


Conflict in the Sahel region and the developmental consequences





United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission for Mali
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CDD	Capacity Development Division
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFA	Communaute Financiere Africaine (West African Franc)
CILSS	Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G5	Group of Five Sahelian countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune deficiency Syndrome
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAFAP	Monitoring African Food and Agriculture Policies (by FAO)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINUSMA	The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MISAHEL	African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel
MNJ	The Niger Movement for Justice

MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute in Oslo
PSI	Pan-Sahel initiative
QOG	Quality of Government Standard Dataset
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UM	Mauritanian Ouguiya
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
WDI	World Development Indicators
WFP	World Food Programme

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In 2014, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) proposed to undertake a study entitled “Conflict in the Sahel region, development costs and consequences.” This was against the backdrop of the request by H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, for evidence-based assessment of the root causes of the conflicts in the Sahel, their consequences for development and impacts on governance and economic growth. Such a study would provide the African Union with the necessary empirical bases and evidence for designing informed policy options and intervention strategies to achieve long-term, sustainable solutions to the crises of development and security in the Sahel region.

ECA identified two central themes for the research, namely, an assessment of the root causes of the conflicts in the Sahel region, and the impacts of the conflicts on the economic development of the Sahel region. In assessing the root causes, the Commission emphasized the need to analyse the economic and non-economic causes and the domestic, regional and international destabilizing factors. A distinction should also to be made between the structural issues and the trigger (proximate) factors. It was expected that by analysing the impacts and consequences of the conflicts on development, the study would identify the mechanisms and ways in which conflicts have affected economic growth, and where possible, quantify the human and material cost of the conflicts and examine the consequences on social and economic development patterns.

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Executive summary

Over the past 25 years, the Sahel has attracted international research and policy attention, on account of the environmental challenges it faces, which are often linked to factors such as drought, famine and desertification. Secondly, the effects of environmental change have impoverished the region. Thirdly, the scale and scope of security issues and the challenges linked to ethno-nationalist irredentism is increasing, as is the spread of small arms and light weapons, organized crime and criminal network activities and radical armed groups.

The research focuses on frontline States in relation to two conflict corridors, namely Northern Mali and Northeast Nigeria (Lake Chad Basin), where large-scale armed conflicts and violence are rife. Some generic features and characteristics define these two corridors. First, they directly or geographically manifest the impact of armed conflict and large-scale insecurities. Second, governments are responding to the insecurity by deploying troops, increasing patrols or combating with armed groups. Third, tensions occur between host communities and displaced or refugee communities. Fourth and last, the corridors crisscross national boundaries.

When superimposed on the corridor that begins in Northern Mali, which has been the scene of major armed conflicts, these same features and characteristics extend into the border areas of Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso – countries most impacted by the attendant insecurities. Likewise, the corridor from north-east Nigeria extends into Niger, Cameroon and Chad, which all have been impacted by the Boko Haram crisis. However, this study primarily focuses on what it calls the five frontline States - Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. The study was limited to these frontline States because of the short time available for research and also for the sake of analytical simplicity and coherence, and the opportunity for in-depth empirical assessment and analysis of the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity on economic and governance-related themes.

The emphasis on these frontline States does not preclude tangential focus and gathering of data and use of examples from other Sahelian States. Countries of secondary focus include Algeria, Cameroon, Chad and Guinea Bissau. When the study began, Cameroon and Chad had not yet acquired their current status as significant extensions to the Northeast Nigeria conflict corridor. Nonetheless, the choice of Niger as the main extension of that corridor is significant. The country is at the intersection of both corridors – from Northeast Mali and Northeast Nigeria – and has been at the receiving end of the insecurity caused by the armed conflicts.

Key messages

- a) ***The realities of the Sahel call for radical rethinking of the African State and the construction of regional dynamics and international response frameworks in Africa.*** The approaches and responses to conflict and its development consequences have remained largely constant, be it in terms of research and policy or programmatic interventions. The populations around

which these interventions are designed are changing rapidly, however. The constantly mutating regional and global conflict contexts are a challenge to sustainable peace and development. Indeed, the traditional construction of the State as the foremost lens through which responses to armed conflict are analysed is being challenged by these changes. This study will show that the situation in the Sahel challenges the idea of organizing activities along the lines of statist logic.

- b) Conflict and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel and their development consequences must be understood within two divergent forces – a State-based regional security complex and a people-based transnational security complex.** It is possible to construct a view of the Sahel as a security region. Rather than a regional pattern which connects States, this security region manifests both at the level of States and at the level of groups of individuals. The two are compelled by different sets of logic. While the State-based complex is underpinned by concerns about immediate threats to States, including armed violence and organized crime, which are countered with military force, the people-based security complex is driven by deep-seated human existential concerns, which connect both the human security and the human development needs of the people, generating significant regional (transnational) formations. The people of the Sahel are seeking a range of responses (not precluding violent acts) to these needs. Arguably, the development and security outcomes in the Sahel will depend on which of these two forces ultimately gains ascendancy if their convergence is not achieved.
- c) The factors that underpin the two security complexes shape the way in which the Sahel is defined, how conflict and insecurity as well as their development consequences are understood and how various interested parties respond to the challenges of the region. Policy decision-makers will do well to take this into account.** The distinct peoples' dimension of the Sahelian security complex is partly determined through history. History tells us, for instance about how they have responded to common threats from the natural environment. There is more focus on non-military threats. The intersection of human development and security needs makes this a human development complex as well. Population mobility, among others, is a key factor in considering the Sahel as a transnational security complex. The Sahel as a (State-based) regional security complex derives from the interests of external actors, the perception threats to their security and the acquiescence of the Sahel's governing elite in the pursuit of those interests. It is not really based on the conception that the Sahelian people have about their security or insecurity. Transnationalism in the Sahel predates recent insecurities in the region but is often treated as a function of the movement of armed groups and criminal networks, which facilitate conflict and insecurity
- d) People in general, and State actors (including the governing elite) construct different interpretations of a variety of security challenges and invariably accord different priorities to these security concerns. This is the root**

cause of the widespread insecurity in the Sahel and a sustaining factor of the conflict and insecurity. Security concerns such as the environment, drought and social exclusion pose an existential threat to the Sahelian people. Paradoxically, the very coping strategies and remedies that provide resilience to the populations as they seek to overcome these threats are those considered by State actors as major threats to the State and resisted by military approaches. By extension, the porous borders, which are a source of resilience to the people as they seek various coping mechanisms across borders in the bid to overcome their insecurities, are also the very source of threat to Sahelian States.

- e) **The amalgamation of these two complexes offers a chance for security and stability and by extension human development in the Sahel.** Extension of national security concerns to include the Sahelian populations' own conception of insecurity could potentially lead to prioritization of the existential issues of concern and ultimately produce a qualitative shift in policy and programmatic responses. It will also mean a reconfiguration of interests and partnerships in the Sahel.
- f) **The factors that cumulatively produce these two divergent complexes in the Sahel (illustrated in Table 1) are found in the structural, proximate and conflict-sustaining causes of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel, the overview of which is found in the report, with a brief outline below.** The overview is derived from the country case studies and provides some explanation for the two divergent – State-based and people-based – security complexes in the Sahel. These factors cut across all the Sahelian areas or countries studied:

Structural causes:

- **The environmental stress** stemming from the very location of the Sahel subjects the region and its peoples to conditions such as drought, desertification and variations in rainfall, with the accompanying impacts on food security and livelihoods. This has led to challenges such as internal tensions, displacement and in/out flow of refugees, youth migration, inter-communal violence and revival of (Tuareg) irredentism and political instability.
- **Historical grievances:** to varying degrees, this has complicated inter-group relations and political dynamics and State building processes across the Sahelian countries under study. The inability of the States to adequately respond to the deep-seated grievances exacerbated the problems, which have escalated and manifested in the spread of terrorism, criminality, and jihadism in the Sahel.
- **Fractured State-making processes:** Forging a common national identity and a collective destiny among the peoples within Sahelian States has been a deep-seated challenge at the root of conflict.

- **Youth bulge:** Sahelian countries have a high youth population with more than 60 per cent of them under the age of 25, on average, across the countries studied. The implications are grave when combined with the challenges of environmental stress, socioeconomic exclusion and political instability.

Proximate and conflict-sustaining causes:

- **Migration** across the Sahelian countries is a feature of life among Sahelian peoples for reasons beyond climatic conditions. The flow of refugees, in some cases, moving with livestock from war-affected areas in Mali, Niger and north-eastern Nigeria, adds to the insecurity.
- **Food insecurity:** current estimates for food insecurity point to a total caseload of 19.8 million people, with at least 2.6 million having already crossed the emergency threshold and requiring urgent food assistance.
- **Politicized military** coups, mutinies, overt and covert intervention in politics have been a regular occurrence in the frontline countries. Overall, the exclusionary policies and political repression associated with politicized security establishments is an important trigger for instability and other insecurities in the Sahel.
- **Rise of Jihadi and criminal networks:** Conflict and insecurities in Sahelian countries and their perpetrators have transmuted from grievance-based movements into more complex phenomena, with internal and regional consequences. This has been particularly prominent in Mali and Nigeria, with serious implications for Niger.
- **Regional and cross-border conflict and insecurity:** The security of Sahelian States is invariably tied to regional and transnational security dynamics, with some countries more susceptible to these dynamics than others.
- **Corruption and general socioeconomic deprivation:** All the Sahelian countries targeted for this study are endowed with considerable natural resources. However, they are plagued with governance challenges. As such, there is no effective management of the youth bulge and the resultant issues of unemployment and vulnerability to radicalization. Failure to break a cycle in which exclusion and unresolved grievances mutate into violent opposition to the State, strengthens narratives of extremist insurgent movements and provides justification for their cause.
- **Global dynamics and role of external actors:** The global context of the war on terror included narratives and counter-narratives that constructed radical Islamic groups as threats to democratic cultures, and Western civilization as threats to Islam. The subsequent dynamics in the Sahel accentuated this. The presence of a range of external actors (including security actors and extractive industries) in the Sahel is not necessarily targeted toward transforming this dynamic for the benefit of the Sahelian peoples.

- g) Empirical investigation of the impact of armed conflicts and insecurities on governance and economic growth in the Sahel region, with focus on the five frontline States, reveals a greater impact on governance.** The two most important results of the regressions (see chapter III of the report) are that the negative impact of conflict is more pronounced on governance than on economic growth in the frontline States. The other determinants of governance play key roles in mitigating the impact of conflict. These results are interesting from a policy standpoint because they suggest that it is more important to strengthen governance, so as to mitigate the negative impact of conflict.
- h) A qualitative analysis of the impact of armed conflicts and insecurities in the Sahel from regional as well as country perspectives reveals a range of crosscutting economic and governance impacts, which reinforce the divergent security complexes.** These impacts are briefly outlined below with a comprehensive overview in chapter IV of the report.

Economic impacts

- **Common, but variable macro-economic impact:** Armed conflict and insecurity continue to have varying degrees of macroeconomic impacts across countries in the Sahel. The macroeconomic impact oscillates between local and national levels. The type and scale of the macroeconomic impact is linked to the nature of the economy (specifically the role of agriculture), geographical proximity to the two conflict corridors and growth in other sectors, especially mineral and hydrocarbon. In countries such as Mali and Niger, the macroeconomic impact is more national, as opposed to Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mauritania where it is more localized.
- **Displacement and refugees:** Almost all countries along the Sahelian belt are either host or country of origin of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2014, at least 3.5 million persons were displaced by armed conflict and insecurity in two conflict corridors (Northern Nigeria and Northern Mali) in the Sahel.¹
- **Increased security-related expenditure:** There has been a noticeable increase in security-related activities and expenditure in all the Sahel countries affected by armed conflicts and insecurity. The scope and range of increases vary, based on four factors: proximity to major conflict corridors/theatres; intensity of conflict and security challenges; linkages to natural resource extraction and the nature of politics, and the subsisting role and influence of the military in governance.
- **Worsening poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability:** The case studies conducted show that cumulatively, armed conflict and insecurity have triggered or worsened poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability in regions and areas in and around the Sahel. The scale of the impact differs, relative to proximity to the two conflict corridors, as does the scale of displacement, hosting of refugees and IDPs, and subsisting local political and security dynamics.

¹ Norwegian Refugee Council (2014), Global Overview: People internally displaced by conflict and violence.

Governance impacts:

- **Displaced public administration and disrupted democratic governance:** The key countries at the centre of conflict and insecurity in the two conflict corridors (Mali and Nigeria), have witnessed the disruption of routine governance and service delivery in areas and communities in and around the Sahel (the so-called 'Northern phenomenon'). Conflict affected areas and communities in the Sahel are increasingly marked by the absence, displacement or replacement of public officials by insurgent groups.
 - **Stifling of civil liberties and human rights:** Civilian populations in case study countries, especially in areas and communities directly affected by conflict and insecurity in the Sahel face restrictions and violations of their civil liberties and freedoms by insurgent groups and government security forces alike.
 - **Complex humanitarian emergencies:** Conflict-affected areas and communities in the countries of the Sahel increasingly embody complex humanitarian emergencies, considering the intersection of multiple crises, and the breakdown of order and authority from a mixture of internal and cross-border cataclysmic events, and their cross-border and trans-national character. The scale varies within and across countries, with conflict-affected areas in Mali and Nigeria being the most acute, followed by villages and communities in border regions.
 - **Securitized foreign relations:** Armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel have transformed the regional and international relations of Sahelian countries. Security pacts, cooperation, collaboration and joint operations now dominate relations at bilateral and multilateral levels. This triggered and continues to reinforce the overwhelming law enforcement approach to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel. The securitization of foreign relations is also reflected in greater roles and involvement of major powers in security issues across the Sahel.
- i) **There is a proliferation of strategies on the Sahel with little synergy, cooperation and coordination:** Despite the limited understanding of the situation of Sahelian peoples, there is a proliferation of strategies and policies in the region. While every major actor appears to have a strategy, there is very little coordination or harmonization among organizations, in addition to which the prevailing situation creates competition for funds between a number of organizations and agencies.
- j) **Policies pertaining to the Sahel suffer from lack of understanding of the interconnections and linkages between its peoples, and the absence of reliable statistics and other indicators.** There is limited understanding of the realities of Sahelian life and conditions. The interconnections in the region are often not seen as largely people-driven, and the significance of the non-formal is not fully appreciated. There is hardly any evidence that the existing policies on the Sahel have drawn from people's lived realities and the trends that have underlined those realities in the past few decades. Historical patterns

of the interaction of the Sahelian peoples have long been transnational. At best, this transnationalism intersects with State actors in regional ways and cannot be contained neatly within national spaces.

- k) *The responses to what a regional crisis is and what a transnational crisis is are intensely national in scope:*** The responses to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel are not well analysed, and this invariably limits the impact of interventions. All operational responses are national in scope. The responses by institutions with a regional mandate are typically State-led, government-to-government, with the outcomes manifesting nationally. Most responses do not engage the subnational stakeholders, particularly those that are not formal or institutionalized and prone to constant movements across national boundaries and regionally organized.
- l) *The humanitarian approach provides a potential alternative, exemplary framework for responding to the Sahel:*** Humanitarian agencies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) interpret the Sahel crisis as a regional one and offer a regional response. In its response framework, humanitarian and food assistance is deployed with a regional focus across the entire region. Although country-by-country analyses and support are important, acting nationally is seen as producing limited results. As such, priority is given to cross-border initiatives. This approach moves closer to the transnational realities of the region's population because it follows people's movements by and large.
- m) *Overwhelming focus on terrorism, crime and militarized responses by powerful external actors for which these pose major threats relegates the long standing human security threats in the Sahel to the background.*** The presence of a range of international, particularly multilateral institutions such as the African Union and the United Nations provides a real opportunity to respond to the actual security and development needs of the Sahelian peoples. Military-centred approaches to combating terrorism and insecurity in the Sahel have proven insufficient to eradicate the structural problems, which underlie all of its countries. These approaches have become a source of resentment among the Sahelian populations and have served to increase the influence of non-State security actors. Neither the State-based security concerns nor the people-based security is alleviated by this narrow focus on military approaches. The converging international attention given to the Sahel must focus more on the real human conditions of its people, who are the structural roots of the insecurities witnessed in the region.
- n) *African States and regional institutions must respond to these challenges posed by the situation in the Sahel, their institutional frameworks and programmes to the realities of their peoples.*** The Sahelian areas of all five countries at the core of these investigations reflect key elements of human insecurity and the developmental consequences of conflict. The response frameworks of the African Union and the regional economic communities need to be retuned and adapted to this reality. Greater engagement with and adaptation to non-State, human conditions will offer a more relevant

strategy to cope with the type of challenges seen in the Sahel and bring about a convergence between the two security complexes.

- a) The effectiveness of adapted regional and international frameworks in addressing the challenges in the Sahel depends largely on the extent to which crucial leadership gaps can be filled.** Much depends on the ability and willingness of the governing elite to pursue common goals with the people. A re-ordering of security priorities to include the existential concerns of the people that they govern stands a greater chance of aligning the State and people-based complexes.

Key recommendations

- a) African Union and regional institutions as well as the United Nations should adopt an authentically region-based approach with transnational application, in order to bring about a convergence of the two security complexes in the Sahel.** Their level of analysis of the Sahelian situation needs to shift from an intensely national focus to a transnational one. A collective regional agenda with transnational implementation of programmatic interventions offers a more relevant framework for responding to Sahelian conditions and reaching populations whose lives straddle different State boundaries.
- b) National governments along the affected Sahelian corridors should draw regional lessons from their experiences and use them for programmes that work nationally, by scaling up successful national programmes to regional and transnational spaces.** Governments in the region should tone down their exclusive focus on State-related barriers to exploit opportunities for local lessons learning from the common situation of the Sahel.
- c) All African Union and United Nations agencies responding to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel should view engagement with sub-national and non-formal stakeholders, as a necessary part of dealing with the transnational character of the Sahel.** In effect, security and development services should follow the movement of people and operate across border areas.
- d) The United Nations, the African Union and regional organizations should refocus their Sahel strategy by organizing and implementing policies and programmes for the Sahel region and its peoples.** The management of Sahelian security and facilitation of development for Sahelian peoples is beyond the capacity of any individual State.
- e) Operational agencies working on the Sahel should reposition their operational presence toward patterns of population movement in the region.** Invariably, the collective redirection of the Sahelian strategy toward transnational application of policy and programmes will encourage the desired change in operational patterns among relevant agencies.

Introduction

The present study on “Conflict in the Sahel region and developmental consequences” has a three-pronged objective:

The research process is anchored on both the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts on development in the Sahel. Accordingly, the primary question guiding the research is: “*What are the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity on development in the Sahel?*” This primary research question reflects two broad components, namely assessing the root causes of armed conflicts and insecurity, and assessing the impacts on human development in the Sahel.

The primary research question expands the focus from mere conflict to violent or armed conflicts, and from conflict to incidences of large-scale insecurity (even in the absence of a formal armed conflict), and adopts a plural interpretation of conflict. The research team defined the markers of large-scale insecurity to include the existence of armed conflict; armed groups; acts of terrorism and terrorist groups; transnational crime and networks; humanitarian crises (food insecurity, refugees and internally displaced persons); restricted population movements; environmental challenges (intense drought and climatic changes, and disrupted socioeconomic activities) and international interventions.

The primary research question acknowledges that ‘Sahelian areas’ criss-cross several countries, and the impacts and effects of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity differ across Sahelian countries. There is therefore, a need to focus on Sahelian areas affected within specific countries, as well as country-level assessments where and when necessary.

In practical terms, the research breaks down the primary research question into three pillars – key elements that straddle the national and regional levels of analysis. The first pillar references the regional dynamics. The second pillar captures issues at the national level through specific country case studies. The third pillar builds on the findings of the specific country (field) studies. The three elements that emerged are as follows:

The first interrogates the interconnectedness and linkages in the causes, actors and processes underlying armed conflicts and insecurity across the Sahel. Through this, the research takes a broad regional overview and the interconnections between national and transnational dynamics.

The second provides an analysis at the national level, through selected country case studies. This restates nation-States as the pre-eminent unit of analysis and the basis for building a regional overview. At the same time, it provides a basis for comparing national situations with transnational trends. The criteria for selection of countries were premised on the severity (of armed conflict and large-scale insecurities) and the relevance to the research problem and questions mentioned above along the two conflict corridors described below.

The third element provides sufficient narrative for gauging the development process impact, trends and trajectories. This essentially derives from field research findings (specific country case studies) and informs the first and second pillars by validating or rejecting the hypothesis.

Defining the Sahel: the essence of frontline States along two conflict corridors

The Sahel is the stretch of land between the shores of the Upper West (Atlantic Ocean) and Upper East (Red Sea) of Africa. 'Sahel' is an Arabic word meaning the 'Shore', a reference to the two enclosing shorelines. It is a mixture of grassland and semi-arid and desert (Sahara Desert) climate. It is inhabited by nomads and pastoralists. The Sahel is rich in history, as evidenced by the historical Trans-Sahara trade routes that crisscrossed the Sahel; the centres of civilization (Timbuktu, Gao and Djenne); and the rise of powerful empires such as Songhai and the Sokoto Caliphate. The area covers about 3 million square km and includes parts of southern Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan. It is estimated that about 50 million people live in the Sahel region.

Over the past 25 years, the Sahel has attracted international research and policy attention, on account of its environmental challenges, often linked to factors such as drought, famine and desertification. A second reason for the focus on the Sahel is the poverty profile of the region, worsened by the effects of environmental changes. The third reason is the increasing scale and scope of security issues and challenges linked to ethno-nationalist irredentism, the spread of small arms and light weapons, the escalating organized crime and criminal network activities, and the spread of radical armed groups.

In the context of this research, the focus is on frontline States in relation to two conflict corridors, namely northern Mali and north-east Nigeria (Lake Chad Basin), areas rife with armed conflicts and violence. Some generic features and characteristics define these two corridors. First, they directly or geographically manifest the impact of armed conflict and large-scale insecurity. They are thus, the scene of armed attacks and clashes, and suffer the impact of such attacks, as evidenced by the displacement of populations and the influx of refugees. Secondly, governments are responding to insecurity by deploying troops, increasing patrols and combating with armed groups. Thirdly, tensions occur between host communities and displaced or refugee communities. Lastly, the corridors crisscross national boundaries.

When superimposed on the corridor that begins in northern Mali, which has been a scene of major armed conflicts, these features extend into the border areas of Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso, which have been highly impacted by the insecurity situation. Likewise, the corridor from north-east Nigeria extends into Niger, Cameroon and Chad, which all have been impacted by the Boko Haram crisis. This study, however, will focus on five countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.

A second set of countries, including Algeria, Cameroon, Chad and Guinea Bissau, was also identified. When the study began, Cameroon and Chad had not acquired their

current status as significant extensions to the Northeast Nigeria conflict corridor. Nonetheless, the choice of Niger as the main extension to that corridor is significant as it is at the intersection of both corridors – from Northeast Mali and Northeast Nigeria – and has been at the receiving end of the insecurity stemming from both scenes of armed conflict.


The study was limited to these frontline States because of the short time available for research and also for the sake of analytical simplicity and coherence and the opportunity for in-depth empirical assessment and analysis of the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity on economic and governance-related themes.

The significance of the Sahel

The relevance of the Sahel in the study of security and development in Africa, and indeed, the world, cannot be overstated. The two Sahelian corridors – Mali and north-east Nigeria – at the core of this study, exemplify the security and development challenges of African societies and States. They also raise critical questions about the established frameworks around which responses to these challenges are organized – both nationally and regionally. Arguably, the realities of the Sahel compel a radical rethinking of the African State and the construction of the associated regional dynamics and international response frameworks in Africa.

The security and development realities of the Sahel are underscored by conflict and under-development, which are constant features of the Sahelian areas. Four out of the five Sahelian countries in this study – Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – are in the bottom 30 of the Human Development Index (2013). The fifth country, Nigeria – which is now recognized as Africa’s largest economy – is only nine places above Mauritania, which is number 161 out of 188 on the Human Development Index.

Figure 1: Human Development Index for first set of Sahelian countries



Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Reports. Table 1: Human Development Index and its components. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components>.

All of these frontline countries have experienced varying degrees of armed conflict in the past decade, with the attendant consequences for development and security

ramifications. All of them have experienced the classic peace-building dilemma of conflict relapse – a recurrence of violent conflict, mostly within 10 years of a conflict ending. While the same conflict has recurred or mutated in some cases, new conflicts have emerged in others, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. This not only raises questions about the approach to sustaining peace but also about how to maintain the dividends of peace, of which development is a key component. The 2015 review by the United Nations of its peace building architecture underscores the global search for a solution to the challenge of conflict relapse.

The approaches and responses to conflict and its development consequences have remained largely constant, be it in terms of research and policy or programmatic interventions. However, the populations around which these interventions are designed are changing rapidly. The constantly mutating global and regional conflict contexts are a challenge to sustainable peace and development efforts. Indeed, the traditional construction of the State as the foremost lens through which responses to armed conflict are analysed is being challenged by these changes. It is difficult to challenge the logic of organizing activities along statist logic. Not only is the State the recognised unit in international relations and global engagement, it is the entity to which citizens and society submit their sovereignty in exchange for guaranteed organized protection and governance. The State is thus the instrument around which priority setting and resource allocation are secured for society. Its institutions are relied upon to manage the resultant conflict from these processes without becoming the basis for larger violence. Where these functions are performed on behalf of the populations with which it has developed a compact, the logic of the State is hard to fault. The situation in the Sahel challenges this logic. However, this is not the preserve of the Sahel but a residual, unanswered question about the post-colonial State in Africa.

Methodology: a case study approach

The study uses the case study approach as the overall research strategy and data collection method. The case study approach is used for investigating “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”.² The use of a case study approach involves the definition of the phenomenon (research problem and questions) to be explained, a hypothetical explanation of it and case studies (frontline countries) to be investigated to evaluate the relevance of the study assumptions.³

The case study approach is especially suitable for this study as it enables the research to combine multiple typologies (qualitative and quantitative) and sources (interviews, document analysis and focus group sessions) of data. Secondly, it provides the logical bases for generalizing findings and observations on the likely root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel. Thirdly, it simplifies and reduces the

2 Yin, R. (1994). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Applied Social Research Methods, Vol.5. Thousand Oaks, CA.

3 Silverman, D. (1985). *Qualitative Methodology and Sociology: Describing the Social World*. England: Gower.

complexities of the proposed study by narrowing down to logical samples and case studies (frontline countries). Fourthly, the case study approach allows the research to observe, interpret and analyse data against contextual specificities, thereby enabling data to be contextualized. Lastly, it makes it possible to conduct cross-case studies and cross-country comparisons, thereby giving the study a comparative value.

The selection of case studies is done at three levels:

1. Selection of the five frontline States based on their proximity to the two conflict corridors of northern Mali and north-eastern Nigeria (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria) as case studies (of logical relevance to the research problem and questions) within and among Sahelian countries.
2. The focus, when identifying and citing specific cases of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities in each of the frontline States, should be on documenting such conflicts or cases of insecurity. The two conflict corridors are relevant here, as the sites of specific armed conflicts or insecurities. In Mali, for instance, the focus could be the Tuareg uprisings or the rise of radical armed Islamic groups; and in Nigeria, it could be the Boko Haram insurgency. The in-country case studies provide an entry point for assessing and analysing the micro- and macro-level impacts of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities in the frontline countries.
3. The division of the overall study into mini case study reports with each addressing one or more secondary research questions. Accordingly, six mini-case study reports are proposed, including:
 - a) Assessment of the Sahel as a regional security complex, including the assessment of the transnational root causes and response patterns to armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel.
 - b) Empirical assessment of the impacts of armed conflicts and insecurities on economic and governance development in Burkina Faso.
 - c) Empirical assessment of the impacts of armed conflicts and insecurities on economic and governance development in Mali.
 - d) Empirical assessment of the impacts of armed conflicts and insecurities on economic and governance development in Mauritania.
 - e) Empirical assessment of the impacts of armed conflicts and insecurities on economic and governance development in Niger.
 - f) Empirical assessment of the impacts of armed conflicts and insecurities on economic and governance development in Nigeria.

Analytical framework: a human development approach

The research methodology is anchored on Amartya Sen's concept of "Development as Freedom" and "Development as Capability".⁴ According to Sen, freedom and development are intertwined, with freedom being the primary goal and means of development and development being the expression and fulfilment of human freedom, the removal of impediments to freedoms such as poverty, discrimination, inequalities, absence of social services, lack of economic opportunities, social exclusion, armed conflicts, large-scale violence and other forms of physical insecurity. Poverty and mainstream economic issues are only one component of development, rather than its totality. There is therefore a need for a wider approach to and interpretation of development that incorporates *capabilities and potentials*. Poverty is the deprivation of capabilities, rather than merely lowness of income. The conditions leading to constraints to freedom are, by nature, subjective. The input, therefore, must come through a democratic and participatory process following a bottom-up approach, rather than from statistics.

In this sense, development encompasses five interdependent elements, including orthodox macroeconomic measures of growth rates, investments and fiscal stability; access to basic social services and poverty alleviation; democracy, human rights and civil liberties; a reasonable level of security; and good governance virtues (accountability, transparency, etc.).⁵ Sen's ideas pinpoint the importance of the macro-, meso- and micro-level aspects and measures of development, as well as their diversity in terms of understanding incomes not so much as an end in itself, but rather a means to a bigger goal – the expression of freedom and choice.

Sen's approach is particularly relevant for the proposed study on four accounts. First, it emphasizes the "human" as opposed to the single-level analysis of macroeconomic trends and patterns. This "human" focus is consistent with what is invariably a focus on "human security" concerns in the discussion on the causes of conflict in the Sahel and the manifestation of this in the consequences. Secondly, it presents diverse issues that transcend economic variables to include social and governance themes. Thirdly the approach is in line with extant policy approaches and assessment mechanisms, thereby enhancing the prospect of using extant data sets, such as UNDP human development indicators). Lastly, it allows the research to interrogate the differential aspects and impacts of conflicts on development on different social categories, not least women, children and youth.

On the basis of Sen's conception of development, the assessment of the impacts and consequences of the conflicts in the Sahel will be anchored on two broad areas, namely economic-related and governance-related issues. It is noteworthy that these broad areas also encompass the seven dimensions of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. [UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 1994].

4 Sen, Amartya (1999). *Development as Freedom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5 Sen, Amartya (1999). *Development as Freedom*, pp. 13-34.

a) The scope of economic-related issues to be assessed follows the template developed for a similar ECA study on the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the following:

i) Overall macroeconomic effects

- Economic growth trends and patterns
- Price effects, including impacts on inflation
- Impact on government revenue.
- Impact on government expenditure, including on investment (infrastructure) and social spending
- Impact on military and/or security-related expenditure and spending patterns

ii) External position, including impacts on:

- Trade balances and patterns
- Exports (focus on natural resources and manufactured goods)
- Effects on imports (types and nature of imports and volume)
- Impact on cross-border and regional trade

iii) Sectoral impacts on:

- Agriculture (especially agricultural production, land management and investment in agriculture)
- Industry, especially mining (formal and artisanal), the manufacturing sector and industrialization.
- The services sector, including implications for small- and medium-scale enterprises and employment creation.

iv) Poverty and poverty alleviation, including implications for:

- Poverty trends (over an extended period, especially before, during and after the conflict).
- Impacts on poverty alleviation programmes and interventions.

v) Human capital development issues, including:

- Impact on the overall human development index (before, during and after the conflict)
- Impact on education in terms of government spending, education and infrastructure spending and delivery of education services
- Impact on health, including effects on government spending, delivery and functioning of health services, on levels and spread of major diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria) and effect on sexual violence against women.
- Impact on vulnerable groups, specifically women, children and youth, in terms of mortality rates, nutrition, economic activities and production (e.g. unemployment), and family and community life and wellbeing.

b) The governance-related component will cover five key elements, including:

i) Democratic processes

- Elections and political participation
- Rule of law
- Political transitions
- Public administration

ii) Human rights and civil liberties, including:

- Legislation
- Curfews and state of emergency declarations
- Media freedom
- Violence against women
- Religious freedom

iii) Inter-group relations (social capital) and national cohesion, including:

- Diversity management and inter-group interaction patterns
- Inter-group perceptions and stereotypes
- Group identities
- National narrative

iv) Security sector governance and efficiency, including:

- Role and activities of non-State armed groups
- Security operations by formal State security institutions
- Civil-military relations
- Security-related expenditures
- External participation and security activities

v) International relations, including:

- Transnational movement of people and services
- International relations policy framework
- Patterns of regional cooperation and integration
- Aid and development assistance
- Foreign security assistance and external influences

Assessing root causes: a conflict tree approach

The research focuses on the violent manifestations of conflict rather than the mere existence of disagreement and disputes. It also views conflict in 'plural' terms, thus differentiating between different episodes of violent conflicts (notwithstanding historical and empirical connections). Thus, the Sahel is considered to be host to multiple types of conflict, which are assumed to be different (even if there could be connections by virtue of geography, history, armed groups, causes and impacts).

In assessing the causes of conflict in the Sahel, the research will use a 'conflict tree' approach that differentiates between underlying structural issues, proximate causes,

and conflict-sustaining variables. Structural causes relate to the way societies, countries and institutions of government are organized, the rules and processes by which they operate and the official and unofficial exercise of power. In specific terms, structural causes may include historical dysfunctionalities, dislocation and injustice arising from colonialism, structural violence, population settlement patterns; nature of political systems; systems of inclusion and exclusion from mainstream socioeconomic and political decision-making processes; geographical and environmental complexities; and horizontal (intra-group) and vertical (inter-group) inequalities.

Proximate causes relate to specific events, actors, movements, empirical realities and moments that amplify and catalyse subsisting tensions and grievances that lead to violence. Some examples of this in relation to the Sahel are military coups and mutinies; economic collapse; scarcity (arising from drought and famine); contestations arising from elections and inter-elite power struggles; spread of radical ideologies (including but not limited to political Islam); rise of ethno-national and ethno-political movements and sentiments; youth bulges, etc.

Conflict-sustaining variables are exogenous factors that prolong or reproduce the cycles of violent conflict, and give violent conflicts their independent dynamic. In certain instances, they overlap with proximate causes. Some of the likely conflict-sustaining variables in the Sahel are the spread of small arms and light weapons; organized crime and criminal networks; inappropriate or failed conflict management approaches; corruption and profiteering from security operations; inappropriate external interventions; and strategic stalemate.

Outline of chapters

The chapters that follow present the findings of the study, taking into account, among other things, the regional trends that emerge from the examination of conflict and insecurity along the two conflict corridors that form the focus of this study. The first chapter examines the Sahel as a *security complex*. It highlights the key factors that qualify this area as a security complex and the nature of that complex.

Chapter II presents regional and country overviews of the structural, proximate and conflict-sustaining causes of armed conflict and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel. The first set of Sahelian countries, which serve as case studies in this research are the focus of the discussion.

The third chapter provides a qualitative overview of the impact of armed conflict and insecurities in the Sahel from a regional and country standpoint. The empirical analysis of the impact of conflict on economic growth and governance in the Sahel region contained in the annex provides additional data to support the discussion in this chapter as well as this study's overall regional dimension. It relies on a panel data set of 11 countries from 1990 to 2014. The 11 countries selected, based on the broader definition of the Sahel region that includes Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Sudan.

Chapter IV examines responses to the challenges of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel region through an analysis of the various regional policies and programmes being implemented by a range of regional and extra-regional actors. In particular, it analyses response patterns and lessons learned from these responses.

The conclusion to this report discusses policy implications of the responses to conflict and insecurities in the Sahel and offers recommendations for future engagement with the Sahel region by governmental and intergovernmental bodies; the African Union, United Nations and a host of extra-African organizations and State actors operating in the Sahel.

CHAPTER 1: The Sahel as a security complex

The idea of a regional security complex points to the shared nature of armed conflicts and insecurity in terms of causes and impacts in the Sahel - in essence, how the peace and security of Sahelian countries are systematically linked. Against this background, the following operational questions were determined to address the transnational dimension:

- a) What are the transnational connections and dimensions of structural, proximate and conflict sustaining causes of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel?
- b) Which locales best demonstrate the effects of regional security dynamics?
- c) How is armed conflict shaped by international actors and processes?

1.1 Deciphering a security complex in the Sahel

Making sense of the dynamics and interconnection which qualify the sociocultural, political and economic space called the Sahel as a regional security complex is crucial for an analysis of the causes and the consequences of conflict in the region. Equally important is understanding the external dynamics that have led to the gradual securitization of the Sahel as a key area of concern for international security, particularly, the war on terror.

In its original conceptualization, the “classical security complex” had the States as its focus, especially with regard to political and military issues. A security complex refers to “a set of States whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another”.⁶ The States within a complex produce dynamics based on their interactions with each other, in the pursuit of their security needs. The accepted idea of a regional security complex is thus a situation in which States form regional clusters in response to threats and vulnerabilities.⁷ It is thus possible to construct a view of the Sahel as a *security region* – a collection of States whose relationship is characterized by deep security interdependence.

The framers of the idea of a regional security complex also envisaged situations where security concerns might be non-military and States not the key actors. Invariably, actors other than the State are linked by their mutual security concerns. And the security issues at the core of such concerns are not necessarily of a political or military nature. Indeed, it is possible to decipher regional patterns below the level of the State

⁶ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulden CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 12.

⁷ For a discussion on the classical security complex theory, see Barry Buzan. *People States and Fear* (1983), pp. 105-115.

when dealing with individuals or groups of individuals. Buzan and others refer to this as the “bottom line of most analysis in the social sciences”. The security dynamics in the non-military sector thus, also produce their own regional logic. Invariably, the non-military and human security concerns also produce regional formations.

It is difficult to challenge the logic of organizing activities such as research, policy and programmatic interventions along statist logic. Not only is the State the recognized unit in international relations and the associated global commitment, it is the entity to which citizens and society submit their sovereignty in exchange for guaranteed organized protection and governance. The State is thus the instrument around which priority setting and resource allocation are secured for society. Its institutions are relied upon to manage conflict resulting from these processes without becoming the basis for larger violence. Where these functions are performed on behalf of the populations with which it has developed a compact, the logic of the State is hard to fault.

However, the African post-colonial State has struggled to conform to this logic. The mutating and challenging contexts of conflict and insecurity in Africa compel a return to Peter Ekeh’s pathbreaking thesis of four decades ago on “Colonialism and the two publics in Africa”.⁸ Ekeh discussed “two public realms in post-colonial Africa with different types of moral linkages to the private realm.”⁹ He argued that while the *primordial public*, is driven by the same moral compulsions as the private realm, the *civic public*, with all its connections to colonial systems of administration, “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the primate realm and in the primordial public”.¹⁰ Without adapting to the social context in which they were to operate, institutions of governance, including the civil service, the police and armed forces, presided over by the African inheritance elite, were super imposed on African societies. In the absence of sustained conversations between the new African elite and the peoples about the terms on which they would live together in the inherited conditions, African States and societies have plodded along, adjusting to the realities of their existence.

Forty years after Ekeh’s conceptual statement, it is still possible to decipher a major distance between many African States and vast populations under their jurisdiction. Indeed, the inability of the State to obtain the loyalty of the vast majority of its citizens is at the core of the recurrent conflicts in Africa. Many African States remain enigmatic in the absence of a deep connection to their affiliate societies. The State has, for too long, maintained its ascendancy by affiliating itself with inter-governmental and multilateral institutions. In reality, however, the populations, which ought to be the best expression of a State’s legitimate existence, are far removed from the State and its institutions. Invariably, actors other than the State fill the governance vacuum, and people who do not feel the practical effect of the State gravitate toward alternative systems of protection and governance.

8 Ekeh, Peter (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol 17, Issue 1, pp 91-112.

9 Ekeh, Peter (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa, p. 92.

10 Ibid.

This challenge is manifested in varying degrees across African States and perhaps is best exemplified in the Sahel, given the centuries of history that connect the Sahelian peoples and the inability of the relatively new States to adapt to this history. Without an organic connection to their peoples, these States can only form clusters in response to a narrow set of threats and vulnerabilities, which challenge them, and not necessarily their peoples.

1.2 The coexistence of two security complexes in the Sahel

This study finds that two distinct security complexes are visible in the Sahel. In one, regional patterns are evident in the interaction between States, based on security inter-dependence, which gives priority to military-related activities. In the other, groups of individuals are connected below the level of the State by (non-military) human security concerns, which generate significant regional ('transnational') formations. While this is not necessarily exclusive to the Sahel, the region reveals a clear pattern in which it is not only States, but also communities of people outside the frame of the State, which emerge in regional clusters. The latter is distinctive. It is a solid and durable people-based transnational cluster.

The Sahelian security complex could thus be observed as a collection of States as well as human communities whose regional and transnational interaction is not dependent on the formation of a cluster of regional States. The fact that security complexes are clearly observable at the two levels of analysis – State and people – is a distinctive feature of security in the Sahel.

This study submits that conflict and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel and their development consequences must be understood within these two divergent forces – a State-based regional security complex and a people-based transnational security complex. The two are compelled by different sets of logic. On the one hand, the State-based complex is underpinned by concerns about immediate threats to States – including, for example, armed violence and organized crime – to which predominantly military responses are sought. On the other hand, the people-based security complex is driven by deep-seated human existential concerns, which connect both human security and human development needs of the populations. Arguably, the development and security outcomes in the Sahel will depend on which of these two forces ultimately gains ascendancy.

Two sets of factors underpin the two security complexes. These factors shape the way in which the Sahel is defined, how conflict and insecurity as well as their development consequences are understood, and how the various interested parties respond to the challenges of the Sahel. This report teases out several factors, which serve as key features of the two Sahelian complexes. It highlights how Sahelian States and peoples have related to each other in terms of perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities. It also sheds light on the threats and vulnerabilities, which emanate from within and outside the region and which shape the dynamics that facilitate conflict and insecurity for peoples and States and account for divergences in outlook. A capsule summary is provided below.

1.3 The Sahelian people-based (transnational) security complex

This distinct peoples' dimension of the Sahelian security complex is in part determined through history. It is determined, for example, by how they have responded to common threats from the natural environment. There is greater focus on non-military threats in this regard. The intersection of both human security and human development needs when examining this people-based security complex makes this arguably a human development complex at the same time. Ultimately, however, there are issues to be resolved in terms of contradictions that occur in policy and programmatic responses to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel. We return to this issue in the last part of this report, although it is discussed here in passing.

Population mobility is a key factor in considering the Sahel as a transnational security complex. The interconnections and interdependence among Sahelian peoples are characterized by a history of movement of people along trading and transhumance routes – a movement that is underlined by extreme climatic and ecological conditions. As such, it's nomadic and less mobile populations have sought to adapt to these extreme climatic conditions through age-old traditions that include seasonal and livestock migration and diversification of crop growing areas, in a bid to reduce economic and climatic risks.¹¹ Trade and social organizations have necessarily been driven by these factors. Transhumance livestock migration and the attendant resource needs facilities, such as access routes and water invariably influenced trade patterns and the structure of the Sahelian economy.¹² Interdependence was a core feature of the movement across ethnic boundaries and economic specializations across the region. This underlying structural factor continues to define the Sahel, albeit to varying degrees, notwithstanding intervening events and factors, such as jihad, colonialism and most recently, the War on Terror.

Borders (porous, uncontrolled and often unrecognized by local populations) are a key factor in considering the Sahel as a transnational security complex. They are a source of resilience for the Sahelian peoples. Border areas in the Sahel, by the very nature of life in the region, have remained permeable. Their location in vast, sparsely populated lands is accompanied by unregulated migration, organized criminal activities, including illicit transfer of arms, drugs and unchecked access of terrorist networks. These organized criminal activities and movements are a more recent development in the Sahel. There is, however, a disconnect between the goal of securing these borders through traditional, State-focused approaches and the patterns of movement of Sahelian peoples who have criss-crossed the Sahel for centuries without giving a thought to the restrictions laid down by nationally drawn boundaries. This underlying transnational inclination of Sahelian peoples raises questions about conventional approaches to border security in the region. It is one of the key factors for the divergence between the people-based and State-based security complexes in the Sahel. As discussed later, this also raises practical questions for the application of Africa's regional integration agenda.

11 ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD (2006). The Ecologically Vulnerable Zone of Sahelian Countries: Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa, Environmental Series.

12 P. Lovejoy (2005). Ecology and Ethnography of Muslim Trade in West Africa, African World Press, Inc., Trenton NJ. p.3.

Population growth, urbanization and availability or scarcity of resources, are key structural drivers of violence in the Sahel and a compelling factor for a security complex.

The Sahel is a constantly changing region in terms of population growth, urbanization and the demand for and management of natural resources. Inadequate monitoring of these mutating factors across such a vast area makes effective response elusive and prolongs the cycle of conflict. Perhaps the single most important factor in recent history to have first mobilized Sahelian States toward a regional security complex was the drought from the late 1960s to the 1970s and its resultant effect on the Sahelian peoples. The creation of the Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) by Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal was in response to this crisis. This drought ushered in a period coloured by negative coping mechanisms that partially contributed to insecurity and conflict in the Sahel. Climatic conditions, environmental degradation and inadequate government policies continue to affect Sahelian livelihoods, particularly agro-pastoralism, contributing to a steep decline in the coping capacity of the region's poorest.

The socioeconomic impact of conflict and insecurity on the Sahelian populations is more significant than the effects of extreme vulnerability to climate.

Indicative estimates suggest that more than 20 million people are food insecure in the region. This is more significant than the effects of the worst periods of drought. The current situation demonstrates the cumulative impact of a number of crises. It is this cumulative effect, more than any single cause, which explains the dramatic numbers of vulnerable people across the Sahel. The occurrence of these cycles of vulnerability makes the Sahelian condition more difficult to manage.

The linkages between structural and proximate dimensions of insecurity and armed conflict in the Sahel are inextricably linked to the spread of terrorism and criminal networks across the region.

The same features and dynamics that produced the Sahelian peoples' adaptation in response to extreme climatic conditions have generated a symbiosis in which negative adaptation in turn sustains a criminal network and alliances with terrorist groups and methodology. Invariably, the security dynamics among non-State groups (of various extractions) has generated regional patterns and formations. It is this which mostly compels a State-based regional security complex, and which is yet to percolate down to deeper issues of insecurity among the Sahelian peoples.

1.4 The Sahel as a State-based regional security complex

According to the Sahel West Africa Club, "Today, the Sahara-Sahelian region has yet again regained global attention, due to the insecurity threatening the area. *The Sahel is perceived as a threat to the region's States and against international security*".¹³ This is consistent with the views expressed by a range of regional and international organizations as explained in chapter 5 of this report. This perceived threat to international security defines and drives the approach to the Sahel as a (State-based) regional security complex and places an overwhelming focus on military activities. The United Nations Secretary-General has emphasized the "links between criminal

13 Sahel West Africa Club (SWAC-S) (2014a). p.10.

syndicates involved in drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as non-State armed groups active in the region". This draws attention to the activities of terrorist organizations and other militant groups.¹⁴ For the African Union Peace and Security Council, the links between terrorism, drug trafficking and cross border-crime give armed terrorist and criminal groups the "capacity of regeneration" in a situation where these groups "thrive on the vulnerabilities of the region."¹⁵

Responses to insecurity, armed conflict and terrorism have securitized the Sahel and contributed to a clustering of select Sahelian States into a regional security complex:

External State interests in the Sahel in the post-9/11 period has been driven in large part by the counter-terrorism agenda of key nations. The scale of interest and involvement of international actors has facilitated (without qualification) a regional security complex among a select group of Sahelian States. As such, security perceptions and concerns of these States are increasingly interlinked such that their national security problems are not viewed apart from one another. However, in a large part, the security concerns of their peoples remain far removed from these national security concerns. This is a crucial factor for the existence of two divergent security complexes in the Sahel.

The Sahel's position as a State-based regional security complex has more to do with the interests of external actors and their perception of their own security threats than with the people's conceptions of their security or insecurity.

Military-centred approaches to combating terrorism and insecurity in the Sahel have not succeeded in eradicating the structural dimensions of all the countries. These approaches increasingly turned into a source of resentment among the people of the Sahel and helped to heighten the influence of non-State security actors. Invariably, neither the State-based security concerns nor the people-based ones are alleviated by this narrow focus of external interventions on military approaches.

1.5 Explaining divergent security complexes and connection to armed conflict and insecurity

These divergent complexes are not the natural order of things. Rather, they represent the fundamental disconnects between Sahelian States and large portions of their populations. A combination of the factors above, which account for the people and State-based security complexes, should form a single outlook of a Sahelian security complex for the countries and the people. In an ideal situation, the State provides the umbrella view of security, defining security broadly from the viewpoint of citizens and the State; and security policy and planning would ideally be undertaken from this perspective. The divergent complexes in the Sahel reflect narrow State conceptions of security as well as State-centric and fragmented responses to deep-seated security concerns across Sahelian societies.

Table 1 below reflects how people and State actors construct different interpretations of a variety of security challenges and invariably accord different priorities to these security concerns. This, in part, lies at the root of the large-scale insecurities in the Sahel

14 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2013a). p.2.

15 African Union (2014b). p.3.

and very often serves as a sustaining factor of conflict and insecurity. Certain security concerns, such as environment, drought and social exclusion, pose an existential threat to Sahelian peoples. Paradoxically, the very coping strategies and remedies that provide resilience to the populations as they seek to overcome these threats are considered by State actors to be major threats to the State and resisted by military approaches. By extension, the porosity of the borders, which provides a source of resilience to the Sahelian populations as they seek various coping mechanisms across borders in their efforts to overcome their insecurities, is seen as a source of threat to the Sahelian States. The table (1) below provides a snapshot of the key concerns in each complex and the interpretations that create and/or reinforce the divergence.

The divergence stems from disconnection at a number of levels. In the first place, government institutions are far removed from society. State institutions are not easily accessible to the vast majority of people. Clearly, many of the colonially inherited security institutions and arrangements were not intended for the protection and care of large parts of the population. Invariably, the governing elite and segments of capital cities have privileged access to these institutions. As such, the State is rarely aware of the security concerns of large segments of the population. Secondly, States become responsive to broader security issues beyond the protection of the regime and ruling elite only when the security of the State is obviously threatened through violent attacks or insecurities created by non-State activities. As indicated later in this report, the inability to respond to underlying causes of conflict and insecurities in the larger society invariably becomes the basis for larger crises and violent conflicts. Another source of this disconnect is the relationship between African States and their powerful external allies, which naturally engage on the basis of their interests. It is not unusual for African States to be responsive to the concerns of powerful external allies. This certainly applies to the Sahel, as will be shown later in this report. Powerful external actors, which engage with the Sahelian States quite often focus on narrow security interests, and influence policy responses that do not necessarily touch the deeper security concerns of the Sahelian peoples. One last and obvious level of disconnect is the regional integration agenda in Africa, which also tends to focus on integration of States rather than people-to-people integration.

Table 1.1: Two divergent security complexes in the Sahel

Issues or dimension	State-based regional/ transactional security complex	People-based transnational/ regional security complex [and human development complex]	Conflict causing and sustaining factors
1. Dominant issues	Political issues	Humanitarian and human development issues	Survival and human development of people and communities in Sahel and border areas are interconnected or inter-dependent and this must be made a priority issue on the radar of the States.
2. Security threats and challenges	Terrorism and related organized crime	Local grievances; protests against the State over neglect and exclusion	The pursuit of negative coping mechanisms in dealing with State exclusion and existential threats has led some groups to collaborate with declared terrorist groups and criminal networks.
3. Constituency or key actor/ focus	State/ regime-centred	People/community-centred	Limited points of intersection
4. Borders and territories	Evidence of State sovereignty and inviolable	Borders are immaterial; porous borders are a source of resilience and coping mechanism for Sahelian peoples.	A key area of tension: Sahelian peoples have criss-crossed the region as part of their coping mechanisms for centuries. Raises issues for Africa's regional integration agenda.
5. Mobility and migration	Cross-border movement is a source and form of security threat	Cross-border movement/ migration is a source of livelihood, resilience and adaptation and survival	Regional approaches to integration might either aggravate or reduce this tension.
6. Key resource	International law, protocols and African Union processes	Social capital: trust, confidence and solidarity	Without integrating State and people-based security concerns, these resources might be deployed at cross-purposes.
7. Impact on policy and practice	Strong /dominant impact on policy at State, regional and international levels: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Huge funding available • Huge political attention 	Limited variable impact on policy and practice: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited funding (relatively) • Limited political attention 	Human development of Sahelian peoples not achievable with current State-focused approaches.
8. Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • States/ Regimes • Regional Economic Communities and the African Union • Armed Forces and security agencies • Bilateral security initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian agencies • Civil society organizations/ non-governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations • Community groups and citizens • Traditional authorities • Diaspora groups • Armed groups/networks 	Treating the Sahel as a regional or transnational security and human development complex alongside current military approaches.

1.6 Concluding remarks

The next two chapters highlight the factors that cumulatively produce these two divergent complexes in the Sahel. Invariably, the amalgamation of these complexes offers a chance for security and stability, and by extension, human development in the Sahel. Extending national security concerns to include the Sahelian populations' own conception of insecurity could potentially lead to prioritization of the existential issues of concern and ultimately produce a qualitative shift in policy and programmatic responses. It will also mean a reconfiguration of interests and partnerships in the Sahel.

CHAPTER 2: The structural, proximate and conflict-sustaining causes of armed conflict and insecurity in Sahelian countries

A country analysis was conducted for the “first set of countries”, namely Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. These case studies facilitate comparability within the Sahel region and also generate country-specific issues. While the central focus of Pillar 2 of this study explores structural, proximate and conflict-sustaining causes of armed conflicts and insecurity in the selected case studies, it also generates initial proposals on the impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity on human development. The proposals were explored on the basis of desk research and then tested for relevance in the field, thus forming the basis for Pillar 3, which is the focus of Chapter IV of this report. The operational research questions guiding Pillar 2 therefore contain elements linked to exploring the impacts of armed conflict and insecurity on human development in Sahelian countries. The research sub-questions explored include the following:

- a) What are the structural causes of armed conflict and insecurity in Sahelian areas or countries?
- b) What are the proximate causes of armed conflict and insecurity in Sahelian areas or countries?
- c) What are the conflict-sustaining factors in Sahelian areas or countries?

This chapter provides an overview of the findings from the country case studies, highlighting crosscutting issues as well as country-specific issues. Some of the crosscutting issues at the root of armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahelian countries under focus begin to offer some explanations for the divergent security complexes that exist in the Sahel. As will be shown in this chapter, some countries manifest these issues more than others.

2.1 Regional overview

What are the structural causes of armed conflict and insecurity in Sahelian areas or countries? The following structural factors are crosscutting and present across Sahelian areas or countries studied:


Environmental stress arising from where the Sahelian is located makes Sahelian States and peoples susceptible to drought, desertification, reduced arable land, variations in rainfall and temperature and their impact on food security and livelihoods. This has created challenges, including internal tensions, displacement and inflow and outflow of refugees, (youth) migration and in some cases, frequent pastoralist-farmer clashes leading to inter-communal violence and revival of (Tuareg) irredentism and political instability.

Historical grievances: to varying degrees, this is a factor that has complicated intergroup relations and the political dynamics and State building processes across the Sahelian countries under study. Tuareg marginalization was an issue from the start in Niger and Mali. The sociopolitical exclusion of the Haratine in Mauritania remains an underlying conflict issue. In Nigeria, the perception of exclusion of northern Muslims by colonial policy is seen to continue to shape new forms of exclusion and grievances. The inability of the States to adequately respond to the deep-seated grievances exacerbated the problems, which have escalated and manifested in the spread of terrorism, criminality and jihadism in the Sahel.

Fractured State-making processes: Forging a common national identity and a collective destiny among the peoples of the Sahel has been a deep-seated challenge. The resulting degrees of socioeconomic and political exclusion are a factor at the root of conflict throughout the region. The politics of ethnicity lingers, albeit in varying degrees across these States. The country-specific overviews below illustrate this manifestation of this factor in each case study country. This factor, combined with historical grievances, makes for the distance between the State and vast numbers of the population.


Youth bulge: Sahelian countries have a high youth population, with over 60 per cent of them under the age of 35 across the countries studied. The implications of the youth bulge are grave when combined with the challenges of environmental stress, socioeconomic exclusion and political instability. A fertility rate of more than five children per woman across these countries confirms the rising youth bulge in the Sahel, a pattern that cuts across the African continent. With no sound national planning, the pressures placed on already weak systems means make it impossible for governments to convert the youth resource into productive energy for development. Excluded from access to mainstream life, including organized educational facilities and health care, and unable to get decent jobs, many young people are rendered vulnerable to participation in armed conflict and other organized criminal activities including becoming radicalized into violent extremist groups. This is, thus, a key factor at the root of armed conflict and insecurity in the region.

Figure 2.1: Youth bulge (percentage of population under 35) (2014)



Source: Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, "Age Structure". <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2010.html#ml>.

Figure 2.2: Fertility rate (Total births per woman) (2013)



Source: The World Bank. Data, "Fertility Rate, total (births per woman)". <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN>.

Proximate causes and conflict-sustaining causes of armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahel

Migration: across the Sahelian countries remains a feature of life among Sahelian peoples for reasons beyond climatic conditions. The flow of refugees – in some cases moving with livestock from war-affected areas in Mali, Niger, and north-eastern Nigeria – increases pressure on land and water and foments new insecurities.

Food insecurity: current estimates for food insecurity point to a total caseload of 19.8 million people, with at least 2.6 million having already crossed the emergency threshold and requiring urgent food assistance. In the Sahel, one out of seven people are food insecure; one out of five children are malnourished; 2.76 million are refugees and IDPs.¹⁶ More worryingly, food security projections for the first quarter of 2015 indicate a slight deterioration for Burkina Faso and Mali, while for Mauritania and Senegal an additional 1.4 million people were expected to suffer from food insecurity "due to poor rangeland production affecting pastoralist livelihoods".¹⁷

Politicized military: coups, mutinies, overt and covert intervention in politics have been a regular occurrence in the target countries. Decades of military rule in Mauritania have been coloured by a short interregnum of civilian rule. Mali's descent into armed conflict in 2012 was exacerbated by a military coup. Events leading to the exit of Blaise Compaoré demonstrate the continued influence of the military in Burkina Faso. Niger's history of military interventionism has produced a record of four successful military coups, four political transitions, seven republics and seven constitutions. Similarly, Nigeria's earlier history of direct military intervention in politics gave way to a fourth republic of 16 uninterrupted years of civilian rule, with a recent trend of covert involvement of senior military chiefs in politics. Overall, the exclusionary policies and political repression associated with politicized security establishments is an important trigger for instability and other insecurities in the Sahel.

¹⁶ OCHA (2014c).

¹⁷ Ibid.

Rise of Jihadi and criminal networks: Conflict and insecurities in Sahelian countries and the actors associated with them have transmuted from grievance-based movements into more complex phenomena with internal and regional consequences. This has been particularly prominent in Mali and Nigeria, with serious implications for Niger. The penetration of Mali by Wahabbist groups from the early 1990s led to a steady radicalization of Islam, particularly in the north. Boko Haram is seen as a variant (albeit in a changing context) of previous episodes of violent Islamic radicalization in northern Nigeria, specifically the Maitatsine of the 1970s/1980s. There has also been a noticeable convergence of radical Islamism, smuggling and Tuareg irredentism and kidnapping and Boko Haram insurgency. Criminal and Jihadi groups have secured a steady presence in large parts of Mali and northern Nigeria with little control by the central governments and consequences for their Sahelian neighbours.

Regional linkages among radical groups in the Sahel, such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and MOJWA/MUJAO and Boko Haram are a sustaining factor of insecurity in the region. Anecdotal evidence points to collaboration and operational support between Boko Haram and other radical groups in the Sahel. For instance, remnants of Boko Haram were reunited and trained in northern Mali following military operations by Nigerian security forces in 2009. In April 2012, about 100 members of Boko Haram were reported to have been involved in an attack on the Algerian embassy in Gao, Mali.

Regional and cross-border conflict and insecurity: The security of Sahelian States is invariably tied to regional and transnational security dynamics, with some countries more susceptible to these dynamics than others. Niger sits at the intersection of the conflict corridor between Mali and northern Nigeria and its internal security challenges have been triggered or exacerbated by the insurgencies in north-eastern Nigeria (Boko Haram), northern Mali, southern Libya and also the Central African Republic. Similarly, Burkina Faso is a recipient of refugees fleeing conflict and insecurity in northern Mali. Some of the countries identified in this research as the second set of Sahelian countries are also impacted. Chad and Cameroon are affected by the cross-border activities of Boko Haram and are invariably drawn into that conflict, not least through their activities in the multinational joint task force fighting against Boko Haram.

Corruption and general socioeconomic deprivation: All the Sahelian countries targeted for this study are endowed with considerable natural resources. However, they are plagued by corruption, mismanagement and socioeconomic deprivation, albeit in varying degrees. As such, there is no effective management of the youth bulge and the resultant issues of unemployment and vulnerability to radicalization. Inability to break a cycle in which exclusion and unresolved grievances mutate into violent opposition to the State strengthens the narratives of extremist insurgent movements in the region and provides justification for their cause.

Global dynamics and role of external actors: Events in the Middle East, the 11 September 2001 attacks and a sense of alienation contributed to the radicalization of grievance-based movements in the Sahel. The global context of the war on terror included narratives and counter-narratives that constructed radical Islamic groups as threats to democratic culture, and Western civilization as threats to Islam. The

subsequent dynamic in the Sahel accentuated this. The presence of external actors in the Sahel has not always made this dynamic beneficial to the Sahelian peoples. This is not limited to security and development actors. The presence of extractive industries generates additional dynamics, with mineral resources gaining increasing importance among local populations, where thousands tend to abandon their areas of residence and primary activity (agriculture) to search for gold, silver, diamonds and uranium.

2.2 Country overview: Mali

As one of the two conflict corridors in this study, Mali offers a primary focus in the analysis of the causes of armed conflict and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel. Findings from the country's case study reveal the severity of the factors at the core of conflict and insecurity, with potential connections to the other countries close to this conflict corridor.

The context of Mali

Since independence in 1960, the northern region of Mali has been at the centre of conflict in the Sahel, exacerbated by security issues and challenges, including irredentism and transnational criminal and jihadi activities. Mali is encased in the Sahel, sharing long swathes of Sahelian borderline with Algeria (north), Niger and Burkina Faso (east), Mauritania (north-west) and Senegal (south-west), among others. The country's 15 million people are predominantly Muslim and composed of the Mande (Bambara, Malinke, Soninke) (50 per cent); Peul (17 per cent); Voltaic (12 per cent); Songhai 6 per cent); Tuareg and Moor (10 per cent) and others 5 per cent). Until 2012, Mali was often cited as a model democracy in West Africa, due to its 20 years of uninterrupted democratic rule, dozens of political parties, a vibrant civil society, free press and a democratically controlled security sector.

Economically, Mali has two dominant sectors - agricultural and mineral - that shape economic production. The country's most productive agricultural region, which is located between Bamako and Mopti, produces crops, livestock and fish. Its resource in livestock consists of millions of cattle, sheep, and goats while agricultural activities occupy 87 per cent of its labour force and provide 42 per cent of the GDP while cotton and livestock make up 75 per cent to 80 per cent of its annual exports. The mineral sector is made up of proven deposits of bauxite, iron ore, base metals, phosphate deposits, gold, salt and uranium. The Taoudeny basin in northern Mali abounds in quantities of strategic minerals such as gas, oil, and uranium.¹⁸ In spite of Mali's natural resource profile, it has consistently been ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world¹⁹, with 78.7 per cent of its citizens living on less than \$2 a day, and successive declines in its GDP per capita in recent years, (from \$739 to \$715 in 2013, for instance).²⁰

18 <http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/Mali/> (accessed August 22, 2014).

19 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY> (accessed August 20, 2014).

20 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> accessed August 26, 2014). All socioeconomic data are drawn from this World Bank data set unless otherwise indicated. Available at <http://data.worldbank.org/>.

Politically, Mali has oscillated between military and civilian rule. It emerged as a beacon of democracy in West Africa in the 1990s after a successful transition to civilian rule in 1991. The country's seeming peace and democratic stability was truncated with the outbreak of armed Tuareg insurgency in 2012, followed by a military coup and attempted armed invasion by a combination of Jihadi, irredentist and criminal networks. This necessitated intervention (Operation Serval) and a subsequent multinational peacekeeping force. Mali's geography and recent political-security dynamic makes it the epicentre of the security and developmental challenges of the Sahel; no other Sahelian State epitomizes the crisis of insurgencies, criminality, terrorism and irredentism and their impacts on human development as Mali. The country is at the heart of extensive transnational trafficking of drugs, weapons, human beings, terrorist attacks and kidnaping for ransom.²¹

Structural causes of armed conflict and insecurity

Fractured State-making process: The issue of forging a common Malian identity and fair participation and representation in governance have been at the centre of conflict and insecurity in Mali. The 7 June 1960 law 60-5/AL-RS on territorial administration created six regions, one of which is Gao, which covers the entire northern part of the country. Its jurisdiction comprises a territory larger than the rest of Mali's five other regions. This, coupled with the highly centralized system of government and the socialist orientation of the immediate post-independence decade set the tone for a fractured State-making process that has plagued Mali ever since. The grievance of the 1962 Tuareg rebellion echoed a sense of marginalization, centralization, suppression of regional specificities and the inability of successive governments and generations of elites to find the appropriate formulas to meet the socioeconomic and security needs of the Malian people.

Tuareg grievances: The Tuareg problem started with the 1962 demand (Afellagarebellion) for Sharia law and independence by semi-nomadic Tuareg (Berbers) and other groups that inhabit the north. By 1964, the rebellion had been suppressed militarily²², but the outcome neither addressed the grievances the rebellion sought to express nor elicited a prospective approach to the issues it raised. The grievances festered over time, leading to a sense of victimhood, exclusion, and disenfranchisement from the Malian nation-State. Subsequent Tuareg rebellions in 1990, 2006, and 2012 were all linked to the inability of the Malian State to adequately respond to this initial 1962 challenge. Of course, regional and international dynamics have exacerbated the Tuareg problem, including a series of droughts and the devastating impacts on Tuareg livelihoods that hit the Sahel in the 1980s; as well as the spread of terrorism, criminality, and jihadism in the Sahel.

Environmental stress: Mali's location at the heart of the Sahel and susceptibility to environmental stresses, notably drought, desertification and variations in rainfall and temperature, and their impacts on food security and livelihoods make it vulnerable. The drought of the 1970s and 1980s set the context for the 1990 rebellion and

21 Roussellier, Jacques (2011). *Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel: Al-Qaeda's Franchise or Freelance*, Washington, DC The Middle East Institute.

22 Keita, Kalifa (1998). *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali*. Available at <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps12312/carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/tuareg/tuareg.pdf> p.11 (accessed, August 18, 2014).

subsequent ones, which wrecked the livelihoods of nomads and farmers in the north, with massive loss of animals, poor harvest, and famine, which triggered mass migration by young people (Ishumar) to cities and neighbouring countries²³, specifically Libya, where they were trained and employed as soldiers by the Gadhafi regime. This revived armed Tuareg irredentism in the 1990s.

Youth bulge: Mali's youth bulge began in the 1980s and 1990s and it has one of the most youthful populations in the world today. About 53 per cent of its population is under the age of 18. It also has one of the highest population growth rates (3.1 per cent). The droughts, famine, harsh economic conditions and insensitive military regimes of the 1980s triggered a huge migration of youth from the north to cities in the south and neighbouring countries. This had three effects, the first being the de-population of the northern areas to the extent that by the end of the 1990s, vast areas were a "no-man's land". Second, criminal networks and activities like smuggling, kidnapping, the drugs trade and human trafficking and membership of jihadi groups lured the youth in the northern areas. Third, it exposed Tuareg youth to combat training. Libya was a major attraction for migrating Tuareg youths as they were readily trained and integrated into Gadhafi's military. This helped re-launch Tuareg armed irredentism, including the 2006 and 2012 insurgencies (by returnee fighters from Libya).

Poor education: the crisis of the educational system in Mali has been a critical feature of Malian society since the 1980s at least, because of poor funding, politicization, disruptions, limited accessibility, poor regulation and limited adaptation to contemporary needs.²⁴ A 2009 study found that Mali spends, on average, only \$24 per year for each person and the total spending on education amounts to 21 per cent of the total budget, 30 per cent of the recurrent budget and 5 per cent of the GDP, all of which still left 900,000 children aged 7-12 years out of school in 2009.²⁵ As such, Mali has only 1.99 mean years of schooling.²⁶ Besides, numerous madrasas or "koranic schools" have proliferated, and their curriculum is poorly regulated. These madrasas are largely disconnected from the values and political culture of tolerance of Malian traditional society. Instead, they espouse the Salafi/Wahhabi brand of Islam, thus becoming potential breeding grounds for future jihadists.

Proximate and conflict sustaining causes of armed conflict and insecurity

Rise of Jihadi and criminal networks: Conflict and insecurity in northern Mali has changed from a mere Tuareg and grievance-based insurrection to a more complex phenomenon with regional and internal ramifications. The penetration of Mali by Wahabbist groups from the early 1990s led to a steady radicalization of Islam, especially in the north. At the same time, there was convergence of sorts between radical Islamism, smuggling, and Tuareg irredentism that triggered the 2006 and 2012 insurgencies.²⁷ By 2006, northern Mali was completely outside the control of the

23 Lecocq, Baz (2010). *Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali*, Leiden, Brill, pp. 227-253.

24 Diakité, Drissa (2000). *La crise scolaire au Mali*. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 9 (3), pp. 6-28.

25 Pearce and others. *Delivering Education*.

26 UNDP, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MLI> (accessed August 21, 2014).

27 Lecocq Baz and Paul Schrijver (2007). "The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the

central government. By 2012, several criminal and Jihadi groups controlled much of northern Mali. Some of the groups include AQIM; Ansar Deen a Jihadist group led by a Tuareg veteran rebel; MUJWA (or MUJAO), an offshoot of AQIM, manned mainly by sub-Saharan Jihadists; the Unified Council for Azawad (HCUA); the Arab Azawad Movement (MAA) and the Popular Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MPSA).

Poor governance: The festering of the crisis in the north and the inability of Mali to contain it (especially in 2012), and the coup d'état of March 2012 are linked to a weakened security sector. The weakening of Mali's security forces resulted from an accumulation of deliberate decisions made by the two regimes between 1991 and 2012, ostensibly to prevent military coups and protect democracy. The military was underfunded, had shrunk in size and become an avenue for corrupt enrichment. Indeed, in spite of battling two rebellions between 1993 and 2012, military expenditure fluctuated between 1.4 per cent and 1.6 per cent of GDP while under the regime of Moussa Traoré (1968-1991) military expenditure accounted for over 2 per cent of GDP. Under the civilian ATT regime (2002-2012), corruption and embezzlements of public funds reached new heights, and professionalism was negated in the recruitment into the military. Moreover, the ATT regime's 'hands-off' policy was central to the mushrooming of criminal and jihadi groups in the north²⁸ and the return of heavily armed, battle-hardened Tuareg fighters from Libya to enter Mali's territory and settle in with their arms and equipment.

Failed peace accords: The Malian government and Tuareg leaders signed the Tamanrasset and the Algiers peace accords to end the 1990 and 2006 insurgencies. The accords included economic and security measures aimed at integrating the north into mainstream Mali, accelerated economic investment in the north and integrating ex-rebels into the armed forces.²⁹ However, the accords have only provided a lull in conflict for a few years. The accords failed due to the inability of the Malian government to consolidate, and the bad faith or extremism of the various factions and leaders of Tuareg nationalism. Some of the poverty alleviation measures for the north have been marked by corruption and embezzlement.³⁰

2.3 Country overview: Mauritania

In addition to factors associated with Mauritania's Sahelian location, it shares similar features with Mali and other Sahelian countries, as discussed below. This is evident in the structural roots of the armed conflicts and insecurities triggered by the spillover effect of insecurity experienced by its Sahelian neighbours.

Saharan Front," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25, 1, Jan., pp. 148-156. Also, Wolfram Lacher. Organized Crime and Terrorism in the Sahel: Drivers, Actors, Options. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comment*, No. 1 (January 2011).

28 Coulibaly, Oumar. Notre enquête: L'armée malienne: Clochardisée par 20 ans de gestion chaotique. Available at <http://www.maliweb.net/societe/notre-enquete-larmee-malienne-clochardisee-20-ans-gestion-chaotique-412452.html> (accessed August 29, 2014).

29 Republic of Mali, *Livre Blanc sur le 'Problem du Nord' du Mali*, Bamako: Official publication of the Republic of Mali, December 1994; See also the Algiers accord, available at: <http://saadlounes.a.s.f.unblog.fr/files/2010/05/accordsdalgerjuillet2006.pdf> (accessed August 22, 2014).

30 Dramé, Tiébilé. La situation politique et sécuritaire, un an après le coup d'état du 22 mars 2013" Speech made on 20 March 2013, at Laïco El Farouk hotel in Bamako. Available at: <http://www.maliweb.net/politique/la-situation-politique-et-securitaire-un-an-apres-le-coup-detat-du-22-mars-2013-136474.html> (accessed August 27, 2014). Author's translation.

The context of Mauritania

Mauritania has become an important player in security and political developments in the Sahel. Geographically, ethnically, culturally, politically and diplomatically, the country is uniquely positioned between North and West Africa. It shares borders with Algeria and Western Sahara in the North, with Mali (Hodh Charghi and Hodh El Gharbi regions) in the east and south-east and Senegal in the south-west. This unique position creates sociopolitical challenges, such as the vastness of its territory, which borders Mali and Algeria across thousands of kilometers. This exposes Mauritania to the effects of regional armed conflicts and insecurities, including refugee inflow, and the activities of irredentist groups.

Politically, Mauritania has been dominated by military coups and authoritarian military rule. Since 1978, with the exception of a 17-month democratic interlude in 2006-2008, military officers who came to power through coups d'état have ruled the country. The country has possibly the highest numbers of coups, coup attempts, and coup plots in West Africa.³¹

Economically, Mauritania has an estimated population of 3.1 million, 59 per cent of which approximately live in rural areas. This population is largely composed of children under 14 (44.5 per cent). People aged over 64 account for only 3.6 per cent. Practically, therefore, only about 52 per cent of the population constitutes a potential labor force (14-64 years).³² Mauritania is richly endowed with iron ore, gold, copper, fishery resources and an immense agricultural potential. Mauritania's economy is mainly based on three main areas. Cereals (millet, sorghum, paddy rice, maize, wheat, barley), livestock (cattle, camels, goats and sheep) and fishing largely dominate the primary sector. The secondary sector is dominated by extractive industries (oil, gold, copper, iron); and the tertiary sector, by transport and communication. The mining sector is the main driver of economic growth in contemporary Mauritania, as part of the secondary sector that accounts for 24.8 per cent of GDP in 2013 (mining contributes 20 per cent of GDP). Since 2009, the *Société Nationale des Industries Minières* has signaled its ambition to modernize and develop a program aimed at boosting mining national production. The production of iron rose, for example, rose from 11.417 tons in 2010 to 11.975 tons in 2013.³³

It is Mauritania's social composition and the challenges therein that dominates the country's political landscape. Mauritians are all Muslims and made up of mixed Moor/black (40 per cent), Moor (30 per cent) and black (30 per cent).³⁴ Culturally, there are two dominant groups, the light-skinned Arab-Berbers and the Black-Africans. The country has suffered social and political tensions, fueled by ethnic

31 N'Diaye, Boubacar. The Legacy of Mauritania's Colonels: West Africa's Next Crisis? Unpublished paper under review.

32 Direction du Travail, Ministère de l'Emploi, Office National de la Statistique, Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement, Bureau International du Travail, Mauritanie - Enquête de référence nationale sur l'emploi et le secteur informel 2013 (ENRE-SI), Nouakchott, Catalogue de données MRT-ENRE-SI-2013-V01, Octobre, 2014, 47p. (Réédition).

33 République Islamique de Mauritanie, Rapport macroéconomique 2013 et prévisions 2014-2015, Nouakchott, Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement, Rapport de la Direction Générale de la Politique Economique et des Stratégies du Développement, Direction de la Prévision et de l'Analyse Economiques, Février, 2014, p.8.

34 See <http://countrystudies.net/Mauritania>.

divisions, the monopoly by a group (Berber) over the State, and the lingering effects of slavery and political volatility (especially between 1989 and 1992). A major socio-political development is the emergence of the *Haratines* as a potential social and political force whose leaders fight slavery as currently practiced, and its vestiges in Mauritanian society.³⁵

Structural causes of conflict and insecurity

The post-colonial State: The insecurity felt by most Mauritians has to do with the challenge of widespread poverty and unmet basic needs, the unresponsive nature of the postcolonial State and from the absence of physical and psychological safety common to the Sahel region due to terrorism and radicalism. At independence, Mauritania suffered from the complete absence of administrative, institutional or social infrastructures needed for national cohesion and a responsive government.

The politics of identity: The division between Berbers (Arabs) and Black Africans is a major sociopolitical fault line in Mauritania. This has been exacerbated by the inability of the immediate postcolonial era leaders to craft a national identity. The policies pursued to manufacture an exclusively Arab identity created anxiety and fear for a large portion of the non-Arab population. This gap between mostly the black component of Mauritania's population and the State is indeed a source of insecurity because of the unpredictability of what may result from any incident.

Environmental stress: Mauritania has a large proportion of its territory covered by desert and characterized by a chronic rainfall deficit that make agriculture in the north and agricultural lands in the south haphazard and heavily dependent on nature's whims. Since in 1968, Mauritania has fallen victim to recurring droughts that have devastated its livestock and subjected large proportions of the nomadic and sedentary populations to famine and chronic malnutrition. The shrinking size of grazing areas has also been an additional source of insecurity, triggering serious crises and conflict between communities within Mauritania and across international boundaries.

Geo-political environment: As a State in a particularly conflict-ridden environment, Mauritania is affected by the decades of tensions and rivalries between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara.

Mauritania has more than 5000 kilometers of land borders to control in addition to 750 kilometers of its Atlantic coastline. Given the intense trafficking of all kinds and the atmosphere of violence and uncertainty in the Sahel/West African region this is a major challenge for Mauritania, especially because of its limited administrative capabilities. The borders with Mali in particular have been porous, enabling armed groups and traffickers to carry out their activities across large swaths of land between Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.

³⁵ See <http://fr.alakhbar.info/6616-0-MANIFESTE-Pour-les-droits-des-Haratines-au-sein-dune-Mauritanie-unie.html> (accessed 09/02/2014).

Proximate and conflict sustaining causes of conflict and insecurity

A history of praetorianism: Mauritania's experience of praetorianism for more than 30 years has been a major source of insecurity. Mauritania experienced a single party regime, and then military regimes that surpassed even the heavily decried mismanagement and repressive policies of the civilian regime. Since 1978, Mauritania has been governed by a succession of repressive military regimes, with the exception of 17 months (April 2007-August 2008) of a democratic regime, after arguably the only truly free and fair elections in the 54 year-history of the country. ³⁶

Deliberate economic mismanagement: Despite the notable 5 per cent GDP growth, on average, in recent years, paradoxically, Mauritania kept a dangerously high unemployment rate of 30 per cent in 2008, a 10 per cent increase from 2004. Despite a notable increase in the economic activities and in the GDP per capita, poverty has increased due to widespread corruption, official falsification of economic data, and sharp increases in inter-group inequality.³⁷ All this has contributed to inter-group tensions and insecurity.

Terrorist activities: The civil war in Algeria and its aftermath (in the form of terrorism) directly affected security in Mauritania. Mauritania has suffered a succession of armed attacks by armed terrorist groups. In April 2005, the Algerian terrorist group the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which later became AQIM, attacked Lemgheity, an isolated army outpost in northern Mauritania, killing 15 and seizing military equipment. Several other attacks followed, including the 2010 attack on the presidential palace and a daylight shoot-out between a terrorist cell and the security forces in Nouakchott.³⁸

2.4 Country overview: Burkina Faso

The context of Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is only partially located in the Sahel. It has huge swathes of border area along the Sahelian belt in its northern and western axis; it shares borders with Niger in the north-east and Mali in the north-west and Western regions. It has non-Sahelian borders in the south and eastern regions with Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Burkina Faso is thus an outlier State to the key conflict corridors in the Sahel.

However, since independence, the country has experienced its own, often internal, political challenges and instability. Much of the instability in Burkina Faso is largely internal and has limited connections to the broader Sahel dynamic. There have been reports of cases of insecurity in Burkina Faso's northern region along the border with Mali, but these are minor events (banditry) rather than major incidents. Burkina Faso's role has been to mediate (Tuareg-related) conflicts and insecurity in

36 N'Diaye, Boubacar. The Legacy of Mauritania's Colonels: West Africa's Next Crisis? Unpublished paper under review.

37 Boris, Samuel, Trajectoire technocratique et instabilité politique en Mauritanie 2003-2011, Paris, les études du CERI, CNRS, 2011.

38 Aly, Ahmed Jiddou, "Le terrorisme, menace principale pour la Mauritanie," available at http://www.rmibiladi.com/fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=213:le-terrorisme-menace-principale-pour-la-mauritanie-&catid=1:actualites&Itemid=2 (accessed 09/04/2014).

the Sahel and host refugees from neighbouring Sahelian States (Mali and Niger) over the past 20 years. It has attracted considerable foreign security assistance (training, funding, and equipment) and is also a host to international counter-terrorism assets and operations in the Sahel. Still, Burkina Faso shares some of the conflict and security factors of the Sahelian countries.

Structural causes of conflict and insecurity

Environmental stress: The country's location has made it susceptible to environmental disasters, including a severe drought in 1970, which caused internal pressure and contributed to the current pattern the country faces. The instability in Burkina Faso stems from violent inter-communal clashes between pastoralists and farmers owing to the scarcity of resources. There has also been a massive influx of refugees as a result of drought. Recently also, 35,700 people moved down from northern Mali, together with 50,000 animals, placing additional pressure on already limited resources.³⁹

Fractured State-making process: The potential for conflict and insecurity in Burkina Faso stems from the historical and contemporary conditions of conflict, both internally and externally. The combination of military and quasi-military rule and military coups has led to unstable leadership. Moreover, the lack of national identity has been attributed to what is described as a failed historical process. While present and future conflict may be the result of tension caused by former President Compaoré's attempts to stay in power, suppression of the opposition has further exacerbated the inequality in the country and poor governance has led to the reproduction of a small elite.

Poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability: Tracing back to colonialism and pre-colonialism is the issue of political systems, which changed as a result of the former. Conflict comes in the form of land clashes in rural communities, reflecting the effects of sociocultural differences. In addition, Burkina Faso, ranked 181st out of 188 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index in 2013. Large disparities exist in the allocation of resources, with emerging issues of elitism. Deeper inequalities also occur across other categories, including regional.

Youth bulge. Just like many countries in the region, Burkina Faso faces the challenge of a high youth population, as 65 per cent of its 18 million people are under 25 years old,⁴⁰ with the national median age being 17 years, and the fertility rate at 5.93 per cent.⁴¹ The high unemployment rates are also alarming as the lack of generated employment opportunities challenges the country's economic growth. With job creation at 20,000 per annum, the country faces problems of accommodating the continually rising active population of people above 15 years of age.⁴² Regional disparities in unemployment exist, with 38 per cent occurring in urban areas.⁴³

39 Yameogo S., and A. Kienou (2013). Analysis of public expenditures in support of food and agriculture development in Burkina Faso, 2006-2010. Technical notes series, MAFAP, FAO, Rome. P. 9

40 Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: A Country Case Study of Burkina Faso. Unpublished Paper, 2015. p.7.

41 Ibid.

42 Government of Burkina Faso Presentation by Government of Burkina Faso to the committee on employment and social policy of the government body of the International Labour Organization (2007) p.14.

43 Simonsson, L. (2005). Vulnerability Profile of Burkina Faso, for the Poverty and Vulnerability Programme, Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), p. 3.

Proximate and conflict sustaining causes of conflict and insecurity

Politicized military: The fractured State-making process in Burkina Faso has been characterized by the role of both the military and quasi-military regimes, while the politicization of the military has also led to an environment of repression. Although there is increasing awareness of its location being susceptible to jihadi infiltration, more concern lies within internal power dynamics. Burkina Faso's politicized military must also be characterized by the army mutinies of 2011, which reveal the fragile nature of this branch of government.

Authoritarian rule: Victory for Blaise Compaoré in the 1991 elections came through the opposition's decision to boycott the elections. The regime had a stranglehold on power, with the constant repression of opposition parties and social movements. The recent movements in 2014 could have led to conflict as they called on the use of open violence to suppress democracy. Also, State-sponsored violence was used by the ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) to remain dominant politically. Moreover, the constant amendments to the constitution were a cause for concern.

2.5 Country overview: Nigeria

Nigeria, like Burkina Faso, is only partially located in the Sahel, straddling the Sahel in its north-east region. Given the country's size and population, however, a spillover of its internal crisis into neighbouring countries can rapidly amplify existing insecurities in those places. The Boko Haram crisis in north-east Nigeria demonstrates this potential. Given the severity of the insecurity caused by this crisis for Nigeria and its neighbours, this study focuses on north-east Nigeria as the second conflict corridor.

The context of Nigeria

Nigeria's population of 173 million makes it the most populous country in Africa, as well as a regional hegemon in West Africa. Nigeria is Africa's most diverse country with over 400 ethnic groups⁴⁴. The three dominant ones are Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the north, and the mostly Christian Yoruba and Igbo in the South. Nigeria is linked to the Sahel through its contiguous borders along the Sahelian belt in its north-east region, where it borders Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The outbreak of radical jihadi violence (Boko Haram insurgency) from 2009 and its escalation ever since, in the north-eastern areas makes Nigeria central to assessing armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahel.

Nigeria's political history since independence in 1960 has been replete with a mixture of civil and military rule. Since 1999, it has been under democratic rule. Nigeria operates a federal structure made up of 36 federating units (states) that are divided into six geo-political regions. In general, the country's ethnic, religious, geographical and political identities converge with a north-south dichotomy, but recent dynamics indicate a more fluid and changing sociopolitical and ethno-religious landscape. Historically, Nigeria has had different episodes of internal (subnational) conflict and insecurity, varying across the geo-political regions. The north-east region is a

⁴⁴ Alao, Abiodun (2007). *Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment*, Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

hotbed of Sahel-related conflict and insecurity in Nigeria, specifically the Boko Haram insurgency in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno, which is the most-affected State that was the original base of the Boko Haram movement in 2002.

Nigeria is Africa's largest economy with a GDP of \$521 billion in 2013, and has had consistent economic growth of over 5 per cent over the past decade. The Nigerian State relies heavily on oil revenue. In 2010, for instance, Government revenue from oil proceeds stood at 74 per cent. The economy in northern Nigeria relies on the agricultural sector, through pastoralism and the cultivation of cash crops such as millet, cowpeas, sorghum/guinea corn, corn, rice, cotton and groundnuts. Trade in agricultural products with southern Nigeria and across the border with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, is the mainstay of this region.

Structural causes of armed conflict and insecurity

Consequences of colonial division: The colonial power's configuration of the Nigerian State has led to many problems. The amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates in 1914 created fundamental complexities, as the two regions had different political, religious and ethnic configurations.⁴⁵ Nigeria has struggled with religious supremacy and identity claims by different groups. The claim that British colonial rule favoured Christianity and the south, led the Muslim community to counter the situation. This is illustrated in part by Boko Haram's resolve to introduce Sharia law and reject Christian-laden "Western" civilization and education.

Complexities of inter-group relations: Inter-group relations in Nigeria have always been coloured by a zero-sum rivalry at the macro level by the three main ethnic groups, as well as at the micro-level by the over 400 ethnic groups. The rivalry among the three main ethnic groups has always been rooted in the struggle for political leadership. That the Hausa-Fulani have ruled for the most part of post-independence Nigeria has often galvanized opposition from the south. Civilian rule has often involved a complex informal political arrangements of rotating power between the north and south, and among the major ethnic groups. The circumstances surrounding the ascendancy of the president from the south (the death of a former one from the north (President Yar Adua)) is often interpreted as a pointer to the north's opposition and its resolve to regain political power.

Ethno-religious dynamics: Boko Haram's instrumentalization of Islam in its insurgency underlines attitudes towards religion among Nigeria's ethnic groups. The Yoruba and Igbo share a liberal attitude towards the religion, with considerable allowance given to the mixing of Christianity or Islam with other religious practices. The Hausa and Fulani strictly adhere to Islamic beliefs, and owe greater allegiance to their religion than to their ethnicity or even the Nigerian State.⁴⁶ This is a major factor in the rise and sustenance of Islamic radicalization by Boko Haram.

45 Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1968). *Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria: A documentary Record - a reprint of the report by Sir F. D. Lugard on the amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria and administration 1912-1919*. Compiled and introduced by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.

46 Falola, Toyin (1999). *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, University of Rochester Press, Rochester.

General political instability: Nigeria has never really been politically stable since its independence and the impact of this is somewhat connected to the structural cause of Islamic radicalization and Boko Haram jihadi violence. In the course of its post-independent existence, the country has witnessed a bitter civil war, volatile shifts and turns in its political leadership (coups), brutal authoritarian regimes, armed ethno-political militias and inter-group clashes, as part of a zero-sum politics.⁴⁷ Underlying this are ethno-political claims and demand for social inclusion, political representation, socioeconomic fairness and control of natural resources. This is the context for recurring armed opposition to the State, of which the Boko Haram insurgency is a variant.

Proximate and conflict sustaining causes of armed conflict and insecurity

Corruption and general socioeconomic deprivation: While Nigeria is endowed with considerable natural resources, including oil, it has been plagued by corruption, mismanagement and socioeconomic deprivation since independence. In 2007, the country's anti-corruption watchdog estimated that from 1960 to 1999, its rulers stole \$300 billion in oil revenue. The net result is a large mass of unemployed youths who are vulnerable to radicalization.⁴⁸ This is most acute in northern Nigeria, where homeless youths (*Almajiris*) form the core of the perpetrators of the successive cases of religious violence in the country, including Boko Haram.⁴⁹ Socioeconomic deprivation also provides the moral justification for Boko Haram to challenge the Nigerian State, seen as corrupt and inept.

Previous episodes of Islamic radicalization: The *Boko Haram* insurgency is not the first case of violent Islamic radicalization in northern Nigeria, and Boko Haram is seen as a variant of previous episodes, specifically the Maitatsine of the 1970s.⁵⁰ The Maitatsine crisis led to riots in Kano and other cities and resulted in the deaths of several thousands of people.⁵¹ Just like Boko Haram, the Maitatsine group focused on the marginal and poverty-stricken sections of the population and campaigned against corruption and deprivation. The crisis exhibited many key issues that were later to become common features in Nigeria's Islamic radicalization, including the politics of external dimension, the use of marginalized groups, intra-Islamic differences and alleged government connivance.⁵²

47 These groups, formed along ethnic lines are: the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), formed among the Yoruba and the Egbesu boys among the Igbo. For more on this, see, Augustine Ikelegbe, State, ethnic militias, and conflict in Nigeria, *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 39(3) 2005, pp. 490-516

48 For more on this, see, AJAEGBU, O. (2012) Rising youth unemployment and violent crime in Nigeria, *American Journal of Social Issues and Humanities* 2(5) pp. 315-321.

49 Adetoro, R. A. (2010). The Almajirai syndrome as a potential threat to Nigeria national security: the role of social studies education. *Nigerian Journal of Social Studies*, vol. XIII (1&2), pp. 141-150.

50 Danjibo, N.D. Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' crises in Northern Nigeria', Published online by the University of Ibadan, 2010. http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/N-D-DANJIBO-Islamic_Fundamentalism_and_Sectarian_Violence_The_Maitatsine_and_Boko_Haram_Crises_in_Northern_Nigeria.pdf

51 Isichie, Elizabeth (1987). The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria: 1980 – 1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17 (3). Kastfelt, Niels (1988).

52 For more on the inter-linkage between Boko Haram and Maitatsine, see, among others, Adesoji, Abimbola, Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigeria State. *African Today*, 57 (4) Summer 2011. Rumors of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria, *African Affairs*, (88). Boko Haram's Dangerous Expansion into Northwest Nigeria and Boko Haram's International

Emergence of radical muslim youth movements: Islamist revival in northern Nigeria began in the 1980s, as young Muslims, inspired and radicalized by the Iranian revolution, began introducing variants of Islam with radical dispositions. The first group to come out clearly as a radical group was the “Muslim Brothers”, led by Sheikh Ibraheem El Zakzaky.⁵³ Another group was the *Jamaatu Izalat al Bid’ah wa Iqamat al – Sumah* (Group for the Eradication of Innovation and Establishment of Tradition). The groups, like Boko Haram, mainstream Sunni groups for “innovation” and “apostasy,” were in conflict with political authorities. The emergence of radical groups from the 1980s was a proximate antecedent for *Boko Haram*.

Introduction of Sharia law: The issue of Sharia has always been a very controversial one in Nigeria and the politics surrounding its formal introduction in some parts of the country has a strong proximate bearing on the emergence and activities of *Boko Haram*. Nigeria has a long history of political debates and disagreements over the use of Sharia law, which was reintroduced across the northern States from 1999, creating controversy on several fronts that are crucial in understanding the complexities of Islamic radicalization in the country. The introduction of Sharia law in some parts of the country was to be the main excuse for Boko Haram’s insistence that the same system be adopted throughout the country.⁵⁴

Global dynamics: Events in the Middle East, the 11 September 2001 attacks and a sense of alienation contributed to radicalization and Boko Haram emergence. The *Al sunna Wal Jamma* (Followers of the Prophet), the precursor to Boko Haram, was formed around 2001, and operated in border regions in the north-east. The global context of the war on terror included narratives and counter-narratives that constructed radical Islamic groups as threats to democratic culture, and the West and Western civilization as threats to Islam. Subsequent dynamics in the Sahel accentuated this.

Regional linkages: A major sustaining factor for Boko Haram has been the links with other radical groups in the Sahel, such as (AQIM) and MOJWA/MUJAO. Anecdotal evidence points to collaboration and operational support between Boko Haram and other radical groups in the Sahel. For instance, remnants of Boko Haram were reunited and trained in northern Mali, following military operations by Nigerian security forces in 2009. In April 2012, about 100 members of Boko Haram were reported to have been involved in an attack on the Algerian embassy in Gao, Mali. In November 2011, the deputy foreign minister of Algeria Stated that intelligence reports showed coordination between Boko Haram and AQIM.

2.6 Country overview: Niger

Niger sits at the intersection of the two conflict corridors – between Mali and northeast Nigeria – and has been at the receiving end of the fallouts of the conflicts in the two corridors. As such, in addition to dealing with

Connections; and a recently published occasional paper by Jamestown Foundation, Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: the Prize in Al-Qaeda’s Africa Strategy.

53 Waldek, Lise and Shankara Jayasekara (2011). Boko Haram: the evolution of Islamist extremism in Nigeria, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, Vol.6 No. 2, 2011, p. 170.

54 Agbibo, D. E. (2013). The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram. *Conflict, Security and Development* 13(1). Pp. 1–29.

the consequences of its Sahelian location, Niger has had to deal with its own internal dynamics of conflict and insecurity, as well as with the potential triggers of insecurity created by the conflict in Mali and the Boko Haram crisis, and the fallout from the State collapse in Southern Libya.

The context of Niger

Niger is a former colony of France, located in the north-central part of Africa. It is a vast landlocked territory of 1,267,000 square kilometres. Niger's population of 17 million is unevenly distributed throughout this territory, with about 60 per cent concentrated in three areas (Maradi, Tahoua and Zinder), making effective governance difficult.⁵⁵ Niger's economy is dominated by subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry, on which 90 per cent of the labour force depends for income and employment. Agriculture accounts for over 45 per cent of GDP. The agricultural sector remains weak, as it is vulnerable to climate change, a problem compounded by the country's location in the Sahel. Desertification and acute drought-related food crises, especially those of 2005 and 2010, affected more than 10 million people in the region, including 2 million in Niger.⁵⁶ As a result of the primary sector's vulnerability to climate change, Niger's economy continues to be heavily dependent on uranium mining exports. Niger's uranium accounts for nearly 8 per cent of world production, with mining royalties constituting roughly 40 per cent of the GDP.⁵⁷ In sum, the country's real GDP growth reached 3.6 per cent in 2013 after expanding by 11.1 per cent in 2012, an expansion driven by the start of crude oil production and a good harvest.⁵⁸

Since independence in 1960, Niger has had a chequered political history, including the rule of four military leaders and four civilian presidents, a development that has impacted its democratization and governance. Niger has internal and external connections with conflict and insecurity in the Sahel. Internally, the country has had challenges managing tensions associated with its Tuareg population. The Tuareg are the third largest ethnic group (estimated at 9.3 per cent of the population), after the Hausas and the Djerma-Songhais, based on the 2001 census⁵⁹. They predominantly occupy the regions of Azawak (Tahoua region) and Air (Agadez region), but are also spread across Niger's eight regions. Since independence, the Tuareg have protested alleged exclusion in governance, especially from the 1970s, following the tensions between Niger and Libya over the expulsion of non-Nigerien Tuareg.⁶⁰ Successive Tuareg protestations were repressed by the army, necessitating a series of peace accords signed in the mid-1990s. Despite peace accords in the 1990s, Niger witnessed a resurgence of Tuareg attacks (spearheaded by the *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice* (MNJ)) in 2007-2008.

55 Sendzimir, J., C. P. Reij, and P. Magnuszewski (2011). Rebuilding resilience in the Sahel: re-greening in the Maradi and Zinder regions of Niger. *Ecology and Society* 16(3), p. 1.

56 African Development Bank Group (2013). Niger Combined 2013-2017 Country Strategy Paper and Portfolio Review. P. 2.

57 African Development Bank Group (2013). Niger Combined 2013-2017 Country Strategy Paper And Portfolio Review. World Nuclear Association (2014).

58 Ndoye, Daniel and Mansour Ndiaye (2014). Niger 2014. AfDB, OECD, UNDP www.africanecoomicoutlook.org.

59 United Nations Demographic Yearbook (2001). Like most African countries Niger has discontinued releasing census data disaggregated along ethnicity.

60 Dickovick, Tyler (2012). *The Republic of Niger, The World Today Series 2012: Africa*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. p. 121.

Externally, the transborder and cross-regional dispersal of Tuaregs in the Sahel has triggered tensions with other States, especially Libya. More importantly, Niger's peculiar geographical location has placed it at the interface of the two conflict corridors in the Sahel in recent years. Since 2010, the country has been at the interstices of political and religious violence and geo-strategic interests within the Sahel region - from Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, the Tuareg separatist and armed Islamist movements in northern Mali to inter-communal violence and State collapse in southern Libya. An examination of each of these crises points to the impact on Niger and the subsequent role that it has had to play to manage the spillover of regional insecurity.

Structural causes of armed conflict and insecurity

Environmental stresses: Political instability and insecurity in Niger is linked to severe environmental stresses, mainly variations in rainfall patterns and recurrent droughts that impact livelihoods and levels of tension. Variation in rainfall patterns and the recurrent droughts of the 1970s and 1980s disturbed the natural vegetation, contributed to land erosion and the reduction in suitable land for cultivation⁶¹. The resultant extreme food shortages since 2009 have led to chronic food insecurity, with 15 to 20 per cent of the population (2 to 3 million people) facing food insecurity even when there is surplus production⁶². In January 2012, the number of people at risk of food insecurity was estimated at 3 million, with 400,000 children requiring treatment for malnutrition⁶³. In 2012, Niger also suffered unprecedented floods, which affected more than half a million people, through damage to homes, public infrastructure, river food and cash crops⁶⁴.

Youth bulge: The 2012 general population and housing census pegs Niger's annual population growth rate at 3.9 per cent.⁶⁵ This high demographic expansion is attributed to the high level of fertility, with 7.1 children on average per woman and a decline in infant mortality from 226 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1998 to 128 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2009. This is an annual rate of decline of 5.1 per cent⁶⁶. As a result, the population structure shows that two out of three Nigeriens (66 per cent) are less than 25 years old, making Niger one of the countries with the highest proportions of young people in the world.⁶⁷ This is a significant increase from 2006 where 47.6 per cent of the population was below 15 years, against 4.5 per cent above 60.⁶⁸ The insecurity risks emerge from structural dynamics such as poverty, lack of education and high unemployment that foster youth disgruntlement in the context of a weak State and inadequate service delivery. As such, many young Nigeriens are involved in seasonal migration, particularly to Nigeria and Libya.

Historical grievances: Tuareg marginalization is linked to the creation of the State of Niger in two ways: first, colonial State-making was antithetical to the nomadic way

61 African Development Bank Group (2013). Niger Combined 2013-2017 Country Strategy Paper and Portfolio Review. pp. 2 and 8.

62 Ibid.

63 UNICEF (2012). Humanitarian Action for Children. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/hac2012/files/HAC2012__Niger_LOW__WEB_Final.pdf.

64 Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET). 2014. Niger Food Security Brief, pp. 43.

65 African Development Bank Group, 2013, p. 8.

66 UNICEF Niger Country Profile, Maternal, Newborn and Child Survival, March 2010 or www.childinfo.org

67 African Development Bank Group (2013) p. 8.

68 UNDP Population Statistics 2000 – 2013.

of life of the Tuareg - unpredictable climatic conditions of the Sahel region required inflexible borders for animal husbandry. Secondly, colonial and post-colonial State structures resulted in the Tuareg loss of control of trans-Saharan trade routes as well as by the relocation of State power to the south to Zinder and subsequently Niamey. The drought and food shortages of the 1970s and 1980s severely affected pastoral economies, which led to several Tuareg fleeing to neighbouring countries (especially Libya). This generated feelings of marginalization by the Nigerien Government. Over time, Tuareg claims of marginalization were radicalized, leading to armed attacks and brutal repression. This includes the May 1990 *Tchintabaraden* massacre of Tuareg communities by the Nigerien army.

Proximate causes of armed conflict and insecurity

Military rule and authoritarian regimes: Historically, Niger has had an interventionist military and a record of authoritarian regimes, including four military coups (1974, 1996, 1999 and 2010), four political transitions, seven republics and seven constitutions.⁶⁹ The management of economic fragility occasioned by Niger's location in the Sahel, the resurgence of Tuareg resistance and the challenges associated with the political system has always formed the axis for military intervention. The recurrence of military rule and several transitions have slowed economic development, and precipitated political instability. The military regimes in Niger have often coincided with economic crises such as the 1970's drought in the Sahel, which provided the basis for the first coup, or the government's response to the Tuareg rebellions, which formed the basis for coups in the 1990's.

Regional and cross-border conflict and insecurity: Internal security challenges in Niger have been triggered or exacerbated by regional security dynamic, namely the insurgencies in north-east Nigeria (Boko Haram), northern Mali, southern Libya and the Central African Republic. The four insurgencies have triggered the in-flow of refugees and returnee Nigeriens, generated inter-group tensions, prevented seasonal migration, disrupted remittances from the Nigerien Diaspora from those countries, border closures that impact on cross-border trade, and heightened insecurity and armed attacks on border communities (Diffa and Tillaberi).

2.7 Concluding remarks

This overview of the causes of armed conflict and insecurity in the Sahel derived from the country case studies, provides some explanation for the two divergent – State-based and people-based – security complexes in the Sahel. The natural conditions of the Sahel pre-dispose Sahelian peoples to a significant degree of insecurity to which they have sought varying coping mechanisms to address for centuries. As such, among other things, migration in response to environmental insecurities has been second nature to Sahelian peoples for generations. The governance systems and approaches for managing the harsh realities of the environmental stress then become key to the prevention of armed conflict and large-scale insecurities. It is here that the nature of the post-colonial State contributes to the severity of the insecurity in the region.

69 Baudais, Virginie and Grégory Chauzal (2011). The 2010 Coup d'Etat in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics? *African Affairs*, 110/439, pp. 295–304.

A crosscutting issue at the core of this challenge is the fractured State-making process in the Sahel, not unlike other parts of Africa. Post-independence governance arrangements have not succeeded in making the State responsive to the plight of vast numbers of people. Rather, the entrenchment of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes has served to widen the gulf between States and the populations they rule over. Added to this is erosion of the time-tested coping mechanisms of the people to the threats in their natural environment. The resulting marginalization and exclusion lie at the root of armed conflict and insecurities in the region. The pressures from forced migration and food insecurity, compounded by corrupt governance and politicized military have sustained the conflicts and insecurities in the Sahel.

One country, which reflects the severity of this challenge, is Niger. A good number of its population, no doubt, has experienced a significant sense of loss in the State-making process. Tuareg marginalization was entrenched by the creation of a State that gave little or no recognition to the Tuareg nomadic way of life, not least their adaptation strategy in response to unpredictable climatic conditions, which required flexible borders for seasonal migration. This was compounded by the loss of control of trans-Saharan trade routes as well as by the relocation of State power to Zinder in the south, and subsequently, Niamey. The marginalization of the Tuareg was complete with the drought of the 1970s and 1980s, after which many Tuareg migrated to neighbouring countries, following a dwindled pastoral economy. The ensuing feeling of exclusion is at the core of the violent Tuareg campaigns, which were brutally suppressed by the Nigerien armed forces.

The extent to which the conflicts and insecurities arising from this regional situation have impacted development and governance in the region and case study countries remains to be seen.

CHAPTER 3: Overview of impact of armed conflicts and insecurity on human development across Sahelian countries

This chapter presents a qualitative overview of the impact of armed conflicts and insecurities in the Sahel from a regional and country standpoint. It provides a narrative for gauging the impact, trends and trajectories on development processes. This essentially derives from field research findings (specific country case studies) and informs the first and second pillars of the study by validating or rejecting the hypotheses advanced at the earlier phase. The following questions are explored:

- a) At which sites can we observe the impact of armed conflict and insecurities on development processes?
- b) What short- and medium-term scenarios can be developed, based on field findings?

The key research questions that guided the analysis in this section are outlined in Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

3.1 Regional overview

Economic impacts

Common, but variable macroeconomic impact: Armed conflict and insecurity continue to have varying degrees of macroeconomic impacts across countries in the Sahel, although the degree of the macroeconomic impact oscillates between the local and national levels. The type and scale of the macroeconomic impact is linked to the nature of the economy (specifically the role of agriculture), geographical proximity to the two conflict corridors (northern Nigeria and northern Mali), and growth in other sectors (especially mineral and hydrocarbon). In countries such as Mali and Niger, the macroeconomic impact is more national than in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mauritania, where it is more localized.

In Niger, for instance, the national-level macroeconomic impact is linked to its economic structure. Subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry account for over 45 per cent of GDP⁷⁰, while the minerals sector (uranium and gold mining) accounts for 40 per cent of GDP.⁷¹ In sum, Niger's real GDP growth reduced to 3.6 per cent in 2013, after expanding by 11.1 per cent in 2011.⁷² Notwithstanding the vulnerability of the agricultural sector to environmental conditions, and the onset

70 Ndoye, Daniel and Mansour Ndiaye (2014). Niger 2014. AfDB, OECD, UNDP. www.africanecoomicoutlook.org.

71 African Development Bank Group, Niger Combined 2013-2017 Country Strategy Paper And Portfolio Review; World Nuclear Association (2014).

72 Ndoye, Daniel and Mansour Ndiaye (2014). Niger 2014. AfDB, OECD, UNDP. www.africanecoomicoutlook.org.

In countries such as Mali and Niger, the macroeconomic impact is more national, compared to Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mauritania where it is more localized. Niger's poor macroeconomic performance in 2013 is directly linked to the disruption in mining activities (kidnappings, armed attacks and heightened insecurity) in the Agadez region, which slowed down sectoral growth from 43.3 per cent in 2012 to 10.3 per cent in 2013. Similarly in Mali, the series of events triggered by the 2012 outbreak of conflict and insecurity led to a decline in government resources and expenditure by at least 30 per cent and pushed Mali into a recession in 2013. In Nigeria, the share of agriculture's contribution to GDP declined from 23.96 per cent in 2010 to 21.97 per cent in 2013 as a result of armed conflict and insecurity in the north.

of oil production (increased GDP in 2012), the poor macroeconomic performance in 2013 is directly linked to the disruption to mining activities (kidnappings, armed attacks and heightened insecurity) in the Agadez region, which slowed down sectoral growth from 43.3 per cent in 2012 to 10.3 per cent in 2013.⁷³ Similarly, in Mali, the series of events triggered by the 2012 outbreak of conflict and insecurity led to a decline in government resources and expenditure by at least 30 per cent.⁷⁴ Mali experienced increased fiscal deficits and external debts to the gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, all of which pushed the country into economic contraction (-0.4 per cent) and a recession by 2013.⁷⁵

The fact that conflict and insecurity have limited impact on the national macroeconomic outlook for Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Mauritania does not preclude a huge macroeconomic impact in the regions and areas directly affected. In Burkina Faso, the impact on overall macroeconomic performance was limited to aspects of the agricultural sector in the border areas along (north-western region) its border with Mali. The mineral sector, specifically gold, is the main driver of macroeconomic performance, having accounted for 72 per cent of total exports in 2013.⁷⁶ Burkina Faso recorded sustained real GDP growth of 6.9 per cent in 2013, after a 9.0 per cent leap in 2012.⁷⁷ This was the result of value added growth of more than 5.0 per cent made up of 6.6 per cent in the primary (agriculture) sector; 8.8 per cent in the secondary sector, led by extractive industries; and 5.2 per cent for the tertiary sector (service sector).⁷⁸ This fall in growth is linked to the fall in the price of gold on the international market.

The patterns are similar for Nigeria, where the oil and gas sector accounts for two-thirds of public revenue. The Sahel-related conflict and insecurity in the north-east region has little or no impact on oil and gas exports, hence minimal impact on national

73 Economic Commission for Africa (2015). Sahel Study: Niger. p7.

74 The International Monetary Fund (2013). Mali: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, May 2013. IMF Country Report No.13/111. p. 8. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13111.pdf>.

75 U.S. Department of State. U.S. Relations with Mali. Retrieved 4 June 2008. <http://www.State.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm>.

76 Bedossa, B., (2012) Natural ressources : Macroéconomie & Développement. Burkina Faso: l'émergence du secteur aurifère suffira-t-elle à redresser un modèle de croissance en perte de vitesse? Division Analyse macroéconomique et risque pays Département de la Recherche, AFD.

77 World Bank Indicators and African Statistical Yearbook (2009-2014).

78 Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: A Country Case Study of Burkina Faso (2015). p. 33.

macroeconomic performance. In 2014, Nigeria's Central Bank reported that macro-level policy, including monetary policy, was unaffected by the conflict. However the local economies of the Sahelian conflict-affected areas in the northeast, dominated by farming and animal husbandry, have been heavily disrupted. Despite the lack of disaggregated macroeconomic data for the north-east, there are sufficient pointers to the impacts of conflict and insecurity on farmland cultivation, harvest and animal production, as evidenced by the contribution of agriculture to GDP, which declined from 23.96 per cent in 2010 to 21.97 per cent in 2013.⁷⁹

Disruption of agriculture and trade (cross-border): The main economic activities and sources of livelihood across the Sahel are farming, animal husbandry and cross-community and cross-border trade, mostly in these items. The onset and intensification of armed conflicts and insecurity in Sahelian communities over the past decade have negatively impacted agricultural production and cross-border trade. This does not preclude the contributory impact of subsisting vulnerabilities on environmental conditions, including variations in rainfall and temperature that have always led to flooding, drought, famine, and desertification in the Sahel, a phenomenon which may have intensified in recent years. Across communities directly affected by armed conflicts (northern Nigeria and northern Mali), and those indirectly affected (north-western Burkina Faso and south-eastern Niger), agriculture has been disrupted. The nature of the impact differs across the case studies. However, we estimate that armed conflict and insecurity have reduced agricultural produce and trade between them significantly, thereby contributing to worsening food security, malnutrition, and socioeconomic vulnerability in Sahelian areas and communities. In areas in and around the conflict corridors, farmlands are invaded and looted by insurgents, farmers killed or kidnapped, markets bombed, farmers displaced as IDPs and refugees, animals seized, animal herding restricted and farmland left uncultivated and not harvested. In areas indirectly affected, displaced persons and refugees disrupt host communities (e.g. by generating tensions), triggering clashes between farmers and herders and disrupting trade.

The nature of the impact on agriculture production and trade (cross-border trade) differs across the case studies. Armed conflicts and insecurity, however, have reduced agricultural production and trade among countries by 25 per cent to 30 per cent, thereby contributing to worsening food insecurity, malnutrition and socioeconomic vulnerability in Sahelian areas and communities.

In Burkina Faso, the fall of the contribution of agriculture to overall growth from 2012 (4.6 per cent) to 2013 (1.9 per cent) is not only because of variable rainfall, but also tensions and clashes between farmers and herders, following the inflow of refugees (mostly cattle herders) from Mali since 2012.⁸⁰ In Mali, the insecurity affected cereal production and thereby food security. Sikasso, for example, which produced 50 per cent of the country's cereal before the conflict, saw a 24 per cent decline in output. Mopti also produced about 5 per cent less than its pre-crisis

⁷⁹ National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja. 2014. Measuring Better: Frequently asked questions on the Rebasing/ Re-Benchmarking of Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

⁸⁰ World Bank Indicators and African Statistical Yearbook (2009-2014).

(2012) level.⁸¹ Compounding the problem was the looting that followed the fighting in early April 2012. This affected harvest stocks intended for consumption, sale and the creation of seed stocks in many regions. All this worsened Mali's food security in 2012 and 2013, as many families resorted to rationing, consuming less nutritious food and regularly experiencing bouts of hunger.

In Niger, insecurity in the border areas with Nigeria and Mali disrupted cross-border trade in goods and services. The border closures and restrictions continue to disrupt trading activities in Diffa and Tillaberi, thereby affecting the movement of goods with Nigeria and Mali, respectively. Beyond limiting the inflow of goods, it also affects livelihoods, through the limited export of animals and farm produce, and disrupts seasonal migration of labour and remittances.

In Nigeria, farmland cultivation and food production have declined, owing to displacement and armed attacks. Food security reports from the Famine Early Warning System in 2014 reported below-average food stocks in States affected by Boko Haram. The result of this has been above-average 2014 prices for maize and sorghum at up to about 30 per cent higher than the largest cereal markets in West Africa, Dawanau Market, near Kano State.⁸² These have been attributed, in part, to reducing trade from north-eastern Nigeria. Trade in agricultural products, the mainstay of this region, has been in decline as a result of the conflict. Trade flows and activities have suffered extensively as key food markets in north-east Nigeria (Yola, Maiduguri, Damaturu, Potiskum and Mubi) are functioning at half capacity, with most semi-urban markets not functioning at all, due to security threats. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates, the Boko Haram insurgency has cost economic losses (in terms of trade and destruction to infrastructure and service delivery) to the tune of \$6 billion.

Displacement and refugees: Almost all countries along the Sahelian belt are either host or country of origin for refugees and IDPs. In 2014, at least 3.5 million people were displaced by armed conflict and insecurity in two conflict corridors (northern Nigeria and northern Mali) in the Sahel.⁸³ The estimate is even higher when persons displaced by other low-level conflicts (e.g. farmer-herder clashes and inter-community fighting) and returnees from Libya and the Central African Republic are included. Evidently, Nigeria and Mali are the two main sources (country of origin) for displaced persons, while Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania are host countries. Beyond sheer displacement, massive population movements (of refugees and IDPs) trigger additional negative impacts for the displaced persons and their host communities. These include disruption to livelihoods, host-settler tensions and farmer-herder clashes, and over-stretch available social services and infrastructures.

Nigerians displaced and with refugee status in neighbouring countries increased from 18,021 in 2012 to 31,664 in 2013, and reached 41,836 in June 2014.⁸⁴ It is estimated that greater increases occurred after July 2014 when attacks by Boko Haram

81 "Mali" 2014. Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from "Annuaire Statistique".

82 Famine Early Warning Systems Network (2014), Nigeria Food Security Alert, 7 January 2014.

83 Norwegian Refugee Council (2014), Global Overview: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence.

84 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014). Statistical Database.

intensified, as they seized more and more communities. Moreover, the Boko Haram crisis is estimated to have displaced a total of 66,000 West Africans (as refugees).⁸⁵ Internally, the number of IDPs has been increasing exponentially since 2011. In May 2014, an assessment led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) identified nearly 650,000 persons displaced within Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba.⁸⁶ In January 2015, Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported the existence of 981,416 IDPs, with 108,000 living in IDP camps. In Mali, the displacement started in 2007-2008, following the 2006 rebellion with the most affected regions being Nyafunké (Timbuktu), Hombori (Gao), Léré (Timbuktu), Menaka, Anderanbouka (Gao), Tessalit (Gao), Aguel Hoc (Kidal), Inhalid (Kidal), Tin-Zaouaten (Kidal). By April 2012, the estimated number of post-fighting refugees was 138,990 and those of the post-fighting IDPs was about 93,433.⁸⁷ The asylum countries of the Mali refugees were Ouagadougou (32,631 refugees), Niger (26,650 refugees), Mbéra (49,709 refugees) and Algeria (over 30,000 refugees) while the number of returnees was only 2,390.⁸⁸

In 2014, at least 3.5 million persons were displaced by armed conflict and insecurity in two conflict corridors (northern Nigeria and northern Mali) in the Sahel. The estimate is even higher (almost 2 million) when persons displaced by other low-level conflicts (e.g. farmer-herder clashes and inter-community fighting) and returnees from Libya and the Central African Republic are included.

Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania are host to fleeing refugees. Burkina Faso started receiving a high influx of refugees from Mali in 2012, with over 125,000 estimated to have sought refuge at different times.⁸⁹ Currently, the number of refugees locally is said to be about 43, 000 and they are scattered in refugee camps along the Mali-Burkina border.⁹⁰ Prior to the conflicts in Mali and Nigeria, Niger had had its own IDPs as a result of armed attacks by the MNJ and the army's reprisal attacks that led to over 11,000 IDPs in 2007⁹¹, and over 23,000 in 2008 (mostly north of Agadez).⁹² Insurgencies in neighbouring countries (the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali and Nigeria) have led to the influx of returnees and refugees. From Nigeria, there were over 50,000 refugees in 2013 and 12,000 additional arrivals in early 2014; from

85 UNHCR Briefing Notes. 9 May 2014. Refugees fleeing attacks in northeast Nigeria, UNHCR watching for new displacement. Accessed October 20, 2014. <http://www.unhcr.org/536ca0f79.html>.

86 Nigeria Food Security Outlook: July to December 2014. Postharvest Crisis acute food insecurity expected in conflict-prone areas of the northeast. Accessed October 16 2014. http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Nigeria_OL_2014_07_EN.pdf.

87 OCHA. 12 April 2012. Mali: Armed Conflict and Population Movement. Available at: https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1334611376_map-2003.pdf.

88 Ibid.

89 Oxfam Briefing Paper 16 (2013). Available at: <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp167-malis-conflict-refugees-220113-summ-en.pdf>.

90 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2014. UNHCR country operations profile - Burkina Faso. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483de6.html>.

91 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Niger Internally Displaced People Analysis. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/niger/figures-analysis>; Integrated Regional Information Networks, 10 December 2007. News filtering of the north suggests grave conditions. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/75792/niger-news-filtering-out-of-north-suggests-grave-conditions> and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 18 June 2009.

92 United States Department of State. 25 February 2009. "Human Rights Report: Niger". <http://www.State.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119017.htm>.

Mali, 60,000 refugees in 2012, as well as 3,000 returned Nigeriens; over 200,000 returnees from Libya, and several thousand from CAR.⁹³ The two receiving points or communities are Diffa (in the extreme south-east region, bordering north-east Nigeria) and Tillabéri (in the north-west region, bordering Mali). Médecins Sans Frontières estimates that nearly 10,000 Malian refugees have settled in Tillabéri.⁹⁴

Table 3.1: Refugees from first set of Sahelian countries (as at 2014)

Name	Refugees from	Refugees in
Burkina Faso	1,857	31,894
Mali	139,267	15,195
Mauritania	34,114	75,635
Niger	738	77,830
Nigeria	90,921	1,239

Source: The UN Refugee Agency. "West Africa: 2015 UNHCR Sub regional Operations Profile". <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html>.

Source: The UN Refugee Agency. "North Africa: 2015 UNHCR Sub regional Operations Profile". <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45ac86.html>.

Increased security-related expenditure: There has been a noticeable increase in security-related activities and expenditure across countries affected by the armed conflicts and insecurity. The scope and range of this increase vary, depending on four factors: proximity to major conflict corridors/theatres; intensity of conflict and security challenges; linkages to natural resource extraction and the nature of politics; and the subsisting role and influence of the military in governance. The quality of data and information about security-related spending differ across the case-study countries. Nigeria had the most open-source data among the countries under study. Such open-source data, however, hardly indicate factual realities; there are considerable "off-budgeting" practices and budgetary deviations. In general, reliable and consistent data on security spending is lacking in the Sahelian countries studied. This is consistent with the highly secretive nature of the security sector and the sensitivity attached to security issues in Africa.

Three findings emerge nonetheless: (a) the increasing scale of internal security operations, counter-insurgency operations, armed clashes and casualties, and the high incidence of internal and cross-border displacement call for extra security-related spending; (b) the additional security-related expenditure is largely financed through diversion or budgetary adjustment that reduces resources devoted to other government activities, specifically education, health and poverty alleviation; and (c) for countries with some open source data and through field-level interviews, security-related spending appears to account for 25 to 50 per cent of the national budgets of Nigeria and Niger respectively.

⁹³ International Crisis Group. September 2013. "Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?" Africa Report N°208: 32 p. 38.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p.43.

For countries with some open source data and through field-level interviews, security-related spending appears to account for 25 to 50 per cent of the national budgets of Nigeria and Niger respectively. Nigeria demonstrates the most and clearest impact of Sahelian-related conflict and insecurity on security spending. Annual security sector spending increased from \$5.07 billion in 2010 to over \$7 billion in 2014, and the yearly average between 2010 and 2014 was \$6.5 billion.

Since the outbreak of conflict in Northern Mali in 2012, Burkina Faso has expanded internal security operations and its participation in subregional peacekeeping activities in Mali. These have implications for its security spending. Burkina Faso contributed 650 military personnel to the African-led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA). In early 2013, it deployed 1000 soldiers along its borders with Mali in northern Burkina Faso. Increased security around this border is seen as a way of preventing “Islamic infiltration” and the war spreading southwards into Burkina Faso.⁹⁵ There were fears that Western interests and capital investment in the gold mines along the border with Mali would make them potential targets by jihadi groups from that country. They therefore had to be protected. The effects of the outbreak of violence in the north since 2012, still linger in Mali, hampering humanitarian efforts. In spite of French and United Nations military operations and presence, there are still attacks by militant groups in Timbuktu and Gao, as well as fighting between separatist Tuareg groups and Malian forces in Kidal.

In Niger, military and para-military forces have historically wielded strong influence on governance, and recent armed conflicts and security challenges since 2006 and 2007 have bolstered the case for high security-related expenditure. In 2013, the defence budget (CFA31.5 billion or €48 million) was less than for education (CFA117.9 billion or €180 million) and health (CFA72 billion or €110 million).⁹⁶ However, in the supplementary budget adopted in May 2013, the defence expenditure (CFA28 billion or €42.6 million) was roughly the same as health (CFA29 billion or about €44.2 million) and more than half of the sum allocated for education (CFA55.5 billion or about €84.6 million).⁹⁷ This led to a cancellation of CFA 35 billion in the finance and education ministries and the presidency.⁹⁸ In addition, insecurity has led to increased security spending and overall production cost for mining companies in Niger. Following the May 2013 attacks, security spending increased to 4 per cent of the operational costs for equipment and for paying over 600 troops deployed to mining sites.⁹⁹

Nigeria demonstrates the most and clearest impact of Sahelian-related conflict and insecurity on security spending. As a result of counter-insurgency operations, Nigeria’s annual security sector spending (covering defence, police, the Office of the National Security Advisor, para-military agencies and security-related service-

95 Economic Commission for Africa. Sahel Study: A Country Case Study of Burkina Faso. Unpublished Work (2015). p.43.

96 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Military Expenditure Database. (2013).

97 Ibid.

98 ICG, Niger... (2013) p. 44; See also Journal officiel de la République du Niger. (2012) and United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 - Niger, 30 April Cite as 2014, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/536229d18.html> (accessed 19 September 2014).

99 Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: Niger. Unpublished manuscript. (2015). p.9.

wide votes) increased from \$5.07 billion in 2010 to over \$7 billion in 2014, and the yearly average between 2010 and 2014 was \$6.5 billion.¹⁰⁰ On average, security-related spending in annual budgets since 2011 has accounted for around 25 per cent of total government expenditure, with a corresponding impact on social service delivery expenditure.¹⁰¹ These figures exclude other extra-budgetary security-related spending, as contained in supplementary appropriation bills, spending by State and local government, and by ministries, departments and agencies (e.g. the Central Bank and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)) and loans.

Worsening poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability: Cumulatively, armed conflict and insecurity have triggered or worsened poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability in regions and areas in and around the Sahel, across the case studies. The scale of the impact differs, according to proximity to the two conflict corridors, the extent of displacement, hosting of refugees and IDPs, and subsisting local and political-security dynamics. In general, border areas and communities are the worst hit. Across the board, the impacts on poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability are hardly visible in national-level data (except for Mali), but field visits point to the systematic destruction of resilience, coping mechanisms, social safety nets and socioeconomic assets at household and community levels. The impacts on poverty levels and socioeconomic vulnerability are indexed by displacements, loss of livelihoods and increasing levels of unemployment, worsening relations between communities (farmers versus herders and host communities versus refugees); human trafficking, gender-based violence, food insecurity, and collapse of social service delivery. In most of the case studies, armed conflict and insecurity have accentuated regional disparities in socioeconomic conditions with conflict-affected Sahelian areas and communities increasingly becoming the most impoverished regions in the respective countries.

The impacts on poverty levels and socioeconomic vulnerability are indexed by displacements, loss of livelihoods and increasing levels of unemployment, worsening relations between communities (e.g. host communities and refugees); human trafficking, gender-based violence, food insecurity, and collapse of social service delivery. Armed conflict and insecurity have accentuated regional disparities in socioeconomic conditions with conflict-affected Sahelian areas and communities increasingly becoming the most impoverished in the respective countries. In Mali, the incidence of poverty rose from 45 per cent in 2011 to 47 per cent in 2013, with the percentage increase most severe in some of the conflict-affected regions. By the end of 2012, conflict-affected areas had witnessed a 17 per cent decline in the number of health centres; a 4 per cent decline in the number of professional health workers; an 8 per cent increase in the risk of malaria; increased spread of diarrhoea from 216 in 2011 to 228 in 2012 (6 per cent increase); and increased measles infection from 246 in 2011 to 620 cases in 2012 (152 per cent increase).

¹⁰⁰ Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: Nigeria Case Study Baseline, Unpublished manuscript, 2015, Table 1.2, p. 33.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.33.

In Burkina Faso, drought and the influx of Malian refugees triggered armed clashes between Mali Tuareg pastoralists and Burkina farmers [including Dogon farmers in Mali and Fulani pastoralists from Burkina Faso], which resulted in a significant number of fatalities and injuries in May 2012. While the proactive actions of the Burkina Faso government could be said to have minimized such clashes in 2012-2013, there are subsisting risks. OXFAM recently warned of a deteriorating security situation since January 2012, including a rise in actual or threatened kidnappings, which has made it difficult for agencies to provide aid. Also, the crisis in Burkina Faso's cotton industry has led to migration towards gold mining sites, in the absence of alternative employment sources, with attendant rise in illegal and unsafe artisanal mining, often by children. Burkina Faso is a key site and destination country for trafficking of women and children, and cataclysmic events in the Sahel in the last decade have accentuated this. In 2012, the U.S State Department's report on trafficking in persons documented that Burkina Faso, despite its efforts, is unable to comply with the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking. All the same, this report acknowledges the government's increasing efforts to prevent human trafficking, especially of children, having seized 1,112 children from traffickers in 2011.

Mali's human development situation deteriorated with the outbreak of armed conflict and insecurity in 2012. The incidence of poverty rose from 45 per cent in 2011 to 47 per cent in 2013, with the percentage increase most severe in some of the conflict-affected regions, especially Koulikoro (27.8 per cent) and Sikasso (14.6 per cent), relative to just 2 per cent increase in Bamako.¹⁰² Conflicts and insecurity have exacerbated the limited provision of healthcare services, including widening regional disparities, across Mali. For instance, by the end of 2012, the conflict-affected areas of Timbuktu, Gao and Kayes, Koulikoro, Segou and Mopti, had witnessed a 17 per cent decline in the number of health centres.¹⁰³ Recent conflicts also worsened Mali's already weak health system as they led to a reduction in the number of health professionals by 4 per cent, from 2011 to 2012. The risk of malaria also grew by 8 per cent, while the number of people affected by measles tripled from 2011 to 2012. Also, diarrhoeal cases increased from 216 in 2011 to 228 in 2012 (a 6 per cent increase), while measles infections increased from 246 in 2011 to 620 cases in 2012 (a 152 per cent increase).¹⁰⁴

The recent conflicts and insecurity worsened unemployment and occasioned the loss of livelihoods in Mali. The conflict-affected areas of Koulikoro, Kayes, Sikasso, Mopti, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu have the highest unemployment rates due to low demand, pervasive insecurity, and the closure of most businesses (e.g. an estimated 80 per cent of firms closed in Gao). Women aged 40 to 49 are the most affected, as their job applications decreased by 80 per cent, compared to 48 per cent for men in 2012.¹⁰⁵

In Niger, the arrival of returnee Nigeriens and refugees has put pressure on the limited social services and facilities available in the refugee hosting communities of Diffa and Tillaberi, with implications for livelihoods, education and health. For

102 Mali 2014. Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from *Annuaire Statistique*.

103 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. *Conflict in the Sahel region: The Development Cost and Consequences. "The Root Cause and Impact of Armed Conflict and Insecurities on Development: The Case Study of Mali"*. Unpublished manuscript, 2015. P.53.

104 *Ibid*, pp. 53-55.

105 *Ibid*, p. 61.

instance, mobile health clinics were discontinued because of the violence, cutting off populations from already scarce health care services. Border closures have badly hit cross-border trade and Niger's access to imports from Nigeria and the ability of Nigeriens to export livestock, dairy produce and red peppers, with implications for livelihoods and household incomes. All these have amplified the impact of the three-year drought in the Diffa region of Niger.

The Boko Haram conflict continues to exacerbate subsisting levels of poverty, unemployment, and access to education and health services in northern Nigeria. The insurgency has reduced economic and commercial activities, as small- to medium-sized enterprises have suffered a migration of businesspersons, while banks have been providing limited services. Given the impact on agriculture, rural poverty levels far exceed urban poverty levels, at 52.1 per cent, and 34.1 per cent respectively.¹⁰⁶ It also decreased the human development for girls. Schools and other institutions of learning have been targeted and forced to close, while school girls have been targeted for kidnapping, as exemplified by the April 2014 kidnapping of over 200 female students in Chibok, Borno State. In 2013, north-west and north-east Nigeria had the highest rates of women and girls with no education at 62.8 per cent and 61.1 per cent, respectively, against the average of 16.1 per cent in southern Nigeria.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, subsisting high unemployment in the north-east region has been worsened by the Boko Haram insurgency. Youth unemployment in the north-east areas rose from 47.6 per cent (2010) to 53.2 per cent (2012).¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, in the conflict-affected rural areas, where some households have remained, their cropping activities have been affected negatively, as young people are unable to seek work opportunities in agriculture to supplement their incomes, owing to security threats.

Governance impacts

Displaced public administration and disrupted democratic governance: The key countries at the centre of the conflict and insecurity in the two conflict corridors (Mali and Nigeria), have witnessed the disruption of routine governance and service delivery in areas and communities in and around the Sahel (the so-called 'northern phenomenon'). Conflict affected areas and communities in the Sahel are increasingly marked by the absence, displacement or replacement of public officials by insurgent groups. In conflict-affected areas, jihadi insurgent groups are increasingly displacing and replacing democratic governance with Salafi-inspired stricter forms of Sharia as the preferred mode of governance. In other countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania, whilst public administration may not have been displaced or replaced, their ability to function effectively and deliver services have been constrained. Routine governance and service delivery processes have been interrupted by new security measures and operations, and the influx of refugees. All this, especially in Mali and Nigeria, continue to affect democratic governance.

106 World Bank World Development Indicators 2014. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf>.

107 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, 2013. Accessed October 20, 2014. Available at: http://www.population.gov.ng/images/ndhs_data/ndhs_2013/2013_ndhs_final_report.pdf.

108 NISER. (2013). Analysis and design of safety nets and capacity empowerment programme for unemployed youth in Nigeria, Ibadan: NISER.

In conflict-affected areas, insurgent groups are increasingly displacing and replacing democratic governance with Salafi-inspired stricter forms of Sharia, as the preferred mode of governance. Conflict affected areas and communities in the Sahel are increasingly marked by the absence, displacement or replacement of public officials by insurgent groups. In Mali, the 2012 conflict triggered a military coup and the disruption of democratic governance. Insurgent groups also took over the administration of towns and villages in the north. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has been in control (administration) of at least 20 local government areas, covering 130 towns and villages. The native administration system (emirate council) is also displaced, with traditional rulers (emirs), kingmakers, district heads and ward heads being killed, kidnapped or displaced.

In Mali, armed conflict in the north directly contributed to the March 2012 military putsch that truncated the country's democracy. Moreover, owing to insecurity, weakened security forces and poor leadership, insurgencies in northern Mali displaced public administration as a coalition of irredentist, jihadist and criminal networks took over the administration of towns and villages in the north. It was the threat to overrun Bamako that prompted international military intervention. Prior to the 2012 rebellion, the Malian military was barely present in the north, following the terms of the 2006 Algiers Accord under which Mali's security forces withdrew from major sites in the north, which were subsequently taken over by Tuareg. Also, insurgents in northern Mali targeted and destroyed public infrastructure, especially those connected to tourism. In Djenné, Mopti and Timbuktu, the support infrastructure for the tourism sector was destroyed, including the closure of many hotels, displacement of tour operators, unsafe travel routes, and collapse of government tourist establishments, leading to a 30,000 decline in the number of tourists by 2013.

Similarly in Nigeria, Boko Haram insurgents continued to sack and replace elected and administrative officials, and instituted Sharia rule in communities under their control. The same applied to native (traditional) administrative officials. By late 2014, it was estimated that at least 20 local government areas (covering about 130 towns and villages) were taken over by Boko Haram in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States in the north-east region. Some of the affected local government areas include Dikwa, Gworza, Liman-Kara, Gamboru-Ngala, Marte, Bama, Damboa, Buni Yadi, Buni Gari, Gonjiri, Gujba, and Madagali. State government functionaries were forced to relocate and many State governments and executive councils in the north-east region operated from Abuja, the national capital city. The traditional emirate administrative system, including emirs, Lanwani (village heads), Bulamas (ward heads) and Aja/Hakimai (district heads) were also displaced. By 2014, the Borno Emirate Council had lost many of its kingmakers, district heads and at least 13 ward heads, following Boko Haram attacks. The process of displacing public administrative structures often include the destruction of official installations, offices and training institutions, including police stations, telecommunication masts, post offices, military barracks, military posts and facilities, hospitals, prisons and schools.

Stifling of civil liberties and human rights: Civilian populations in case study countries, especially in areas and communities directly affected by conflict and insecurity in the Sahel, face a double jeopardy with restrictions and violations of their civil liberties and

freedoms by insurgent groups as well as government security forces. Armed conflict and insecurity have taken their toll on civil liberties and freedoms as a result of the activities of insurgent groups and counter-insurgency operations and precautions by national governments. The insurgent groups in the two conflict corridors and mostly across the Sahel share and espouse jihadi (strict salafi and wahhabi) ideologies that place considerable limitations on civil liberties, especially for women and girls. The introduction of stricter modes of Sharia in areas in northern Mali and north-east Nigeria by insurgent groups have been accompanied by bans on freedom of speech, association, and religion; girls education; visibility of women in public places; and the right to fair hearing, based on existing national and international human rights instruments. Moreover, girls and women continue to face forced marriages and rape.

On the part of governments, the coalescing of regional and international institutions and policies against terrorism continue to place overwhelming emphasis on a law-enforcement approach, thereby triggering a series of new or strengthening of subsisting anti-terror legislations in the case-study countries. Security agencies have been given new or additional powers of investigation, intelligence gathering, arrest, detention, and emergency rule. This has increased the visibility and influence of the military and other security forces in governance. The anti-terror laws and policies continue to struggle to reflect the delicate balance needed between counteracting terrorism and protecting civil liberties. In most cases, the balance is tilted against civil liberties. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations continue, with a heavy strain on human rights. Several local and international human rights agencies continue to document the abuse of civil liberties and human rights by security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Sahelian countries. Far more citizens are arrested, detained, or killed in extra-judicial circumstances than those subjected to due process.

Mali has declared emergency rule in conflict-affected areas of the north at different times since 2011, as well as introduced new laws to strengthen the powers of security forces and criminalize actions considered to be terrorist. Notwithstanding, armed conflict and insecurity, and the displacements they triggered, have exacerbated violence against women and girls. In a survey of 120 women and girls in Mopti region, 28 per cent were victims of early forced marriages, and a further 53 per cent had experienced female genital mutilation and rape.¹⁰⁹ In Niger, intermittent Tuareg conflicts, especially from 2006, and armed conflicts in Mali and Nigeria have increased the army's influence and visibility in governance and society. There is a pervasive presence of military personnel across government units, including serving as governors and administrators in regions such as Agadez and Tillaberi.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram insurgents and government counter-terrorism activities have targeted press freedom. Boko Haram bombed the *This Day* newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna in 2012 and the Nigerian army cracked-down on media houses in July 2014, following unfavourable media reports of counter-terror operations. The Boko Haram insurgents continue to target women and girls by abducting, raping and killing them. Several other instances of abductions have taken place before and after the April 2014 kidnap of over 200 girls in Chibok. Boko Haram fighters also infringe on freedom of religion and association by attacking places of religious worship and

109 Mali (2014). Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from field survey made by a stakeholder in Mopti.

Civilian populations in case study countries, especially in areas and communities directly affected by conflict and insecurity in the Sahel, face a double jeopardy, with restrictions and violations of civil liberties and freedoms by insurgent groups and also government security forces. The insurgent groups across the Sahel share and espouse jihadi (strict salafi and wahhabi) ideologies that place considerable limitations and violations of civil liberties, especially for women and girls. The overwhelming emphasis on a law enforcement approach by national governments have triggered a series of new 'anti-terror' powers and in most cases, the balance is tilted against civil liberties. Several local and international human rights agencies continue to document the abuse of civil liberties and human rights by security agencies in the fight against terrorism in Sahelian countries; far more citizens are arrested or detained, or killed in extra-judicial circumstances than those subjected to due process.

persons on account of their religious persuasions and practices. The government's **new anti-terror laws** have given additional powers to security agencies to arrest and detain persons suspected of terrorism for extended periods. The declaration of emergency rule and counter-insurgency operations continue to be trailed by allegations of secret trials, low evidence thresholds, general delays and slow trials, low rate of convictions, extra-judicial killings and mysterious disappearances of alleged Boko Haram members. Moreover, women and girls are the most affected by the disruption of women-sensitive economic activities such as trading and farming, following the imposition of curfews and the attacks on markets and raiding of farmlands and food barns for supplies.

Complex humanitarian emergencies: Conflict-affected areas and communities across countries in the Sahel increasingly embody complex humanitarian emergencies, considering the intersection of multiple crises, and the breakdown of order and authority from a mixture of internal and cross-border cataclysmic events, and their cross-border and transnational character. The scale varies within and across countries, with conflict-affected areas in Mali and Nigeria most acute, followed by villages and communities in border regions. The complex humanitarian emergency is indexed by the sheer number of persons displaced, civilian deaths, violence against women and girls, human trafficking and food insecurity. The subsisting cross-border vulnerabilities to environmental variations (history of famine, drought, flood, etc.) by communities in the Sahel have been aggravated by armed conflict and insecurity by restricting or destroying traditional coping mechanisms and sources of resilience such as cross-border access to pasture and water, trade, and seasonal occupational migration. Some data point to the fact that about 577,000 children, particularly those under five, die of malnutrition and other health related consequences each year in the Sahel.¹¹⁰

Since the outbreak of conflict and insecurity in northern Mali in 2012, over 3,000 deaths have been recorded and 475,000 persons displaced. Food security also worsened (Sikasso produced 50 per cent of the country's cereal before the conflict),

110 Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Humanitarian Needs Overview- Sahel Region", 2013 Available at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/HNO_2014_Sahel_Region.pdf.

Conflict-affected areas and communities across countries in the Sahel increasingly embody complex humanitarian emergencies, given the intersection of multiple crises, and the breakdown of order from a mixture of internal and cross-border cataclysmic events. The complex humanitarian emergency is indexed by the sheer number of persons displaced (over 1.5 million), civilian deaths, violence against women and girls, human trafficking and food insecurity. The subsisting cross-border vulnerabilities to environmental variations (history of famine, drought, flood, etc.) by communities in the Sahel have been aggravated by armed conflict and insecurity by restricting or destroying traditional coping mechanisms and sources of resilience such as cross-border access to pasture and water, trade, and seasonal occupational migration. An estimated 577,000 children, particularly those under five, die of malnutrition and other health-related consequences each year in the Sahel.

with a 24 per cent decline in output. Also, in spite of the presence of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and international forces, insecurity is worse in the northern towns of Ifoghas Mountain (in Kidal) and around the town of Tessalit, and in Menaka and Ansongo towns in Gao. In Burkina Faso, losses from variable rainfall (floods in some areas and poor rainfall in others) were compounded by the steady in-flow of Malian cattle herders (refugees) from 2012, leading to new tensions and clashes between farmers and herders. This influx of refugees occurred at a time when Burkina was experiencing its worst drought, and the refugees were not welcome, as they put a strain on local resources. Those conditions were exacerbated by the limited access to humanitarian assistance, leading to malnutrition and disease among the displaced persons, a situation engendered by the limited presence of organizations such as UNHCR in Burkina Faso, until 2013.

Populations in Niger, especially in border regions, have been displaced by attacks by insurgent groups (MNJ) and the army's reprisal operations since 2007. This led to over 11,000 IDPs in 2007¹¹¹, and over 23,000 in 2008 (mostly north of Agadez).¹¹² This is in addition to the arrivals of refugees from Mali and Nigeria since 2012. It is estimated that over 100,000 refugees have fled to Diffa (swelling the local population by 20 per cent).¹¹³ Apart from stretching services, the influx also led to the creation of 110 more border routes and crossings, only 54 of which are manned by border guards.¹¹⁴ Moreover, border closures and disruption of trade between Niger and Nigeria compounds the effects of drought in Diffa region in Niger.

In northern Nigeria, over 6,347 civilians were killed as a result of Boko Haram and counter-insurgency operations in 2014 alone.¹¹⁵ This is in addition to the huge

111 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2007). Niger Internally Displaced People Analysis <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/niger/figures-analysis>; Integrated Regional Information Networks, See also News filtering of the north suggest grave conditions. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/75792/niger-news-filtering-out-of-north-suggests-grave-conditions>; and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 18 June 2009.

112 United States Department of State, 25 February 2009. "Human Rights Report: Niger". <http://www.State.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119017.htm>.

113 Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: Niger, Unpublished manuscript (2015). p 8.

114 Ibid. p. 32.

115 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: Niger, Unpublished manuscript. 2015. p,8.

problem of internally displaced persons within and across Nigerian borders, the disrupted livelihoods and occupations, attacked or closed schools, and destroyed communities and infrastructure. Some of the major attacks include April 2012 in Jos (30 people reportedly killed); January 2012 attack in Yola (17 reportedly killed) and Gombe (six killed); and the 2011 Christmas day bombing in Madalla town, near Abuja (42 reportedly killed).¹¹⁶ Also in 2013, 209 schools in Yobe were attacked and 800 classrooms in Borno were destroyed, and in 2014, a further 85 schools were closed and 120,000 students displaced in Borno. Similarly, between 2011 and 2014, across the north-east region, over 176 teachers were killed and several thousands displaced.¹¹⁷

Securitized foreign relations: Armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel have transformed the regional and international relations of Sahelian countries. Security pacts, cooperation, collaboration and joint operations now dominate relations at bilateral and multilateral levels. This triggered and continues to reinforce the law enforcement approach to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel. Apart from bilateral agreements, there is a plethora of security arrangements among Sahelian countries, including the Lake Chad Basin Authority; the Multi-national Joint Task Force (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad); the G5 Sahel Countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), and the Pays du Champs (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) for combating (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) in the Sahel.

The securitization of foreign relations is also reflected in the greater roles played by international actors in security issues across the Sahel. Since 2012, Operation Serval has intervened militarily to halt the territorial advances of insurgent groups, and has since bolstered and reconfigured its military presence in the Sahel (e.g. with facilities in Niamey and Agadez). In Burkina Faso, international actors also have a military presence, often using it as the operational base for conducting surveillance over the Sahel. Sahelian countries, including Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Niger receive foreign military assistance such as the African Deployment Assistance Partnership Team and the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership whose objective includes building military capacity and providing these forces with equipment. The security and development initiatives in the Sahel are a testament to the security agendas of countries in the Sahel. In addition, in May 2014, foreign powers organized a special Paris Summit on Boko Haram involving Boko-Haram affected countries in the Lake Chad Basin.

Security pacts, cooperation, collaboration and joint operations now dominate relations at bilateral and multilateral levels. Apart from bilateral agreements, there is a plethora of security arrangements among Sahelian countries, and those initiated by foreign powers, including the African Deployment Assistance Partnership Team, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and the Trans Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative. Emerging patterns point to foreign powers as the drivers of the security agendas and activities of countries in the Sahel.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: Nigeria Case Study, Unpublished manuscript, 2015, Table 1.2, p. 28.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.25.

Intriguingly, Burkina Faso, and to a lesser extent Niger, appear to benefit positively from the increasing securitization of foreign relations in the Sahel. Burkina Faso (under former President Compaoré), positioned itself for mediation and the role of a stabilizer within the region. Apart from contributing troops to the peacekeeping mission in Mali, Burkina Faso under Compaoré was active in the mediation and negotiations to end the Tuareg rebellion in Niger and in the peace accords of the 1990s and thereafter. Burkina Faso also mediated the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire (2010-2011) and served as the chief mediator for the Mali conflict on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Burkina Faso and Niger have attracted additional aid and development assistance in recent years, all linked to their security cooperation with foreign powers active in the Sahel. The motivations for involvement in the Sahel appear to differ for among foreign powers.

3.2 Country overview: Mali

Economic impacts

Macroeconomic impacts: The 22 March 2012 coup d'état led to the suspension of almost all public development assistance, except emergency aid and direct population aid from the national community and ECOWAS. GDP growth was relatively low and negative and public debt was high, while inflation hovered around 5.3 per cent in 2012 (compared to 3.1 per cent in 2011). This led to a rise prices of basic foodstuffs and fuel and a decline in the purchasing power of the people.¹¹⁸ According to the rectified 2012 Finance Act, government resources fell by 30 per cent, and overall expenditure by 33 per cent.¹¹⁹ The government was then constrained to maintain current spending and reduced capital expenditures. As a result of the loss in revenues and continuing expenditure, the fiscal deficit significantly increased and the share of external debts to GDP also increased significantly¹²⁰ while economic credits grew by only 5 per cent due to the recession in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Similarly, the crisis has cost approximately FCFA700 billion in public assistance to development, which decreased dramatically in 2012, hampering growth and consequently also causing a contraction in economic activity that led the country into a recession with a revised growth rate of -0.4 per cent¹²¹ compared to 4.3 per cent in 2011.¹²²

Balance of payments: Balance of payments and investments have been severely affected, with a deficit of FCFA49 billion and a decline of 50 per cent of private investment, respectively. While the surge of gold and cotton exports and remittances from migrant workers contributed to a slight decline of the current account deficit, the capital account financial transactions deteriorated sharply due to the decline in foreign aid and foreign direct investment. The overall deficit of the balance of payments was estimated at FCFA49 billion. Similarly, the public and private investment rates decreased dramatically from 14 and 19 per cent in 2011 to -11 and -50 per cent

118 Mali 2014. Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from INSTAT, Accessed June 4 2008.

119 The International Monetary Fund. (2013). Mali: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. May 2013. IMF Country Report No.13/111. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13111.pdf>.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 The International Monetary Fund. (2013). Mali: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, May 2013. IMF Country Report No.13/111. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13111.pdf>.

respectively in 2012.¹²³ According to Space Business Mali¹²⁴, the Special Investment Budget for 2012 has been reduced by 90 per cent, with a 67 per cent reduction in domestic financing and a virtual absence of external financing.

Refugees and displacements: According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2005, no more than 137,000 refugees remained in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger.¹²⁵ In fact, the population movements started in 2007-2008 following the 2006 rebellion, with the most affected regions being Nyafunké (Timbuktu), Hombori (Gao), Léré (Timbuktu), Menaka, Anderanbouka (Gao), Tessalit (Gao), Aguel Hoc (Kidal), Inhalid (Kidal) and Tin-Zaouaten (Kidal). By April 2012, the estimated number of post-fighting refugees was 138,990 and that of the post-fighting IDPs was about 93,433.¹²⁶ The asylum areas of the Mali refugees were Ouagadougou (32,631 refugees), Niger (26,650 refugees), Mbéra (49,709 refugees) and Algeria (over 30,000 refugees) while the number of returnees was only 2,390.¹²⁷

Health care: Conflict and insecurity have exacerbated the limited provision of healthcare services and widened regional disparities across Mali. For instance, by the end of 2012, the conflict-affected areas - Timbuktu, Gao, Kayes, Koulikoro, Segou and Mopti¹²⁸ - witnessed a 17 per cent decline in the number of health centres. Recent conflicts also further weakened Mali's health system, as the number of health professionals reduced by 4 per cent from 2011 to 2012. Also, the risk of malaria rose by 8 per cent, diarrhoea cases increased from 216 in 2011 to 228 in 2012 (6 per cent increase) and measles cases from 246 in 2011 to 620 in 2012 (152 per cent increase¹²⁹).

Poverty: Conflict and insecurity exacerbated poverty levels in Mali, with the incidence of poverty increasing from 45 per cent in 2011 to 47 per cent in 2013. The percentage increase was more severe in some of the conflict-affected regions, especially Koulikoro (27.8 per cent) and Sikasso (14.6 per cent), relative to a mere 2 per cent increase in Bamako. The increase was modest in Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao,¹³⁰ owing to poor agricultural production (food insecurity), trade disruption and low level of public investments and unemployment, as well as disrupted access to basic social services such as education, health and water.

Unemployment and loss of livelihoods: The recent conflicts and insecurity worsened the unemployment situation and occasioned the loss of livelihoods in Mali. Despite the fact that 78 per cent of the public sector work force had long-term contracts in 2012, the unemployment rate increased from 8 per cent in 2008 to 15.7 per cent in 2011 and 10.8 per cent in 2013. Unemployment is most acute in Bamako, Koulikoro, Kayes, Sikasso, Mopti, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, where demand is low, insecurity

123 Ibid.

124 <http://www.emergence-mali.com/economie.html> 2011 is supposed to be the year before the conflict.

125 UNHCR Regional Strategy for the Forced Displacement of Malians: Refugees and Internally displaced Persons, (2016-2017), 7 December 2015.

126 UNOCHA. 12 April 2012. Mali: Armed Conflict and Population Movement. Available at: https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1334611376_map-2003.pdf.

127 Ibid.

128 Mali (2014). Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from Annuaire Statistique.

129 Mali (2014). Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from Malikunnafo database.

130 Ibid.

pervasive, and most businesses closed (an estimated 80 per cent of firms closed in Gao). Women aged 40 to 49 were the most affected, as their job applications decreased by 80 per cent, compared to 48 per cent for men in 2012.

Cereal production and food insecurity: In addition, insecurity affected cereal production and food security in Mali. For instance, Sikasso, which produced 50 per cent of the country's cereal before the conflict saw a 24 per cent decline in output, with Mopti also producing about 5 per cent less than pre-crisis (2012) levels. This has been compounded by the looting that followed the fighting at the beginning of April 2012, and which affected harvest stocks intended for consumption, sale and the creation of seed stocks in many regions. All of this worsened Mali's food security in 2012 and 2013, with many families resorting to rationing, consuming less nutritious food, and regularly experiencing bouts of hunger.

Governance impacts

Increased armed attacks: The outbreak of violence in northern Mali in 2012 has continued to have lingering effects on security) in Mali, hampering humanitarian efforts. Admittedly, international military operations and presence improved security in some northern Mali towns, while attacks by militant groups in Timbuktu and Gao continued, as well as fighting between separatist Tuareg groups and Malian forces in Kidal. For instance, the number of violent incidents increased from 8,754 in 2011 to 9,034 in 2012.¹³¹ The United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) estimated that insecurity was worse in the northern Ifoghas Mountain (in Kidal), and around the town of Tessalit, in the Menaka and Ansongo towns in Gao.

Collapse of democratic governance and public administration: Insecurity and armed conflict directly contributed to the March 2012 military putsch that truncated Mali's democracy.¹³² Moreover, owing to insecurity, weakened security forces and poor leadership, insurgencies in northern Mali displaced public administration as the coalition of irredentist, jihadist and criminal networks took over the administration of towns and villages in the north. It was the threat to overrun Bamako that prompted international military intervention. Prior to the 2012 rebellion, the Malian military was barely present in the north; it was under the 2006 Algiers Accord that Mali's security forces withdrew from major sites in the north that were subsequently taken over by the Tuareg.

Foreign military intervention: Operation Serval changed the dynamics of the 2012 insurgency as it halted the territorial advances, and led to the retake of key northern towns from insurgent forces. Successive rebellions and insecurity weakened Mali's security forces, prompted foreign military intervention, thereby making the country more dependent on external actors for its security and prone to influence by international actors.

131 Ibid.

132 Traub, James (2013). Two Cheers for Malian Democracy: The West African country has a lot going for it, but sadly that's not enough. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/13/two_cheers_for_malian_democracy (Accessed August 23, 2014).

Violence against women and girls: The situations of conflict, post conflict and displacement exacerbated existing and new forms of violence against women and girls in Mali. In a survey of 120 women and girls in Mopti region, 28 per cent were victims of forced early marriages,¹³³ and a further 53 per cent had experienced female genital mutilation and rape. This is in addition to displacement, and the loss of livelihoods and economic assets.

Destruction of cultural heritage and tourism: Northern Mali, and its UNESCO World Heritage sites (Timbuktu mausoleums and manuscripts) were important cultural assets and tourist attractions in Mali. Insecurity and attacks by jihadi groups targeted and destroyed these cultural assets, in addition to kidnapping of tourists, often for ransom. Moreover, the support infrastructure for the tourism sector in Djenné, Mopti and Timbuktu were destroyed, many hotels closed and tour operators displaced. Furthermore, travel routes became unsafe and government tourist establishments collapsed. All this resulted in a 30,000 decline in the number of tourists in Mali (mostly African tourists).¹³⁴ While the net effect of this remains low in macroeconomic terms (it only accounts for about 0.5 per cent of GDP), it has greater significance in terms of the long-term reputation and image of Mali in the tourism sector.¹³⁵

3.3 Country overview: Burkina Faso

Economic impacts

Economic structure: The economy of Burkina economy is dominated by the primary sector, which consists of farming, livestock herding, fishing and forestry, on which 86 per cent of the active population relies.¹³⁶ Farming and livestock herding are the dominant activities, accounting for 56.2 per cent and 34.1 per cent respectively, and fishery 9.7 per cent, from 2010 to 2011. The country experienced sustained real GDP growth of 6.9 per cent in 2013, after a 9.0 per cent leap in 2012.¹³⁷ This stemmed from value-added growth of more than 5.0 per cent, with 6.6 per cent in the primary sector; 8.8 per cent in the secondary sector, led by the extractive industries (despite a fall in international gold prices); and 5.2 per cent in the tertiary or services sector.¹³⁸ This is partly explained by an increase in gold production from 2000. In 2013, for instance, gold accounted for 72 per cent of total exports.¹³⁹ The four most dynamic sub-sectors all accounted for almost half of the country's GDP. They are agriculture (19 per cent), extractive industries (13.1 per cent), trade (11.8 per cent) and livestock farming (11 per cent).¹⁴⁰

133 Mali (2014). Economist Firmin Vlavonou's elaboration based on data from field survey made by a stakeholder in Mopti.

134 Economic Commission for Africa. Conflict in the Sahel region: The Development Cost and Consequences. The Root Cause and Impact of Armed Conflict and Insecurities on Development: The Case Study of Mali. (2015) Unpublished manuscript, p 69.

135 Ibid.

136 Politique Nationale de Développement Durable au Burkina Faso. (2013) p. 12.

137 Ibid.

138 World Bank Indicators and African Statistical Yearbook (2009-2014).

139 Bedossa, B. (2012). Natural ressources : Macroéconomie & Développement. Burkina Faso: l'émergence du secteur aurifère suffira-t-elle à redresser un modèle de croissance en perte de vitesse? Division Analyse macroéconomique et risque pays Département de la Recherche, AFD.

140 Economic Commission for Africa. Conflict in the Sahel region: The Development Cost and Consequences. "The Root Cause and Impact of Armed Conflict and Insecurities on Development: The Case Study of Mali". Unpublished manuscript. (2015). p 33.

Reduced agricultural output: As Burkina Faso is partially located in the Sahel, its economy and vulnerabilities are aligned with those of other Sahelian countries. The country's population is highly dependent on the agricultural sector, which is susceptible to environmental vagaries and pastoralist-farmer conflicts. Agriculture's contribution to overall growth fell to 1.9 per cent in 2013, from 4.6 per cent in 2012.¹⁴¹ This is because of variable rainfall and flooding in some areas, and poor rainfall in others, and tensions and clashes between farmers and herders. From 2003 to 2011, over 3,800 incidents were recorded. The situation is compounded by the in-flow of refugees (mostly cattle herders) from Mali since 2012.¹⁴²

Unemployment: The youth bulge has led to worsening unemployment, with a growing population, environmental stress, reduced agriculture, and poor governance. Unemployment tends to be higher in the urban areas, with 38 per cent in major towns, including Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, and 0.9 per cent in the rural areas.¹⁴³ The crisis in the cotton industry and the absence of alternative sources of employment have also led to increasing migration towards the gold mining sites.¹⁴⁴ The population growth rate is at odds with the country's absorption capacity into the labour market. Compounding this situation is the literacy rate, which stands at 28.7 per cent.¹⁴⁵ The informal sector remains a crucial alternative to formal employment, and contributes to 20 per cent of GDP, employs 12 per cent of the country's population and accounts for 70 per cent of the active population.¹⁴⁶ Burkina Faso has historically had portions of its population working outside the country, specifically in Cote d'Ivoire. Remittances therefore remain key to the national economy and are primarily derived from the over 4 million migrant workers in neighboring countries.¹⁴⁷

Gold mining: The expansion of the gold mining sector in Burkina Faso is directly related to the rise in gold prices, which shot up more than 450 per cent from 2003 to 2011, reaching \$1,895/ounce in 2012. Under the current system, the Burkina Faso government receives 48 per cent of gross profits generated over a mine's life.¹⁴⁸ The gold mines are concentrated in the north, along the border with Mali. There are reports of insecurity, especially cross-border smuggling, illegal mining and banditry in the mining areas. This could constitute a major conflict and insecurity risk, given the volatility of northern Mali and inflow of refugees into Burkina Faso, especially in

141 World Bank Indicators and African Statistical Yearbook (2009-2014).

142 United States Department of State (2012). Burkina Faso: Country report on Human Rights Practices for 2012. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour.

143 Simonsson, L. (2005). Vulnerability Profile of Burkina Faso, for the Poverty and Vulnerability Programme, Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). p. 3.

144 Programme international pour l'abolition du travail des enfants (IPEC) (2010). Etude transfrontalière sur le travail des enfants dans l'orpaillage au Burkina Faso, au Mali et au Niger. Projets BIT/IPEC Mines (Afrique de l'Ouest) - TBP Mali - LUTRENA II – TACKLE Mali Programmes Nationaux IPEC Burkina Faso/Mali/Niger – SIMPOC, Rapport Volet pays Mali, pp : 46.

145 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2007). Burkina Faso: Literacy, Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uv.html> (accessed on 26 October 2014).

146 Government of Burkina Faso. (2011). See also Government of Burkina Faso (2007). Presentation by Government of Burkina Faso to the committee on employment and social policy of the government body of the International Labour Organization(2007). p. 14.

147 World Bank(2011). Migration and Remittances Fact book 2011. Washington DC.

148 The revenues constitute royalties (24 per cent), dividends paid to the government and tax on income from securities (IRVM, 20 per cent), which is only paid late in the mine's life, tax on industrial and commercial profits (IBIC, 19 per cent), which are generally low in the first few years of production due to depreciation of capital investments and customs and related duties (16 per cent). See KPMG-SECOR, Analysis of Profit Sharing in Burkina Faso Gold Operations. 2013.

the context of internal political challenges and opaque governance and regulation of the mining sector. Moreover, the problems in the agriculture sector have led to an upsurge in artisanal mining, which has attracted children as young as six years, who drop out of school to work. Parents even encourage their school-age children to go to the mines on weekends.¹⁴⁹ This could have a negative impact in the long term.

Development aid and assistance: The close security relationship that the country has with the international community has pre-positioned its access to higher levels of development aid and assistance in recent years. It is estimated that 80 per cent of the Burkina Faso public expenditure budget is derived from foreign aid - a figure that has been uninterrupted for a number of years now, and is said to be to the tune of \$400 million per year.¹⁵⁰ This is in addition to the presence of several national and foreign non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies operating across the country. It has therefore contributed to a significant amount of CFA francs in circulation in the economy. Under the Compaoré regime, Burkina Faso carved for itself, an image of a stable, secure and pro-mediation country in the Sahel.¹⁵¹

Refugee inflow: The large influx of refugees coming from Mali since 2012 tests the tolerance of the host communities in northern Burkina Faso. About 475, 000 refugees left Mali in 2012 and roughly a third of these (about 125, 000) took refuge in Burkina Faso,¹⁵² while others are in Mauritania and Niger. The current number of refugees in the country is said to be about 43,000, scattered in refugee camps along the Mali-Burkina border.¹⁵³ This influx of refugees occurred at a time when Burkina was experiencing its worst drought. The refugees were thus seen as putting a significant strain on local resources. These conditions were exacerbated by the “limited access to humanitarian assistance, as well as thousands of internally displaced persons being faced with malnutrition and disease,”¹⁵⁴ a situation caused by the limited presence of organizations such as UNHCR in Burkina Faso, until 2013.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, these refugees live in environments characterized by “extreme heat, violent winds and rain.” While Tuareg pastoralists are, to some extent, used to these harsh environmental conditions, life in the camps is far from bearable, as basic supplies such as milk for children and food are lacking.¹⁵⁶

Pastoralist-farmer conflicts: Drought and the influx of refugees have ignited conflicts between Mali Tuareg pastoralists and Burkina farmers. For instance, armed clashes occurred between Dogon farmers in Mali and Fulani pastoralists from Burkina Faso, resulting in a significant number of fatalities and injured in May 2012. While the

149 KPMG-SECOR (2013). Analysis of Profit Sharing in Burkina Faso Gold Operations. p.1.

150 Economic Commission for Africa (2015). Sahel Study: A Country Case Study of Burkina Faso. Unpublished manuscript. p.47.

151 International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013). Burkina Faso: With or without Compaoré: Times of uncertainty. Africa Report, No. 25, pp. 25-26.

152 Oxfam (2013). Oxfam Briefing Paper 167. Retrieved from: <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp167-malis-conflict-refugees-220113-summ-en.pdf>.

153 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2013). UNHCR country operations profile - Burkina Faso. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483de6.html>.

154 David. J. Francis (2013). The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali. Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre.

155 UNHCR (2014). Burkina Faso Country Profile.

156 Afua Hirsh (2012). Mali refugees struggle to settle in Burkina Faso as food crisis deepens. Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/jul/12/mali-refugees-burkina-faso-food-crisis>.

proactive actions of the Burkina Faso Government could be said to have minimized such clashes in 2012-2013, there are subsisting risks. All the same, should more refugees arrive, the risks and tensions would rise.¹⁵⁷ This contributes to the general risk and atmosphere of insecurity in the northern region, where the refugee camps and gold mines are located. OXFAM, for example, had warned of a deteriorating security situation since January 2012, documenting a rise in actual or threatened kidnappings, which had made it difficult for agencies to provide aid.¹⁵⁸ The deployment of the military along the border corroborates the security concern. Humanitarian organizations concerned about the protracted nature of the situation in Mali emphasized the need to ensure self-reliance among refugees in order to curb conflicts between the host communities and the refugees in the long term.¹⁵⁹

Governance impacts

Internal and regional security operations: One noticeable impact of the conflict and insecurity in the Sahel is the fact that Burkina Faso stepped up its internal security operations and participation in subregional peacekeeping activities in Mali. The country contributed 650 military personnel to AFISMA in Mali; while in early 2013, 1,000 soldiers were deployed along the borders with Mali in the north.¹⁶⁰ Increased security around this border is seen as a means to preventing “Islamic infiltration” and the war spreading southwards into Burkina Faso. Given that the gold mines are along the frontiers with Mali, thereby needing protection, there were fears that they could be potential targets for jihadi groups from Mali. Burkina Faso is also a member of the G5, which consists of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The G5 was partly informed by the United Nations Sahel strategy and is aimed at enhancing security and development in the Sahel.¹⁶¹

Violent public protests and army mutinies: Large-scale public protests ousted Compaoré in 2014. Such protests date as far back as 1998, under Compaoré, when the army often mutinied to protest non-payment of salaries and allowances. Indeed, also in 1998, there were protests against the killing of journalist, Norbert Zongo¹⁶². In 2011, there were protests against the police killing of student Justin Zongo.¹⁶³ Instances of mutinies include the 2008 protests against high living costs and poor salaries and the 2011 military mutinies in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dori, Kaya, Dedougo, Fada Ngourma, Po, Gorom-Gorom, Gaoua and Bobo Dioulasso against wide spread dissatisfaction within the rank and file of the army who cite discrimination and total neglect as triggers.¹⁶⁴ While this may not be directly connected to trans-Sahel dynamic, they remain relevant to stability and security in Burkina Faso and the Sahel region – for instance, they led to the ouster of President Compaoré.

157 IRIN News. Burkina Faso: Preventing conflict between farmers and herders. Retrieved from: <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96663/burkina-faso-preventing-conflict-between-farmers-and-herders>.

158 Oxfam, Oxfam Briefing Paper 167, Retrieved from: <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp167-malis-conflict-refugees-220113-summ-en.pdf>, pp. 3.

159 Ibid.

160 International Crisis Group (2013). Burkina Faso... p. 36.

161 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-06/peace_and_security_in_africa_sahel.php. See also UNDP Support Framework for the Implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel: Towards sustainable and inclusive human development.

162 At the time of his death Norbert Zongo was investigating the unresolved murder of the driver of the President's brother.

163 International Crisis Group (2013). Burkina Faso... p. 29.

164 See <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/burkina-faso#.VKvHd0uKill>.

Regional mediation: Compaoré was re-cast as an influential mediator, and Burkina Faso as a mediation site for conflict and insecurity in the Sahel.¹⁶⁵ Despite discontent within the army, as witnessed in the 2011 mutinies, Burkina Faso maintained its “stabilizer” role within the region. Apart from contributing troops to the peacekeeping mission in Mali, then President Compaoré was actively involved in the mediation and negotiations to end the Tuareg rebellion in Niger and the peace accords of the 1990s and thereafter, in addition to mediating in the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010-2011. Compaoré also served as chief mediator, on behalf of ECOWAS, for the Mali conflict, initiating talks with both rebel groups in the northern region and the official Malian administration. It is important to note that in previous Tuareg uprisings in Mali and Niger, from the period 1991-1995 to the period 2005-2009, Algeria and Burkina Faso were key mediators in these peace processes.¹⁶⁶ It is therefore understandable that both countries were keen to establish a stable government in Mali.

Foreign security assistance and operational presence: As a result of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel, Burkina Faso has attracted foreign military presence in the form of military bases. The country also received three light aircraft (Humbert Aviation Tetras CSLs) and several vehicles, in addition to training, technical assistance and maintenance, to help it monitor its northern border with Mali.¹⁶⁷ The Burkina army has also received training as part of the African Deployment Assistance Partnership Team programme, which is intended to develop deployment capacity for African military personnel.¹⁶⁸ In addition, Burkina Faso is also a participant in the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership, whose objective includes building Burkinabe military capacity and providing the forces with equipment. All these actions may turn out to be a medium- to long-term risk, as there may be retribution from armed jihadi groups in the Sahel.

Human trafficking: Burkina Faso is a key site and destination country for the trafficking of women and children; and cataclysmic events in the Sahel in the last decade have accentuated this. Highlighting the gravity of this situation, the United States Department of State 2012 report on trafficking in persons documented that Burkina Faso, despite its efforts, has been unable to comply with the minimum standards for eliminating human trafficking. The report, however, also acknowledged the Government’s increasing efforts to prevent human trafficking. Indeed, 1,112 children were seized from traffickers in 2011.¹⁶⁹

3.4 Country overview: Mauritania

Economic impacts

Limited impact on macroeconomic performance: Empirical evidence from official statistics suggests that the 2012 Malian crisis did not seem to have directly or

165 International Crisis Group (2013). Burkina Faso...

166 Alexis Arieff (2012). Algeria and the Crisis in Mali. Institut Francais des Relations Internationales. Retrieved from: file:///C:/Users/nlYO/Downloads/IFRI_actuellesariefffinal per cent20(1).pdf.

167 Defence Web website (2013). Burkina Faso. Retrieved From: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29375:burkina-faso&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255.

168 United States Army in Africa website, USARAF Coordinates Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Tea program in Burkina Faso, Retrieved from: http://www.usaraf.army.mil/NEWS/NEWS_140513_bk_ad.html.

169 Freedom House (2013). Burkina Faso Overview. Retrieved from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/burkina-faso#.VElFo_mUffl.

substantially affected the formal economy of Mauritania. The country's economic growth pattern has been showing a steady increase since 2010, after recording a decline (-1.2 per cent) in 2009.¹⁷⁰ In 2010, the overall growth was estimated at 5.1 per cent, excluding the oil sector, supported by increases in commodity prices and global demand; measures provided by the authorities to support the 2010/2011 crop year; increased electricity supply; and the recovery of the construction sector.¹⁷¹ The estimated growth rate for the next five years is at least 6 per cent, driven by the mining sector.¹⁷² According to UNDP, 75 per cent of budget revenue of Mauritania derives from exports (gold, copper, iron, oil).¹⁷³ For instance, benefiting from a favorable climate, mining posted real growth of 3.7 per cent in 2013 versus 0.3 per cent in 2012. Iron production grew by 3.7 per cent (+2.7 per cent in 2012), copper by 3.3 per cent (-0.5 per cent in 2012) and gold by 3.2 per cent (-10 per cent in 2012).¹⁷⁴ In 2013, the overall fiscal balance, including grants, showed a small deficit (-1.1 per cent of GDP), while subsidies fell sharply after the emergency response to the drought in 2012.¹⁷⁵ Tax revenues continued to increase between 2011 and 2013, following Government's sustainable efforts to improve the coordination between tax administrations, increase the tax base and introduce new taxes. From 2011 to 2013, tax revenues increased by approximately 5.6 per cent, representing 22.1 per cent of GDP.¹⁷⁶

Overall, Mauritania's macroeconomic performance has been insulated from the negative impacts of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel for a variety of reasons: (a) most of Mauritania's public and private companies are farther in the hinterland, far from the areas of turbulence along the Malian border; (b) the economy of Mauritania is not integrated with those of its neighbors in any substantial way; (c) Mauritania is relatively far from other Sahelian countries and at the crossroad between the Maghreb and West Africa; and (d) the country's hosting of many armed groups, MNLA in particular, as part of an informal non-aggression pact, appears to have minimized the expansion of terrorist activities in the territory. All this, however, does not preclude that conflict and insecurity in the Sahel have not affected Mauritians.

Volatile market prices and inflation: The data collected on Mauritania's economy indicated that while consumer prices rose steadily, a positive change was observed in the level of inflation. From 2009 to 2011, Mauritania suffered from deteriorating exchange rate and rising inflation, which penalized the purchasing power of households. From June 2010 to November 2011, the Ouguiya (UM) lost 17 per cent of its value against the United States dollar.¹⁷⁷ Mauritanian market prices were affected by interrupted cross-border flows due to the Malian crisis and the drought that reduced production in neighboring countries. The arms and trade embargo imposed on Mali by ECOWAS, following the military coup, contributed to rising food

170 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (12 September 2014). Mauritania, London, Country Report. 20p. p. 6.

171 Ibid.

172 Ntah, Ndong Marcellin, and Souleman Boukar (2014). Country Case: Mauritania, Tunis, African Development Bank. African Economic Outlook. 12p. www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.

175 Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement, Office National de la Statistique République Islamique de Mauritanie (2014). Annuaire Statistique 2013, Nouakchott. 116p. p.92.

176 Ibid.

177 African Development Bank (2012). Mauritania 2012, Tunis, African Development Bank Publications. 12p. www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.

prices in Mauritania, as it became less profitable to Mauritanian exports. Mauritania, as it is commonly the case with most arid countries, suffered from scarce rainfall, as the rainy season reduced to less than three months from the usual four to five months. The regional dimensions of poor agricultural production magnified the impact of Mauritanian market prices. Thus, a poor agricultural year (for example the rainfall deficit of 2011) negatively affects economic growth, price index and the volume of foreign trade transactions.

Unclear impact on military/security expenditure: Between 2008 and 2012 the capital expenditure and the total revenue and grants increased significantly from UM200 million to UM350 million.¹⁷⁸ The research could not access official data from ministries and other organizations to properly disaggregate and identify the country's military expenditure. However, anecdotal inferences point to the likelihood of increases in military/security spending. For instance, the State capital expenditures grew rapidly between 2009 and 2011 before starting to decline around 2012.¹⁷⁹ The same trend can be observed for total revenue and State grants. This may mean that during the period, Mauritania faced a significant acquisition in military equipment, given the political unrest that was brewing at its borders. For lack of data, however, we are unable to calculate the percentage for military expenditure, as a share of GDP.

Unaffected foreign direct investment: In terms of public and private investment, the period 2008-2012 saw a strong recovery in investment in Mauritania, as confirmed by a huge increase from UM235 billion to nearly UM550 billion during the period. Reported in nominal GDP terms, total investment evolved by 25 per cent from 2008 to 2010 to 45 per cent in 2012.¹⁸⁰ This ratio is similar to that of neighboring countries (and even higher in some cases). These investments are mainly provided by the private sector (including foreign direct investments) whose share has averaged about 75 per cent over the past five years. Apart from foreign direct investments, private sector investment accounted for nearly 2 times that of the public sector, and about 12 per cent of GDP (average for the last five years) according to the General Services of Private Sector Promotion.

Variable impact on trade: Between 2009 and 2013, the Mauritania imports/exports sector grew tremendously, even though this growth took the form of switchback graph in the days following the outbreak of the crisis in Mali. The increase in exports coincided with soaring prices of major commodities (oil, gold, iron, copper and fish), and the increase in demand for imports of major commodities (food, cosmetics, chemicals, building materials, automobiles and spare parts, equipment, etc.).¹⁸¹ Mauritanian exports for the period 2009-2013 grew by 46 per cent and imports increased by 84.7 per cent. However, there was a slight decline in exports by 19.7 per cent from the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2012, probably due to the outbreak of conflict in Mali on March 22, 2012. In addition, during the third quarter of 2013, there was a spike in imports (UM502.6 billion), while at the same time, exports decreased by UM26.2 billion from the 2nd to 3rd quarters.¹⁸² While conflict and insecurity may

178 Vlavinou, Firmin (2014). Mauritanian Compile Database.

179 Ibid.

180 Source of the Figure : Vlavinou, Firmin, Mauritanian Compiled Database. (2014). Doc. Excel.

181 République Islamique de Mauritanie, Bulletin trimestriel de conjoncture, op cit. p.31.

182 République Islamique de Mauritanie, Bulletin trimestriel de conjoncture, op cit, pp.29-30.

not have affected the country's balance of payments and formal trade, anecdotal evidence suggests some negative impact on informal trade and exchanges, especially in border regions and communities. Items affected most are Mauritanian cattle exports and the import of cereals from Mali. Given the lack of accurate economic data, the research is unable to establish the actual scale of the impact of the Malian crisis over the informal trade on the bordering localities of the two countries in the period from 2009 to 2013.

Tourism: Tourism is one of the major sectors that have been impacted by the Malian crisis. The number of tourists increased from 65,000 in 2011 to 73,000 in 2012 before decreasing to 72,000 in 2013.¹⁸³ Hotel occupancy rates had practically followed the same switchback trends - 9,950 beds in 2011, 10,000 beds in 2012 and 9,612 beds in 2013.¹⁸⁴ The research observed that the unstable political situation in Mali in 2012 notwithstanding, Mauritania received a massive influx of tourists from Mali, because of the new security measures introduced by the government to protect the tourism industry and the hosting of several exhibitions in Nouakchott and other locations during that period.

Limited impact on job creation: It is not easy to analyze the impact of the Malian crisis, which occurred from 2010 to 2013, on employment creation in Mauritania, as statistics available on the situation of the labour market are limited. Furthermore, the complexity of the composition of the Mauritanian economy, with a strong duality between the modern and informal sectors in wealth creation calls for specific surveys to be conducted to understand the market data on employment, in accordance with the specificities of each sector. However, the research observed that the recent crisis did not have a negative impact on job creation in Mauritania since the regions bordering Mali (Hodh Charghi and Hodh El Gharbi) had the lowest rates of unemployment. Furthermore, rather than conflict and insecurity, the main challenges of employment in Mauritania are the predominance of the informal sector in the national economy, unemployment, lack of integrated information on employment and the absence of a national policy on employment and an intergovernmental coordination mechanism for the promotion of employment. In addition, the mismatch between the education system and the labour market calls for a major structural change to tailor the school curriculum to the jobs available.

Poverty levels and poverty alleviation: In a recent study entitled: "*UNDP support to the implementation of the Integrated Strategy of the United Nations Framework in the Sahel*", UNDP highlighted worsening poverty, among others, as a major cause of conflict and insecurity across the Sahel. Mass poverty is estimated as affecting nearly 51 per cent of the Sahelian population, except Burkina Faso (46.4 per cent) and Niger (48.2 per cent), which had a slight decline in the poverty rate in the past 10 years. Other countries, including Mauritania, are not able to reverse the trend.¹⁸⁵

183 République Islamique de Mauritanie. Avril 2014. Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSLP). Rapport de mise en œuvre du Troisième Plan d'actions du CSLP 2011-2015, Nouakchott, Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement. 179p. p.39.

184 République Islamique de Mauritanie, Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté. Rapport de mise en œuvre du Troisième Plan d'actions du CSLP 2011-2015, Nouakchott, Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement, avril, 2014, 179p, p.39, (version provisoire).

185 Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (2014). Cadre d'appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie intégrée des Nations Unies pour le Sahel. Pour un développement humain durable et inclusif, New

According to *Profile of Poverty in Mauritania - 2008*, 25.9 per cent of the population lived below the extreme poverty threshold with rates higher in rural areas (40.8 per cent) compared to urban areas (7.7 per cent). Mauritania's poverty profile aligns with its performance and ranking in the Human Development Index assessment. The country was ranked in the low human development category. Its HDI value stagnated in 2011 and 2012, then slumped in 2013, losing six points: 159/172 countries in 2010; 155/187 in 2011; 155/172 in 2012; and 161/187 in 2013.

Conflicts and insecurity exacerbated poverty levels in Mauritania, as they: contributed to the disruption of agriculture; restricted access to market and trade; and reduced the capacity to adapt to environmental stress. The degradation of the productive capital of farmers and ranchers, combined with the negative effects of climate change, exacerbate the vulnerability of the people and justify their dependence on humanitarian aid. Mauritania has been suffering from recurrent climate crises since the 1960s. This has weakened the capacity of the rural productive sector (agriculture, livestock) and settled the country in a situation of growing food addiction. Rural development strategies have failed to support the effects of these crises. Mauritania started preparing for the arrival of the oil era in 2003. A significant over-estimation of revenue flows from oil led to inappropriate public finance decisions. The country was also hit by the food and energy crisis of 2007-2008, which led to a sharp rise in the international prices of commodities and energy. Emergency government responses have curbed but not entirely eliminated the impact of price rises on the poor. The global financial crisis that occurred in 2008 affected Mauritania, at a time when the country was facing a serious political crisis that had led to a freezing of part of official development assistance by key partners. The combination of these adverse factors has led to a decline in GDP, which will inevitably affect the population and delay the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).¹⁸⁶

Worsening food security: According to the World Food Programme (WFP), a little over a quarter (26.2 per cent) of the Mauritanian population was food-insecure in June 2014. This rate recorded a progression of almost 9 per cent, compared to the same period in 2013 (23.7 per cent of households were food insecure). Food insecurity affected over 635,000 people in Mauritania, with 182,000 severely food insecure and 453,000 moderately food insecure.¹⁸⁷ The results of the investigation of post-harvest food safety in 2013 indicated that 18.5 per cent of households were food insecure at the national (urban and rural combined) level. This rate was higher than that observed in December 2012, where 16.5 per cent of households were food insecure and that of December 2011 (18 per cent). Over the past five years, similar rates of food insecurity were observed. December 2008 was a year of significant increases in food prices.¹⁸⁸ This gradual increase stems from the strong drought that hit the Sahel in 2011, combined with the escalation of cereal prices on the international market and the impact of the refugee crisis, especially, in Mali.

York, juin, 2014, 25p, p.4.

186 République Islamique de Mauritanie/Système des Nations Unies, Rapport sur les Progrès 2010 vers l'atteinte des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) en Mauritanie, Nouakchott, 15 avril, 2010, 65p, pp.10-11.

187 Programme Alimentaire Mondial, Enquête de suivi de la sécurité alimentaire des ménages, Nouakchott, Décembre, 2013, 10p, p.3.

188 Programme Alimentaire Mondial, Mauritanie. Enquête de suivi de la sécurité alimentaire (FSMS), Nouakchott, Etude réalisée par le Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire (CSA), Juin, 2014, 20p.

Governance impact

Poor democratic governance: The evidence gathered in the field research in Mauritania clearly indicates that, over the last decade, there has been a clear, direct and reciprocal connection between political governance and the dynamics of conflict and insecurity. The long years of coups, military rule and authoritarian regimes have led to intimidation and repression, with political power exercised in a manner that induced inter-group tensions, demonstrations and insecurity among its citizens. Long years of this practice have led to a lingering sense of vulnerability and disempowerment that is still felt even when military regimes were liberalized, as is currently the case. Authoritarianism has also resulted in political apathy (low participation in democratic processes) among citizens. Nearly, all the opposition political parties, for example, boycotted the 2014 municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections. The re-election of President Ould Abdel Aziz by only about one-third of the electorate (due to low voter turnout) has led many to question the legitimacy of the current institutions.

Continued exclusionary policies: The sociopolitical dynamics of Mauritania contributes to inter-group tensions and insecurities. For instance, a discriminatory population registration process whereby a large percentage of non-Arab voters are unable to register continues to exist. The Arab-Berber population dominates all facets of national life, leaving the non-Arab “Negro-Mauritanian” and the *Haratine* (former enslaved black Africans) groups virtually excluded from all spheres of sociocultural, economic and political life.¹⁸⁹ The Arab-Berber community dominates the security sector, especially the top echelons, while the Afro-Mauritanians are virtually excluded from any top positions. The lower ranks are made up overwhelmingly of *Haratine* and other non-Arab Mauritanians. In their declaration, the *Haratine* intellectuals called attention to rather distressing statistics to illustrate this point. Out of more than 150 police commissars, only 2 or 3 are *Hartani*. Among the more than 500 military officers, only about 30 are *Hartani* (mostly junior officers), and none of the dozen or more generals is *Hartani*.¹⁹⁰

Radicalization and politicization of Islam: Poor governance and insecurity have contributed to the politicization and radicalization of Islam. The crisis in Mali triggered a growth of Islamism in governance in Mauritania through the instrumentalization of religious sentiments by the government. Religion has been used to whip up religious fervour to garner political support, and repress opposition groups (e.g. anti-slavery movements). Mauritanians are Muslim and tend to practice a moderate form of Sufi Islam. With Salafi and Wahhabi funding from the Middle East, Mauritania has had its share of Islamist religious and political leaders, and NGOs engaged in preaching a radical form of Islam. Some of these organizations and religious leaders have over the years garnered remarkable clout, enabling them to weigh in decisively on political and social events by issuing Fatwas.

The militarization of Mauritanian society: The August 2008 coup was the most recent in a long series of military coups. Mauritania has been ruled for the past 30

189 See Armes: the Syndrome Mauritanian. Available at http://www.cridem.org/C_Info.php?article=661950 accessed 23 October 2014.

190 Economic Commission for Africa. Conflict in the Sahel region: The Development Cost and Consequences. “The Root Cause and Impact of Armed Conflict and Insecurities on Development: The case of Mauritania,” 2015 Unpublished manuscript, p.28.

years by the military, and military rule has transformed the country in a number of ways, including giving it a stubborn culture of acquiring power through force, and legitimizing military coups (once they succeed). One of these consequences has been the militarization of Mauritanian society and the blurring of the demarcation between the military sphere and the civilian sphere, with military officers heading, for example State-owned parastatals or major State institutions, and engaging in lucrative commercial activities. One of the outcomes of military rule has been the de-professionalization of the security sector in general, and the weakening of discipline and meritocracy.¹⁹¹

Illegal human and drug trafficking: Recurring political tensions, conflicts and insecurity in and around Mauritania over the past decade have contributed to the country being a major transit hub of illegal human and narcotic trafficking to European and other markets. As typical of such developments, one of the State institutions that were the most implicated¹⁹² was precisely the armed and security forces, not to mention government officials. Anecdotal evidence for this included the discovery of a mysterious Columbian plane (and its drug cargo) in 2004 on the tarmac of Nouadhibou airport, and the unexplained immense wealth of civil servants.

Availability/spread of small arms and light weapons: Conflicts and insecurity in and around Mauritania have contributed to increased availability of small arms. It is estimated that around 70,000 small arms and light weapons are in circulation, most of which could be traced to the conflict and insecurity in neighbouring countries. Also, the overwhelming majority of these illegally held weapons are in the hands of the dominant Arab-Berber community. It is believed that the members of this community are the same who are adherents of the shooting sport clubs, the number of which is rapidly increasing throughout the country.¹⁹³

Social discrimination and tensions with the Haratine: The long years of political, socioeconomic and cultural subjugation of the black-African communities (including through slavery) by the Arab-Berber group have led to sharp social divisions and tensions, and the threat of radicalization and uprising by the Haratine. This risk is palpable, notwithstanding the new legislations and institutions set up to address slavery and its aftermath, which is in the form of social discrimination and inequality.¹⁹⁴ The *Haratine* are impoverished and marginalized former slaves at the lowest rung of Mauritanian society who make up at least 40 per cent of the population. They include a sizeable number of “abeed” (slaves) mainly in the Adwaba (nomadic settlements of *Haratine and Abeed*) where, undeniably, slavery and practices akin to slavery still exist, in their structural forms. The radicalization of the *Haratine* stemmed from the extremely slow progress in eradicating slavery and the perception that the State, especially its judicial system and law enforcement agencies are on the side of the

191 N'Diaye Boubacar. The Legacy of Mauritania's Colonels: West Africa's Next Crisis? Unpublished paper under review.

192 See Union des Forces du Progrès, “Drogue, ‘Droguerie’... Trafics, quincaileries...” Available at <http://fr.ufp-web.org/spip.php?article210> accessed 30 October 2014.

193 See Armes: Le Syndrome Mauritanien. Available at http://www.cridem.org/C_Info.php?article=661950 accessed 23 October 2014.

194 For example, the “Tadamoun” and the set-up by the Government as a chain of shops known as “Emel”, to sell staple products at subsidized prices to Haratines. These measures are still considered poorly designed and of limited impact on the vast majority of the Haratine, particularly those in the rural areas.

slave owners. The *Haratine* and other marginalized groups have been calling on the State to enact policies to address the dire situation of exclusion and extreme poverty (reminded in 2012 in a declaration in the form of a damning indictment of the sociopolitical order).

Internal displacement and influx of refugees: The large influx of refugees and their movement across borders, as well as the movement of armed groups and individuals are factors of insecurity in Mauritania. Notorious non-State armed groups involved in insurgencies and terrorism in Mali and parts of Algeria, and active in organized crime across the Sahel use parts of Mauritanian territory as safe havens or operational bases. In some cases, Mauritania is claimed to have accorded hospitality to MNLA leaders, as well as sanctuary for its combatants along its long border with Mali. The presence and activities of the armed groups have triggered armed attacks at the country's military posts) and across the border in Mali and Algeria. This triggered the displacement of Mauritanian populations and the influx of refugees, especially from Mali. There has, since the 1990s, been an estimated 10,000 Mauritanian refugees in Mali and as many as 30,000 in Senegal. Mauritania is thought to have had an influx of 72,000 refugees at the height of the Malian crisis.¹⁹⁵

The Sahelian crisis as a driver of foreign relations: Mauritania appears to have exploited the conflict and security challenges of the Sahel to enhance its stature in regional and international politics. Since the beginning of the Malian conflict, issues of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel have become the main driver of the country's relations with its neighbours and foreign partners. Mauritania hosted and contributed to the emergence of the "Nouakchott Process," a collaborative Sahel-wide anti-terrorist security policy process. Similarly, since 2009/2010, Mauritania has given permission to foreign countries to use its territory for reconnaissance and security operations against AQMI terrorists, traffickers, or rescue hostages. The country has a subsisting agreement with these countries to maintain a "light footprint" military presence, and is also an active partner in stemming illegal emigration. Clearly, the emigration attempts in the Sahel stem from the dire economic and security conditions prevailing in all Sahelian countries. In return, Mauritania has enjoyed the goodwill of foreign partners in the form of training, equipment and funding to the country's special anti-terrorist units.

3.5 Country overview: Nigeria

Economic impacts

Localized macroeconomic impact: In 2014, Nigeria's Central Bank reported that macro-level policy, including monetary policy, was unaffected by the conflict.¹⁹⁶ After an initial dip from 7.8 per cent to 4.7 per cent from 2010 to 2011, GDP growth rose to 7.3 per cent in 2013.¹⁹⁷ Agriculture, as a percentage of GDP, declined slightly from 23.96 per cent in 2010 to 21.97 per cent in 2013; manufacturing as a proportion of GDP increased marginally from 6.6 per cent to 6.83 per cent and within services, financial services as a percentage of GDP increased from 2.29 per cent to 3.3 per cent

¹⁹⁵ UNHCR. Mauritania, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486026.html> (accessed 9/4/2014).

¹⁹⁶ CNBC News, Interview with Dr. Kingsley Moghalu, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, July 23, 2014, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/101860511#> (accessed 1 October 2014).

¹⁹⁷ World Bank World Development Indicators 2014.

and telecommunications as a proportion of GDP declined slightly from 9.1 per cent to 8.69 per cent.¹⁹⁸ Inflation declined dramatically from 102.3 per cent in 2010 to 4.9 per cent in 2013. However, the Central Bank noted that inflation rates could climb in the future if the conflict continues. Goods and services exports declined substantially, nonetheless, from 31 per cent in 2009 to 18 per cent in 2013.¹⁹⁹ However, these are more a function of oil price fluctuations. Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a proportion of GDP has been in decline, falling from 5 per cent in 2009 to 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2013.²⁰⁰ The actual volumes of net FDI inflow have been unstable, rather than steadily declining. These data suggest that the conflict in north-east Nigeria has thus far had a limited macroeconomic impact nationally.

Agricultural production: The impact of the conflict in Northern Nigeria on the wider Nigerian economy is mainly localized, specifically on agriculture. Food prices have been affected negatively by the conflict in north-east Nigeria due to some challenges to food production in parts of Nigeria.²⁰¹ Farmland cultivation and food production have declined, owing to displacement and armed attacks; food security reports from the Famine Early Warning System in 2014 reported below average food stocks in Boko Haram activity-affected States.²⁰² The result of this has been above-average 2014 prices for maize and sorghum (at about 21 per cent and 29 per cent, higher than the 5 year average, respectively) in the largest cereals markets in West Africa, Dawanau Market, near Kano State.²⁰³ These have been attributed, in part, to reduced trade from north-east Nigeria.

Local and regional trade: Trade in agricultural products, the mainstay of this region, has been declining as a result of the conflict. Trade flows and activities have suffered extensively as key food markets in north-east Nigeria (Yola, Maiduguri, Damaturu, Potiskum and Mubi) are functioning at about half capacity, with most semi-urban markets not functioning at all, due to security threats.²⁰⁴ Trade between the north-east and the south of Nigeria has been severely disrupted, as it is now largely diverted through the north-west.²⁰⁵ Although there is no data evidence, this will very likely affect transportation costs, which may impact negatively on food prices in the south of Nigeria. Moreover, the trade volumes are at far lower quantities, indeed, approximately half of what would normally be expected between July and December.²⁰⁶ Also, cross-border trade with Niger, Chad and Cameroon has almost ceased due to border closures and armed attacks on markets and travel routes. UNCTAD estimates that the Boko Haram insurgency has cost economic losses to the

198 National Bureau of Statistics (2014).

199 World Bank World Development Indicators 2014.

200 Ibid.

201 Interview with Dr. Kingsley Moghalu, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, with CNBC News. July 23, 2014, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/101860511#> Accessed 01 October 2014.

202 West Africa - Nigeria Food Security Outlook conflictrelated food insecurity continues in the northeast April 2014 to September 2014 Famine Early Warning Systems Network; http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria_per_cent20-per_cent20Food_per_cent20Security_per_cent20Outlook_per_cent20Tue_per_cent202014-04-01_per_cent20to_per_cent20Tue_per_cent202014-09-30.pdf (accessed October 10 2014).

203 Ibid.

204 Nigeria Food Security Outlook July to December 2014 Postharvest Crisis acute food insecurity expected in conflict-prone areas of the northeast. http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Nigeria_OL_2014_07_EN.pdf (accessed October 16 2014).

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

tune of \$6 billion in terms of costs to trade and destruction of infrastructures and service delivery.²⁰⁷

Worsening poverty in the north-east: Northern Nigeria suffers higher rates of poverty across a range of measurement modes. North-west Nigeria has the highest level of food poverty, relative poverty and absolute poverty at 51.8 per cent, 77.7 per cent and 70 per cent in 2010.²⁰⁸ North-east Nigeria follows closely with rates of 51.5 per cent, 76.3 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively.²⁰⁹ This is important for understanding the context within which the conflict continues unabated. The insurgency has reduced economic and commercial activities, with small and medium-sized enterprises hit by out-migration of businesspersons, and banks providing limited services. Given the impact on agriculture, rural poverty levels far exceed urban poverty levels at 52.1 per cent, up from 34.1 per cent in 2010.²¹⁰

Decreased human development for girls: Literacy rates in the affected States are lower than in other parts of Nigeria, with an average of 56.1 per cent for Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe and Bauchi in 2010.²¹¹ While northern Nigeria tends to have lower literacy levels, the insurgency is bound to compound the problem, as schools and institutions of learning have been targeted and forced to close. The April 2014 kidnapping of female students in Chibok, Borno State, is especially damaging for girls' education, in a region with a high incidence of girls being married off without education. In 2013, north-west and north-east Nigeria had the highest rates of women and girls with no education, at 62.8 per cent and 61.1 per cent, respectively, against the average of 16.1 per cent in southern Nigeria.²¹² The rate for boys and men is 46.9 per cent and 52.4 per cent in north-west and north-east Nigeria respectively. Although these are the highest rates for men across Nigeria, they are considerably lower than those for women.²¹³

Socioeconomic vulnerability: The extent of vulnerability in north-east Nigeria is extensive. Unemployment rates in north-east Nigeria are some of the highest nationally, averaging 26.34 per cent for Borno, Gombe, Yobe, Adamawa and Bauchi States in 2010.²¹⁴ Youth unemployment in the rural areas, including in the north-east, rose from 47.6 per cent to 53.2 per cent from 2010 to 2012.²¹⁵ Furthermore, in the conflict-affected rural areas where some households have remained, their cropping activities have been affected negatively, as young people are unable to seek waged labour opportunities in agriculture to supplement their incomes, owing to security threats.²¹⁶

207 Vanguard, 20 August 2013. Economic fall-out of Boko Haram activities. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/economic-fall-out-of-boko-haram-activities/>.

208 National Bureau of Statistics (2012). Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report. p. 16 <http://www.proshareng.com/news/16302.html>. (October 20, 2014).

209 Ibid.

210 World Bank World Development Indicators (2014).

211 National Bureau of Statistics (2012).

212 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (2013). http://www.population.gov.ng/images/ndhs_data/ndhs_2013/2013_ndhs_final_report.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014).

213 Ibid.

214 National Bureau of Statistics (2012).

215 NISER. 2013, Analysis and Design of Safety Nets and Capacity Empowerment Programme for unemployed youth in Nigeria, Ibadan: NISER, 2013.

216 NIGERIA Food Security Outlook July to December 2014 Post-harvest crisis acute food insecurity expected in conflict-prone areas of the northeast. http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Nigeria_OL_2014_07_EN.pdf (accessed October 16 2014).

Refugees and internal displacement: For the first time since 2002, the number of Nigerian refugees more than doubled, from 18,021 in 2012 to 31,664 in 2013.²¹⁷ The majority of this is from north-east Nigeria. Indeed, more recent reports of refugee movements in May 2014 put the figure at 22,000 Nigerian refugees as fleeing the crisis (out of a total of 66,000 West African refugees also fleeing the crisis).²¹⁸ Rural-urban migration has reached almost 75 per cent at centres in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, as well as neighbouring countries and States. The current number of persons internally displaced by the conflict is difficult to tell. However, in May 2014, an assessment led by OCHA identified nearly 650,000 persons displaced within Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba.²¹⁹ Women and children constitute a substantial proportion of all displaced persons, with poor access to social services. For instance, less than 10 per cent of women in the north-east and north-west regions had access to a doctor for antenatal care, compared to 45.3 per cent of women in southern Nigeria.²²⁰

Governance impacts

Governance structures: The Boko Haram insurgency has affected the public administration, as official facilities, offices and training institutions, police stations, telecommunication masts, post offices, military barracks, military posts and facilities, hospitals, prisons and schools have all been destroyed. For instance, in June 2011, the national police headquarters (Louis Edet house) in Abuja was attacked. In April 2012, the police headquarters in Maiduguri was also attacked. In 2014, the elite riot police training academy in Liman-Kara was destroyed. Similarly, military formations in Ngala and Maiduguri, and police stations in several communities such as Gujba, Dikwa, Gworza, Damboa, Gonjiri, etc. were attacked and destroyed.

Displacement of public administration: The insurgency continues to displace government agencies, public officials and governance institutions. For example, the insecurity forced the Yobe State Executive Council to relocate from Damaturu to neighbouring Jigawa State²²¹ and many State governments and executive councils in the north-east region tend to operate from Abuja. Local government areas taken over by Boko Haram insurgents include in Borno (Dikwa, Gworza, Liman-Kara, Gamboru-Ngala and Marte, and Bama, Damboa), Yobe (Buni Yadi, Buni Gari, Gonjiri and Gujba), and Adamawa (Madagali).²²² The dislocation of governance structures covers traditional governance institutions, centrally the emirate structures, including emirs, Lanwani (village heads), Bulamas (ward heads) and Aja/Hakimai (district heads).²²³ In August 2014, one emir (Gworza) was killed, two kidnapped (later escaped or released), and seven (two in Yobe and five in Borno) were forced to flee their palaces and

217 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014). Statistical Database.

218 Refugees fleeing attacks in north-east Nigeria, UNHCR watching for new displacement UNHCR Briefing Notes. 9 May 2014. <http://www.unhcr.org/536ca0f79.html> (accessed 20 October 2014).

219 Nigeria Food Security Outlook July to December 2014 Postharvest Crisis acute food insecurity expected in conflict-prone areas of the northeast. http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Nigeria_OL_2014_07_EN.pdf (accessed October 16 2014).

220 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey, 2013. http://www.population.gov.ng/images/ndhs_data/ndhs_2013/2013_ndhs_final_report.pdf (accessed October 20, 2014).

221 The Nation (Nigeria). 4 December 2012.

222 Vanguard (Nigeria). 6 August 2014.

223 Daily Trust. 4 August 2014. Gunmen kill district head, 2 others. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/news/30780-gunmen-kill-district-head-2-others-in-bauchi>.

emirate councils. The Borno Emirate Council has lost many of its kingmakers, district heads and at least 13 ward heads since 2010, following Boko Haram attacks.²²⁴

Public infrastructure: Boko Haram insurgents have targeted and destroyed critical transport infrastructures (bridges, roads, motor parks, among others). Boko Haram attacks have destroyed, for example, the Katarko Bridge that links Damaturu (capital of Yobe State) with satellite towns (Buni-Yadi) and the Bamboru-Ngala Bridge that connects Nigeria and Cameroon. Also, arterial roads such as the 135 km Bama-Gworza road have become unusable due to armed attacks, with impacts on population movement and trade.²²⁵ All this has limited the ability of government officials and agencies to function properly.

Social service delivery: Social service delivery, especially education, has been disrupted in most affected communities. Students have been killed, injured or kidnapped as a result of armed attacks on schools. The February 2014 attack on the Government College in Buni Yadi led to the death of at least 59 boys.²²⁶ Similar attacks took place in Kano in June 2014, killing at least eight students.²²⁷ Also, the threat of Boko Haram attacks and the general insecurity led to the closure of schools. In Borno and Yobe States, most high schools were closed, students relocated and teachers displaced. In 2013, some 209 schools in Yobe were attacked and 800 classrooms in Borno were destroyed. In 2014, a further 85 schools were closed and 120, 000 students displaced in Borno.²²⁸ Also, over 176 teachers were killed and several thousands displaced between 2011 and 2014 across the north-east region.²²⁹

Civil liberties and human rights: Nigeria's response to these attacks has been the use of law enforcement, which entails the passage of a new anti-terror law, declaration of emergency rule and the deployment of security forces (Joint Task Force). The law enforcement approach impacts on human rights, by abrogating key aspects of Nigeria's human rights. It also gives additional powers to security agencies to arrest and detain persons suspected of terrorism, for extended periods of time. Under the emergency rule declared in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, extrajudicial powers had been given to restrict the movement of citizens, goods and services. The Government even broadened the powers of the security forces, allowing them to make arbitrary arrests and detain people. The system of checks and balances in the various arms of government is not efficient. In practice, there are documented instances of secret trials, low-evidence thresholds, general delays and slow trials, very few convictions, extrajudicial killings and mysterious disappearances of alleged Boko Haram members.²³⁰

224 Daily Trust. 3 September 2014. Boko Haram Crisis: Seven Emirs flee palaces in Borno, Yobe. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/top-stories/33438-boko-haram-crisis-7-emirs-flee-palaces-in-borno-yobe>.

225 Daily Trust (Nigeria). 1 August 2014.

226 The Guardian. 25 February 2014. Boko Haram kills 59 children at Nigerian boarding school. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/boko-haram-kills-children-boarding-school>.

227 The Guardian. 23 June 2014. Nigerian Bomb Blast Kills at least Eight. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/nigeria-bomb-kills-medical-school-eight-boko-haram>.

228 Punch (Nigeria) 7 March 2013.

229 Vanguard (Nigeria), 18 July 2014. 176 Teachers killed in Nigeria's restive north-east since 2011- Official. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/176-teachers-killed-nigerias-restive-north-east-since-2011-official/>.

230 Aghedo, I. and O. Osumah (2012). The Boko Haram uprising: How should Nigeria respond? *Third World Quarterly* 33(5), pp: 853-869.

Media freedom: Boko Haram insurgents and government counter-terrorism activities have targeted press freedom. Boko Haram bombed the This Day newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna in 2012²³¹, while the Nigerian military undertook a nationwide crackdown on media houses in July 2014 on the grounds that newspaper distribution network vans had been suspected of being used to transport explosive materials.²³²

Violence against women: The Boko Haram insurgency has deliberately targeted women and girls by abducting, raping and killing them. The 14 April 2014 abduction of 276 young girls from a government secondary school in Chibok town, Borno State, is the most high profile of such cases. Other high profile cases include the June 2014 kidnapping of 60 married women and 30 young boys in the village of Kummabza (Borno State).²³³ There are other isolated, less-known cases, where the women and young girls left behind by fleeing or killed emirs, village and ward heads district heads and adult men have been targeted for kidnap, rape and killing by Boko Haram. Also, owing to the curfews that had been imposed, and the attacks on markets and raiding of farmlands and food barns, women and can no longer engage in trading and farming activities.

Religious identities and freedoms: The Boko Haram crisis has negatively impacted on religious identities and freedoms in three ways. In the first place, Boko Haram insurgents directly target places of religious worship and congregations. Secondly, individuals and groups of people, including the clergy (pastors and imams) have been attacked, killed or injured on account of their religious identities and practices). Lastly, Boko Haram's aspiration to and declaration of an Islamic Caliphate and imposition of strict Sharia in captured communities (Gworza, Damboa, Gamboru-Ngala) from August 2014 forecloses the right to alternative religion and a belief system other than Islam and its Salafist strand. Some of the notable attacks on churches and against Christians include attacks in Jos in March and April 2012 (30 people reportedly killed); January 2012 attack in Yola (17 reportedly killed) and Gombe (six killed); and the 2011 Christmas day bombing in Madalla town, near Abuja (42 reportedly killed). Attacks against Muslims include the December 2011 bombing of worshippers after Friday prayers in Maiduguri; the September October 2011 killings of Malam Dala and Sheikh Ali Jana in Maiduguri for openly criticising the Boko Haram ideology.

Inter-group relations and national cohesion: Given that ethnicity and religious identities overlap considerably in Nigeria, the Boko Haram crisis is increasingly straining inter-group relations, and threatening to upset Nigeria's delicate north-south, Muslim-Christian divides. The targeting of Christians by Boko Haram, including southerners across the north-east, has triggered reprisals in the south. For instance, in June 2014, some 50 northerners travelling across the southern city of Aba, for business, were apprehended, detained and allegedly tortured for over 13 days on suspicion of

231 BBC. Nigeria's Boko Haram Militants claim This Day attacks. 2 May 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17926097>.

232 Premium Times, 6 June 2014. Nigerian Military defends attacks on newspapers, describes it as routine security action. <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/162205-nigerian-military-defends-attack-newspapers-describes-routine-security-action.html#sthash.dpSrS388.dpbs>.

233 The Guardian. 24 June 2014. Boko Haram abducts scores of women and girls in Nigeria, say locals. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/24/boko-haram-abducts-women-girls-north-nigeria-kidnap>.

being members of Boko Haram.²³⁴ The insurgency has triggered gender and inter-generational profiling of Muslim youths as terrorists, suicide bombers, dangerous, evil and killers. Young female Muslims wearing the hijab are now suspected to be suicide bombers.²³⁵

Security expenditure: One obvious impact of the Boko Haram insurgency and counter-terrorism operations has been the huge increase in Nigeria's security-related spending since 2010. As a result of counter-insurgency operations, the nation's annual security sector spending (covering the defence, the police, the office of the National Security Adviser, paramilitary agencies and security-related service-wide votes) increased from \$5.07 billion in 2010 to over \$7 billion in 2014, with the yearly average over the same period amounting to \$6.5 billion. On average, security-related spending in annual budgets from 2011 has accounted for around 25 per cent of total government expenditure. This has had an impact on social service delivery expenditure. These figures exclude other extrabudgetary and security-related spending, as contained in supplementary appropriation bills, spending by State and local government, ministries, departments and agencies such as the Central Bank and NNPC.²³⁶

Nigeria's international relations: The Boko Haram insurgency has impacted Nigeria's international relations through the international media and policy response to the Chibok abductions, global context of Salafist-Jihadi insurgencies, and its trans-border and trans-regional dimensions Boko Haram has necessitated new regional alliances, security cooperation and formation of a regional security force. In the wake of the attacks, Nigeria reactivated old and initiated new security cooperation and military pacts with neighbouring countries, including Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The Multinational Joint Task Force is a clear example of this. The establishment of a 2,800 regional force was also agreed in July 2014 by Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad.²³⁷ Boko Haram has reshaped the country's international relations dynamics as reflected in the debates, statements and resolutions made by key international institutions at the May 2014 special Summit on Boko Haram held in Paris for Boko-Haram-affected countries in the Lake Chad Basin.²³⁸

Civil-military relations: Boko Haram attacks and government counter-terror operations have damaged civil-military relations. Pointers suggest that the level of trust and confidence of citizens in the capabilities and effectiveness of formal security sector institutions, in official briefings and Statements (and assurances) by security agencies and the government at large on Boko Haram have thinned out. The indicators include recurring take-over of communities and killings by Boko Haram, reported cases of mutinies and fleeing to neighbouring countries (Cameroon) by soldiers, broken promises by successive security chiefs over the timeline for ending the Boko Haram crises, and frustrations over the failure to locate or rescue or secure the release

234 Daily Trust (Nigeria). 30 June 2014.

235 Daily Trust (Nigeria). Suicide bombers' trainer nabbed with 16 females. 11 August 2014. <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/news/31322-suicide-bombers-trainer-nabbed-with-16-females>.

236 For example, the President sought parliamentary approval for a \$1 billion loan to acquire military and security hardware against Boko Haram see Punch (Nigeria), 17 July 2014.

237 Punch (Nigeria), "Nigeria, others form regional force to tackle Boko Haram", 25 July 2014, at: <http://www.punchng.com/news/nigeria-others-form-regional-force-to-tackle-boko-haram/>.

238 Sahara Reporters, "Paris Summit on Boko Haram: Resolutions", 17 May 2014. at <http://saharareporters.com/2014/05/17/paris-summit-boko-haram-resolutions>. 17 May 2014. (Accessed 16 July 2014).

of the girls kidnapped from Chibok. All this has been compounded by the military media clampdown, reported human rights abuses and impunity by security forces, mounting human, financial and material costs of the insurgency and the overall sense of frustration and lack of strategic direction appears to weaken civil-military relations in Nigeria.

3.6 Country overview: Niger

Economic impact

Disruption of mining: Over the past decade, conflict and insecurity have disrupted mining activities in the Agadez region, and slowed down growth (from 43.3 per cent in 2012 to 10.3 per cent²³⁹) in the secondary (extractive) sector in 2013. Notable incidents include the May 2013 attacks of Tuareg-linked groups against the Somair plant in Arlit and Agadez; the kidnapping of a Chinese nuclear engineer in the Agadez and that of four Areva employees from Arlit in 2007 and 2008.²⁴⁰

Disruption of cross-border trade: Since the onset of the insurgencies and insecurity in 2010, the borders of Niger have either been closed completely or the crossings severely limited. This has had far-reaching implications for Niger, considering its land-locked nature. The border closure and restrictions continue to disrupt trading activities in Diffa and Tillabéri, thereby affecting the movement of goods with Nigeria and Mali, respectively. Beyond limiting the inflow of goods, it also affects livelihoods, as it limits the export of animals and farm produce and disrupts the seasonal migration of labour and remittances.

Inflow of returnees, refugees and IDPs: Internally, Nigeriens have been displaced partly by floods and mostly by MNJ attacks and the army's reprisal operations since 2007, leading to over 11,000 IDPs in 2007²⁴¹ and over 23,000 in 2008 (mostly in the north of Agadez)²⁴². Insurgencies in neighbouring countries (the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Mali and Libya) have led to the influx of returnees and refugees. From Nigeria, there were over 50,000 refugees in 2013 and 12,000 additional arrivals in early 2014. From Mali, there were 60,000 refugees in 2012, as well as 3,000 returned Nigeriens. There were over 200,000 returnees from Libya, and several thousand from the Central African Republic.²⁴³ The two receiving points are Diffa (in the extreme south-east region and at the border with north-east Nigeria) and Tillabéri in the north-west region and at the border with Mali). Médecins Sans Frontières estimates that nearly 10,000 Malian refugees have settled in the Tillabéri.²⁴⁴

239 Ndoye, Daniel and Mansour Ndiaye (2014). Niger 2014. AfDB, OECD, UNDP. www.africanecoomicoutlook.org, p. 3, 2014.

240 Ibid.

241 See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Niger Internally Displaced People Analysis. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/niger/figures-analysis>; Integrated Regional Information Networks, News filtering of the north suggest grave conditions. 10 December 2007. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/75792/niger-news-filtering-out-of-north-suggests-grave-conditions> and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 18 June 2009.

242 United States Department of State. Human Rights Report: Niger. 25 February 2009 at: <http://www.State.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119017.htm>.

243 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? Africa Report N°208: 32, September 2013. p. 38.

244 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger... p. 43.

Pressure on service delivery, especially in border communities: The inflow of returnee Nigeriens and refugees has put pressure on the limited social services and facilities available in Niger, centrally in Diffa and Tillaberi, with implications for livelihoods, education and health. For instance, mobile health clinics had to be discontinued because of the violence, depriving the people of health care services. It is estimated that over 100,000 refugees have fled to Diffa, swelling the local population by 20 per cent.²⁴⁵ Apart from stretching services, the influx also led to the expansion of border routes and crossings to about 110, only 54 of which are manned by border guards.²⁴⁶

Increased security spending: The context of the strong influence wielded by the military in governance, and a militarized approach to internal and cross-border security challenges in Niger have increased financial resources expended on and diverted to defence. In 2013, the defence budget of CFAF31.5 billion or €48 million was less than for education (CFAF 117.9 billion or about €180 million) and health (CFAF72 billion or about €110 million). However, in the supplementary budget adopted in May 2013, defence expenditure (CFA 28 billion or about €42.6 million) was roughly the same as for health (CFAF 29 billion or about €44.2 million) and more than half of the sum allocated for education (CFAF 55.5 billion or about €84.6 million). This led to a cancellation of CFAF 35 billion for the finance and education ministries and the presidency.²⁴⁷ In addition, the insecurity has led to an increase in the security spending and overall production cost for mining companies in Niger. Following the May 2013 attacks, security spending increased to 4 per cent of operational costs for paying over 600 troops deployed to mining sites and for equipment.

Governance impact

Insecurity in border communities: Boko Haram draws its fighters mainly from the Kanuri ethnic group some of whom are in Niger. The group has therefore developed rear bases, provided medical facilities, conducted training and created a safe haven in Niger, especially in the regions of Diffa and Zinder.²⁴⁸ Banditry has increased in the border areas in the North (Agadez) as a result of regional security challenges and the discovery of gold. Also, in spite of proactive measures (Operation Malibero) to stem the flow of weapons and combatants from Libya,²⁴⁹ concerns remain about threats emanating from south-west Libya. In May 2013, the Nigerien government indicated that the twin attack on Agadez and Arlit was prepared in southern Libya.²⁵⁰ South-western Libya is also thought to be a new haven for jihadi groups who have fled from Mali. This has implications for Niger.

Recruitment of citizens into armed groups: Anecdotal evidence point to Boko Haram and the MNLA (northern Mali) recruiting fighters from Niger, especially in border

245 Economic Commission for Africa Sahel Study: Niger. Unpublished manuscript. 2015. p.8.

246 Ibid, p.32.

247 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger..., p. 44; See also Journal officiel de la République du Niger, 2012 and United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 - Niger, 30 April Cite as 2014, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/536229d18.html> (accessed 19 September 2014).

248 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger... p.41.

249 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger..., p. 34.

250 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger... p. 35; On 23rd May 2013, there were two coordinated terror attacks at an army barracks in Agadez, which killed 19, including 18 soldiers with four attackers dying. There was also a concurrent attack on the Areva owned Somair mine in Arlit. See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22637084>.

communities (Diffa and Tillaberi). The recruitment is primarily among the Kanuri (Diffa) and Tuareg (Tillaberi) ethnic groups, thus indicating the exploitation of shared identity. The recruitments are said to be voluntary, through defections, and induced, by offering monetary rewards to the horde of unemployed Nigerien youth. In addition, the recruitment in Tillaberi was seen to have been facilitated by subsisting militias.

Securitization of foreign relations: Conflict and insecurity in the Sahel has made defence and security a key driver of governance and external relations for Niger, in that: (a) it is part of several regional groupings on security, including the Lake Chad Basin Authority, G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), Pays du Champs (Algeria Mali, Mauritania and Niger) for combating (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) in the Sahel; and (b) Niger has granted permits to a few foreign countries to use its territories (e.g. under Operation Serval in Mali) and facilities (e.g. Niamey and Agadez airfields²⁵¹) for security operations. Through all this, Niger enhanced its access to external funding and assistance for security and development in the Sahel, and the Trans Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative.²⁵²

Enhanced role and visibility of military in governance: The Nigerien army's influence and visibility in governance and society has increased in the wake of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel. There is a pervasive presence of military personnel across government units, including serving as governors and administrators in regions such as Agadez and Tillaberi. The army also guards key economic sites, specifically mining companies, to forestall attacks. Moreover, external security assistance has prioritized training, equipment and some funding for the military. This is linked to the need to protect economic interests (uranium and gold mining companies), as well as prevent kidnapping, which has necessitated permanent army escorts across Niger.

3.7 Concluding remarks

The qualitative overview in this chapter supports the finding of the statistical assessment in the previous chapter in two ways. First, the economic impact of the conflicts and large-scale insecurities is less evident at the macro level. With a few exceptions, including for example, Mali – one of the epicentres of conflict in the Sahel in the last few years – and Niger, which sits at the intersection of the two conflict corridors, much of this impact has been localized. One reason that accounts for this is that the Sahelian areas affected by conflict and insecurity in Nigeria and Burkina Faso, for example, are relatively marginal to the national economy. Secondly, the impact of these conflicts has been more pronounced on governance than on economic growth across the five frontline States at the core of this study. Poor governance is both a causal and sustaining factor in these conflicts; and the continued deterioration of governance during conflict creates a cycle of insecurity that makes peace, stability and development difficult to realise. This is easily compounded by the role of various actors in conflict situations.

The ways in which the impacts of conflict and insecurity are experienced across these frontline States exemplify the intersection of security and development and

251 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger... p. 38.

252 International Crisis Group (2013). Niger... p. 38.

the inseparability of human security and human development in the daily realities of people. This Sahelian experience reveals key human security dimensions that cut across countries and have similar development consequences. These human dimensions of security and development become even more emphasised where the development consequences are not visible at the macro level. They are palpable at the level of the individual and the community. When these impacts are cumulated at these levels, the formation of regional clusters in response to insecurity along individual and communal lines becomes inevitable, particularly when States are not readily responsible or able to address the huge governance deficits. The way in which the security implications of conflict and development consequences intersect at the level of the individual, where the human security and human development concerns of individuals are inextricably linked and cannot be dealt with separately confirms the existence of a people-based security complex.

The separation of the people-based complex from State-based regional arrangements is sustained by two crucial factors. First is the inability of the State or unwillingness of its ruling elite to provide adequate responses to the security needs of the people. As the Sahelian experience reveals, in a conflict environment, State capacity is uneven and the intentions of the governing elite are not easily aligned to that of the population. Moreover, the security complex that binds States is determined by factors beyond the experiences and needs of citizens. Apart from the fact that each of the frontline States was not always similarly impacted by the conflicts along the two corridors, their interests and the influences shaping their responses varied. Burkina Faso and Mauritania, for example, have benefitted, to varying degrees, from increased external interest in the Sahel, as a result of which they have both received external aid, which respond to the Sahelian conflicts in particularly narrow ways. The assistance received is largely directed at military-related initiatives and not at the human development needs of the Sahelian peoples. Such factors tend to widen the division between States and the populations.

While this is not the immediate focus of this chapter, two sets of regional clusters emerged along the two conflict corridors and they are driven by different influences. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (around an expanded Lake Chad Basin) emerged in response to the Boko Haram crisis, while a number of other regional clusters and groupings are visible in the response to the Mali crisis. The G5 is one notable indicator of an extended Sahelian grouping, while the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) (discussed further in the next chapter), is a potential engine for a sustained regional cluster.

The basis for the existence of divergent security complexes is thus well established by these Sahelian experiences. The next chapter examines the extent to which policy and programmatic responses to the situation in the Sahel understand and address this reality.

CHAPTER 4: Patterns of response to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel

This study has examined the responses to the challenges of conflict and insecurity in the Sahel region through analysis of the various regional policies and programmes being implemented by a range of regional and extraregional actors. This chapter attempts to answer the following questions:

- a) What are the response patterns to armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities in the Sahel and the lessons learned?
- b) To what extent are conflicts and insecurity managed from a regional dimension?

This chapter makes four key observations in its assessment of responses to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel: (a) the excessive focus on external security concerns and the related military activities, which, among other things, keeps the two security complexes separated; (b) the proliferation of policies and programmes by external actors in ways that do not readily adapt to the realities of the Sahel. This lack of adaptation remains a feature of the response, notwithstanding that the United Nations Integrated Strategy on the Sahel correctly reflects the cross-border and transnational nature of the Sahelian challenge; (c) the apparent competition among these actors (mostly for resources); and the distinct difference in the approach of humanitarians to the Sahel in relation to other actors (security and development). This approach adapts itself to the movement of people in the Sahel.

4.1 Excessive focus on external security concerns: the making of a divergent regional security complex

It is important to trace the gradual securitization of the Sahel as a key area of concern for international and regional security, particularly in gauging the implications of the interventions undertaken so far in the region.²⁵³ The Sahel has become, over the last decade, a key focus of international concern and a security strategy.²⁵⁴ In several respects, the Sahel is considered as an existential threat to the security of a range of external actors. As a result, the existential threat that a range of non-violent and non-military related insecurities pose for the peoples of the Sahel takes a backseat in relation to the security concerns of external actors. This gradual securitization is at the root of the current focus on a “security first” approach by many of the organizations

253 Abrahamsen argues that “*identifying something as a security issue is not an innocent practice, but has political implications and changes the legitimate mode of engagement with a particular problem...*” (2004). “A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa & Britain’s ‘War on Terrorism’”, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 31, No. 102, December 2004. p.681.

254 Note that the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which rolled into action on 10 January 2004, is a “\$100 million ‘anti-terror’ initiative for the Saharan nations of Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger”. It began with the disembarkation in Nouakchott of an “anti terror” team of 500 troops and the deployment of 400 rangers into the Chad-Niger border to “hunt down the terrorist groups which are swarming across the Sahara”.

interviewed for this study, and for whom military approaches to counter-terrorism are prioritized (in practice if not in theory).²⁵⁵

The securitization of the Sahel has steadily been taking place since the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks that took place on 7 August 1998 at the United States embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi killed 224 people and injured 5,000. With these events, the terrorist threat in Africa became real. Other cases such as the abduction of 32 European tourists in the Algerian Sahara in 2003 proved that something had to be done to prevent the spread of terrorism across Africa's vast and so called "ungoverned" spaces.²⁵⁶ 11 September 2001 would fundamentally change global policies towards the continent, including the Sahara and Sahel regions.

Key to fighting the war on terrorism in this region was initially the Pan-Sahel initiative (PSI). The PSI has given way, since 2007, to the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, which focuses on containing and marginalizing terrorist organizations by "strengthening individual country and regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security and intelligence organizations, promoting democratic governance, and discrediting terrorist ideology". Many other bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been established to combat extremist groups and prevent terrorist sanctuaries by building the security capacity of many of the Sahelian countries. The more recent establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) (2008) is also an example of the prioritization of the (military) security approach.

In the Sahel, counter-terrorism operations have affected the local populations in a number of ways, including the disruption of trade networks, such as routes used for smuggling people, weapons, cigarettes and other types of goods. The livelihoods of thousands of Sahelians depend on trading and smuggling, as coping strategies. The terrorist groups, however, also use them. An additional risk is the types of relationships that counter-terrorist operations need to establish with border officials, who themselves may be involved in the smuggling. Reflecting on this dilemma, Ellis notes that "*an attempt to interdict all smuggling in such a region has the serious consequence of depriving many non-terrorists of their livelihood, and declaring areas a security zone destroys tourism*".²⁵⁷

Without a comprehensive approach that includes substantial humanitarian and development assistance, support to governance, among other things, military and security counter-terrorism operations also engender local grievances. As far back as 2005, it is noted that anti-western sentiments have been developing in much of the region that most describe as unprecedented.²⁵⁸ In northern Mali for example, people were beginning to ask why their lands were being "invaded" by both "terrorists" and international actors. They wanted to know why the foreigners had come to their land and what they want from them. In Niger, the Tuareg were "equally tense".²⁵⁹

255 Interviews conducted by research-team member with United Nations agencies in Dakar in October 2014.

256 Nyman, P. and J. Morrison (2004). The Terrorist Threat in Africa. Foreign Affairs.

257 Ellis, S. (2004). The Pan-Sahel Initiative, African Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 412, July 2004, pp.463.

258 International Crisis Group. (2005). Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel... p. 3.

259 Keenan, J. (2004). Americans and 'Bad People' in the Sahara-Sahel, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 31, No. 99. p.137.

Paradoxically, PSI would be seen to have increased political instability and insecurity – a lesson that should be drawn for today’s interventions in the Sahel. Indeed, a number of incidents in 2004 serve to illustrate the point. The alleged coup attempt in Mauritania against Ould Taya, the third in 15 months; the Kounta-Arab incident (a long-standing feud between them erupted in a fresh outbreak of fighting); Tuareg attacks in Mali (on a humanitarian convoy near Bourem); the events in Niger (developing in the Tuareg regions of northern Niger and for which President Mamadou Tandja was largely responsible); and the attempted coup in Chad against President Idriss Deby in May 2004, among others. At the time, some warned that the weak governments of the region “are all benefitting from global financial and military support and consequently have a vested interest in both generating and maintaining the new climate of “terror”, which now pervades their desert regions”.²⁶⁰

In considering the potential harm of a military and “security only” approach to counter-terrorism, we should consider carefully the relationships between local populations and terrorist groups. In this regard, the International Crisis Group notes that there is “a generic relationship in situations where terrorism exists, in the form of concentric circles of interest and complicity, leading toward those who are or might be actual terrorists”. Furthermore, one must “distinguish between those who are opposed, apathetic, or ambivalent, those who gleefully watch from the side lines, those who contribute money, know someone involved or are otherwise close to the active participants, and those who are actively involved”.²⁶¹

A concluding observation here is that the exclusive focus on military and counter-terrorism activities in the Sahel emphasises only the efforts made to address the existential threat that the Sahel poses to more powerful external actors. It does little to address the more present non-military human security threats to the Sahelian populations. The securitization of the Sahel in this way seems to have produced the following unintended consequences: (a) a Sahelian population that is incrementally resentful of the negative impact of this international military presence; (b) the slow gravitation (for a range of reasons) of parts of the local Sahelian population toward the very terrorist networks that these military activities were intended to remove; (c) the governments of Sahelian States have been able to “instrumentalize” this external military presence to entrench themselves in power and further alienate the populations that they are supposed to be protecting.

This contributes to keeping the people-based transnational security complex in the Sahel separate from the State-focused security complex. This regional security complex seems both superficial and externally constructed, responding only to external security dynamics. They bear little or no organic resemblance to the human security dynamics at the level below the State, thus remaining largely disconnected from the realities of Sahelian peoples seeking to address a range of other existential threats. The extent to which the policies of inter-governmental and multilateral institutions have responded to this challenge now remains to be seen. Institutions such as the African Union and the United Nations must continue their efforts to

260 Keenan J., (2004). Political Destabilisation & ‘Blowback’ in the Sahel, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 31, No. 102, pp.691, emphasis added.

261 International Crisis Group (2005). *Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel...*, p. 34.

integrate the security complexes in the Sahel so as to make the nations responsive to the vast majority of their people.

4.2 Overview of policies and strategies on the Sahel

The Sahel is today the subject of numerous targeted policies and programmes, ranging from the continental (African Union) and regional organizations to international organizations. As far as the United Nations is concerned, Dakar has become a hub of regional projects and programmes by several of its agencies. This is the case for the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Advisor and its Crisis Prevention and Recovery Regional Offices, the Regional Office for West and Central Africa of OCHA, as well as the presence in Dakar of the United Nations Special Representative for the Sahel and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. As part of the research for this paper, interviews were conducted with United Nations system organizations as well as others in Dakar in October 2014. It is therefore important to examine the main existing policies, as this will help us understand which organizations are better placed to provide responses to insecurity and why, and the extent to which existing “Sahel strategies” and “security and development” initiatives in the region are adapted to current challenges.

The United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel

The multiple national security, governance, development and human rights challenges facing the countries of the Sahel have regional ramifications. *Inequitable political participation and access to social services have regional dimensions, given the cross-border ties of marginalized groups. Terrorist and criminal groups are active at the national, regional and international levels. The environmental and economic shocks that give rise to humanitarian crises are also regional and international in nature. The challenges facing the Sahel do not respect borders and neither can the solutions...*²⁶²

The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel was issued with the 14 June 2013 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, in tandem with a definition of the parameters of a comprehensive solution to the Malian crisis.²⁶³ According to one respondent, prior to the development of the policy, a series of assessment missions were undertaken to the region. For this respondent, “the assessment done prior to the development of the United Nations strategy – in so far as the insecurity/extremism dimensions are concerned – is still valid today”,²⁶⁴ According to the Secretary-General, “the United Nations integrated strategy builds on existing analyses and recommendations, including the United Nations inter-agency assessment mission to the Sahel conducted in December 2011 with the participation of the African Union, the conclusions of the meetings between the African Union and United Nations experts on the Sahel held in Addis Ababa on 14 and 15 March 2012 (endorsed by the ministerial-level meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the

262 United Nations Security Council. (2013a). Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, pp. 7.

263 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013.

264 Interview with United Nations West Africa Office (UNOWA) official held in Dakar, Senegal, on 13 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 003.

African Union held on 20 March 2012 in Bamako), and the United Nations action plan on resilience-building in the Sahel.”²⁶⁵

The strategy recognizes a security-development nexus at both the national and regional levels. It also contains a series of proposals for addressing some of the key structural challenges at the national level in the countries of the Sahel. Indeed, the strategy identifies the following strategic goals: (a) enhancing inclusive and effective governance throughout the region (political inclusion, rule of law, State capacity to deliver basic services, accountability, good governance, including in the security sector); (b) strengthening the capacity of national and regional security mechanisms to address cross-border threats with respect for human rights and the rule of law; and (c) integrating development and humanitarian interventions to build resilience (bridging of humanitarian and development programming with the aim of addressing underlying causes and subsequent consequences of food and nutrition insecurity and other vulnerabilities and promoting long-term development).²⁶⁶ Underlying the strategy is the acknowledgment that the specific challenges facing the Sahel are not nationally based, but cut across borders. Furthermore, the United Nations understands that activities within each of these pillars should be undertaken jointly and collaboratively with regional and sub-regional organizations.²⁶⁷

The national-regional nexus is evident in several key principles that underlie the strategy. Furthermore, an important focus is placed on regional-level interventions and cross-border issues and threats, with UNOWA tasked with strengthening regional and sub-regional organizations' capacity to address cross-border threats to peace and security. As noted by one of our interviewees, “responses to insecurity, armed conflict and terrorism in the Sahel require a regional response”.²⁶⁸

The United Nations integrated policy also calls for, *inter alia*, the promotion of regional priorities in national planning programming and, as was to be expected, the promotion of coordination and cooperation among national, regional, subregional and international partners.²⁶⁹ Indeed, the Secretary-General notes that, “past initiatives aimed at resolving crises and conflict in the Sahel have focused largely on the national level and shown their limits, given the cross-border nature and regional scope of the complex challenges confronting the region”.²⁷⁰

A recognition of the multifaceted nature of insecurity in the region (including the spread of terrorism) and the need for a multipronged strategy is a positive dimension of the strategy. For example, in order to support effective and inclusive governance, priority is given to strengthening institutions to foster democratic practices, including political dialogue, free, fair and transparent elections, and broad-based participation.

265 United Nations Security Council (2013). *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region*, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, p. 12.

266 United Nations Security Council (2013). *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region*, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, p. 7.

267 Interview with United Nations West Africa Office Official held in Dakar, Senegal, on 13 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 001.

268 Interview with United Nations West Africa Office Official held in Dakar, Senegal, on 13 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 001.

269 United Nations Security Council (2013). *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region*, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, pp. 8 and 9.

270 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

In addition, support to local governance and the extension of government services throughout national territories, as well as strengthening State capacities to ensure more equitable access to resources and socioeconomic services are prioritized. This support includes: assisting Sahelian countries to strengthen regional mechanisms for economic governance; strengthening national and regional human rights mechanisms to combat impunity and assisting Sahelian countries' strengthening of their independent national justice systems to effectively address corruption; supporting community security and social cohesion; assisting Sahelian countries to develop national and regional early warning systems to address potential governance challenges and security threats; and fostering sustainable security sector governance in Sahelian countries.

Strengthening national and regional security mechanisms will include: enhancing United Nations regional security analysis and monitoring cross-border threats in the Sahel, including a detailed mapping exercise by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Taskforce; strengthening UNOWA analytical capacity and improving information sharing within the United Nations system in the subregion, including MINUSMA; enhancing national capacity to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime; enhancing national capacities for effective border management, including through improved coordination among relevant national institutions; strengthening regional capacity to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime; and enhancing regional and interregional cooperation among Sahel, West African and Maghreb States.²⁷¹

The humanitarian and development dimension includes: support to local, national and regional stakeholders to better identify and track vulnerable households in a participatory manner (disaggregated data collection, etc.); supporting government and other stakeholders to provide equitable and effective coverage of basic social services and promote effective social protection systems; strengthening household, national and regional risk management capacities; strengthening sustainable livelihoods²⁷²; and promoting environmental sustainability through national and regional natural resource management mechanisms and climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes, with a special focus on water.²⁷³

The African Union strategy for the Sahel region

The African Union, through the Peace and Security Council, adopted its Strategy for the Sahel on 11 August 2014.²⁷⁴ This strategy was the ultimate outcome of a series of demarches that had seen the organization, since the 2011 Libyan crisis, increasingly concerned with the region. One of those initiatives, of relevance to this study, was the joint African Union Commission-United Nations Secretariat interdisciplinary mission from 7 to 23 December 2011 followed by a meeting of experts on 14 and 15 March 2012 in Addis Ababa. According to the Peace and Security Council,

271 Ibid, Annex.

272 This requires some reflection, as one of the actions contradicts what has been noted above: "provide enhanced agricultural and pastoral livelihood opportunities through increased investment, the use of resistant seeds and species, rural extension services and new infrastructure.

273 United Nations Security Council (2013). *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region*, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, Annex.

274 African Union (2014a). *The African Union Strategy for the Sahel Region*, Peace and Security Council, 449th Meeting, PSC/PR/3 (CDXLIX). Addis Ababa. 11 August 2014.

“the United Nations drew largely on these recommendations to prepare the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.”²⁷⁵

Similar to the United Nations’ strategy, the African Union Sahel strategy is centred on three main pillars: governance, security and development. The organization believes that “these three areas, especially the first two, are issues on which the African Union has a clear comparative advantage, as per its continental mandate, its experience in the subject matters and its familiarity with the issues at hand”. Furthermore, the organization stated, “by its continental nature, the African Union is the organization that can very legitimately provide an overall umbrella for the regional initiatives in the Sahel, which transcends almost three geographical regions of the continent and is thus situated beyond the space of any regional mechanism.”²⁷⁶

Priority actions are defined for each pillar, including, for the governance pillar, the consolidation of the rule of law and strengthening of democratic institutions; administrative decentralization; fight against corruption and promotion of international standards of good public finance management; promotion of human rights and humanitarian action; support for the dialogue and reconciliation processes, including transitional justice; electoral processes in the region; promotion of peace and national cohesion through religious and traditional leaders; and, conflict management and integration of nomadic communities.²⁷⁷ Yet, perhaps a reflection of the possible contributions that an organization such as the African Union is limited to doing include the majority of specific actions relate to monitoring, conduct of assessment missions, initiatives in support of popularization of legal and normative instruments, organization of conferences, provision of experts, awareness campaigns, training, encouragement of national authorities, support to civil society.

In the security cluster, attention is focused on the promotion of the Nouakchott Process, support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in northern Mali (but here in terms of deployment of experts and assistance) and participation in security Sector Reform programmes in the Sahel.²⁷⁸ With the assistance of the African Union, States of the region have tried to address security challenges by creating the Nouakchott Process, launched by the African Union Commission in March 2013. This process aims at enhancing security cooperation in the region through the regular exchange of views between these countries’ heads of intelligence and security services on the situation in the region. In 2014, a secretariat for this process was created under the leadership of MISAHEL and the concept of operations for the establishment of joint teams and joint border patrols developed (AU 2014). Information-sharing and monitoring; the promotion of confidence building between the countries of the region; and the conduct of assessments and the facilitation of regional cooperation structures are among the objectives of the process (AU 2014).

According to the African Union Commission, “significant progress has been made in facilitating interactions among the countries and organizations participating in the Nouakchott Process, in order to ensure continuous updating on the security situation

275 Ibid pp. 4.

276 Ibid pp. 2 and 5.

277 Ibid pp. 6-12.

278 Ibid pp. 13-15.

in the region and the status of threats posed by terrorist and criminal groups” (AU 2014). Moreover, for the African Union Commission, “it is imperative that the countries of the region enhance their cooperation and capacity to act. To tackle their common threats, the countries of the region may employ the joint patrols system or the mixed and integrated units” (AU 2014). An additional key initiative is the African Arrest Warrant for persons charged with or convicted of terrorist acts, seen as part of the available tools for a more effective combat of terrorism and transnational organized crime.

In terms of implementation, MISAHEL is the structure responsible for implementing the African Union strategy in the Sahel. Furthermore, “based on the principles of complementarity and comparative advantage, as well as African ownership, the effective implementation of this strategy will require the assistance and collaboration of the regional economic communities, particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the CILSS”.²⁷⁹ For the African Union, the coordination proposed is essential to avoid duplication between the continental body and regional organizations.

Most of the current strategies have very little synergy, coordination and cooperation. Several of our respondents were highly critical of the current state of policy coordination and cooperation. Indeed, one interviewee referred to it as “the complexity of the policy environment”.²⁸⁰ The concern is not about policies contradicting each other or even harmonization. It is the proliferation of actors and strategies, to the point that, as noted by one respondent, “everyone has a policy”. This was considered to be the “common trend since the adoption by the UNSC of resolution 2071 (2012) which saw the appointment of a Special Envoy for the Sahel”.²⁸¹

At the regional and subregional levels, for example, the African Union and ECOWAS have specific policies towards the Sahel – the African Union Policy Towards the Sahel and the ECOWAS Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, among others. At the international level, the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and other bilateral donors have specific policies and programmes.

According to one respondent, “no one wants to coordinate strategy,” as the organizations compete with each other, largely working on their own agenda and raising funds individually.²⁸² In general, “everyone is keen on pursuing their own strategy”. This observation was discussed further, as one of our concerns for this paper is precisely the extent to which the mechanisms of the different “Sahel strategies” and initiatives are regional in nature and adapted to current challenges and dynamics. According to that respondent, what is observed is not only the lack

²⁷⁹ Ibid pp. 2 and 3.

²⁸⁰ Interview with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs official, held in Dakar, Senegal, on 14 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 007.

²⁸¹ Interview with United Nations West Africa Office official held in Dakar, Senegal, on 13 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 002.

²⁸² Interview with United Nations West Africa Office official held in Dakar, on 13 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 002.

of coordination between organizations and agencies, but fierce competition for the resources available.

The creation of the G5 group of Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) is an example of an effort to strengthen each State's capacity at accessing available funds/resources for the Sahel but also an additional element adding to the already existing competition for scarce resources available for the Sahel.

This is a key dimension affecting current responses to the challenges in the Sahel. In fact, a careful reading of the 2013 report of the Secretary-General on the Sahel, shows that, in theory at least, the "integrated strategy" approach was meant to have precisely the opposite effect: "the United Nations integrated strategy is designed to foster system-wide unity of purpose and provide a basis for coherent United Nations engagement in the Sahel. The United Nations integrated strategy seeks to foster a multi-sectoral approach to the problems of the region and ensure that the design and implementation of actions bring together the strengths and capacities of the various entities of the United Nations system".²⁸³ Indeed, in its guiding principles, the promotion of "cooperation and coordination among national, regional, subregional and international partners" is highlighted, as is "strengthening partnerships with regional and subregional institutions and stakeholders within their respective mandates and reaching out to new potential partners".²⁸⁴

The need for mapping and harmonization of different strategies and initiatives for the Sahel is also noted by the African Union, which points to the establishment of a ministerial platform on 5 November 2013, co-chaired by the African Union and the United Nations.²⁸⁵

4.3 Reflecting on humanitarians' perspective on the Sahel

Despite their commitment to a regional integration agenda most of the international and regional organizations have adopted a limited and State-centric approach to their Sahelian strategy. The priority issues highlighted are often threats to States rather than the age-old threats to the Sahelian peoples and communities. Herein lies the refreshing humanitarian approach to the Sahelian situation. The primary consideration of these humanitarians is the biogeography of the Sahel.

The Sahel's biogeography is conditioned by its extreme climate, as the region experiences a mean annual rainfall of 150mm or less. The fact that to the "north of the 250mm isohyet, crops can scarcely grow in most years without irrigation" (Grove 1978: 409), point to the harsh environmental conditions of the Sahel, where the wet season lasts approximately three months, but with significant annual variations.

283 United Nations Security Council (2013a). *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Sahel Region*, S/2013/354, 14 June 2013, pp. 8.

284 Ibid.

285 African Union (2014b). *Report on Mali and the Sahel and the activities of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel*, Peace and Security Council, 449th Meeting, PSC/PR/2 (CDXLIX), Addis Ababa, 11 August 2014. pp. 5.

This rules out most export crops and makes more intensive farming practices a risky endeavour.²⁸⁶ Indeed, “halfway between 200 and 600 mm isohyets we find the limit of the rain-fed agricultural area. To the north of this line is the nomadic area, where each year, the extent of new vegetation indicates the quality of the rainy season and determines pastoral activity” (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD 2006: 2).

The specific nature of the Sahel as a phyto-geographical unit has led authors to attempt geographical delimitations of the Sahel, based on the region’s isohyets, which are lines on a map that connect points that have an equal amount of rainfall. One example was the research undertaken within CILSS by the Agrhymet Regional Centre. Here, the Sahel is defined as “the area between the 200 and 600mm isohyets (sometimes 150-500 mm) stretching through six continental West African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) and brushing northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon” (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD 2006: 1).²⁸⁷

It is telling that of all the organizations with Sahel policies and programmes surveyed for the purposes of this paper, only OCHA used these criteria to delimit its areas of operation. Indeed, according to one respondent: “for humanitarians, geopolitical definitions are not useful as humanitarians must follow the emergency. For this, the biogeographical approach is much more useful, as it highlights where people are able to settle, base themselves and practise agro-pastoralism”.²⁸⁸ As of 2014, the agency included Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal in its strategic response plan for the Sahel region. This approach is in stark contrast to the geopolitical approach of many other organizations and agencies, which focus only on States, and restrict their programmes to national boundaries.

In addition, but no less important for the purposes of this study is the fact that on average, isohyets have moved 100-150 km farther south in the last 30 years or so (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD 2006: 9). This implies that, literally, in the phytogeographical sense at least, the Sahel has moved south and affected the livelihoods, socioeconomic development, movements and social relationships of the people, who have to survive in that difficult and harsh environment.

The approach used by OCHA may offer an insight into the terms of adaptation to the realities of the Sahelian peoples. For OCHA, the Sahel crisis requires a regional response. Indeed, humanitarian and food assistance must perforce be deployed with a regional focus in mind, across the entire region. Although country-by-country analyses and support are important, acting nationally only will produce limited results. Cross-border initiatives for example should be prioritized.

286 With approximately 38.2 per cent of the Sahel and West Africa region made up of arid zones, unfavourable to the development of crop production, livestock rearing remains “the only way of optimizing the fragile ecological zones inhabited by people who are vulnerable in terms of both income and food security” (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD 2008: 12).

287 There is some variation in this interval. For Nicholson (1976:12), it was situated between 100 and 300mm; for Maley (1977:573) between 100 and 500mm; for Grove (1978) between 200 and 400mm; for Rapp (1976:16) and Jakel (1977:89) 350-500mm.

288 Interview with United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs official, held in Dakar on 14 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 007.

This approach is all the more important because the Sahel region continues to be afflicted by an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, compounded by extremely high levels of vulnerability and poverty. Interviews conducted for the purposes of this study revealed that as a result of the combination of insecurity and environmental shocks, the coping capacity of the region's poorest is declining. This is what humanitarian agencies refer to as the "resilience" of communities²⁸⁹. According to the Secretary-General, "a growing number of households find themselves still struggling to fully recover from one shock when they must start dealing with the next one" (UNSC 2014). This is a critical point as it helps us understand why Sahelians continue to suffer food insecurity, even in years when agricultural production may not have been affected.

Indeed, current estimates for food insecurity point to a total caseload of 19.8 million people, with at least 2.6 million having already crossed the emergency threshold and requiring urgent food assistance. In the Sahel, one out of seven people is food insecure, one out of five children is malnourished; and 2.76 million are refugees and IDPs (OCHA 2014c). More worryingly, food security projections for the first quarter of 2015 indicated a slight deterioration for Burkina Faso, the Gambia and Mali; while for Mauritania and Senegal, an additional 1.4 million people were expected to suffer from food insecurity "due to poor rangeland production affecting pastoralist livelihoods" (OCHA 2014).

Yet, as severe as these statistics may be, the true number of food insecure people in the Sahel is closer to 28 million, according to interviews conducted in Dakar in October 2014. According to one respondent, "the figures are so high that we can't publish them", pointing out that, "the States of the region have put pressure on OCHA not to release these figures".²⁹⁰ Although no immediate answer was given as to why this should be the case, it is apparent that because Sahel States want the focus to shift to support for infrastructure, increased security and counter-terrorism, there is pressure on humanitarian agencies not to release current figures.

It is clear that while vulnerability is a cyclical condition affecting Sahelians, it reaches catastrophic proportions when compounded by the effects of armed conflict (as seen in Mali and the Central African Republic) or terrorism (as seen in north-eastern Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger). In addition to structural vulnerabilities caused by the Sahel's climate and geography, armed conflict significantly exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. However, overwhelming emphasis on other security issues such as conflict, crime and terrorism, not least by powerful actors for which this poses major threats, relegates the long-standing threats to the background. Yet, if the "conflict" and factor was extracted from the Sahelian situation, the other vulnerabilities remain and along with this, the transnationalism of Sahelian populations along the corridor as they pursue adaptive responses to environmental stresses. In those instances, the flexibility of national boundaries is an important factor for communities. Arguably though, external response has motivated a level of action from several Sahelian States that might otherwise not have been in a position to mount any response.

289 Interview with United Nations West Africa Office, Dakar, 13 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 001.

290 Interview with United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, official held in Dakar, on 14 October 2014. Interview FN Dakar 007.

The presence of a range of international, particularly multilateral institutions such as the African Union and the United Nations thus provides a real opportunity to respond to the real security and development needs of Sahelian peoples. The challenge, going forward, is to consolidate the converging international attention in the Sahel, by focusing on the real human condition of the Sahelian peoples and the structural roots of the insecurities experienced in the region.

4.4 Concluding remarks

The following is an overview of the key observations and conclusions reached from the analysis made in this chapter.

Difficulty in understanding the interconnections and linkages between the peoples of the Sahel has affected the formulation of appropriate policies for the region. Besides, there are no reliable statistics or other indicators. The interconnections in the region are not seen as largely people-driven, and the significance of the non-formal is not fully appreciated. There is little evidence that existing policies on the Sahel have drawn from people's lived realities and the trends that have underlined those realities in the past few decades. Historical patterns of interaction of Sahelian peoples have long been transnational. At best, this transnationalism intersects with State actors in regional ways and cannot be contained neatly within national spaces.

While transnationalism in the Sahel predates the recent conflicts and insecurities in the region, it is often treated only as a function of the movement of armed groups and criminal networks, which facilitate conflict and insecurity. This is in part an influence of powerful actors who define the Sahel through the lens of their existential threats. The natural movement of the Sahelian people, however, has long been characterized by transnationalism. They have moved across borders in pursuit of livelihoods, while adapting to climatic conditions. Armed groups and criminal (including terrorist) networks have simply adapted to the movement of the Sahelian populations. The threats accompanying population movements across borders are therefore not contained within any national boundary. Indeed, this Sahelian transnational pattern is reordering security and development perspectives in radically different ways than traditional views of security would allow. Any response formula that does not adapt itself to the movement of people stands a limited chance of success. Current policies on the Sahel do not encourage such adaptation.

Responses to what is a regional and transnational crisis are intensely national: A level of analysis problem plagues responses to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel and this invariably limits the impact of interventions. Operational responses are nationally based. Responses by institutions that are regional in mandate are typically State-led, government-to-government and the outcomes manifest nationally. Most responses do not engage the subnational, stakeholders particularly those that are not formal or institutionalized and prone to constant movement across national boundaries. In addition, the State-led, government-to-government approaches are driven typically (but not exclusively) by law enforcement approaches given the overwhelming focus on security issues.

Proliferation of strategies on the Sahel with little synergy, cooperation and coordination:

Despite the limited understanding of the situation of the Sahelian peoples, there is a proliferation of strategies and policies in the region, with every major actor appearing to have a strategy, without much coordination or harmonisation among the organizations, not to mention the competition for funds among them.

The humanitarian approach provides a potential alternative and exemplary framework for responding to the Sahel:

Humanitarian agencies such as OCHA interpret the Sahel crisis as a regional one and offer a regional response. In its response framework, humanitarian and food assistance is deployed with a regional focus to cater for the entire region. Although country-by-country analyses and support are important, acting nationally is seen as producing limited results. As such priority is given to cross border initiatives. This approach moves closer to the transnational realities of the region's population.

Overwhelming focus on terrorism, crime and militarized responses by powerful external actors for which these pose major threats relegates the long-standing human security threats in the Sahel to the background.

Arguably, were it not for the high-level international response, Sahelian States and governments might have been less responsive to the threats facing the people. Thus, the presence of international, particularly multilateral institutions such as the African Union and the United Nations provides a real opportunity to respond to the actual security and development needs of the Sahelian peoples. The challenge, going forward, is to consolidate the converging international attention in the Sahel, paying more attention to the real human condition of the Sahelian peoples and the structural roots of the insecurities experienced in the region.

If the African State is to be relevant, and if African regional institutions are to be relevant to these realities, their institutional frameworks and programmes have to be rethought to adapt to the realities of their peoples.

For example, the Sahelian areas of all five countries at the core of these investigations reflect key elements of human insecurity in the development consequences of conflict. The response frameworks of the African Union and the regional economic communities need to be retuned and adapted to this reality. A move away from militarized responses and greater engagement with and adaptation to non-State, human conditions will offer a more relevant strategy to the type of challenges seen in the Sahel.

Conclusion: Policy implications and recommendations for future engagement in the Sahel

Based on the findings of this study, the following are some of the implications for policy and programmatic interventions in the Sahel.

Maintaining the status quo: With response frameworks narrowly focused on national-level programmes and activities, interactions with subnational stakeholders and actors are limited. The power dynamics between foreign and local populations are maintained to the advantage of the former.

Limited presence and interaction with the sites of conflict and insecurity: The real places and populations affected by conflict and insecurity along the Sahelian corridors under study will remain largely untouched by the programmes and resources meant to improve their condition. Response will be limited to nationally focused and governmental interventions, regardless of the claims or mandate of regional approaches.

Artificial separation of humanitarian response from other responses: The approach of humanitarians, which is to follow people's movement because they invariably follow people's emergency, will remain separate and divorced from other approaches – security and developmental – which are still largely nationally focused. The transnational delivery of humanitarian aid (at least in outlook) will continue to underline the disconnection between key security and development actors and the populations they claim to serve.

Programmatic implications: The following key questions are raised for programmatic interveners: Does this change who gets to participate in peace talks? Does it change the kinds of interventions and policy options that are put on the table? How should the African Union or the regional economic communities think about the communities affected? There are programmatic implications of adapting to peoples' realities in the Sahel in terms of other critical actors that have been left out of the processes as well as the issues at the focus of the responses.

What is to be done?

Key recommendations

- a) **African Union and regional actors as well as the United Nations should adopt an authentic region-based approach with transnational application.** Their level of analysis of the Sahelian situation needs to shift from an intensely national focus to a transnational one. A collective regional agenda with transnational implementation of programmatic interventions offers a more relevant framework for responding to Sahelian conditions and reaching populations whose lives straddle different State boundaries.

- b) National governments along the affected Sahelian corridors should draw regional lessons for programmes that work nationally by scaling up successful programmes at the national level into regional and transnational spaces.** Governments in the region should tone down their exclusive focus on State-related barriers, to exploit opportunities for local lessons learning from the common situation of the Sahel.
- c) All agencies responding to conflict and insecurity in the Sahel should view engagement with subnational, non-formal stakeholders as a necessary part of dealing with the transnational character of the Sahel.** In effect, security and development services should follow people's movement and operate across border areas.
- d) The United Nations, the African Union and regional organizations should redirect their Sahel strategy toward regional organization (targeting Sahelian States) and transnational implementation of policies and programmes (targeting Sahelian peoples across national boundaries).** The management of security in the Sahel and facilitation of development for the Sahelian peoples is beyond the capacity of any individual State.
- e) Operational agencies working on the Sahel should reposition their operational presence toward patterns of population movement in the region.** Invariably, the collective redirection of the Sahelian strategy toward transnational application of policy and programmes will encourage the desired change in operational patterns among the relevant agencies.
- f) There is a need for a comparative analysis of existing policies on the Sahel:** This should include policies of the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, G5, and the European Union.

Annexes

Annex 1: Case study matrix and data method

Table A1.1: Case study matrix and data method

Case study research	Indicative research questions explored	Output
The Sahel as a security complex	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the structural, proximate and conflict sustaining causes of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel? 2. What are the transnational connections in the dynamic of causes, actors and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel? 3. What are the response patterns to armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity in the Sahel, and what are the lessons to be learned from these? 4. How have armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities shaped the international relations of Sahelian countries or Sahel region? 	Case study report on the Sahel as a security complex
Impact of armed conflicts and insecurity in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How have armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity shaped economic processes and growth patterns in affected areas and countries in the Sahel? 2. How have armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities affected human capital (provision and access to basic services such as education, health, housing, employment, etc.) development in affected areas and countries in the Sahel? 3. How have armed conflicts and large-scale insecurities impacted on trade and investment patterns (including tourism) in affected areas and countries in the Sahel? 4. What is the impact of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity on democratic governance and processes in affected areas and countries in the Sahel? 5. What are the effects of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity on human rights and civil liberties in Sahelian areas or countries? 6. In what ways have armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity affected security sector governance and operations in Sahelian areas and countries? 7. What are the noticeable effects of armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity on inter-group relations and national cohesion in Sahelian countries? 8. How have armed conflicts and large-scale insecurity shaped the international relations of Sahelian countries? 	5 Case study reports on the impact of armed conflict and insecurity in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.

Data methods

The case study approach adopted used a combination of qualitative and quantitative data derived from four sources, namely, key informant interviews, focus group sessions, document analysis and data mapping. The study involved field missions to at least the five frontline States (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria), where the research team interacted with officials of national governments, aid and development agencies, representatives of international organizations, civil society groups, women groups, youth, media, and people directly affected by armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel (victims, internally displaced persons, refugees, etc.). The use of multiple data types and sources allowed the research to cross check and compare (triangulate) inferences from different data methods, thereby ensuring the robustness, validity, reliability and logicity of data and research findings.

The description of the use of the four data methods is provided as follows:

- a) **Key informant interviews:** this involved semi-structured interviews with identifiable respondents such as government officials (in the security sector, parliamentarians, humanitarian and disaster relief agencies, poverty alleviation agencies, central banks, and ministries of finance, women and children, youth, health, and education); civil society groups (non-governmental organizations, community associations, religious bodies and leaders, and charity organizations); media practitioners; chambers of commerce and private sector organizations and actors; academics; and internally displaced persons and other people directly affected by armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel. This enabled the study to gain invaluable insights into the nature, dynamics and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel at the micro (individual and community) and macro (societal and national) levels.
- b) **Focus group sessions (FGD):** This involved group conversations and discussions by a select group of six to eight respondents with a view to gauging group-level opinions and consensus and differences in the understanding and assessment of the root causes and impacts of the armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel. Given the strong influence of patriarchy and the reality of youth bulges in the frontline States, a targeted FGD session involving women and youth was explored.
- c) **Document analysis:** This involved a survey and review of literature on conflict, security and development in the Sahel. These included policy documents (of national governments, regional organizations and international multilateral agencies and institutions); reports of fact finding missions and public inquiries; reports of civil society groups, non-governmental organizations and aid and humanitarian agencies; records of parliamentary debates and specialist briefings; media reports, published academic papers and reports; press releases and statements by national governments and armed groups; etc. This data source allowed the study to ground its assessment in secondary sources, connect primary data from key informant interviews and focus group sessions with extant knowledge, and expand the evidence base of the study.

d) Survey of extant statistical data sets: This involved an assessment of existing data sets to map the range of available statistics available on socioeconomic and governance issues, and quantitative evidence linked to the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurities in the Sahel. Some of the potential data sets surveyed included the Human Development Index, the World Development Report, the African Development Bank Country Reports, the World Bank Country Reports, the African Governance Reports, the Global Peace Index, national-level data (from central banks, ministries of finance, national budgets, and bureaus of statistics) and reports on refugees and internally displaced persons reports. This data type and source allowed the study to connect qualitative with quantitative evidence, and to survey the extent to which extant data reflected the realities of socioeconomic, political and governance dynamics of the Sahel.

Table A1.2: Data matrix

Method	Data type	Indicative sources and respondents	Expected excerpts	Link to research problem/question
Key informant interviews	Qualitative	Government officials (relevant ministries departments and agencies); parliamentarians; security sector agencies; aid and humanitarian agencies; members and leaders of local communities, religious groups, and civil society groups; members of chambers of commerce and private sector institutions; media practitioners; academics; victims of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel areas	Insights, narratives, life histories, personal experiences, accounts of events and quotes related to the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel.	Assessment of the research questions and frontline State case studies.
Focus group sessions	Qualitative	Members and leaders of local communities affected; women's groups; youth groups; civil society activists; religious groups; and media practitioners.	Individual and group-level discussions, consensus, insights, narratives and accounts of events linked to the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity in the Sahel.	Assessment of research questions; and frontline State case studies.
Document analysis	Qualitative and quantitative	Policy documents (national budgets, conflict management strategies, counter-terrorism strategies, anti-terror legislations); reports of judicial panels of inquiries and fact finding missions; records of parliamentary debates and expert briefing sessions to national and international assemblies; reports of civil society groups and non-governmental bodies; media reports; reports of chambers of commerce, stock exchange, and private sector bodies; country fragility assessment reports; reports of election observer missions, etc.	Qualitative and quantitative insights and statistical data on the root causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity on populations and broader economic and governance issues in the Sahel.	Assessment of the primary research question and frontline State case studies.

Method	Data type	Indicative sources and respondents	Expected excerpts	Link to research problem/question
Data and statistical mapping	Quantitative	UNDP HDI reports; WDR; AfDB Reports; African Governance Index/ Report; central bank reports; national budget reports; socioeconomic data sets (from national bureau of statistics); Global Peace Index; Military and security expenditure data (from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)); refugees and internally displaced persons reports	Provide trend analysis of socioeconomic indicators (education, health, housing, mortality and life expectancy, displacement, etc.); macroeconomic indicators (GDP, foreign direct investments; trade levels and balances; etc.); and comparative assessment of social versus military/security spending	Contribute to the assessment of research questions and frontline State case studies.

Annex 2: Statistical assessment of the impact of conflict on economic growth and governance in the Sahel region

The objective of this paper is to analyse empirically the impact of conflict on economic growth and governance in the Sahel region. This objective is in line with the primary question of the overall study - "What are the causes and impacts of armed conflicts and insecurity on development in the Sahel?" To answer this question, we use a panel data set of 11 countries from 1990 to 2014. The 11 countries are selected based on the broader definition of the Sahel region that includes Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan. However, the analysis focuses on the five frontline States that make up the two conflict corridors of the Sahel under focus in this study. This chapter goes beyond the case study approach to address the project's overall regional dimension. We adopt a broad definition of conflict, because of the limited data available on conflict. The relatively long time frame covered by this section is because of the fact that the recent events in Mali and Nigeria stem from historical grievances that have challenged and impeded the State-building process across the Sahelian region. The methodology of choice for the empirical analysis is the instrumental variables estimator. This methodology controls for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality (endogeneity).

The present study differs from earlier studies by Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti²⁹¹ and Ciccone²⁹², for instance, in that: it considers the link between conflict and economic growth or governance; it examines conflict using military expenditures measured as a share of GDP; and lastly it considers a more recent era (1990–2014).

The empirical model and methodology

Our empirical analysis aims to assess the impact of conflict on economic growth and governance in the frontline States. However, conflict and economic growth or governance are locked in a circular relationship. Conflict creates poor economic conditions that cause further decline in economic performance and growth. In turn, this worsens a country's macroeconomic environment and creates conditions that drive conflict. A naïve empirical analysis would result in inconsistent estimators, as a result of reverse causality or endogeneity between conflict and economic growth or governance. Empirically, this is translated into two biases, omitted variables and measurement error problems that must be corrected to ensure consistency.²⁹³ Therefore, we use the instrument variables (IV) estimator as our preferred estimation methodology. The empirical model is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \beta X_{it} + \gamma C_{it} + \theta_i + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{it}^Y$$

$$G_{it} = \beta T_{it} + \gamma C_{it} + \theta_i + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{it}^G$$

$$C_{it} = \gamma Z_{it} + \theta_i + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{it}^C$$

291 Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach. *Journal of political Economy*, 112, 4, pp. 725-753.

292 Ciccone, A. (2011). "Economic shocks and civil conflict: A comment". *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. 3(4), pp. 215-227.

293 C. Baum, *An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata*. Stata Press, 2006, pp. 340. See also J. Wooldridge, *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. MIT Press, 2002, pp. 741.

Where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cov}[C_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}^Y] \neq 0, \text{Cov}[C_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}^G] \neq 0 \\ E[\varepsilon_{it}^C] = 0, E[\varepsilon_{it}^Y] = 0, E[\varepsilon_{it}^G] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

In the first equation, the dependent variable is the per capita growth rate of GDP capita (Y_{it}). The dependent variables of the second and third equation are governance (G_{it}) and conflict (C_{it}), respectively. C_{it} is a proxy for conflict in country i and time t . X_{it} is a $K \times 1$ vector of exogenous variables that determine growth. We have selected these variables based on the literature on the nexus of economic growth and conflict. T_{it} is a $K \times 1$ vector of exogenous variables of governance. As with X_{it} , we rely on the literature on governance for selecting these variables. The three error terms are independent and identically distributed (IID).

$\text{Cov}[C_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}^Y] \neq 0$ and $\text{Cov}[C_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}^G] \neq 0$ indicate that C_{it} is correlated with the error terms in the first and second equations. This implies that conflict is endogenous. Therefore, we must find a variable—instrument variable (Z_{it})—that is uncorrelated with ε_{it}^G but correlated to economic growth (Y_{it}) and governance (G_{it}) in order to derive consistent estimators.²⁹⁴

In the three equations, we alternately introduce unobserved country- (θ_j) and time- (φ_t) fixed effects to capture time-invariant country characteristics and country-specific time trends that can be correlated with conflict, economic growth, and governance. Apart from correcting the problem of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement errors, the added advantage of the IV estimator is its adaptability to long time series and large sample sizes. We use panel data from 11 countries over a 24-year-period. The 11 countries are selected based on the broader definition of the Sahel region that includes Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Sudan. However, analysis focuses on the five frontline States that make up the two corridors of the Sahel.²⁹⁵ This provides us with a large sample of 275 observations and a smaller sample of 121 observations. This small sample for the regressions focusing on the five frontline States can undermine the robustness of our estimates. Therefore, we correct this problem using a degrees-of-freedom adjustment.²⁹⁶

Another analytical shortcoming is the problem of differentiating the impact of conflict from the impact of declining economic growth. This is particularly important, taking into account that, during the period under consideration, the frontline countries experienced economic downturn, the structural adjustment programmes, the financial crisis, and other economic shocks. The inclusion of country and time fixed effects correct for this shortcoming.

The empirical model defines two relationships, which we alternatively analyse. The first relationship is between conflict and economic growth; the second is between

294 Ibid.

295 This is operationalized by using the if condition of the IV estimation available in Stata.

296 J. Wooldridge, *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. MIT Press, 2002, pp. 741.

conflict and governance. Therefore, the empirical analysis is operationalized in two steps (see the empirical results section below).

The growth equation

We rely on the literature on economic growth for guidance in selecting variables for the growth equation. The strategy is to identify factors that affect a country's performance to ensure robust results. In the growth equation, we consider macroeconomic and human capital variables and government indicators that capture different aspects of macroeconomics policy, human capital, and governance indicators. The growth equation is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \text{InitGDPpc}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Invest}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{M2}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Trade}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{SecEnr}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Inflat}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{GovCons}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Rulelaw}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Conflict}_{it} + \beta_{11} Y_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}^Y$$

The dependent variable (Y_{it}) is the per capita GDP growth, and Init.GDPpc_{it} is the initial per-capita GDP of country i in 1990. We introduce the initial GDP to capture the initial conditions of countries in 1990, thus capturing the convergence effects between countries. The coefficient for the initial GDP is expected to be negative because the gap between national GDP growth rates diminishes over time.²⁹⁷ In the growth equation, we include a proxy for investment (Invest_{it}) to capture the source of capital formation. A priori, investment positively affects growth.²⁹⁸ M2_{it} is a proxy for broad money, a variable that captures a country's financial development.²⁹⁹

We include Trade_{it} , the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP, as a proxy for trade policy. This variable captures trade volume. The theoretical and empirical literature has not been unanimous on the impact of trade volume on economic growth because different definitions and measures have been used for trade openness.³⁰⁰ We also introduce one variable for human capital (SecEnr_{it}). The coefficient for secondary school enrolment is expected to be positive.³⁰¹ Finally we include inflation (Inflat_{it}) to capture monetary policy as suggested by Fischer.³⁰² Inflation is defined as the consumer price index; we expect its coefficient to be negative. GovCons_{it} , or government consumption, is a proxy for fiscal policies. Both theoretical and empirical literature predicts a negative correlation between government consumption and economic growth.³⁰³

297 Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995). *Economic Growth*, New York: McGraw-Hill,

298 Johansson, P. (2010). Debt Relief, Investment and Growth, *World Development*, 38 (9); pp. 1204-1216.

299 King, R.G. and R. Levine (1993). Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3), pp. 717-737.

300 Rodriguez, F. and D. Rodrik (2001). Trade policy and economic growth: A skeptic's guide to the cross-national evidence. In *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000*, Volume 15 (pp. 261-338). MIT Press. See also Yanikkaya, H. (2003). Trade openness and economic growth: a cross-country empirical investigation. *Journal of Development economics*, 72(1), pp. 57-89.

301 Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (2): pp. 407-443. See also Barro, R. J., & J. W. Lee. (1993). International Comparisons of Educational Attainment. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 86(2): pp. 218-223. See also Mankiw, N. G., D. Romer, & D. Weil. (1992). A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107 (2): pp. 407-437.

302 Fischer, S. (1993). The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 32 (3): pp. 485-512.

303 Barro, R. J. (1988). Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth.

*Rulelaw*_{it} captures both the law and order aspects of governance, reflecting both the population confidence and abidance to the judiciary.³⁰⁴ Rigobon and Rodrik found that both rule of law and democracy produce better institutions and higher income, two mutually reinforcing indicators.³⁰⁵ Collier and others demonstrated that conflict is negatively related to growth.³⁰⁶ Collier estimated that, on average, civil war reduces growth by 2.3 per cent per year, lasts seven years, and worsens a country's poverty by 15 per cent. Y_{it-1} is the lag of per capita GDP growth and is introduced to capture the previous growth rate's impact on the contemporary growth rate.³⁰⁷ This variable can also capture previous-year macroeconomic context and policies for which we do not account in the empirical model. Below is the correlation matrix of the different variables of the growth equation and conflict (Table A2.1).

The governance equation

We rely on the literature regarding the determinants of governance for guidance in selecting variables for the governance equation. As in the case of the growth equation, we include only factors that directly affect governance. The governance equation is as follows:

$$G_{it} = \alpha + \alpha_1 \text{Conflict}_{it} + \alpha_2 \text{Womparl}_{it} + \alpha_3 \text{GDPpc}_{it} + \alpha_4 \text{Ethnicfract}_{it} + \alpha_5 \text{Religfract}_{it} + \alpha_6 \text{FrenchCol}_{it} + \alpha_{10} \text{EnglishCol}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^G$$

Following the governance definition of Kaufman and others, G_{it} is the average of six governance indicators that capture the three aspects of governance as defined above.³⁰⁸ The six indicators are control of corruption, law and order, the quality of bureaucracy, government effectiveness, political stability, voice and accountability, and regulatory quality. This variable measures the perception of corruption, including supplementary bribes required to ensure that requests are fulfilled, the effects of corruption on the business environment, and corruption among the elite.³⁰⁹ Hence, corruption represents a challenge of governance. Rule of law captures both the law and order aspects of governance. Rule of law reflects both the population confidence and abidance to the judiciary.³¹⁰ Rigobon and Rodrik found that both rule of law and democracy produce better institutions and that these two indicators are mutually reinforcing.³¹¹

304 Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton, (1999a). Governance matters. Policy research working paper, 2196. See also Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton. Aggregating governance indicators. World Bank policy research working paper, (2195), 1999; see also Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, & P. Zoido-Lobaton, Governance matters II: updated indicators for 2000-01, *World Bank policy research working paper*, (2772), 2002.

305 Rigobon, R., and D. Rodrik (2005). Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income. *Economics of transition*, 13, 3, pp. 533-564.

306 P. Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler, A. and M. Soderbom. Post-Conflict Risks. CSAE WPS/2006-12, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2006; see also P. Collier. The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European Development Policy. University of Oxford, 2009.

307 P. Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

308 D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton. Governance matters. *Policy research working paper*, 2196, 1999 See also D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, A., and P. Zoido-Lobaton. Aggregating governance indicators. *World Bank policy research working paper*, 2195, 1999. See also D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton. Governance matters II: updated indicators for 2000-2001. *World Bank policy research working paper*, 2772?, 2002.

309 Ibid.

310 Ibid.

311 R. Rigobon and D. Rodrik (2005). Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income. *Economics of transition*, 13, 3, pp. 533-564.

Government effectiveness and regulatory quality captures two aspects of the government's ability to formulate and implement policies.³¹² Government effectiveness measures the quality of bureaucracy and the public service provision, the competence of civil servants, etc. The regulatory quality concentrates on policies. Van de Walle argued that an independent public administration provides a buffer for political turbulence.³¹³ La Porta and others³¹⁴ and Shleifer and Vishny³¹⁵ asserted that greater government intervention negatively influences efficiency. Political stability is an index of the public's perception of how likely the government is to be overthrown via possibly unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism.³¹⁶ This indicator captures policy continuity. Jensen and Wantchekon found empirical evidence that resource abundance is a key determinant of African political regimes.³¹⁷ They observed that resource abundance provides the incumbent government with an advantage and political stability that can spur tougher policies toward the opposition.³¹⁸ Voice and accountability measure the perception that citizens are able to participate in their country's electoral process and that they have a free and independent media.

We introduced $GDPpc_{it}$, the GDP per capita, in governance, following the guidance of La Porta and others, who found empirical evidence that nations whose poverty levels are high, who are close to the equator, who are ethno linguistically heterogeneous, or whose populations include high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance.³¹⁹ We also controlled for colonial history through two dummy variables: $FrenchCol_{it}$ and $EnglishCol_{it}$. These are two dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a country is a French or English colony or 0 if not.

$Womparl_{it}$ is the instrument variable for the governance equation. It measures the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women.³²⁰ In other words, $Womparl_{it}$ captures women's political participation. In the two last decades, women's participation in politics has dramatically increased in most developing countries and has made national institutions more representative while raising legislators' awareness about women's issues and needs. This has also aroused the interest of policymakers and academics. In a case study examining the impact of the rise in the number of female parliamentarians in the Tanzanian legislature, Yoon found that the growth in women's legislative representation has positively affected parliamentary debates and atmospheres, attitudes toward female parliamentarians, recruitment of women into parliament and policy outcomes.³²¹ Swamy and others noted that corruption is negatively correlated with the proportion of women in

312 D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton. Governance matters. *Policy research working paper*, 2196, 1999.

313 S. Van de Walle. Measuring bureaucratic quality in governance indicators. 8th Public Management Research Conference, Los Angeles, United States, 2005.

314 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, The quality of government. *Journal of Law, Economics, and organization*, 15, 1, 1999, pp. 222-279.

315 A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. Corruption. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108, 1999, pp. 599-617.

316 D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton, Governance matters. Policy research working paper, 2196, 1999.

317 N. Jensen and L. Wantchekon. Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. *Comparative political studies*. 37, 7, 2004. pp. 816-841.

318 Ibid.

319 R. La Porta and others. The quality of government. 1999.

320 World Bank Group (Ed.) (2012). *World Development Indicators*.

321 M. Y. Yoon, "More women in the Tanzanian legislature: Do numbers matter?" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29, 1, 2011, pp. 83-98.

parliament, in the work force and in senior government positions.³²² A study on the Indian experience with political reservation in village councils discovered significant evidence that female leaders make policy decisions differently from their male counterparts, while increasing the overall participation of women in the political process.³²³ However, these studies looked at this variable in the context of a country in peacetime. Women's political participation in fragile or failed States may not produce the same results as presented above. Therefore, we cannot predict the sign of this variable a priori.

Ethnic fractionalization (*Ethnicfract_{it}*) weakens governance because in an ethnically diverse society, public officials from one ethnic group have the incentive to restrict political freedom and political participation from other ethnic groups, as well as redistributing rents, national income, and wealth to their own ethnic group from others.³²⁴ Empirical studies on the impact of ethnic fractionalization are unanimous as to the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on governance.³²⁵ Here, we rely on data from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (QOG), which defines *ethnicity* as a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics.³²⁶ Therefore, ethnically diverse countries receive higher points. Likewise, religious fractionalization (*Religfract_{it}*) reflects the tension stemming from a society's domination by a single religion that can seek to exclude other religions by laws (ICRG, 2014). Alesina and others examined whether ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, have an impact on the quality of institutions and growth.³²⁷ Their results partly confirm previous results on the impact of fractionalization on growth and governance; however, they found that religion fractionalization positively affects good governance and concluded that countries with more religious diversity tend to be more tolerant and free. The data on religion fractionalization is from the QOG dataset, which defined it as the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same religious group; hence, the higher the number, the more fractionalized the society.³²⁸

See the end of this annex for the correlation matrix of the different variables of the conflict equation and the governance indicators (Table A2.2). The correlation matrix indicates a strong and highly significant correlation among the variables.

322 A. Swamy, S. Knack, Y. Lee, & O. Azfar, "Gender and corruption." *Journal of development economics*, 64, 1, 2001, pp. 25-55.

323 L. Beaman, E. Duflo, R. Pande, & P. Topalova, *Political reservation and substantive representation: Evidence from Indian village councils*.

324 F. Al-Marhubi, "The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis", *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 22(3), 2010, pp. 394-406.

325 La Porta et al, "The quality of government", 1999; See also P. Mauro, "Corruption and growth", *The quarterly journal of economics*, 1995, pp. 681-712.

326 J. Teorell, S. Dahlberg, S. Holmberg, B. Rothstein, F. Hartmann, & R. Svensson, *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset*, version Jan15, University of Gothenburg, The Quality of Government Institute, 2015, <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.

327 Alesina, A. and others "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic growth*, 8(2), 2003, pp. 155-194.

328 J. Teorell and others. *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset*, version Jan15. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 2015 at: <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.

The conflict equation

$$Conflict_{it} = \delta_1 + \delta_2 MilitExp_{it} + \theta_i + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{it}^C$$

Conflict refers to armed conflict, which is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a State, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”.³²⁹ Therefore, we use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a joint project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset further disaggregated conflict into four types: extra systemic (conflict between a State and a non-State group outside its own territory), inter-State (conflict occurring between two or more States), internal (conflict occurring between the government of a State and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other States), and internationalized internal armed conflict (occurring between the government of a State and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other States (secondary parties) on one or both sides). The dataset also noted details on the start and end dates of each conflict and codifies the intensity of each conflict according to the number of battle-deaths in a given year. Minor [conflicts] result in 25–999 battle-related deaths in a given year and wars result in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.³³⁰

The dummy variable $Conflict_{it}$ takes the value of 1 if the conflicts have caused 25 or more battle-deaths or the value of 0 if the conflicts have generated less than 25 battle-deaths. Although the five frontline countries have experienced one or two of these four types of conflict at some point in the past, this paper indicates a difference in the types of conflict in the empirical analysis. It does not differentiate between minor conflict and war. These decisions are made solely based on the limited availability of data.

$MilitExp_{it}$ represents military expenditures measured as a share of GDP and is the instrument variable. The data on military expenditure come from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Theoretical and empirical literature has not been in agreement on the impact of military expenditures on governance and economic growth. There is, however, a consensus regarding the link between conflict and military expenditures. On the one hand, it appears intuitive that a country increases its military expenditure if it perceives an internal or external threat to its stability or security. From this perspective, military expenditures are a cause of conflict. Pieroni asserted that at the first threat of insecurity military expenditure increases and causes government resources for non-military expenditure to be reallocated to military expenditure.³³¹ Dunne and Perlo-Freeman stated that both internal and external threats have a positive relationship with military expenditure.³³²

329 N. Gleditsch and others. Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5), 2002 pp. 615–637.

330 Ibid.

331 L. Pieroni. Military expenditure and economic growth. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 20(4), 2009, pp. 327–339.

332 J. P. Dunne and S. Perlo-Freeman. The demand for military spending in developing countries: A dynamic panel analysis. *Defence and Peace Economics*. 14, 6, 2003. pp. 461–474.

On the other hand, increased military expenditure is a consequence of conflict if the country increases its military expenditure as a result of conflict. This crowds out other government expenditures, changes the composition of public spending and causes a reallocation of government resources from productive government expenditures to military expenditures, resulting in lower economic performance. This is particularly true if the country imports most or all of its military supplies. All the countries in the sample are importers of arms.

The government's main role is to guarantee the country's security by providing defence services, which places its armed forces on the demand side of the military supplies economy. By their very nature, armed forces are shrouded in secrecy, making it almost impossible to know the true value of military budgets as well as how military budgets are allocated. This secrecy engenders corruption. Gupta and others examined the link between corruption and military expenditures, concluding that corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses both the supply and the demand side consideration of arms deals.³³³ Foreign suppliers and arms producers can bribe government officials responsible for importing arms and military equipment. On the demand side, there is no transparency in military equipment procurement.³³⁴ However, corruption is only one aspect of governance. θ_i and φ_t are country- and time-fixed effects. Their inclusion in the conflict equation corrects for possible circular relationship among the three endogenous variables.

Descriptive statistics

We use data from various sources, including the World Development Indicators (WDI), the Human Development Report (HDR), the Uppsala Conflict Datasets (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) and SIPRI. Table A2.8 at the end of this report contains both the definition and the sources of each variable. Table 2.3 provides a summary statistics of variables. The mean rate of per capita growth is 1.22 per cent for the full sample and 1.48 per cent for the five frontline States.³³⁵ In 2004, Nigeria had the highest per capita growth rate of 30.34 per cent. Chad had the lowest per capita growth rate of -18.33 per cent in 1993. In 2005, Mauritania had the largest percentage of gross capital formation or investment measured as a percentage of GDP. Sudan reached a three-digit inflation of 132.82 in 1996. The highest secondary school enrolment rate was recorded in Algeria in 2012. In 2014, women held 43.3 per cent of parliamentary seats in Senegal, whereas Nigeria had 6.7 per cent.³³⁶

In Figures A2.1, A2.2, and A2.3 at the end of this chapter, we illustrate the relationships between the three endogenous variables (economic growth, governance, and conflict) and the instrument variable (military expenditure). Figure A2.1 displays an almost perfect linear relationship between economic growth rate and conflict. Figure A2.2 confirms the negative relationship between governance and conflict. The positive trend line in Figure A2.3 suggests that conflict causes an increase of military expenditure. The downward trend line between economic growth and

333 S. Gupta, L. De Mello and R. Sharan. Corruption and military spending. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 17, 4. 2001. Pp. 749-777.

334 *Ibid.*

335 The descriptive statistics of the frontline States variables are available upon request.

336 World Bank Group (Ed.). (2015). *World Development Indicators 2012*. World Bank Publications.

increased military expenditure attests to the negative impact of military expenditure on economic growth.

Empirical results

We begin this section by presenting the results of the base specification for the growth equation using both the OLS and IV estimators. The results are presented in Tables A2.4 and A2.5 at the end of this annex. Caution is required in the interpretation of the estimates obtained using the OLS because of the circular relationship between growth and conflict, which introduces a strong bias in the results. The variable of interest in the regression is conflict. Columns 2 and 4 through 6 report the regression results of the small sample made of the five frontline States. We further control for the time or country fixed effects except for the last column, where both fixed effects is controlled. Most variables in Table A2.4 have their intuitive signs, but their significance varies based on the sample and fixed effect. The coefficient of the variable of interest is negative and insignificant in all columns, suggesting that conflict does not affect the economic growth of countries in the Sahel region regardless of how the Sahel region is defined.

In Tables A2.4 and A2.5, openness and the rule of law are both negative and significant. The signs of these two variables are opposite to their intuitive signs. However, this is not counterintuitive because it takes into account the broader conflict contexts of the sample. A country's wartime political economy is quite different from its peacetime political economy. If openness enhances growth in peacetime, this may not necessarily be the case in conflict time, because greater trade liberalization can promote the smuggling of arms across borders and contribute to worsening conflict and economic decline. The negative coefficient of the rule of law can also be explained in the same conflict context. Rule of law can negatively affect growth because of the State's perceived lack of legitimacy, sovereignty or authority within some regions. This is particularly true in the context of civil war or rebellion.

Similar to the data in Table A2.4, the variable of interest (conflict) is mostly negative and not significant. The conflict variable coefficient is significant in the sixth column at 10 per cent. There is evidence of convergence among the Sahelian countries even in the conflict context, as shown by the negative and significant coefficient of the initial GDP. Surprisingly, gross capital formation or investment and secondary school enrolment are important for growth. This result is not entirely counterintuitive as most civil wars in the Sahel region are localized; hence, because the destruction of fixed capital affects only a small part of the country, increased investment in the peaceful part of the country can offset the destruction of investment in conflict-affected areas. The coefficient of the lagged growth rate is negative and significant for both the large and small sample. This attests to the protracted and negative impacts of conflict.

We test the validity and strength of the instrument variable by performing two different tests: Hausman and Sargan. We also report the partial R squared that measures the interconnections among the instruments.³³⁷ The p-values of the Hausman test rejects attest to the endogeneity of conflict in columns 3–8. Therefore, the IV estimators are more consistent than the OLS estimators. The p-values of the Sargan test attest that

337 Baum, C.(2006). *An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata*. Stata Press, p. 340.

the empirical model is exactly identified. The low partial R squared suggests that the instrument variable is sufficiently relevant.

Next, we present the governance specification regression. We follow the same strategy as in the previous regression (alternately controlling for the time- and country-fixed effects, distinguishing between large and small samples and correcting for the small sample bias). Table A2.6 presents the results of the OLS estimator, and Table A2.7 presents the IV estimators. The estimate of the conflict variable is negative and significant in seven out of the eight columns.

The *women in parliament coefficient* is negative and mostly significant (columns 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8) in Table A2.6. As predicted above, the sign of this variable is opposite to the intuitive sign of women's political participation. This can be explained by the conflict context of the sampled countries and a persistent culture of gender inequality in these countries. The coefficient of the GDP per capita variables is small but has its intuitive signs. Ethnic fractionalization improves for governance, whereas religious fractionalization weakens governance.

Moving from OLS to the IV estimator results presented in Table A2.7, we observe that while the signs of the variables remain unchanged, their significance level changes. Focusing on the frontline States results presented in the even number columns, we immediately notice that conflict negatively affects governance. Surprisingly, on the one hand, the coefficients for other variables are more significant, except for that of the conflict variables for the frontline States. On the other hand, in the odd-numbered columns, we observe that only two variables are significant, not counting the conflict variable coefficient, which is highly significant for the large country sample. This result is surprising and interesting from a policy perspective. Indeed, the results suggest that the other determinants of governance play a role in mitigating the negative impact of conflict on governance, particularly in the frontline States.

The two most important results of these regressions are that the negative impact of conflict is more pronounced on governance than on growth in the frontline States. The other determinants of governance play a key role in mitigating the impact of conflict on governance.

These results resonate with those of extended literature on the consequences of conflict on both economic development and growth. The seminal work of Collier on the economic consequences of civil war describes the process through which civil war, in particular, affects GDP.³³⁸ The first process involves the destruction of physical capital. The consequences of civil war are weakened, however, as unlike international wars, the technology used is low. Secondly, civil wars create extra costs for achieving the same outcomes. During such wars, roads become unsafe, making trade unsafe and compelling the countries to increase the costs of securing roads. This results in lowering of trade efficiency and erosion of government resources. Moreover, conflict results in the suppression of civil liberties, the breakdown of social order and the lack of clear frontline demarcation, which contribute to declining economic

338 Collier, P. (1999). Doing Well out of War. The World Bank, 28137. Prepared for the Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, 26-27 April 1999.

performance. The third process involves the reallocation of public expenditure from output-enhancing activities to military expenditures. This further expands the power of the armed forces and police and contributes to the deterioration of the rule of law.

Concluding remarks

This section investigates the impact of conflict on governance and economic growth in the Sahel region with focus on the five frontline States (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria). The two most important results of these regressions are that the negative impact of conflict is more pronounced on governance than on growth in the frontline States. The other determinants of governance play key roles in mitigating the impact of conflict on governance. These results are interesting from a policy standpoint because they suggest that it is important to strengthen governance to mitigate the negative impact of conflict. Poor governance is the main cause of conflict.

Tables

Table A 2.1: Correlation matrix between conflict and macroeconomic indicators

Variables	Growth	Conflict	Initial GDP	Capital formation	M2	Openness	Secondary enrollment	Inflation	Government Consumption	Rule of law
Conflict	0.0783 (0.2047)									
Initial GDP	-0.0147 (0.8118)	0.362 (0.0000)								
Capital formation	0.1162 (0.0599)	0.0456 (0.462)	0.1508 (0.0144)							
M2	-0.0466 (0.4631)	0.1179 (0.0626)	0.6797 (0.0000)	0.4091 (0.0000)						
Openness	-0.1222 (0.0759)	-0.0102 (0.8792)	0.0792 (0.2391)	-0.0293 (0.6725)	0.2185 (0.0018)					
Secondary enrollment	0.0761 (0.2916)	0.3693 (0.0000)	0.8356 (0.0000)	0.2007 (0.0051)	0.8088 (0.0000)	-0.0156 (0.8486)				
Inflation	0.0076 (0.9027)	0.2311 (0.0001)	0.0643 (0.2915)	-0.1947 (0.0015)	-0.0899 (0.1565)	0.0748 (0.2705)	0.2172 (0.0023)			
Government consumption	-0.0942 (0.1277)	-0.2003 (0.0011)	0.0528 (0.3938)	0.2952 (0.0000)	0.2746 (0.0000)	0.1576 (0.022)	-0.0195 (0.7874)	-0.2464 (0.0001)		
Rule of law	-0.0206 (0.8139)	-0.1601 (0.0553)	-0.1206 (0.1499)	0.1279 (0.1424)	0.1727 (0.0541)	0.1737 (0.0537)	-0.1256 (0.2353)	0.2313 (0.006)	-0.0224 (0.798)	
Lagged growth	0.1733 (0.0057)	0.0213 (0.7302)	-0.0147 (0.8118)	0.0841 (0.1834)	-0.0292 (0.6539)	-0.1311 (0.056)	0.0937 (0.2061)	-0.1058 (0.0886)	-0.0893 (0.1574)	-0.0694 (0.4258)

Note: Numbers between parentheses are the significance level.

Table A2.2: Correlation matrix between conflict and governance indicators

Variables	Conflict	Governance	Ethnic fractionalization	Religious fractionalization	French colony	English colony	Corruption	Government effectiveness	Political stability	Rule of law	Regulatory quality	Voice account	GDP pc
Governance	-0.5347 (0.0000)												
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.3104 (0.0000)	-0.1743 (0.0311)											
Religious fractionalization	-0.0702 (0.265)	-0.4863 (0.0000)	0.7445 (0.0000)										
French colony	-0.0369 (0.5425)	0.3835 (0.0000)	-0.3135 (0.0000)	-0.168 (0.0073)									
English colony	0.0369 (0.5425)	-0.3835 (0.0000)	0.3135 (0.0000)	0.168 (0.0073)	-1 (1.000)								
Corruption	-0.3336 (0.0000)	0.8588 (0.0000)	-0.3655 (0.0000)	-0.5268 (0.0000)	0.3555 (0.0000)	-0.3555 (0.0000)							
Government effectiveness	-0.3272 (0.0000)	0.8165 (0.0000)	-0.3257 (0.0000)	-0.5008 (0.0000)	0.2976 (0.0002)	-0.2976 (0.0002)	0.7946 (0.0000)						
Political stability	-0.6514 (0.0000)	0.874 (0.0000)	0.0231 (0.7767)	-0.3581 (0.0000)	0.324 (0.0000)	-0.324 (0.0000)	0.6365 (0.0000)	0.5937 (0.0000)					
Rule of law	-0.3994 (0.0000)	0.927 (0.0000)	-0.2674 (0.0008)	-0.6101 (0.0000)	0.2385 (0.003)	-0.2385 (0.003)	0.8016 (0.0000)	0.7857 (0.0000)	0.7499 (0.0000)				
Regulatory quality	-0.5011 (0.0000)	0.8893 (0.0000)	-0.1248 (0.1243)	-0.3868 (0.0000)	0.3571 (0.0000)	-0.3571 (0.0000)	0.7746 (0.0000)	0.6982 (0.0000)	0.723 (0.0000)	0.7952 (0.0000)			
Voice accountability	-0.3698 (0.0000)	0.8082 (0.0000)	-0.0733 (0.3679)	-0.2492 (0.0019)	0.4058 (0.0000)	-0.4058 (0.0000)	0.6093 (0.0000)	0.5667 (0.0000)	0.5851 (0.0000)	0.7219 (0.0000)	0.6949 (0.0000)		
GDP per cp	0.3973 (0.0000)	-0.2299 (0.0043)	-0.7229 (0.0000)	-0.2737 (0.0000)	0.0347 (0.575)	-0.0347 (0.575)	-0.0263 (0.7473)	0.0657 (0.4201)	-0.3806 (0.0000)	-0.1335 (0.0998)	-0.2391 (0.0029)	-0.2323 (0.0039)	
Women parliamentarians	-0.0871 (0.2297)	0.1597 (0.0633)	0.0044 (0.9545)	-0.077 (0.3166)	0.1282 (0.0764)	-0.1282 (0.0764)	0.2207 (0.0098)	0.1237 (0.1515)	0.0539 (0.5329)	0.2138 (0.0124)	0.1196 (0.1654)	0.1741 (0.0427)	-0.0347 (0.6431)

Note: Numbers between parentheses are the significance level.

Table A 2.3: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Growth pc	264	1.229808	4.489589	-18.33146	30.34408
Initial GDP	275	2384.414	2545.425	847.6067	10112.8
Gross Capital formation	263	20.02179	8.996863	4.562498	61.54311
Broad money (M2)	250	24.47737	12.95546	6.546494	67.40395
Gross secondary school enrolment	194	26.71644	18.87552	6.37521	97.60729
Inflation	271	9.272702	18.90511	-8.97474	132.8238
Government consumption	263	13.03121	5.094628	4.157404	34.28584
Rule of law	144	-0.744366	0.4489625	-1.633458	0.163488
Conflict	275	0.3709091	0.4839288	0	1
Military expenditure	249	0.01911	0.0130383	0	0.1054
Women in parliament	192	11.5125	7.956179	1.2	43.3
GDP pc, PPP	264	2766.295	2737.758	778.0746	12892.94
Ethnic fractionalization	254	0.7107793	0.1431668	0.3394	0.86349
Religious fractionalization	254	0.3464975	0.2764158	0.0091285	0.742145
French colony	275	0.7272727	0.4461737	0	1
English colony	275	0.2727273	0.4461737	0	1

FigureA2.2: Governance and conflict






Figure A2.1: Economic growth and conflict



FigureA2.4: Military expenditure and growth



FigureA2.3: Military expenditure and conflict




Table A2.4: OLS regression of conflict on economic growth

Independent variables	Dependent variable: per capita economic growth rate (per cent)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conflict	-0.9048 (0.342)	-0.9478 (0.522)	-0.1661 (0.884)	-0.0149 (0.992)	2.3674 (0.269)	2.1614 (0.377)
Initial GDP	-0.0009** (0.039)	-0.0004 (0.853)	-0.0000 (0.943)	-0.0035 (0.194)	0.0111** (0.042)	0.0091 (0.203)
Capital formation	0.2208*** (0.000)	0.1755** (0.039)	0.1636*** (0.009)	0.2059** (0.037)	0.2078 (0.110)	0.2096 (0.159)
M2	0.0236 (0.772)	-0.1032 (0.484)	-0.1592 (0.127)	-0.1089 (0.478)	-0.5501** (0.047)	-0.5811* (0.092)
Openness	-0.0029 (0.892)	-0.0607* (0.058)	-0.0392 (0.269)	-0.0270 (0.560)	-0.1261*** (0.008)	-0.0760 (0.286)
Secondary enrolment	0.0497 (0.313)	0.1316* (0.097)	0.1896*** (0.002)	0.1284 (0.156)	0.0164 (0.900)	-0.0462 (0.834)
Inflation	0.0124 (0.800)	-0.0916 (0.278)	-0.0121 (0.803)	-0.1402 (0.123)	-0.6168* (0.055)	-0.6687* (0.098)
Gov. Consumption	-0.1300 (0.253)	-0.0454 (0.805)	-0.6076** (0.011)	-0.5009 (0.125)	1.0034** (0.032)	0.6997 (0.345)
Rule of law	-1.3861 (0.251)	-5.2282** (0.048)	-0.4017 (0.808)	-9.6589 (0.135)	3.1470 (0.530)	-2.6143 (0.794)
Growth pct-1	-0.1004 (0.346)	-0.3126* (0.086)	-0.1919* (0.093)	-0.4542** (0.042)	-0.6314** (0.024)	-0.7312** (0.032)
Constant	-2.6029 (0.283)	0.2301 (0.963)	1.1367 (0.792)	8.1106 (0.420)	-12.2456 (0.177)	-9.4737 (0.543)
Observations	62	30	62	30	30	30
R-squared	0.348	0.628	0.593	0.706	0.840	0.868
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Frontline States		YES		YES	YES	YES

Notes: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.5: Instrumental variable estimation of conflict and economic growth

Independent variables	Dependent variable: per capita economic growth rate (per cent)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conflict	0.8915 (0.829)	-9.3734 (0.736)	1.4646 (0.318)	-0.3784 (0.886)	2.3280 (0.328)	-1.7993* (0.054)	0.5371 (0.617)	-0.7566 (0.505)
Initial GDP	-0.0012** (0.033)	-0.0048 (0.694)	-0.0012*** (0.005)	-0.0011 (0.638)	-0.0013*** (0.006)	-0.0017 (0.276)	-0.0011*** (0.006)	-0.0013 (0.472)
Capital formation	0.1824*** (0.002)	0.0627 (0.668)	0.1748*** (0.001)	0.0973* (0.066)	0.1633*** (0.006)	0.0918* (0.084)	0.1872*** (0.001)	0.0958* (0.054)
M2	0.0111 (0.920)	-0.0485 (0.878)	0.0051 (0.959)	0.0423 (0.478)	-0.0039 (0.971)	0.0279 (0.714)	0.0148 (0.877)	0.0385 (0.603)
Openness	-0.0058 (0.792)	-0.0031 (0.973)	-0.0076 (0.683)	-0.0340* (0.095)	-0.0104 (0.622)	-0.0292* (0.096)	-0.0046 (0.800)	-0.0327* (0.051)
Secondary enrolment	0.0872 (0.203)	0.2117 (0.549)	0.0942** (0.032)	0.0990* (0.086)	0.1047* (0.066)	0.1168*** (0.006)	0.0829** (0.031)	0.1037** (0.025)
Inflation	0.0484 (0.540)	0.1219 (0.866)	0.0437 (0.529)	-0.1031 (0.362)	0.0367 (0.607)	-0.0676 (0.303)	0.0513 (0.460)	-0.0937 (0.202)
Government consumption	-0.0445 (0.783)	-0.3479 (0.699)	-0.0248 (0.834)	-0.0803 (0.685)	0.0049 (0.969)	-0.1226 (0.360)	-0.0566 (0.614)	-0.0916 (0.546)
Rule of law	-1.5086 (0.363)	-8.0668 (0.193)	-1.3279 (0.312)	-6.7624*** (0.000)	-1.0556 (0.490)	-6.9685*** (0.000)	-1.6204 (0.202)	-6.8173*** (0.000)
Growth pct-1	-0.0203 (0.895)	-0.4821** (0.015)	-0.0173 (0.910)	-0.4399*** (0.005)	-0.0128 (0.935)	-0.4466*** (0.006)	-0.0221 (0.885)	-0.4417*** (0.007)
Constant	-3.5655 (0.193)	4.9554 (0.824)	-3.4945 (0.194)	-1.7926 (0.642)	-3.3876 (0.222)	-0.7267 (0.798)	-3.6093 (0.180)	-1.5089 (0.634)
Observations	51	24	51	24	51	24	51	24
R-squared	0.311		0.293	0.681	0.250	0.673	0.318	0.683
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Frontline States		YES		YES		YES		YES
Hausman Test,	0.8378	0.6882	0.2033	0.9166	0.2905	0.1902	0.5142	0.9889
Sargan Test	----	----	0.0267	0.6817	0.0447	0.3082	0.0332	0.3169
Partial R squared	9.5426	0.1074	12.2595	0.9087	2.1445	4.0572	6.0481	4.12708

Notes: p-values in parentheses. Regression corrected for small sample. Coefficients for country and time fixed effects not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.6: OLS estimation of conflict and governance

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Governance index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conflict	-0.3881*** (0.000)	-0.1138** (0.025)	-0.0923** (0.013)	-0.0914* (0.080)	-0.3850*** (0.000)	-0.0914* (0.083)	-0.0735** (0.036)	-0.0870 (0.102)
Women in parliament	-0.0011 (0.760)	-0.0125*** (0.004)	-0.0093*** (0.000)	-0.0132*** (0.003)	0.0030 (0.495)	-0.0116** (0.018)	-0.0021 (0.454)	-0.0135** (0.016)
GDP pc. PPP	-0.0000 (0.478)	0.0001*** (0.008)	0.0001* (0.063)	0.0000 (0.464)	-0.0000 (0.863)	0.0001*** (0.001)	0.0001*** (0.000)	0.0001 (0.209)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.4987 (0.322)	6.4495*** (0.000)	3.8818*** (0.001)	39.3722* (0.093)	0.7047 (0.185)	6.4974*** (0.000)	5.9548*** (0.000)	27.5404 (0.320)
Religion fractionalization	-0.9293*** (0.000)	-0.7994*** (0.004)	-1.1916* (0.082)	-8.0981 (0.119)	-0.9632*** (0.000)	-0.7644*** (0.004)	-2.1088*** (0.002)	-5.4383 (0.376)
French Colony	0.2928*** (0.000)	1.7042*** (0.000)	1.0683*** (0.000)	4.0894** (0.018)	0.3034*** (0.000)	1.7959*** (0.000)	0.8950*** (0.000)	3.3156 (0.102)
Constant	-0.7981** (0.040)	-6.3130*** (0.000)	-3.7051*** (0.000)	-28.6671* (0.072)	-1.0301** (0.013)	-6.5959*** (0.000)	-5.1130*** (0.000)	-20.8693 (0.267)
Observations	136	61	136	61	136	61	136	61
R-squared	0.614	0.835	0.912	0.841	0.632	0.890	0.934	0.891
Country FE	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Frontline States		YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. English colony dropped due to collinearity.

Table A2.7: IV estimation of conflict and governance

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Governance index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conflict	-1.2674*** (0.000)	-0.2891 (0.233)	-0.5923*** (0.000)	-0.3990* (0.052)	-1.1348*** (0.000)	-0.1849* (0.085)	-0.5613*** (0.000)	-0.1959* (0.069)
Women in parliament	-0.0038 (0.604)	-0.0140** (0.023)	0.0032 (0.399)	-0.0144** (0.021)	-0.0024 (0.708)	-0.0135** (0.025)	0.0035 (0.350)	-0.0135** (0.024)
GDP pc, PPP	0.0000 (0.170)	0.0001** (0.017)	-0.0000 (0.751)	0.0001*** (0.010)	0.0000 (0.196)	0.0001*** (0.005)	-0.0000 (0.651)	0.0001*** (0.005)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0081 (0.991)	7.8483*** (0.001)	0.1366 (0.781)	8.5677*** (0.000)	0.0333 (0.958)	7.1660*** (0.000)	0.1425 (0.774)	7.2379*** (0.000)
Religious fractionalization	-0.6970*** (0.002)	-1.0597** (0.021)	-0.7838*** (0.000)	-1.2073** (0.010)	-0.7141*** (0.001)	-0.9197*** (0.001)	-0.7878*** (0.000)	-0.9345*** (0.001)
French colony	0.2201* (0.054)	1.8693*** (0.000)	0.2158*** (0.000)	1.9313*** (0.000)	0.2193** (0.025)	1.8106*** (0.000)	0.2156*** (0.000)	1.8168*** (0.000)
Constant	-0.2886 (0.615)	-7.3758*** (0.000)	-0.5084 (0.186)	-7.8869*** (0.000)	-0.3318 (0.515)	-6.8910*** (0.000)	-0.5184 (0.179)	-6.9421*** (0.000)
Observations	123	56	123	56	123	56	123	56
R-squared		0.812	0.534	0.765		0.836	0.549	0.835
Country FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Frontline States		YES		YES		YES		YES
Hausman Test	0.0000	0.4160	0.0000	0.0554	0.0000	0.2353	0.0000	0.1710
Sargan Test	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.4484	0.9779	0.4424	0.0000	0.3057
Partial R squared	0.1047	0.0730	0.53860	0.1279	0.1253	0.3852	0.5913	0.3853

Notes: p-values in parentheses. Regression corrected for small sample. Coefficients for country and time-fixed effects not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0

Table A2.8: Variables, definitions, and sources

Variables	Definition and measurement	Sources
Growth pc	Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita	WDI, 2015
Initial GDP	GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1990	WDI, 2015
Gross Capital formation	Gross capital formation (per cent of GDP)	WDI, 2015
Broad Money (M2)	Broad money (per cent of GDP)	WDI, 2015
Secondary enrolment	Gross secondary school enrolment (per cent)	WDI, 2015
Inflation	Consumer prices (annual per cent)	WDI, 2015
Government consumption	General government final consumption expenditure (as per cent GDP)	WDI, 2015
Corruption	Perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain.	KKZ, 2002
Government effectiveness	Perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies into a single grouping.	KKZ, 2002
Political Stability	Perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including terrorism.	KKZ, 2002
Rule of law	Measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.	KKZ, 2002
Regulatory quality	Measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.	KKZ, 2002
Voice and accountability	Measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments	KKZ, 2002
Conflict	1 if the conflicts have caused 25 or more battle-deaths or the value of 0 if the conflicts have generated less than 25 battle-deaths	UCD/PRIO, 2015
Military expenditure	Military expenditure (per cent of GDP)	SIPRI, 2015
Women in parliament	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (per cent)	WDI, 2015
GDP pc, PPP	GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP)	WDI, 2015
Ethnic fractionalization	The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics	QOG, 2015
Religion fractionalization	Probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same religious group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society	QOG, 2015
French colony	1 if the country was a French colony, 0 otherwise	QOG, 2015
English colony	1 if the country was an English colony, 0 otherwise	QOG, 2015

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