Migration
Regional integration and development in Africa

Technical report of the High-level Panel on Migration

January 2019
## Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iii

Acronyms and abbreviations ......................................................................................... iv

I. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

II. The developmental potentials of migration ............................................................... 3

III. Regional integration and migration ..................................................................... 6

IV. Trends and patterns of African migration ............................................................... 8

   Intra-African Migration ....................................................................................... 10

   Extra-continental migration ............................................................................. 13

   Unauthorized migration .................................................................................... 15

V. How economic and human development affects African migration .................. 16

VI. The contribution of migration to economic development .................................. 17

VII. African migration regimes: the prevalence of restrictionism .......................... 20

VIII. Experiences of subregional integration and free movement ......................... 22

IX. A long way ahead: potentials of pan-African regional integration .................... 23

X. Opportunities provided by the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular
   Migration ......................................................................................................... 25

XI. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 28

References .................................................................................................................... 30

Annex Legal instruments signed at the 10th extraordinary session of the Assembly of the
   African Union on the launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area ............ 36
Figures

Figure 1: Association between levels of human development and migration patterns ..........4
Figure 2: Contemporary migration within and from Africa .................................................9
Figure 3: Immigrants by regions of Africa .................................................................10
Figure 4: Immigrants as a percentage of total population ...........................................11
Figure 5: Absolute and relative size of registered immigrant population, 2015 ...........12
Figure 6: Immigrants and refugees in African countries ............................................12
Figure 7: Emigration from Africa to destination countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by region of origin, 1975-2010 ..........14
Figure 8: Destination regions of African overseas migration ......................................15
Figure 9: Registered African emigrant population, by destination, 2015 ......................18
Figure 10: Remittance receipts, absolute and as a percentage of gross domestic product, 2016 .............................................................................................................19
Figure 11: Inbound entry visa restrictiveness of African countries by origin ...............21
Figure 12: Inbound entry visa restrictiveness for African nationals by region of destination.21
Acknowledgements

The present technical report is a joint publication of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the High-level Panel on Migration.

The report was prepared under the leadership and guidance of Thokozile Ruzvidzo, Director of the Social Development Policy Division, with the active participation of the Division’s Population and Youth Section and the Panel’s Technical Committee.

Substantive financial and technical support from the African Development Bank in the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.

The ECA core team comprised William Muhwava, Gideon Rutaremwa, Mamusa Siyunyi, Saurabh Sinha, Edlam Yemeru, Adrian Gauci, Eden Teklay Hailu and Sofanit Abebe. Useful comments and suggestions were received from the staff of the Social Development Policy Division and from other ECA divisions, notably the Regional Integration and Trade Division.

The report was drafted by Hein de Haas and incorporates research findings prepared by Daniel Makina and Loren Landau. The earlier drafts were extensively reviewed by the Technical Committee, comprising Maureen Achieng, Andrew Allieu, Jerome Berndt, Charles O. Boamah, Roberta Buhagiar, Francis Galea, Stein Erik Horjen, Linguere M. Mbaye, Phumza Manqindi, Sean Morency, Serigne Lahbib Ndiaye, Sibry Tapsoba and Geoffrey Wafula. The Technical Committee validated the report at a meeting held at the African Development Bank on 19 and 20 September 2018.

Appreciation also goes to the ECA printing and publications team for editing, layout and printing services, without which this report would not have been issued.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms and abbreviations</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMIG C2C</td>
<td>Determinants of International Migration (country-to-country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

Migration has attracted considerable attention in policy debates at global and regional levels in recent times. African migration in particular is commonly portrayed as a phenomenon driven by poverty, violence and other forms of human misery. Media images and political narratives routinely portray African migrants as victims, who easily fall prey to “unscrupulous” smugglers and human traffickers who “ruthlessly” exploit their desperation to reach the European “Eldorado”. Images of rickety boats packed with African migrants and refugees arriving on European shores and the increasing death toll this involves add to the image of an increasing “migration crisis”.

An overly simplistic narrative currently dominates both media and policy circles: fast population growth and persistent poverty and conflict in Africa, combined with environmental degradation and climate change, are supposedly leading to an uncontrollable increase in the number of young Africans desiring to cross towards Europe and other overseas destinations. Such simplistic ideas of an African exodus tap into deep-rooted fears of an impending “migration invasion” that risks spiralling out of control.

The most common “solutions” that Governments and international organizations have proposed to address this perceived “migration crisis” typically consist of:

(a) Preventing unauthorized migration by “combating”\(^1\) smuggling and trafficking through intensified border patrols and policing in transit countries;

(b) Deportation or pressuring unauthorized migrants and rejected asylum seekers into ‘voluntary return’ or ‘soft deportation’ (Boersema, Leerkes and van Os, 2014; and Pian, 2010) through readmission agreements with origin and transit countries such as Libya, Morocco, Senegal and Turkey);

(c) Addressing the root causes of migration by reducing poverty and increasing employment in African countries (particularly through aid which has increasingly been made conditional on collaboration with readmission of unauthorized migrants);

(d) Informing and sensitizing prospective migrants about the dangers of (unauthorized) migration and the arduous circumstances in Europe (through media campaigns, artistic events and other activities (Pelican, 2012)).

Such “solutions”, despite being widely accepted in policy circles, are unfortunately rooted in a number of questionable assumptions about the nature and drivers of African migration, in particular, and migration from and to developing countries more generally. In the case of Africa, the very idea that there is a rapidly increasing “migration crisis” driven by a growing number of young men and women desperately trying to enter Europe denies the following basic facts:

- The overwhelming majority African migrants entering Europe and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries arrive legally.

\(^{1}\) While such belligerent terminology seems wholly inappropriate when talking about migrants, such terms have become common usage in policy and media narratives about unauthorized migration. These terms have been consciously avoided in this text, mainly because their usage should be rejected on moral terms, but also because of empirical evidence.
• The vast majority of Africans move within the continent.
• Africa is the least migratory region in the world.
• Most Africans move for reasons of work, study and family.
• Most Africans living abroad are generally not from the poorest sections of their societies of origin.
• Unauthorized overland and maritime journeys represent a minority of all moves.
• Only a very small fraction of unauthorized migration can be characterized as “trafficking” (Kihato 2017).

Given the importance of intra-African migration and the considerable but as yet largely untapped potential of extra and intra-continental migration to contribute to economic growth and human development in Africa, there is a need for African States to develop common migration policies to facilitate legal migration for higher and lower skilled migrants within the African continent, in addition to advocating for more legal pathways for migration to Europe, North America and the Gulf region. Such development of common migration policies could also facilitate and benefit from regional integration processes, and contribute to a common African policy agenda and narrative. That outcome could also help to counter more effectively the dominance of Western States in international migration forums and Western narratives that are characterized by negative portrayals of African migration, including by highlighting the contribution that migrants make to economic development and prosperity in destination countries.

A common African policy agenda and narrative could highlight the positive benefits of migration in terms of comprehensive economic growth and human development in Africa. These can also help to eliminate misleading stereotypes and perceptions about African migration and migrants. This includes implementing policies in origin and destination countries that focus on facilitating and managing legal migration and the effective protection of migrants’ rights. The developmental impacts of migration are captured in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development across three Sustainable Development Goals, and are also part of Agenda 2063 of the African Union. To achieve convergence between the Goals and migration policies, a central element of a common African migration policy agenda should be increasing the access of the relatively poor to legal migration opportunities within and outside the continent. Current migration regimes in Africa, and the world in general tend to favour the skilled and wealthy, which makes it unlikely that international migration can be an effective instrument to decrease poverty and decrease inequality in origin societies. This highlights the need to reform migration regimes so that the relatively poor have better access to legal migration opportunities as well as rights in destination countries.

It is against this background that, in 2016, ECA was mandated to set up a High-level Panel on Migration that could provide overall guidance and support policy dialogues on international migration in Africa. In particular, the Panel aims to increase collaboration and knowledge about African migration among the continent’s States and in international organizations, and to formulate recommendations for African policymakers, including Heads of State. In order to achieve these goals, the Panel draws its mandate from Resolution No. ECA-L3 on International Migration in Africa, adopted at the Conference of African Ministers
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development held in Addis Ababa in 2016. The Panel seeks to identify important migration issues and to push them to the top of policy agendas.

The High-level Panel on Migration provides a vital opportunity for African States to build political consensus on migration governance. Such consensus-building is essential because the interests of States are not necessarily aligned. As is the case on the global level, it often comes down to a division between countries of net emigration and countries of net immigration, with the former pleading for more liberal immigration policies by receiving States while the latter frequently face opposition fuelled by fears of unlimited mass migration. It is therefore important to identify a common interest in coherent regional migration policies and to mobilize the political will at the highest level so that migrants can fully contribute to the development of countries of origin and destination alike whilst safeguarding their rights. This will serve to build an evidence base and to develop common political messages and strategies that inform the process of negotiations on the continent among African Heads of State and globally, especially through the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (or Global Compact for Migration for short).

In order to inform this process, the present report will analyse how migration is linked to, can facilitate and is driven by regional integration and economic development in Africa. To provide an evidence base to inform policy, the report will first review theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the reciprocal relationship between migration, regional integration and development, with a particular focus on evidence from Africa. This will inform the analysis of how regional integration and regional and global migration policy frameworks can contribute to enhancing the development potential of migration while safeguarding the rights of vulnerable migrants. In this way, migration and remittances can be harnessed as tools to reduce poverty and inequality, instead of mainly benefiting elite groups in destination and origin societies. In its recommendations, this report will pay particular attention to:

- Opportunities provided by the Global Compact for Migration to move beyond rhetoric about the development potential of migration by implementing effective migration policies on the ground that can enhance the development potentials of migration.

II. The developmental potentials of migration

Migration is increasingly recognized as an intrinsic and therefore inevitable component of development processes. This is a far cry from conventional accounts that portray migration, particularly from African countries, as a result poverty, warfare and other forms of human misery. Historical and contemporary evidence from around the world has shown that processes of economic and human development initially lead to significant increases in both internal (rural-to-urban) and international migration. This is because processes such as infrastructure development, labour specialization, increasing education and the spread of new ideas about ‘the good life’ tend to increase people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. This challenges ‘push-pull’ models, and exemplifies the need to conceptualize migration as an intrinsic part of broader development processes rather than a ‘problem to be solved’. The growing structural complexity and segmentation of labour markets and overall increases in educational levels and
occupational specializations also encourage people to migrate for reasons of work, education and family.

This corroborates ‘transition theories’ (de Haas, 2010b; Skeldon, 2012; and Zelinsky, 1971) which hypothesize that the relation between development and levels of emigration is non-linear, first increasing in the transition from low- to middle-income countries, and only decreasing if societies become wealthier (de Haas and others, 2018). Only at later stages of economic development do levels of internal mobility and international emigration tend to level off and decrease. This generally goes hand-in-hand with increased immigration (see figure 1), after which societies can transform from countries of net emigration to countries of net immigration (de Haas 2010c).

Figure 1
Association between levels of human development and migration patterns

![Graph showing association between human development index and migration patterns](source: De Haas 2010)

Recent analysis of global migration data covering the period 1990-2010 further corroborates the idea that there is an inverted U-shaped relation between processes of development and emigration. The absence of an effect of the ‘youth bulge’ (estimated by the share of 15 to 35 year olds) on emigration and its positive impact on immigration challenge push-pull models and Malthusian explanations of migration, and show that demographic factors only play an indirect role in migration processes (de Haas and Fransen, 2017). For most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the implication is that any form of economic and human development is likely to increase long-distance migration both within and outside the continent. Development may make new migrations destinations increasingly attractive, possibly including countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco and Tunisia. At the same time, development is also likely to increase extra-continental migration, particularly among the skilled. In almost any migration scenario, the share of Africans in the world migrant population is therefore likely to increase strongly in the decades to come. The age of African migration has only just begun.

Migration has an important potential for contributing to economic growth and development. In destination countries, migration can boost profits and economic growth by
providing a source of cheap (and malleable) labour in lower skilled professions while filling critical labour shortages in higher skilled professions, such as engineering, management and medicine. However, the extent to which the development potential of migration is used strongly depends on the following factors:

(a) Migration policies, which determine the volume and selection of immigration in terms of skills, age and gender as well as the rights that different migrants can access;

(b) More general development conditions in origin and destination countries in terms of economic growth, employment, social and legal security, inequality and political stability.

Migration does not automatically foster development. In fact, we can envisage both positive and negative scenarios (de Haas 2010a). For instance, if a combination of high labour demand and restrictive immigration policies lead to situations of large-scale unauthorized migration and exploitative employment in the informal sectors of destination countries, it is difficult to envisage how this can contribute to equitable development. Although employers and elite groups in destination countries generally benefit from influxes of labour, migrant workers may feel exploited and native workers may perceive that they are losing out while bearing the social costs of large-scale immigration. Politicians may exploit such perceptions by using migrants as scapegoats to direct attention away from their own inability or unwillingness to provide employment and basic public goods such as education, housing and health care. In this way, immigration may exacerbate inequality and tensions in destination societies.

From an origin country perspective, and notwithstanding the considerable benefits of migration and remittances for the individuals and communities involved, migrants alone can generally not remove more structural development constraints and migration may actually contribute to development stagnation and reinforce the political status quo. In fact, elite groups may see emigration as a convenient political ‘safety valve’ by allowing the potentially discontented to leave. Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can therefore neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger sustainable development in unattractive investment environments and insecure political environments (de Haas 2012; de Haas 2010a).

The extent to which migration can contribute to sustainable development in origin countries depends on the more general macro-level development context. Development is a complex and multifaceted process, involving and requiring structural social, political and institutional reforms, which cannot realistically be achieved by individual migrants or remittances alone, and require active government intervention. Notwithstanding their blessings for individuals, households and communities, migration and remittances are therefore no panacea in solving the more structural development problems. If Governments fail to implement general social and economic reforms, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to nationwide sustainable development (Gammage, 2006, Taylor, Moran-Taylor and Ruiz, 2006).

As Heinemeijer and others (1977) already observed in a study on migration and development in Morocco, the paradox is that development in origin countries is a prerequisite for investment by migrants rather than a consequence of migration. This provides a warning against overly optimistic views on migration and development and shows the real but fundamentally limited ability of individual migrants to overcome structural development
constraints such as macroeconomic instability, corruption and a general lack of trust in Governments, the judiciary and other key institutions.

However, if development in origin countries takes a positive turn, if trust in Governments increases and economic growth starts to take off, migrants are likely to be among the first to join in and recognize such new opportunities, reinforcing these positive trends by investing, circulating and returning to their origin countries. Policies that improve the functioning of social, legal, economic and political institutions, increase the access of ordinary people to basic amenities and markets and restore trust in Governments are crucial, not only for creating fertile ground for development in general, but also for compelling more migrants to invest in or return to their countries of origin. Policy and scholarly discourses celebrating migration, remittances and transnational engagement as self-help development “from below” shift attention away from structural constraints and the real but limited ability of individuals to overcome them. However, the solution is not so much a generally illusionary quest to stop migration, or to tap into unrealistic hopes that migration can be a migration and development ‘game changer’, but to improve conditions at home.

III. Regional integration and migration

In addition to development policies in origin countries, migration policies are a second crucial factor in determining the development potential of migration. While the overall volume of migration will affect the number of people that can benefit from improved access to income, employment, education and skills as a result of migration, the selection criteria will determine the extent to which the relatively poor, the less educated and the vulnerable, including groups such as refugees, are able to migrate under safe and legal conditions. The problem is that selective migration and visa policies tend to privilege the already privileged by providing ample legal provisions for the wealthy and highly skilled international ‘expat’ class to migrate freely and legally, receive adequate social protection and take their families with them. At the same time, policies tend to block access to legal migration opportunities for the lower skilled. This increases the costs and risks of migration and the likelihood of discrimination and exploitation in destination countries. If the relatively poor and lower skilled are allowed to migrate, this often happens in the context of temporary recruitment policies, which provide very limited social, economic and residency rights to migrants.

Selective immigration policies thus severely limit the access of the most vulnerable members of society to migration opportunities, often leaving them in frustrating situations of ‘involuntary immobility’ (Carling 2002; and Lubkemann 2008). This is likely to exacerbate inequality in communities and societies of origin because the benefits of migration in terms of remittances, knowledge and skills will accrue disproportionately to the already affluent. By contrast, if relatively poor people are allowed to migrate more freely and if their rights are protected, migration can be an important vehicle for the upward social, cultural and economic mobility of disadvantaged classes and ethnic groups, allowing them to escape from the constraints placed on them by traditional societies (de Haas 2010a). The most effective way for destination countries to increase the development potential of migration is therefore to create more legal channels for lower-skilled migration and integration policies that favour the socioeconomic mobility of migrants while avoiding discriminatory practices and racist rhetoric. Obviously, this can run counter the interest of employers who benefit from cheap migrant labour and politicians who are eager to portray themselves as ‘tough’ on migration.

In positive circumstances, migration, economic development and regional integration can be mutually reinforcing. For instance, in the European Union a combination of free
mobility and free trade have been the centrepieces of regional integration and economic development policies. The current European Union is the result of a process of internal opening and enlargement that started in 1951 when Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community, and, subsequently in 1957, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. In seven successive accession waves from 1973 to 2013, the European Economic Community, which became the European Union in 1993, expanded to 28 members. The enlargement process started with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973. Greece joined the European Economic Community in 1981 and was followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden became European Union members in 1995; the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004; and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Finally, in 2013, Croatia joined the European Union.

This process of regional integration was accompanied by fears of mass immigration from new accession countries. This led to the imposition of temporary immigration restrictions during transitional periods, whereby citizens of new member States did not instantly acquire full rights to migrate to and work in other member States. In fact, it was not until 1968 when a council regulation was implemented establishing full rights of free movement within the European Economic Community for the citizens of its members (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and forbidding any discrimination within the labour market. Alongside the facilitation of internal migration between European Union member States, the creation of the Schengen zone (which largely, but not entirely, overlaps with the European Union zone), starting in 1995, partly coincided with the imposition of travel visa regimes for important origin countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. The opening up of free mobility necessitated the establishment of common external border policies and visa regimes. Accordingly, besides the potential of migration to contribute to regional economic, social and cultural integration, the need to define common regional immigration policies and border regimes can also stimulate the process of regional political integration. However, as the European Union example shows, it can also lead to significant political tensions, the outcomes of which are uncertain.

The alleged ability of ‘open borders’ to spark mass migration has been a recurring theme in politics and has been fuelling movements in favour of more closed border regimes in a drive to “bring migration back under control”. In these debates, proposals to remove migration barriers are frequently portrayed as tantamount to ‘opening the floodgates’. However, a recent study drawing on new data from the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) C2C (country-to-country) database, covering comprehensive migration flow data for European Union countries over the period 1946-2010, shows that the liberalization of the internal border regimes has not led to the anticipated long-term increase in intra-European Union migration, but has rather boosted circulation. While the removal of migration barriers can lead to migration surges, particularly when economic gaps between origin and destination countries are large, these surges are temporary, after which migration tends to consolidate at lower levels and becomes increasingly circular, with levels of migration mainly responding to economic growth and job opportunities in destination countries. While internal liberalization has increased intra-European Union circular migration, ‘external closure’ through the imposition of visa regimes from the 1980s has interrupted circulation by pushing non-European Union migrants into permanent settlement, after which migration continued through significant family migration. Together with continued labour demand these factors explain increasing non-

---

European Union immigration over the 1990s and 2000s (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018).

In fact, levels of internal mobility in the European Union have been much lower than anticipated despite significant economic differences within the region. On the one hand, this shows that fears of mass migration under liberal migration regimes are generally not justified. The paradox is that, because the right to migration is guaranteed, European Union citizens seem less eager to seize the opportunity to migrate, whereas migration restrictions often generated ‘now or never’ migration surges and tend to push migrants into permanent settlement (de Haas and others 2018). On the other hand, the European Union experience shows that we should also temper unrealistically high expectations about the economic and social benefits of free migration.

While the removal of internal migration barriers has contributed to development and growth in the European Union, it has not been the main driver of such change, but one of the factors that can contribute to regional integration through increasing social, cultural and economic ties between nations. This exemplifies the need to conceive the mutually reinforcing role of migration, regional integration and economic development as a potential. The extent to which this potential is tapped strongly depends on broader policy frameworks going beyond migration policies per se. The inference is not so much that ‘open borders’ are necessarily the best migration policy, but that greater coherence between economic policies and immigration policies is desirable. Incoherence between these policy areas tends to results in large-scale unauthorized migration and exploitative employment conditions. This exemplifies the need to align migration policies with policies of regional integration and economic development. The remainder of the report will further explore these links between migration, economic development, regional integration and migration policies in Africa.

IV. Trends and patterns of African migration

Although political narratives and media images often focus on the purported ‘exodus’ of Africans to Europe, the bulk of African migrants (see figure 2 below) move within the continent (Fall, 2017; Kamdem, 2017; Kihato, 2017; Ndegwa, 2017; and Zohry, 2017).
Despite popular representations of Africa as a ‘continent on the move’, Africans are actually underrepresented in the world migrant population and Africa has the lowest intercontinental out-migration rates of all world regions (Flahaux and de Haas, 2016). This reflects low levels of development and the high constraints that poverty and border controls tend to put on people’s ability to migrate over long distances. Since the mid-twentieth century, however, and as an integral part of economic development and industrialization, urbanization...
has fuelled internal and international migration to towns and cities, particularly at the subregional level. This has led to the emergence of new migration systems centred around fast growing urban clusters, often located in or close to urban areas, capital cities or mining regions. Important regional migration systems have evolved in recent decades, centring on areas of economic growth such as Libya in the North; Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in the West; the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in the Centre; Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique in the East; and Angola, Botswana and South Africa in the South (Bakewell and de Haas 2007: 96). (Fall 2017; Kamdem 2017; Kihato 2017; Ndegwa 2017; and Zohry 2017).

**Intra-African Migration**

Figures 3 and 4 show that Eastern and Western Africa host the largest immigrant populations on the continent. While Eastern Africa has a relatively high number of refugees, the number of immigrants there has remained relatively stagnant. The number of immigrants in Western Africa, however, has been increasing over the period 1990-2015. Similarly, the number of immigrants in Northern Africa has remained stagnant (although immigration into Libya and undocumented migration into other North African countries are both very likely to be severely undercounted), while the number in Central and Southern Africa has been increasing. However, expressed as a share of total population, the relatively size of immigrant populations has been decreasing in all African regions below 2 per cent, with the exception of Southern Africa, where estimated immigrant rates\(^3\) soared from around 2.5 per cent in 2005 to 5.5 per cent in 2015, which is well above the world average of 3.3 per cent. This increase mainly reflects the transformation of South Africa into a major destination for African migrants in the post-apartheid era, particularly from Eastern and Middle Africa.

**Figure 3**

**Immigrants by regions of Africa**

![Graph showing immigrants by regions of Africa from 1990 to 2015.]

*Source:* Department of Economic and Social Affairs Trends in International Migrant Stock – The 2015 Revision.

\(^3\) Immigrant and emigrant rates are the total size of immigrant and emigration populations (‘stocks’) as a percentage of the population.
Figure 4

Immigrants as a percentage of total population

Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs Trends in International Migrant Stock – The 2015 Revision.

Figure 5 confirms South Africa’s position as the main African migration destination, followed by Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in coastal Western Africa. Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan form a third cluster, with a relatively high proportion of refugee migration. Libya (although real numbers are certainly much higher) and the oil rich economies of Central Africa (particularly Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) form a fourth cluster. Expressing the number of immigrants as a percentage of the total population of destination countries, a somewhat different picture emerges. While Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Gabon (together with Equatorial Guinea, a prosperous oil economy and a migration pole for Central and West African migrants) boast the highest immigrant rates of African States, with above 10 per cent, in relative terms immigration to populous countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria turns out to be very low.
Over the past decades, regional and domestic conflicts have created significant refugee movements within and from Africa. Refugees and ‘people in refugee-like situations’ represented 4 million or 19 per cent of international migrants in Africa in 2015, up from about 2.4 million or 14 per cent in 2010 (see figure 6). The relative importance of refugee migration – as a percentage of total international migration within Africa – has shown a decreasing trend over the past decades, from about 36 per cent in 1990 to about 19 per cent in 2015. These data also show that between 2015 and 2018 the number of refugees in Africa rebounded again, particularly because of conflict in the Central African Republic, Nigeria and South Sudan, and political oppression in Eritrea. If internally displaced persons, are included, over 18 million people in sub-Saharan Africa are of concern to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

**Figure 6**

**Immigrants and refugees in African countries**

*Source:* Department of Economic and Social Affairs Trends in International Migrant Stock – The 2015 Revision.
As this is the case globally, the large majority of African refugees stay within the region. Many African countries have received refugees, often in the middle of their own conflicts. For instance, Uganda has admitted Burundians, Rwandans and Sudanese; Ethiopia and Kenya have hosted numerous Somali; Ugandans have gone to the Sudan; and Burundians, Congolese, Rwandans and Somali have gone to the United Republic of Tanzania (Ndegwa 2017). Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda are the most important refugee hosting countries in Africa. Relative to population size, refugee populations are particularly large in Chad, Cameroon and Mauritania. There have also been significant conflict-related long-distance movements of refugees, such as from the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Europe and North America, while significant numbers of Sudanese and Somali refugees have been moving to Egypt (Ahmed, 2003; Al-Sharmani, 2003; Grabska, 2005; and Zohry, 2017).

Extra-continental migration

Before the 1990s, African migration to European and North American countries was dominated by labour and family migration from the Maghreb, while Egypt, and to some extent Sudan, experienced larger-scale migration to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. After the 1973 oil shock and the subsequent recessions in Europe, migration from the Maghreb to Europe continued, partly as a consequence of family migration, which was encouraged by migration restrictions, which interrupted circular migration and pushed workers into permanent settlement. At the same time, increasing labour demand in the formal and informal sectors of Spain and Italy prompted a surge in Moroccan and Tunisian labour migration to Southern Europe (Fargues, 2005; and Natter, 2014).

Visa requirements and intensified border controls in Europe prompted migrants to cross borders illegally and to seek the help of smugglers. European border closure and the introduction of visa requirements by Spain and Italy in 1991 as a result of the Schengen Agreement created a demand for smuggling services and heralded the start of trans-Mediterranean ‘boat migration’. Over the 1990s and 2000s increasing numbers of migrants and asylum seekers from West African and other sub-Saharan countries joined North Africans on these journeys. This also led to an increasing use of trans-Saharan migration routes through Algeria, Libya, the Niger and Mali (Barros and others, 2002; Brachet, 2005; Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005; Scheele, 2012).

Extra-continental migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and North America has tended to be largely an elite affair. For instance, in the United States of America, Africans possess the highest average level of education of any immigrant group (Capps, McCabe and Fix, 2012). After all, long-distance international migration entails significant costs, which are generally out-of-reach for poorer groups. However, since the 1990s an increasing number of sub-Saharan migrants have started to participate in migration to Europe and beyond. This changing profile of migration is partly linked to the increase in the number of sub-Saharan looking for work in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa, or wishing to move on to Europe from there (de Haas, 2008). African migration to the United States has also recently been diversifying, with increasing migration from poorer and non-English speaking African countries, which can be partly explained by increases in Diversity Visa migration, refugee migration and family migration (Thomas, 2011).

Available data (see figures 7 and 8 below) clearly confirm that there has been a steady increase in migration out of the continent. Total registered African migration to major OECD destinations (except for the United Kingdom) increased from 70,000 to 80,000 in the mid-1970s,
peaking at 610,000 in 2008. Based on 2015 migrant stock data, we can estimate that the countries included in these flow data capture about 86.5 per cent (or 9,943,551) of all African-born migrants in Europe and North America (estimated at 11,474,546), with the United Kingdom accounting for almost 12.8 per cent (1,444,457), and other countries for 0.8 per cent. From this we can make a tentative estimate that real registered (legal) outflows to Europe and North America countries would be approximately 15 per cent higher, or around 700,000 in 2008. More recent flow data are not yet available, but there are strong indications that, in line with overall trends in OECD immigration (see BBC/MPI, 2010; and Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014), emigration decreased because of the economic crisis in OECD countries, but has since rebounded following resumed growth and employment in destination countries (OECD, 2011; and OECD, 2014).

Since the 1973 oil shock, the Gulf region has developed in a new global migration pole (Sell, 1988) for migrants from the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, and, increasingly sub-Saharan Africa. The booming Gulf economies initially attracted migrants from Egypt and Sudan, and, to a lesser extent, countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. In parallel, a subregional migration system evolved in North Africa around oil-rich Libya, particularly since Muammar Gaddafi started to encourage sub-Saharan guest worker migration as part of his pan-African policies in the 1990s (Pliez, 2002; and Pliez, 2005). In recent years, the number of sub-Saharan migrants to Gulf countries has increased, including an increasing share of women – particularly from Ethiopia – migrating as domestic workers to the Gulf and also Yemen (De Regt, 2010; Fernandez, 2010; and Ndegwa, 2017).

Figure 7
Emigration from Africa to destination countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 4, by region of origin, 1975-2010

![Chart showing emigration from Africa to destination countries](chart.png)

Source: Flahaux and de Haas 2016, based on DEMIG C2C flow data.

---

4 Countries for which statistic were available: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America.
Unauthorized migration

Notwithstanding the recent media attention on ‘boat migration’, unauthorized migration is a relatively small source of African emigration. For instance, it is estimated that about 700,000 Africans migrate legally to OECD countries every year (see evidence above), possessing the correct paperwork. Meanwhile an unknown but significant number of Africans, which must run in the hundreds of thousands, move to Gulf countries on temporary labour contracts. By comparison, the number of African migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean or the Red Sea illegally is comparatively small.

For instance, in 2007, the number of Africans crossing the Mediterranean illegally was estimated to several ‘tens of thousands’ per year, peaking at 60,000 in 2006 (de Haas, 2007). After a slowdown, numbers increased again in the wake of the uprising in Tunisia and after another decline, since 2015, as a partial consequence of Syrian refugee migration and new conflicts in Africa. For 2016, a record number of about 100,000 unauthorized arrivals of African nationals in Europe were detected, mainly as a result of increased crossings from Libya to Italy. Most of these migrants and refugees were from Gambia (11,929); Côte d’Ivoire (12,396); Guinea (13,342); Nigeria (37,551) and Eritrea (20,718) (IOM, 2017). These are significant and worrying numbers, particularly because this migration involved significant human suffering and an increasing death toll (Last and others, 2017). However, even the high number for 2016 was only about one seventh of legal African emigration to OECD countries. Furthermore, there is evidence that the majority of unauthorized migrants living in Europe have entered legally and subsequently overstayed their visas, and Africans seem to follow that pattern (Flahaux and de Haas 2016; and Hearing and Erf 2001).

The history of a quarter century of Mediterranean border controls (starting with the 1991 introduction of visa requirements for North African nationals by Spain and Italy) illustrates the fundamental dilemmas that Governments of origin, transit and destination countries face in controlling migration, and how such attempts at controlling migration may ‘produce’ unauthorized migration and smuggling. While immigration restrictions and border controls do generally reduce inflows at the targeted geographical crossing point, they tend to
have unintended consequences, such as diversification towards more dangerous maritime and terrestrial (Saharan) migration routes, the increasing reliance of migrants and refugees on smugglers, and a rising death toll. Such restrictions also prompt legal migrants to cancel return plans and to stay, and encourage temporary visitors to overstay their visas (see Flahaux, 2016, for evidence on Senegal).

V. How economic and human development affects African migration

The African experience exemplifies that, particularly in low-income countries, processes of economic and human development tend to increase internal and international migration (de Haas, 2010c). Middle-income countries generally experience higher international emigration rates, particularly with regard to long-distance migration towards other world regions. This is also reflected in extra-continental migration from Africa, which is dominated by African countries with comparatively higher levels of economic and human development, with the exception of refugee migration from countries like Somalia. While there is a need to continue and further enhance efforts towards poverty eradication, job creation and peace and security, scientific evidence strongly suggest that such development will likely increase migration, at least for the next generation to come. It is therefore an illusion that development will reduce migration. However, it is important to look beyond the numbers and consider how development may change the nature of migration and the vulnerability of migrants. In particular, human and economic development may increase people’s opportunities to migrate in a dignified way as well as migrants’ capabilities to defend their interests and integrate into destination societies within and outside Africa.

The tendency of development to boost migration in the short to medium term is perhaps best illustrated by the role of education. The growing desire to acquire an education and rapidly rising levels of schooling across Africa have gained in importance as a driving force of mobility and migration within and across borders. This often starts with local and intra-regional education. For instance, the absence of primary and secondary schools in rural areas is often a reason for children to migrate to towns, particularly when good transport is lacking, either by joining family or community members already living there, or by staying at boarding schools or other collective facilities. Educated job seekers are unlikely to find jobs in rural areas that match their qualifications and desires. Research from across a range of African countries indicates that literacy and education are positively associated with internal migration aspirations and that many young adults migrate to cities with the goal of working or pursuing education (Elder and others, 2015; Erulkar and others, 2006; Henry, Boyle and Lambin, 2003; Schewel, 2014; and Tegegne and Penker, 2016). This argument also applies to international migration, as increasing levels of secondary education can generate more international migration through demand for higher education, particularly if countries have a lack of supply of suitable tertiary education places (Kritz, 2015).

Besides development in origin countries, the structure of labour demand in destination countries plays a central role in African migration. The dynamics of labour demand in African, European, Middle Eastern and other overseas labour markets are a key factor in explaining changing patterns of intra-African migration as well as the recent increase of migration from sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the segmentation of European and Middle Eastern labour markets into a higher skilled, formal sector, on the one hand, and lower skilled often informal sectors, on the other, alongside rising living standards and levels of education as well as ageing, has led to a persistent demand for migrant labour in the informal labour markets of comparatively wealthy destination societies, where migrant workers typically do the manual jobs that local workers are unwilling or unable to do (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Massey
and others, 1993; and Piore, 1979). At the same time, the demand for skilled migrant workers, who are increasingly favoured by skills selective immigration policies (Czaika and Parsons, 2017; and de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli, 2016), is also motivating increasing numbers of young, skilled African to migrate overseas to work or study.

Labour market dynamics also drive a significant part of rural-to-urban migration, migration between African countries, such as refugee women working as domestic workers in Cairo (see Ahmed, 2003) and migration within African countries, such as that of domestic and construction workers (for Ghana, see Awumbila and others, 2017). While male migrants typically work in sectors such as construction, industry and intensive agriculture, an increasing number of women have been migrating within and between African countries as domestic workers as part of a broader trend towards the feminization of migration. This also illustrates the extent to which the migration experience of Africa, as elsewhere in the world, is linked to urbanization. A recent analysis of internal migration intensities around the world suggested a strong link with development processes, although intensities show a great deal of variation (Bell and others, 2015). Although Africa remains the least urbanized continent in the world, its urbanization rates are amongst the world’s highest. The percentage of Africans living in urban areas has increased from an estimated 14 per cent in 1950 to 40 per cent in 2015, and is projected to further rise to about 56 per cent in 2050.

Available empirical evidence from Africa suggests that adverse environmental conditions such as droughts mainly increase short-term, short-distance and largely circular mobility, and have no effect on long-distance and international migration. In fact, environmental adversity may deprive people from the resources to migrate (Suckall, Fraser and Forster 2017; Henry, Schoumaker and Beauchemin, 2004; Lewin, Fisher and Weber 2012; and Beine and Parsons, 2015). This corroborates evidence from studies on refugee migration, which suggest that the same factors (violence, oppression and deprivation of basic necessities) that may motivate people to leave can also prevent their flight, and that the biggest victims of conflict are those who are immobilized by it (Lubkemann, 2008).

VI. The contribution of migration to economic development

According to United Nations data (see figure 9), in 2015 an estimated 32.5 million Africans were living outside their country of birth. Most African international migrants were living in other African countries and Europe, although the growth rate of African emigrant populations between 1990 and 2015 was the highest in North America (316 per cent), Australia and New Zealand (296 per cent) and Latin America (171 per cent). The number of sub-Saharan migrants to Gulf countries has also risen in recent years, including an increasing share of women – such as from Ethiopia – migrating as domestic workers to the Gulf and also Yemen. While migration from North and Eastern Africa to the Gulf is significant (particularly from Egypt, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and the Sudan), this predominantly concerns temporary migration.

While the African diaspora has made many contributions to development, there is evidence that migration primarily produces economic growth in destination countries and that migration on its own cannot create the conditions for sustainable, equitable economic growth and human development. A recent McKinsey Global Institute study on the global economic impacts of migration found that migration contributed between 40 and 80 per cent of labour force growth in destination countries, generated a net productivity increase of $3.0 trillion worldwide and did not harm the long-term employment or wages of native workers (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016). However, the same study also found that the average wage gap between
native and migrant workers with similar skills was 20 to 30 per cent, which seems largely the consequence of insufficient protection of labour rights and the discrimination that this facilitates.

Another crucial finding of the study was that migration contributed far more to the gross domestic product (GDP) of countries in the global North (5.8 to 6.3 per cent) than to the GDP of developing countries (0.9 per cent). This shows that migration tends to exacerbate inequalities between relatively wealthy and poor countries, primarily through the increased labour force, economic output and productivity in destination countries. Although most destination countries benefiting from migration are located outside Africa, African destination countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda and South Africa benefit considerably from migration, with productivity gains estimated at 19, 13 and 8 per cent, respectively (OECD/International Labour Organization 2018).

Figure 9
Registered African emigrant population, by destination, 2015

Migration can also have considerable benefits for origin countries. First and foremost, this pertains to the remittance that migrants send home. According to World Bank estimates, officially recorded remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa alone totalled approximately $37.8 billion in 2017, but that figure might be some 50 per cent higher if informal remittances were included. Total remittances to sub-Saharan Africa have remained stable as a percentage of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2018). In many African countries remittances represent more than 3 per cent of GDP and are often larger than private capital flows (International Monetary Fund, 2018). Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Senegal, Tunisia and Kenya are the most important remittance-receiving countries in absolute terms. Expressed as a percentage of GDP, remittances are particularly important in countries such as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Liberia, Lesotho, the Gambia and the Comoros, where they count for over 10 or 20 per cent of GDP (see figure 10). Expressed in per capita terms, remittances are highest in Seychelles, Morocco, Mauritius, Egypt and the Comoros.
Remittance receipts, absolute and as a percentage of gross domestic product, 2016

There is ample evidence that remittances enable migrants and their families in origin countries to achieve significant improvement in their living conditions (de Haas, 2012). Research indicates that remittances support vital daily household expenses, but also expenditure on health and education, with investments in housing, business and local services generating considerable employment opportunities for non-migrants (see Zohry, 2017). There is also evidence that remittances have a certain poverty-reducing effect (Adams and Page, 2005), although its extent should not be exaggerated. Although the poor are underrepresented among international migrants, this can be partly explained by the poverty-reducing multiplier effects created by the expenditure and investment of remittances in origin countries.

Yet most remittances flow neither to the poorest countries nor to the poorest members of societies and communities. This is because long-distance migration is often not affordable for the poorest members of society. These “selection effects” become even stronger for extra-continental migration, which generally entails much higher costs and risks and is therefore often out of reach for the poorest. For instance, a survey conducted in the Central Plateau region of Burkina Faso found that comparatively poor households embark on continental migration (for instance, to Mali) primarily for the purpose of income diversification, whereas overseas migration (to Europe) is only accessible for comparatively wealthy households, allowing them to accumulate more wealth through remittances (Wouterse and Taylor, 2008; and Wouterse and Van den Berg, 2011).

This should also mitigate unrealistic expectations that migration and remittances can make a major contribution to reducing inequality in origin societies. In fact, if costly international migration is mainly accessible to the relatively better-off because of the costs involved in migrating and the qualifications needed to obtain a visa, it may even increase inequality. Internal rural-to-urban migration or short-distance international migration to neighbouring countries may often be seen as less attractive or even undesirable by policymakers, but it is generally more accessible to the relatively poor and much greater in volume. Its cumulative contribution to enhancing well-being and living standards should therefore not be underestimated (de Brauw, Mueller and Woldehanna, 2013; and Oucho, 1996).
There is also reason to believe that the considerable development potential of migration and remittances is not fully realized because of unfavourable political and economic conditions in many African origin societies. One the one hand, this is related to unfavourable investment conditions in origin countries and, on the other, to restrictive immigration policies and the lack of rights that migrants can access in destination countries. Xenophobia, negative perceptions, discrimination and the marginalization of migrants in African and non-African destination countries are among the greatest barriers to empowering migrants as agents of development. Lastly, restrictive immigration policies also tend to interrupt circulation, thereby significantly reducing the development potential of migration. This is corroborated by evidence suggesting that dual citizenship (which equates to free mobility for migrants) results in increasing remittances (Vadean, 2007) because it helps migrants to circulate freely.

VII. African migration regimes: the prevalence of restrictionism

There is a large and growing gap between political discourse about ‘facilitating safe and orderly migration’ and the restrictive immigration practices of many African States. While frequent lip service is being paid to the development potential of migration, and numerous conventions and agreements have been signed to facilitate travel and migration on the continent, these agreements are often poorly implemented. As argued in the previous section, African migrants living in other African countries often experience xenophobia, racism and xenophobia, and a general lack of access to rights. This weakens the credibility of African countries when they argue with European and other non-African destination countries in favour of more liberal immigration regimes for African citizens.

African countries maintain some of the most restrictive immigration and integration regimes in the world, which is reflected in a high level of visa restrictiveness indices (see figures 11 and 12). African countries not only impose high inbound travel restrictions on citizens from other world regions (around 90 per cent), but also on other African citizens (around 80 per cent). Africans need visas to travel to 55 per cent of other African countries, can obtain visas on arrival in 25 per cent of other African countries and do not need a visa to travel to only 20 per cent of other African countries. Over the past decades, this inbound visa restrictiveness has actually been increasing in West Africa, East Africa and Central Africa. North Africa shows a mixed pattern, with Libya and Algeria showing increasing restrictions, and the relatively stable regimes of Morocco and Egypt having comparatively liberal inbound visa regimes. Southern Africa is the only region where levels of visa restrictiveness have decreased since the 1990s.
Although many African borders may be relatively easy to cross, particularly when States’ enforcement capacities are weak, some African borders are not at all easy to cross and can be heavily militarized, as is the case in North Africa. In addition, immigration controls have increasingly become ‘internal’, through the exclusion of unauthorized migrants from social, economic and political rights, or subjecting them to harassment, violence and discrimination. In fact, with a few exceptions, Africa is characterized by rather stringent immigration regimes and a lack of legal facilities to encourage their integration and naturalization and to protect migrants from abuse. Although African countries are signatories to various relevant international treaties (including the 1951 Refugees Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly) the full implementation, particularly the right to settle and work, is still only partial and faces many obstacles to implementation at the national level (Fall, 2017; Kamdem, 2017; Kihato, 2017; Ndegwa, 2017; and Zohry 2017).
In fact, there has been a rise of ‘autochthony discourses’ throughout much of Africa which reveals an increased politicization of migration (Mitchell, 2012) that parallels the rise of anti-immigrant discourse in Europe (Fall, 2017; and Kihato, 2017). Most African countries are characterized by weak protection of migrant rights, and migrants are often scapegoated. In the past mass deportations have regularly occurred, particularly in times of economic crisis. In post-apartheid South Africa, ethnic exclusion and race continue to define patterns of urban segregation (Kihato, 2017; and Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2015), and ‘indigeneity’ is often the only way to acquire resources and stable jobs (Neocosmos, 2008). Ethnic minorities, such as the Lebanese in Ghana (Akyeampong, 2006) and Sierra Leone (Van Hear, 1998) or the Mandingo in Liberia (Konneh, 1996), have found it difficult to obtain full recognition as full and active political citizens within a broader context of national ideological fervour.

In general, it is very difficult for immigrants to access residency rights and only a few African countries provide migrants with a right to citizenship in their constitutions and other legislation, even for stateless children born on their territory (Manby, 2016). This can lead to the multi-generational exclusion of residency and citizenship rights, sometimes for political reasons, as is the case for Palestinian, Somali and Sudanese refugees and their descendants in Egypt (Al-Sharmani, 2003; Grabska, 2005; and Zohry and Harrell-Bond, 2003).

VIII. Experiences of subregional integration and free movement

In Africa, various regional economic communities and other organizations have been created for the purpose of removing barriers to trade and the free movement of goods, capital and people. Regional organizations, such as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have introduced rules for free movement of nationals between their member states. However, with a few exceptions the regional agreements of these bodies, including their free movement provisions, suffer from a lack of ratification and implementation. With the exception of ECOWAS, ECA and most SADC States, not all States have even ratified such instruments. Yet even when they have, implementation is often weak.

For ECOWAS, for instance, nominal free travel has been implemented within the bloc particularly since 1994, but restrictions for other African nationals have remained high at levels of around 70 per cent. Despite nominally free movement, in the ECOWAS zone, migrants are vulnerable to harassment, extortion and bribery by border guards and other State officials (Akokpari, 2000). While ECOWAS has been comparatively the most advanced regional bloc in terms of establishing free mobility, despite persistent implementation problems (Fall, 2017), the intraregional free movement vision of SADC, EAC and other regional organizations has not yet become a reality (Kamdem, 2017; Kihato, 2017; and Ndegwa, 2017). For instance, South Africa still restricts migration from other SADC members despite the existence of its far-reaching 1995 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons.5

Kihato (2017) observes that regional migration policies within SADC are primarily driven by bilateralism in the negotiation of visa requirements, labour agreements (as between South Africa and Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland) and unauthorized migration (Malawi-Mozambique, South Africa-Mozambique, South Africa-Mozambique-Swaziland, and South

Africa-Lesotho). This bilateral approach results in a lack of coordination and harmonisation between border agencies, the duplication of services, and a general ineffective management of mobility across regional borders. In Central Africa, immigration policies are particularly restrictive, and migration governance in the region is affected by political authoritarianism as well as a rather hostile social climate towards migrants (Kamdem, 2017).

The implementation by regional economic communities of protocols on the free movement of persons is mixed. Regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC have adopted specific protocols on the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment. While the founding treaties of AMU, EAC and ECCAS contain provisions on the free movement of persons, capital and the right to establishment, progress in ratification and implementation of the relevant protocols is mixed. There has however been substantial ratification of protocols by AMU, EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS to enable their operationalization. COMESA and SADC have protocols not yet ratified by the minimum number of member States to be operational and hence have made partial progress. The Community of Sahelo-Saharan States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development are still in the process of developing protocols on the free movement of persons. More importantly, the extent of the rights accorded by the different regional protocols to migrants differs substantially, from merely free entry (first level) to the right of residence (second level) and ultimately to the right to establishment (third level), which is the highest level of integration. The latter allows an individual from one country to work and also practice a profession in another country.

Only the right to establishment implies free de facto migration rights. For instance, the EAC protocol has provisions for the free movement of labour for only some categories of professionals and envisages a common passport. The ECCAS protocol provides rights of residence and establishment, but only 4 of 11 countries have ratified it. The ECOWAS protocol, which has been fully ratified, covers all rights, from the right to entry to the right to establishment, including harmonizing education certificates. However, there are still challenges regarding equal treatment of migrant workers and nationals in areas such as security of employment, job loss, re-employment and training.

IX. A long way ahead: potentials of pan-African regional integration

The African Union has an ambitious plan with regard to continent-wide regional integration. This can be traced as far back as the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community also known as The Abuja Treaty, which formulated a 34-year plan of regional economic integration to be achieved in six stages. The building and strengthening of regional economic communities is seen as part of the process towards continent-wide regional integration. The Abuja Treaty aims to gradually remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment among member States. This distinguishes AEC from other integration organizations. Article 88 of the Abuja Treaty stipulates that the establishment of AEC is “the final objective towards which the activities of existing and future regional economic communities shall be geared”.

The aim to create an open African space for the movement of people has received political commitment at the highest level. Agenda 2063 of the African Union included as one of its 12 ‘flagship programmes’ the introduction of the “African Passport and free movement
of people” within the first ten years. According to Agenda 2063, this implies “transforming Africa’s laws, which remain generally restrictive on movement of people despite political commitments to bring down borders with the view to promoting the issuance of visas by member States” to “enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries by 2018”. This would mean free movement of goods, services and capital; and persons travelling to any member State could obtain their visas at the point of entry.

The most recent relevant development toward continent-wide regional integration relating to migration is the signing of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2018, making the continent the largest free trade area since the establishment of the World Trade Organization. Although the long-term impacts are potentially very large, the short and medium-term effects are likely to be minimal because of the length of time it will take to implement the regulations, as well as uncertainties around States’ willingness to ratify and implement provisions on the right to residence and establishment. As in other regions of the world, economically powerful States are generally more eager to support free trade than free migration.

The main objectives of the Agreement are to create a single continental market for goods and services with free movement of business persons and investments, thereby paving the way for the establishment of the Customs Union. It will also expand intra-African trade through better harmonization and coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation instruments across the regional economic communities and across Africa in general. The Agreement is also expected to enhance competitiveness at the industry and enterprise level by exploiting opportunities for scale production, continental market access and better reallocation of resources. The Free Trade Area is expected to bring together all 55 States members of the African Union. It will cover a market of more than 1.2 billion people, including a growing middle class, and will have a combined GDP of more than $3.4 trillion.

To date, 49 of 55 African Union member States have signed the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area and 47 have signed the Kigali Declaration for the Launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area. However, only 30 have signed the African Union Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right to Residence and Right to Establishment, which shows that free migration is more of a thorny issue than free trade. At the time of writing, six countries had ratified the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area: Chad, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Ghana, Kenya, the Niger and Rwanda.

The potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area for free movement is potentially significant. The evidence mentioned above shows that free movement, if combined with the right to establishment, can have significant benefits in terms of providing better jobs and salaries for lower and higher-skilled workers, and protecting their rights. Such free movement will not only enhance circular migration movements but also the responsiveness of migration to economic opportunities: workers will be able to follow concrete work opportunities and will be prevented from taking dangerous routes. Enhanced circulation will also help facilitate migrants’ involvement in origin country investments, and remove the need for migrants to use smugglers to cross borders. Regional integration can therefore enhance the

---

8 Ibid.
contribution that migration will make to equitable economic development in origin and destination countries, particularly through increasing productivity and remittances. It is also likely that the lifting of migration restrictions will enhance access of the relative poor to legal migration opportunities and, hence, increase the contribution of migration to poverty alleviation and decreasing inequalities. However, significant obstacles will need to be surmounted before such a free movement region is established, and in the short term only limited concrete change can be expected. Even if ratified and implemented, medium-term effects are most likely also limited, also because the protocol includes all three rights (entry, residence and establishment) to be implement in three stages, and phases two and three are critical to truly facilitate mobility in the region. However, there are no agreed target dates for those phases in the road map established for implementation:

- Phase one (entry): total abolition of visa requirements for citizens of African Union member States; free movement of workers and students; harmonization of immigration national laws, policies and procedures; mutual recognition of qualifications and portability of social security. By December 2023.\(^{10}\)

- Phase two (residence): from 2023, date determined by the Executive Council after review of implementation of phases one and two by the Commission.

- Phase three (establishment): date to be determined by the Executive Council after review of implementation of phases one and two by the Commission.

There is still a long road ahead before a possible pan-African free migration area is effective. Notably fewer countries have signed the protocol with specific provisions covering rights to entry, residence and establishment than the broader African Continental Free Trade Area. Unsurprisingly, non-signatories of the specific provisions protocol include important destination countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and South Africa. This seems to reflect long-standing conflicts of interest between countries of net immigration and net emigration in Africa. Therefore, in the short to medium term, the regional economic communities are likely to be the most relevant mechanisms for regional integration and mobilizing migration for economic development. This is also consistent with the stipulation in the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area that the regional economic communities are not meant to disappear, but are seen as building blocks, which implies that the Agreement will preserve the “acquis”, essentially respecting regional economic community obligations. This is why removing obstacles to free movement within regional economic communities by means of ratification and implementation seems to be a key priority.

X. **Opportunities provided by the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration**

The Global Compact for Migration\(^{11}\) may potentially provide opportunities, moving beyond rhetoric about the development potential of migration by implementing effective migration policies that can enhance the benefits of migration for migrants as well as origin societies. As with pan-African regional integration processes, the main challenge will be to

---


reconcile the conflicting economic and political interests of countries of net immigration and countries of net emigration. The most relevant objectives agreed under the Global Compact in this respect are the following:

- Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration (Objective 5).
- Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work (Objective 6).
- Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration (Objective 7).
- Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner (Objective 11).
- Provide access to basic services for migrants (Objective 15).
- Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion (Objective 16).
- Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration (Objective 17).
- Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences (Objective 18).
- Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries (Objective 19).
- Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants (Objective 20).
- Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits (Objective 22).
- Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration (Objective 23).

This list of objectives also exemplifies the complexity of achieving the general objectives of greater regional integration, including the facilitation of legal migration while protecting migrants’ rights. This goes way beyond the introduction of free mobility and the abolition of visas, and includes introducing the rights of residency, establishment and citizenship, as well as recognition of diplomas and qualifications and the portability of social security benefits and pensions. Even within established free migration zones, such as the European Union, and between New Zealand and Australia, the latter issues still form significant obstacles. However, in principle the Global Compact objectives seem largely commensurate with those of Agenda 2063 and the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area. Viewing the complexity of achieving the Global Compact objectives and the considerable need for compromise this requires, it seems a more realistic approach to start by implementing these objectives on a subregional and regional level within Africa. At the same time, the building of regional free mobility unions on an African level can
help to form a more united front in negotiations with important destinations countries outside the African continents, most notably in the European Union and the Gulf region.

Another, more concrete, opportunity is the participation of African States in a capacity-building mechanism in the United Nations. According to the Global Compact for Migration, this mechanism will consist of:

(a) A connection hub that facilitates demand-driven, tailor-made and integrated solutions, by:
   (i) Advising on, assessing and processing country requests for the development of solutions;
   (ii) Identifying main implementing partners within and outside of the United Nations system;
   (iii) Connecting the request to similar initiatives and solutions for peer-to-peer exchange and potential replication;
   (iv) Ensuring effective set-up for multi-agency and multi-stakeholder implementation;
   (v) Identifying funding opportunities, including by initiating the start-up fund.

(b) A start-up fund for initial financing to realize project-oriented solutions, by:
   (i) Providing seed-funding, where needed, to jump start a specific project;
   (ii) Complementing other funding sources;
   (iii) Receiving voluntary financial contributions by Member States, the United Nations, international financial institutions, and other stakeholders, including the private sector and philanthropic foundations.

(c) A global knowledge platform as an online open data source, by:
   (i) Serving as a repository of existing evidence, practices and initiatives;
   (ii) Facilitating the accessibility to knowledge and sharing of solutions;
   (iii) Building on the Global Forum on Migration and Development Platform for Partnerships and other relevant sources.

The current initiatives already underway within African regions and sub regions, including the High-level Panel on Migration. The involvement of ECA in setting up mechanisms for improved and harmonized migration data collections, strengthening capacities for analysis and policy development and establishing African centres of expertise on migration data and policy could increase the visibility and impacts of Africa in global efforts aimed at the facilitation of legal migration and the protection of migrants’ rights.
XI.  Conclusion

Regional integration and the concomitant liberalization of migration can have significant economic and social benefits for destination and origin countries and, particularly, the improved protection of rights of low-skilled workers and other vulnerable migrant groups such as refugees. While migration is no panacea for more structural development problems, improved access to legal migration opportunities has a considerable potential to contribute to the well-being of migrants and economic growth in destination and origin countries, and to the establishment of social, cultural and economic links between societies. Such liberalization of migration seems to be most effectively achieved at the regional rather than global level. However, it has proven to be difficult to find ways of achieving such regional integration, particularly to reconcile the conflicting interests between origin and destination States, and to include mechanisms for accountability. The lack of ratification and implementation is a key problem. All too often, international inter-State forums on migration, including at the African level, remain limited to declarations of good intent, in which stakeholders disguise their lack of agreement behind rather general and vague declarations, without providing very clear pathways and mechanisms in terms of how to reconcile conflicting interest or translate laudable objectives into concrete policies.

The African experience of regional integration and migration exemplifies this large gap between rhetoric and practice. As this report has shown, African countries maintain some of the most restrictive immigration and integration regimes of the world. Within Africa, numerous regional economic communities have been created for the purpose of removing barriers to trade and the free movement of goods, capital, and people. However, there are large obstacles towards their ratification and implementation, particularly with the regard to the right to settle and work. At the same time important countries of destination in Europe and elsewhere have shown increasing levels of policy restrictiveness towards lower skilled African migrants, such as through the introduction of visa requirements. Together with South Asia, Africans face the highest travel restrictions to move to other countries in the world, with citizens from North-Eastern and Central African countries facing the highest restrictions. At the same time, these countries also tend to maintain very restrictive visa and immigration policies for other citizens (African and non-African) wishing to visit, stay or work.

Potential obstacles to achieving more open migration regimes include conflicting interests between origin and destination countries, both outside and within Africa. For instance, while current Euro-African regional agreements are often couched in the language of cooperation and win-win outcomes, they are at their core aimed at curtailing African migration to Europe, which can undermine African Union aims of promoting easier and safer movement within and from the continent. This report has also highlighted that the interests of African Governments are often not uniform. African countries of net immigration and net emigration often take conflicting positions. While important African destination countries often adopt a more restrictive stance, for instance opposing the legalization of undocumented migrants, prominent emigration countries often favour more liberalized migration regimes for their own citizens abroad, although they may themselves also maintain rather restrictive immigration policies towards foreign citizens in their country.

This report has identified an urgent need to enhance governmental capacities through technical cooperation, in order to facilitate efficient migration governance at the regional and sub regional levels. There is considerable potential for societies to be created in which people have real mobility options, both in terms of their freedom to move, as well as real livelihood options in their own countries and regions of origin. A key priority is therefore to establish and
adapt migration policies with a view to liberalizing mobility and migration among member States (within and between regional unions), while ensuring both the protection of migrants’ rights and the contribution of migration to development. As member States are being encouraged to implement protocols on the free movement of persons in Africa, key recommendations therefore include:

(a) Reducing barriers to mobility and the circulation of people within and outside Africa;

(b) Developing and harmonizing African migration policies;

(c) Ratifying and implementing international and regional protocols on the legal movement of persons and the protection of migrants;

(d) Developing policy mechanisms that provide pathways to legal residence for unauthorized migrants and permanent residence and naturalization for migrants who reside legally;

(e) Encouraging the economic participation of migrants through the right to work, practice a profession, conduct business and obtain an education.

The African Continental Free Trade Area provides a framework for achieving an African free trade union, including free mobility rights. The Global Compact for Migration, if implemented, may also potentially provide opportunities, beyond rhetoric, about the development potential of migration by implementing effective migration policies that can enhance the benefits of migration for migrants as well as origin societies. However, in view of the many obstacles to achieving consensus between immigration and emigration countries, and the reluctance of countries to sign and ratify provisions for rights of stay and establishment, it will still take a long time before a possible pan-African free migration area is realized.

Therefore, in the short to medium term, the effective ratification and implementation of protocols of regional economic communities are likely to be the most relevant and effective mechanisms for African regional integration and to mobilize migration for economic development. Removing obstacles to free movement within regional economic communities by ratifying and implementing the necessary instruments is a key priority and an essential first step towards achieving the longer-term goal of an African free mobility zone. Doing so can gradually help to turn the political will for such a zone, which is already present at the highest levels, into a reality. The effective establishment of sub regional free mobility zones will also increase the influence and leverage of African States in global negotiations aimed at increasing legal opportunities for Africans to migrate to other regions of the world.
References


Annex
Legal instruments signed at the 10th extraordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union on the launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Signing Authority</th>
<th>AfCFTA Consolidated Text</th>
<th>Kigali Declaration</th>
<th>Free Movement Protocol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Heads of State</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Saharawi Republic</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ministers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Minister of Industry, Trade and Energy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>D.R.C.</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs/Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs/Minister of Foreign Affairs/Head of State</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Minister of Trade and Industry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Minister of Trade</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Minister of Trade</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Minister of Industrialization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>São Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>Minister of Finance and Trade and Blue Economy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 44 47 30