of the Sahelians, the strengths and threats of the Vision have also been identified.

3.1 The Vision

The “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah”, of all three scenarios, is the one that best expresses and reflects the desired future of Sahelians for 2043. This is borne out by the national consultations conducted as part of the diagnostic analysis. This optimistic scenario is entirely plausible, consistent and aligned with the commitments made by the Sahel countries at the regional or global level.

As such, formulating the 2043 Sahel Vision fuels this desired future, while making the most of its strengths and exploiting the opportunities offered by its environment. This also requires eliminating its weaknesses, and an ability to respond effectively to potential threats that may occur on the long road to building a more prosperous, peaceful and equitable future for all the Sahel’s peoples.

The ambitious and proactive Vision is rooted in the regional vision reflected in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which is expressed as follows: “Building an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. The regional Vision is reinforced by the 7 common aspirations18 that are perfectly reflected by those of the Sahelian population (see Chapter 1). As such, achieving the Sahel Vision by 2043 would inexorably contribute to achieving the continent’s vision by 2063.

Based on all these considerations, the Sahel Vision 2043 is worded as follows:

“The Sahel in 2043 will be a region of peace, strong institutions based on worthy cultural values, sustainable environment, and managed population dynamics that generate transformed economies for Sahelian prosperity.”

In sum, this 2043 Vision of the Sahel is based on the four fundamental principles of (i) peace and security; (ii) strong institutions; (iii) sustainable environment; and (iv) managed demographic dynamics. These are discussed in more detail below.

3.1.1 Peace and security

Sahel States have struggled to build real stable spaces after independence. Community, regional, ethnic or religious references have often served as a basis for divisions, insecurity and poor governance. Yet peace and security are the priority elements of the region. Peace and security have also emerged as a priority of the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

Peace and security are prerequisites for achieving development but they cannot be achieved in a landscape of poverty and inequality. Neither can they be decreed or imposed. They are built collectively through inclusive dialogue. This dialogue should be the preferred mechanism for managing crises and building sustainable development.

3.1.2 Strong institutions

Strong institutions generate good governance, justice and peace, respect for State leaderships and sound management of the development process.

---

18 These aspirations, articulated in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, are: a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; an integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism; an Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; a peaceful and secure Africa; an Africa with strong cultural identity, values and ethics; an Africa whose development is people-centered, including the potential for young people and women; and Africa as a strong and influential actor and partner on the world stage.
The Sahel region suffers from weak institutional capacity and this creates a weak governance regime, with limited capacity for the State to provide adequate leadership and basic services to its citizens. In addition, several governance deficits relating to the authority and capacity of the State, consolidation of democracy, management, the rule of law, transparency and accountability, social exclusion, and human rights violations have contributed to instability and conflict in Sahel countries.

While some Sahel countries have made considerable efforts to achieve good governance through the implementation of reform programmes, the objectives of government effectiveness, accountability and transparency remain a challenge.

3.1.3 Sustainable environment
The region suffers from increased vulnerability of its environment in the face of climatic shocks that have become recurrent. The succession of droughts and floods has deteriorated productive capital and exposed people to hunger and food insecurity. The climate and the environment define the pace of life in the Sahel. They completely influence the way of life of the populations and their relationship with the rest of the world, particularly through continuous migrations towards more fertile lands.

3.1.4 Managed demographic dynamics
The profile of the predominantly young Sahelian population is seen as an asset, but also as one of the factors that can inhibit economic growth and sustainable development. The high fertility rate combined with the weakness of healthcare and the low educational level of the population generate low productivity of the labour force and dependency ratios that are among the highest in the world. In addition, this less skilled young population is often described as a “time bomb”. The proposed Vision sees the youth as an asset and a human capital to generate prosperity and improved living standards. The Sahel population can benefit from the demographic dividend if they are well educated, and if both girls and boys are given access to job creation opportunities. On the other hand, no economic or social target can be achieved without taking human capital into account.

3.2 Strategic orientations to achieve the SDGs in the Sahel

The principal path to achieve the Vision of the Sahel region by 2043 lies in the formulation of long-term strategic orientations for development. Indeed, if the long-term Vision aims to answer the question, “Where do we want to go?”, the strategic orientations respond to the question, “How do we get there?”

The results of previous analytical steps – namely identifying development challenges; drawing conclusions from the survey on the aspirations of Sahelian populations; determining the main factors of long-term change; and constructing scenarios for the future – all feed into the identification of the long-term strategic orientations.

3.2.1 Five strategic orientations
Starting from the synthesis of the key elements, five strategic orientations can be identified:

- **Strategic Orientation 1**: Promote inclusive governance for better community living;
- **Strategic Orientation 2**: Improve human capital and capitalise on the demographic dividend;
- **Strategic Orientation 3**: Transform economic structures;
- **Strategic Orientation 4**: Promote inclusive development; and
- **Strategic Orientation 5**: Build the resilience capacities of the Sahel.

The first strategic orientation addresses the challenge of governance and is related to arrangements for better community living and the peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnicities and beliefs within and between Sahelian communities. The next three strategic orientations are driven by the need for Sahel countries to improve the living conditions and well-being of their populations through strong, sustained and inclusive growth. These strategic orientations therefore focus on building human capital, ensuring structural transformation of Sahel economies and promoting inclusive development – one that does not lead to inequalities but rather reduces them. They therefore address the economic, demographic and sociopolitical challenges. The
fifth strategic orientation has to do with building the resilience of populations and States and responds to the challenge of resilience to shocks.

**Strategic Orientation 1: Promote inclusive governance for better community living**

It is worth pointing out that the challenge of governance goes beyond the classical understanding of the term. Governance should include not only the elements of the political competence of States, but also the State’s leadership capacity (which in reality is a cross-cutting variable) in self-organisation and the legitimacy to do so.

Governance also encompasses the nature of the relationship that exists between States and the other actors in the socioeconomic and sociocultural life of the region. We must therefore consider that governance, like politics in the etymological sense, is linked to the organisation of the life of the community. This strategic orientation therefore obligates the States in the Sahel region to strive towards an effective regional integration. Peaceful coexistence is only possible when the countries of the Sahel region succeed in embracing and coalescing around a greater sociocultural and political diversity inherent in the region.

Such a strategic orientation embodies a legal governance that allows for equal access to justice for all, political governance that is based on transparent and participatory electoral processes, and economic governance that fights corruption and promotes a culture of accountability and equal opportunities.

In addition to strengthening inspection bodies, it is necessary to ensure that the population and civil society have the means to control and oversee the use of public resources by governors and State officials. In this perspective, the fight against corruption will involve strengthening the integrity of the system as a whole. This requires building large coalitions between national, regional and international actors involved in the fight against corruption. In the same vein, it will be necessary to develop a work ethic that takes into account the interests of the population and encourages each citizen to use his/her talents and skills to their fullest.

The desired development-oriented State also embodies an upgrade of administration through the development of certain functions relating to planning, financial management, statistics, monitoring & evaluation, human resource management, and control. This administration should be able to design, implement and evaluate relevant public policies through leadership and national ownership. In this context, it will need to have the capacity for dialoguing, in order to define local solutions adapted to the local realities and avoid the imposition of wholesale “one size fits all” panaceas proposed by the International Development Institutions.

Security is an essential component of good governance. According to the human security paradigm, the individual must be at the centre of the security strategy. Thus, beyond the security of the institutions, the State must protect each person from any threat or danger to their survival. The image of the State must evolve from “predator” to “protector and provider”. This approach integrates the security paradigm based on traditional and non-traditional mechanisms. It also enables citizens to become more accountable for their own safety with community security, prevention and conflict management strategies.

These orientations reflect the African Union’s “Silence the Guns” programme, which aims not to “bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans” and to deal once and for all with “the scourge of conflicts and violence on the continent”.

In addition, profound transformation of the armed forces and the establishment of regional and multinational forces must be supported by the construction of anticipatory and prospective capacities as well as actions to strengthen the management of the security system.

Living together also requires a “culture of peace” and social cohesion within the States of the region, as well as the establishment of strong political, religious and societal mechanisms to prevent and avoid religious radicalisation and other harmful practices observed in the region. In this respect, the issue of the relationship between farmers and livestock farmers needs to be addressed and resolved by highlighting the mutual benefits of cooperation and complementarity. Thus, traditional mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution
between these two groups of farmers must be revisited to create a framework for discussion, collaboration and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

More broadly, public schools in the Sahel have an important role to play in civic education and socialisation to help restore a culture of peace and social cohesion. They must inculcate in the children, at a very early age, acceptance of one another, and traditional values such as enhancing relations and integration. They should also support actions of the media, cultural actors and civil society organisations, in particular, youth and women’s associations, in awareness-raising, information and communication campaigns on tolerance, citizenship and peaceful settlement of conflicts. In the same way, increasing civil–military actions will help to restore confidence between the people and their army.

This strategic orientation of promoting inclusive governance for peaceful coexistence can strengthen social cohesion within countries and improve relations between Sahel countries. The overarching aim is to develop a culture of peace and to promote citizenship. It is about bringing economic, religious, political and opinion leaders together to forge a common vision of life in society, while safeguarding their individual identities.

In this respect, some attention must be paid to the power of religious leaders, because it occupies a place of influence in the Sahelian space. It is therefore essential for governments to have healthy interactions with the powers within the religious system. While maintaining leadership, the State must also grant a central place to research institutions and non-State actors.

In brief, from a perspective of development, governance for living together must be holistic. The States of the Sahel must therefore be interested in the organisation and exercise of powers, particularly State power which plays an essential role, as shown by the structural analysis. The visions and actions of the various powers must be integrated into the different social and cultural frameworks and be enriched by everyone’s help. In so doing, energies will be rallied around common and shared objectives and this will make it easier for everyone to live together harmoniously.

Strategic Orientation 2: Improve human capital and capitalise on the demographic dividend

It should be emphasised that the issue of demography is addressed here from the broader perspective of the demographic dividend and the enhancement of human capital in the Sahel region.

Thus, strategic orientation 2 aims to create the conditions for the demographic transition in the Sahel. The objective is to improve the quality of human resources in order to benefit from demographic dividend opportunities. This strategic orientation is consistent with the aspirations of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals.\(^{19}\)

The low productivity of the Sahelian economies is, in part, the result of the ineffectiveness of the education systems.\(^{20}\) Because of their importance in the development of human capital, education, training and information must be prioritised by policy-makers; they are essential for building the skillsets and capacities of Sahel countries to have the quantity and quality of human capital needed for the structural transformation of the economies and societies of the region.

At the same time, the development of human capital involves not only increasing the resources allocated to education, but also improving the efficiency of the system. In addition to infrastructure, it is crucial to enhance the initial qualification and development of teachers to raise the level of education at all cycles, and also develop the scientific, technical and professional disciplines. Similarly, because of their importance in the Sahel region, Quranic schools should, within frameworks defined with States, be encouraged to create synergies with general education schools and vocational training.

---

19 SDGs: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages, SDG4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all, SDG5: Gender equality.

20 Only 61 per cent and 72 per cent of enrolled children complete their primary education in Senegal and Cameroon respectively and out of 1,000 children enrolled in primary school, only 2 children in Burkina Faso and Guinea, 3 in Mauritania and 10 in Cameroon complete the entire 12-year school cycle. In Mali, Niger and Senegal, the figures seem lower (UNECA 2018).
institutions to improve the technical skills of young people in addition to religious knowledge.

Achieving the objectives of quality and relevant education requires strengthening learning and the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). It also requires adapting offers to specific areas and the needs of the population (multilingualism, nomadic education, alternative schools for school dropouts, arts and culture, etc.). Harmonising teaching and implementing standardised regional evaluation criteria should also contribute to achieving the objective of quality. Special attention should be paid to ensure equal access to education at all levels for girls and boys.

While education improves the quality of human resources, there should also be an increased focus on improved nutrition and healthcare to enhance the productivity of human capital. In this context, improving health systems governance, strengthening instruments for combatting communicable diseases, and promoting maternal and child health emerge as top priorities.

Demographic growth in the Sahel region can be controlled mostly by a reduction in the Total Fertility Rate through:

- Encouraging religious leaders to talk about family welfare and family planning in general in their sermons;
- Building partnerships within local communities, at national and regional levels through integrative projects;
- Raising awareness among the population, especially young people, on sexual and reproductive health with a network of actors disseminating coherent and accessible messages;
- Organising family planning and reproductive healthcare programmes;
- Ensuring greater effectiveness in combating early marriages; and
- Keeping girls in school by providing targeted incentives.

Expanding people’s access to basic social services, such as drinking water and improved sanitation, and strengthening social protection networks, are also crucial for this strategic orientation.

Strategic Orientation 3: Transforming economic structures

The problem of structural transformations remains of serious concern to the countries of the Sahel region and represents one of the major challenges. This orientation is in line with Goal 4 of the aspiration 1 of Agenda 2063 and with Goal 8 of the Sustainable Development Goals, which relate to the transformation of economies and the promotion of inclusive and sustainable economic growth to create decent jobs for all (UNDP, 2017b).

This strategic orientation therefore aims to promote:

- Industrialisation based on commodities, including agricultural products, livestock and natural resources;
- Gradual allocation of factors of production from low productivity (agriculture) sectors to high productivity and value-added sectors (modern manufacturing and services);
- Profound transformation of agriculture in the broad sense;
- Better management of natural resources;
- Sustainable and productive debt in support of the process of structural transformation of economies; and
- Better integration into regional and global trade.

The key to the structural transformation of African economies lies in the industrialisation of Africa. This industrialisation is associated with the emergence of new productive sectors and engines of growth capable of capturing regional and international market shares, as well as the improvement of sectoral competitiveness. It involves the adoption of proactive and targeted industrial policies to support emerging industries. It should be supported by a profound transformation of agriculture through water control, improved management, and the use of technologies in methods and products.

The State must lead the way in promoting industries at this stage of development. In this endeavour, it will have to play not only its sovereign role of coordinating, guiding and supplying non-market services, but also the role of facilitator and provider in respect of the different principles of free trade. The State could also serve as a protector through
the adoption of smart measures to protect emerging industries.

By speeding up the regional integration processes, the State would facilitate trade, which serves as the engine of industrialisation. Regional integration will also allow the emergence of regional champions in global value chains, competing with some large companies. Similarly, regional integration will enhance international bargaining capacity and better protect the interests of emerging new industries. Ultimately, regional integration will gradually remove barriers to industrialisation through trade. Thus, the implementation of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) will eventually promote the creation of a single market.

Despite being geographically favoured by the CFTA, the Sahel could only take advantage of this opportunity by implementing reforms to facilitate transport and major investments in the fields of energy, ICT and transport infrastructure. In this context, innovative financing mechanisms are to be implemented in major structuring projects for energy production and interconnection. A new mining resource governance should be introduced to better finance other development sectors, ensure local transformation and create jobs.

It is also strongly suggested that States improve the fairness, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of taxation and subsidies. An improvement in financial inclusion in the region could also be a good way to mobilise domestic savings, not to mention the impact of remittances and the contribution of Islamic finance products.

Strategic Orientation 4: Promote inclusive development

It is in response to the issue of inequality at several levels that strategic orientation 4 was formulated. It is also fully in line with key international documents and their objectives of reducing gender inequalities and inequalities among countries. It is specifically in line with SDGs 1, 5 and 6 and has the following objectives, namely to:

- Reduce natural, spatial and geographical disparities as well as inequalities among social groups and individuals;
- Enable all actors to be both beneficiaries and contributors to the socioeconomic development of the Sahel region; and
- Ensure equitable access to economic opportunities and implement decent work and income generation initiatives.

More specifically, this strategic orientation focuses on policies targeting the most marginalised and vulnerable areas and populations (rural areas, women, young people, the disabled, refugees, migrants, etc.). Several countries have distinguished themselves in this area by strengthening professional networks and cooperatives to generate more value for their members. They have substantially improved access to finance in rural areas, strengthened small and medium size enterprises and built the capacities of disadvantaged actors. The sustainability of these strategies has been assured by building the capacities of the youth in particular to participate and benefit fully from the wealth creation process through the promotion of entrepreneurial skills development and lifelong learning initiatives.

These policies should make it possible to eliminate obstacles specific to the various vulnerable groups, particularly through access to training, information and financing. Positive discrimination measures will be encouraged, with bonuses for actors who create the required conditions. Particular attention needs to be given to women’s economic empowerment to reduce economic inequalities and improve access to production resources, finances and social services.

Moreover, to avoid the exclusion, isolation and the feeling of rejection, it is crucial for States to adopt city policies, particularly regarding housing and social protection for the most vulnerable. The so-
cial policies regarding education, health, water and sanitation should contain clear measures and stated objectives for vulnerable groups. Similarly, innovations could be used for isolated and low-density areas or for overcrowded centres to build smart cities that will provide quality public services, including state of the art technology, to people at affordable costs and thereby strengthen their integration with the rest of the world. Finally, as part of the regional integration process, mechanisms to correct imbalances and support certain disadvantaged areas should be considered in a regional approach of redistribution through the establishment of a Regional Solidarity Fund.

Beyond the different actions and services that could be provided to vulnerable people, intervention strategies and major projects should contain clear guidelines for vulnerable and marginalised groups with the aim of improving living conditions or at least maintaining livelihoods. Mechanisms for consultation and dialogue tailored to these groups should also be established.

All these initiatives prove that there is a wide array of instruments that the Sahel region could use to achieve inclusive development, whereby the incomes and quality of life of the populations would increase substantially.

**Strategic Orientation 5: Enhancing resilience capacities**

In the face of the region’s vulnerability to many exogenous shocks, it is important for actors in the region to work towards enhancing its resilience. Hence the need for this fifth strategic orientation, which aims to prevent and manage crises, including the use of mitigation, adaptation and recovery techniques. This orientation is part of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Strategic orientation 5 focuses on integrating emergency actions into development. It is really a question of finding the balance and capacities to prevent security and health crises or natural disasters leading to humanitarian crises that require external assistance. The main points of strategic orientation 5 are as follows:

- Implementing national and regional (harmonised) climate change mitigation and adaptation plans and international advo-
- cacy to meet on international climate commitments;
- Strengthening national and regional capacities for forecasting, anticipating, monitoring and responding to crises and natural disasters;
- Improving research and developing new technologies for production and consumption;
- Developing regional standards for occupancy and space management, taking into account the different risks;
- Breaking with dispersed, untargeted, uncoordinated and unsustainable actions in the humanitarian field;
- Establishing integrated emergency response and recovery mechanisms following natural disasters or security crises; and
- Empowering the populations to break the cycles of State handouts and develop specific attitudes of resilience.

It is important that the Sahel States are prepared to respond to any form of shock (climate, security, health, etc.) by applying a human security approach that takes into account all the threats to human life. This strategic orientation also requires the drawing up of integrated and tailored policies (including the triple economic, social and environmental dimension) to allow States to appropriately respond to climate variations, humanitarian or security challenges, and also to strengthen their resilience to these shocks. This strategic orientation will make it possible to avoid “dictatorship of emergencies” because, as Marechal Talleyrand said: “When it is urgent, it is already too late.”

This strategic orientation also aims to ensure that all the actors, including the populations of the region, embrace their responsibilities and strengthen their capacities to respond to shocks. The responses will have to reconcile the issue of nature conservation with that of production and livelihoods of people, especially rural and other vulnerable groups. The numerous regional organisations around the Senegal River, the Niger River and Lake Chad are examples of the concerted management of surface water resources in the Sahel that should be sustained and strengthened. Investments in structuring projects, such as irrigation and water retention systems, should be considered in order
to overcome climatic hazards, as much as possible, and revitalise agricultural production in rural areas.

### 3.2.2 Strengths and threats to achieving the Vision

Based on an analysis of the main findings of the surveys on the aspirations of the people of the Sahel, the future Vision for the year 2043, is intended to be realistic and achievable. The long-awaited Sahel of 2043 will depend on the willingness of everyone to believe in it and to take ownership of it in order to work towards its realisation. The day-to-day actions of all stakeholders must promote achievement of the desired future, while refusing to provoke (or contribute to provoking) the advent of the pessimistic “Clipping of the Eagle’s Wings” scenario. Instead all must embrace and work towards the optimistic “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah” scenario.

Future monitoring is needed, to see how feasible the scenario assumptions would be, in the light of the actions undertaken. The aim is to alert decision-makers to the potential risks as well as the favourable forces for the realisation of the Vision. That is why the Vision that has been defined and the related strategic orientations need to be reconciled with the possible futures (the three scenarios) identified in this study.

Cross-reading between the Vision and each scenario helps, on the one hand, to identify the strengths contained in each of them, and on the other hand, to identify any possible risks to the achievement of the Vision. In addition, analysis of the components of the Vision itself, as formulated, points to potential endogenous strengths and threats to the Sahel system.

The general picture of strengths and threats for each group of components of the Vision (peace, strong institutions, cultural values, sustainable environment, controlled demographic population, structurally transformed economies, and prosperity of the Sahelians) is summed up in Table 14.
### Table 14: Synthesis of key strengths and threats for the achievement of the Sahel Vision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBAL LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Endowment of natural capital (arable land, surface water, subsoil wealth, water tables, agro-pastoral potential, etc.)</td>
<td>• Declining official development assistance (ODA) trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High percentage of youth among population</td>
<td>• Escalating insecurity and extreme violence, including terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence and operationalisation of long-term national development programmes</td>
<td>• Volatile commodity and natural resource prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing international community interest for the Sahel</td>
<td>• Persistent underperformance in the mobilisation of domestic resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Free movement of people</td>
<td>• Relevance of ODA to public revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasing indebtedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Insufficient dialogue with non-State actors and their exclusion from the Vision implementation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Weak development management capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEACE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic diversity and marriages</td>
<td>• Sociopolitical instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of democracy since the 1990s</td>
<td>• Persistent conflicts, especially between farmers and pastoralists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Experiences in inter-community dialogues and peaceful settlement of conflicts</td>
<td>• Weak local government (decentralisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emergence of conflicts linked to pastoralism (herders versus farmers)</td>
<td>• Rampant corruption and poor governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Insecurity and extreme violence, fuelled by the new geopolitical dynamics in the Sahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Insufficient policies targeting the most vulnerable areas and groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor inclusion of some minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRONG INSTITUTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of a civil society committed to democracy and the rule of law</td>
<td>• Low capacity of the armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advances in the freedom of the press</td>
<td>• Weak political governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political stability in most countries</td>
<td>• Increased political risk in most Sahel countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CULTURAL VALUES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kinship influence as a strong factor of social cohesion</td>
<td>• Gerontocracy, early marriages, low participation of women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Solidarity</td>
<td>• Very slow transmission of good Sahelian cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Traditional power as an influence on endogenous conflict management</td>
<td>• Insufficient channelling of youth in the face of cultural competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasing dominance of modern culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local awareness of adaptation to the effects of climate change</td>
<td>• Exacerbation of climate shocks, driven by persistent global warming trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existence of various river basins and lakes and density of ground water</td>
<td>• Increasing soil depletion and erosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial flows expected since the Paris climate conference (COP 21)</td>
<td>• High frequency of drought in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTROLLED POPULATION DYNAMICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Beginning of demographic transition in some countries</td>
<td>• Persistent high fertility rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multiplication of contraceptive methods and their increasing use by women</td>
<td>• Persistent early marriages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Acceleration of gender equality in schools</td>
<td>• Persistent illiteracy, especially among women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Migration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter 3: Vision and strategic orientations for long-term development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSFORMED ECONOMIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Natural resource endowment</td>
<td>• Weak relevant strategies and/or action plans for the structural transformation of economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consolidation of industrialisation in the region</td>
<td>• Expansion of the informal sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing adoption of renewable energy initiative</td>
<td>• Corruption (bad governance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Investment and gradual access to basic infrastructures (road, water, telecommunications)</td>
<td>• Inadequate local resource mobilisation to finance investments needed to drive structural transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High dependency of economy on natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low use of innovative financial channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low productivity of agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROSPERITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emergence of a middle class</td>
<td>• Exacerbation of extreme poverty, inequality and population vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Importance of remittance transfer in the region</td>
<td>• Resource growth not keeping pace with the needs of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Speedy penetration of ICT to promote mobile telephony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Conclusions

The Sahel has, in recent times, claimed its place in the global spotlight, but for all the wrong reasons. Riven by insecurity and marked by fragility and vulnerability to climate change, the Sahel’s long history of protracted conflicts and poor governance continues to inordinately shape the region’s economic and social landscape. The narrative of a Sahel plagued by violent extremism, trafficking, irregular migration, and crippled by food insecurity has been told time and again. Headlines, reports and studies warn that the reverberations of this complex crisis will be long felt in the region and beyond.

While there is no denying that the Sahel is fraught with a multitude of challenges, the “crisis narrative” tells only one side of the story. The reality is that the Sahel is endowed with an overwhelming abundance of natural resources, which, if managed equitably and sustainably, could turn the region’s fortunes around. The Sahel is home to the continent’s top producers of oil, gold and uranium. These very riches have rendered the region an arena for geopolitical confrontation. Beyond its mineral riches, the Sahel’s wealth lies in its resilient people.

The Sahel 2043 follows an approach whose main objective is to explore the possible futures of a society. Such an exercise requires analytical, multidisciplinary and intellectual rigour. The prospective approach also requires the use of proven and consistent tools and methodologies. It is first and foremost a sociopolitical method that mobilises all segments of the society in a common endeavour to draw lessons from the past, understand the challenges of the present, and design a common future through concerted effort. These principles have guided this study of the Sahel region.

The desired future for all Sahelians is enshrined in the Vision of “a region of peace, strong institutions based on worthy cultural values, sustainable environment, and managed population dynamics that generate transformed economies for Sahelian prosperity”. For this to happen, State and non-State actors should all gear towards the realisation of the optimistic scenario, namely the “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah.” This necessitates a new social contract between the State and non-State actors. The Sahelian State needs leaders who possess a clear vision for development, a legitimate mandate, and the capacity to adapt to change. This inevitably entails creating conditions for citizens’ participation in public life, with spaces for information, consultation and involvement in the development process.

Realising the Sahel 2043 would entail the following five strategic orientations (i) promoting inclusive governance for better community living; (ii) developing human capital and capitalising on the demographic dividend; (iii) transforming economic structures; (iv) promoting inclusive development; and (v) increasing the resilience capacity of the Sahel.

This report is a first major step towards the harmonisation of the numerous existing strategies in the Sahel region, while pointing the way to ensure improved policies and programmes for the future that engage and involve the Sahelian people. It provides a conceptual and analytical framework to address national, regional and transboundary challenges specific to the region. The five strategic orientations are ambitious, coherent and mutually reinforcing goals tailored to the Sahel, to realise both the Sustainable Development Goals and Africa’s Agenda 2063. Owning the Sahel 2043 Vision and domesticating the strategic orientations at the national level will build the bedrock for achieving the “Great Leap and Agility of the Cheetah” which the populations of the Sahel so badly need and deserve.
Appendix 1: Key Stakeholders’ Consultative Mechanism

The present section explains the institutional mechanism put in place for the formulation of the Sahel 2043 study. It is based on an integrated operational mechanism for a fruitful dialogue between political and development actors at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.

First, the Steering Committee, which serves as the decision-making body for the process, is tasked with ensuring validation and ownership of the outcomes of the process by the Sahel States, who are the main beneficiaries. It is composed of the 10 Sahel countries’ ministers in charge of development planning, together with ECOWAS.

Second, the Technical Secretariat of the Steering Committee, which is provided by ECA and UNDP, receives guidance and instructions from the Steering Committee and passes these on to the Technical Committee for implementation and consideration.

The main task of the Technical Secretariat is to support and facilitate the work of the technical committee. The Technical Committee is multidisciplinary and representative of the national and regional level. It is made up of country experts (Ministry of Planning and National Statistical Offices), consultants and resource persons.

The formulation process of the study was guided by the following three principles: (i) participatory and multidisciplinary; (ii) political backing; (iii) linkages with the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

An organisational chart showing the reporting structures and interactions between the various bodies is given below.
Organisational chart of the Sahel 2043 study

**STEERING COMMITTEE**
(Representatives of countries and regional institutions)

**Technical Secretariat**
(ECA and UNDP)

**TECHNICAL COMMITTEE**

**EXPERTS**

**CONSULTANTS**

**RESOURCE PERSONS**

Supervises formulation works; provides opinion on findings and the process; approves the results of final stages and makes necessary periodic adjustments. It ensures adoption, political backing and local ownership of **Sahel 2043**.

**Production of technical reports:**
1. Socioeconomic diagnosis of the Sahel
2. Identification of aspirations of Sahelians
3. Structural analysis of the Sahel system
4. Formulation of scenarios
5. Quantification of scenarios
6. Formulation of vision and strategic orientations
7. Production of general report on **Sahel 2043**
8. Development of communication and advocacy strategy
9. Country support for local ownership of **Sahel 2043**
# Appendix 2: Summary of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>End poverty in all its forms everywhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Reduce inequality within and among countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2015). Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/


