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Finance and Resource Mobilization for the Lagos Plan of Action

by

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The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) is predicated upon the concept of collective self-reliance, which is a relative concept. It does not mean autarky, in which Africa would delink itself from the rest of the world, supplying all of its own needs and only its own needs. A total withdrawal from the larger global society is probably no longer feasible even were it to be desired. The "interdependence" of all peoples is not only a fashionable concept in the industrialized world; it is an inescapable reality--both in the economic sense and in terms of the hazards of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare; in terms of environmental phenomena such as acid rain and the greenhouse effect; in terms of management of the global commons such as the marine food supply; and in terms of a host of other supra-national issues.

But in admitting that all nations are inextricably linked in myriad ways one must guard against succumbing to an euphoria which assumes that the growing recognition of global inter-dependence somehow replaces the stark realities of dependence. The reciprocity of interdependence thrives alongside egregious inbalances in economic and political strength, which shackle the nations of Africa into positions of near-permanent dependence on the economic well-being of the developed nations and of their largesse.

African leadership has realized that the weakening of the linkages which nurture Africa's dependence is a sine qua non for Africa achieving the sustained economic growth and the peership with the developed countries which a meaningful "interde-

pendence" genuinely calls for. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)[1] sets forth the strategy by which these linkages may be relaxed. It is a collective strategy, which means that the African leadership must begin to focus on the Continent as well as on the nation-state.

Global interdependence has a parallel at the local level, especially in Africa, where the well being of most countries is highly affected by what is happening to one's neighbor. For countries to be responsive to this phenomenon, the lesson of Pan Africanism must be learned and internalized by all Africans--possibly a difficult task for many Africans whose loyalties have traditionally been narrower, even, than the nation-state. But if the experience of the past decade has illustrated any developmental truth at all, it is that African problems can only be addressed effectively on a supra-national basis. That this perspective is gaining in acceptance is especially gratifying to American blacks. Pan Africanism comes naturally to black Americans. We can never know from exactly where in Africa our ancestors came. Consequently, our African nationalism, our emotional ties, are to the continent as a whole, but not to any particular nation. It is comforting indeed to note that economic reality has pushed Pan Africanism to the forefront of the African struggle for economic independence.

Paradox, however, is a commonplace element in human existence. It should, therefore, provoke no great surprise that the LPA, a program designed to minimize Africa's dependence on others, calls

initially for increased assistance from others as a pre-requisite for eliminating such assistance altogether. Self-reliance, the basic objective of the LPA, is achievable only after a period of reliance on others. This is a general pattern in the animal kingdom, where the stages of infancy, growth and maturity are accepted as norms. Most industrialized nations have passed through a similar cycle, having been capital importers, or debtor nations, for prolonged periods before they achieved a level of development wherein net external assistance was no longer necessary for them. The LPA recognizes that Africa will require a continuation, and indeed the augmentation, of its present flow of resources from abroad for some years into the future. But the LPA prescribes a strategy which is specifically designed to eliminate, ultimately, the need for this external flow.

Despite its continental focus however, the LPA must be implemented mainly at the national level. There are, of course, a host of vital regional and multi-national entities, programs and projects which constitute the core of the self-reliance strategy. Their effectiveness will be a major determinant of the success of the LPA. But underpinning every multi-national effort there must be solid national support from the nations involved. Until the African nations begin to perceive their economies as parts of a larger, collective, system, the LPA will be prevented from "taking off" as a viable strategy. This observation has particular relevance with regard to the mobilization of resources

for implementation of the LPA, both internal and external resources. In this paper we will consider the availability of both domestic, or internal, resources and of foreign resources which might be enlisted in support of the LPA, and attempt to draw some conclusions which might help to serve as guides to policy formulation in this area.

II

Mobilizing Internal Resources

The LPA must be implemented by the African countries. There is no supra-national entity which can implement projects within countries, nor that can select cadres, plant crops, market produce, issue currency, or incur debt. Nor are these tasks for foreigners to do. They are the responsibility of national governments and of private citizens functioning within the nationally constituted framework. The choice of tasks to be performed and the method of carrying them out may, however, have significant implications for the LPA and it is therefore important that each African country, in formulating and implementing its own national plans, take full account of how its efforts fit into the larger picture. This, in itself, can constitute a first step toward resource mobilization because it can lead to significant economizing in the use of scarce resources. If complementarity rather than competitiveness of neighboring economies is to be encouraged, if wasteful duplication of facilities is to be avoided, if optimal size installations are to be constructed, and if other similar economies are to be realized,

then the first step must be a coordination and harmonization of national economic activities within regions. The LPA offers many suggestions in this regard, including the development of intra-African trade, the substitution of local goods and local foods for imports, replacing of foreign technicians by indigenous cadre, and the abandoning of European life styles in favor of more traditional customs. Such suggesions are, of course, easily made, but are implemented only with considerable difficulty.

A demonstration of vigorous support for the LPA by the African countries is absolutely essential for the successful mobilization of large amounts of external resources for the LPA. Although none of the industrialized powers has expressed any opposition to the Lagos Plan, this absence of verbal opposition does not mean that they are supportive of it. In Washington, the LPA is not given much attention in official circles. One can attribute this to the urgency of Africa's immediate needs, such as emergency food relief, refugee problems, debt servicing requirements, and to the current fascination with policy reforms and expanded conditionalities. An equally likely explanation for the ignoring of the Lagos Plan, however, is the absence of any significant pressures from Africa demanding support for the LPA.

Furthermore, the LPA's objective of reducing Africa's dependency and directing the continent's efforts toward the develop-

ment of internal markets moreso than external ones is not viewed with equanimity in all quarters of the industrialized world. Consequently, the developed nations might perceive the LPA as threatening to their raw materials supply lines as well as to their markets for manufactured goods. The LPA implies a drastic revision in the existing international division of labor which may not have been in the plans of the industrialized nations.

The prospect of Third World countries assuming control over the disposition of their resources has historically provoked consternation. Who can forget the strident calls for Washington to invade the Middle East and take over its oil fields when OPEC first began to flex its muscles? And as recently as last year, the U.S. representative at the United Nations stated that "We must take careful reckoning of a sinister aspect of the policies of many developing countries--- I refer to their efforts to achieve full state control of their natural resources... in complete disregard of our own interests... We might be unable to satisfy in full our requirements of strategic raw materials and of others essential to the prosperity and welfare of our people."[2] Clearly, the effective implementation of the LPA would create some problems for the industrialized nations, which have anticipated quite a different role for Africa to play in the global economy. Although in the long run a self-reliant Africa can become a valued trading partner for the industrialized nations, both for imports and for exports, the terms

of this trade are expected to become more equitable under the LPA scenario, so there will be some costs imposed on those developed countries which are currently extracting disproportionally large benefits from the Africa trade.

Thus, it is not surprising that the developed nations have not rushed to embrace the Lagos Plan and it is mandatory that the Africans mount a major initiative to win support for it. Such an initiative must begin at home, where both leadership and popular support must be mobilized under the LPA banner. The volume of support which can be garnered abroad for the LPA will be in direct proportion to the volume of support which it is perceived the LPA has garnered at home, so the first step in mobilizing external resources is to mobilize internal support. This entails both the drumming up of popular support as well as the taking of concrete actions by African governments and institutions which are unambiguous steps in the direction of LPA implementation. The mobilization of domestic savings for private investment would, of course, be highly useful in this regard but can probably not be relied upon as a major source of funds in many African countries because extensive savings may not be present. In some countries, however, it may be possible to tease out a substantial volume of investment capital which may presently be in hiding or housed outside the continent.

For undertakings requiring large amounts of resources, however, Africa has no institution better suited to facilitate the

task of resource mobilization for the LPA than the African Development Bank (ADB). As a contintent-wide organization, controlled by the Africans and with a relatively substantial capitalization, it is admirably suited to channel financial resources toward those activities which are supportive of the LPA and to encourage other donors and lenders to do likewise. The ADB Group (which consists of the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Nigerian Trust Fund) is presently lending at a rate approaching $1 billion per year, which represents about 7.5% of official development assistance for Africa. Disbursements are, of course, considerably less, owing to the lengthy delay which generally ensues between the commitment of a loan and the widespread implementation of a project.

The importance of the ADB for the LPA does not rest upon the magnitude of ADB loans, however, nor even upon the not inconsiderable additional monies which ADB attracts via the co-financing arrangements which characterize many of its loans, bringing in funds from other lenders to supplement those being lent by the ADB. The real promise of the ADB lies in the manner in which the ADB is proposing to utilize its resources.

In a highly significant speech delivered at the twentieth anniversary meeting of the ADB governors in Tunis in May, 1984, ADB president Wila Mung'Omba set forth the program for the Bank's next two decades.[3] The thrust of this program foreshadows a commitment to the achievement of the goals of the LPA. A seminar on the future role of the ADB provided much of the focus for this 20th anniversary meeting and a Bank paper set forth in greater detail the program which President Mung'Omba was proposing. From this paper one can see that the Bank has digested the LPA and is recommending a lending program which will be supportive of it in ways which are meaningful.

In his address, President Mung'Omba spoke of the next 2-3 years as a period of transition at the Bank, during which time priority would be given to food security and to project rehabilitation. Beyond this transitional period, the Bank's program stresses: (1) non-project lending; (2) multi-national projects; (3) support to the private sector; (4) population issues; (5) policy dialogue with member countries; (6) trade promotion; and (7) support to the industrial section. Indeed, the seminar paper goes on to state that "In adopting these priorities, reference should be made to setting the objectives and developing activities in the context of the Lagos Plan of Action for economic development ..."[4]

Three of these ADB priority areas--multi-national projects, trade promotion and industry--can address a major thrust of the LPA in a particularly synergistic fashion: The production and

distribution of manufactured goods for a multi-country region. With the ADB taking the leadership in providing financing for such programs, other donor and lender agencies may be persuaded to follow suit, so the role of the ADB becomes a crucial one in terms of attracting external resources.

III

Mobilizing External Resources

The effective implementation of the Lagos Plan will require vast sums of external resources. These resource needs are in addition to those which are necessary just to keep the continent lurching along in its present unsatisfactory condition. Preliminary ECA estimates for 1983 indicate that Africa experienced a $13.6 billion deficit on current account, down from $24.7 billion in 1982. Official transfers (net) remained steady at $3.3 billion for both years, net capital transfers fell from $14.2 billion to $7.8 billion, and the drawdown in reserves declined from $7.1 billion to $2.4 billion.[5] These figures must be read with caution, however, because the $11 billion decline in the current account deficit was achieved by cutting imports by a comparable amount--imports which were, for the most part, essential to Africa's economic growth and development.

The resources necessary for achieving the goals of the LPA probably exceed by far the resources likely to become available under the best of circumstances. This author is in no position either to estimate Africa's total resource

needs nor the sums which it is likely to be able to obtain. It may however, be useful to examine the current trends in development assistance with a view toward identifying resources which might be sought via an effective resource mobilization campaign. The bulk of the external resources flows to Africa will be (a) multi-lateral, (b) bi-lateral, or (c) private including both debt and equity-type capital. A modest amount will come from voluntary organizations.

When one thinks of multi-lateral assistance one almost inevitably thinks of the World Bank and its sister institution, the International Development Association (IDA). These two institutions are by far the largest single institutional sources of aid monies for African development, (but funds from EEC countries, collectively, are larger). In 1984 they committed in excess of $3.4 billion in loans to African governments, almost exclusively for the funding of specific projects which presumably had been requested by the recipient country (although it is possible that the requests had, in some cases actually been prompted by the donor.) IDA, which makes its loans on highly concessional terms and affords priority to the poorer countries, was responsible for $1.2 billion of this total.[6]

There appears to be a general disposition to allocate in the future about one third of IDA's resources to Africa,[7] so the actual size of the IDA resource base becomes the major determinant of the volume of IDA resources available for Africa. The U.S., as the largest contributor to IDA, plays a major role in

shaping IDA policy and in recent years it has drastically reduced its support for IDA, a decision which slashes IDA resources by a multiple of about 4 in terms of what other donors would have given if only the U.S. were willing to be more generous. For the period 1985-87 an IDA replenishment of only $9 billion was agreed to, a 25% decrease from the 1981-83 figure of $12 billion. If the allocation of one third of IDA resources to Africa is in fact adopted, then the IDA allocation for Africa will presumably run in the neighborhood of $1 billion annually for the next three years, roughly comparable to the ADB's current level of commitment. Loans from the World Bank totaled $2.2 billion for Africa in 1984 and while this sum could conceivably be substantially escalated without a new cash levy being required of its members (by a change in the gearing ratio, for example) the World Bank's loans are not particularly attractive to many African nations because the price of its loans are too high.

In 1981 the World Bank released a special study focussing on Africa's developmental problems. This highly controversial study, entitled Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (and popularly known as the Berg Report) placed the principal blame for Africa's desultory economic performance on the improper policies being pursued by most African countries. It prescribed a number of policy reforms which African governments needed to institute to rectify

the situation and called upon the donor nations to increase substantially the resource flow to Africa as a means of helping to persuade the African governments to make the reforms being called for. To facilitate borrower compliance with the recommended policy reforms, a shift away from project lending in favor of "structural adjustment lending" was recommended, with the policy reforms mandated as pre-conditions for receiving the loans.[8]

In effect, what was being urged was a shift in the World Bank's entire lending program, rendering it more akin to the International Monetary Fund, which lends to meet balance of payments financing needs, tying its loans to strong "conditionality" requirements which effectively places national economic policy in the hands of the IMF. IMF lending in Sub-Saharan Africa, which tends to be short term in nature (generally, less than three years) and highly subject to cancellation for non-compliance with IMF-determined policy targets, has increased rapidly in recent years, going from $161.2 million in 1973 to $3,987,9 million in 1983 (excluding the Reserve Tranche and the Trust Fund).[9]

As a supplier of resources for implementation of the LPA, the IMF is not likely to be a significant agent. Its role in influencing capital flows, however, can hardly be over stated. Because of the current disposition toward extracting policy reforms from African borrowers as a pre-condition for obtaining developme

aid a movement which may have been sparked by the World Bank's report but which shows signs of being adopted for bi-lateral as well as for multi-lateral assistance, the "good conduct" cachet of the IMF is becoming a requirement for obtaining significant external assistance from any source, including commercial bank loans and private investment capital.

None of this augurs well for the prospects of obtaining the large sums of resources needed for effective implementation of the Lagos Plan. The IMF's policies in Africa are already under severe criticism because they are often inappropriately tailored to the African situation. The LPA, with its emphasis on self-reliant development, is out of step with the export-oriented World Bank report and is probably viewed with skepticism if not hostility in the major industrialized capitals which set the policies for the IMF and the World Bank. Thus the probability of a sympathetic response to calls for resources to implement the Lagos Plan is not likely to be great unless considerable effort is made to convince the major powers that support for the LPA is actually in their own self interest. To make that case will require considerable wizardry, given the fact that the whole purpose of the LPA is to wean Africa from the economic clutches of these same industrialized powers. Can it realistically be in their interests to assist Africa to break free of them?

There would appear to be two types of arguments which Africa might use in this regard: (1) an effectively implemented Lagos Plan offers the best, perhaps the only, prospect for assuring stability in Africa, and (2) an effectively implemented Lagos Plan will produce an economically prosperous Africa which can offer expanded markets for imports, attractive prospects for foreign investment, and plentiful supplies of raw materials. The first argument, based on political considerations, presumably presents no problems to the African states, who are as eager for continental stability as anyone else. But like the success of the Lagos Plan itself, it is an argument which can be persuasive to donors only insofar as the African states remain united around a common objective. If this unity proves to be easily shattered by a few states succumbing to the blandishments of the great powers and allowing themselves to be split off from the others in return for momentary gain, then the LPA will be still-born and unable to attract resources. Whether African leadership has matured to the point where such unity is achievable remains to be seen.

The second, or economic argument is less persuasive than the first. A highly prosperous Africa is clearly in everyone's interest, but a coincidence of interests between a self-reliant Africa and today's great powers cannot be automatically assumed. Indeed, a commitment to satisfy the interests of the capital surplus nations could effectively nullify the very purpose of the LPA and make the entire exercise futile. Yet within certain

limitations and with adequate safeguards, there may be some basis for negotiation for resource transfers within the framework of the second argument.

What is quite clear is that the obtaining of external resources for implementing the LPA will not be easy, and a realistic assessment of these prospects suggests that the most effective strategy may be for Africa to seek multi-lateral and bilateral assistance primarily for the financing of national programs whose contribution to the LPA is complementary to their contribution to national development. The LPA objectives would be left to be achieved through the intimate coordination of the national development activities of the countries within regions, with African resources being utilized to fund the appropriate collective and integrative activities.

There are, of course, multi-national projects which are capable of attracting external financing, as has been demonstrated by the foreign support received by some of the projects of the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC), although even here much of the non-African support has been for projects which are as much national in nature as they are regional. For the next few years, the competition for the restricted pot of money available for Africa is likely to be so intense that there will be limited possibilities for convincing donors to fund new initiatives not of their own choosing.

The current trend in foreign economic assistance is strongly toward structural adjustment and sectoral lending, linked to policy reforms. This is true not only at the level of the World Bank but is also being articulated as a model for future bi-lateral assistance. The U.S. is a prime example of this trend. Washington has proposed a new program entitled the Economic Policy Initiative, which would set aside $500 million over five years, to be allocated among a very limited number of African countries who agree to accept Washington's direction in setting policy for the sector in which the funds are to be used.[10] Principle emphasis would be on private sector initiatives in agriculture. Although the program was denied funding by the U.S. Congress on its first hearing, it is still being pushed vigorously by the Administration and may well be funded during a second Reagan Administration.

Meanwhile, Washington appears to be leading an effort to bring about greater coordination and cooperation among all donors to Africa, with policy "conditionalities" standardized to prevent one donor being played off against another. It will be particularly interesting to note the extent to which this trend is reflected in the Lome III discussions and in the future bi-lateral assistance of the EEC countries.

The most recent annual meeting of the World Bank (September, 1984) recognized the severity of Africa's economic plight and gave its informal endorsement to the idea of a special meeting to be held next spring to explore more intensely how the inter-

national community might be of assistance. Meanwhile, a sequel to the World Bank's 1981 report on Africa was released at this annual meeting.[11] This document took a second look at Africa's economic situation, focussing particularly on what had transpired since the 1981 report had appeared. Although its conclusions were in large measure reaffirmations of what had been said in the earlier report, namely, that African policies were faulty and needed to be changed, and that there was too much public and insufficient private sector involvement in the African economies, there was also a greater recognition that Africa's problems were not entirely of its own making and that a pure export-led development strategy would not suffice to put Africa on a satisfactory growth path. Particular stress was placed on the urgency of the need for expanded capital flows to Africa and on the gloominess of the outlook if such flows were not forthcoming.

Just prior to the formal opening of the meeting the policy-making Development Committee called for the creations of a supplemental fund of $2 billion for Africa. According to news reports, only Germany and the U.S. were opposed to this proposal, which was clearly an effort to help counteract the disastrous underfunding of IDA-7 and the U.S. shortfall in IDA-6. The U.S. will be pressured to ante up some additional resources and the U.S. will battle to see that these resources are made available with strong restrictions on their use. Increased

private sector involvement and other policy reforms will be mandated, and the LPA philosophy will almost certainly be ignored unless a major campaign is organized to make the African voice audible.

IV

Conclusion

A realistic assessment of the prospects for mobilizing substantial resources for the LPA at the present time must necessarily be pessimistic. The minimum resources needed merely for Africa's survival are barely forthcoming and are increasingly made subject to harsher conditionalities, some of which may not be in Africa's best interest and some of which are predicated on the assumption that an export-led development strategy is the only appropriate path for Africa to pursue. The received wisdom in donor countries, as well as these courtries' perception of their own self-interest, lead them to favor continuation of the present export-led development strategies for Africa and ill-equips them to be receptive to the LPA program of collective self-reliance. Indeed, the very concept of a "collective" Africa rather than of 50 separate states may strike fear in the breasts of some donor countries. The concept of a collective Africa may, however, be an attractive one to U.S. private investors who have heretofore not found Africa to be a particularly attractive arena. Foreign private investment is a mixed blessing, as we all know, and the LPA is ambiguous in terms of the role which it envisions for such investment. Assuming that

Africa does desire to have an inflow of this sort of capital, it can be attracted. However, the terms of which its availability is acceptable to both parties is likely to require considerable negotiation, and may in fact vary from country to country if that is the decision-making unit. Regardless of whether such decisions are to be made on a national or a Pan-African basis, it is virtually mandatory that these terms be worked out and made public if an enlarged flow of such capital is to be forthcoming. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is beginning to display some interest in Africa and is a capital source worth exploring.

So the search for funds to implement the LPA will require a variety of skills. Unless Africa is perceived as being solidly united behind the Lagos Plan, donor nations will thus have neither an incentive nor an obligation to take it seriously and will proceed to undermine it with impunity through the simple act of buying client states with aid monies. At the same time, as a capital-short area, Africa cannot afford to frighten off potential capital flows so it must exhibit this unity in a non-threatening manner, seeking assistance but accepting it only when its utilization is in harmony with the LPA. The difficulty of attracting external resources highlights the importance of Africa striving to mobilize its domestic resources to the maximum extent possible, although such resources can never entirely take the place of outside help. The China experience demonstrated how difficult it is to develop without external assistance but it also proved that a great deal could in fact be accomplished if the level of disci-

pline and of sacrifice be sufficiently high. Africa enjoys neither the homogeneity nor the unity of China so there are obvious limits to the applicability which the Chinese experience in domestic resource mobilization has for Africa.

Africa will be well advised to use its internal resources as a means to leverage external resources. As the only Pan-African institution with significant funding capabilities, the ADB must inevitably bear much of the burden of this effort. The ADB will have a dual role to play in this regard. It should not only fashion its lending program in ways which are strongly supportive of the LPA, as it has indicated it intends to do, but it must recognize how admirably suited it is to fill the very serious void which exists in terms of an African economic voice in influential foreign and international circles. This void is especially noticeable in Washington, where so many of the decisions which have strong economic impacts on Africa are taken. Rarely if ever is there an authoritative spokesman for the continent available to present a continental perspective at the endless fora which provide the underpinnings for many U.S. foreign policy decisions. Occasionally an African from a particular embassy or from an international organization, or an African expatriate resident in America, may participate in such fora, but even such a chance participant is likely to bring a narrow rather than a continental perspective to the discussion. A few of Africa's American friends attempt to fill

this void but inasmuch as we are merely private citizens, clothed with no official authority to speak for Africa, our views carry little weight.

If the LPA is to acquire credibility among donors it must achieve some degree of acceptance in the U.S., which is why this conference is a significant first step. At least the LPA has reached North America! But if the acceptance of the donor community is to be achieved it will require an on-going campaign by a team of persons who are tuned into the relevant structures on both sides of the Atlantic, and who are totally dedicated to the cause of African development. U.S. policy largely shapes western donor policy and U.S. policy is in turn heavily influenced by a fairly elite group of foreign policy specialists, who move in and out of government as political fortunes change but whose influence is on-going. The LPA perspective must be strongly and persuasively introduced within these circles and an ADB liaison office, properly staffed and mandated, would appear to be the most promising way to launch this effort.

U.S. policy is also influenced by pressure groups within the American populace. Virtually the only constituency which Africa enjoys within the U.S. is the black American community. This group has become highly influential in recent years, and while it wields considerably less influence during Republican administrations than during Democratic ones, the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives takes its lead on many Afircan issues from the increasingly influentical Black Caucus

(the Black Congressmen). The Jesse Jackson presidential campaign substantially expanded the scope of black influence in American politics and publicly established the black community's interest in international affairs. Although the average black American's interest in Africa (other than South Africa) is less intense than one would wish, the black American community can, with proper nurturing, be fashioned into a highly influential lobby on behalf of such issues as U.S. policy toward Africa, U.S. aid levels for Africa, and other Africa-related topics. Here again, however, the need is for an African agency to take this on as a task to be accomplished. Sympathetic black Americans can help, and indeed are already doing much in this regard, but what is missing is some African liaison agency which by virtue of its official status would render such efforts more credible and more authoritative.

In this regard it is interesting to note that Israel received $2.6 billion in U.S. economic and military assistance for fiscal year 1984, or approximately $1000 per inhabitant. This invites comparison with the $1.1 billion which the U.S. provided to all of Sub-Saharan Africa for the same year. Even if we add on the U.S. share of multilateral assistance to Africa, the total U.S. aid to Africa works out to only $5. per inhabitant. While Israel's special relationship to the U.S. is well-known, a disparity of this magnitude dramatically illustrates how meaningless is the U.S. argument that "it cannot afford" to be more generous with Africa. The disparity highlights just how ineffective we have been in selling Africa to the U.S. and we all share in the blame for this.

The Lagos Plan can have a future if sufficient numbers of Africans wish it to. Resources can be mobilized for it, if Africa convincingly demonstrates its support for it. It won't be an easy task but with sufficient perseverance the necessary resources can be raised! In the spirit of the Civil Rights movement, I feel confident in saying that "We shall overcome".

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