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**The Economics of War
in the Sudan**

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1 Introduction

Sudan became an independent republic on the first of January 1956. For the following next years a democratic parliamentary system was established under the First Republic. The Second Republic was established in November 17th 1958 when the military took power and it lasted for six years. The military and Second Republic were overthrown by a popular uprising on October 21st 1964, known among the Sudanese and in the literature as the October Revolution. After the Revolution, a transitional government led the country in the Third Republic in which a democratic system was re-installed. Four years were to pass before on May 25th 1969; Colonel Gaffer Mohammed Nimeiri led a coup é establishing the Fourth Republic, known as the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. The Nimeiri's Republic remained in place for 16 years. It was overthrown through a joint action of a popular uprising, beginning on March the 26th 1985, and a coup é concluding the uprising on 6th April on the same year.

The alternate military-civilian regimes were not the only political feature of the Sudan, before and after Nimeiri. A second important feature of the post-colonial Sudan has been economic crises. It has been observed that each civilian military alternation in the country was preceded by economic crises (Kaballo: 1988, 21-30). Civil war was a third striking feature. On the eve of the independence a short and limited mutiny took place among the forces of the Southern Corps stationed in Toriet, Southern Sudan on August 16th 1955. Since then, civil war has twice struck the Sudan.

The Sudan has faced a regional conflict since 1955 between the South and the North. This conflict has been justified in the literature by the differences between the two regions in aspects of ethnic origin, religion beliefs, culture and languages. Without playing down the role of these differences in the conflict, this article argues the importance of uneven development in originally inciting the conflict and continuously determining the position of different fractions involved in it. The argument is based on the understanding that the conflict is about sharing of power and distribution of wealth and resources in the Sudan.

1.1 The Regional Question on the Agenda

1.1.1 The First Democracy

The failure of the ruling power bloc to include representatives of other groups, especially the Southerners was evident during the Sudanization process when only eight Southerners were promoted to senior posts replacing the 800 British officials, while the remainder posts were allocated to Northerners. An apologist from the North described that as "Following the best traditions of the British Civil Service", for the Sudanization Commission" allocated jobs and made promotion in accordance with seniority, experience and qualifications" (Beshir, 1968:72). Actually what happened was a failure "to take into account that the South would eventually need some compensating mechanism whereby to gain greater representation as the years went by" (Khalid, 1990:158). The promises made by northern representatives in the Juba conference and during the 1953 elections were forgotten. The Northern power bloc needed the alliance with the Southern Sudanese in the struggle against British Colonialism, when independence was achieved, that alliance became outdated and the representation of Southerners in constitutional institutions would then become merely a decoration.

The events which took place immediately before the mutiny of the Equatorial Corps in August 1955, were evidence of the attempt of the Northern power bloc to monopolise the state power and exclude Southerners from real power. Though two Southern ministers were appointed to the cabinet, (raised to three in some government), the South itself was put under the administration of the Northern Sudanese who also assumed the leading role in forces of the Equatorial Corps (composed of Southerners) after the Sudanization of the Administration and the Armed Forces in October 1954.

The dissatisfaction of Southern MPs with the Sudanization process led them to cross the floor to join the opposition. The Southern Liberal Party called for a conference in October 1954, some days after the announcement of the Sudanization Committee's final report. The conference, which took place in Juba, adopted the demand for a federal union between the South and the North (Sayeed, 1990, 255). The message was clear: because the Northerners did not give the Southern petty bourgeoisie its share in the post-colonial state, the Southerners would demand a federal system to get their 'fair share', and in that they would rally the masses and make use of ethnic and religious differences between the South and the North. A minor contradiction between the Northern ruling power bloc and the Southern petty bourgeoisie would develop into a major conflict and into an antagonistic contradiction between the North and the South.

On May 1955, the two Southern ministers resigned from the NUP parliamentary group and the Cabinet and joined the Liberal Southern Party (LSP), which was demanding a federal status with the North (R of S, 1956, 21). Azhari's government responded by issuing accusations and threatening Southerners with using force against any attempt to cause troubles within the South. The third conference of the LSP, the only Southern political party, to be held in Juba in July 1955 was faced with obstacles. The NUP government and the administration in the South were accused of trying to intimidate the LSP (Ibid. 91). In the same month, the new Northern administration of Anzara agro-industrial project, the only one in the South, dismissed some 300 hundred workers. On the 25th of that same month a Southern member of the Parliament, Mr. Elias Kuze, was sentenced to 20 years in prison following a rally in which he attacked the government policy and its attitude to make an alliance with the Southern tribal leadership. Though the accused was a member of the Parliament, his parliamentary immunity did not prevent his arrest and trial in a Chief's Court without permission from the parliamentary authorities concerned. The second day of the trial, demonstrations broke out in Anzara. The army was called to disperse the demonstrators. They used excessive force killing six wounding many others. Though the situation became critical, the NUP government in Khartoum was not concerned with the South since it declared as early as 1954 that it would use force against any Southerner who would endanger the security and unity of the country.

This official threat made an apparently false telegram, which was assumed to have been signed by the Prime Minister Ismail al-Azahari, easy to circulate and likely to be believed. The false telegram ordered the northern administrators to oppress and ill-treat the Southerners (O'Ballance, 1977, 40; Sayeed, 1990, 257/258). On August 7th, 1955 two civilians were arrested in Juba accused of contributing to a plot to cause a mutiny in the Southern forces of the army. Demonstrations demanding their release were dispersed by the use of tear gas for the first time in the South. On August the 18th the Southern units of the army in Torit in the Equatoria province, refused the orders issued to them to move to the North. The mutiny resulted in the death of 275 Northerners and 70 Southerners. The politics of ethnic conflicts claimed a new era throwing dark shadows on the real issues behind them.

Despite these shadows, the political movement in the South continued to believe in a possible peaceful solution to the contradiction between them and the Northern power bloc. In December 1955, the Southern members of the Parliament agreed to vote for the immediate independence of the Sudan, following a promise given as a

decision passed in the Parliament to consider their 'claim' for a federal system of government when the permanent constitution was written. But when the Constitutional Committee was formed only three Southerners out of 46 members were appointed to it. When the Committee 'considered' the Southern 'claim' for a federation, it rejected them and the Southern members walked out. One of the Southern leaders, Father Saturino Lohure, a Catholic priest and a founder of the Federal Bloc, summarised the position of many educated Southerners when he said in the Parliament on June 1958,

"The South claims to federate with the North. A right that the South possesses as a consequence of the principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to a free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides, directly or indirectly through political, social and economic subjection of the South."

In less than eleven years, since the Juba Conference decided the unity of the Sudan, the Southern demands developed from mere constitutional safeguards to a federal state to a threat to separate. It is absurd to explain that change in position merely by reference to the colonial heritage, because the colonial heritage did not prevent the Southern representatives in the Juba Conference from choosing the unity of the Sudan. The explanation though should take into account the colonial heritage of the Sudan, as a whole (in the sense how the North and South developed and were structured) should be sought in the way different actors on the stage performed. Because the play no longer had an author, the actors were the authors and they should be held responsible to their performance.

The mistrust and worries about the policies of the power bloc spread to other less developed regions in the Sudan and a Federal Bloc was formed after the 1958 elections. Though mostly constituted of Southern members, the Federal bloc inspired the rise of important regional awareness.

The Beja Congress held in October 1958 demanded an autonomous rule for Eastern Sudan, (where more than 500,000 Beja people were living at the time), and more representation for the Beja in the Central government.

The November coup brought the Beja movement to a temporary halt.

1.1.2 The First Dictatorship

Aboud regime continued the same policy of uneven development as shown above. In addition the failure of the Constitutional Reform Committee that was appointed by the Aboud's military government in 1961, to bring real devolution of power from Khartoum to these areas and the absence of democracy and democratic

institutions to allow the expression of regional grievances, a civil war culminated in the South by 1963 and an underground organisation called Sony (after a place in Jebel Mara in Darfur Province), distributed pamphlets against the domination of Jallaba in Darfur. The regional conflicts made their contribution to the crisis of the First Military Regime, and it was the discussion on the Southern Question that ignited the uprising that overthrew the regime in October 1964.

1.1.3 The Second Democracy

The aftermath of the October 1964 Revolution in the Sudan that had overthrown Aboud's regime witnessed the rehabilitation of the regional questions. The first of these was the Southern Question that contributed to the ignition of the revolution itself as mentioned before. A Round Table Conference was held in Khartoum in March 1965 to negotiate a peaceful solution. The Conference, which was attended by representatives of the Southern and Northern political parties, the government and delegations from neighbouring countries as observers, failed to reach an agreement and the Question was referred to a Twelve Man Committee. It was to haunt the ruling power bloc after the elections. However the Second democracy was known to the people in the South by three incidents that promoted the mistrust between the Southern intellectuals and northern politician:

- 1- The Wau white house Massacre 1958
- 2- The Juba Massacre 1968,
- 3- The assassination of William Deng the leader of SANU in 1968.

The Beja Congress re-emerged as a parliamentary group of 10 members. The Nuba Mountains Union also re-emerged as a parliamentary group holding ten seats. Darfur regionalism which was first expressed by the Sony under ground organisation, found itself in a Darfur Renaissance Front which unlike the other regional organisation did not contest the 1965 elections, but influenced the political parties' choice of their candidates by emphasising that candidates should be Darfurians. The leader of the Front, who stood for election as independent candidate, was elected to the parliament. Regional politics were in the agenda due to the October Revolution.

1.1.4 The Second dictatorship 1969-85

After 1969 many regional movements were discovered within the armed forces. The first of these groups was

disclosed and members arrested in July 1969 (Wai, 1979, 98). The September 1975 coup was labelled racist.

The leaders of the coup in their testimony in Atabara trials argued that

"a deep feeling of Regional deprivation and disillusionment, especially among the Western province and the Nuba hills (Mountains) - provided the core motivations" (ACR, 1975/76, B113).

One of the most important achievements of Nimeiri's regime was the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1973 between the regime and the Anya-nya rebels of Southern Sudan which ended the eighteen years (1955-1973) war between southern rebels and the north dominated central government. In its report on the events of 173/74 the ACR noticed,

"The Southern Sudan, for the first time since Sudan's independence on 1 January 1956, has become an important stabilising political element" (ACR, 1973/74) B90).

By the mid-seventies this element of stabilisation began to appear as one of political instability. Although some isolated events took place in 1974 provoking tension, the sound beginning of instability could be suggested by a motion of non-confidence in Abel Alier's regional government in 1975 presented by the four prominent Southern politicians Joseph Aduhu, Clement Mboro, Benjamin Pol Akok and Philip Pedak Leith. The motion failed to gain the support of the Regional Assembly; the former two were detained, the latter fled the country to Ethiopia.

In 1976 the discontent began to appear among the Southern soldiers, mainly commissioned from the former Anya-nya forces under Addis Ababa Agreement. In February some soldiers mutinied in Wau and took their arms to the bush, and in March another mutiny took place in Akobo, 225 miles from Juba towards the Ethiopian borders. Troubles were reported the same year in Kapoeta when southern soldiers refused the orders from their northern officers. One year later a mutiny was reported in Juba Airport when the mutineers occupied the airport for several hours killing nine soldiers and an American pilot. Soon government forces recaptured the airport and arrested 98 soldiers and their leader, a sergeant. The government accused "foreign powers" of the "Juba conspiracy". (AL-Ayam, 12/2/1977).

Although these events were not directly connected, they were expressions of the discontent about the way the Addis Ababa Agreement was implemented and the conduct of the High Executive Council, the regional government of the south. Complaints were voiced by tribal representatives concerning the overwhelming domination of the Dinka, the biggest tribe in the south, both on the regional government administration and

the SSU and about the level of representation of the South in similar national bodies. Dissatisfaction was expressed by wider groups in the South, including prominent Dinkas, about the development policy of the regional government and the flow of funds from the central government to the South. Allegation of corruption and nepotism were made without being fully investigated or brought to trial.

The National Reconciliation of 1977 brought another element in the Southern discontent. Bona Mallwal wrote in 1981,

"Since 1977, dangerous talk of an even wider role of religion in politics has begun again. There renewed talks of an Islamic Republic of the Sudan. This very decisive issue, which almost split the country into two parties in the 1960s is now a matter of national debate once more." (Mallwal, 1981, 249).

The question of introducing Islamic laws was raised when a committee was formed following NR to "review Sudanese laws in conformity with Sharia" (ACR, 1977/78, B119). Bona Mallwal, then Minister of Information and Culture and, hence, editor of the Ministry's monthly magazine *Sudanow*, expressed the fears of "some people" and called for the principle "the religion for the individual and the country for all." (*Sudanow*, October 1977). In the same issue of *Sudanow*, General Lagu expressed the South "great concern" on the issue of Sharia, which the General predicted would cause discontent (Ibid.).

Another problem that contributed to the Southern discontent was the controversy over Jongeli Project (JP). Lord Cromer first suggested the project on the advice of Sir Garstin who surveyed the Nile in 1904. The aim of the project is to save the water losses in the Sudd area and provide navigable waters way between Juba and Malkal. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan has given the Sudan "the right to construct such projects as to decrease the losses of water at Bahar el-Gebel, Bahar el-Zaraf, Bahar el-Gazal and tributaries Sobat and tributaries and the White Nile." (Kaballo, 1972, 9). The water from and costs of the project/s are to be shared and divided equally between Egypt and the Sudan. The Agreement gave Egypt the right to construct the JP if she needed the water before the Sudan, and the Sudan could pay its share when it needed its share in the water. In 1974 a joint communiqué following a visit to Egypt by Nimeiri declared the intention to "complete the feasibility studies on the Jongeli Canal and the Upper Nile projects." (Khalid, 1985, 315). In 1976 an agreement between the two countries was signed to construct the Jongeli Canal (ACR, 1976/77, B116). Allegations and rumours about the Canal and its aim to settle Egyptian farmers in the south spread and found some response among some circles in the South specially students who launched some

demonstrations. (ACR, 1977/78, B122).

The discontent caused by these problems was submerged, for a while, by the internal conflicts among different political and tribal groups. By 1975, three groups emerged as opposing Abel Alier's government.

The first group was led by the former leader of the Anya-nya rebels General Lagu who found himself and his fellow Equatorians under the shadow of Abel Alier's Dinka's domination. The second group was led by Samuel Aru and unifying the former SANU members. The third group led by Clement Mboro and composed mostly of the members of the Southern Front>

These internal conflicts resulted in the defeat of Abel Alier in the regional elections in 1977; and General Lagu became Chairman of the HEC uniting several groups under his leadership. Soon internal conflict paralysed Lagu's government. In 1979 the front that joined Alier's three rivals collapsed. Lagu in February dismissed SANU leader Aru, who had held the post of Deputy Chairman of the HEC, and in July Lagu dismissed Mboro who was the Speaker of the Regional Assembly. By 1980 the President interfered to call for new regional elections and Alier returned to power in the South.

During this second office of Alier, new issues came to the front line between the North and the South. The first of these issues was the decision of the central government to locate an oil refinery in Kosti, in central Sudan, instead of Bantiu in the south, where most of the oil discoveries were made.

The second issue was the question of the boundaries of Southern Region, which was raised, apparently, during the decision to adopt regionalisation as a system to govern northern Sudan. In reality the question of boundaries goes back to the Addis Ababa Agreement which defined the boundaries of the Southern Region as those in force on the date of Independence, 1st January 1956. According to these boundaries an area amalgamated by the first military government in 1960 in Darfur, should be reunited with the south. Another problem concerned an area that had been part of the Kordofan Region since the Independence, but inhabited by Dinka. The Southerners were demanding a referendum in the area to ask whether the people there wanted to remain part of Kordofan or unite with the south.

The third issue, although raised by Nimeiri and suggested by General Lagu, was to re-divide the south into three regions according to the old boundaries of three provinces, Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahar el-Gazal. Lagu argued that by dividing the North into regions the logic of uniting the South versus the North was outdated (Sudanow, June, 1981). The issue divided the Southerners and gave Nimeiri a chance to interfere

extensively in Southern politics.

When, in March 1981 the Southern Regional Peoples' Assembly adopted a resolution rejecting the re-division plan, Nimeiri dissolved the Assembly, dismissed the Regional government and appointed a care-taker government under Major General Rassas. Immediately 22 Southern leaders signed a letter to the President announcing the formation of a 'Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan' and objecting to the attempts to divide the south claiming that the "preponderance of Southern opinions is against" the division and accusing the President of choosing to "abide by the opinion of the minority". (ACR, 1981/82, B99-B100). The response of the president was to order the detention of those who signed the letter.

By the beginning of 1983, incidents of small-scale 'guerrilla' activities were being reported and in February 1983 the army units mutinied in Bor in the Upper Nile. The officers and soldiers were reported to have entered the bush. By mid-1983 two armed movements were reported to fight the government forces in the South. The second war has had started to become the most significant instability element for the regime. 1984 stopped both the oil explorations and the Jongeli Canal construction because security could not be assured (ACR: 1984/85, B85).

Although the second war had already begun, in September 1983 Nimeiri gave the 'rebels' a new justification to continue the second war by announcing the enforcement of Islamic Sharia Laws.

1.1.4.1 The 1983 Civil War

Civil war in the Sudan was re-started in March 1983, following the mutiny of the 105th battalion of the Sudanese Armed Forces, stationed in Bor. The Battalion that was constituted of Southern Sudanese from the ex-Anynya soldiers, mutinied refusing orders to be transferred to the North. It would be a naive simplification if the transfer to the North itself is taken as the sole reason to the mutiny and hence to the restarting of a civil war. The mutiny was just a spark that set the fire on a situation ready to be ignited. Usually five reasons are sighted to explain the collapse of Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 that ended sixteen years of the first civil war and brought a fragile peace to the Sudan. These are:

1. The interference of President Nimeiri in the regional politics of the South.
2. Nimeiri's decision to divide the South into three regions.
3. Nimeiri's decision to amend the frontiers of the Southern Region (which were determined by Addis

Ababa Agreement by the frontiers at the Independence of the Sudan in January 1956) to add some parts of the South to Dar Fur Region. These areas are believed to be rich in mineral deposits.

4 Nimeiri's decision to construct a refinery in Kosti on the White Nile in North Sudan instead of Bantiu in the South, where the oil reserves was discovered.

5 the failure of Nimeiri's regime in taking in serious step to overcome the gap between the uneven developed South and North.

Despite the truth about the five reasons, the main contradictions that lead to the collapse of the Agreement were sometimes ignored. Although the Agreement established a regional autonomy in the South, it failed in establishing a system where the South had a genuine share in the political power in the Centre. The power in the Centre that dominated resource allocation remained within the hand of the northern power block, of Arab-Islamic origins. This was of particular importance when the Agreement did not attach its implementation to any programme of even distribution of resources or a timetable to overcome the 'uneven development of the South and North. The Southern elates who harried to rally behind the Agreement were driven by an illusion that they could establish a regional democratic system within a national authoritarian one in which they had no share. The renewal of the civil war was an expression of the deepening of these unresolved contradictions.

The war that started by the Bor mutiny in 1983 has continued since then. At the beginning of the war there were three fighting forces: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Sudan People's Liberation Army, and the Any-ana II forces. In 1984 the government was able to enlist the support of the Baggara tribes of southern Kordofan and Darfur and arm them in tribal militias called Murahaleen and encourage them to attack the Dinka, burn their villages and raid their cattle. The Dinka was targeted as the main force behind the SPLA. In 1985 fight between SPLA and Anyana II, in which the latter was defeated, led the remaining forces of Anyana II to join the government SAF as what was called the Freindly Forces.

1.1.4.2 The Rise of the SPLA/SPLM

The rise of the SPLA/SPLM was a response to the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement to solve the problem of uneven development. Its appeal to all the people of the less developed areas in the Sudan was significant.

The SPLA/SPLM provided in its "Manifesto", an attempt to explain the crisis that led to its formation. The SPLA/SPLM analysis was based on the proposition that there

"Is generally a 'Problem of Backward Areas' in the whole country that is particularised and exacerbated in the South by successive minority clique regimes in Khartoum." (SPLA/ SPLM, 1983, 1)

The uneven development that led to the creation of these backward areas was traced back to the colonial regime (Ibid. 1). These areas were defined as the whole Sudan except Khartoum and Blue Nile old provinces. The latter two were together defined as the North. The problem of underdevelopment, according to the Manifesto, "was particularised in the South especially in the field of education." (Ibid. 7), which led to a development of a Northern elite more rapidly than a Southern one. This was "to become the central problem in Sudan's post-independence politics" (Ibid. 7). Accordingly the Manifesto evaluated the mutiny of Turret and the rise of Any-Any 1 as a response to the distribution of jobs after independence, "The objective and aims of Anya-nya 1 therefore centred on jobs and jobs titles" (Ibid. 8). That is why it was possible to reach an agreement such as Addis Ababa which "was a deal between the Southern and Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elites" (Ibid. 9). Such an agreement was "thus bound to collapse as it ignored the real interests of the masses of the people" (Ibid. 9). In addition to that, the northern elite in Khartoum undermined the agreement by its policies and actions, the Manifesto did not say why? Instead it went on listing the policies and actions on the political economic, and military sides (Ibid. 10-14). In response to these policies and actions Southern people began to organise themselves in different opposition groups: National Action Movement (NAM), Movement For Total Liberation of Southern Sudan (MTLSS), Equatoria Central Committee for Re-division (ECC), and the Council for the Unity of South Sudan (CUSS) (p 12). At the same time

" The old CNF (Congress of New Forces, which included the Fur, Nuba and Beja) took advantage of the political crisis in the South and organised African-based coups against Khartoum" (p 12)

The 1975 coup was quoted as an example.

John Garang, in a speech to the nation from SPLA/SPLM radio, tried to sum up the reasons of the crisis by saying:

"The neo-colonial system that has developed in our country since 1956 and was represented by Nimeirism since 1969 is a regime in which a few people have amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority. The injustice has resulted in profound crisis and distortion in our economy, politics, ethics and even religion which Nimeiri has perverted into an article of trade" (Garang, 1992, 19)

Though Garang was more explicit in exposing the national nature of the crisis on both economic and political levels, he emphasised the particular crisis in the South, which justified that his movement began from there to

liberate the whole Sudan. The SPLA/SLM's and Garang's analysis concentrated on the problem of uneven development and they did not see any classes beyond the bush! This led to a serious undermining of the democratic movement in the North. It is not enough to define the ruling bloc as 'a minority elite in Khartoum' or a 'bourgeoisified bureaucratic group' in the North and South, though the latter represent an important step towards a class -based analysis. The analysis of Anay-nya and the Addis Ababa Agreement was more sound than the rest of the analysis, yet it is not enough alone to provide satisfactory explanation of the reasons for the 17 years war or for signing or failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Concrete analysis requires a comprehensive outlook to all the elements and their interrelation. The "distribution of colonial jobs between the Southern and Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elite" might be an important element in the 17 years war initiation, but it was not the sole element and the continuation of the war for seventeen years had other additional reasons. The same could be said about the reasons for reaching the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. Both international, (including regional), as well as internal conditions contributed to reaching the Agreement.

The rise of the SPLA/SPLM and the continuation of civil war in the Sudan stand as a clear evidence of the importance of uneven development as an element in the organic crisis in the Sudan. The contribution of the second civil war to the 1973-85 crisis was important in deepening the crisis after 1983.

1.1.5 The Third Democracy

The war continued despite the overthrow of Nimeiri. The SPLA/SPLM saw in the new Military Council a continuation of Nimeiri.

Much

The war among the different forces had negatively affected the livelihood of the civilians in the Southern Region. It is within that context the famine of 1986-1988 in the South is discussed.

1.1.5.1 War-created famine

Deliberate famine, caused not by drought or crop failure but by war, is the more frequently encountered situation in Southern Sudan. An especially severe famine in the South in 1986-89 resulted from the

destructive strategies of both the government and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Both sides displaced hundreds of thousands of villagers and prevented them from farming. The resulting famine was concealed and denied by the new civilian government, which had begun arming militias to plunder rural communities, while the SPLA laid siege to garrison towns. The international donor community, meanwhile, largely went along with the pretence that the famine was not connected with the civil war.

In 1986 the UN Resident Representative, Winston Prattley, was expelled after trying to start a relief airlift to the South. The next year, four aid agencies were expelled from the South after calling for famine relief. The desire of aid agencies to remain in place and not upset their host government meant that fear of expulsion became more important than publicising their reasons for being there. The agencies' interdependence with the media in calling attention to their needs became problematic. Foreign journalists often relied on the aid agencies for transport to the government-controlled parts of the south to which they were allowed access. They were unable to gain a clear picture of the situation in the areas of conflict, and either reported that aid was getting through to the towns they saw, or made claims that they were unable to document about the areas they could not reach.

Although Sudanese journalists were enjoying a period of relative freedom between 1986 and 1989, little press coverage was given to the war or the famine, let alone the connection between the two. When one Southern Sudanese reporter, Mike Kilongson, dared to report from Juba on the developing famine, he was detained for two months in inhumane conditions by the military, who denied that there was a food shortage. Military Governor Peter Cirillo insisted that food was abundant in Equatoria, and that poverty was the only problem. (It is characteristic of many famines that food is available for those with the money to buy it.)

1.1.6 The Third Dictatorship

The party that supports the regime, the National Islamic Front (NIF), calls for a holy war (*Jihad*) as an Islamic duty (*farad*) against the enemies of Islam; the latter are defined as those who reject an Islamic state or the NIF version of Islam. It, also, justifies taking aggressive measures against its opponents as another religious duty. This NIF's interpretation has given the civil war in the Sudan a new dimension as a religious conflict. The civil war in the Sudan had always been the violent expression of the political conflict on power sharing and resource allocation between the North and the South. The expansion of the war to some other parts in the

North, like the Nuba Mountains, Dar Fur and the Ingassana region of southern Blue Nile, confirmed its political nature. The religious dimension was first introduced by Nimeiri when he was in alliance with the NIF in 1983, by imposing the Islamic Sharia Law. The failure to abolish the Sharia Law after the fall of Nimeiri in 1985, had prevented a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In March 1989, the formation of a new government, backed by all parties except the NIF, had provided, for a while, an opportunity for a peaceful settlement. When the new government started the negotiation with the SPLA/SPLM to that extent; a military coup intercepted the process in June 1989. The coup was backed by the NIF to prevent a settlement based on the abolition of the Islamic Sharia Law.

The military government was faced by a difficult situation; the SPLA in 1989 was controlling almost most of the South; and that the government's forces were under siege in isolated military garrisons and towns. From the start the military government of General al-Bashir decided to escalate the war against SPLA/SPLM in all fronts. The government had carried out a policy of indiscriminate aerial bombardments of the areas held by the SPLA in the South; the result was the death of thousands of civilians who were trapped in those areas. The aerial bombardments were intensified during the 1992 dry season; the government forces accompanied the bombardments with ground attacks on four fronts. This was one of the worst periods of violation of human rights in the war zone. The government imposed restrict censorship on the news of the operations> The operations were accompanied by a policy of denying the population food relief from international agencies and charity organisation. The government, "starting in March 1992 ordered the relief personnel to leave many southern locations, refused permission to airlift supplies to starving civilians, staged attacks by Toposa militia on relief convoys around Kapoeta, and for months denied permission to truck food and non food items into most of the South."¹ During the operations the government forces killed civilians and burnt burnt villages and looted cattle. It was during these operations that the SPLA made its attempt to catch Juba that was under its siege for almost four years. The government's response was severe. The government forces responded by "extrajudicially executing civilians and captured SPLA soldiers during house-to-house search operations," in Juba; and "arresting over 290 soldiers, police officers, prison guards, paramilitary forces attached to the

¹Human Rights Watch /Africa, *Civilian Devastation Abuses By All Parties in the War in southern Sudan*, New York., Human Rights Watch, 1994, p 37

²Amnesty International "The Tears of the Orphans: No Future without human rights", London, 1995, pp 64-65

Department of Wildlife and prominent civilians."² Despite the government strict censorship; the news was distributed through the world by human rights organisations, and was brought to the attention of the UN. The Juba incidents of 1992, as they were widely known, had represented a turning point in the international response to human rights violations in the Sudan.

The aerial bombardments had continued in 1993, when government planes bombed Mundri, Lowe, and Amadi; Kajo-Kaji, Kaya and Chukdum; and many other areas and camps. While the bombing continued in the Equatoria region, government ground troops marched in Bur area in Upper Nile, and in Bahar El Gazal region; killing civilians, burning villages and granaries; and looting cattle. By mid 1993 the government launched its largest dry season offensive in Western Equatoria. The offensive was composed both of aerial bombardments and ground troops' attacks. One report has stated that the immediate result of the bombing in July 1993 was: "approximately 75,000 people were internally displaced; 27,000 fled across the boarder to Uganda; and 1,000 went to Zaire."³

In 1994, the government repeated its annual seasonal aerial bombardment and ground troops offensive. The result of the offensive was the destruction of Ame, Aswa and Atepe camps, (known as Triple A Camps); and the displacement of the already displaced people who use to take refuge in Triple A camps.

1.1.6.1 The War in the Nuba Mountains

The military government failed to impose complete censorship on the news of the war in the Nuba Mountains. The news atrocities and violation of human rights violation in the Nuba Mountains found their way to the international community. The silence, the government wanted to impose, was broken.

The government took many measure in order to eliminate the presence of SPLA in the Nuba Mountains. These measures had included the re-enforcement of the army in the area and the use of aerial bombardments. They had, also, included the establishment of the popular defence forces and the legitimisation of the tribal militias' forces, known as the *murahaleen*; as well as, the use food as weapon and the implementation of a policy of ethnic cleansing. The measures did not target the SPLA forces alone; but also they had targeted the civilian

²Amnesty International 'The Tears of the Orphans: No Future without human rights', London, 1995, pp 64-65

³Human Rights Watch /Africa, *Civilian Devastation Abuses By All Parties in the War in southern Sudan*, New York,, Human Rights Watch, 1994, p 79.

population; the government used to accuse of being supportive of the SPLA. The armed forces, the popular defence forces and the tribal militias, separately or jointly, had attacked the Nuba villages; killing civilians, burning churches and huts; looting cattle and sheep and burning and confiscating crops. The Nuba people were forced to leave their land and to move to the sandy *quoz* of Northern Kordofan. The government had particularly targeted among the Nuba: their political leadership and the educated; a large number of them had been detained, tortured and forcibly disappeared.

1.1.6.2 The War of the NDA

In 1995 the Northern opposition forces joined the war against the NIF government. The operations in the eastern Sudan began by the Sudanese Alliance Forces, a newly formed organisation led by an ex-Brigadier in the Sudanese army. Soon the other parties sent their military men to open camps, train volunteers and support the military operations.

The new front in the east put under threat the large dura producing area of Gedaref, the second large irrigated agriculture scheme of Rahad, the Highway that connect Khartoum to its main sea port (Port Sudan) and both oil-pipelines that pump imported oil in the Sudan and exported oil to the port.

2 The Economic Causes of the War:

2.1 *The Paradox of Uneven Development*

One important element in the colonial legacy that has continued is the uneven development of the different Sudanese regions. This was not only an economic problem, but it was, (and still is), the major element in the political instability and the unstable state in the Sudan.

Uneven development was a result of the rigid articulation of modes of production inherited from the colonial era and preserved by the post-colonial state. Uneven development in the Sudan is an expression of the local division of labour, albeit dependent on and linked to the international division of labour as has been argued in Chapter 2.

It was just logical for the market forces to deepen the uneven distribution of private investment, for capital tends to seek areas of high average rate of profit (or high marginal efficiency of capital in Keynesian terminology). Government intervention was not enough to upset this general trend. Its intervention took two measures. The first was the encouragement of private sector to invest in the most undeveloped areas, especially through the investment laws. The second was direct government investment. Except for the investment in mechanised agriculture, the first measure failed to attract private investment outside the triangle area of Khartoum-Kosti- Sennar, where most of the infrastructure and public utilities were concentrated. Though mechanised agriculture did contribute in generating extra income by providing seasonal work opportunities, its effects on the environment, the peasant agriculture, the availability of pastures for nomads were negative. Many empirical studies have argued that surpluses generated by mechanised agriculture were transferred to urban areas and to the Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle (See Affan, 1978). The direct government investment was mainly limited to social services and public utilities. There is some other isolated government projects (Wau Fruit and Vegetable Canning Factory, Babanosa Milk Dehydration Factory, and the Textile factories in Nyala, and Kadogli) which did not constitute part of a comprehensive rural or regional development strategy. Both the central and the regional governments failed in drafting such a strategy.

Uneven developed in the Sudan has been reflected in three main characteristics:

- a) the uneven development of the forces of production,

- b) the uneven development of social services (especially education and health)
- c) and the other infrastructure and public utilities which are necessary for the development of both social services and productive forces (transport and communication, electricity and water)

2.1.1 Uneven Development of the Forces of Production

The most important symptom of uneven development in the Sudan was the uneven development of the forces of production. Agricultural producers in the less developed areas (despite the production relations that governed their production) were still by 1985 using primitive tools and means of production (no irrigation facilities and complete dependency on rain fall, no modern agricultural equipment, no use of modern fertilisers or chemicals, absence of agricultural research and instruction ...etc.). This resulted in a low crop yields. This is shown in table 27. The yields of *dura* in the less developed areas amounted to 54% of the yields per *feddan* in the most developed areas. Groundnut yields amounted to 25.2% and those of sesame were 73.4% of the respective yields per *feddan* in the most developed areas

Table Yields per Feddan for Three Main Crops in the Sudan (Average of 1975/76-1984/85 in Kg /feddan)

	<i>Dura</i>	Groundnuts	Sesame
Less developed areas*	238.9	203.1	92.4
Most Developed areas**	442.4	807.1	125.8
All Sudan average	272.7	321.3	101.6

Note: *the less developed areas are defined here as the non-mechanised rain-fed agriculture

***The most developed areas are defined as the irrigated and the mechanised rain-fed agriculture*

Source: Calculated from: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, (1984), *Sudan Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, 1984*.

In industry the discrepancy in the forces of production could be shown by the relative distribution of industrial establishments, their fixed assets, production, contribution to value added, number of workers and the salaries and wages they paid. Table 28 shows the relevant data on that. The Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle is taken as the most developed areas, while the rest of the country is defined as less developed.

It is clear from table 28 that industry in 1981/82 was concentrated in the Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle¹. The discrepancy in the level of the development of forces of production is shown by the fact that although the less developed areas had 43.6% of the total number of industrial establishment. They employ 20.1% of the

industrial labour force and paid 19.1% of the industrial wage bill, produced 23.4% of the total industrial production and 29.8% of the value added. Their fixed assets were only 20.7%; most of it located in Port Sudan and Kassala towns of the Eastern Region.

Table Uneven Development of Industry in the Sudan 1981/82 (%)

	No. of establishments	No of Workers	Salaries and Wages	Total Production	Value Added	Fixed Assets
Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar Triangle	56.4%	79%	80.9%	76.6%	70.2 %	79.2 %
The rest of the Sudan	43.6%	21%	19.1%	23.4%	29.8 %	20.7 %*

Note: * of this 16% were located in the Eastern Region (mainly in Port Sudan and Kassala) and the remaining 4% is located in the other regions of the Sudan

Source: Ministry of Industry: Industrial Survey of 1981/82, Khartoum.

2.1.2 Uneven Development of Social Services and Infrastructure:

2.1.2.1 Education Services

The discrepancy in the distribution of education services throughout Sudan could be shown by comparing the number of pupils in general education in every region as percentage of the total number of pupils in the country with the size of the population of that region as percentage of the total population in the Sudan. Table 29 shows the percentage distribution of pupils and teachers in the different Sudanese region in 1983.

While only 8.8% of the population of the Sudan lived in Khartoum in 1983, Khartoum had 15.7% of the primary schools pupils in the country. It had 22.5% of the intermediate schools pupils, 27% of the academic and technical schools pupils and 9.7% of the teachers institutes students. The Central Region share in education service was also greater than its relative size of population. While its population constituted 20.5% of the population in Sudan it had 30.3% of primary school pupils, 30% of intermediate schools pupils, 28.4 of academic secondary schools students, 33% of the technical secondary schools and 20.9% of the teachers institutes students.

Table .The Distribution of Population, Pupils and Teachers in the Different Regions in the Sudan (in percentage, 1983)

Regions	Population	Primary	Intermediate	Secondary Academic	Secondary Technical	Teachers Institutes
Northern	5.4	11.0	14.5	13.5	8.8	14.7
Eastern	10.7	9.6	8.7	8.3	13.4	10.8
Northern and Eastern	18.1	20.6	23.2	21.8	22.2	25.5
Central	20.4	30.3	30.0	28.4	33.0	20.8
Khartoum	8.8	15.7	22.5	27.0	27.1	9.7
Central and Khartoum	29.2	36.0	52.5	55.4	60.1	30.6
Kordofan	15.0	10.8	9.8	8.7	4.8	9.1
Darfur	15.0	13.1	7.1	5.2	7.5	15.9
Equatoria	6.8	5.7	4.2	4.6	3.8	7.7
Bahar el Gazal	11.1	1.3	1.5	2.2	1.5	11.1
Upper Nile	7.8	2.3	1.8	2.1	--	---
Less Developed	55.7	33.2	24.4	22.8	17.2	43.8

Source: 1) Department of Statistics, Population Census 1983 (unpublished). 2) Ministry of Education and Instruction, (1985), *Educational Statistics 1984/85*, Khartoum.

If the figures for Kordofan, Darfur and the Southern Regions are together compared with those of Khartoum and Central Region, the disparity in the distribution of education services will be clearly apparent. The less developed region was the home for 55.7% of the population. It had 33.2%, 44.4%, 22.8% 17.6% and 43.8% of the pupils and students in primary, intermediate, academic secondary, technical secondary schools and teacher's institutes respectively, compared with 46.5, 52.5%, 55.4%, 60.1% and 9.1% for Khartoum and the Central Region together where only 29.2% of the population were living.

The comparison of the less developed areas with the Northern Region raises directly the question of the regional and ethnic composition of the ruling classes in the Sudan. The Northern Region had more pupils and students than its relative size of population. This has no explanation except that the ruling classes who predominantly of Northern regional origin favoured their areas in allocating educational services.

The uneven distribution of general university services was reflected in the higher education. Students from Khartoum, Central and Northern regions continued to dominate the annual intake in higher

education. They represented about 70% of the University of Khartoum annual intake for the years 1979/80-1984/85, while students from Kordofan and Darfur regions represented 12% on average during the same period Al Maiden, 18 December 1988, 6).

2.1.2.2 Health Services

Evaluating five indicators could look at the disparity in the distribution of health services: the number of persons per doctor, per hospital bed, per specialist doctor, and per nurse; and the number of hospital beds per doctor. Table 29 shows these indicators in the different Sudanese regions.

Table Indicators of the Distribution of Health Services in the Different Sudanese Regions

Region	Persons/ Doctor	Persons/ Hospital bed	persons per Specialist doctor	Persons/ nurse	Hospital bed / Doctor
Khartoum	1367	484	5474	456	2
Eastern	9324	945	41928	1421	9
Northern	9783	654	30500	864	14
Central	14643	1156	67360	1445	12
Kordofan	19585	1449	89222	1196	13
Darfur	49600	2591	16047	2871	19
Southern	42739	1023	173333	2977	41
Sudan	8861	1035	33707	1298	7

Source: Calculated from: **Ministry of Health, (1982), *Annual Health Statistical Report*, Khartoum 1982.**

In 1982 there were 1,367 person per doctor in Khartoum, while there were 19,585-persons/ doctor in Kordofan and 49,600-persons/ doctor in Darfur and 42,739-persons/ doctor in the Southern Region. While there were one hospital bed for every 484 persons in Khartoum, the ratio was a bed for 1449 in Kordofan, 2491 persons in Darfur, and 1023 persons in the Southern Region. There were two beds per doctor in Khartoum, 13 beds per doctor in Kordofan, 14 bed per doctor in Darfur and 41 bed per doctor in the Southern Region. The indicators of persons per specialised doctor and per nurse confirm the same trend of uneven distribution of health services. There was a specialist doctor for every 5,474 persons in Khartoum. The indicator for Kordofan was 17 time higher (89 thousand persons per specialised doctor), in Darfur 32 times higher, (160 thousand persons per specialised doctor) and in the Southern Region 34 times higher (173 thousand persons per specialised doctor). There was a nurse per 456 persons in Khartoum, 1,196 persons in Kordofan, 2,871 persons in Darfur and 2, 977

persons in the Southern Region.

2.1.2.3 Other Infrastructure

The National Electricity Grid is concentrated in the Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle. Except for the Eastern Grid which distributes Khasham al-Girba Dam electricity to New Halfa and Kassala towns, the other urban parts of the Sudan depended on local diesel generated electricity. Most of the regional thermal stations suffer problems of shortage of diesel oil and spare-parts supply.

Darfur and Kordofan Regions suffer from continuous shortage in water supply.

Until 1985, out of eleven modern roads built to connect the main Sudanese towns only three were in the less developed area. The total length of modern road built between 1973 and 1985 was 2,148 kilometres, of them only 401 kilometres were in Kordofan and Darfur.

2.1.3 Regional Responses to Uneven Development and their National effects

We have argued that uneven development was responsible for the rise of regional movements between 1956 and 1969 (Kaballo, 1994, Chapter 3). After 1969 many regional movements² were discovered within the armed forces. The first of these groups was disclosed and members arrested in July 1969 (Wai, 1979, 98). The September 1975 coup was labelled racist. The leaders of the coup in their testimony in Atabara trials argued that "a deep feeling of Regional deprivation and disillusionment, especially among the Western province and the Nuba hills- provided the core motivations" (ACR, 1975/76, B113).

In the introduction of this paper we have shown the response of the South that began since 1974 and culminated in the rise of the SPLA/SPLM and the start of the second civil war.

2.2 *The War on Resources*

There are four areas of resource conflict:

- 1- The Oil: which was discovered in the Upper Nile Region, Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur
- 2- The water resources and this is mainly about the Jongeli Canal. There are two worries about the

construction of the canal one is environmental and the second concerning the related projects in the area and whether the people of the South are going to benefit.

3- The land resources of the Great clay plain of Central and Southern Sudan. Here again the issues of the conflict are both environmental and developmental. The Central Clay Plain is where most of the mechanised agriculture schemes are distributed to companies and merchants. From an environmental point of view that alters the natural setting both the Savannah forest and the rainfall. From a developmental point view it marginalise the local population, increase the conflicts on pasture and the profits created by the farms are transferred to Central Sudan (Kaballo, 1994)

¹For an interesting discussion of the geographical location of industry in the Sudan see Mohammed Ali (1989), Chapter 3 and 4.

²The official description for such movements was that they were racist movements.