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**POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE  
EFFICIENCY IN AFRICA: EMERGING  
TRENDS, PROSPECTS AND APPROPRIATE  
POLICY RESPONSES**

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## **List of Acronyms**

<b>AAPAM</b>	African Association for Public Administration & Management
<b>AFSAP</b>	Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programme
<b>DRS</b>	Democratic Renewal Strategy
<b>CC</b>	Citizens' Charter
<b>EBRD</b>	European Bank for Reconstruction & Development
<b>ECPDM</b>	European Center for Policy Development & Management
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>KANU</b>	Kenya African National Union
<b>LPA</b>	Lagos Plan of Action
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PAS</b>	Public Administration System
<b>PHSD</b>	Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division
<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Programme
<b>SAPAM</b>	Special Action Programme for Public Administration & Management
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNECA</b>	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
<b>USAID</b>	United States of America for International Development
<b>VAT</b>	Value Added Tax
<b>WB</b>	World Bank

## **Executive Summary**

African public services once thought as largely irrelevant to the development challenges confronting the continent are increasingly being recognized as one of the critical institutions for bringing about and sustaining political and economic change. The continent's economic, ecological and demographic problems together with the pressure towards economic and political reforms, however, imply that African public services must discharge their responsibilities in close collaboration with non-state (or civil society) organs, citizen groups and actors in the international arena. A primary challenge which these public administration systems (PAS) face in Africa is that of raising the quality of the services they provide in an era of profound economic, social and political changes which have lent greater weight to citizens' expectations of, and demands, on public agencies.

Following a critical review of past approaches and strategies for revitalising African public services and their limited effectiveness in tackling the major problems confronting African public services today - including the absence of clear and coherent mission, low morale, declining performance levels, loss of self-regulatory capacity, crisis of governance and appropriate reform directions - some proposals for change through interactions between political institutions/actors and public sector institutions based on a strategy of Democratic Renewal are articulated. Central to the strategy is an articulation of a mission for African public services which includes the following clusters of responsibilities:

- Creation of an enabling policy environment for economic growth;
- Provision of physical, institutional and financial infrastructure for the growth of a fledgling private sector;
- Development of human resources through major investments in educational and health infrastructure;
- Efficient management of key strategic industries which have backward linkages to the mass of small-scale and informal sector operators;
- Support for economic and political reforms- especially in nurturing institutions for the advance of democratisation and decentralization;
- Promotion of regional and economic trade and integration; and
- Mobilization of productive and financial resources, promotion of competition and the reduction or elimination of debt profile.

The Democratic Renewal Strategy (DRS) has five key components. The first is the existence of virile political institutions that can ensure efficient services and enforce accountability and responsiveness of public sector organizations. The second component are the variety of civil society organizations (including organized corporate entities such as trade unions, media, independent policy and research centres and other non-governmental and people-based organizations). The third and fourth components are the organized private or business sector and the international institutions that are active within each country. The final component is the existence of public sector organizations which are **competent, confident and credible**.

Each of these components are subsystems which incorporate a variety of institutions. Each of the institutions must in turn possess three key attributes: **Independence** or the capacity for self-governance including the ability for self-financing and of separate legal existence; **Integrity**, that is the ability to perform the specialised roles conferred on it by the society and must possess the capacity to **interact** with other institutions within the subsystem and the larger political system. The PAS interacts with other subsystems and its institutions also interact with other institutions within the larger political system. It is the interactions between these various subsystems and institutions that lead to innovativeness and the other attributes of good governance- effectiveness, participation, accountability, responsiveness, rule of law etc.

Specifically, five major strategies are recommended for enhancing the capacities of African public services. They include:

#### **A Enhance the Capacity of Legislatures to Exercise Oversight Over the Executive and Public Services**

Substantive measures will include:

- enforcing the legislature's constitutional requirement to exist as an independent and separate branch of government -complete with its own personnel, infrastructure and independent information system;
- undertaking a close review of all legislations which constrain the effectiveness of the legislature to have access to government information and undertake a constructive criticism of government programmes and activities;
- creating and identifying special centers for the training of legislators to improve their knowledge base, skills and integrity both as members of the ruling party and the opposition;
- reviewing procedures for approving government budgets at all levels to enable the legislature to exercise sanctions on defaulting departments through strengthened audit units; and
- ensuring that each parliament has a strong public accounts committee (preferably chaired by the leader of the opposition party) and a committee on the public service.

#### **B. Enhance the Independence and Effectiveness of the Judiciary and of Critical Quasi-Judicial Institutions**

Specific measures in this area will include:

- enforcing the constitutional requirement for an independent judiciary, complete with self-accounting status and independent personnel headed by the Chief Judge;
- reforming the judiciary in terms of access of ordinary people to legal remedies especially in the rural areas-through the integration of formal and informal judicial systems;
- ensuring the independence of quasi- judicial institutions such as electoral commissions by ensuring independent funding and personnel and the representation of civil society actors on their boards;
- undertake the reform of laws to ensure rule of law.

### **C Strengthen the Capacity of Decentralised Agencies**

Substantive measures will include:

- the delegation of authority in respect to finance and personnel management to managers at lower levels within the framework of broad guidelines from the center to strengthen field administration, and laterally from policy making units to implementing organs. As much as possible, civil service organs should be responsible for policy while the delivery of services should be undertaken by decentralised agencies.
- empowerment of local people by revitalising local governments through the revitalisation of local authorities and municipal governments especially in Africa's growing urban centers.

Specific desirable strategies are: a) redefinition of responsibilities of between the central and local governments using the principle of subsidiarity; b) the development of local government tax systems that can produce adequate resources to finance decentralised services; c) integration of official and non-official local governing structures; d) make local officials accountable to their respective communities as well as central government audit units for the use of resources; and most importantly, the agencies for coordinating the work of local governments must be strengthened.

### **D Reaffirm Public Service Ethical Norms**

Critical ethical norms that need to be re-affirmed in African public services include:

- merit- system of recruitment and compensation systems which reflect market scarcities;

- a renewed commitment to the idea of a professional, neutral, objective and impersonal civil service. This will necessitate the removal of all laws and practices which require civil servants to join political parties or to take directives from ruling political parties; This principle should also be extended to the military branch of the public service which should also be kept small and effectively decentralised with opportunities provided for compulsory national service.
- the cultivation of a culture of principled government and opposition, restrained partisanship and adherence to the rule of law;
- ensuring the fair representation of all social groups (gender, race, ethnic groups) without sacrificing merit principles in personnel recruitment and retention practices;
- development of training policy that ensures that every public officer is regularly exposed to new developments and required attitudes to ensure the realisation of public service missions.

#### **E Make Public Services Directly Accountable to the Public**

The notion of customer driven services should be enhanced by the following measures:

- Encouraging African PAS to Adopt Citizens' Charters,
- Devolution of More Responsibilities to the Local Governments, Independent and Self-accounting Agencies
- Creation or strengthening of public complaints commissions that are independent and have broad powers to ensure compliance of executive departments
- Involving the public in measuring the effectiveness of public sector organisations and building this into the system of compensation (including annual national awards) for units or divisions of the public service

#### **F Develop Indicators for Measuring Public Service Efficiency on the Basis of the Clarified Mission of PAS**

Substantive measures will include:

- requiring each unit of government to identify and articulate its mission on the basis of broad framework provided by the government;

- setting up productivity units to monitor performance and should render periodic reports to the executive, the legislature and the public;
- integration of organisational, personnel and financial audits;
- reviewing the systems of compensation to ensure that salary levels and working conditions reflect market scarcities, cost of living and the productivity of each unit of government;
- enhancing the capacity of civil service units for pro-active and intelligent policy analysis- especially in the area of information management and meta- policy coordination.

**Finally, a combination of pressures from domestic and external actors will be required to compel African countries to adopt governments to adopt these reforms, even though some countries in the region have already moved along these paths. In particular, external actors will be required to provide financial support for these reform activities. Their assistance would also be crucial in two critical but related areas: research and documentation on African public services through the creation of a data bank on African public services and governance institutions based at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The main responsibility of such a data bank will be to gather and periodically disseminate information on the issues covered in this report very much along the lines that economic and socio-economic data are currently compiled by organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF etc.**

## **I Introduction**

### **1 Rationale for the Study**

Even though doubts were once expressed about the relevance of public administration institutions to Africa's development challenge, it is generally accepted today that public services are critical to providing a favourable environment for the growth of the continent's fledgling indigenous private sector and for the attainment of overall economic and social development (World Bank 1981, 1989, 1994, 1995; Comia & Helleiner 1994; Beyene & Otobo 1994; Rasheed & Luke 1995, Balogun 1995).

But the problem is that the public sector's capacity to undertake these tasks has deteriorated rapidly in the last two decades. African public administration systems (PAS) are afflicted with a very fundamental governance crisis which aggravates the other crises - economic, demographic and ecological - which confront African countries in the 1990s (Balogun & Mutahaba 1989; World Bank 1981; Olowu 1991, 1992; Mutahaba 1994). They have lost their capacity to formulate and implement policies, provide needed services with cost-effectiveness, promptness and courtesy to their users or even to provide these services at all. Moreover, they have suffered further severe institutional decline arising from the administrative reforms undertaken within the last three decades (about the period of the independent existence of these countries as modern-states) which were aimed at revitalising them but which have produced few positive results. In some cases, these reforms have become part of the problem rather than the solution (See Moharir 1994; Mutahaba 1995; Rasheed & Balogun 1995).

The position taken in this paper is that while this general overall decline has several causes, we propose that the decline is largely a reflection of the poverty of political institutions and the political controls exercised by political actors and institutions over the public administration system. However, we also believe that the second wave of democratization and political liberalization that is currently sweeping through most of the continent provide an outstanding opportunity to revisit the problem of poor performance of administrative institutions on the continent.

According to the 1995 Human Development Report, opposition parties have been legalized in 31 countries that used to be governed by single party or military dictatorships in the sub-saharan Africa region. In addition, since 1990, 27 multi-party presidential elections have been held, in some of these countries for the first time (United Nations Development Programme 1995a: 28). While the democratic transition in Africa is still generally described as fragile (See for instance Decalo 1992 and Rasheed 1995), there are good grounds for optimism as we shall show below. However, it is noteworthy that the linkage between the two phenomena (political and administrative reforms) has, until the most recent period, been tenuous either among the donors and international financial institutions some of whom have become the champions of democratization on the continent or in the actual implementation experiences of democratization in the African countries. Indeed, some observers have wondered whether the new democratic political

institutions might not become constraints rather than facilitators of administrative and developmental action (ECPDM 1992).

There are, however, three grounds for the more optimistic position adopted in this paper. First, African countries are experiencing four types of transformations each of which presents dynamic challenges to African public services. The first and perhaps the most visible is the one already noted above- the transition from one-party or military regimes to multiparty democracy. But there is also a transition from state dominated economic order to market based economic systems; and a third transition, based on the first, from conflict and strife to political reconciliation and economic rehabilitation. Of course, there are countries in which none of these transitions have taken place or where there is still a continuing resistance to these changes. A fourth transition is the movement of large numbers of Africans to cities, in many cases to large cities. All these four transitions constitute the major changes confronting the majority of African countries and they call for a different approach to thinking about public administration on the continent (See in particular Beyene & Otobo 1994, Stren 1995, Olowu 1996a).

The second cause for optimism is the global resurgence of interest in how to make the civil and public services more interested not only in inputs but in outputs- how to be more service- oriented and more responsive to the needs of their customers in particular and citizens in general. Historically, efforts to revitalise administrative performance have relied on three major principles. The first is the separation of politics from administration coupled with programmes aimed at enhancing administrative capacity through the acquisition and improvement of resources (the three Ms: men, materials and management) together with emphasis on procedures and techniques. The second principle is the subordination of administrators to political functionaries via partial or wholesale politicisation (Wamalawa 1975, Hyden & Rweyemamu 1975, Balogun 1975, Mutahaba 1995). The emergence of single party and military states in Africa were critical to the popularity of the application of this principle- with unfortunate results. The third strategy, which has not been seriously engaged in Africa is the third principle of administrative reform: the increasing involvement of the citizens in governance processes. Yet, this last principle constitutes a powerful idea which is being used to raise the effectiveness of public sector agencies in different parts of the world, both developing and developed. (See Osborne & Gaebler 1992, Numberg 1992, World Bank 1994, UNDP 1995b, Halachmi 1995, Commonwealth Secretariat 1995, Westcott 1996).

A third factor which reinforces the first two is the fact that African countries are democratising at a time when they are confronted with severe resource limitations. This in itself makes the search for higher levels of governmental efficiency, effectiveness and value for money more necessary. Popular governments will seek to provide more (not less) services to please the electorate and assure their re-election through democratic processes. Without a substantial improvement in the economic base they must make do with the current, limited resource levels. This makes the search for economy in governmental business an important priority of the newly emerging democratic governments. These same considerations make the search for a more integrative role between public, private sectors and civil

society actors a more likely strategy to pursue rather than the failed policies of state-dominance.

The onset of political transitions from monarchy to institutional pluralism in Africa thus provides a special opportunity to identify the most appropriate strategies for increasing the level of administrative efficiency through the reconstitution of political institutions and the opportunities which exist for citizens to ensure that Africa's public services actually provide quality services.

Fortunately, one of the most important perspectives which has become popularised in the 1990s is the concept of governance. Even though there is considerable controversy as to its meaning, the manner of its application to the policy discourse and the extent of its relevance to Africa, the concept highlights the critical importance and relevance of political institutions for the revitalization of the public service. This concept and its relevance for the search for administrative efficiency will be further examined in this paper. In a sense, the increasing emphasis in the literature on governance or the political environment as an important factor in public administration reform represents a return to the ecological concerns of the 1950's and 1960's in the discussion on public administration analysis and reform in developing countries (e.g. Riggs 1961, World Bank 1992). The only difference though is that the current emphasis on governance in the 1990s is not limited to developing countries. It is a global phenomenon and all countries are seeking for ways to improve the performance of their public institutions through the application of governance norms of public service effectiveness, accountability, openness, institutional and policy pluralism and rule of law. African countries are likely to be able to benefit from the study of evolving comparative experiences and possibly adapt some of these to their local conditions.

## **2 Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of this paper therefore include the following:

First, to evaluate the significance of the role of political actors and institutions in determining the efficiency of African administrative institutions in the light of African experiences.

Second, the paper will review past administrative reforms in Africa and identify the reasons for their relative ineffectiveness. In particular it would focus on the relationships between political and administrative actors and institutions in an effort to identify the relationships which are likely to be most conducive to higher levels of administrative efficiency on the continent.

The third objective is therefore to suggest appropriate measures for improving administrative efficiency through dynamic interactions between political and administrative actors and institutions on the one hand and administrative institutions and citizens on the other.

It is hoped that African member-states will find the analysis and the recommendations useful in formulating their own plans for increasing the quantity and quality of services provided by their public services as comprehensive reforms aimed at ensuring that the Public Administration System (PAS) in the various countries are not only efficient but are able to provide the appropriate enabling environment for a vibrant private sector and civil society are undertaken.

### **3 Working Propositions**

In order to assist our enquiry, two working propositions or assumptions are made:

- Political arrangements determine to a large extent the ability of any administrative institution to provide goods and services in appropriate quantity and quality to its clientele.
- African administrative systems are likely to be most effective and efficient when they are highly motivated, professionalised and accountable to the citizenry.

This paper relies exclusively on desk research and reviews all available documents as well as published and unpublished literature in this area to the extent that they relate to the experiences of public services in sub-Saharan Africa.

Fortunately, the Public Administration and Human Resources and Social Development Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has conducted a number of projects, workshops and missions in this area in the last several years, especially under the Special Action Programme for Public Administration and Management in Africa (SAPAM) initiative. These, together with the publications official of a number of national, regional and international organizations as well as the works of individual researchers within and outside Africa, constitute the resource base for this paper.

The next section is the conceptual part of this paper in which the key concepts are used in the study are defined and an attempt is made to indicate the manner in which political actors and institutions impact on the operations of the public sector. In the section following that (three), administrative reforms undertaken since political independence in African countries are reviewed to evaluate the extent to which such reforms constituted adequate responses to the problems in African public services.

In section four, we take a close and analytical look at the state of African public services and the major problems with which they are afflicted in order to understand the fundamental nature of the problems. The conclusion reached is that the fundamental problem confronting African public administration systems (PAS) is about the nature and form of governance. In the final section, we identify the proposals for improving administrative efficiency and effectiveness using the democratic renewal strategy.

## **II Politics and Administrative Efficiency: A Conceptual Framework**

### **Major Concepts used in this Study**

#### **1 Politics, Political Institutions and Public Service Efficiency**

'Politics' relates to how human beings are governed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary refers to politics as the 'art and science of government'. In scholarly usage, politics is taken to mean the authoritative allocation of values in society. It is concerned with who gets what, how and why?. The above definition helps us to understand its various forms- partisan and non-partisan politics; national versus local politics etc.

Politics is crucial for attaining societal goals but perhaps the most important thing about politics is that it is normally expressed, in all societies, through institutions. 'Institutions' are defined as 'the rules, the enforcement characteristics of rules, and the norms of behaviour that shape repeated human interaction' (North 1993: 13). They are accepted norms and rules that have enforcement characteristics.

Political institutions are of two broad types- state and civil society institutions. State institutions give expression to the will of the society and are compulsive. They include: the legislature, the political executive, the judiciary, local governments, and in some countries, political parties etc. Civil society institutions are those intermediate institutions between the state and the citizen which are created by citizens on a voluntary basis. They include private or business sector organisations, non-governmental or people-based organisations, interest and pressure groups.

Administrative institutions constitute a sub-set of state institutions. These are institutions that are charged with making and executing policy and are therefore regarded as part and parcel of the executive branch.

Nevertheless, each of the institutions mentioned above impact in some way with the public administration system (PAS) to ensure that the PAS attains very high standards of administrative efficiency - although exactly how this function is carried out varies from one country to another depending on political and administrative culture or what is often referred to as regime types.

Generally, the legislature is responsible for promulgating into law, bills which guide administrative action. Administrative officials who are appointed might have assisted in drafting the bills but the final approval and adoption of such bills are the responsibilities of members of the legislature- who are elected as the peoples' representatives. Secondly, they are also responsible for reviewing and approving the budget. They are thus responsible for providing the needed resources for each unit or branch of government. Thirdly, they are also charged with auditing and

scrutinising how public funds are expended. In some countries, such as the British westminster model and those influenced by the British system, they have powers to ask questions from members of the political executive. In the United States system, legislators could conduct investigations and they have powers to summon any member of the executive -either in the political or permanent or administrative division of the public service. For this reason, they also have impeachment powers.

The **executive** is responsible for providing the political leadership in each ministry or department of government. They make policies even though they rely on civil servants (especially in the Westminster model) as confidential advisers. They also formulate budget proposals and are (at least in theory ) responsible for the management of men, money and materials in their respective ministries or departments. They make all the appointments to top positions in the civil service although this responsibility is often shared with independent agencies referred to as civil service commissions or personnel management offices. One of the most important requirements which ensures that the civil service functions at the top of its capacity is that the civil service attracts the most talented and skilled personnel, especially to the topmost levels. However, in all systems, a mixture of generalist and professional administrative officers -depending on their backgrounds- are recruited into the civil service. The British system traditionally emphasised the former whereas the American system emphasised the latter but in recent times all systems have come to focus on recruiting and training people from diverse backgrounds for top positions in government by turning them, through training and duty assignments, to professional administrators.

The **courts** have the least direct impact on the PAS especially in English-speaking countries. On the other hand, in French- speaking countries, law and courts plays an important role. Public servants' roles are defined in a civil service code and there are also special administrative courts that deal exclusively with administrative matters. The closest to these in English-speaking countries are the quasi - judicial commissions such as ombudsman, ethical codes of conduct agencies and tribunals etc. However, in all countries, the courts are essential for guaranteeing public order and arbitrating between various institutions and actors in case of conflict. Moreover, institutions such as ombudsman and specialised commissions are referred to as quasi-judicial institutions and they combine elements of state and society institutional characteristics.

**Local governments** are constituted with powers and responsibilities devolved from the central government with their own policy- making and executing structures. They are important for helping to decongest the central government and for bringing government nearer to the people. This arrangement not only enables these institutions to mobilise resources from the community, they also ensure that services are both responsive and accountable to the public. For this reason, local governments in many countries are responsible for the majority of domestic services and actually spend a large proportion of the total public expenditure. They also employ a large number of professional staff, and in many countries, local governments employ more staff than their respective central governments (Rowat 1990, UNDP 1993).

**Civil society** organs such as the private media, non-governmental and people-based organisations and independent research centers would be regarded as extra-legal structures. They could help to investigate and expose cases of gross maladministration. They could also help to suggest and evaluate alternative policy choices.

Table 1 gives a schedule of the various political institutions that impact on administrative agencies to enhance their effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability to the public.

As already noted above there are varying differences from one country to another. For instance, both the legislature and the civil society institutions play a more visible role in the policy process in the United States than they do in the British tradition. Similarly, civil servants in the British Westminster-Whitehall model are more involved in the policy process than their counterparts in the American political system, although there has been a trend towards convergence in the last few years. British ministers have adopted the idea of special advisers (1983) while the Americans have also introduced the idea of a senior executive service to serve the top echelons of the public service (1978). All of them subscribe to the doctrine that civil servants are expected to be **objective, anonymous and politically neutral** while the political executives take full responsibility for all the deeds and misdeeds of their respective ministry- the **doctrine of ministerial responsibility**. The only difference is the point at which political officials are drawn and permanent officials (or administrative) officials begin. In the American system, the number and levels of political officials within the PAS are more than in any of the European systems. In addition, in the American system, each minister is responsible only for his or her own department (ministry) whereas in the British and European tradition each minister is also responsible for the collective behaviour of the whole of the political executive (Smith 1982, Adamolekun 1986).

These institutional arrangements are underpinned by democratic beliefs. And African countries generally adopted the institutional arrangements existing in the mother colonial country at the time of independence in the late 1950s or early 1960s - for the same reasons - to promote or enhance PAS efficiency. This was the situation up to the late 1960s. The British Westminster and French presidential models prevailed everywhere, although much later, countries such as Nigeria, switched from the British Westminster model to the American presidential model after the first intervention by the military and their withdrawal to the barracks. After this period, there emerged one-party and military governments in most of the African countries which nullified institutional pluralism and substituted for them the dominance of the public sector by one institution (the single, official political party or the military bureaucracy) which was closely allied with and controlled the PAS (late 1960s to late 1980s). All these developments have raised afresh the controversy about the relative strength or weakness of the public servants in the policy process compared to the political class. The original view was that civil servants exercised more control of the policy process because of their historical, tenure and intellectual advantages over the politicians. Post independence developments in several countries however, led some others to suggest that while

this was the case in the pre-independence period, there had been a qualitative change in the relations between politicians and civil servants in the post-independence period. The latter neither possessed the cohesion nor the autonomy imputed to them and several of them have had to survive by surrendering to the whims and caprices of political masters who had come to believe that ministerial control of the ministries meant absolute discretion of the ministers in all matters-whether routine or strategic (Hyden 1979: 93-96).

However, from 1990, there was a revival of democratisation demands which led to the opening up of very many countries on the continent. The belief is that this development presents opportunities for a realignment of social forces which might lead to a redefinition of the respective roles of political and administrative actors but also of other institutional actors and the public- with the objective of raising the levels of public sector performance which has fallen to an all time low in many African countries.

## **2 Democracy and Democratization**

Democracy is one word which has suffered from its own success. In the cold war era, Western nations as well as those in Eastern Europe prided themselves on being more democratic than the other. The collapse of the Berlin Wall confirmed what had been suspected all along, that democracy, like other political science concepts such as federalism and decentralization, can be distorted to mean the exact opposite of what it is expected to imply. Even for a country like the United States of America, regarded by some as the exemplar of democracy, the existence of large pockets of poverty has led some observers to wonder the extent to which 'democratic' can continue to be used to describe the political system existing in that country (Tocqueville 1969, Ostrom 1991, Sandbrook 1993: 118-119). For these reasons, it is important to clarify exactly what we mean by this concept.

The great challenge confronting all societies is to ensure that those who temporarily wield power have sufficient power to pursue public interest but at the same time can be prevented by the people from exercising these prerogatives to promote their own personal interests at the expense of the public will (Ostrom 1987, 1990).

To this end, Robert Dahl(1971) uses the word 'polyarchy' to characterise a democratic government. The attributes of this system of government include: a) competition for public office by individuals and organised groups (political parties) without the use of force; b) an inclusive political participation mechanism for the selection of leaders and policies; and c) a reasonable level of civil and political liberties to guarantee the integrity of political competition and participation.

On the other hand George Sartori (1987:34), after an extensive review of different conceptions of democracy posits that democracy is an expression of the nature and quality of the relationship between the governed and the government: when the state is at the service of the citizens and not the citizens at the service

of the state'. This is what some observers have referred to as 'responsive rule' (Beetham 1994, Saward 1994).

An attempt has been made to synchronize these institutional and attitudinal views of the concept with the works of other scholars on the subject (Oyugi & Gitonga 1987, Ostrom 1990,1993; E. Ostrom 1986, Hyden & Bratton 1992, Hadenius 1992, ECPDM 1992, Buijtenhuijs & Rijnierse 1992, Beetham 1994) to suggest that democracy is:

a system of governance (a manner of exercising power, see below) which underscores the plural nature of politics and hence gives recognition to the diversity of social forces in the community. A democratic regime accommodates these forces by providing for a polycentric political order which not only recognises these forces formally but enables them to interact with one another in diverse ways: in competition, collaboration or cooperation. (Olowu 1995a: 16)

The opposite of a polycentric political order is a **monocentric** political order in which all the powers of the state emanate from and gravitate to one central point (Ostrom 1988,1990). Each of these conceptions of political order has tremendous implications not only for the amount of political freedom which the citizen can exercise but also for the range and quality of political institutions existing in a society and for administrative performance.

'Democratisation' is the movement of a society from a monocratic to a polycentric political order. Democracy thus refers to a particular system of social organization of political forces in a society in such a way that the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is one of symmetry sustained by specific institutions and attitudes that regulate the behaviour between the ruler, the ruled and the manner in which the rules are made and applied. We return to a fuller discussion of these issues later. Nevertheless, it is important to point to the fact that several African societies were organized as polycentric political systems in the pre-colonial period. (Ayyitey 1991)

Hence, even though there has been a tendency for donors and some civil society actors to limit democratization to the formal adoption of multi-parties, it is important that the democratization movement in Africa acquire or re-acquire these institutional and attitudinal dimensions of the concept to ensure the sustainability of democratic practice and especially in view of the fact that the majority of African states opted for a monocratic political order with disastrous consequences in the immediate post independent period. (Wunsch & Olowu 1990)

Table 2 gives a good idea of the state of the democratization movement in Africa. It is important to note that only three countries are classified as having an 'established but limited democracy'. Twelve (12) have recently instituted democracies, 6 of this having been ruled by the military in the recent past. The second but largest category (22 states) is referred to as 'enjoying democracy in parts'. In fact only 9 of these states are still making advances towards democracy, the remaining 13 have already been coopted by the existing ruling elites. According to the criteria set up earlier, the latter category of states as well as three others (asterisked) will fail the 'democratic' test. In other words, only 21 of the 54

countries within the region can be regarded as either democratic or strongly aspiring to the democratic political structure. It is heartening though that even in countries such as Nigeria, Zaire, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Uganda where the democratic process has been stalled by the political leadership, civil rights and oppositional groups have continued the pressure for political liberalization.

The above demonstrates the extremely fragile nature and the reversibility of some of these positive trends. Events in the Gambia, Niger, and Sao Tome in recent times have served to underscore how very fragile the process can be (See also Decalo 1992, Bratton & De Walle 1992, Rasheed 1995). There is therefore the need to strengthen the capacity of critical democratic institutions in various African countries.

The point must therefore be made on the outset that any form of democratization which is confined only to institutional reforms at the national level, and which focuses all attention on the national government is bound to the same intellectual tradition or paradigm that produced Africa's centralized state. What is required is a different paradigm of governance, one that moves us from a **monocratic** political order to a **polycentric** political order. A monocratic political order which presumes a single centre is bound to fail in Africa for the following reasons: its exclusive preoccupation with the formal sectors of the economy and society, the assumption of the limitless capacity of the bureaucracy to coordinate and manage the economy, belief in the single party or military dictatorships as the sole strategy of bringing about unity and national integration (Wunsch & Olowu 1990, Olowu 1995a).

Furthermore, a monocratic political order tends to ascribe ultimate value to political power, leading to desperation in the struggle to attain and keep it. Anyone who is unlucky to find himself or herself in the opposition will most probably spend the rest of his/her life in detention, jail, political asylum and will suffer the loss of property if not his or her own life. (Wiseman 1994). The monocratic political order not only makes democratic governance impossible, it also endangers the development process- because of the absence of peace, a framework of law and order, the declining opportunities for people to associate together for productive purposes and the pervasiveness of the corruption associated with absolute power in patrimonial conditions. (See Rweyemamu 1986, Balogun 1986, Ake 1995; and Section 5 of this paper).

A polycentric political system thus consists of many autonomous units which are formally independent of one another. These units interact through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, conflict resolution and consensus building. A key feature of the polycentric model is the recognition of diverse centres of powers. Power is deliberately divided vertically and horizontally. Vertically, the national government and sub-national entities are conferred with constitutional powers which clearly state their responsibilities and tax powers. Horizontally, there will also be a division of responsibilities and resources such that branch of the government can specialise in what it is able to do best- making the laws, executing them or adjudicating on them. In addition, they will act as checks on one another's excesses. Moreover, other society based institutions- such as trade unions,

universities, religious and private sector organizations constitute a separate category of actors within the system, but definitely outside the framework of the public sector. (Ostrom et. al. 1988; E. Ostrom 1986, Wunsch & Olowu 1990).

Historically, democratic systems emerged all over the world several years after the formation of centralized nation-states. Democratic political systems are of relatively recent origin in contrast to various forms of monarchy as analyzed in the Hobbesian conception of the modern state. (Ostrom 1990, Cohen 1995). However, democracy has acquired new epithets in recent times: concepts such as governance and good governance have come up and are usually closely related to it.

### 3 Governance

While some scholars equate democracy to governance, the latter as an evolving term is subject also to various interpretations. Even though a few scholars have made reference to the word 'governance' in discussing aspects of African administration in the past, its ascendancy to becoming a dominant concept in the lexicography of African public sector reform is a relatively recent phenomenon (See AAPAM 1986). Indeed, some writers have mistakenly traced its origins to the publication of the World Bank's landmark publication on development management in Africa, **Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth- A Long Term Perspective Study** (1989b: 60 - 61). The appropriate section of this treatise argued quite rightly that:

Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance. By governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs. Because countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their own interests without fear of being called to account. In self-defence, individuals have built up personal networks of influence rather than hold the all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failures. In this way, politics becomes personalized, and patronage becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled and voluntary associations are coopted or disbanded.

Several political scientists, especially those associated with the study of state and civil/society relationships in Africa have written extensively about the importance of governance as distinct from government before this time (See for instance AAPAM 1984, Rothchild & Olorunsola 1988, Wunsch & Olowu 1990, Hyden & Bratton 1992 etc). What the World Bank document has done is to popularise it within the donor and multilateral development community and apply the concept concretely to African conditions. Even though the Bank was at first cautious in moving out of its traditional confines of economic management, first because of its mandate and second because of the fear that it could be accused of trampling on the sovereignty of independent nation-states, several other donor agencies took a cue from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), moved swiftly and began to use 'the establishment of democratic structures or multiparty systems' as part of their conditionalities for financial

assistance to cash- strapped African governments (See for instance USAID 1992, 1994; and especially Nunnenkamp 1995).

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the effectiveness of this position was demonstrated in the case of Kenya. The political leadership had asserted late in 1991, that the people of Kenya, were not ready for multiparty democracy. However, when donors insisted that aid to that country be put on hold until the political situation improved in that country, (a euphemism for 'good' or democratic governance), the political leadership changed gears and began to sing a new tune. A constitutional review was quickly undertaken and other parties other than the ruling party were allowed to contest the forthcoming elections. Such a strategy has not always worked in every country especially where the political leadership has access to independent revenue sources, such as in the case of Zaire and Nigeria. Nevertheless, it shows how important the concept of governance has become in the conduct of African politics.

In any case, since 1989, a variety of notions have been built around the concept- from being a euphemism for Western liberal democracy to norms of assessing governmental effectiveness. In the main, there are at least three senses in which the word 'governance' is used today. First, it is used to **describe** institutional relations between the state and civil society structures- political parties, voluntary organisations, business enterprises, non- governmental organizations etc. Secondly, it is also used to **analyze** the quality of any governmental form. The main elements of governance that are used in this type of analysis include the following: efficiency, participation, transparency, accountability, pluralism, rule of law etc. Finally, the concept is used **normatively** to describe desirable characteristics of a public administration system. In fact, according to a recent publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1995b: xiii-xiv) governance is regarded as synonymous with public sector management. The elements of good or sound governance include "political accountability, freedom of association and participation, reliable and equitable legal frameworks, bureaucratic transparency, the availability of valid information, and effective and efficient public sector management".

In sum, governance focuses on the essential institutional and attitudinal imperatives of a democratic society- the emphasis being on the attempt to relate the state to the whole of the society rather than segments within it. This means that state power has to be used to benefit the totality of a country's population rather than the few who wield power. In the belief that democracy will advance these goals, many African countries have joined the democratic trail as we saw above.

Governance institutions are the variety of state and society structures already discussed above. Governance norms are those which constitute the ground-norms in a democratic society. In particular these norms set the framework for the relationship between state and society institutions and actors, between the governed and their governors. Of these norms, the following are perhaps the most important:

- managerial or organizational efficiency;
- participation and consensus building;
- accountability;
- openness, transparency or visibility of governmental actions;
- rule of law; and
- institutional pluralism.

We shall examine the interrelationships between these norms and their implications for the operations of the political and administrative institutions in the next sub-section.

#### 4 Administrative Efficiency

**Efficiency** is a technical concept. It expresses the relationship between input and output. However, in applying this concept to public sector institutions, one is confronted with two types of problems, the first, philosophical, the other technical. On the philosophical side, some scholars have wondered whether the most efficient means is the best or most realistic course to pursue in public sector agencies. Some have thus substituted for efficiency, cognate concepts such as least-cost, rationality, etc. (Simon 1947, Ostrom 1974). Still, there are those who believe that the least cost might run contrary to social welfare or other societal values such as community solidarity, equity, fairness, promptness, courtesy etc. (See Propenko 1989, Balogun 1975, Khan 1975, Ake 1993, Olowu 1995b).

On the technical side, there is usually the problem of measuring efficiency in the public sector especially given the fact that a number of the services provided by the public are not easily quantifiable because of the nature of the services (e.g defence, security and other 'public' services (indivisible and with substantial externalities) and the complex objectives of governmental operations, which often combine economic with non-economic goals.

However, since available resources are always too scarce to meet the range of social needs, these problems have been resolved over the years by devising a number of surrogates to measure efficiency in the public sector. Such measures include, among others: **effectiveness**, the relationship between organisational objectives and the achievements of the organization; **productivity**, the combined use of efficiency and effectiveness measures; **client-satisfaction** which measures the extent of satisfaction of citizens and clients for service quality; **transactional efficiency**, which measures the speed and accuracy with which internal communications within the public service are completed; and a number of others such as value for money, promptness, courtesy, etc. Indeed, the considerations of relating cost to output have dominated efforts to improve organizational skills and procedures in public agencies usually patterned after those of the private sector institutions (e.g personnel, budgetary and organizational reforms such as management by objectives, organizational development etc). There are in fact several scholars and practitioners who believe that there is considerable scope for measurement in the public sector organizations and the increasingly limited resources available to governments worldwide has

been a major consideration in bringing about critical innovations to the operations of the public service worldwide (See Osborne & Gabler 1992, Commonwealth Secretariat 1995).

On the other hand, those who maintain that individual rationality (the individual's perception of the most advantageous behaviour) constitutes the most reasonable way to provide for public goods and services especially where the market criterion does not apply make a strong case for institutions which allow each member of the society to play an active role in the organization and delivery of public goods and services- in order to reduce opportunities for the pursuit of organizational and individual maximising strategies at the expense of the public in public bureaucracies. Institutional opportunities must be provided for 'exit, the opportunity to opt out and for 'voice ' - in terms of the ability of citizen-consumers of public goods to express opinions on the quality of services received and to obtain redress. To this end then, political institutions are provided to supervise the providers of services on behalf of the consuming public. It is within this framework that the five governance norms earlier identified above mutually reinforce one another in promoting the 'efficiency' of public administration institutions. Without these in place, public organizations tend to promote the interests of their organizations and organizational members to the detriment of the citizens (Crozier 1964, Ostrom 1974, Paul 1991).

For the avoidance of doubt, the term, Public Administration System (PAS) as used in this document refers to the totality of the institutions charged with policy formulation and implementation in a country. It has a number of component parts (civil service institutions as well as local governments or parastate organs). However, even though public enterprises are included in the conception of PAS, they are not discussed in this paper because a separate study that would focus on this institution alone is under way (See UNECA 1996).

## **5 The Dynamic Relationships Between Political and Administrative Efficiency**

All the points already made above have profound implications for the organization of the public administration system. Even though public administration as an intellectual discipline has its roots in the attempt to separate politics from administration, it is generally understood that political institutions are crucial for the realisation of administrative efficiency and effectiveness- in at least three important ways.

First, political institutions provide direction and energy for public administration institutions. They are supposed to provide the general directions of policy or policies to be followed by administrative or appointed officials, based on the interests articulated and aggregated by the political parties. The extent to which this function is actually carried out by the political leadership or senior administrators varies from one country to another but it is usually dependent on the relative capabilities of political and administrative officials respectively and the prevailing political culture (Adamolekun 1986).

Secondly, political institutions are responsible for providing necessary resources for the effective functioning of the administrative system. They allocate resources not only between various socio-economic groups in the society through taxation but also through the provision of different types of services to the public and the differential funding of government departments and agencies.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, these political institutions are uniquely responsible for ensuring that the administrative system is efficient in terms of the quantitative considerations of time and resource utilisation as well as effective in the attainment of societal qualitative values of equity, responsiveness, fairness, courtesy, respectfulness etc. For this reason, administrative institutions and actors are subordinated, at least in theory, to political institutions and actors. The logic behind this arrangement is that political institutions represent the citizens whereas administrative officials are appointed on the basis of their expertise. In recent times, governments and consumers have been seeking to increase their ability to extract accountable and responsive performance from public sector institutions.

Different governance models have different implications for the realization of these societal goals mentioned above. Vincent Ostrom (1974) has provided an insight into the different administrative implications of the two models of governance already discussed above. These are provided as Appendices A and B at the end of this report. He argues that monarchy makes the realization of these (five) governance norms practically impossible. This is because the more bureaucratic the organization becomes, the more remote it is from its consumers. Since most public services are provided for all members of the public without the application of the exclusion principle, there is a tendency for bureaucratic organizations to maximise their profits in spite of their declining performance levels and pass their costs to the consumer. However, when public services are provided using different sets of institutions, producers are at an arms length relationship with consumers or their representatives and are compelled to reflect consumer interests (See Paul 1991).

Governance norms are difficult if not impossible to realise in a monocratic political system. But they are not automatic even in a polycentric political system. In Table 3, an attempt is made to characterise each of the governance norms together with the most important areas of application and the results. African countries had monocratic political systems and have begun to democratise only recently. The institutions that are required to ensure that the PAS is subject to the people are still new and in some cases non-existent. As a result, African public servants are still the masters that are being served by the masses of the people rather than the other way round.

Institutional weaknesses in African countries have been further reinforced by the negative attitudes of those engaged in the political process. Politics is perceived not as an ennobling activity for advancing societal or public interests but as a means of advancing the personal or sectional interests of those who wield power. Unfortunately, as we shall show in Section four, there are no consistent data, hence the reliance on surrogates, spot studies and subjective assessments

of African PAS. How to reverse these negative trends of the African PAS is an issue that we examine in the next and subsequent sections.

We shall conclude this section by noting that the last decade has witnessed tremendous changes in the field of public sector management throughout the world. The changes are of such magnitude and of universal application that they have been likened to a shift in public administration paradigm (Kauffmann et. al. 1986, Esman 1994, Borins 1995). We quote from the report of a recent international colloquium of Commonwealth countries on this theme:

The key finding of the (conference ) report is that despite the diversity of Commonwealth countries (a total of 51 nations which represent all the world's major economic and geographical zones), there was a common pattern in their responses. So strong is this common pattern that it can be labelled a new paradigm in public administration (Borins 1995:4, reporting CAPAM conference, emphases in the original; parentheses added).

This new paradigm, which emerged in the last decade has five major emphases:

- The role of public managers in providing high quality services that citizens value;
- Increased managerial autonomy, particularly from central agency controls;
- Organisations and individuals are measured and rewarded on the basis of whether they met demanding performance targets; and
- Provision of the human and technological resources that managers need to meet their performance targets; and
- Receptiveness to competition and a more discriminatory attitude as to which public purposes should be performed by the public sector as opposed to the private sector.

The challenge confronting African countries is to shift from the old to this new order in which the consumer/citizen is king and one in which institutional pluralism is encouraged rather than monocracy. As we show in the next section past administrative reform efforts have failed to lead in this direction but the ability to make this shift constitutes the central challenge confronting African countries in the 1990s and beyond.

### **III Administrative Reforms In Africa: Past and Present**

#### **Introduction**

Since the attainment of independence, virtually African countries have sought to reform their respective PAS in the hope that this will synchronise with changes in the environment of public services but also in the hope that higher levels of administrative efficiency would be secured. Such hopes have however not been realised in most of the countries. In this section, we review why this has been the case. The year 1980 is regarded as a watershed in terms of the different types of reforms that have been formulated and implemented to tackle the major problems confronting African public services since they emerged from colonial rule beginning from the late 1950s on. Whereas the earlier reforms of African public services sought to Africanise, restructure and expand the public service, reforms associated with structural adjustment and stabilization (from the 1980s on) sought to retrench the role of the state both in terms of the scope of its activities and the size and strength of the personnel within the bureaucracy.

#### **1 Administrative Reforms Up To the 1980s**

Several factors made administrative reform an immediate and almost universal preoccupation of the newly independent governments of Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The first was the legacy of the public service inherited at independence. The colonial service was one that has been variously described as: 'conservative, unresponsive, and undevelopmental'; 'elitist, centrist and autocratic' (Mutahaba, et. al. 1993, Wunsch 1990). Even though some efforts were made to develop a minimal level of infrastructure in physical and social services, it was essentially a 'law and order' administrative system designed primarily to facilitate the exploitative objectives of the colonial enterprise. Clearly, this administrative system needed to be reoriented to meet the 'developmental' objectives of the newly independent states.

Second, African political leaders in the immediate post-independence years led their people to have very high expectations of the fruits of political independence. Kwame Nkrumah's clarion call, which equates political independence to the Divine invitation to the kingdom of God, 'seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will be added unto you' was widely shared by a cross section of African peoples and their leaders. Governments set themselves the (near impossible) task of eradicating poverty, illiteracy and diseases during their terms of office. This necessitated not only the mobilisation of human and material resources for the realisation of these lofty objectives but the restructuring of the public services and a reorientation of the public servants' attitudes.

Third, the state seemed the only suitable candidate to promote change in society. The indigenous private sector was underdeveloped and whatever exists was controlled either by foreign multinationals, non-nationals or settlers (e.g. the

Asians in East Africa and the Syrians and Lebanese in West Africa). Restrictive colonial policies discriminated against indigenous private capitalism. Local governments which could have shared in carrying some of the burdens of development were discredited either by corruption of the new political elements or their control by traditional chiefs who were regarded as collaborators with the old colonial establishment.

Finally, development and donor agencies both from the east and west encouraged a state-centred approach. Either due to geopolitical considerations emanating from the cold war or the belief that science and capital were all that were needed to transform a continent that has been referred to as 'development's last frontier', African states were encouraged to adopt a strategy of development planning which required that the state acts as a catalyst of change throughout the economy (See for instance Hyden 1986: 123). In addition to generous donor support, the international environment was also auspicious to African exports thus providing ample resources for this state-based social engineering.

In the main, the administrative reforms of this period had six major components: localisation or Africanisation of top and middle levels of the public services; the restructuring of the public service; the adoption of modern management techniques in the public service; adoption of development planning as the major strategy of socioeconomic transformation and the widespread use of public enterprises and the politicisation of the higher echelons of the public service. Each of these elements will be discussed briefly in turn (more extensive treatment exists in the literature e.g. AAPAM 1984, 1985; Wamalwa & Balogun 1992, Mutahaba et al. 1993, Balogun 1995, Adamolekun 1995).

## **I Localisation or Africanisation**

In the colonial period, the public service was racially structured: the senior classes had white officers while the junior ranks were for the indigenous population. One of the first concerns in the post-independence years was to replace European officers with locals. This was a relatively easy process and one that was carried out rather rapidly. However, there were three major constraints. First, the attitudes of the political leadership - as in the Cote d'Ivoire - which believed that too rapid localisation policy might jeopardise professional performance. The second constraint was the availability of qualified local personnel. Many countries lacked qualified personnel and there was the fear in a place like the Northern parts of Nigeria that a policy of rapid localisation will only replace Europeans with Southern Nigerian elites. Hence, that part of the country came up not with a localisation or Africanisation policy but with a **Northernisation** policy. A third constraint was the problem of paying off the retiring Europeans. Where financial resources were in short supply, they were allowed to retire normally - rather than pay immediate severance benefits.

One of the most important outcomes of the localisation strategy was the great emphasis on education and training of local officials. Besides generous education policies, financed largely by the state, most countries established Institutes of

Administration or Ecole National d'Administration to prepare officers for the positions being vacated by the Europeans. Over time, the emphasis in these training programmes shifted from localisation or indigenisation to professionalisation.

## **II Restructuring of the Public Services**

Another initiative adopted by many countries was the restructuring of their public services. Beginning with the civil service, new structures for the coordination of the central civil services were put forward. In almost all Anglophone Africa, for instance, the task of management coordination of the ministries passed from the Treasury to the Office of the Head of Civil Service and the Public Service Commission (which also served in a quasi-judicial capacity). Next, political appointees became head of the mainline civil service departments, in place of professional civil servants. These political appointees were assisted in their task of relating to the main units of their respective Ministries by Permanent Secretaries who were generalist officers, patterned after the Westminster model. Thirdly, the civil service was restructured from two (racial) classes to four: administrative/professional, technical, clerical and sub-clerical classes. Fourthly, the local authorities were reformed by the abolition of their semi-autonomous status and the secondment of senior officers of the government to coordinate their activities - much more like prefects than council/town clerks. In a sense this had the effect of helping to integrate the local authority system with the field administration system but it reduced the people's capacity to participate in local development efforts.

## **III Adoption of Modern Management Techniques**

Many of the countries in the region actually established special commissions comprising local and foreign experts and experienced administrators to study the major problems confronting the public service and make recommendations to the government on the best approach to tackling these problems. In almost every case these study groups or commissions identified the same common set of problems- lack of executive capacity, excessive decentralization and ossified administrative procedures etc. In virtually all the cases, great reliance was placed on the application of modern management techniques. This was the case with the Mills- Odoi Commission in Ghana (1967), the Ndegwa Commission in Kenya (1971), the Udoji Commission in Nigeria (1974) and the Wamalwa Commission in Swaziland (1975/76).

The new management techniques recommended by these Commissions included: Management by Objectives, Organization Development, Programme and Performance Budgeting, Management Survey, Matrix Management and others such as Cost-Benefit Analysis, Programme Evaluation and Review Technique, Management Audit, Performance Evaluation etc. According to some evaluations of these reforms, although the Commissions identified important human and organic problems, their remedies were 'largely mechanical and technical' (Rasheed

& Balogun 1995:38). In any case, many of these new techniques were never fully implemented. In most cases, the administrators were quick to take advantage of recommendations which enhanced their salaries but ignored those that had to do with mastering new techniques. And, in many cases, they got away with it, partly because the political class lacked the political will to enforce these reforms and because no effort was made in most of these countries to devise an appropriate strategy for implementing these reforms in the first place (Wamalwa & Balogun 1992, Adamolekun 1995).

#### **iv Development Planning Strategy**

Most countries in the region launched five-yearly development plans which were supposed to enable the state to coordinate the development process. An administrative machinery was set up to coordinate this process, of which local administrative units formed a component. Many countries sought to control the private sector and actually went ahead to **nationalise** or **indigenise** operations of key organisations in the 'commanding heights' of the economy, which in many cases meant turning these organizations into public enterprises (see next section). In extreme cases, governments such as those of Socialist Tanzania or Ethiopia attempted to collectivise farm land and or resettle the farming population, using the instrumentalities of the state bureaucracies - in the field.

Most of these development plans were never fully implemented, again for a variety of reasons. These included the uncertainties of the economic environment especially for economies that were largely monocultural, weak plan discipline, low executive capacity etc. Nevertheless, they all had the same effect of centralizing the administrative processes and institutions further and reducing input from societal organizations and actors. In most cases, these plans were poorly integrated programmes of the central ministries and agencies- with minimum input from the people. The result was a lot of resistance to plan implementation and minimal support from the people. Perhaps one of the most remarkable cases was the attempt by the Tanzanian government to resettle the rural populace into new villages. The organizations which provided linkages to the people such as cooperatives and local authorities had to be abolished by the government because they were regarded as points of resistance to government policy. Several years after this incident these institutions were reinstated and the initiators of the programme of resettlement regretted this outlandish decision but then the damage had already been done (Nyerere 1984, Wallis 1993).

#### **v Widespread Use of Public Enterprises**

In the absence of a strong indigenous private sector, the state moved in to create a large number of public enterprises for a range of different objectives. In fact, what happened in most countries was that the state took - over several enterprises which were being run by private sector operators either as a part of a nationalization or indigenization policy, the latter being the case in countries with a more modest socialist ideological posture. The result is one in which the state

combined with its detailed regulative and allocative roles, an entrepreneurial role. We provide below one example that was not untypical of the processes by which African countries from the decade beginning in 1968 took over the management of private sector businesses turning them into public enterprises:

On 1 January 1975, the government (of Ethiopia) took over banks, financial intermediaries, and insurance companies. The overall management of the banks was vested in a public agency, the Bank of Ethiopia, and also to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry... on 2 February 1975, seventy-two industries and commercial firms were taken over and the government assumed a majority of shares in twenty one of the industries. On 4 March 1975, rural land and commercial farms and their management were given to government ministries and parastatals such as the National Coffee Board, the Addis Ababa Dairy Development Agency, the Livestock and Meat Board, and the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit.... (Mutahaba et.al 1993: 30).

Unfortunately, even though these public enterprises controlled substantial resources and employed a large number of skilled personnel, they were poorly managed. They became a huge drain on the public treasury. One scholar referred to the inefficiencies associated with the African parastatal agencies sector as 'legendary' (Balogun 1995: 22). Unfortunately, few serious efforts were made to tackle these problems, again because the parastatal sector had become a major institution for sustaining the patrimonial systems of government that were in place in many African governments. The parastatals were particularly prone to large-scale corruption and nepotistic tendencies. In most cases they were never given the autonomy to operate as quasi-business agencies. (See Nellis 1986, Olowu 1988, Adamolekun 1995).

By the late 1970s, the bubble had burst on this strategy of development management. As African governments' deficits grew, so was their indebtedness (See UNECA 1996). Moreover, the capacity of the state to manage development shrank as inflationary pressures led to severe wage erosion while the response of governments to populist pressures by trade unions led to wage compression over the years.

## **vi Politicisation of the Public Service**

In contrast to the emphasis of the expert administrative commissions favouring technocracy, those who wielded political power in various African countries became increasingly pre-occupied with how to sustain themselves in power perpetually. But one of the most important obstacles to this objective was the tradition of the objectivity and political neutrality of appointed officials. The first measure adopted by many African political leaders was to transform their countries, legally into one-party states. Military rule also had the same effect of placing this inherited British tradition under immense pressure. Politicians (civil and military) worried more about the loyalty of persons who served in top positions of the public services rather than their technical competence. In many countries, therefore, these political leaders insisted that political loyalty was one of the critical criteria for appointment into senior positions in the public service. This happened in countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Ghana and several of the

Francophone countries. Positions such as those of the Head of the Civil Service were politicised. So were the several independent commissions responsible for overseeing the civil service, the teaching service, the police and the prisons services all of which came under political control. In Kenya, provincial and district commissioners were required to be first and foremost members of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU).

Secondly, in some states public servants were deployed to work in the party offices. This was justified on the ground that the party was superior to the state and in any case public policies emanated from the party, with the legislature and state executive merely serving as rubber stamps (Mutahaba 1989). The idea was that since policies were crafted in the (single) political party, public officials should bring their skills to bear on the policy making process- i.e. within the party rather than allow the state lose the benefit of the expertise due to some notion of neutrality.

Given this context and the reasoning of those who wielded political power, it was not too surprising that senior many civil servants not only supported this trend towards politicisation in their respective countries, they savoured the idea as is evident from the deliberations at the various Roundtables of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) during this period (Rweyemamu & Hyden 1975, AAPAM 1984,1986).

This change bred a lot of problems for the public services. One of this was that it undermined the tenure of public servants in the event of a change of government. In Nigeria, over 10,000 public officials of the government were dismissed by a new military administration after a successful coup d'etat against a preceding military administration in 1975- because some of them-especially the senior ones- were regarded as too closely involved with the policies of the preceding administration. The idea of a career service for the most senior officers received a jolt in this country from which the service has not been able to recover. This problem was further complicated by divergent ethnic loyalties, a problem that took a heavy toll in other African countries as well (See Rothchild & Olorunsola 1983). There were also problems of indiscipline, factionalism within the party being carried into the public service together with growing cases of patronage appointments into the public service and sycophancy. (Balow 1984, Wamalwa 1986). A case can indeed be made for the partial politicisation of the higher civil services especially. However, the wholesale politicisation of African public services which characterised this period had negative implications for the operations of the African public services.

## **2 Administrative Reforms of the Post-1980 Period**

The first salvo on the need for a new paradigm in African development management was fired by the World Bank in the form of what is now commonly referred to as the **Berg Report** (World Bank 1981). After calling attention to the region's declining productivity and per capita incomes during the decade of 1970s, it located the sources of the present economic crisis (slow overall economic

growth, sluggish agricultural performance, rapid population growth and balance of payments and fiscal crises) in the geophysical and cultural environment, external variables which were exacerbated by wrong-headed policies - bias against agriculture, overextended public sectors and trade and exchange rate policies which protected loss-making industries. The report called for short- to- medium term set of policies that focused on agriculture and export orientation through the adoption of market based trade and exchange rate regimes, a reduction of the deficit through cut-backs in public expenditure and a greater reliance on the private sector. These came to represent the core elements of the Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programmes which were designed to correct the fiscal and balance of payment problems confronting many African governments- financed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank respectively, the latter being the more dominant.

The programme has three main components: macroeconomic stability; policies to ensure that prices reflect relative scarcities and a reduction of the role of the state.

The administrative reform compliment to SAP fell into two broad categories: civil service management and economic policy and financial management reforms (See Table 4). The former has two broad components: the first, were programmes aimed at reducing wage bills while the second focused on the reform of pay and employment policy as incentives to greater / productivity and efficiency. The retrenchment programmes included censuses to eliminate ghost workers, hiring freezes early retirement and voluntary departures, retrenchment of staff, redeployment and retraining programmes. Pay and employment programmes, on the other hand, focused on: the rationalization of remuneration systems, wage decompression and related salary supplements.

The focus of the economic and financial management reforms were the improvement of economic and financial policy- making institutions. The most important characteristics of these reforms are that: a) they are all short-term programmes, and b) they involved only the national government and the donor agencies. Non- state actors and non-executive agencies of the government are not usually involved in the reform processes. (Adamolekun 1989, Dia 1993). In addition, c) these reforms tended to aggravate the loss of the available human resource and institutional capacity in African countries because of its lack of a serious concern with raising the level of excellence in the public service and the tendency to rely heavily on external technical assistance in installing the reforms.

Even where they succeeded in reducing the total number of public sector employees (rare cases), such reductions did not lead to substantial savings to enable them tackle the more difficult task of improving public sector incentives. The result has been the aggravation of salary erosion and the loss of critical for policy management (Numberg & Nellis 1995).

Several appraisals of the impact of structural adjustment policies in Africa have been conducted and some of these have been quite controversial both in terms of their findings and methods. Initially, the line of battle was a very clear one

between protagonists of these policies - the Bretton Wood Institutions - and their antagonists - other multilateral agencies and independent Africanists and African scholars - most of whom were not impressed with the performance of SAP. More recently, a broad consensus has emerged that equitable and sustainable development should be the objective of African aspirations and "that there are no economic 'quick fixes' for Africa and that appropriate change will take much longer than originally thought". (Helleiner 1994:3).

The World Bank has made a number of concessions to its critics. It has accepted the necessity for a long-term view, the need to incorporate into its programmes concern for the poor, the environment and the improvement of governance. All of these are incorporated in the long-term perspective study on African development (World Bank 1989). Moreover, sympathizers of the World Bank argue that the poor performance of African countries in spite of the stringent application of SAP (in some of the best cases) should not be taken as a failure of SAP but rather the focus should be on the counterfactual - what would have happened without SAP? In particular, they point to the fact that in spite of all its faults - SAP made available to African countries a level of in-flow of concessional resources into the continent, an attribute which none of the alternatives that have been prepared to SAP has. More importantly, all the alternatives to SAP imply a greater role for the state, without indicating how the capacity of the state would be improved. (van de Walle 1994).

In a recent study commissioned by the World Bank itself, the institution argues that SAP has succeeded in those countries which made the most effort in reforms but concedes that it has failed with respect to public sector reform:

There is increasing recognition that adjustment programmes, with their focus on containing civil service costs, have had limited success in tackling the more fundamental problems of the public sector, such as the lack of accountability and transparency, civil service employment and pay practices that are unrelated to technical competence and productivity, regressive patterns of resource mobilization, expenditures that conflict with development priorities, and the limited capacity for policy analysis. Broader approaches that address the difficult tasks of strengthening the administrative structure and creating the conditions for improved governance are thus called for. (World Bank 1994a: 13).

A more detailed study of the Bank's civil service reforms showed that in fact they led to absolute increases in wage bills after the reforms and none of the country cases indicated that the reforms succeeded in 'fostering the needed change in work attitudes, ethics and organization culture that could lead to greater efficiency and productivity in the civil service' (Dia 1993: 6).

In the new consensus on African development management which is widely shared by the international development community and African governments, there is a clear recognition of the relevance and role of state institutions in fostering democracy and economic growth through the careful cultivation of market forces.

Within this framework, the expected roles of the new African state are expected to include the following seven clusters of responsibilities.

- Creation of an enabling policy environment for economic growth (maintenance of macro-economic stability, appropriate exchange rate regimes, promotion of trade, product and factor market liberalisation, financial and public expenditure reforms).
- Provision of physical, institutional and financial infrastructure to support the growth of a fledgling private sector;
- Development of human resources through investments in educational and health infrastructure;
- Efficient management of major enterprises which remain in the public sector either because of strategic linkages to the mass of informal and small scale producers; and
- Support for economic and political reforms - especially for the advance of democratisation and decentralization;
- Promotion of regional economic integration; and
- Mobilisation of productive and financial resources and promotion of competitiveness of African countries in the global market and the reduction/elimination of waste and of high debt profiles.

All of these point in the direction, not of a diminished state but a redirected and revitalised set of institutions in the political realm. The revised version of SAP has adopted a developmental, long-term and more intellectually well-rounded outlook, with appropriate focus on the development of market and non-market institutions. There is a reasonable discussion of governance and institution building even though these are yet to be integrated into the Bank's programme of economic or institutional reform in Africa.

### **Overall Assessment of Administrative Reform Efforts in Africa**

In sum, the reform efforts of the earlier period (pre-1980) were undermined by the tendency towards monocracy, either through one-party government or military rule, the non-accountability of the executive branch to the public, the struggle for ascendancy among ethnic elites. All of these made it easy for those who wielded power to substitute private for public interest and where this was not the case, they made it impossible to develop consistent measures of effectively monitoring administrative performance (For a full review of the administrative reform of this period, see Hyden 1983, Adamolekun 1986, 1995, Wallis 1989, Wamalwa & Balogun 1992, Beyene & Ootobo 1995, Balogun 1995, Olowu 1996b).

On the other hand, later (post-1980) reform initiatives were in their earlier phases highly economistic in their outlook. They attempted to ignore all political institutions other than the executive organ. In addition, reforms of this period also suffered from an underestimation of the critical importance of public sector institutions in providing the enabling environment for private sector growth. Furthermore, the implementation strategy they chose aggravated the loss of available human resources capacity since they relied so heavily on foreign technical assistance without seriously tackling the critical problem of how to retain the available capacity

of skilled resources within African public services (See for instance Adamolekun 1989, Dia 1993, Numberg & Nellis 1995).

Fortunately, the emerging consensus has put ultimate value on governance- the need to address political issues which are at the heart of declining administrative performance. It is interesting to note that some countries in the region have embarked upon a fresh round of administrative reforms in the 1990s which draw on the lessons of the past and are premised at improving governance in public management. We return to these issues in section five. In the meantime, in the next section, we take a look at the state of African public services by the early 1990s.

## **IV The State of the African Public Services by Early 1990s**

### **1 Nature and Dimensions of the African Administrative Crises**

In this section, it will be shown that by the early 1990s, a crisis or crises existed and still exist in the public administration systems of most African countries. Crisis signifies a situation of profound disequilibrium and has been used to describe the African administrative systems since the late 1970s (World Bank 1981, Balogun & Mutahaba 1989, Olowu 1991). It is a moot question whether this is itself a cause or effect of other crises (economic, political, demographic, ecological etc) but the situation which exists is one in which concurrent crises in the political, economic and administrative sub-sectors have become mutually reinforcing. As a result, efforts directed at solving the economic and/ or administrative problems without paying full and simultaneous attention to the political dimensions of the African crisis are bound to fail, and vice versa. The evidence in favour of this position seems to be growing by the day.

It is necessary to enter a caveat at this point. There is sufficient diversity within Africa to defy very broad generalisations. Nevertheless, in terms of the operations and performance of the African public sector certain broad generalisations can be made about the majority of African counties' experiences.

### **2 Three Self-Evident Problems**

First, it seems fairly evident that African public services are confronted with a problem with respect to their **mission**. Whereas in the colonial times, African public services were labelled as 'law and order' administrations, in the post-independence period and certainly up to the late 1970s, the public service became not only a regulator but an active player in the economic realm, playing as well the roles of financier and entrepreneur in the development process. The pendulum swung to the other extreme from the early 1980s when economic recession came to a head in many African countries and the Bretton Woods institutions seized the initiative in economic and administrative reform as shown in the last chapter.

It was initially asserted that African PAS needed to return to their colonial law and order mission leaving the field for private capital - domestic and foreign - and non-governmental organizations. With time, the list of what was conceded to the African PAS increased to include: basic infrastructure, investment in human capital (health and education), providing and ensuring stable macro-economic management, undertaking poverty alleviation measures and protecting the environment. As a popular publication of the World Bank (1989:5) puts it what 'Africa needs is not just less government but better government -government that concentrates its efforts less on direct inter.

The second response is brain-drain, the rapid flight of the brightest and best to greener pastures in the West or the Oil-rich Arab countries or to in-country donor-funded projects which provide completely different levels of remuneration to professionals.

The summary dismissal of staff and the arbitrary changes of their tenure contracts either as a result of SAP related reforms, independent government actions all add insult to injury in depressing the morale of civil servants further. This problem has been aggravated in countries that are engaged in warfare or civil strife.

A third self-evident problem is that of **performance**. There is a widespread perception that the performance of the public service has declined over time. It is unfortunate that however, that there are no clear indices for measuring performance in many of Africa's public services. As a result, a number of surrogate measures are used to indicate declining performance. For instance, economic decline is blamed on the expansion of the public services. In particular, it is argued that African governments spend too high an amount of their Gross National Product than is expected. But a comparison of African public sector expenditures as a proportion of the GNP shows that their central governments spend far less than the central governments of countries in the industrialized or industrializing nations of Asia whose economic performance have been dubbed as 'miraculous' (See Table 5). The average value for the latter category of countries is 38% (with some countries having values in excess of 50%) whereas it is under 30% for African countries. Yet, it is known that the subnational governments in the latter category of countries spend more than the national governments in those countries (Heller & Tait 1982, Rowat 1990). A closer inspection of the African data (Table 5) shows that it is the countries that are regarded as star performers on the continent (Botswana, Gabon etc ) that record high values of public expenditure/GNP.

In fact, in the industrialised West, the proportion of a national income which goes into public spending has increased from 36% of GDP in 1980 to 40% and the role of the state in setting macroeconomic policy and in ensuring that the society can compete in the global market in any part of the world has increased. Ditto for the transitional economies of Eastern Europe (Economist 1995:13; see also World Bank 1994b, United Nations 1995). What is, important is therefore not the size of public expenditures but the use to which such expenditures are put. It is significant for instance, that all these countries are making fresh efforts to ensure that their public agencies are efficient, accountable, responsive and that they give the public value for money (Osborne & Gaebler 1992, Numberg 1992, Manning 1995, Borins 1995).

In other words, the growth of global state expenditures may not be the best way to justify or explain economic or public sector decline. For one, several other factors such as those of ecology, terms of trade, political turmoil, population explosion etc. which are clearly beyond the reach of the public service might more readily explain economic decline (See for instance Balogun 1994: 25-26, Degefe 1994). In the same way it can be demonstrated that the size of the African public

services may not be the problem but the composition of their services: public service size per 100 population averages about 1.5 in Africa but ranges from 14.7 (Sweden) to 3.8 (Japan) with an average of 7.15 in the OECD countries. But the preponderance of Africa's public employees are in the junior grades and are located mostly at the center. (Rowat 1990, United Nations 1993).

In essence, the point being made here is not that African PAS have performed creditably but that the absence of consistent and reliable measures of performance constitute the critical problem as we show below. Yet, this ought to be the major preoccupation of those charged with the oversight over the public sector- on behalf of the public. This has not been the case in Africa. We shall indeed show on the basis of some available indicators that the performance of African PAS have declined over time.

This should have led to the reform and revitalisation of the policy and implementation processes by strengthening the inputs of citizens and other non-state actors into the policy process and clarifying the roles of political and administrative actors. Unfortunately, this path has not been pursued until the most recent times because of the political context in which citizens played a passive role.

In a sense, the foregoing three self-evident problems are important but they mask problems of a deeper character - the problems of internal self-regulation and performance monitoring, of governance and of reform. These three are not only related, they feed the other problems already discussed above.

### **3 Three Fundamental Administrative Problems**

The inability of an organization to **regulate itself and monitor its own performance** is one of the most pernicious symptoms of crisis (disequilibrium). In a sense, there is a close similarity to the human machine - the inability of a person to self-regulate/monitor himself or herself marks the symptoms of mental, emotional or physiological disorder. When applied to African PAS, some of the most serious elements of these symptoms include: inability to maintain an up-to-date information system on staffing levels in various departments and units; an inability to even have a good idea of the total number of units and relate this periodically to the performance levels of each unit. Others include - absence of a system of monitoring and appraising the activities of various sections and of personnel, the breakdown of disciplinary procedures, absence of a system of personnel development, and ignorance on the part of several officials of such critical documents as civil service procedures, financial regulations, code of conduct for public officers etc.

In short, the inability of the African PAS to carry out its most mundane functions as an organization and to self-correct itself represent one of the most dramatic symptoms of a crisis-situation. These symptoms lent credence to the idea of bloated public services even though the reality was one in which there are several vacancies at the critical (senior and intermediate technical/professional)

levels of the civil service. The result today is a public service that has all the manifestations of bureau pathology as has been noted in a recent evaluation study of African public services (Olowu 1995b):

- excessive centralization;
- defective systems of personnel management;
- inconsistency in upholding standards of performance;
- low levels of competence;
- absence of sound and financial systems and practices;
- failure to exact accountability among officials;
- low investment in administrative technology;
- ineffective organization systems;
- pay and compensation policies that fail to reflect market trends or staff performance;
- low morale among officials;
- inertia of public officials; and
- inability to collect government revenues.

It is possible to dispute the causes of these manifestations but no one who has either worked or transacted business with African public services can deny the existence of these manifestations of administrative paralysis.

We provide some indicators on the performance of African public services. In the absence of reliable and or valid and consistent indicators, we are forced to rely on surrogate measures.

The first set of measures reviewed are the **economic and social development indicators**. Several countries in the region increased the level of external indebtedness over the period. Table 6 shows that total debts as a percentage of exports was 13.5% in 1980 but had climbed rapidly to almost 20% by 1992. The World Bank estimates that Africa's total debt represented 73.2 % of the continent's GNP by 1993. The debt overhang is further reinforced by central government expenditure figures which shows that public expenditures continue to outstrip public revenues. Average fiscal deficit was 8.7% in 1981-87 but rose to 9.8% in 1988- 93. For all the countries for which figures are available in 1993, they incurred a deficit as a percentage of their GNP (World Bank 1995b). For some countries, this deficit was as high as 9% - 5% (Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Madagascar)- even though for the majority of the countries figures were not available. The ability of African countries to invest wisely, reduce debt and government deficits is called to question by these figures. Equally worrisome is the low domestic resource mobilization through savings and tax collection. The fact that overall GNP per capita rose during this period from \$428.9 in 1980 to \$ 701.9 in 1992 although for a few countries (e.g Nigeria, Cote D'Ivoire and Congo there were sharp declines in GNP per capita), underscores the fact that African government's fiscal performance could have been better. Note also that Table 5 shows that African government's spend a substantial portion of their revenues on the military.

Finally, available statistics of enrolment ratios for educational levels between 1980 and 1990 for all ages show that for all the countries on which figures are available, over one half of them register a sharp decline in enrolment (the largest declines were suffered by big and rich countries such as Nigeria, Morocco, Madagascar, Zaire, Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire) or recorded only very marginal increases of 2% or less (See Table 7). Similar trends are noted by the World Bank for gross enrolment which fell for all African countries from 75% to 70% between 1985 and 1990 and also for the immunization of Africa's children against life threatening diseases (diphtheria and measles) which has slid back since 1990 when a coverage of 54% was recorded. (World Bank 1995b: 14).

We next turn to **subjective assessments of public or civil service performance** in the various countries. For instance, the **Ugandan** civil service was described in 1986 as 'inefficient, demoralized, and unresponsive; its reputation as the best in Africa south of the Sahara had been ruined'. Power was concentrated at the top, the civil service at this time had completely lost its autonomy as widespread political interference and the collapse of the remuneration system led to 'frequent moonlighting, corruption, overstaffing and non-performance' (Langseth 1995: 1, 2). Another observer described the Ugandan public sector as 'limping with inefficiency, the civil service bloated, with a workforce whose motivation to work was low and which lacked discipline. The public service was largely unresponsive and inefficient' (Enid 1996: 7).

Similarly, the **Tanzanian** Civil Service Reform Commission found that the catalogue of the problems of the civil service included the following:

- over involvement of government in too many roles and functions;
- very poor remuneration for government employees;
- erosion of discipline;
- erosion of ethics;
- overstaffing of the service;
- poor personnel records;
- low technical and managerial skills;
- obsolete administrative technologies;
- corruption;
- poor attitudes towards work;
- politicisation of the civil service. (Ntukamazina 1996:2)

A report on the **Egyptian** public service notes the increase of costs, the negative impact of the absorption 36% of state resources by wage costs on the implementation of economic and social plans. It also lamented the 'low productivity and complicated administrative procedures and the increase of absenteeism, indifference and negative behaviour' of civil servants (El-Gibaly et.al 1996: 6).

In the same vein, a comprehensive review of the **Nigerian** federal civil service by a study group established by the federal government in 1985 found that the:

The Nigerian civil service today is a battered institution which has virtually lost its vital attributes of anonymity, neutrality and security of tenure; an institution in which morale has

reached its nadir, in which excessive caution, undue bureaucratic practices and interminable delays have become the hallmarks, an institution that is resistant to dynamic change; an institution which has become the object of constant criticism (Nigeria 1985: 19).

A recent World Bank publication (1995:62) on the state of the public service capacity in Africa had this to say:

Throughout most of Sub-Saharan Africa and for the most of the post independence period, governments have been captured by small groups of elites, usually ethnically bound. Most governments of this kind have not been accountable to their populations and have not emphasised effective public service. This is illustrated by:

- ineffectiveness of public health and education systems, agricultural services, customs and revenue administrations and court systems;
- poorly designed and maintained roads, ports, telecommunications, sewerage and water systems;
- inefficient marketing and agricultural products and inputs, provision of credit, by government enterprises; and
- ignoring and sometimes suppressing local community groups, the private sector and traditional authorities.

We next turn to the findings of some few **spot studies** in some countries seem to indicate that the performance of African public services have fallen over time compared to the colonial period when they had very limited functions to perform. This was the finding of some policy analysts in respect of the Nigerian public services in the mid-1970s. (Balogun 1975b). A United Nations study of 10 African countries (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in the late 1980s found that public sector performance in these countries has fallen relative to labour cost, total public expenditure levels or the GNP. Yet, all these countries recorded significant increases in the size of their civil and public services. Countries such as Ghana and Lesotho were spending 36% and 46% of their total public expenditures on their public services respectively by 1986. Rather paradoxically, these same studies although confirming overstaffing at the junior levels and for unskilled cadres show that African PAS are understaffed at senior and professional levels (United Nations 1993, Oyugi 1993).

All of the above underscore the point not only of declining performance but also of the absence of any available mechanism for measuring PAS efficiency on a sustained basis. The above United Nations study called attention to the urgent need to improve civil service personnel management information systems as an integral part of civil service management improvement in Africa.

This then brings us to perhaps the most fundamental problem afflicting African PAS- is that of **governance**. As we saw in section 2, African governance systems have been characterised as **excessively centralized** and **patrimonial**. Neither of these concepts promotes the idea of an efficient, proactive PAS. Rather, they sap the PAS of its vitality, efficacy, morale and normative orientations.

Centralized governance according to Wunsch and Olowu (1990:5) means a propensity towards the concurrent centralization of power in at least five important

domains: **constitutionally** (in terms of the balance of power between state and society institutions represented most prominently by the movement in favour of one-party and military dictatorships, without any scope for dissent), **institutionally**, all the institutions for asserting public accountability such as the legislature, the judiciary and other semi-judicial institutions such as the ombudsman are either legislated out of existence or stripped of resources to keep them moribund. A centralized governance paradigm is also responsible for the increasing dominance of the state in **economic activities** -either through outright nationalization or indigenization of businesses and the take over of community-, private- or voluntarily financed educational, health and other social infrastructure services. **Financially**, the centre takes on more responsibilities away from local authorities and other sub-national entities if it does not abolish them altogether. Finally, even within the civil service, **administratively** there is a tendency to concentrate all critical resources: skilled and senior personnel, financial resources, and discretionary authority over minute details of field operations in the hands of central officials. This results in a lopsided situation in which the majority of officials are at the headquarters leaving only a few handfuls to cater for the multifarious operations in the countryside.<sup>1</sup>

The recent relabelling of African services as 'patrimonial' provides an explanation for this inclination towards centralism - the desire to personalise state institutions and turn civil services into prebendal institutions (Dia 1993, Joseph 1991, Balogun 1994).

The effect on the PAS is to turn it into an ascriptive rather than a meritocratic institution, further destroying morale and a heavy emphasis on the politicisation of the higher reaches of the public service. These features stand in stark contrast to the major elements of an ideal bureaucracy. - meritocratic, impersonal, objectives, professional etc. The fact of the matter is that ordinary citizens in Africa are not involved in any credible way in compelling public officials to be efficient, effective, responsive or accountable.

A final problem relates to the direction of **reform**. In the last section we reviewed the various reform measures that have been undertaken to address some of the problems highlighted in this chapter. In the main, we classified them into two groups- those undertaken in the first two decades of independence period and those undertaken after the period of economic downturn, mostly spearheaded by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Each of these reforms succeeded in some important respects but at the same time led to fresh problems.

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1 Even the colonial public service was much better on this respect in that it emphasised strong field administrations. In many African countries, field staff constitute only 20-30% of the public service strength - to serve 80-70% of the population outside the capital. For very many industrialised nations, the reverse is the case - 70-80% of the central civil servants work and live outside the headquarters. A few African countries such as Tanzania and most recently Uganda and Ethiopia have a more reasonable deployment pattern of their public servants between the center and the periphery.

In response to this situation, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) formulated in 1989, an 'African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic and Transformation'(AFSA-P), partly in response to these problems. In contrast to SAP, AFSAP focused on a long-term perspective and anchored its proposals on the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) which calls for diversification away from traditional exports and regional cooperation. This proposal gives even greater responsibilities to the public service - including those of spearheading land reforms, financing rural credit systems and of nurturing the private sector and withdrawing progressively over time to an expanded indigenous private sector.

Unfortunately, the UNECA AFSAP, suffers from two devastating problems. First, there was no clear mode of financing this alternative. Its draconian reforms (e.g. enlarging the tax base, improving efficiency and probity of tax collection machinery, allocation of credit and foreign exchange for productive activities, expenditure -switching from non-productive to productive and social sectors etc) were left to the initiatives of individual African governments to implement, as they deem fit (UNECA 1989: 51). Other financing sources included 'improved international commodity trade environment', measures for the mobilization of more domestic resources and their more efficient utilization, reduction of outlays on debt-servicing, additional resources generated from the growth of African economies, increased external resource flows, promotion repatriation of monies by Africans living abroad and the prevention of financial leakages etc. Most of these measures represent an exercise in wishful thinking in the absence of concrete measures or programmes to realise them. In any case, the international economic environment declined rather than improved after the launching of this programme. Neither do the political conditions in most of the African countries encourage the repatriation of profits or the implementation of any of the revenue generating measures suggested.

Secondly, the AFSAP proposals are lacking in any specifics of how to bring about a more efficient and effective public services to undertake the broad range of responsibilities expected of it.

However, the Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division (PHSD) of UNECA has mounted a number of initiatives and programmes to rectify these lapses since 1990. Its Special Action for Public Administration and Management in Africa (SAPAM) made notable impact on management thinking and training in the region. Also, in February 1990, the Division organised a major international conference on 'Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa' at Arusha, Tanzania and adopted the 'African Charter for Popular Participation in Development' The Division has followed this up with a number of national workshops, research and training projects in very many African countries.

In 1993, the Division again sponsored a major international conference 'Development Management in Africa in the 1990s'. A important document emerged from this conference, **Strategic Agenda for Development Management In Africa In the 1990s** which has formed the basis of some national reform

initiatives in some selected African countries with positive results. These initiatives have been supported by other multilateral development institutions such as the UNDP, World Bank and a number of bilateral donors. Some of the best cases of civil /public service reform include Botswana, Zambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Gambia, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania etc. (UNECA 1993, Langseth 1995, Westcott 1996).

These initiatives indicate that African management problems are not insurmountable but not many countries have been able to formulate a holistic approach to the problem of public sector management- one that effectively connects the economic, social and political changes taking place in Africa with the imperative of raising the efficiency of public sector management. These are the issues we attempt to tackle in the concluding section which follows. We believe the present democratic ferment provides the ideal opportunity to pursue the renewal of administrative institutions in the region, a necessary step to enabling countries in the region to utilise the abundant human and material resources available on the continent to improve the welfare of their populations. (Rasheed 1993, Veit et al 1995)

## **V Proposals for Improving Administrative Efficiency through Democratic Renewal in the 1990s and Beyond**

### **Introduction**

In the opening section of this paper, it was noted that majority of African countries are undergoing a transition from one party and military autocracies to systems of democratic governance. Three other types of transitions are taking place at the same time. These are the transitions from a reliance on state-centred development to a greater reliance on market forces; from conflict and strife to reconciliation and rehabilitation and from rural to urban existence. The essence of this final section is to identify the most relevant strategy that can be adopted by African governments that will ensure that these transitions are sustained and consolidated, that they mutually reinforce one another and most importantly, that they lead to a substantial increase in the innovativeness, efficiency and effectiveness of public sector institutions throughout the continent. The strategy that is being recommended is the 'Democratic Renewal Strategy' (DRS) which builds on the principles of polycentricity and self-governance earlier discussed in this paper.

First, we will try to justify this strategy- show why it is the most appropriate to African conditions at this point in time. Secondly, we shall identify the major components of the strategy. Finally, the manner in which higher levels of PAS efficiency can be secured within the framework of the strategy will be indicated.

### **1 Justification of the Democratic Renewal Strategy (DRS)**

The analysis, thus far, has shown that African public services declined over time because of the emergence of excessively centralized state structures which in many countries led to personalized or patrimonial rule and all the consequences associated with this system of governance- lack of accountability, responsiveness, responsibility; isolation, clientelism, institutionalized corruption and, in some countries, civil strife- all of which became insuperable hindrances to an effective public administration system (PAS).

A centralized/ patrimonial system poses three sets of problems for the development of the appropriate institutional and human resources capacity in the PAS. First, it leads to the pursuance of economic and civil service policies which are detrimental to the development and sustenance of institutional and human capacities. Increasingly the state dominates ownership and management of economic activities, while leaving its most essential facilitative and regulatory responsibilities poorly attended. Economic policies discriminate against producers in favour of consumers. This further depresses the economy. Poor economic policies ensure that the public sector agencies will never be able to pay competitive salaries to public servants which is further worsened by wage erosion. In addition, negative personnel policies such as the preference for ascriptive rather

than meritorious and performance -related criteria and wage decompression lead to a situation in which the civil service cannot attract people with appropriate skills.

A second factor, however, is the fact that political leaders in patrimonial states do prefer to work with minions who are completely dependent on them rather than highly skilled people. Their policies in any case do not allow for the attraction or retention of the brightest and best minds or experience in the public service. The result is a vicious circle in which low-skilled officers produce economic and public policies which only tend to generate a further downturn of the economy.

Thirdly, members of the public are incapacitated from asserting themselves over the PAS. The latter intimidates them and both the citizens as well as PAS officials have a distorted perception of public service and public servants- the latter are to be served and courted by the public rather the other way round. The major characteristics of a patrimonial state are sketched out in Table 8 even though few countries in the region can be described as representing a pure type of these features.

The most viable option for moving out of the constraints imposed by a patrimonial/centralized political system is through institutional pluralism.<sup>2</sup> But these various institutions must be properly structured to ensure that they enable the political system to produce appropriate goods and services for the citizens. This is important in view of the growing consensus that the public service should become a critical institution for animating and facilitating other governmental and non-governmental institutions. As we saw in section three, the consensus presently is that what is required is a **strong and efficient** African PAS- what some have referred to as a 'muscular' instead of a 'swollen' public service (UNECA 1993, Diamond 1988).

The seven clusters of responsibilities identified in that section, clearly, cannot be provided by one institution. What is required are a range of institutions which ensure that these services are provided and sustained over time. These include all the institutions within the political system -all of which are essential for the effective functioning of African public services.

## **2 Elements of A Democratic Renewal Strategy**

A DRS has five major components. Building on our analysis of political institutions made in chapter three, we can separate the economic subsystem from the civil society subsystem and the institutions belonging to various international organizations from the political subsystem, we then have a total of five subsystems comprising: the political, the economic, the civil society and the international, the PAS being the fifth and the most important from the point of view of our analysis.

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<sup>2</sup> Good leadership is another possible option, some might contend. However, good leaders are also nurtured by appropriate institutional structures and incentives.

Each of the elements within the political system must be capable of making enforceable claims on other elements- otherwise what results is centralized or monocratic rule. These interactions take different forms: **contestation, competition, cooperation or conflict**. It is also important to note that the organizations exist at different levels. There are those operating within the framework of small communities just as there are those operating at regional and national levels. Indeed it is possible to contemplate actors from the international scene in this model as a separate subsystem. The most important point however is that each of these institutions must possess three key attributes: Independence or the capacity for self-governance; to make and enforce contracts and maintain separate legal existence; Integrity, the ability to perform the specialised roles assigned to it by the society. Finally they must possess the capacity Interact with other institutions competently, confidently and credibly.

### **A Political Subsystem Institutions**

These include the variety of institutions for governance at the center and in the localities. They include the executive branch, the legislatures, the judiciary and quasi-judicial institutions such as the election commissions, the ombudsman organs, political parties etc.

Given the fact that some of these institutions have been managed as part of the executive, there is a need to ensure that they are accorded independence and self-governing status as discussed above. They also need to have support staff to enable them play the roles expected of them in the policy making and governance processes.

### **B Economic Subsystem Institutions**

These include the different types of economic organisations- large scale enterprises, medium and small scale enterprises, and informal sector enterprises. There are also joint venture enterprises by government and foreign companies etc. What these organizations require is a clear regulatory framework that enables them to legally transact their businesses, and supportive infrastructures by the PAS for which they would expect to be taxed. Hence, an effective tax regime that can generate sufficient level of financial resources for the provision and maintenance of adequate level of infrastructures is an important requirement for this category of organizations.

### **C Civil Society Subsystem Institutions**

These include as already noted above, the mass media, political parties, trade unions and professional associations, independent policy centres, the variety of non-governmental organizations and people-based agencies including human rights groups and village development organs.

These organizations require political space and legal independence to operate within the political system. They are important in that they can place additional pressure on the PAS to perform as expected.

#### **D International Subsystem Institutions**

These would include bilateral and multilateral international development/ donor agencies, regional organisations etc. Increasingly these organizations have played a more visible role in Africa in recent years. It is therefore important to realise how important they are for policy advocacy and for providing support for programmes which other actors in each nation's political system consider desirable.

#### **E The Public Administration Subsystem**

The PAS comprises the civil service, public enterprises, local governments and other decentralized agencies (such as field administration organs).

Since this is the subsystem which services all the other subsystems it is given a much fuller treatment than the other subsystems in the next section.

### **3 Enhancing PAS Efficiency within the Framework of DRS**

The most important requirement for ensuring that the public sector is efficient is to ensure that it has adequate level of financial and human resources to perform the roles assigned to it but at the same time that it actually performs these roles. The only way that these two conditions can be met is if the PAS is brought under the effective control of the public - who are the direct beneficiaries of its services. In the case that the direct beneficiaries cannot assume the responsibility for overseeing the PAS, then the representatives of the public must themselves be effectively brought under the control of the public. Past experience shows that the PAS in most of the African countries have been subject to the control of those who wielded executive power but the latter were themselves not subject to control by the public. It is therefore imperative to enhance the capacity of all the institutions that would make the PAS more responsive, responsible and accountable.

In order to accomplish this objective, the following will be essential:

- Enhance the capacity of the legislature to exercise oversight functions over the executive branch and the PAS.
- Enhance the independence of the judiciary and quasi judicial institutions.
- Strengthening the capacity of decentralised agencies.
- Reaffirm the ethics of public service for political and administrative officials.
- Make public service agencies directly accountable to the public and their customers.
- Develop indicators for measuring public service efficiency.

Each of these recommendations are further elaborated in this section.

### **A Enhance the Capacity of the Legislature to Exercise Oversight Over the Executive and the Public Service**

The legislature is expected to have oversight responsibilities over the executive and the public service. Unfortunately, as we saw in section three, this responsibility is poorly and, in many cases, not being carried out in many countries at all. Factors responsible for this situation include - lack of training for legislators in respect of their responsibilities, the absence of critical support mechanisms such as independent sources of information, libraries, staff aides etc., laws and organisational practices that disable the legislature from carrying out its responsibilities. Writing from the perspective of the Tanzanian example, Mhiyo (1994:39) for instance notes:

Many (parliaments in the Third World but with particular reference to Africa) .. are weakened by the structural articulation in their national power structures, in which they feature as subordinate, advisory bodies. Some are prevented by statutory and constitutional restraints from playing a prominent role in policy formulation and evaluation. Others are dominated by government bureaucracies despite their constitutional powers and rights. Factors perpetuating dependence between government and Parliament tend to be similar from country to country. Apart from the fact that .. governments tend to emphasise executive power, with the executive controlling the distribution processes over which many members of the National Assembly depend for legitimacy, governments also control several other needs crucial to individual members and to the National Assembly as a group. Such dependencies include transport, income, political influence, information, and the administrative process.

Some of these constraints and practices are the hang-overs from the era of the one-party and military governments but there is no way that African legislatures can become watchdogs over the executive branch and the PAS so long as they are dependent on them for everything.

The first step towards enhancing the capacity of the legislative branch is therefore to **assert its constitutional requirement of existing as a separate branch of the government -complete with its own personnel, infrastructure and independent information system- the most important of which is an up-to-date library and information service.** Secondly, there would also need to be **a close review of all laws that constrain the effectiveness of the legislature - especially those which limit their power to have access to government department information or to criticise government.** In some countries parliamentary immunity is either not given to legislatures or are severely constrained. Indeed, the legislature can be encouraged in the various countries to review these laws.

Thirdly, given the relatively lower educational status of members of the legislature in several African countries it is surprising that few training programmes for legislators exist in the continent. To this end, there is a need to **create or identify special centres for developing training programmes and appropriate**

training modules for legislatures in each country. Where one country cannot afford the appropriate institutional mechanism, there should be opportunity to team up on a regional basis. The focus of such training should be improving the knowledge base, skills and integrity of parliamentarians - both for those in the government and the opposition.

Fourthly, there is the need to review the procedure for the approval of government budgets. The legislature is required to approve the annual budget of the government and is also expected to be involved in the economic management issues- especially in matters connected with debts and debt reduction plans. The audit institutions in very many countries have also all but collapsed. To this end, there is a need to review the accounting and auditing processes so that the legislatures have access to ample information upon which they can base their budget approvals. As much as possible, budgets should only be approved on the basis of demonstrated performance of each agency. Agencies that fail to make their mark in terms of expenditure and physical outputs should be sanctioned while agencies that perform creditably should be rewarded. Hence, the audit institutions should be strengthened. To this end, there is a strong need to enhance the capacity of the public accounts committee(PAC). One way to ensure its effectiveness, independence and visibility is to appoint the leader of the largest opposition party in parliament to the chair of the PAC. Besides enabling parliament to enforce sanctions and reward performance, it would also help to modify the winner-take-all syndrome that seem characteristic of Africa's fledgling democracies.

Finally, each parliament should have a special committee on the public service. The responsibility of this committee is to monitor the level of efficiency of the various units of the public service on a continuous basis. How these indicators of efficiency should be derived are discussed below but they could be based on a combination of objective and subjective indicators.

## **B Enhance the Independence and Effectiveness of the Judiciary and Quasi-Judicial Institutions.**

At first, it may seem that the judiciary and quasi-judicial institutions are not directly related to administrative reform. But the rule of law is central to effective public sector management and to democracy. The conduct of elections that are perceived as free and fair by the population, the independent conduct of public service commissions, anti-corruption organs etc are also critical to the legitimacy of the government and of the public service.

Some of the specific measures which are deemed capable of bringing about these ideals include the following:

- enforcing the constitutional requirement for an independent judiciary, complete with self-accounting status and independent personnel headed by the Chief Judge;

- reforming the judiciary in terms of access of ordinary people to legal remedies especially in the rural areas-through the integration of formal and informal judicial systems;
- ensuring the independence of quasi- judicial institutions such as electoral commissions, public service and anti-corruption commissions by ensuring their independent funding and personnel and the representation of civil society actors on their boards;
- undertake a reform of the laws to enthrone the principle of rule of law and remove all anti-democratic laws from the statute.

### **C Strengthen the Capacity of Decentralised Agencies.**

**Decentralization** both in terms of the deconcentration and devolution are required in African countries. Indeed, some countries such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria have adopted the principle of non-centralisation, characteristic of federal systems with varying degrees of success and a few others such as the Sudan and the Cameroon are considering it.

Decentralization is desirable, because, as earlier argued, African PAS are generally too centralised in terms of intra-organizational and inter-organizational relations within the public service institutions. Paradoxically, decentralization seems capable of enhancing a countries' national unity and administrative/organisational effectiveness if properly structured.

Three forms of decentralised institutional systems deserve urgent attention.

**a) Field Administration Agencies:** As discussed in the last section, the institutions which make direct contact with the civil service clientele, the field administration agencies, are weak in terms of all the critical resources- personnel, finance, materials and discretionary authority. With respect to the distribution of personnel, it is not unusual to find most of the senior personnel concentrated in the headquarters in many African countries. One result of this is long delays in obtaining approvals for actions that are expected to be taken in the regions. Another result is the congestion of officials at the center existing side by side with the dearth of skilled personnel in several African countries (United Nations 1993).

Some countries- especially in East Africa and Ghana in the West Africa region - undertook some deconcentration programmes designed to move substantial proportions of their civil service personnel to the regions but the level of success in these experiments have not been high- because of lack of sustained political commitment and resistance from central government officials. In contrast, in most developed countries of the world, majority of the civil servants actually work outside the capital cities in the regions and districts. The proportion for countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France are as follows: 88 %; 80 %; and 75% respectively. The figures for most African PAS, with but a few exceptions, reflect the exact opposite- yet a larger majority of Africans live in rural

scattered communities which are even more difficult to reach from a central point (Smith 1967, 1985, Rowat 1990, Wunsch & Olowu 1990).

**b) Horizontal Delegation within the Civil Service:** Furthermore, some countries have already begun to experiment with **horizontal restructuring** which involves the creation of locally based organizational units, each of which is 'capable of providing a broad range of services', broad delegations of authorities to cost and profit centres which are required to achieve agreed goals within an agreed framework of accountability; and the contracting of assets and public services to private and non-governmental organizations. In all these cases **what is required is the delegation of financial and personnel management to managers at lower levels who exercise their autonomy within the framework of broad guidelines from the center** (Manning 1995:281-282). None of these ideas have yet been tried in Africa and they should be.

**c) Local Governments or Devolved Agencies:** This is the most important organizational challenge confronting many African countries. African countries have the least developed systems of local government - either in terms of the personnel capacity of the local governments or the level of expenditure decentralization. A 1982 survey of the human resource capacity of different government levels showed African local governments with a proportion of total public sector employment of only 6% whereas the figures for other regions were 21%, 37% and 57% for Latin America, Asia and OECD countries respectively (Heller & Tait 1982, Rowat 1990). A more recent survey of expenditure decentralization shows that African countries in the sample of countries had a ratio of and 7%, much below the figures for the sample of all developing countries (15%) and the industrialized nations of the world (35%) (United Nations Development Programme 1993: 69-73).

Yet, it is widely recognised that strengthening local governments will not only empower the citizens but also increase the level of government's overall effectiveness. Firstly, local governments tend to invest in small-scale projects which will have a higher multiplier effect because they are more likely to engage local contractors. Genuine decentralization to responsible local organs is noted to lead to better priority ratios and 'increased efficiency..as a result of lower costs, better maintenance, closer monitoring and supervision' (ibid, 7). Besides, such investments- e.g. rural roads, rural water supply, basic health and education, - all help to address the problem of poverty either directly and indirectly and to contribute cumulatively over time to the build up of social and physical capital.

Secondly, the geographical and psychological proximity of these institutions to the citizens also make various forms of **co-production** possible between the producers of services and the citizens. It is much easier for the latter to provide resources by way of information, cash or labour contributions to services produced locally. Due to all of these reasons, these institutions have a considerable potential for contributing to poverty alleviation programmes. (Esman & Uphoff 1984, Ake 1990, Olowu & Smoke 1992, E. Ostrom 1996).

Thirdly, the involvement of local governments in the programmes of national economic development also reduces the potential for governmental corruption in

one important sense - by placing these resources at levels where it is much easier for the citizen to demand accountable and responsive performance (Olowu 1992, Stren 1989a; Balogun 1993b).

Fourthly, local governments can also mobilise community resources to build infrastructures which are critical for economic recovery and development. By raising financial resources from sources such as property taxes, progressive local income taxes or automobile taxes, local governments, especially in Africa's rapidly growing urban centres are capable of shifting the burden of financing infrastructures from the poor to the rich and well to do. Finally, Local governments can also help in tackling the problems of environmental degradation through tree planting programmes, community health inspection etc. (World Bank 1989)

Unfortunately, however, local governments have not been able to live up to these expectations in many countries in the region. They are usually incapacitated in performing the roles expected of them because they lack the critical resources - discretionary authority, personnel and finance. In some cases, some of them have had to be dissolved for corruption and poor performance. Only recently has it become evident that these problems arise from a poor design of the institutions by the central authorities which created them and a political environment of authoritarianism and centralism. African local governments in virtually all African countries are enmeshed in a vicious circle of poor quality political and administrative personnel, low resource base, low performance and the withdrawal of their responsibilities to other central government controlled agencies. (Adedeji 1973, Cochrane 1984, Smith 1985, Olowu 1988, Olowu & Smoke 1992, Balogun 1993).

Fortunately, some countries in the region have led the way in creating new structures of local government which actually devolve substantial legal, financial and administrative responsibilities to locally elected bodies ( Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia, South Africa and Cote D'Ivoire) and it will be useful if other countries in the region can take a cue from them. In all these countries, local governments have been constituted into effective self-governing organs. There are also a few examples in which ordinary citizens have sought to empower themselves through community action- developing their own infrastructures and amenities with little or no assistance at all from the state (Esman & Uphoff 1984, Olowu et al 1991).

There is in particular, the special case of Africa's growing urban centres. United Nations estimates indicate that African countries will be transformed from predominantly rural to urban population within the next quarter of a century (See Table 9). Yet, many of these cities do not have any effective systems of urban governance. They are forced to rely on government grants to finance their infrastructures. At a time when many central governments in the region are financially distressed, the result has been the collapse of infrastructures which are critical to economic and social development. Yet, most of these cities have not developed revenues sources such as the property tax which could bring in much needed resources to finance and/or at least maintain their infrastructures as they do in other countries of the world (See Stren & White 1989, Bahl & Lin 1992, Bird 1995, Olowu 1996a).

**It is therefore strongly recommended that African countries should seek to enhance the capacity of their urban governance/finance systems where this has not been done.** The potential for economic and social improvement is great not only to sustain infrastructures but also to address such social problems as mass unemployment, street children, gang and drug culture and the care of the aged and youths.

### **C Reaffirmation of the Critical Ethical Norms of the Public Service**

We have earlier noted that many African countries politicised the topmost layers of their civil services. We have also reviewed the arguments and results of this development. The most important justification for politicisation is that in a single-party (or no-party, military) state, the notions of objectivity, neutrality and anonymity seem to undermine the desire of the political executive for the absolute loyalty of senior officials to their political masters. As representatives of the people with an urgent and ambitious developmental mission, African political leaders thought they could not afford to have obstacles placed in their way by higher civil servants in the guise of commitment to neutrality norms. Unfortunately, in many countries, the political executive pursued private rather than public agendas. What further complicated matters was the highly subjective nature of the cleavages among the politicians- usually along the lines of ethnicity and religion rather than alternative methods of attaining socially desired goals. All of these led to ethical confusion among both political and administrative officials in terms of responsibility and further dampened morale among the permanent officials. However, now that most countries are returning to democratic governance systems, it is essential that these ethical principles be restored.

The most important of these principles is the notion of a **politically neutral and professional civil service**. While different countries in the region may have to adopt different approaches based on their history, culture and resource situations, there is need for a commitment to the idea of a professional civil service in all countries. The most important rationale for this argument is the need to adopt a merit-based public service, especially with respect to recruitment, promotion and the allocation of responsibilities. The topmost layers of the civil service would then be saddled with three major types of responsibilities: the provision of confidential advice to their political executives or ministers, the management of departmental resources and account for the use of these resources and programming the implementation of policies and thus serve as the link between the political and administrative personnel.

The practice in most West European countries is to allocate the responsibility for policy making to politicians whereas public servants provide (confidential) advice and implement the policies. The detailed experiences of each country may vary but, in the main, political masters in all these countries accept the **doctrine of ministerial responsibility** - that is they take full responsibility for their respective departments or ministries, including the actions of their civil servants, and answer all queries emanating from the parliament or the public. On the other

hand, civil servants are expected to be **objective, politically neutral and anonymous.**

These norms are so fundamental that several institutional mechanisms are put in place to ensure that they are functional. One of these mechanisms is the requirement that public servants- especially senior public servants - be denied some aspects of their political rights other than voting at elections- in order to sustain the confidence of the public. The public servant is expected to put himself or herself in a disposition in which he/she can serve any political party that wins an election. He/she serves as a junior partner to the minister in the policy process. Another mechanism was that of career service. By virtue of long service, appointed officials have a stronger commitment to the institutions they serve rather than to particular political regimes. However, the idea of career service is giving way in many countries to contract service with greater emphasis on professionally relevant qualifications and performance on the job.

A most important mechanism for ensuring professional and meritorious service is the compensation system for public officials. As discussed in the body of this paper, case-studies on African civil services indicate that the human resource capacity of African PAS have fallen steadily over time especially in the last decade. One principal reason for this is the low compensation levels - vis- a-vis what is paid in the private sector, the level of inflation and international salary structures (Shellukindo & Baguma 1993, Adedeji et al 1995). The problem is not an easy one because without an appreciable increase in the level of economic production the salary levels are likely to remain stunted. One proposal however is that **salary levels in African PAS should be made to reflect market values and each agency and individual's compensation should reflect the productivity of that unit/ person as measured by independent indices within the organization and also by the customers/citizen users of these services.** Some countries within and outside Africa are already making major changes to their compensation systems using this approach. Botswana, Zambia, Cape Verde and Lesotho have undertaken salary decompression schemes aimed at attracting and motivating top officials. Gambia, Lesotho, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are paying 'scarcity' and 'retention' allowances to rare professionals while the new South African government is seeking to ensure that its civil service reflects meritocratic concerns as well as the diversity of the total population. Several other countries in the region (Ghana, Mauritania, Kenya) are undertaking other reform measures aimed at restoring a meritocratic civil service system that is able to attract and retain the best. (United Nations 1993, Commonwealth Secretariat 1995, Manning 1995, Wescott 1996).

The other principles of objectivity and anonymity flow from the requirement that the public servant be politically neutral. The senior official is expected to objectively put forward arguments in favour of a particular policy as forcefully as possible - based on the facts of the case- in selecting among alternative choices. However, once the Minister has decided the appropriate policy choice, he/she is expected to implement this policy with as much enthusiasm and dedication as if it was the alternative he/she favoured but was rejected. For this reason, he/she does not

take blame or praise for government policies. The political officials do. (Smith 1984, Adamolekun 1986, Olowu 1996).

In the main, there would seem to be three major possibilities for every African country in this regard. First, there may be a **partially neutral civil service**. Non-civil servants may be brought into the civil service positions. These should, however, not be overwhelming and as much as possible such persons must possess qualifications that will enable them to perform their tasks of policy analysis and advocacy. This is a variant of the American practice and the Nigerian government attempted to adopt in the reform of its civil services in 1988. Secondly, some countries might wish to return to the system they inherited at independence whereby the civil service was **wholly neutral politically and therefore was able to serve different teams of political power holders**. At best, each party in power may appoint Special Advisers who will assist the political executive and provide independent information and advice as the case may be (as in Britain and Australia). Such advisers will serve for short periods of time which are coterminous with the tenure of the political executives that appointed them.

The third variant which was practised in many African countries in the period from the mid-1960s to the late-1980 period, is the wholesale politicisation of the civil service. Members of the civil service were required to be card-carrying members of the ruling party. The problem is that this model is unworkable in a multi-party democracy in which there is a good chance of any of the parties in opposition assuming power through the elections. This is the model that, it is hoped, no African country will select. But more importantly, **all the old laws and practices that went with this model have to be jettisoned as well- the requirement that civil servants join political parties or take directives from the ruling parties. These vestiges of the old order which are still manifest in many African countries must be identified and destroyed.**

Certain political conditions are required to sustain the above-mentioned arrangements. They include the following. First, a political culture of government and opposition in which the opposition party(ies) has(ve) a good chance of competing and winning popular elections. Second, a political culture of restrained partisanship - on the side of the government and opposition to compete within the framework of the constitution. Third, adherence to a code of conduct which respects the concept of political neutrality of public servants and the idea that public servants are (junior) partners in the policy-making process. Finally, adherence to rule of law and the existence of institutions to enforce the law and codes of conduct for public officers- both administrative and political. **African countries will need to pay particular attention to these requirements and seek all avenues to institutionalise these practices through training programmes and the enforcement of codes of conduct for public officers if the idea of multi-party democracy is to be sustained in the continent.**

In drawing up or reviewing their codes of conduct for political and administrative officials, African countries can take a cue from the British code for these respective officers which are provided at the end of this paper as Appendices C and D respectively.

The adoption of a merit system should not conflict with measures aimed at ensuring that the public service reflects the character of the various groupings in the society. Affirmative action legislation or procedures should however never be applied at the expense of merit.

#### **D Make Public Services Directly Accountable to the Public and their Customers.**

Besides the traditional accountability of the public services to the law and the legislature, it is also being proposed here that the **African public services should be directly accountable to the public and their customers. There is no doubt that this will be easier at the level of local governments and public enterprises.** However, there are some interesting international examples which may constitute important object lessons for Africa.

One interesting development is the movement in favour of 'reinventing government' in the United States and of the 'Citizens' Charter' (CC) under the 'Next Steps programme' in the United Kingdom. The latter has led to new management structures which give greater autonomy to chief executives of various departments who are designated as agencies. These CEOs take full responsibility not only for the use of resources but also for results. The results include the articulation and publication of a citizens' charter which helps to inform the public of the standards of performance they should expect from the agency and what they can do if the agency fails to live up to its own charter. It is said that nearly 64% of all public service activities are currently being carried out through these agencies with extraordinary improvements to public service productivity and efficiency. Several other countries within and outside the Commonwealth are already adopting this innovation (Osborne & Gabler 1992, Borins 1995:7, Thomas 1996).

**African countries should be encouraged to adopt citizens' charters. A citizen's charter should embody all or most of the following ten principles:**

- The principal objective of the Charter is to raise the effectiveness with which public services are delivered in African countries by forging direct relationships of accountability between public sector service providers and the citizens in their role as consumers and taxpayers.
- While the Charter attempts to strengthen direct accountability between service providers and the consumers, the intention is to utilise this to complement rather than displace or replace the present forms of indirect accountability through the law, legislative and judicial and executive authorities.
- The Citizen's Charter aims at improving the **quality** of public services, increase the citizens' ability to **choose** between alternative providers of public services, compel public service producers to articulate the **expected standards** of public services and ensure that the citizen obtains **value for money** spent on procuring these services.

- As a strategy for raising productivity in Africa's public services, citizens' ratings of the effectiveness of the different agencies will be the critical factor in determining the productivity of public sector institutions and compensation of individuals units and agencies of public sector institutions.
- The Citizens' Charter (CC) is designed to encourage public service producers to respond to customer needs, reward innovations and improve the effectiveness and job satisfaction of staff of government agencies-much along the same manner as it obtains in the private sector.
- As much as possible each public sector organisation will be allowed to work out what constitutes the standards the public can expect of it and how it will treat its customers. This commitment to high quality service means that performance targets will be aligned and provide employees in these organizations a clear message of what is to be achieved while the agency itself has a fair standard of measuring the performance of the whole agency and individual employees through its performance monitoring system.
- The CC requires that greater institutional and operational autonomy be allowed within the public service. In addition, managers at various levels must have access to human and technological resources to enable them perform and meet their targets. These resources include the ability to recruit and retain the most talented, improve skills through mandatory training and retraining programmes, and to access leading edge technology. All of these raise the issue of resources to finance the new approach to public management.
- One way to tackle this resource problem is to involve citizens more fully in revenue mobilization than has been the case in African countries. Many African countries have preferred to continue to rely on indirect taxes mainly from custom duties rather than develop direct taxes, whose potential are increasing with improved economic conditions in many African countries and growing levels of urbanisation. Sources such as VAT, income, sales and property taxes etc need to be developed and tapped. This will also increase the fiduciary contract between the government and the citizens. In addition, the public must be more closely involved in the utilization of resources through the development of the audit mechanisms and closer public scrutiny of debt portfolio and debt management.

A draft charter for African public services together with a separate section on implementation mechanism is attached at the end of this paper as Appendix E.

#### **E Develop Indicators for the Measuring Public Service Efficiency.**

The point has been made several times in this paper that most of the African countries do not measure the efficiency of their own agencies. As a result there are no comparable statistics over time or among the different countries. There are also few institutions charged with measuring PAS efficiency or productivity in various African countries.

We are of the opinion that the place to begin to work towards correcting these defects is to clarify the mission of African countries' PAS. We have already identified the five major clusters of responsibilities. The five clusters include: the creation of an enabling policy environment for economic growth; the provision of physical, institutional and financial infrastructure for the growth of a fledgling private sector; the development of human resources through major investments in educational and health infrastructure; the efficient management of key strategic industries which have backward linkages to the mass of small- scale and informal sector operators; and support for economic and political reforms- especially in nurturing institutions for the advance of democratisation and decentralization.

Nevertheless, every African country will have to adapt these to suit its own peculiar conditions. The articulation of mission must form the basis of settling up efficiency indicators and measurements. Each agency of the government should identify its mission within this framework of these national guidelines. It should form the basis of their resource requirements and their charter with the citizens.

On the basis of these, efficiency indicators should be derived. While each agency will monitor its own performance, Productivity Units should be set up to monitor these measurements across- the- board and report periodically to the executive branch as well as the audit unit which will render its report to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Legislative committee on the Public Service as recommended earlier and to the public at large.

The data generated should form the basis of deciding on which units of the government should continue to operate and which ones should be closed down. Organizational, personnel and financial audits should be integrated and both the executive agencies and the legislature as well as the citizens should be involved in these processes. This will help to restore the PAS capacity for self-regulation and to monitor its own performance.

In addition, as much as possible, a comprehensive audit of government activities- monetary, personnel and organizational audits - should be undertaken and reported to the legislature (through the PAC or the Committee on the Public Service). To be able to carry this through there will be a need to strengthen or create Audit Departments with considerable independence and other resources to enable them discharge their responsibilities within each PAS Institution. None of these institutions will be able to fully fulfil their missions without a renewed commitment to the principle of rule of law within the polity as a whole. This should be an important component of training for all actors in the political system, but most importantly for the public servants.

This links up with the broader need to have a policy on training and retraining for all public officials. This training policy should have four critical elements. First, it should articulate the case for mandatory training which should be tied to career development prospects. Second, a proportion (between 5- 20%) of personnel emoluments should be set aside for mandatory training and retraining.

Thirdly, the policy should incorporate appropriate mechanisms for imparting work-related training within and outside the PAS. Each Ministry or agency should have an officer charged with training and there should be an agency that reviews and monitors training policy and compliance of different agencies within each of the institutions comprising the PAS subsystem. Finally, the training institutions themselves are to be autonomous so that they compete for their clientele and be self-sustaining rather than depend on annual subventions.

## **VI Strategy for the Realisation Public Service Reform Agenda**

This agenda for reform seem ambitious. Yet, it is difficult to see how a different set of reforms can bring about the realisation of the critical goals of African development aspirations of democracy, private sector led economic growth without having these reform elements in place. It is heartening though that a few African governments are already charting their way along these directions e.g Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Africa- although most of these efforts are relatively new, the longest being only two or three years old.

For the large majority of African countries, a combination of domestic, civil society and external actors will be required to pressure African governments to adopt these reforms. Since the combination of both forces were essential to compel many African governments to adopt multi-party democracy in some form, it will be necessary to have the combination of these forces to push African governments along the path of desirable administrative reforms. It is indeed not accidental that civil service reforms in today's developed and rapidly industrialising countries came through domestic and external pressures for change. This fact further reinforces the position that both forces will be required to assist the reform processes identified in this paper.

Specifically, domestic pressure groups such as Chambers of Commerce and the professional associations of public servants and other professional groups within and outside the public service will need to adopt a reform plan which draws on all the five elements that have been articulated in this paper. They will attempt to lobby all branches of the government -especially those in the executive and legislative branches of the government to adopt this reform plan.

The role expected of external actors will include provision of financial support for these reform activities. They could also provide specific support in two critical but related areas: research and documentation on African public services. To this end, they could help African countries by helping to create a data bank on African public services and governance institutions based at a regional center like the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The main responsibility of such a data bank will be to gather and periodically disseminate information on the issues covered in this report very much along the lines that economic and socio-economic data are currently compiled by organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF etc.

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**Table 1**  
**Institutions for Promoting Accountable**  
**Performance in Democracies**

Internal Mechanisms		External Mechanisms		
	Legislature-Based	Executive-Based	Judicial-Based	Extra-Legal
1. Civil Service rules/regulations (including financial instructions)	1. Initiation and approvals of Bills into law	1. Ministerial control	1. The Courts	1. Media
2. Training (formal and informal; including effective supervision)	2. Budget review and approval	2. Budget (Formulation, implementation and monitoring)	2. Quasi-judicial institutions e.g. Commissions of Inquiry, Administrative Courts and other specialized agencies such as the Ombudsman, Public/Civil Services Commissions	2. Pressure/ Interest Groups
3. Disciplinary/appraisal procedure	3. Audit through the Public Accounts Committee	3. Appointments to top positions and review	3. Ethical codes and enforcement institutions	3. Political parties
4. Inspectorates	4. Approval of top appointments			4. Elections
	5. Investigation of abuse of office (and removal of public officers through impeachment procedures)			

Source: Olowu (1993)

**Table 2**  
**The Consolidation of Democracy in Africa as of late 1994**

<b>Democracies In Process of Consolidation</b>			
(i) Established but Limited Democracies			
Botswana	Senegal	Senegal	
Mauritius			
(ii) More Recently Instituted Democracies			
<i>Civilian Since Independence</i>			
<i>Previously Military-Ruled</i>			
Cape Verde	S. Tomé and Príncipe	Benin (*)	Madagascar
Malawi	South Africa		
	Central African Rep. (*)		
	Mali		
Namibia	Zambia	Congo	Niger
<b>Countries Enjoying 'Democracy In Parts'</b>			
(i) Still Making Advances Toward Democracy			
<i>Civilian Since Independence</i>			
<i>Previously Military-Ruled</i>			
Eritrea	Tanzania	Ethiopia	Lesotho (*)
Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Ghana (*)	Uganda (*)
Seychelles			
(ii) 'Democratic' Institutions Coopted by Existing Ruling Elite			
<i>Civilian Since Independence</i>			
<i>Previously Military-Ruled</i>			
Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau		
	Egypt		
Comoros	Kenya	Guinea	
Côte d'Ivoire	Morocco		
	Mauritania		
Djibouti	Swaziland		
Gabon	Tunisia		

**Table 2 contd.**  
**The Consolidation of Democracy in Africa as of late 1994 (Cont'd)**

COUNTRIES WHERE DEMOCRATIZATION HAS BEEN STALLED OR REVERSED	
(i) Stalled or Reversed by Existing Authoritarian Regime	
<i>Civilian Since Independence Formerly or at Present Military-Ruled</i>	
Algeria (2)	Burkina Faso(*)
Burundi (2)	Chad (*) (2)
Equatorial Guinea	Gambia
Libya	Nigeria (*)
Sierra Leone (*) (2)	Sudan (*) (2)
Togo	Zaire
(ii) Stalled or Reversed by War/Armed Conflict	
<i>Civilian Since Independence Formerly or at Present Military Ruled</i>	
Angola	Liberia
W. Sahara (1)	Rwanda
	Somalia
<b>Notes:</b>	
(*) Countries where previous returns to constitutional or democratic government have been thwarted.	
(1) Not yet independent.	
(2) In Algeria, Chad, Sierra Leone and Sudan democracy is blocked both by military regimes and by armed conflict; in Burundi by conflict and a political stalemate between an elected regime and the armed forces.	

**Source:** Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, Vol. 26,  
 No. 2, p. 50.

**Table 3**  
**Application of Governance Norms for**  
**Improved Levels of Administrative Efficiency**

Governance Norm/Description	Most Important Areas of Application	Relevance for Overall Organizational Efficiency
<p>1. <u>Managerial/Organizational Efficiency</u></p> <p>Use of public sector organizations to tackle societal problems - determine needs and problems, identify solutions, make plans and programmes, allocate resources, evaluate performance, learn and readjust in view of new environment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of appropriate personnel skills</li> <li>• Organizational procedures, routines and of technology</li> <li>• Relating structure to function (Organizational Design) - Central/Field Administration/Local Government/Public Enterprises</li> <li>• Clear articulation of Responsibilities of all units and individuals (Job Description, Target Setting etc.)</li> <li>• Set up channels and procedures for reporting on performance of responsibilities</li> <li>• Review &amp; reward for performance of responsibilities.</li> </ul>	<p>Efficient and effective use of organizational resources in a rapidly changing environment</p>
<p>2. <u>Accountability</u></p> <p>Development of objective standards for assessing performance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review &amp; reward for performance and sanctions for failure to perform responsibilities.</li> </ul>	
<p>3. <u>Transparency</u></p> <p>Availability of accurate information on governmental activities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy Process</li> <li>• Budgetary Processes (Accounting/Auditing)</li> <li>• Recruitment Processes</li> <li>• Record Keeping</li> <li>• Information Management</li> </ul>	<p>Ensures that targets/responsibilities are carried out as expected: operates between administration officials (supervisor/ subordinate); between political and administrative officials and between political and the citizens, e.g. through elections, recall, queries, etc.</p>
<p>4. <u>Participation and Consensus Building</u></p> <p>Involving the maximum number of people in the decision-making and implementation processes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy Process (Consultation within and outside the organization)</li> <li>• Developing organizational vision and strategies for implementation</li> <li>• Decentralized organs.</li> <li>• Law-making or legislative processes</li> <li>• Adjudicatory processes</li> <li>• Law enforcement mechanisms</li> </ul>	<p>Fairness and promptness of administrative actions</p>
<p>5. <u>Rule of Law</u></p> <p>Ensuring that rules are made and enforced in the public realm</p>		<p>Increases the legitimacy and public ownership of governmental action. Reduces alienation and integrates state/society institutions.</p> <p>Ensures compliance with/and by all irrespective of social condition guarantees law and order.</p>

Sources: Olowu & Wunsch 1994; Ake 1995, World Bank 1992, USAID 1992.

**Table 4**  
**World Bank-supported Measures for the Improvement**  
**of Public Sector Management**

**Civil Service Management**

- staff reduction and growth control (including census of civil servants)
- salary and compensation policies review
- job classification and evaluation
- documentation and records management (statistics/management information system)
- strengthening and reorganization of selected ministries and agencies, e.g., Office of the Head of Civil Service, Ministries of Public Service, Local Government/Interior
- promoting public service training through strengthening of national training institutions
- administrative decentralization

**Economic and Financial Management**

- strengthening and reorganization of economic planning and economic financial management institutions, notably Ministries of Planning and Finance
- improving formulation of economic policy, planning, and management
- public investment and expenditure planning
- reform of the budgetary system
- improving government accounting and auditing
- reform of tax administration and revenue mobilization
- external financial management (aid, debt management)
- training for staff of economic institutions

*Source:* Ladipo Adamolekun, "Public Sector Management Improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: The World Bank Experience", in M.J. Balogun & G. Mutahaba, eds. 1989, p. 70.

**Table 5**  
**Central Government Expenditure Profile: African Countries**  
**and Selected Countries**

No	Country	Central Government Expenditure					
		% age of GNP		Defence		Education & Health	
		1980	1992	1980	1992	1980	1992
1	Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Ethiopia	23.4	-	-	-	13.8	-
3	Tanzania	28.8	-	9.2	-	19.3	-
4	Sierra Leone	29.8	19.6	4.1	9.9	24.-	22.9
5	Uganda	21.7	-	25.2	-	20.-	-
6	Malawi	37.6	26.6	12.8	4.8	14.5	18.2
7	Chad	-	32.-	-	-	-	-
8	G. Bissau	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	Madagascar	-	16.1	-	7.5	-	23.8
10	Rwanda	14.3	26.1	13.1	-	23.3	-
11	Niger	18.7	30.7	3.8	-	22.1	-
12	Burkina Faso	14.1	-	17.0	-	21.3	-
13	Kenya	26.1	30.7	16.4	9.2	27.4	25.5
14	Mali	21.6	-	11.0	-	18.8	-
15	Nigeria	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	Togo	31.9	-	7.2	-	22.-	-
17	Benin	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	C.A. Republic	21.9	-	9.7	-	22.7	-
19	Ghana	10.9	-	3.7	-	29.0	-
20	Guinea	-	23.1	-	-	-	-
21	Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	Zimbabwe	35.3	34.8	25.0	-	20.9	-
23	Lesotho	22.7	33.2	0.0	6.5	21.5	33.4
24	Egypt	53.7	-	11.4	-	10.5	-
25	Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	Sudan	19.1	-	13.2	-	11.2	-
27	Zambia	40.-	-	0.0	-	17.5	-
28	Cote d'Ivoire	33.3	31.2	3.9	-	20.2	-
29	Senegal	23.9	-	16.8	-	27.7	-
30	Cameroon	15.5	20.3	9.1	-	17.5	-
31	Congo	54.6	-	9.7	-	16.1	-
32	Morocco	34.2	29.8	17.9	12.8	20.7	21.2
33	Namibia	-	44.2	-	6.5	-	31.9
34	Tunisia	32.5	32.8	12.2	5.4	24.2	24.1
35	Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-
36	South Africa	23.5	34.5	-	-	-	-
37	Mauritius	27.4	24.7	0.8	1.5	25.1	22.7
38	Botswana	36.5	40.4	9.8	13.3	27.6	25.7
39	Gabon	40.5	33.5	-	-	-	-
	<b>Average</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>29.7</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>7.74</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>24.9</b>

**Table 5**  
**Central Government Expenditure Profile (Cont'd....)**

No	Country	Central Government Expenditure					
		% age of GNP		Defence		Education & Health	
		1980	1992	1980	1992	1980	1992
1	Ireland	48.9	47.5	3.4	3.3	25.1	25.2
2	Israel	72.4	45.4	39.8	22.1	13.5	15.5
3	Spain	27.0	34.2	4.3	4.4	8.7	12.3
4	Hongkon	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	g	20.8	22.7	25.2	22.1	21.6	29.1
6	Singapor	23.1	27.4	9.4	8.6	18.2	19.7
7	e	38.2	39.5	13.8	11.3	15.9	27.-
8	Australia	41.0	51.6	3.4	-	21.-	-
9	U.K.	52.7	52.8	5.6	4.6	24.8	24.7
10	Italy	21.8	-	7.7	-	10.5	-
11	Nether-	51.3	50.4	5.7	-	16.6	-
12	lands	29.5	45.4	7.4	6.4	23.4	23.-
13	Canada	30.3	24.6	9.1	-	19.9	-
14	Belgium	21.7	24.3	21.2	20.6	13.-	17.8
15	France	40.4	42.4	6.5	5.0	11.9	10.8
16	Germany	39.5	47.5	7.7	5.5	12.6	10.1
17	U.S.	18.4	15.8	-	-	-	-
18	Denmark	19.5	-	10.2	-	15.1	-
	Sweden						
	Japan						
	Switzer-	<b>35.67</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>11.28</b>	<b>10.35</b>	<b>16.99</b>	<b>19.56</b>
	land						
	<b>Average</b>						

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report*, Washington D.C.

**Table 6**  
**Economic Profile of African States and Some Comparisons**

No	Country	Total Debts as % of Exports		GNP Per Capita	
		1980	1992	1981	1992
1	Mozambique	0.0	8.1	-	60
2	Ethiopia	7.3	14.2	140	110
3	Tanzania	19.6	31.5	260	110
4	Sierra Leone	23.2	20.5	320	160
5	Uganda	17.4	40.2	220	170
6	Burundi	9.5	35.3	-	-
7	Malawi	27.7	23.8	200	210
8	Chad	8.3	5.4	110	220
9	G. Bissau	-	92.7	-	220
10	Madagascar	17.1	18.6	330	230
11	Rwanda	4.2	23.4	250	250
12	Niger	21.7	14.2	330	280
13	Burkina Faso	5.9	6.2	240	300
14	Kenya	21.0	27.1	420	310
15	Mali	5.1	7.4	190	310
16	Nigeria	4.2	28.9	870	320
17	Togo	9.0	7.3	360	410
18	Benin	6.3	4.1	320	410
19	C.A. Republic	4.9	9.6	320	410
20	Ghana	13.1	26.7	400	450
21	Guinea	19.8	12.4	300	510
22	Mauritania	17.3	17.2	460	530
23	Zimbabwe	3.8	32.0	520	570
24	Lesotho	1.5	5.3	540	590
25	Somalia	4.9	-	280	-
26	Sudan	25.5	5.4	380	-
27	Zambia	25.3	-	600	-
28	Cote d'Ivoire	38.7	31.9	1200	670
29	Senegal	28.7	13.8	430	780
30	Cameroon	15.2	16.2	880	820
31	Congo	10.6	11.9	1100	1030
32	Namibia	-	-	-	1380
33	Mauritius	9.1	8.1	-	2700
34	Botswana	1.9	-	-	2790
35	Gabon	17.7	16.5	-	4450
	<b>Average</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>428.9</b>	<b>701.9</b>

**Table 6**  
**Economic Profile of African States (Cont'd...)**

No.	African Countries Outside SSA	Total Debts as % age of Exports		GNP Per Capita	
				1981	1992
1.	Egypt	14.7	15.5	650	640
2.	Morocco	32.7	23.6	860	1030
3.	Tunisia	14.8	20.6	1420	1720
4.	Algeria	27.4	71.3	2140	1840
5.	South Africa	-	-	2560	2670
	<b>Total</b>	<b>89.6</b>	<b>131</b>		
	<b>Average</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>32.75</b>	<b>1526</b>	<b>1580</b>
	<b>High Income Non-African Countries</b>				
1.	Ireland			5230	12210
2.	Israel			-	-
3.	Spain			5640	13970
4.	Hongkong			5100	15360
5.	Singapore			5240	15730
6.	Australia			11080	17260
7.	U.K.			9110	17790
8.	Italy			6960	20460
9.	Netherlands			11790	20480
10.	Canada			11400	20710
11.	Belgium			11920	20880
12.	France			12190	22260
13.	Germany			13450	23030
14.	U.S.			12820	23240
15.	Denmark			13120	26000
16.	Sweden			14870	27010
17.	Japan			10080	28190
18.	Switzerland			17430	36080
	<b>Average</b>			<b>10,437</b>	<b>21,215</b>

*Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1994, Washington D.C.*

**Table 7**  
**School Enrolment Ratios in African Countries 1980-90**

All levels (% age 6-23)					
Negative/ Marginal	Values		Positive	Values	
	1980	1990		1980	1990
Morocco	52	38	Burkina Faso	8	18
Kenya	62	58	Chad	16	26
Madagascar	60	40	Gambia	23	29
Ghana	48	46	Mauritius	48	57
Cote d'Ivoire	39	37	Tunisia	50	62
Nigeria	50	37	Botswana	51	64
Zaire	46	38	Algeria	52	60
Comoros	45	34	Egypt	51	66
Togo	61	54	Zimbabwe	41	66
Tanzania	44	32	Cape Verde	45	49
Angola	54	32	Cameroon	48	52
Benin	34	30	Senegal	24	30
Mozambique	29	24	Equatorial Guinea	57	64
Sierra Leone	30	29	Burundi	11	30
Guinea	21	19	Rwanda	33	39
Niger	12	14	Uganda	25	41
Guinea Bissau	27	25	Malawi	33	38
Zambia	46	47	Mauritania	19	25
Sudan	25	27	Djibouti	19	24
C.A.R.	33	35			
Ethiopia	16	17			

**Source:** United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Human Development in Africa: 1995 Report*, Addis Ababa. pp.75-76.

**Table 8**  
**Characteristics of a Patrimonial State**

- A hybrid of modern and traditional governance and public administration system
- High expectations with respect to output but low inputs by citizens (Loyalty of citizens remain with pre-mordial structures, which have high legitimacy but relatively low resource levels)
- Single-party or No Party (under Military Rule) State: Party or Military Council has absolute power over the government, the legislature and the judiciary.
- Monopolistic control of the economy through nationalisation or indigenisation which is used to build clientelistic support - with associated graft, corruption and misuse of public resources.
- Weakened Accountability- Institutions of accountability either abolished, suspended or reduced to mere rubber-stamps at the political and administrative levels. (e.g. interest groups, legislatures, political parties, independent research groups etc.).
- Lack of Openness or Transparency.
- Muted Application of the Principle of Rule of Law.
- Nationalisation of Landed Property; Judicial Branch treated as part of the Ministry of Justice- rather than as a separate branch of the government. This branch of government is denuded of essential resources. Rulers are above the Law.
- Career development and remuneration levels reflect ascriptive criteria rather than performance/ productivity. Political and personal loyalty are rewarded more than merit.
- Weak capacity to impose effective control and successfully implement its own policies.
- Regressive tax policies- which make the poor pay more than the rich.
- Budget Implementation reflects relative powers of the political/bureaucratic elite rather than the relative economic priority of the programmes.
- Disabling Regulatory Burden on the Private sector. Encouragement of Lethargy and clientilistic behaviours by private entrepreneurship.

*Source:* Adapted from M. Dia "Improving Civil Service Efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Position Paper", 1993.

**Table 9**  
**African Urban Population Trends 1950- 2020**

	YEARS					
Countries by Region	1950	1960	1990	1995	2000	2020
Eastern Africa (18)	5.2	7.3	21.8	25.4	29	43.2
Middle Africa (9)	14.2	17.9	37.8	41.6	45.6	60.4
Northern Africa (7)	24.5	30.0	44.6	47.9	51.2	63.6
Southern Africa (5)	38.0	41.7	54.9	58.2	61.3	71.6
Western Africa (17)	10.2	14.5	32.5	36.1	39.8	54.6
All Africa (56)	14.5	18.3	33.9	37.3	40.7	53.9
Latin America	41.5	49.3	71.5	74.1	76.4	82.9
Asia	16.4	21.5	34.4	38.6	42.7	56.4
Europe	56.5	61.1	73.4	75.0	76.7	83.1
N. America	63.9	69.9	75.2	76.1	77.3	83.4
Oceania	61.3	66.3	70.6	70.8	71.3	75.9
World	29.2	34.2	45.2	48.1	51.1	62.0

Source: United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects 1990* New York, 1991 Table A.1

**Notes:**

Eastern Africa includes: British Indian Ocean Territory, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Middle Africa includes: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, Zaire.

Northern Africa includes: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara.

Southern Africa includes: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.

Western Africa includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, St. Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

## **Appendix A**

### **Key Principles of Monocratic Political/ Administrative Order**

- 1 There will always be a single dominant center of power in any system of government; and the government of a society will be controlled by that single center of power.
- 2 The more power is divided the more irresponsible it becomes; or, alternatively, the more power is unified and directed from a single center the more responsible it will become.
- 3 The structure of a constitution defines and determines the composition of that center of power and establishes the political structure relative to the enactment of law and the control of administration. Every system of democratic government will exalt the people's representatives to a position of absolute sovereignty.
- 4 The field of politics sets the task for administration but the field of administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics.
- 5 All modern governments will have a strong structural similarity so far as administrative functions are concerned.
- 6 Perfection in the hierarchical ordering of a professionally trained public service provides the structural conditions necessary for "good" administration.
- 7 Perfection in hierarchical organization will maximize efficiency as measured by least cost expended in money and effort.
- 8 Perfection of "good" administration as above defined is a necessary condition for modernity in human civilization and for the advancement of human welfare.

Extracted from: Vincent Ostrom (1974: pp. 28-29)

**Appendix B**  
**Key Principles of Polycentric Political/  
Administrative Order**

- 1 Individuals who exercise the prerogatives of government are no more nor no less corruptible than their fellow men.
- 2 The exercise of political authority - a necessary power to do good - will be usurped by those who perceive an opportunity to exploit such powers to their own advantage and to the detriment of others unless authority is divided and different authorities are so organized as to limit and control one another.
- 3 The structure of a constitution allocates decision-making capabilities among a community of persons; and a democratic constitution defines the authority inherent in both the prerogatives of persons and in the prerogative of different governmental offices so that the capabilities of each are limited by the capabilities of others. The task of establishing and altering organizational arrangements in a democratic society is to be conceived as a problem in constitutional decision making.
- 4 The provision of public goods and services depends upon decisions taken by diverse sets of decision makers and the political feasibility of each collective enterprise depends upon a favourable course of decisions in all essential decision structures over time. Public administration lies within the domain of politics.
- 5 A variety of different organizational arrangements can be used to provide different public goods and services. Such organizations can be coordinated through various multi-organizational arrangements including trading and contracting to mutual advantage, competitive rivalry, adjudication, as well as the power of command in limited hierarchies.
- 6 Perfection in the hierarchical ordering of a professionally trained public service accountable to a single center of power will reduce the capability of a large administrative system to respond to diverse preferences among citizens for many different goods and services and cope with diverse environmental conditions.
- 7 Perfection in hierarchical organization accountable to a single center of power will not maximize efficiency as measured by least-cost expended in time, effort, and resources.
- 8 Fragmentation of authority among diverse decision centers with multiple veto capabilities within any one jurisdiction and the development of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions of widely different scales are necessary conditions for maintaining a stable political order which can advance human welfare under rapidly changing conditions.

Extracted from: Vincent Ostrom (1974: pp. 111-112)

## **Appendix C**

### **Draft Code of Conduct for UK Members of Parliament**

#### **General Principles**

It is the personal responsibility of every Member of parliament to maintain those standards of conduct which the House and the electorate are entitled to expect, to protect the good name of Parliament and to advance the public interest.

Members should observe those general principles of conduct which apply to all people in public life.

The primary duty of Members is to their country and their constituents. They should undertake no actions in Parliament which conflict with that duty.

Because Members of Parliament enjoy certain privileges in law, which exist to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities to the citizens they represent, each Member has a particular personal responsibility to comply fully with all resolutions and conventions of the House relating to matters of conduct, and when in doubt to seek advice.

#### **Financial interests**

A Member must not promote any matter in Parliament in return for payment.

A Member who has a financial interest, direct or indirect, must declare that interest in the currently approved manner when speaking in the House or in Committee, or otherwise taking part in Parliamentary proceedings, or approaching Ministers, civil servants or public bodies on a matter connected with that interest.

Where, in the pursuit of a Member's Parliamentary duties, the existence of a personal financial interest is likely to give rise to a conflict with the public interest, the Member has a personal responsibility to resolve that conflict either by disposing of the interest or by standing aside from the public business in question.

In any dealings with or on behalf of an organisation with whom a financial relationship exists, a Member must always bear in mind the overriding responsibility which exists to constituents and to the national interest. This is particularly important in respect of activities which may not be a matter of public record, such as informal meetings and functions.

In fulfilling the requirements on declaration and registration of interests and remuneration, and depositing of contracts, a Member must have regard to the purpose of those requirements and must comply fully with them, both in letter and spirit.

## **Appendix D**

### **Proposed New Code of Conduct for UK Civil Service**

- 1 The constitutional and practical role of the Civil Service is, with integrity, honesty, impartiality and objectivity, to assist the duly constituted Government, of whatever political complexion, in formulating policies of the Government, carrying out decisions of the Government and in administering public services for which the Government is responsible.**
- 2 Civil servants are servants of the Crown. Constitutionally, the Crown acts on the advice of Ministers and, subject to the provisions of this Code, civil servants owe their loyalty to the duly constituted Government.**
- 3 This Code should be seen in the context of the duties and responsibilities of Ministers set out in Questions of procedure for ministers which include:**
  - accountability to Parliament;**
  - the duty to give Parliament and the public as full information as possible about the policies, decisions and actions of the Government, and not to deceive or knowingly mislead Parliament and the public;**
  - the duty to give fair consideration and due weight to informed and impartial advice from civil servants, as well as to other considerations and advice, in reaching decisions; and**
  - the duty to comply with the law, including international law and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of justice; together with the duty to familiarise themselves with the contents of this Code and not to ask civil servants to act in breach of it.**
- 4 Civil servants should serve the duly constituted Government in accordance with the principles set out in this Code and recognising:**
  - the accountability of civil servants to Ministers;**
  - the duty of all public officers to discharge public functions reasonably and according to the law;**
  - the duty to comply with the law, including international law and treaty obligations, and to uphold the administration of justice; and**
  - ethical standards governing particular professions.**
- 5 Civil servants should conduct themselves with integrity, impartiality and honesty in their dealings with Ministers, Parliament and the public. They should give honest and impartial advice to Ministers, without fear of favour, and make all information relevant to a decision available to Ministers. They should not deceive or knowingly mislead Ministers, Parliament or the public.**
- 6 Civil servants should endeavour to deal with the affairs of the public sympathetically, efficiently, promptly and without bias or maladministration.**

- 7 Civil servants should endeavour to ensure the proper, effective and efficient use of public money with their control.
- 8 Civil servants should not make use of their official position or information acquired in the course of their official duties to further their private interests or those of others. They should not receive benefits of any kind from a third party which might reasonably be seen to compromise their personal judgment or integrity.
- 9 Civil servants should conduct themselves in such a way as to deserve and retain the confidence of Ministers and to be able to establish the same relationship with those whom they may be required to serve in some future Administration. They should comply with restrictions on their political activities. The conduct of civil servants should be such that Ministers and potential future Ministers can be sure that confidence can be freely given, and that the Civil Service will conscientiously fulfil its duties and obligations to, and impartially assist, advise and carry out the policies of the duly constituted Government.
- 10 Civil servants should not without authority disclose official information which has been communicated in confidence within Government, or received in confidence from others. They must not seek to frustrate the policies, decisions or actions of Government by the unauthorised, improper or premature disclosure outside the Government of any information to which they have had access as civil servants.
- 11 Where a civil servant believes he or she is being required to act in a way which is illegal, improper, unethical, or in breach of constitutional convention, which may involve possible maladministration, or which is otherwise inconsistent with this Code or raises a fundamental issue of conscience, he or she should first report the matter in accordance with procedures laid down in departmental guidance or rules of conduct.
- 12 Where a civil servant has reported a matter covered in paragraph 11 in accordance with procedures laid down in departmental guidance or rules of conduct and believes that the response does not represent a reasonable response to the grounds of his or her concern, he or she may report the matter in writing to the Civil Service Commissioners.
- 13 Civil servants should not seek to frustrate the policies, decisions or actions of Government by declining to take, or abstaining from, action which flows from ministerial decisions. Where a matter cannot be resolved by the procedures set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 above, on a basis which the civil servant concerned is able to accept, he or she should either carry out the ministerial instructions or resign from the Civil Service. Civil servants must continue to observe their duties of confidentiality after they have left Crown employment.

## **Appendix E**

### **Draft Citizens' Charter for African Public Services**

## **II Proposals for a Model African Public Service Charter**

### **I Preamble**

African public services are critical to the development of the private sector to become an engine of growth, overall economic growth and sustainability in Africa. We note that one important explanation for the failure of previous attempts at public sector reform in African countries is the lack of the application of governance norms which put the citizen at the center of public sector operations. These governance norms have as their object: improving the levels of managerial efficiency, accountability to citizens, transparency of governmental operations, pluralism or choice and predictability.

The transition from unitary to democratic governance models in many African countries since 1990 is expected to increase the importance and relevance of citizen's role in governmental effectiveness. In order to enhance this process of the search for more efficient and effective public services, a model **Citizen's Charter (CC)** is thus being proposed. The model **Citizen's Charter (CC)** is expected to assist the efforts of several countries in the continent in search of a more efficient and effective public service. This CC is a follow-up to earlier initiatives such as the **African Charter for Popular Participation** and the **Strategic Agenda for Development Management in Africa in the 1990s**.

In order to enforce and effectively implement this charter every African country will need to commit itself to democratic governance, develop the appropriate political institutions such as the legislative, judicial/ quasi judicial, electoral and local government institutions to ensure that they have access to appropriate resources and independence to enable them serve the public interest. There will also be the need to develop the capacity of administrative organs to ensure that they operate within the framework of a democratic regime, i.e. with openness, accountability, pluralism of policy choices and institutions and rule of law. These issues are referred to as part of the required implementation mechanisms below.

This Charter which we give to ourselves incorporates six key principles:

- the setting and publication of standards of public service by each agency of the government;
- the provision of information and openness about the service
- the offer of possible choices to citizens about different aspects of each service;
- the requirement that service providers be courteous and helpful to their customers and the citizens at large;
- each agency will ensure value for money for the public services it provides; and
- the provision of mechanisms for correcting failure to meet standards and to respond to opportunities to improve the quality of services delivery.

## **II Implementation Mechanisms**

- 1 There will be a need for every national government to appoint a Minister of Cabinet rank to monitor the implementation of the CC nationally. All subnational government agencies at regional and local levels should appoint an official government of equivalent status to monitor implementation at each level.
- 2 Effective institutional mechanisms for monitoring public service agencies must be established and provided with the requisite resources and autonomy to operate within and outside government executive agencies. In particular, Inspectorate Divisions are to be strengthened as well institutions such as the Public Complaints or Ombudsman Commissions that provide opportunities for citizens to report infractions.
- 3 Periodic - monthly, quarterly and annual - reports will be required of every agency providing services to the public. These reports will be made widely available to citizens.
- 4 Performance of each agency should be linked to organizational and individual rewards. Awards could be made annually to the best performing agency by the Office of the Head of State, President or King to give the award the appropriate national emphasis, but the same could be repeated at other levels of governance. Most importantly, the individual's compensation package within each organization should reflect the contribution each has made to the ability of the organization to attain its targets.
- 5 As much as possible, alternative revenue mobilization strategies should be explored and the public should be much more involved in the decisions on the utilisation of public revenues. To this end, the audit processes should be enhanced and made more autonomous of executive departments. In the same vein, the public should be better informed and more closely involved in the management of the public debts.

(Original principles adapted from Raising the Standard: Britain's Citizen Charter and Public Service Reforms London, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, n.d)