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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT REFORM: POLITICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS VS. THE NEOCLASSICAL IMPERATIVE

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African development management reform: political and socio-cultural constraints versus the neoclassical imperative

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INTRODUCTION

"On our side", African governments told the international community at the special session of the UN General Assembly on Africa's economic crisis, "we reaffirm our commitment to mobilize all our resources for development purposes and to undertake, individually and collectively, all measures and policy reforms necessary for the recovery of our economies and the revitalization of genuine development to the benefit of all our peoples".[1] The African Submission goes on to outline future intensions and strategies: "it is our collective and individual determination to make all the sacrifices required for bringing about economic rehabilitation, recovery and development. Accordingly, we will ... take measures to strengthen incentve schemes, review public investment policies, improve economic management. including greater discipline and efficiency in the use of resources, encourage domestic resource mobilization and ensure the broad participation of all our peoples

in the veritable fight against poverty, famine and hunger, disease and ignorance".[2]

This statement captures the new mood of realism on the priorities, policies, institutional and managerial requirements for short and longer-term development that is now sweeping across Africa.[3] Most African states were, by mid-1986, implementing reform and adjustment programmes in cooperation--in nearly all cases--with the World Bank and/or IMF, the UN system and other international development agencies. In the formulation and pursuit of these programmes in this present post-crisis era of the late 1980s, African leaders and ruling elites exhibit a new realism on the development prospects of the countries over which they preside. Hence, the African Submission emphasizes a commitment to abandon inappropriate policies, identifies the constraints arising out of the 'resource gap' of new money and articulates the need for concerted action in dealing with debt and debt service burdens, declining concessional flows and and the persistent down-ward spiral of the terms of trade of most African countries notwithstanding occasional up-swings. Quite evidently, a rare opportunity for dealing with the region's development problems has been engendered by the current posture of most African regimes.[4]

But this new mood has obviously not been nurtured in a vacuum. It has grown within the present configuration of

the African post-colonial state and the framework of a political culture that undergird and continue to provide the bases of personal rule. It has also appeared in a conjuncture--that is increasingly becoming apparent--of fundamental changes in the structure of the world economy that have further marginalized the African region. A corresponding historical shift in ideologies of economic strategy and management is also apparently underway with the consequence of the decline of Keynesianism or interventionism against the growing influence of neoclassicism (and glasnost and other liberalizing tendencies in centrally planned economies). It is perhaps still too early to characterize these changes although it is clear that a decline in the role of the state in economic (or for developing countries development) management is not an outcome; but more rather a redefinition of its role. Central to the emerging orthodoxy is the belief that there are strict limits on what governments can do effectively; and governments .that ignore such limits, particularly in regard to interventionist mechanisms that constrain rather than enhance the allocative functions of markets are often rewarded with inefficiencies and intractable difficulties for their efforts.

It is partly with this in mind that the three main sections of the paper respectively examine the political and socio-cultural constraints on development management and

practice arising out of the present configuration of African post-colonial states; the challenge presented by recent changes in the structure of the world economy and the imperatives of neoclassical economic strategies; and some key aspects of the practical responses by African governments in the management of their economic affairs.

I

The configuration of African post-colonial states

A recent spate of studies of the post-colonial state and its political and socio-cultural configuration in contemporary Africa have focused on the dubious nature of state-society relations.[5] The problem arises out of what is perceived as a disjointed relationship between the post-colonial state and the society over which it presides. These studies are founded on the premises of the social science of the modern state. In these terms, the state is historically a centralizing force which 'draws in' various aspects of social and economic activity within its scope. Through this process, the state stimulates the development of (and is, itself, further developed by) other ties and interconnections which cut across the economic, social and

territorial realms over which it claims sovereignty. Hence the modern state has emerged from its transformation over time with the important features of a nation-state (having penetrated but not necessarily dissolved the plurality of cultures and sub-cultures within its 'space') in a world of industrial capitalism (as the dominant mode of economic enterprise). It is in terms of these features that the state is 'modern'; according to Weber it "...has only in modern times reached its full development ... it is best to define it in terms appropriate to the modern type of state, but at the same time, in terms which abstract from the values of the present day, since these are particularly subject to change."[6]

As regards the first feature, the modern state has an organic relationship with its (by this point 'civil') society within which social interaction and capital accumulation occurs fuelled by a range of ideologies and the mechanisms of price, profit and investment in labour and commodity markets. Since these processes do not occur in isolation from similar processes in other states, the second feature, a complex web of international relations between states is a simultaneous development. If the modern state is also understood to be a community organized for the purpose of government within a prescribed jurisdiction, it develops specialized institutions (collectively referred to

as the public sector) for mediating and regulating its economy and society, the competing claims of different groups of individuals as well as its external relations. These institutions or agencies operate through impersonal rules to uphold a consciousness of some concept of 'public purpose'. It is from this consciousness and concept that the state derives its legitimacy.

And in relation to the immediate concerns of this paper, to the extent that economic growth--the main if also flawed yardstick of progress--has become a principlal objective of governments, economic and development management is a pre-eminent activity of the modern state.[7] Indeed it is by no means superflous to argue that a claim to 'statehood' in today's world is also a claim to have this capacity.

The complication which recent studies of African post-colonial states have identified is this: these states are in almost all cases a legacy of colonial rule and not a result of step-by-step state/society transformation. As such they exist in an 'overdeveloped' as distinct from organic relationship with their societies. This incongruity in state formation, as one formulation has it, inhibits the emergence of popular consent; undermines the creation and maintenance of political order, territorial integrity, administrative and institutional capacity; obstructs the generation and

allocation of public resources for public purposes; and impedes a regularized exchange of, or succession to, power.

The most common mode of governance that has emerged from this configuration is some variant of personal rule. It arises out a context in which the state has not fully 'drawn in' the plurality of cultural and/or class bases of its society. Accordingly, competing claims from these bases are channelled through kin, clan and ethnic networks rather than mediated by secular political processes.[8] As a mode of governance, personal rule constrains the effectiveness of governmental processes of development management--policy development, planning, organizational design, programming, budgeting, scheduling, processing, staffing, training, personnel and financial management. From this political culture of shared beliefs in the appropriateness of clientelist networks and preferment is derived ambivalent attitudes toward the propriety of bureaucratic processes and institutions.

But this is not to deny that personal rule can be associated with a considerable degreee of variance--from country to country--in state/society relations, bureaucratic effectiveness and economic performance. Not to recognize this is to fall into the deterministic trap of lumping all African countries into the same straight-jacket. Ideology and even leadership style of personal rulers accounts for this

variance.[9] Thus a number of African countries combine the features of the overdeveloped state and personal rule with relative economic success and progress, for example, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, and Morocco; or among non-African countries, Brazil, India, South Korea, Mexico and Thailand. This suggests that personal rulers and other state actors do have some choice (exercised with varying degrees of political ingenuity and resourcefulness) in the management of state/society relations and the bureaucratic procees of economic development. Price has provided persuasive evidence of this in contrasting Ghana's economic decline with the success of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs):

> What emerges from the examination of the NIC experience is that while the particular political systems and governmental structures that constitute their states may differ, these states all exhibit the quality of strength in relation to their domestic societies. Rather than being permeated by societal interest groups that are able to capture the state's economic decision-making and bureaucratic apparatus, the NIC states provide their economic agencies with ... relative insulation from societal demands for the distribution of valued resources ... The autonomy of the NIC state vis-a-vis its society, which this insulation provides, allows key state actors and bureaucrats to perform as economic entrepreneurs--setting production goals, designing economic strategies, accumulating surplus, redirecting capital and labour from low

> to high growth sectors, and choosing technology based upon economic ... criteria.[10]

It is now possible to pull together the implications of the foregoing discussion. Any state that aspires to achieve and maintain a significant rate of economic growth must establish institutional mechanisms through which information is processed to a point of decision and decisions, once made, are implemented and coordinated for effect and consistency. Normally falling under the executive arm of government, these institutions are essentially of two kinds: 'substantive' agencies and departments for setting priorities, policy and decision-making, allocation of resources and the implementation and evaluation of programmes and measures, for example, offices of presidents and prime ministers, the cabinet, ministers as well as decentralized units; and 'non substantive' or 'internal' agencies and departments for applying government-wide standards and regulations on financial and personnel matters and working methods, for example, treasuries, budget bureaus, finance ministries and establishment, public service and manpower secretariats and commissions. In any state, moreover, the effectiveness of these institutions and the administrative and managerial processes within them depends at one level on a variety of factors including organizational 'climate and politics' and other informal aspects of bureaucratic life; and at another level--perhaps, also more importantly--on the

broader political environment. In the case of African post-colonial states where personal rule and political clientelism is a key feature of the political environment, there is the further difficulty, as noted above, of a political culture of levity toward bureaucratic organization and processes--unless of course special effort is made to 'insulate' them. The recognition of this caveat is an important ingredient of the new mood of realism now sweeping across the region. Accordingly, the African Submission refers to the need to improve economic management and for greater discipline and efficiency in the use of of resources. Practical action which African governments can take in this regard and, which indeed many are taking, are discussed below. As will be shown presently, this recognition is timely. Recent changes in the structure of the international economy have further marginalized the African region and revisionist ideologies on the proper role of government in economic or development management have emerged.

II

Economic change and neoclassical revisionism

Future historians writing about this decade will conclude that the 1980s was a watershed in the reorientation of development strategies in Africa in response to persistent economic difficulties. It has been documented that two-thirds of sub-Saharan African states have undertaken significant reforms in economic policy and management since 1982. The check-list in table one provides the details; table two identifies these countries.

The pun on the word 'submission' will also not escape the notice of historians chronicling Africa's economic fortunes during the 1980s. There are good grounds for arguing that African regimes are in effect 'submitting' to the changes in the structure of the world economy that have occurred since the early 1960s and the corresponding revisionism in ideologies of economic strategy and management that had begun to emerge before the recession of 1974-76, received impetus from it, and became even more sharply defined after the 1980-82 recession. An elaboration follows.

In the twenty years since 1960, there has been evident changes in the locus of world manufacturing output and in the relative shares of gross world product of various

Table One

Trends in Policy and Institutional Reform Among African Countries

10	-	countries have decontrolled producer prices
20	-	countries have frozen hiring or reduced public sector employment
13	-	countries have eliminated public agricultural marketing agencies or permitted private sector competition
7	-	countries have given import of agricultural inputs to the private sector
14	-	countries have privatized some state enterprises
21	-	countries have substantially increased producer prices
14	-	countries have reduced or eliminated agricultural input subsidies
8	-	countries have reduced or eliminated food subsidies
16	-	countries have realigned exchange rates to more closely reflect the real cost of foreign exchange
7	-	of the above have adopted floating market rates

Source: West Africa, 30 March 1987, p. 625.

Table Two

African Countries* with Major Structural Reform Programmes Planned or Underway as of March 1987

Burundi	Mali
Central African Republic	Mauritania
Chad	Niger
Equatorial Guinea	Rwanda
The Gambia	Senegal
Ghana	Sierra Leone
Guinea	Somalia
Guinea Bissau	Tanzania
Kenya	Togo
Madagascar	Zaire
Malawi	Zambia

*IDA-eligible sub-Saharan African Countries.

Source: Overseas Development Council (of the US), "Should the IMF withdraw from Africa?" Policy Focus, No. 1, 1987, p. 6.

countries and geographical group of countries. As a result, the industrial market economies of Western Europe and North America have lost some ground to a number of 'new comers', Japan most prominent among them but including two dozen or so 'middle income' countries and/or NICs. The changes in the relative shares of gross world product was accompanied by a significant change in the composition of the exports of the new comers--a trend showing an increasing share of manufactures as distinct from resource-based commodities. During the same period, the share of world product of the 'low income' countries (most of which can be found in Africa) declined, but only marginally; on the other hand, their share of manufacturing output increased and, again, only marginally.[11]

The success of the new comers--especially Japan and the Asian NICs--was associated with a common set of policies and practices including a reliance on export markets to generate growth rather than the expansion of domestic markets; the use of foreign capital and borrowings to finance local investment; the provision of a host of market incentives to stimulate agricultural and industrial production; a shift to floating exchange rates; and the exposure of export industries to market forces and international competitiveness.[12] By contrast, the *dirigiste* import-substitution and/or redistribution strategies which a number of 'poor perform-

ers'--low income and state socialist countries as well as some Latin American NICs--pursued during the same period resulted in high cost and low quality industrial output, neglect of agriculture (and in some cases growing food deficits), worsening income distribution, intractable inflation combined with un (and/or under) employment, and thriving underground economies. These effects were especially pronounced in African countries.

In terms of ideologies of economic strategy and management, the success of the new comers signalled the emergence of apparently viable alternatives to the theories, policies and practices associated with post-war state intervention. As Harris suggests, "by the seventies, there was no such confidence in the capacity of governments to control their domestic affairs; the market, the invisible hand of a benevolent deity, was everywhere to be seen as the only means of allocating resources efficiently; economic growth and high employment were seen as the gift of the world market, not of domestic management".[13] The subsequent rise in influence of neoclassicism received impetus from the desperate search of many governments for a formula of adjustment to economic change and the post-recession climate of the late 1970s. But it has to be understood that neoclassical revisionism did not imply a decline in the role of the state in economic or development management. On the contrary, the visible

hand of government was very much in evidence orchestrating the policies that had brought about the success of the new comers and directing adjustment strategies in developing and developed, market and centrally planned economies alike. Some analysts of European and North American adjustments even identified corporatist tendencies in the neo-activism of the state amid premature paranoia over the alleged de-industrialization of these countries.[14] Harris is quite apposite in asserting:

> Ideologies and their substructure of economic theory are no better than the prejudices of the age and the classes from which they derive, but it is rare for such a complete transformation to take place in such a short time. It is a mark of how conscious most participants are that the change received little systematic attention--it seems that pragmatically one thing led to another...[15]

The mea culpa of the African Submission and its espousal of neoclassical policy and institutional reforms has to be seen as the 'African submission' to new international economic realities (and as noted above, a parallel to liberalizing trends in centrally planned economies).

The redefinition of the role of the state, the provision of appropriate incentives for increased agricultural and industrial productivity, cutting the fat off the public sector, the re-alignment of exchange rates and, more generally, the application of appropriate strategies

reflecting the dynamism of linkages between domestic productive forces and international trade (see table one) are measures that will--the proverbial all things being equal must be inserted here--provide increased economic activbity and growth in the medium term.

But some caveats must be indicated in relation to the foregoing optimism. Firstly, the resource gap identified by the African Submission implies that new money for rehabilitation programmes is inadequate.[16] Private commercial lending to Africa has virtually ceased and interest charges on debts has been increasing. According to one estimate, net resource flows to Africa declined sharply from US$10 billion in 1980 to US$4.9 billion in 1985 in current prices. A partial recovery in 1987 to US$7.3 billion is expected in net flows largely as a result of official aid to finance adjustment programmes. About 40 percent of current debt service payments--estimated at an annual amount of US$11 billion in 1986-87--consists of payments to the IMF and World Bank and interest due to other financial creditors which are not eligible for rescheduling.[17] This is now virtually the only debt that is being paid. Secondly, a number of other difficulties stand in the way of recovery in Africa. These include sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate of major international currencies, instability of oil prices (although African oil-importers are currently enjoy-

ing relief from high prices), tariff and non-tariff trade barriers (including protectionsim in agricultural commodities in North America and through the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe which hurt some existing and potential African exports) and depressed international commodity and mineral markets (with the partial exception of precious minerals).

It is clear that economic reform and development management have become very complex as a result of the limited room for manouvre African ruling elites and policy-makers have. Against such a background, future growth will have to come out of innovations in development management as much as out of increased productivity and export success. The focus now shifts to examine some aspects of the institutional reforms now underway.

III

Development management reform

As noted above, primary responsibility for development management normally falls under the executive arm of government. The public sector is a generic term that encompasses the range of institutions and processes that are involved. Its precise organization and the variety of functions undertaken by it varies among countries. Given, however, its pre-eminent role as an instrument of fashioning and putting public or development policy into effect, public sectors everywhere typically encompass two 'domains' of organization and management. The first domain, as already mentioned, is the substantive arrangements for the setting of priorities, policy and decision-making, allocating resources and the implementation and evaluation of programmes and measures. The network of institutions and organizations under this category includes:

<u>central agencies</u> that prepare and process information for decision-making by the cabinet, prime minister or president;

<u>ministries, departments and agencies</u> at other levels of government including local authorities which generate and process information for decision-making and policy development at these and higher levels and/or implement policies

that have been adopted; and parastatal agencies which ostensibly operate at 'arms-length' from other organizations of the executive branch of government to facilitate a commercial mode of operations, for example public enterprises, or some degree of operating autonomy such as regulatory commissions, advisory councils etc.

The second domain comprises the 'internal' arrangements for applying government-wide standards and regulations on financial and personnel administration and working methods (it is usual for public agencies outside the public service--local authorities and parastatal organizations, for example--to be given autonomy in these matters but their operations may fall within the purview of public service fianancial administration). This network of institutions include:

institutions of financial management such as treasuries, budget bureaus and finance ministries; and institutions of personnel management such as establishment secretariats, public service and manpower commissions, training facilities and ministries of public services.

The domain of internal arrangements provides the administrative infrastructure for the domain of substantive arrangements but, together, they facilitate the role of government in development management. This role itself essentially encompasses three main activities:

macroeconomic management; microeconomic regulation and production. As a manager and regulator, a government respectively sets the macro and microeconomic framework within which economic agents--in the private and public sectors and hybrids of the two-- can operate. As a producer, the public sector directly provides certain goods and services most usually through public enterprises. It should be kept in mind that these activities are effected through the range of public sector institutions, departments and agencies that constitute the domains of substantive operations and internal administrative arrangements. It is not possible within the bounds of this paper to provide a full survey of the reforms being undertaken in these domains and activities.[18] But an account of the reform of central agencies and new approaches to macroeconomic management follow.

The reform of central agencies

These provide political executives with staff services and include central bank, budget, monetary, statistical, policy and planning agencies, aid and technical assistance coordination bureaus and other staff units. Matters which require action by political leaders are processed and analyzed at these agencies to facilitate decision-making, allocate resources and coordinate action. Although these are commonn functions performed by central agencies every-

where, national circumstances such as administrative traditions, the leadership style of chief executives, and the exigencies of national power politics, among other factors have resulted in some central agencies being either dominant or passive intermediaries in decision-making at the highest level of government.

Most African states have some version of the central agencies that have been identified. This cluster of economic and financial agencies constitucute the nerve centre of national development management. But the ability of these agencies in many African states to function effectively in dealing with external and internal challenges has not inspired much confidence in the past. This is because key central agencies in some countries have simply lacked analytical capacity and have slavishly worked within the parameters of multi-year development plans inspite of rapidly changing circumstances and environments. Where this has not been the problem, the tendency for personal rulers to fill them with patronage appointments or to take arbitary decisions irrespective of the impact and consequences for development objectives has undermined the institutionalization of analytical capacity in central agencies.

As part of the new mood, this is now changing. The World Bank's fourth report on sub-Saharan Africa records several instances of institutional reform and new procedures

for dealing with external debt and coordinating multi and bilateral assistance.[19] In Zambia for example, a Special Economic Unit chaired by the Minister of Finance and composed of senior officials of the National Planning Commission, the sectoral ministries, the central bank, major parastatal agencies, the cabinet office, and State House (the office of the president) was created in 1983 to prepare, coordinate and implement the government's policies and efforts to stabilize and restructure the economy following the difficulties caused by the collapse of international copper prices, the country's leading export. According to a 1984 assessment, in the short time since the unit was created, it proved invaluable in instituting policy reforms and it clearly satisfied the long-felt need for a high level body capable of policy analysis and generating information for quick decision-making.[20]

A number of African countries have, of course, consistently displayed institutional capacity at this level. Botswana, frequently cited as a laudable example of the 'insulation' of bureaucratic institutions and processes and, consequently, of effective development management in Africa south of the Sahara is a case in point. Policy analysis and coordination is carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (which has also been headed by the vice-president since independence). As

the nerve centre of policy development in the government, the ministry acts as a channel of information to the Economic Committee of the cabinet which is the government's decision-making body on development matters.[21]

North of the Sahara, the Conseil Supérieur de la Promotion Nationale et du Plan in Morocco brings together staff of various central agencies and ministries not only to facilitate policy development but, in cooperation with the Royal Cabinet (the king's advisers and executive office), the office of the prime minister and the secretariat of the council of ministers, to process information for decision-making by the king and his ministers.[22]

These examples are part of a trend of improving co-ordination and analytical capacity to facilitate more flexible and innovative responses by African governments. The reorientation of central agencies is comlemented by new approaches to macroeconomic management.

Changing approaches to macroeconomic management

The macroeconomic framework is composed of a series of interrelated policies that affect all aspects of economic behaviour. The main instruments are fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, credit, wage, price and trade policies which, in combination and along with exogenous factors help to determine the rate of domestic inflation, the rate and pattern of capital accumulation, resource mobilization and

utilization, the amount of foreign exchange earnings, foreign borrowing, the balance of payments position and, ultimately, the pace of economic activity and growth.

A central element of neoclassical economic management are policy measures that allow prices in an economy (especially of foreign exchange, credit, labour infrastructure services including energy and power) to reflect relative scarcity. A strong correlation is presumed to exist between 'getting prices right' and growth.[23] If 'getting prices right' (and, conversely avoiding price 'distortions') in an economy is ultimately a matter of qualitative judgement, the analytical capacity of central agencies to monitor the impact of macroeconomic measures and international trends on prices and markets and facilitate necessary adjustments is crucial.[24]

Before the onset of the new mood of realism, this approach to development management was de-emphasized by African regimes which emphasized instead a 'plan of action' of some sort. Many African governments are now in their fifth or sixth planning cycles since idependence; for example, Kenya's current (1984-88 plan) is its fifth. But over the years, experience has revealed the inherent limitations of a comprehensive plan in rapidly changing environments and markets. Available analytical techniques are just

not able to cope with the complexities of economic change to produce plans that are up-to-date, relevant and comprehensive.[25]

The limitations of planning as the mechanism of establishing the macroeconomic framework became particularly evident during the recession of 1974-76. It was around this time that analysts identified a 'crisis in planning'[26] with implications of too much emphasis on the plan and not enough on its implementation; over-emphasis on the medium term; excessive rigidity; and differences in perspective and inadequate communication between politicians, planners and administrators.[27] To be sure, there are pragmatic means of coping with the difficulties. To the extent that a government cannot effect public policy without spending money, and to the extent that the national budget not only encompasses expectations of macroeconomic performance but is also the main instrument of public expenditure, the integration of budgeting and the objectives, programmes or projects incorporated in the devlopment plan has long been recognized as crucially important.[28] In addition, the adoption of some variant of performance budgeting by many African countries has led to tighter coordination of the linkages between planning and budgeting. Such reforms while compatible with neoclassical strategies do not, however, go far enough in redressing the fundamental problems of macroeconomic manage-

ment in changing environments: how should fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, credit, wages and incomes, price and tariff policies be adjusted in response to change--and this is the perennial conumdrum--within the bounds of political feasibility and public policy objectives such as the reduction of inequalities and regional disparities in a country?

Since there are no definitive answers (analytical techniques notoriously fail to provide optimal solutions), political judgements have to be made. But in de-emphasizing planning and utilizing a problem solving/policy analysis approach, African governments are beginning to follow the example of the developed market countries and NICs. It has been stressed that this approach requires analytical capability and capacity in central agencies to make the information that is generated intelligible and a commitment at the highest level of political executives to facilitate necessary adjustments. Institutional arrangements in Zambia, Botswana and Morocco which have been identified are a reflection of ths requirement.

The problem solving/policy analysis approach does not imply that planning is redundant. Governments must perforce rely on medium and long-term forecasting to clarify the priorities of public expenditure and investment and to give guidance to the private sector. Variables such as GDP, savings, investment, public revenues and expenditures, export,

import, capital inflows and outflows and so on need to be projected to provide an informed basis for decision-making. And as regards the main economic sectors, forecasts in such areas as power, energy and transport are vital. Hence the problem solving/policy analysis approach does have a need for the programming of public investnment and forecasting; it does not, however, leave the policy instruments and options of governments 'frozen' in an environment and markets characterized by change. Moreover, as the evidence from the NICs suggest, this approach also facilitates innovation, a consideration that is especially relevant to the context of limited room of manoeuvre and constraints in African development management.

Conclusion

As suggested above, it is by no means superflous to assert that a claim to statehood in today's world is also a claim to have the bureaucratic capcity to manage economic or development objectives. The priority being given by African governments to development management reform is as much an ingredient of the new mood of realism as it is a response to the imperatives of neoclassical economic strategies on the 'proper' role of government that have become a world wide orthodoxy. The reforms and World bank/IMF adjustment programmes have a number of interesting implications, a summary of which follow.

The African post-colonial state is seen as overdeveloped because it has not fully drawn in various economic and social activities within the territory over which it claims sovereignty. It is against this background that personal rule--and an underlying political culture of ambivalence toward a consciousness and concept of public purpose and the propriety of bureaucratic institutions and processes--has emerged as the most common mode of governance. The insertion of neoclassical strategies (the inherent logic of which is to draw in economic activities outside the scope of the state) into this context will enhance the process of state formation and the rationality of bureaucratic insti-

tutions; but not necessarily political accountability or popular consent. It was to the economic logic of neoclassicism, its demonstrated effect in the NICs and its impact on international trends that the <u>African Submission</u> 'submitted'.

Notes

1 Organization of African Unity/UN Economic Commission for Africa, Africa's Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa's Economic and Social crisis, Addis Ababa, 1986, p. 2. This document is henceforth referred to as the African Submission.

2 Ibid, pp. 2-3.

3 For a further note on this mood, cf. David F. Luke, "Devlopment strategies: a new realism" in Group of 78, Canada and Africa: Common Cause, Ottawa, 1986.

4 The timing of the World Bank in designating 1986-87 'a year of opportunity' was excellent. Cf. World Bank, Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-90, Washington DC, 1986.

5 Cf., for example, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, Los Angeles, 1982; Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective, Los Angeles, 1983; Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, Cambridge (UK), 1985; and Patrick Chabal ed., Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power, Cambridge (UK), 1986.

6 Cf Max Weber, Economy and Society (vol. 1), Los Angeles, 1978, p. 56.

7 Cf. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (vol. 2), Los Angeles, 1985, for a useful discussion of the social science of the modern state.

8 For a case-study, cf. David F. Luke, Labour and Parastatal Politics in Sierra Leone: A Study of African Working-Class Ambivalence, Washington DC, 1984.

9 This is recognized by the authors cited in note No. 5 above; but the theme is perhaps best developed in Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa, New Haven, 1982.

10 Cf. Robert Price, "Neocolonialism and Ghana's economic decline: a critical assessment" in Canadian Journal of African Studies 18 (1) 1984, p. 187.

11 The best analysis of these changes is probably Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology, Harmondsworth (UK), 1986. But see also Chad Leechor et al, Structural Changes in World Industry: A Quantitative Analysis of Recent Developments, Washington DC (World Bank Technical Paper, Industry and Finance Series) 1983.

12 Cf., for example, Bela Balassa, Policy Reform in Developing Countries, Oxford (UK), 1977; Bruce Cummings, "The origins and development of Northeast Asian political economy", International Organization 38 (Winter), 1978, pp. 1-14; Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford (US), 1982; Miyohei Shinohara et al, The Japanese and korean Experiences in Managing Development, Washington DC (World Bank Staff Working Papers No 574, Management and Development Series) 1983; and Yung Whee Rhee et al, Managing Entry into World Markets, Baltimore, 1984.

13 Harris, The End of the third World, p.155.

14 Cf., for example, G. Lehmbruch and P. C. Schmitter eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, Los Angeles, 1982; John Goldthorpe ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations, Oxford (UK), 1984; P. J. Katzenstein, Small Staes in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe; Ithaca (USA), 1985; and John Whalley ed., Domestic Policies and the International Economic Environment, Toronto, 1985. For liberalizing trends in centrally planned economies, cf., for example, Peter Knight, Eonomic Reform in Socialist Countries: The Experiences of China, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia, Washington DC (World Bank Staff Working papers No 579, Management and Development Series) 1983.

15 Harris, The End of the Third World, pp. 28-29.

16 The African Submission, pp. 23-24.

17 Overseas Development Council (of the US), "Should the IMF withdraw from Africa?", Policy Focus No. 1 1987, p. 6.

18 For a more detailed survey, cf. David F. Luke, African Development Management Reform, forthcoming.

19 Cf. World Bank, Finacing Adjustment with Growth.

20 Cf. World Bank, Zambia: Country Economic Memorandum: Issues and Options for economic Diversification (a restricted access report), Washington DC, 1984, pp. 23-34.

21 Cf. Nimrod Raphaeli et al, Public Sector Management in Botswana: Lessons in Pragmatism, Washington DC (World Bank Staff Working Papers No 709), 1984, pp. 18-20.

22 Cf. World Bank, Morocco: Economic and Social Development Report, Washington DC, 1981.

23 Cf. Ramgopal Agarwala, Price Distortions and Growth in Developing countries, Washington DC (World Bank Staff Working Papers No 575, Management and Development Series) 1983; and World Bank, World Development Report 1983, New York, 1983 pp. 57-63.

24 On this issue cf. Balassa, Policy Reform in Developing Countries.

25 For a review of the planning experience of developing countries, cf. Ramgopal Argawala, Planning in Developing Countries: Lessons of Experience, Washington DC (World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 576, Management and Development Series), 1983.

26 Cf. Michael Faber and Dudley Seers eds., The Crisis in Planning (two vols.), London, 1972.

27 For a good review of these problems, cf. Diana Conyers and Peter Hills, An Introduction to Development Planning in the Third World, Chichester (UK), 1984.

28 Cf., for example, Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience, Baltimore, 1965; Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries, New York, 1974; and United Nations, Development Administration: Current Approaches and Trends in Public Administration for National Development, New York, 1975.