


**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON  
AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE OF  
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND  
ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT**

**15-19 June, 1987  
ABUJA, NIGERIA**

**THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY  
IN THE SUBREGION**

by

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**UNITED NATIONS  
ECONOMIC COMMISSION  
AFRICA**





6107027-99

International Conference on  
"Africa: The Challenge of  
Economic Recovery and  
Accelerated Development"

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## I. PREFACE

I am grateful to the organizers of this historic International Conference on: "AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT" for inviting me to participate on one of its panels.

I am particularly thankful to Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, for his untiring efforts to keep the issues of Africa's economic development alive at every international forum and for taking the lead, both as a scholar and statesman, in strengthening regional and subregional co-operation as a collective means of achieving economic growth and development in Africa. His incisive analysis of what he has coined as "Africa's development problematique" provides us with a lot of food for thought and a great deal of understanding of the enormity of some of the problems facing Africa. As a Pan-Africanist, Professor Adedeji has readily shared the view that the African continent has great potential for development if assisted to exploit its enormous natural resources hitherto untapped. I am glad that I have shared with him the dream that by the year 2000, the African continent will have achieved the objectives set out in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos.

I consider it as a singular honour to participate in this Conference because of the rare opportunity that it offers for an in-depth analysis of Africa's critical economic situation by such a diverse and mixed group of experts and policy-makers. The fact that the International Conference has been convened in Abuja, close to the birth of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, seven years ago, is in itself an event of great significance, to say the least. For, in our deliberations, we will need not only to take stock of the achievements and failures in the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action but also to reflect on the performance of the African continent towards economic recovery and development in the face of a continued spate of economic crises, exacerbated by the widening gap between the developed North and developing South - the latter still deeply imbedded in the crutches of poverty and economic degradation.

Many countries, including the United States of America, have hailed the 1986 United Nations special session to consider indepth the critical economic situation in Africa, as "a key event in Africa's economic turnaround". Many experts and observers have characterized recent developments in Africa as "a success story in the making". To support this statement, they have cited several economic policy reforms that have, in particular, led to increased food production.

However, these observations do not suggest that the end to Africa's economic problems is imminent. On the contrary, the problem being a gigantic and complex one, the observations merely reflect the collective and individual determination on the part of Africa to bring about economic recovery and achieve development within the next decade or two. Needless to say, in this struggle, Africa will need massive assistance from the developed countries of the North to buttress her own efforts.

## II. INTRODUCTION

I have been asked to present views on "The consequences of political destabilization in Southern Africa on economic recovery in the subregion". That this issue needs addressing is important for two reasons.

First, the first OAU Economic Summit meeting in Lagos in 1980, paid particular attention to the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa in the wake of an escalation of destabilization tactics by South Africa on the front-line States of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. To this end, the first OAU Economic Summit observed that the independence of Zimbabwe had ushered in renewed and desperate attempts by the Pretoria racist regime to arrest the tide of history and to perpetuate the status quo in Namibia and South Africa itself. The Summit pledged to pursue, with vigour, the liberation of the last remaining outposts of exploitation, racism, colonialism and apartheid.

Second, destabilization in all its forms has to be recognized as an inhibiting exogenous factor in implementing any country's programme in economic and social development.

In the annex to the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (Res. A/RES/S-13/2) based on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the thirteenth special session, the policy of economic destabilization perpetrated by the racist minority regime in South Africa and its illegal occupation of Namibia, is singled out as one of the aggravating factors to the persistent economic crisis in Africa.

During its Twenty-first session to consider Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting in Addis Ababa, from 18 to 20 July, adopted a priority programme to be concentrated on during the period 1986 to 1990 to pave the way for national and collective self-reliant and self-sustained growth and development on the African continent. The programme consists of:

- (i) Measures for an accelerated implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos;
- (ii) Special action for improvement of the food situation and the rehabilitation of agricultural development in Africa;
- (iii) Measures for alleviating Africa's external debt burden;
- (iv) Measures for a common platform for action at subregional, regional, continental and international levels; and
- (v) Measures for action against the effects of the destabilization policy of South Africa on the economies of the Southern African States.

In its report entitled: Financial Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-1990, the IBRD/WORLD BANK gives credit to the renewed determination by Africa's own regional institutions leading to a positive change in attitudes towards development policy. Both ECA and the OAU have been commended for adopting a theme for Africa's economic recovery which stresses the importance of agriculture, and the need for new industrial policies, a bigger participating role for the private sector and a closer look at the demographic factors affecting developing economies in their policy reforms to reduce macro-economic disequilibria and to increase economic efficiency and the role of incentives in economic management. But the report also outlines major problems in the following terms:

"at the same time, the year (1986) saw a number of important changes in the international economy that affected the performance and prospects of the developing countries ... the developing countries experienced a marked slowdown in export growth and declines in their terms of trade. Per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa deteriorated further, and the highly indebted countries faced increasing difficulties in adjusting their economies to the available finance".

At this juncture, it is important to point out that independent States in the Southern African subregion have experienced serious problems in their programmes of economic development and political stability due to their historical linkage and geographical proximity to apartheid South Africa.

The transfer of technology from Western Europe to South Africa has, over the years, enabled South Africa to develop its industrial and economic infrastructure at the expense of its neighbours. The colonial agencies of Portugal and Britain have left Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe dependent upon South Africa thereby making it difficult for these countries to pursue a truly independent economic development policy. The fact that six out of eight States neighbouring South Africa (i.e. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are land-locked and invariably dependent upon South Africa for their transport and communications had made it very difficult for the implementation of their development priorities.

Recently, a number of them, particularly Botswana, Mozambique and Lesotho, have had the devastating impact of drought, desertification and floods to add to their outstanding economic problems.

Therefore, apart from the above list of problems, the deliberate economic and political destabilization policy of South Africa on those States has been a definite inhibiting, destructive and demoralizing factor - all rolled into one. For there is hardly a single country in the Southern African subregion that has lived in an uninterrupted atmosphere of peace during the past 20 years. Angolans, Mozambicans, Namibians and Zimbabweans have endured long and violent liberation struggles. Due to her geo-political position, Zambia has paid a high price for supporting the liberation struggle. The liberation war still continues in Namibia and dissident groups in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe operate with varying degrees of support from South Africa.

In its paper entitled "An illustrative assessment of the cost of destabilization" to the OAU Summit in 1985, SADCC submits, inter alia, that as a result of destabilization, there were already an estimated 300,000 refugees and displaced persons in the Southern African subregion. Moreover, the continued state of destabilization of the neighbouring states by South Africa would inevitably lead to continued flows of refugees and the resultant need to channel more emergency aid to the subregion.

In terms of costs and loss to these countries, South African aggression and destabilization has been in excess of \$US 10 billion for the period 1980-1986. A recent study on the costs and the areas of loss caused by this form of destabilization includes:

- (a) Loss of human and livestock life and property;
- (b) Damage to infrastructure including roads, railways, bridges, powerlines, factories, agricultural fields;
- (c) Loss incurred in diverting resources to defence spending; war damage repairs, and disrupted supplies of essential goods and raw materials; and
- (d) The cost of keeping refugees and displaced persons resulting from South Africa's disruptive activities.

In recent years, the countries that have been directly affected by the Southern African conflict include those designated by the fate of colonial history as front-line States, namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe together with other African States neighbouring South Africa such as Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. For ease of reference, I have chosen the word ASNSA (African States neighbouring South Africa) to include all affected countries in the subregion.

The front-line States have, over the years, earned the distinction of representing and often speaking on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a de facto sub-committee of its Summit. On matters concerning apartheid and decolonization, they have become both a contact group and a reliable rear base for liberation movements in their struggle for independence, freedom and social justice. But, in the process, ASNSA have become targets of unprovoked armed attacks and destabilization by the apartheid regime of South Africa which has taken vent on them for its failures to wipe out opposition from its own oppressed black nationals who are determined to achieve equality and social justice.

### III. THE PROBLEM AND ITS ROOT CAUSES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

South African policies have been under scrutiny in the United Nations since that Organization's inception and prior to that, the League of Nations. The United Nations' onslaught has been two-pronged - focusing on Namibia, on the one hand and on South Africa's domestic policy of apartheid, on the other.

From the outset, it must be established that apartheid is the root cause of the conflict in Southern Africa and the reason for South Africa's war with its own people within its borders and its undeclared war against its neighbours opposed to its policies and who have the geographical misfortune of sharing its borders. Allied to this is the fact that both violence and destabilization, in all their various forms, are inherent in apartheid. Therefore, we must find it imperative to delve into the background of apartheid and then having done that, we must look at the tactics and machinations applied in South Africa's total strategy and its overall effects on the development of the entire subregion. Only through this method of empirical verification can we be able to find suitable solutions to the Southern African crisis.

In this respect, our attention is immediately drawn to the colonial setting of South Africa and the subsequent rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond secret society - resisting British rule on the one hand, and opposing any rights for the black Africans on the other. For the Afrikaner Broederbond founded in 1918 and dedicated to the ideology of white supremacy has become the driving force behind the Nationalist Party since 1948 and, with it, the growth of segregation into apartheid with all its diabolical legislation that has shaped South Africa into the constitutional oddity that it is today.

It is important to note that all the past Prime Ministers of South Africa since 1948 such as Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd and Vorster - including State President Pieter Botha - belonged (and still do, in the case of President Botha) to this Afrikaner elite. But more importantly is the fact that in 1938, the Broederbond created a Nazi-type organization, the Ossewa Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Brigade), set up on military lines which supported Hitler's Germany during the World War II and conducted armed sabotage in South Africa to disrupt its own country's participation in the anti-fascist war.

That the Afrikaner Broederbond has an all-pervading influence on the economic, political and social policies of South Africa is a factual reality. But what needs to be explained is the deep-rooted and over-riding fear of the blackman -swart gevaar - which has led the whiteman (both Afrikaner and British) to rule South Africa with the arrogance, emotion, suspicion and brutality as institutionalized in apartheid. The whiteman's fear has always been one of social change and how it should come about - the fear of a revolution - the revolution of the black masses overthrowing their white masters. Hence, all South Africa's policies over the years, bizzare or far-fetched as they are, have been primarily designed to prevent that revolution. South Africa continues to believe that, by the introduction of reforms ("Petty" apartheid) particularly in controlled portions and early enough, a bloody revolution can be prevented. As a result of this pre-occupation, it is now common knowledge that any state or group opposed to South Africa's own solution instantly becomes an adversary and, in the case of African States neighbouring it, the reward is aggression, sabotage and other forms of destabilization.



Up to and including the mid-1970s, South Africa's policy was centred around attempts to frustrate and even wipe out activities by liberation movements in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, UDI-Rhodesia and Namibia and as well as inside South Africa itself. The Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique together with UDI - Rhodesia and Namibia acted as buffer States to South Africa. This resulted in what was known as the Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury Axis or the Unholy Alliance.

During this period, the apparent shield provided by a ring of buffer States gave South Africa enough courage and security to embark upon its so-called 'outward looking' policy of 'dialogue' - aimed at winning over allies from within the OAU. The failure of 'dialogue' ushered in a new South African strategy in which proxies such as UNITA in Angola, MNR in Mozambique, MUSHALA in Zambia, etc., were used not only in the destabilization of the region but also in the reinforcement of the sanctions that South Africa had imposed on its neighbours.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that in the intervening period between the collapse of the Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique and the independence of Zimbabwe, South Africa attempted yet another regional strategy in which it expanded its military capacity and, at the same time, launched its diplomatic d'entente initiative, known as the Southern African Constellation of States.

The South African Constellation of African States mooted by South Africa in 1978, was to consist of South Africa itself, the homeland States of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda; neighbouring States of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zimbabwe and possibly Mozambique. It was intended to form an anti-Marxist bastion/buffer south of the Cunene-Zambezi divide, as a regional security and economic bloc of between 7 to 10 States.

The shaping of the current environment of conflict and political destabilization in Southern Africa was heightened by an imminent conflict between South Africa's concept of the Constellation of South African States (CONSAS) in 1979 and the grouping of nine independent African States known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 - thus, shattering the CONSAS dream in the process. The latter was quickly followed up by a larger grouping of 15 countries called the Preferential Trade Area of the Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) in 1982. In addition, other associations of a bilateral nature in the form of Joint Permanent Missions of Co-operation have also strengthened the bonds of solidarity against South Africa's destabilization tactics. SADCC, PTA, MULPOC and other subregional organizations will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention that the failure of CONSAS weakened South Africa as a regional power determined to dominate the subregion by fuelling dissidence, sabotage and economic chaos in the front-line States.

South Africa's strategy is simple: that is, to use both direct and indirect methods to smash the stability of the front-line States and slow development of SADCC while striking at ANC, SWAPO and other liberation movements together with their host nations. This is South Africa's Policy of Swardmag (Power of the Sword) as a counter-revolutionary warfare strategy of destabilization.

In this strategy, South Africa wants to internationalize the conflict by capitalizing on the East-West ideological conflict. At the same time, South Africa wants a show-down with the front-line States - knowing very well that the economies and politics of these countries would suffer severely. In essence, South Africa's "total strategy" policy which involves the mobilization of all forces - political, economic, diplomatic and military - has a regional objective aimed at creating and maintaining a dependence that will be economically lucrative and politically submissive enough to act as a bulwark on the imposition of international sanctions against apartheid.

This combination of tactics against neighbouring States has varied from State to State depending on its political, economic and military vulnerability. For instance, in the case of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (also known as the BLS States), South Africa's economic and political grip is overwhelming in that these States belong to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and, with the exception of Botswana, to the Rand monetary zone of which South Africa is the dominant member. All the three BLS States have over the years been subjected to direct attacks and other forms of destabilization for little or no apparent reason, at all.

The apparent failure in its previous strategies has since hastened South Africa to re-evaluate its "foreign policy" without changing its fundamental belief that reform to apartheid will avert a bloody revolution inside South Africa. Today, South Africa has embarked upon a new diplomatic-cum-military offensive which aims at diverting world attention from apartheid as the root cause by pointing to the presence of the Soviet Union in the subregion as a great threat to Western interests and South Africa's role of protecting them. In short, South Africa has rekindled the traditional East-West ideological conflict in the hope of prolonging and justifying its obnoxious system of apartheid with all its concomitant evils.

#### IV. DESTABILIZATION - ITS BEGINNINGS AND DIMENSION

As it has already been stated earlier on, destabilization is inherent in the policy of apartheid itself. It is a strategy which has increased with intensity as apartheid has also extended its ugly tentacles to strangle its own black population and to flout with impunity all peaceful efforts by the international community to vacate Namibia unconditionally in order for the people of that country to accede to full political independence, in terms of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 of 1978.

South Africa's destabilization strategy, just as apartheid itself, has its roots in colonialism. In involving the economic rationale of imperialism, the British colonialists devoted much time to segregation. Cecil John Rhodes, the Premier of British Cape Colony, when introducing a "Native Bill for Africa" in 1894, declared:

"My idea is that natives should be kept in these native reserves and not mixed with the white men at all ... in the past, we have made mistakes about native representation. We intend to change all that ... we are going to be lords of this people and keep them in a subject position. They should not have the franchise because we do not want them on an equality with us. These are my politics on native affairs and these are politics of South Africa ... We must adopt a system of despotism, such as works so well in (British) India, in our relations with the "Barbarians of South Africa."

And, as if to echo his country's founding racist pioneers, President Pieter Botha in an interview on black rule, on 12 April 1987, categorically stated:

"I am not prepared to sacrifice my rights so that the other man can dominate me with his greater numbers".

Destabilization can be considered as a multi-dimensional factor if looked at from different angles. Here, credit must go to Professor Adebayo Adedeji for some enlightenment on the matter when he states:

"There is, however, the other side to the political destabilization problematique. We have talked about political destabilization arising from continued poor economic performance. However, we must not forget that poor economic performance can also be the product of political instability - whether endogenous like the frequent military coup d'etats that have afflicted sub-Saharan Africa since independence or exogenous like the policy of political destabilization being pursued by South African authorities against the front-line States of Southern Africa".

From the outset, there is an imperative need to understand the endogenous seedlings that form the basis of destabilization. First, South Africa is virtually a slave plantation. Confined to mine compounds or ghettos in prison-like conditions, the workers are not allowed to bring their families with them while working under contracts. In order to overcome the chronic shortage of labour in the gold mines, South Africa recruits labour from some independent African neighbouring States who are sent back to their homes after their contracts. Second, the notorious Group Areas Act, which removes all non-whites from the centres of all towns and cities for resettlement in rigorously segregated ghettos on the outskirts of large cities or into Bantustans, creates so much insecurity for a black population which is already subjected to other inhuman severities. This method has been rigorously applied to force poverty-stricken Bantustans into total subjugation. Likewise, the apartheid regime uses contract African labour as a device to force its neighbouring States to accept apartheid or else have their nationals repatriated.

The havoc that the notorious Group Areas Act causes internally also overflows into some of South Africa's neighbouring States dependent upon it. Health, education and employment are typical examples. For instance, the 1983 World Health Organization (WHO) publication, "Apartheid and Health", shows apartheid to be the cruelest calculated assault on the health of a people, over an extended period of time, ever known to have been devised by man. What

the WHO publication reveals is that, from a situation in which the African people, indigenous black South Africans and those from ASNSA recruited as cheap labour, hitherto healthy and energetic prior to the advent of the white man, have been systematically impoverished to the extent of living under the most miserable circumstances in the world. On the other hand, South African education for blacks has been dysfunctional for national development. This is particularly so because, as noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently, it has helped to pauperize millions and has created major discrepancies in skills essential to national development.

Here now lies the racial confrontation in South Africa. Many Afrikaners have full faith in apartheid. According to a report from the South African Human Sciences Research Council in August 1984, 90 per cent of the Afrikaners approved of separate schooling for black and white children; 85 per cent agreed that different races should use different public facilities; 92 per cent still favoured an electoral system which excludes blacks; nearly 77 per cent supported the Group Areas Act that legalizes residential segregation, and 80 per cent supported the Bantustan or homeland policy.

During the same period, liberation movements such as the ANC of South Africa, the PAC (Azania), SWAPO (Namibia) and many others, have found it inevitable to support armed struggle after the failure of a negotiated settlement through international organizations. There is a period of unrest among youths and labour unions in South Africa. The black masses in South Africa and Namibia have said "enough is enough" and have regarded all reforms by the apartheid regime as delaying tactics. The introduction of the Three-Tier Parliament has been regarded by the blacks and the majority of South African Asians and "Coloureds" as an assault on their unity by the apartheid regime in the same manner as the creation of Bantustans.

One cannot discuss the spate of political destabilization acts without looking at the role of super-Power global interests, i.e. East-West ideological confrontation. For, it is within this context that South Africa has ventured to win the sympathies of the United States and Western Europe. Conversely, it is also within the context of the support that the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries have invariably rendered to liberation movements in the Southern African subregion. Indeed, it is this ideological cold war which has to a great extent influenced the attitude of the developed North towards the developing South in its obligation to assist the latter in eradicating poverty and all its offshoots. We have often heard of countries of the developed North that have refused to give aid to particular countries of the developing South because they are "Communists".

In the Southern African situation, we are very much conscious of the impasse over Namibia because of the "linkage" of its independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola and the support given to UNITA's insurgency against the People's Republic of Angola. Many scholars of politics view the policy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa as a serious attempt on the part of the United States of America to be identified as a big brother against any socio-political in-roads by the Eastern bloc into hitherto an exclusive Western bloc "territory". Thus, in the process, Namibia becomes a "sacrificial lamb"

in the struggle for regional and global influence by the two super Powers. By the same token, the economic infrastructure of South Africa has become paramount in the choice of what form and to what extent sanctions should be applied. In the United States, President Ronald Reagan's Administration has been quite categorical over sanctions. In his address before a convocation at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota, in the United States, Ambassador Michael H. Armacost, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, put this issue succinctly, thus:

"Africa was for years a continent happily insulated from the East-West military competition. The presence of Cuban troops has destabilized Angola and compounded the difficulty of resolving Angola's Civil War. It extended Soviet power into the Region. It thereby challenges our own strategic interests; it establishes an unfortunate precedent...we have succeeded in securing South African agreement that if the Cuban problem in Angola can be resolved, South Africa will agree to carry out international agreements for Namibia's independence. We have similarly brought the Angolan Government to agree to the principle of Cuban withdrawal....this agreement will mean an end to Cuba's destabilizing presence in Angola and South Africa's threats to Angola's security and will help promote independence for Namibia...".

It is quite clear from the above syllogism that the hierarchy of national interests and the quest for global influence have determined super-Power rivalry in the South African crisis.

On its part, South Africa has taken advantage of this East-West ideological confrontation to justify not only its apartheid policies inside Namibia and within its national borders but also to carry out its strategy of political, economic and security hegemony throughout the subregion.

South Africa's preoccupation with the destabilization strategy has not only caused havoc to the economies of its neighbouring African States but has also created a war psychosis which has become a threat to international peace and security.

Recently, it has been ascertained that despite denials from South Africa and cover-ups by its allies, the apartheid regime possesses the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Dr. A. Visser, member of the South African Atomic Energy Board once lamented:

"We should have such a (nuclear) bomb to prevent aggression from loud-mouthed Afro-Asiatic States..."

In another revelation, Dr. A. I. Roux, President of the South Africa's Atomic Board confirmed as far back as 1976 thus:

"We can ascribe our degree of advancement today in large measure to the training and assistance so willingly provided by the United States".

In August 1982, United States Department of Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige admitted in a letter to former Senator Charles Percy, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that his agency had approved five export licences from May 1980 to May 1982 for nuclear-related materials to South Africa.

The implications of these facts for the African States neighbouring South Africa, for the continent of Africa and for the whole planet are enormous and frightening. Moreover, the nuclear alliance between South Africa and its allies has repercussions for the whole nuclear balance between the two super-Powers. Above all, these facts show how very determined apartheid South Africa is to stay in power to the extent that it is prepared to use these awesome weapons rather than accept the inevitable and cede power to the black majority.

#### V. DEPENDENCE - THE SCOURGE OF AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

As it is now quite clear, the economic development or lack of it, for the Southern African subregion has, in large measure, been greatly affected by the "dependence" of the independent African States on South Africa. In fact, the entire spectrum of destabilization has been focused on this weakness. Thus, South Africa's subregional and regional objective is solely to impose and maintain a dependence upon it by the entire area which will be economically lucrative and politically submissive.

The economic importance of the subregion to South Africa is massive, particularly in the areas of trade, transport and communications. South Africa runs a visible trade surplus with eight of the nine countries in the subregion totalling close to \$US 2.0 billion per year. However, dependence on South Africa has varied from country to country, both in substance and origin. Suffice it to reiterate that six out of the nine neighbouring States are land-locked and depend on South Africa's ports for their exports and imports. As part of its colonial legacy, the subregion has been subjected, huffer-mugger, to a whole series of links centred around South Africa. Some of these defy economic logic but yet still continue to exist.

But it is in the area of transport and communications where dependence is predominant. This is reflected in the use of South African roads, railway and ports for overseas trade. The destabilizing policy of South Africa and especially the support of the armed bandits in Mozambique and Angola in the sabotage and destruction of the Mozambican railways and the Benguela railway in Angola has counterbalanced the efforts of the African States to reduce their dependence on the South African transport system. Annex I emphasizes the glaring problem of dependence on South Africa's trade routes that should be changed in order for the African States neighbouring South Africa to achieve collective self-reliance. Other annexes also stress this point.

It must be pointed out that because of the colonial legacy, trade links and other commercial relationships between most of the States in the subregion and South Africa and also with the former colonial powers have been stronger and more developed than the intraregional links among these States.

In short, the mechanisms of dependence as outlined have progressively become both South Africa's preoccupation and effective means of dominance. Through various links, agreements and other outstanding arrangements with its neighbours, South Africa, has over the years acquired a central position which it uses or abuses to the detriment of its peace-loving neighbours. For instance, South Africa provides staff in management positions for transport enterprises and authorities throughout the subregion. Furthermore, the dominant position of South Africa means that it is the nearest main centre in respect of technological services, acquisition of spare parts and other types of technical and consultancy services. Thus, dependence in these areas exists equally or even more in relation to Western Europe and the United States of America.

#### VI. TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECOVERY - A PROGRAMME OF SURVIVAL FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

As early as 1974, when Portuguese authorities had announced their surprise decision to hand over political power to Angola and Mozambique and other African colonial possessions, His Excellency Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, spoke of the day when independent States of Southern Africa would address the issue of "liberation - not liberation from political oppression but liberation from poverty". Indeed, by 1977 the UNECA Lusaka-based Multinational Programming and Operational Centre for Eastern and Southern African States (MULPOC) was established with a membership of 18 countries namely, Angola, Botswana, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the offshore Islands of the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. On the basis of other MULPOCs, the Lusaka-based MULPOC was intended to function as a means of implementing Africa's new development strategy which, at the subregional level, required the MULPOCs to assist in generating and concretizing the process of economic integration in the subregions they served as a first and pragmatic step towards the creation of a regional common market and ultimately, an economic community.

A few years later, in 1982, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) was established with headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. The launching of the PTA was both Lusaka MULPOC's brain-child and its priority project. With a membership of 15 States, namely Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the PTA has since embarked upon "the promotion of co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of trade, customs, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs....". In essence, by its numerical strength and commitment to its Treaty, the PTA became the first step and main vehicle for the realization of a work programme leading to the fulfilment of the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos.

The role of subregional organizations in combating destabilization from South Africa has become crucial each day that passes by. Small wonder that the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, with a membership of nine countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, was hailed as a courageous challenge to counteract against the domination and destabilization strategy of apartheid in South Africa.

In specific terms, the performance of SADCC member States has since 1980 been adversely affected by military aggression and economic destabilization by racist South Africa. The implications of destabilization for the subregion have been in the form of reduction in productive capacity, economic growth and development. Other economic consequences of destabilization have been in the form of:

- (a) Reduction in employment;
- (b) Increase in consumer prices as a result of shortfalls in supply, revenue and the resultant rise in budget deficits;
- (c) Extra defence expenditure of approximately \$US 3.6 billion for the period 1980-1985; and
- (d) Expenditure of approximately \$US 660 million on refugees for the period 1980-1985.

Be that as it may, the outcome of the 1980 SADCC Lusaka Conference was the Lusaka Declaration - SOUTHERN AFRICA: TOWARDS ECONOMIC LIBERATION - committing the member States to work collectively towards the integration of their economies in order to achieve economic liberation and regional self-reliance. The Lusaka Declaration emphasizes the following broad objectives for SADCC, viz:

- (a) The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa;
- (b) The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
- (c) The mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national interests and subregional policies; and
- (d) Concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of SADCC's strategy for economic liberation.

To achieve these objectives, the institutional structure of SADCC provides for a small central secretariat and sectoral committees but leaves the primary responsibility of action on implementation of projects and development of programmes to devolve on its individual national governments, particularly in critical areas as shown below:



Country	Sector
Angola	Energy
Botswana (headquarters of SADCC)	Crop research and animal diseases
Malawi	Conservation of forests, water and wildlife
Lesotho	Soil conservation and land utilization
Mozambique	SATCC - Transport and communications
Swaziland	Manpower development
Tanzania	Industrial development
Zambia	SADCC fund, mining and economic bulletin
Zimbabwe	Agriculture and food security

As regards to its effects on the balance of payments, destabilization has led to a reduction in the value of exports and services and a corresponding increase in the value of imports during the period 1980 to 1985. The 1986 SADCC Macro-economic Survey, offers the following selected estimated losses:

- (i) Transport and energy - \$US 970 million;
- (ii) Exports and tourism - \$US 230 million;
- (iii) Smuggling - \$US 190 million; and
- (iv) Boycotts and embargoes - \$US 200 million

In the preceding paragraphs, an attempt has been made to provide an analytical and historical background to the root causes of the political and economic crises of the Southern African subregion. There is an imperative need to look at other real chances of economic recovery through stabilization and structural adjustment measures.

Since the new commitment to Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990 (APPER) adopted in July 1985, African Governments in the Southern African region have continued to use effective mechanisms to implement strategies and development programmes also as outlined in the UN-PAAERD (1986-1990) individually and collectively.

At a subregional level, SADCC, PTA and MULPOC have put in motion the machinery to upgrade the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action, APPER and UN-PAAERD. During the tenth meeting of the Lusaka-based MULPOC held in Lusaka on 12 and 13 March 1987, it was decided that the UNECA/Lusaka MULPOC

be entrusted with the responsibility to monitor and evaluate the status of the Lagos Plan of Action/APPER/UN-PAAERD at a subregional level. Furthermore, the tenth meeting called on member States to establish an appropriate national mechanism to assist UNECA/MULPOC in its role of monitoring and evaluating Lagos Plan of Action/APPER/UN-PAAERD.

At the regional level, the UNECA twenty-second session of the Commission/thirteenth meeting of the Conference of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa from 23 to 25 April 1987 agreed on a comprehensive programme of work and priorities for the biennium 1988-1989, for submission to the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

At the national level, some Governments in the subregion have taken issue with the IMF in their bid to effect structural adjustment measures without a complete breakdown of their economies. To this end, some of the negotiations with the IMF have centred on the need for the structural adjustment process to be growth-oriented and to be implemented over reasonable period with increased and sustained levels of financial support applied in sufficient amounts and at the right time.

In responding to the IMF credit terms, countries in the subregion have pointed to the difficulties that cross-conditionality has often caused to them. It is the consensus of opinion of the subregional countries that structural adjustment financing would be more effective in the absence of cross-conditionality. In general, in their efforts to achieve the sustainability of some of the reform measures and restructuring programmes, the Southern African subregion has pressed for a more human approach by the IMF/World Bank with due regard to the human element. For any programme of structural adjustment devoid of the human dimension would lead to political and social consequences which would, in turn, delay or even reverse the adjustment efforts.

In specific terms, countries like Zambia have recently taken recognizable bold and somewhat risky economic policy reforms. In her efforts to liberalize the economy, and as part of the conditionality of the IMF stand-bys and World Bank SECALs, the Government took certain measures which included:

- (a) Reduction in the size of the public service and a general freeze on wage increases;
- (b) A gradual switch from subsidies of a consumer type to subsidies on production particularly in agriculture;
- (c) Decontrol of prices; and
- (d) Auctioning of the foreign currency against the Zambian Kwacha (ZK).

In addition, there has been a deliberate bias towards a diversification of the economy - hitherto based on copper as a single major raw material earning the foreign exchange for the country.

Initially, there was strong opposition to such a fundamental shift in economic policy. Various economic groups, such as urban consumers, public sector employees and those with access to foreign exchange had benefitted (at least in relative terms) from the previous system of controls and economic policies and were unwilling to lose their advantages. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions had maintained a claim that there was a steady fall in real and relative wage levels over the preceding 10 years and while eager for change in economic policies, was reluctant to accept any measures that would further reduce real wages and employment.

The political leadership therefore undertook an extensive effort to build a national consensus for change. During 1983, week-long meetings of UNIP, the ruling Party, were held in each provincial capital to listen to complaints and to hear suggestions for improving the economy's performance.

The overall liberalization of the financial and foreign exchange regimes in Zambia has led to rapid realignment of prices and incentives. The exchange rate depreciated from ZK2.2 per United States dollar before the auction to ZK8.07 in mid-July 1986 and then to nearly ZK20 in April 1987. The effects of the depreciating Zambian Kwacha continued to be passed through quickly and fully to domestic prices.

However, there have since been encouraging signs alongside the adverse effects of the reform programmes. For instance, as a combined result of policy changes and good weather, agricultural output had grown by 7.7 per cent per annum during 1983 to 1985. The manufacturing sector also witnessed a rise of 9 per cent of value-added in constant prices - no doubt as a result of a major shift in managerial attitudes. Capacity utilization has also risen from less than 40 per cent to over 50 per cent in the private sector and in some parastatals. Some of the parastatals have shed redundant labour by reinforcing natural attrition. But non-traditional exports have more than doubled.

In spite of these developments, some economists have observed that the reforms have generated the following negative perceptions:

- (i) The auction is allocating significant resources to non-essential goods, particularly luxury items;
- (ii) Some large bidders are more successful in obtaining auction resources and are driving the auction rate up by bidding irresponsibly;
- (iii) Changing the present auction mechanism to a two-tier "Dutch auction" system (where each successful bidder would pay the rate that he offered) would perhaps help keep the exchange rate down and significantly increase government revenues;
- (iv) The auction is fuelling inflation; and
- (v) The auction-determined rate is too volatile.

The Government, on its part, has continued to keep a close watch on the matter.

This paper would not be complete if it did not touch on the debt repayment crisis which has become a nightmare for many a third world country. For, it appears that no amount of adjustment will get the third world out of the debt trap. Most of the adjustment strategies and rescheduling plans seem to drive the developing countries into greater indebtedness. Zambia and many of the countries in the Southern African subregion have had to grapple with this problem over and above the menace of destabilization from the apartheid regime of South Africa. It is sometimes uncertain whether the IMF has anything to do with the so-called adjustment regime or any genuine interest whatever in the economic well-being of the country so affected. More often than not, it sometimes appears as if the IMF is solely concerned with the creation of conditions which would ensure the maximum possible repayment of interest on foreign debt, irrespective of the permanent damage this may cause to the country so involved.

Third world countries that have negotiated for rescheduling of debts know too well about the role of the London inter-bank offered rate for money (LIBOR), which no debtor country can question. In this set up, the debtors have to submit to floating interest rates which can be unilaterally changed by the creditors. They are also subject to variable exchange rates. For example, it is said that between 1985 and 1986 the total debt of the developing countries increased by \$US 40 billion because of the revaluation of non-dollar currencies. In the final analysis, repayment of interest takes precedence over all national needs and domestic consumption. Indeed, the current available figures point to the fact that, at worst, adjustment strategies and rescheduling will only drive the developing countries into deeper indebtedness, as has been demonstrated in the test case of Brazil recently. As one prominent economist put it succinctly:

"... it is an impossible game: the more you pay, the more you owe. The predators are gobbling up country after country".

The thrust and moral here is that both regional and subregional African States have had to face the debt crisis in order to resolve the overall problem of structural adjustment and the sustainability of economic reform.

## VII. CONCLUSION

Earlier on this paper, it has been clearly indicated that South Africa's total strategy of economic, political and military destabilization of ASNSA has added a more complex dimension to the entire Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990. In order to underline the plight of African countries in their attempt to achieve self-sustaining reform programmes, we have used Zambia as a case study.

We have also deduced that the critical and far-reaching consequences on the economies resulting from South Africa's aggression can only be resolved or dealt with effectively through unity and collective self-reliance programmes by the States of the subregion themselves with the assistance of the international community.

On going through this paper, one is immediately made to believe that the situation in the subregion, in economic and military terms, favours South Africa. The real status of the equation between the front-line States and South Africa is that although South Africa is strong economically and militarily, it is weak ideologically since more than 80 per cent of its population reject apartheid. Because they are strong ideologically, the front-line States are a definite threat to South Africa in that the powerful pan-Africanist ideology of the front-line States is shared by the ANC, PAC, SWAPO and other liberation movements determined to destroy apartheid. In fact, this powerful pan-Africanist ideology, which symbolizes Black South African aspirations, can be considered as profoundly destabilizing the apartheid regime. This weakness is South Africa's Achilles heel and will certainly contribute to its downfall.

There is also the reverse side of political destabilization to consider. The economic dependence on South Africa by ASNSA also means that South Africa's destabilization tactics are bound to have adverse effects on its own economic performance. South Africa needs a thriving economy to oil its war machinery.

Recently, it has been reported that the severe deterioration in political confidence following the state of emergency in 1985 together with the continued exodus of companies - especially United States owned - have both rendered the South African economy more vulnerable and growing weaker in every aspect - particularly in its domestic economic activity, i.e., consumer demand, industrial production, construction and agricultural output, which continue to register further declines.

Furthermore, it has been observed by political and economic analysis alike that the South African Government had since 1986 dashed local and foreign investors' hopes that an effective programme of political reforms was underway to boost the flagging economy. To crown it all, it will be recalled that while the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was in South Africa during May 1985, the apartheid regime decided to attack Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe making it abundantly clear to the international community that dialogue with South Africa for peaceful change or a negotiated settlement was futile and that mandatory and comprehensive sanctions were the only alternative towards the dismantling of apartheid.

It will be recalled that in 1985, in the face of mounting resistance, with the economy sliding deeper into crisis, the apartheid regime of South Africa imposed a state of emergency. Furthermore, the cost of defending apartheid both internally and externally has taken up to 30 per cent of the gross domestic product, with the official defence expenditure constituting 15 per cent of the budget in 1986.

South Africa's foreign debt is now estimated to have passed a record high of 32 billion Rand. Many observers have made the point that South Africa's economic crisis is not a recession which will ease in a relatively short time

and over which the apartheid regime will have some degree of control. But rather, it is a fundamental structural crisis which will only be resolved by the restructuring of the social order based upon the will of the majority.

It is evident that the escalation of resistance to apartheid by the oppressed black majority together with the international campaign for sanctions and the complete isolation of the apartheid regime are now the most effective factors causing havoc to the South African economy leading to its inevitable downfall.

## ANNEX I

## Total overseas trade through regional ports in 1984 (million tons)

Country Port	Angola	Botswana	Malawi	Mozambique	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total SADCC Countries <sup>1/</sup>	South Africa	Total
Maputo (incl. Matola)	-				0.53			0.53	1.97	0.8	2.77
Beira			0.04	0.35	-			0.73	1.12		1.12
Nacala			0.19	0.20	-			-	0.39		0.39
Dar-es-Salaam <sup>2/</sup>			0.02			1.15	0.95		2.03		2.03
Lobito	0.40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.40		0.40
Luanda	0.80	-	-	-	-				0.80		0.80
<b>Total SADCC ports</b>	<b>1.2</b>		<b>0.25</b>	<b>1.46</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>1.15</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>1.20</b>	<b>6.71</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>7.51</b>
<b>SA ports</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0.32<sup>3/</sup></b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>1.33</b>	<b>3.04</b>	<b>85.0</b>	<b>88.8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.32<sup>3/</sup></b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>1.46</b>	<b>0.76</b>	<b>1.15</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>9.75</b>	<b>85.8</b>	<b>96.3</b>

Source: SATCC.

<sup>1/</sup> Lesotho overseas trade remained under 5,000 tons.

<sup>2/</sup> Excl. bulk oil

<sup>3/</sup> Estimate.

## ANNEX II

Percentage of overseas trade through regional ports in 1990, million tons<sup>1/</sup>

Port	Countries								Total SADCC Countries	R.S.A.	Total
	Angola	Botswana	Malawi	Mozambique	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe			
Maputo (incl. Matola)		3.0 <sup>2/</sup>		1.9	1.2		0.1	1.6	7.8	2.5	10.3
Beira			0.2	3.1				0.8	4.1		4.1
Nacala			0.5	0.4					0.9		0.9
Dar-es-Salaam			0.0			2.3	0.8		3.1		3.1
Lobito	0.4						0.3		0.4		0.4
Luanda	1.1								1.1		1.1
Total SADCC ports	1.5	3.0	0.7	5.4	1.2	2.3	1.2	2.4	17.4	2.5	19.9
PTA ports	-	0.1	-	-	0.6	-	0.2	0.6	1.5		
Total	1.5	3.1	0.7	5.4	1.8	2.3	1.4	3.0	18.9		

<sup>1/</sup> Lesotho has not been included as its overseas trade is small.

<sup>2/</sup> Use of South African Railways assumed.



## ANNEX III

Direction of trade for the nine SADCC countries (in percentage)

	1981	Exports to			Imports from		
		SADCC	South Africa		SADCC	South Africa	
		1983	1981	1983	1981	1983	1983
Angola	0.0	0.1(1982)	-		1.2	0.9(1982)	-
Botswana <sup>2/</sup>	9.1	8.2	16.6	8.3	6.3	7.4	87.5 <sup>1/</sup>
Lesotho <sup>2/</sup>	0.4	0.1(1982)	46.7	41.3(1982)	0.4	0.1(1982)	97.1
Malawi <sup>3/</sup>	9.9	9.7(1982)	4.7	5.7(1982)	8.1	9.6(1982)	32.2
Mozambique	9.6	3.9	2.8	3.5	2.5	5.0	12.5
Swaziland	2.3	2.6(1982)	34.1	36.9(1982)	0.6	0.8(1982)	83.3
Tanzania	0.9	1.0	-	-	0.5	2.6	-
Zambia	4.0	3.5(1982)	0.6	0.3(1982)	5.8	6.3(1982)	15.1
Zimbabwe <sup>3/</sup>	10.8	11.0	21.6	18.5	7.8	8.2	27.5

Source: Calculated from SADCC Intra-Regional Trade Study Figures. (Interim Report, Phase 1, July 1985).

<sup>1/</sup> Percentages include goods imported from other countries transshipped through South Africa.

<sup>2/</sup> Belongs to SACU (Southern African Customs Union) together with South Africa.

<sup>3/</sup> Have Preferential Trade Agreement with South Africa.

## ANNEX IV

The trend in the production of major agricultural commodity groups in SADCC countries, 1978-1982

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
<b>Food crop production</b>									
Cereals	-8.3	-12.0	-17.9	1.2	-4.8	-3.9	-0.9	-7.0	10.5
Root crops	3.1	0.9	3.7	4.6	2.5	1.3	3.5	1.4	1.7
Pulses	-5.5		4.9	1.3	-5.3	-0.5	-1.3	13.3	4.1
Oil seed crops	-1	3.9		1.4	0.1	1.0	0.3	-4.6	6.5
Meat	2.5	6.6	3.4	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.0	3.9	-6.2
Milk	0.7	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.6	1.3	1.7	3.4	-1.3
<b>Livestock production</b>									
Cattle	3.0	0.6	-3.0	4.2	1.2	1.1	1.9	4.0	-3.1
Sheep	2.3	9.7	8.5	2.0	2.2	3.0	2.0	5.3	-10.8
Goats	0.5	5.7	9.0	-3.8	1.5	6.4	2.0	2.5	-9.2
Pigs	4.6	-7.5	-7.5	-5.3	1.9	4.3	5.1	3.1	0.1
<b>Fisheries production</b>									
Freshwater and Marine	-2.4	11.0	-14.2	-6.8	50.2		5.7	0.8	29.1
Sheel fish	-13.3				21.9		-4.9		
							6.6		
<b>Forestry production</b>									
Fuelwood and charcoal	2.2		1.2	3.3	4.1	2.5	3.2	2.7	0.7
Industrial roundwood	1.2	2.6		6.4	1.7	-2.6	8.8		6.7
Sawnwood				9.4	-7.9	7.9	-2.2	2.0	9.5
Paper					6.7				7.1

Source: FAO: Country tables, basic data on the agricultural sector, Rome, 1984.

## ANNEX V

Socio-economic indicators on the agricultural sector in the SADCC countries, 1981

Country	Agric.	Agric.	Agric.	Agric.	Agric.	Arable	Irrigated	Agric.	Fertilizer use		Tractor use		
	GDP as % Total	pop. as % Total	exp. as% Total	imp. as% Total	exp. as% Total	land as% Total	land as% Total	pop. people/ ha arable land	kg/ha arable land	Cons. rate of change 1978 1982	Prod. rate of change	Per 1000 ha arable land	Rate of change 1978 1982
		Popula- tion	Exp. tion	Imports	Imports		Arable land						
Angola	43	57	5	16	5	3	-	1.2	3	-14.4		3	-1.3
Botswana	15	79	20	12	10	2	-	0.5	1	- 9.3		2	-3.4
Lesotho	23	83	29	21	3	10	-	3.8	15	0.9		5	4.2
Malawi	45	83	88	10	70	25	-	2.3	15	8.1		1	4.4
Mozambique	43	63	22	14	13	4	2	2.2	12	19.8	-6.4	2	1.0
Swaziland	22	72	49	6	33	11	16	2.2	103	51.1	25.4	14	2.0
Tanzania	52	80	77	11	39	6	1	2.9	6	1.5	14.5	4	0.6
Zambia	20	66	1	7	1	7	-	0.8	20	25.3	-25.3	1	1.9
Zimbabwe	16	58	44	3	42	7	4	1.7	68	20.6	10.1	8	1.2
All	34	78	26	n.a	n.a	n.a		2.8	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a

Source: FAO. Country tables, basic data on the agricultural sector

## ANNEX VI

Mineral production and export statistics in SADCC member States 1981 and 1983/84

Member States	Mineral Production				Total exports (million \$US) 1983/84	Value (million \$US) 1983/84	Mineral Exports		
	Value (million \$US)		% of GDP				% of mineral production 1983/84	% of total exports	
	1981	1983/84	1981	1983/84			1983/84	1981	1983/84
Angola	2000	1700 (50)*	55.6	47.2 (1.4)*	2000	1600 (45)*	94.1 (90)*	90	80 (2)*
Botswana	260	477	36	66	637	476	99.8	65	75
Lesotho	19	19	5.4	5.5	46.6	19	100	40	41
Malawi	7	7	0.5	0.5	289	0	0	0	0
Mozambique	15	18	0.6	0.7	354	17.7	98.3	5	5
Swaziland	23	23	5.5	4.6	271	13.6	59.1	5	5
Tanzania	35	45	0.7	0.9	566	43.3	96.2	8	8
Zambia	850	1056	24.6	30.5	1100	1000	94.7	96	91
Zimbabwe	547	547	9.2	9.2	1065	426	77.9	40	40
SADCC	3756	3892 (2242)*	16.3	10.8 (9.7)*	6328.6 (4778.6)*	3595.6 (2045.6)*	92.4 (91.2)*	58	56.8 (42.8)*

Source: Analysis of mineral resources development and opportunities in the SADCC region - SADCC mining sector raw materials report, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1985.

\* Excluding oil and assuming \$US 50 million of other mineral production, largely diamonds.

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