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## Development Planning in Africa: Key Issues, Challenges and Prospects

### A background paper<sup>1</sup>

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*"So much experience has now been acquired about which planning mechanisms work well and which do not, that countries forewarned and forearmed are better able than ever before to avoid pitfalls and plan with reasonable assurance of success" (Waterston, 1965: ix).*

## 1. Introduction

Recently, there has been increasing interest in, and a return to, more comprehensive development plans that go beyond the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP). Indeed, some African countries, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda have adopted long-term development visions and planning frameworks with far more ambitious growth and social development objectives and more detailed strategies and policies than those typically included in PRSPs. This raises a number of important questions as to why African countries need longer-term and comprehensive planning frameworks and what are the key opportunities and challenges ahead?

In the 1960s most of the newly independent African states, diverse as they are, adopted a planning approach to effect deep-seated changes in their economies and societies. This was not surprising, given the major theoretical and policy propositions of the pioneers of development economics<sup>2</sup>.

The pioneers of development economics formulated grand, and visionary, models of development strategy that aimed at effecting structural transformation with a central role assigned to the government in planning and programming development<sup>3</sup>. The policy content of these models was informed by the observation that "a less-developed economy was characterized by pervasive market failures. To correct or avoid market failure, they advocated central coordination and allocation of resources. The newly expanding subject of welfare economics also provided considerable rationale for government action to correct market failure" (Meier, 2001: 14). In addition to pervasive market failures, the role of the government was justified on the belief that the supply of entrepreneurs was limited in these countries, and that major structural changes, rather than marginal adjustments, were needed to effect development. Thus, the "government of a developmental state was to promote capital accumulation, utilize reserves of surplus labor, undertake policies of deliberate industrialization, relax the foreign exchange constraint through import substitution, and coordinate the allocation of resources through programming and planning" (Meier, 2001: 14-15).

Programming, and planning, to coordinate the allocation of resources by the government was understood as "*just another word for rational, deliberate, consistent and coordinated economic policy*" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1955:679). An obvious reason for why developing countries need to plan their development is the recognition that, under the then existing historical conditions, development would not take place automatically. Under such understanding the essential of planning economic development is in "*assuring an amount of productive investment which is sufficient to provide for a rise in national income substantially in excess of the rise in population, so that per capita national income increases. The strategic factor is investment or more precisely productive investment*" (Lange, 1961:695-696).

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<sup>2</sup> The pioneers of development economics of the 1940s and 1950s, and their followers up to the early 1970s are dubbed by Meier (2001) the first generation of development economists in contrast to a second generation that emerged in the 1970's.

<sup>3</sup> Classical examples of visionary models of development include Nurkse's "vicious circle of poverty", Rosenstein-Rodan's "big push", Leibenstein's "critical minimum effort" and "low-level equilibrium trap", Lewis' "dual economy model", Rostow's "take-off stage", and Chenery's "two-gap model". The ideas expressed in these early contributions to development economics are called the "high development theory" by Krugman (1997). Lewis (1954) dual economy model is one of the most quoted papers in the development economics literature.

A major controversy that surrounded the experience of planning in developing countries, including African ones, had to do with the policy content of the planning approach to development, especially the methods recommended for the mobilization of resources for productive investment. As it happened the methods recommended for use in various proportions depending on the development stage of country included the nationalization of industries, finance, trade, and foreign-owned natural resource enterprises; the contribution to state finance from agrarian reform; in addition to general taxation, public loans and deficit financing. In this respect it is important to note that a method of inducing private savers to undertake productive investment was also recommended. *“This implies inducing private industrialists, traders, landowners, and financial groups, to invest a considerable part of their income in the direction which is conducive to assuring the country’s rapid development, that means essentially investment in production”* (Lange, 1961: 696). It was noted that such inducement of private savers can be achieved by, among other measures, the taxation of unproductive use of wealth, compulsory saving, appropriate restrictions on the distribution of profits, and compulsory loans<sup>4</sup>. Thus, for those who called for a leadership role for the private sector in the development process there was no ground for equating the practice of comprehensive planning with an antagonistic dispensation towards the private sector, however embryonic such a sector may be.

The demise of planning the development of poor countries started with the advent of a second generation of development economists (1975 up to the present) which is seen as having been “almost moralistic, dedicated to a somber realism grounded on fundamental principles of neoclassical economics” (Meier, 2001: 17). Neoclassical economics is seen by this generation as being good for the governments of the developing countries. “Governments were admonished not only to remove price distortions but also to ‘get all policies right’. Not differences in initial conditions but differences in policies were the thought to explain the disparate performances of developing countries. A country was not poor because of the vicious circle of poverty but because of poor policies. Markets, prices and incentives should be of central concern in policy making” (Meier, 2001:17).

Such a new development wisdom was embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF which were imposed on developing countries, especially African countries since the early 1980s and up to the end of the 1990s. In this context it is now firmly established in the specialized literature that the World Bank’s commissioned Berg Report provided the theoretical justification for SAPs.<sup>5</sup> The advent of SAPs, with the accompanied array of conditionalities, marked the end of post-independence attempts at development planning on the continent.

From the above rather brief outline it should be clear that the planning approach to development and SAPs approach to the management of the macroeconomics of a developing country share two basic, but differentiated, features: (a) a focus on economic growth, with the planning approach aiming at achieving economic growth over a relatively long period under successive 5 year plans; while SAPs promising the achievement of economic growth in shorter periods of time; and, (b) a concern with policies, with the planning approach seeking to identify relevant development policies for the mobilization of required investment resources to achieve the

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<sup>4</sup> For a comprehensive and highly informative account of the various aspects of planning the development of poor countries, with emphasis on policy, see Lewis (1965).

<sup>5</sup> For an interesting account of the institutional, World Bank, events that eventually gave rise to SAPs see, for example, Stein (2008). It is worth noting that The Berg Report was not endorsed by Africa which had just adopted in April 1980 the Lagos Plan of Action comprised of self reliant programmes for the continent as a whole.

planned rate of growth, while SAPs imposing macroeconomic policies believed to be effective in achieving higher rates of growth.

The above two basic features of the two approaches on how to effect development will be dealt with in sections 3 and 4, respectively, following a brief account of the early experience of development planning in Africa in section 2. Section 5 discusses the arguments for development planning as a means to rationalize and strengthen development policies. The challenges facing, and the prospects for, African countries in reasserting the planning approach are discussed in section 6, while section 7 concludes the paper.

## **2. The Early Experience of Development Planning in Africa**

At the outset it is important to note that Africa's familiarity with development planning dates back to colonial times. The African countries with national development plans in the 1960s and before include: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo (DRC), Congo Republic, Egypt (cited as United Arab Republic), Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia (Waterston, 1965: 589-643).

One of the earliest evaluations of the experience of development planning in Africa was based on "a report originally prepared for the World Bank's African Strategy Review, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*" (Killick, 1983: 74). That evaluation report was written to inform the Berg report of SAPs fame noted above.

The objective of the evaluation exercise was "to review the literature on plan implementation in Africa, with implementation defined as the ability to achieve specified ends by chosen means. Though highly balanced the eventual evaluation report was constrained the availability of the relevant literature. In the event only the experience of Nigeria (1962-69, 1974-78 plans) and Kenya (1966-1970; 1970-74 plans) was reviewed in an in-depth fashion. The planning experience of Chad (1971-80 plan), Ghana (1963-69, and 1975-80 plans), Cote d'Ivoire (at the time Ivory Coast; 1970-75 plan), Senegal (1961-64 and 1965-69 plans), and Tanzania (1964-69 and 1969-74) were briefly considered<sup>6</sup>.

Despite the literature constraint it was concluded that "the available evidence on plan execution in Africa has been negative" (Killick, 1983:57). The facets over which the negative performance is recorded include: over-ambitious formulation of targets; limited success in meeting planned targets; wide dispersions about target levels; failure to modify the impact of market forces; and, failure to put development plans into effect. The sources of these weaknesses in plan implementation are identified as deficiencies in the plan documents; institutional and bureaucratic weaknesses (including inadequate planning resources); exogenous shocks; and political factors (Killick, 1983:58).

Examples of deficient plan documents include those for Chad (absence of financial programming), Ghana (serious technical flaws in the seven-year plan), Kenya (internal inconsistencies in the third and fourth plans), and Tanzania (insufficient provision for an implementation machinery for all plans).

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<sup>6</sup> Published evaluation of the planning experience are to be found in Maipose (2003) for Botswana, Adeniyi et al (1988) for Nigeria, and Mureithi (1988) for Kenya.

The institutional and bureaucratic weaknesses relate not only to the then obvious grave shortages of trained and experienced African personnel and the paucity of required data, but also to weaknesses of governmental structures. Examples of these institutional deficiencies include poor-coordination between government agencies and ministries, inefficient distribution of tasks, and weak incentives for civil service.

Not surprisingly, given the production structure of most African countries at the time of independence and their reliance on agricultural exports, exogenous shocks in the form of changes in world economic conditions and the vagaries of weather are identified as having played important roles in the poor implementation of African development plans.

The fourth source of weakness in plan implementation in Africa relates to political factors. Needless to note that this category of factors is also closely related to that of institutions listed above. Most, if not all, of the factors mentioned in the literature can be understood as relating to the nascent nature of the post-colonial state that emerged in various African countries in the early 1960s<sup>7</sup>. In this respect it is conjectured that there may have been “a mis-match between the received concept of development planning and the political realities of political decision-making processes. Most African societies are marked by actually or potentially grave social divisions. Institutional capacities for expressing and resolving these conflicts within a constitutional framework are still limited, so that society is prone to upheaval and political instability” (Killick, 1983:62). Such a reality, which undermines the rule of law feature of modern government, “often results in a large gulf between the intentions of governments and what actually happens on the ground, and to a de facto dispersion of decision-making power through society” (Killick, 1983:62). For an emerging state the overarching objective becomes the avoidance of social unrest and the maintenance of power. In the event the development objectives of the government are not given the explicit statement, and the required stability to be incorporated in a properly formulated plan (Killick, 1983:62).

The above briefly summarized literature dealt with sub-Saharan Africa, possibly due to the fact that the literature itself was published in English. The planning experience of North Africa has largely been neglected. In this respect it is known that Egypt was a pioneering country in the field of planning development in the continent. Its first five year plan of 1960-1965 is famous for its achievements including a real GDP growth rate of 6.5 per cent per annum against a planned growth rate of 7 per cent; and implementation of 80 per cent of industrial projects, and 70 per cent of agricultural projects. Its second plan of 1965-1970 was abandoned midway due to the war with Israel in 1967. The planning tradition was resumed in 1973 within the context of a liberalized orientation of the economy. Thus, we may add regional war as a political factor that could derail planned development.

In addition to Egypt there is evidence to show that Tunisia had adopted a ten year cycle at first (1962-1971; and 1965-1970), before adopting a four year planning cycle starting 1982-1986, which continued thereafter despite the liberalization of the economy following the implementation of SAPs in 1986. Tunisia, it is known, is a star growth performing African country<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Among listed political factors are: weak political unity and factional bickering; inadequate authority given to planning ministries; ethnic rivalries; and, the political interference in the choice of projects. See Kellick (1983:61) for elaboration of these factors and for references.

<sup>8</sup> Alhamsy (1980: 130-135; 150-157 and 161), who evaluated the planning experience of Algeria (with a ten year plan for 1967-73); Libya (with a first plan for the period 1963-68); Mauritania (with a first plan for 1963-66 and a

The case of Sudan deserves a special mention. An in-depth country case study evaluated the implementation of the ten year plan of the country (1961/62-1970/71) (Mirghani, 1983). Similar to Killick the difficulties that faced the implementation of Sudan's plan included economic and financial aspects, social and cultural aspects, and administrative aspects. Among the examples of the economic and financial difficulties encountered in plan implementation was the inefficient, and slow, processing of loan applications by the World Bank at the time and the sensitivity of funding requests to foreign policy relations with donor countries (Mirghani, 1983:146-151).

Despite the above plan implementation difficulties on the continent, it is worth asking the question: did development planning fail in Africa? A full answer to this question will be attempted in the following section. As a prelude to the answer, however, it may be appropriate to note an overall evaluation of the development achievements of the continent just prior to the advent of SAPs. Such an evaluation was undertaken by Mkandawire and Soludo (1999). After carefully, and succinctly, reviewing the evidence on the initial conditions of the continent, they concluded that by the "mid 1970s, many countries could point to significant progress in initiating processes of economic and social development. Some level of industrialization had been initiated, levels of school enrolment had increased, new roads had been constructed, the indigenization of the civil service had advanced and so forth. However, it was also clear that the economies were still underdeveloped and vulnerable to global economic change without the wherewithal for rapid adjustment" (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999:20).

### **3. Did Development Planning Fail in Africa?**

In addition to the overall assessment noted above a systematic way of answering the question would be to compare the growth performance of African countries for two periods: 1960-1973 during which comprehensive planning was used as an approach to manage the economies, and 1980-2000 during which a SAPs approach was used. Needless to note that the period 1973-1979 was the transition period during which the external economic environment for the development of African economies deteriorated. The origins of the deteriorating external economic environment are traced, from an African perspective, to the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases which precipitated, among other external factors, recession in the developed countries, declining demand for raw materials, and high interest rates (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Such conditions eventually ushered in the SAPs approach to development of 1980-2000.

It is worth repeating that the central message of SAPs was "get the prices right, unleash the markets and rein in the state" (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). The principal components of the SAPs approach to the management of African economies included anti-industrial policy stance, liberalization of agricultural markets, financial liberalization, opening-up of economies and the liberalization of trade regimes, allocation of budget resources to education on the basis of the rate of return, and, administrative reforms to enable technocrats to initiate and implement market-based economic reforms" (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Thus, despite the involvement of the World Bank the implementation of SAPs was dominated by the macroeconomic stabilization agenda of the IMF<sup>9</sup>.

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second for 1969-73); Morocco (with three plans for 1960-64, 1965-67, and 1968-72); Somalia (with plans for 1963-67, 1968-70 and 1971-73); and Sudan (with a ten year plan for 1961/62-1970/71) .

<sup>9</sup> Without getting involved in technical details it needs to be recalled that stabilization is a short-term concern in the context of which economic growth is hoped for as a result of a hoped for an optimal re-allocation of resources in the static sense: after all in the famous IMF programming model real output is assumed exogenous.

With the above understanding, real GDP per capita growth rate will be used as a metric for comparison in view of the fact that achieving a given growth rate is the standard goal for development plans, and that it was the promise of SAPs. In the standard planning methodology, a desired real GDP growth rate is usually derived from a perspective plan or vision of 20 to 30 years duration. Usually such a desired growth rate is formulated in terms of doubling the per capita GDP understood as the aim of raising the standard of living (i.e. the welfare) of the citizens of the country.

For a 20 year perspective plan the desired real per capita growth rate will be about 3.5 per cent per annum; for a 30 year perspective plan horizon the desired growth rate will be about 2.3 per cent per annum. These two growth benchmarks will be utilized in the following analysis where the latest version of GDP per capita in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity dollars is used (Summers, Heston and Aten, 2009).

Despite the diversity of the continent, it is now generally recognized that Africa's growth performance during the period since independence in the 1960s and up to the first oil price shock of 1973 was on par with that of other regions (Rodrik, 1999: 68). The evidence shows that over this period 42 out of 52 African countries recorded non-negative annual growth rates of real GDP per capita; while only *ten* recorded negative annual growth rates: CAR (with an average annual real per capita GDP growth rate of -0.7 per cent), Chad (-0.4 per cent); Djibouti (-1.3 per cent); Gambia (-0.5 per cent); Guinea (-0.8 per cent); Libya (-4.9 per cent); Mali (-1.6 per cent); Niger (-1.6 per cent); Senegal (-1.9 per cent); and, Sudan (-3.4 per cent). Of the total population of the continent only 11.6 per cent lived in these countries.

Of the 42 countries recording non-negative growth annual average real GDP per capita growth rates 20 countries recorded growth rates of less than 2.3 per cent per annum, while the remaining 22 countries recorded growth rates of 2.3 per cent or higher. The group of 20 countries is composed of two sub-groups. A sub-group of 9 countries which recorded non-negative but less than 1 per cent average annual growth rates: Burkina Faso (0.6 per cent); Cameroon (0.2 per cent); Congo Democratic Republic (0.3 per cent); Guinea Bissau (0.1 per cent); Kenya (0.3 per cent); Mauritius (0.6 per cent); Rwanda (0.02 per cent); Sao Tome and Principe (0.7 per cent); and Zambia (0.8 per cent). Another sub-group of 11 countries with an annual real per capita growth rate of 1 per cent but less than 2.3 per cent (implying a doubling of per capita GDP in 30 years or more but less than 70 years) include: Algeria (1.6 per cent); Angola (2.2 per cent); Benin (1.8 per cent); Cape Verde (2.1 per cent); Egypt (1.7 per cent); Ethiopia (1.9 per cent); Madagascar (1 per cent); Mozambique (1.8 per cent); Somalia (1.3 per cent); Swaziland (1.4 per cent); and Uganda (1.3 per cent).

The 22 countries which recorded growth rates of 2.3 per cent or more (meaning a doubling of per capita GDP in 30 years or less) can also be decomposed into two sub-groups as per the benchmark growth rates of 3 and 3.5 per cent. A sub-group of 11 countries which recorded growth rates equal to or more than 3.5 per cent implying a doubling of per capita GDP in 20 years or less. Such relatively high growth rates by world standards were recorded for 11 African Countries: Ghana (8.5 per cent; implying a doubling of per capita GDP in 8.5 years), Gabon (8.1 per cent), Botswana (8 per cent), Republic of Congo (8 per cent), Mauritania (7.3 per cent), Seychelles (5.2 per cent), Morocco (5.2 per cent), Tunisia (4.3 per cent), Togo (3.9 per cent), Lesotho (3.8 per cent), and, Sierra Leone (3.6 per cent). Closely bordering these high growth performers was a group of 5 countries with an annual growth rate in excess of 3 per cent but less than 3.5 per cent comprising Equatorial Guinea (3.4 per cent), Zimbabwe (3.4 per cent)<sup>10</sup>,

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<sup>10</sup> Zimbabwe did not gain independence during this period.

Malawi (3.4 per cent), Cot d'Ivoire (3.3 per cent), and, Comoros (3 per cent). The remaining group of 6 countries with an annual real per capita growth rate of 2.3 per cent but less than 3 per cent (implying a doubling of per capita GDP in 23 years or more but less than 36.5 years) include Burundi (2.9 per cent), Namibia (2.7 per cent)<sup>11</sup>, Liberia (2.6 per cent), Nigeria (2.6 per cent), South Africa (2.4 per cent)<sup>12</sup>, and, Tanzania (2.4 per cent).

It is worth repeating that if each of the above 22 countries had planned to double its real per capita GDP in a time horizon of 30 years or less, the post-independence development plans would have been judged to have achieved their targets. The fact that 11 out of these 22 countries recorded growth rates in excess of 3.5 per cent per annum means that they could have doubled their real per capita GDP in less than 20 years, and their respective plans would have been evaluated as having achieved their growth targets. For illustrative purposes we note that real GDP per capita could have been doubled in about 8 years for Ghana, 8.6 years for Botswana, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon, 9.5 years for Mauritania, 13.3 years for Morocco and Seychelles, and 16 years for Tunisia.

Looking at the continent as a whole the evidence shows that 40.7 per cent of the total population lived in countries that achieved an average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita of 2.3 per cent or higher during the period 1960-1973. Thanks to the planning approach to effecting development, it is no wonder that the continent was hopeful in the 1960s of achieving credible improvements in the standard of living of its people. The evidence also shows that 47.7 per cent of the population of the continent lived in countries that recorded positive growth performance, albeit of rates less than 2.3 per cent per annum. Thus, during the period in question only 11.6 per cent of the population of the continent lived in countries that registered negative per capita growth rates.

Having noted the above, it is now possible to compare the above growth performance under a planning approach to effecting development with that under SAPs (i.e. with the growth performance during 1980-2000). A simple mapping exercise of the growth rates of the two periods is presented in table 1. As in the account for the 1960-1973 above three ranges for the growth rates are used in the table: negative growth rate; non-negative but less than 2.3 per cent growth rate; and growth rates equal to 2.3 per cent or more.

In this table the rows represent the growth performance of countries during the period 1960-1973, while the columns represent the growth performance during the period 1980-2000. The entries of the table give the countries according to their growth performance in 1980-2000 compared to that in 1960-1973; thus, for each country the first figure in the bracket refers to the per capita GDP growth rate during the planning period while the second gives that for the SAPs period. Countries located on the diagonal of the table are those that maintained their growth performance over the two periods. Countries located on the upper, right hand, triangle above the diagonal would be those whose performance has improved, while those located on the lower, left hand, triangle below the diagonal would be those whose performance has deteriorated.

**Table 1: Comparative Per Capita Growth Performance of African Countries:  
1960-1973 vs. 1980-2000**

1960-1973	1980-2000 Average Annual Per Capita Growth Rates (%)
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<sup>11</sup> Namibia did not gain independence during this period.

<sup>12</sup> South Africa was under apartheid rule during this period.



Average Annual Per Capita Growth Rates (%)	Less than zero	0 to 2.3	2.3 +	Number of Countries (Population Weight %)
Less than zero	CAR (-0.7; -1.7); Djibouti (-1.2; -0.1); Gambia (-0.5; -0.7); Libya (-4.9; -5.4); Niger (-1.6; -1.9); Senegal (-1.9; -0.7).	Chad (-0.4; 0.9); Guinea (-0.8; 0.3); Mali (-1.6; 1.9); Sudan (-3.4; 1.3).	-	10 (11.6)
0 to 2.3	Algeria (1.6; -0.1); Cameroon (0.2; -0.5); DRC (0.3; -6.1); Mozambique (1.8; -0.4); Sao Tome and Principe (0.7; -2.6); Somalia (1.3; -2.5); Zambia (0.8; -2.5).	Angola (2.2; 1.0); Benin (1.7; 1.6); G. Bissau (0.1; 1.3); Kenya (0.3; 0.1); Madagascar (1.0; 0.4); Rwanda (0.0; 0.6); Swaziland (1.4; 2.2); Uganda (1.3; 1.6).	CV (2.1; 4.3); Egypt (1.7; 3.9); Mauritius (0.6; 3.9).	20 (47.6)
2.3 +	Burundi (2.9; -0.7); Comoros (3.0; -0.1); CIV (3.3; -0.2); Gabon (8.1; -0.7); Liberia (2.6; -1.4); Mauritania (7.3; -0.2); Nigeria (2.6; -1.2); Sierra Leone (3.6; -3.7); Togo (3.9; -2.2).	BF (8; 0.8); Congo (8; 2.0); Ethiopia (1.9; 0.2); Ghana (8.5; 0.4); Lesotho (3.8; 1.8); Malawi (3.4; 1.0); Morocco (5.2; 0.9); Namibia (2.7; 0.1); South Africa (2.4; 0.4); Tanzania (2.4; 0.2); Zimbabwe (3.4; 0.7).	Botswana (8.0; 4.1); E. Guinea (3.4; 10.3); Seychelles (5.2; 3.1); Tunisia (4.3; 2.9).	22 (40.8)
Number of Countries (Population Weight %)	22 (50.4)	23 (31.2)	7 (18.4)	52 (100)

Source: Author calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010)

During the SAPs period the number of countries recording negative real per capita GDP growth rates increased from 10 countries to 23. Of the original group of 10 countries recording negative growth rates 6 maintained their membership during the 1980-2000, while 4 moved to the positive growth group. These 4 countries are Chad (recording a growth gain of about 1.8 percentage points), Guinea (a gain of 0.6 percentage points), Mali (a gain of 2.8 percentage points), and, Sudan (a gain of 5.1 percentage points). As noted above these countries are located in the upper triangle, above the diagonal, of the table.

The additional 16 countries that joined the negative growth group during the SAPs period is composed of two sub-groups located on the lower triangle, below the diagonal, of the table. One sub-group of 6 countries saw their growth performance decline from non-negative, but less than 2.3 per cent, growth rates. This sub-group includes: Algeria (recording a growth loss of 1.8 percentage points), Cameroon (a loss of 1.6 percentage points), DRC (a loss of 6.3 percentage points), Mozambique (a loss of 2.3 percentage points), Somalia (a loss of 3.9 percentage points), and, Zambia (a loss of 4.0 percentage points). The other sub-group of 10 countries saw their growth performance decline from the high growth category of 2.3 per cent or more. This sub-group includes: Burundi (a loss of 3.1 percentage points), Comoros (a loss of 3.7 percentage points), CID (a loss of 3.9 percentage points), Gabon (a loss of 7.8 percentage points), Liberia (a loss of 3.9 percentage points), Mauritania (a loss of 7.0 percentage points), Nigeria (a loss of 3.5 percentage points), Sao Tome and Principe (a loss of 3.3 percentage points), Sierra Leone (a loss of 7.5 percentage points), and, Togo (a loss of 6.3 percentage points).

The table shows that during the SAPs period, 23 countries posted non-negative, but less than 2.3 per cent, growth rates compared to 20 countries during the planning period. Of the original twenty countries 8 maintained their growth performance during the SAPs period. The additional 15 countries are composed of two sub-groups. A sub-group of 4 countries that saw an

improvement in their growth performance from negative to non-negative but less than 2.3 per cent growth, already listed above, and, a sub-group of 11 countries that saw a deterioration in their growth performance from the high growth rates they achieved during the planning period. This sub-group is composed of the following countries: Burkina Faso (recording a growth loss of 7.2 percentage points), Congo (a loss of 6 percentage points), Ethiopia (a loss of 1.7 percentage points), Ghana (a loss of 8.1 points), Lesotho (a loss of 2 percentage points), Morocco (a loss of 4.3 percentage points), Namibia (a loss 2.6 percentage points), South Africa (a loss of 2 percentage points), Tanzania (a loss of 2.2 percentage points), and, Zimbabwe (a loss of 2.7 percentage points). As is obvious from the table these 11 countries are located on the lower triangle below the diagonal of the table.

At the high growth rates end the table shows that only 7 countries, accounting for only 9.5 per cent of the total population of the continent, recorded an annual growth rate of 2.3 per cent or more during the adjustment period compared to the 24 countries of the planning period. *Four* of these countries are located on the diagonal implying that they maintained their 1960-1973 position in the high growth category. The remaining 3 countries are new to the group and include Cape Verde (recording a growth gain of 2.2 percentage points), Egypt (a gain of 2.2 percentage points), and, Mauritius (a gain of 3.3 percentage points).

On the basis of the above analysis any reasonable assessment of the success or failure of the planning approach to effect economic development on the continent should conclude that the answer to the question posed as a title for this section is in the negative: the planning approach did not fail in Africa.

#### **4. The Achievements of Quasi Development Planning**

##### **4.1. PRSP as Quasi Planning**

It is possible to trace the date of a renewed recognition of the importance of the planning approach to effecting development in the poor countries of the world to 1999. During this year the then president of the World Bank came up with an initiative called the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). The declared aim of the CDF was to enhance the effectiveness of the development partners of the developing countries in bringing about desired development outcomes. It is "an approach by which countries can achieve *more effective poverty reduction* in developing countries. It emphasizes the interdependence of all elements of development - *social, structural, human, governance, environmental, economic and financial*" (CDF Secretariat, 2000) (emphasis added). The framework is articulated around four major principles: long-term, holistic development frameworks; country ownership of development programs and policies; country-led partnership among various stakeholders; and, results orientation<sup>13</sup>.

In December 1999 the World Bank and the IMF "introduced a new approach to their relations with low-income countries, centred around the development and implementation of poverty reduction strategies (PRS) by countries as a precondition for access to debt relief and concessional financing from both institutions" (Development Committee, 2005: 1). A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is to be prepared, in collaboration with external partners if the need arises, and owned by countries. The core elements of a PRSP include:

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<sup>13</sup> In formulating the CDF Wolfensohn was intellectually influenced by Professors Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz.

- (i) a documentation of the participatory process invoked by the country to solidify the ownership of the development program;
- (ii) a detailed diagnosis of the state of poverty in the country including both money metric dimensions, broader capability deprivation dimensions, and dimensions gleaned from participatory poverty assessments;
- (iii) a rigorous identification and setting of medium-and long-term goals for poverty reduction with relevant, and realistic, indicators of progress inclusive of annual and medium-term targets; and,
- (iv) a clear specification of appropriate and feasible priorities for public actions (IMF and IDA, 2001).

In a real sense the PRSP process could be taken as an implicit recognition, albeit grudgingly and belatedly, of the failure of conventional SAPs as relevant development strategies for developing countries in general, and countries in Africa in particular. Central to the PRSP process are the stability of the macroeconomic framework, the appropriate choice of fiscal policies and the adequacy and credibility of the financing plan of the development program, the suitability of the structural and sectoral policies and policies for social inclusion and equity, and the directions of improvements in governance and public sector management.

All of the above aspects of the PRSP process strike a resemblance to comprehensive development planning of the post independence period. The strategy papers have an overarching objective of reducing poverty, money metric as well as capability-based, over a long perspective planning horizon of about 25 years as in the agreed upon UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As in conventional comprehensive planning, the long planning horizon is to be divided into intermediate successive smaller horizons of three years (instead of the conventional five year plans) with provisions for mid-term reviews and with quantitative indicators to monitor progress made towards achieving the periodic goals. From an operational point of view a major weakness that adversely impacted the implementation of earlier African plans in the form of the uncertainty of the flow of foreign aid flows had been explicitly relaxed. In this respect it is noted that to ensure the success of a PRSP donors are encouraged to indicate their preferences regarding the projects they wish to support and “then make a medium term commitment in support of the strategy agreed in the PRSP” (IMF, 1999).

In the context of the PRSP approach, though not explicitly mentioned, the standard planning model used, albeit from the perspective of the World Bank, is that of the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM). The fundamental building blocks of the RMSM model are identical to those found in conventional comprehensive planning models: it is an open economy of the Harrod-Domar growth model exhibiting a target growth rate of real output, a fixed coefficient production technology with an incremental capital output ratio to calculate the required investment rate to achieve the targeted output growth rate, an exogenous export function and an import function with a constant marginal (equal to average) propensity to import out of output. As noted in the introduction in contrast to the comprehensive planning approach the SAPs approach uses the RMSM to “define the content and sequence of policy reform” (Toye, 1995: 35).

From the above observations, and despite the denials of the institutions involved, it would be safe to argue that the PRSP approach is indeed a form of quasi planning<sup>14</sup>. According to the latest updated website of the PRSP on the IMF website, 18 February 2011, there are currently 65 countries with such documents, 35 of them are Africans. Of the 35 African countries, 31 have final versions of the PRSPs<sup>15</sup>. The details of the dates of these documents are given in Annex Table (A.1). What needs to be noted is that the PRSP process started in 2000 for 21 countries with the preparation of what is called Interim PRSPs.

## 4.2. Planning vs. Quasi Planning

With the above understanding of quasi planning table 2 provides the information required to compare the growth performance of African countries under the two approaches to effecting development.

**Table 2: Comparative Per Capita Growth Performance of African Countries: 1960-1973 Planning Period vs. 2000-2007 Quasi Planning Period**

1960-1973 Average Annual Per Capita Growth Rates (%)	2000-2007 Average Annual Per Capita Growth Rates (%)			
	Less than zero	0 to 2.3	2.3 +	Number of Countries (Population Weight%)
Less than zero	CAR (-0.7; -0.7); Djibouti (-1.2; -1.9); Niger (-1.6; -0.1).	Gambia (-0.5; 1.8); Guinea (-0.8; 1.4); Mali (-1.6; 1.4); Senegal (- 1.9; 1.1).	Chad (-0.4; 7.1); Libya (-4.9; 4.5); Sudan (-3.4; 6.3).	10 (11.6)
0 to 2.3	G. Bissau (0.1; -0.5); Madagascar (1.0; - 1.3); Somalia (1.3; - 0.4).	Benin (1.8; 0.9); Cameroon (0.2; 0.9); DRC (0.3; 0.6); Kenya (0.3; 0.3); Rwanda (0.0; 2.2); Sao Tome and Principe (0.7; 1.4); Swaziland (1.4; 1.4); Uganda (1.3; 1.1).	Algeria (1.6; 2.6); Angola (2.2; 7.3); BF (0.6; 2.8); Cape Verde (2.1; 4.7); Egypt (1.7; 2.8); Ethiopia (1.9; 3.1); Mauritius (0.6; 4.5); Mozambique (1.8; 8.1); Zambia (0.8; 9.7).	20 (47.7)
2.3 +	Burundi (2.9; -1.5); Comoros (3.0; -0.9); Congo (8.0; -1.6); CIV (3.3; -2.8); Gabon (8.1; -2.2); Togo (3.9; -1.6); Zimbabwe (3.5; - 10.5).	Liberia (2.6; 0.1); Malawi (3.4; 2.2); Mauritania (7.3; 1.4); Morocco (5.2; 2.1); Seychelles (5.2; 0.2).	Botswana (8.0; 4.6); E. Guinea (3.4; 17.0); Ghana (8.5; 4.3); Lesotho (3.8; 3.9); Namibia (2.7; 2.3); Nigeria (2.6; 9.7); Sierra Leone (3.6; 6.7); South Africa (2.4; 3.2); Tanzania (2.4; 4.2); Tunisia (4.3; 4.1).	22(40.7)
Number of Countries (Population Weight %)	13 (10.8)	17 (26.9)	22 (62.3)	52 (100.0)

Source: Author calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010)

Reading the table as suggested in section (III) above it is clear that during the PRSP quasi-planning period the number of countries recording negative real per capita GDP growth rates increased marginally from 10 countries to 13. Of the original group of 10 countries recording

<sup>14</sup> Toye (1995) calls the approach mini planning and contrasts it with what we call blue print planning.

<sup>15</sup> The four countries with only Interim PRSPs are: CAR (with an IPRSP for 2001); Comoros (for 2006); Republic of Congo (for 2005); and, Lesotho \*for 2000).

negative growth rates 3 maintained their membership during the 2000-2007, 4 moved to the positive growth group with average annual growth rates of less than 2.3 per cent, while 3 countries joined the high growth rate group of countries. The 4 countries that improved their performance to less than 2.3 per cent growth rates are Gambia (recording a growth gain of about 2.3 percentage points), Guinea (a gain of 2.2 percentage points), Mali (a gain of 3 percentage points), and, Senegal (a gain of 3 percentage points). The 3 countries that improved their growth performance to 2.3 per cent or more are Chad (recording a growth gain of 7.5 percentage points), Libya (a gain of 9.4 percentage points), and Sudan (a gain of 9.7 percentage points). All of these *seven* countries are located in the upper triangle, above the diagonal of the table.

The additional 9 countries that joined the negative growth group during the PRSP period is composed of two sub-groups located on the lower triangle, below the diagonal, of the table. One sub-group of two countries saw their growth performance decline from non-negative, but less than 2.3 per cent, growth rates. This sub-group includes Guinea Bissau (recording a growth loss of 0.6 percentage point), and Madagascar (a loss of 2.3 percentage points). The other sub-group of 7 countries saw their growth performance decline from the high growth category of 2.3 per cent or more. This sub-group includes Burundi (a loss of 4.4 percentage points), Comoros (a loss of 3.9 percentage points), Congo (a loss of 9.6 percentage points), CID (a loss of 6.1 percentage points), Gabon (a loss of 10.3 percentage points), and, Zimbabwe (a loss of 14 percentage points).

Next, the table shows that during the PRSP period 17 countries posted non-negative but less than 2.3 per cent growth rates compared to 20 countries during the planning period. Of the original twenty countries 8 maintained their growth performance during the PRSP period. The additional 9 countries are composed of two sub-groups. A sub-group of 4 countries that saw an improvement in their growth performance from negative to non-negative but less than 2.3 per cent growth, already listed above; and a sub-group of 5 countries that saw a deterioration in their growth performance from the high growth rates they achieved during the planning period. This sub-group is composed of the following countries: Liberia (recording a growth loss of 2.5 percentage points), Malawi (a loss of 6 percentage points), Mauritania (a loss of 5.9 percentage points), Morocco (a loss of 3.1 percentage points), and Seychelles (a loss 5.0 percentage points).

At the high growth rates end only 7 countries, accounting for only 9.5 per cent of the total population of the continent, recorded an annual growth rate of 2.3 per cent or more during the adjustment period compared to the 24 countries of the planning period. *Four* of these countries are located on the diagonal implying that they maintained their 1960-1973 position in the high growth category. The remaining 3 countries are new to the group and include Cape Verde (recording a growth gain of 2.2 percentage points), Egypt (a gain of 2.2 percentage points), and Mauritius (a gain of 3.3 percentage points).

The above detailed reading of the evidence comparing the growth performance of African countries during the post independence planning period to that during the PRSP period is confirmed by a quick look at the last row and the last column giving the number of countries and the population weight. Such a quick look at the number of countries would suggest that the growth performance during the two periods under consideration is almost identical. This is one of the messages of this section: growth performance under the PRSP quasi-planning approach should be expected to be similar to that under the conventional comprehensive planning approach to effecting development. Of course, the details of the story of the growth performance will be different. Looking at the population shares it is perhaps clear that under the PRSP quasi planning approach a larger proportion of the African population are now living in countries that can look to doubling their standards of living in shorter time horizons, compared to those who

lived under the conventional planning approach. The second message is that improvements in the external economic environment should hold a promise for further improvements in the growth performance. As noted above one such improvement gave rise to greater certainty regarding the flow of foreign assistance to developing countries.

### 4.3. Quasi Planning vs. SAPs

To further appreciate the relevance of planning to effecting development on the continent the methodology used above can also be utilized to compare the growth performance of African countries during the SAPs period with that during the PRSP quasi planning period. Table 3 provides the relevant information for such comparison.

**Table 3: Comparative Per Capita Growth Performance of African Countries:  
1980-2000 SAPs Period vs. 2000-2007 Quasi Planning Period**

1980-2000 Average Annual Per Capita Growth Rates (%)	2000-2007 Average Annual Per Capita Growth Rates (%)			
	Less than zero	0 to 2.3	2.3 +	Number of Countries (Population Weight%)
Less than zero	Burundi (-0.7; -1.5); CAR (-1.7; -0.7); Comoros (-0.1; -0.9); CIV (-0.2; -2.8); Djibouti (-0.1; -1.9); Gabon (-0.7; -2.2); Niger (-1.9; -0.1); Somalia (- 2.5; -0.4); Togo (-2.2; - 1.6).	Cameroon (-0.5; 0.9); DRC (-6.1; 0.6); Gambia (-0.7; 1.8); Liberia (-1.4; 0.1); Mauritania (-0.7; 1.4); Sao Tome and Principe (-2.6; 1.4); Senegal (- 0.7; 1.1).	Algeria (-0.1; 2.6); Libya (-5.4; 4.5); Mozambique (- 0.4; 8.1); Nigeria (-1.2; 9.7); S. Leone (-3.7; 6.7); Zambia (-2.5; 9.7).	22 (41.2)
0 to 2.3	Congo (2; -1.6); G. Bissau (1.3; -0.5); Madagascar (0.4; -1.3); Zimbabwe (0.7; -10.5).	Benin (1.6; 0.9); Guinea (0.3; 1.4); Kenya (0.1; 0.3); Malawi (1.0; 2.2); Mali (1.9; 1.4); Morocco (0.9; 2.1); Rwanda (0.6; 2.2); Swaziland (2.2; 1.4); Uganda (1.6; 1.2).	Angola(1.0; 7.3); BF (0.8; 2.8); Chad (0.9; 7.1); Ethiopia (0.2; 3.1); Ghana (0.4; 4.3); Lesotho (1.8; 3.9); Namibia (0.1; 2.3); S. Africa (0.4; 3.2); Sudan (1.3; 6.3); Tanzania (0.2; 4.2).	23 (49.3)
2.3 +		Seychelles (3.1; 0.2).	Botswana (4.1; 4.6); Cape Verde (4.3; 4.7); Egypt (3.9; 2.8); E. Guinea (10.3; 17.0); Mauritius (3.9; 4.5); Tunisia (2.9; 4.1).	7 (9.5)
Number of Countries (Population Weight %)	13 (10.8)	17 (26.8)	22 (62.4)	52 (100.0)

Source: Author calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010)

Reading the table in the manner perused above it is clear that during the PRSP quasi-planning period the number of countries recording negative real per capita GDP growth rates declined significantly from 22 to only 13 countries. Of the original group of 22 countries recording negative growth rates 9 maintained their membership during the 2000-2007; 7 moved to the positive growth group with average annual growth rate of less than 2.3 per cent; while six countries joined the high growth rate group of countries. The 7 countries that improved their performance to less than 2.3 per cent growth rates are Cameroon (recording a growth gain of 1.4

percentage points), DRC (a gain of 6.7 percentage points), Gambia (a gain of 2.5 percentage points), Liberia (a gain of 1.5 percentage points), Mauritania (a gain of 2.1 percentage points), Sao Tome and Principe (a gain of 4.0 percentage points), and, Senegal (a gain of 1.8 percentage points). The 6 countries that improved their growth performance to 2.3 per cent or more are Algeria (recording a growth gain of 2.7 percentage points), Libya (a gain of 9.9 percentage points), Mozambique (a gain of 8.5 percentage points), Nigeria (a gain of 10.9 percentage points), Sierra Leone and Sudan (a gain of 9.7 percentage points), and Zambia (a gain of 12.2 percentage points). All of these 13 countries with improved growth performance during the quasi planning period are located in the upper triangle, above the diagonal, of the table.

The additional 4 countries that joined the negative growth group during the PRSP period are located on the lower triangle, below the diagonal, of the table. Previously they were growing at non-negative, but less than 2.3 average annual growth rates. The countries in question are Congo (recording a growth loss of 3.6 percentage points), Guinea Bissau (a loss of 1.8 percentage points), Madagascar (a loss of 1.7 percentage points), and Zimbabwe (a loss of 11.2 percentage points).

The table shows that during the PRSP period 17 countries posted non-negative, but less than 2.3 per cent, growth rates compared to 23 countries during the SAPs period. Of the original 23 countries 9 maintained their growth performance during the PRSP period. The remaining 8 countries are composed of the 7 countries that saw an improvement in their growth performance from negative to non-negative but less than 2.3 per cent growth, already listed above, and Seychelles which recorded a growth loss of 2.9 percentage points.

At the high growth rates end 22 countries recorded an annual growth rate of 2.3 per cent or more during the PRSP period compared to only 7 countries of the SAPs period. Six of these countries are located on the diagonal implying that they maintained their 1980-2000 position in the high growth category. The remaining 16 countries are new to the group and include the 6 countries which saw their growth improve from negative to 2.3 per cent or more already mentioned above; and 10 countries that improved their growth rates from non-negative but less than 2.3 per cent. These 10 countries include Angola (which recorded a growth gain of 6.3 percentage points), Chad (a gain of 6.2 percentage points), Ethiopia (a gain of 2.9 percentage points), Ghana (a gain of 3.9 percentage points), Lesotho (a gain of 2.1 percentage points), Namibia (a gain of 2.2 percentage points), South Africa (a gain of 2.3 percentage points), Sudan (a gain of 5.0 percentage points), and, Tanzania (a gain of 4.0 percentage points).

It is perhaps pertinent to note that the growth performance of African countries during the quasi planning period was vastly superior to the performance during the SAPs period. The above detailed reading of the evidence comparing the growth performance of African countries during the quasi planning period to that during the SAPs period is confirmed by a quick look at the last row and the last column giving the number of countries and the population weight.

## **5. Planning to Rationalize and Strengthen Development Policies**

As noted in the introduction to this paper comprehensive planning to coordinate the allocation of resources by the government is understood as “*just another word for rational, deliberate, consistent and coordinated economic policy*” (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1955: 679). Under such an understanding it can be argued that a major added justification for African countries reassert the importance of planning in managing their economies is to rationalize and strengthen their development policies.

In the early 1960s and up to the advent of SAPs in the early 1980s, development policy in African countries revolved around social equity mechanisms including public expenditure on health and education, food price subsidies, agricultural input price subsidies, other social transfers and public employment. From the middle of the early 1980s up to the end of the 1990s, under SAPs as well as under the PRSP process, such policies came to be labelled as "poor economic policies". Such policies were blamed for the faltering growth performance of the continent during the transition period 1973-1980. There is accumulating evidence that such judgement, and conclusion, was not warranted. The "poor economic policies" are currently being actively recommended by the donor community as constituting relevant development policies in the context of Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa.

Consider, for example, the "poor policy" of allocating current expenditure to the provision of health and education, a standard allocation under the comprehensive planning approach. In a remarkable and almost heretical fashion, a recent report by the Commission for Africa noted that the *"decades in which Asia was investing, the 1970s and 1980s, were the years of crisis when African governments were slashing the budgets of both clinics and schools at the behest of the International Monetary Fund. Evidence shows that IMF and World Bank economic policy in the 1980s and early 1990s took little account of how these policies would potentially impact on the poor in Africa"* (Commission for Africa, 2005: 20)<sup>16</sup>.

More important from a development policy perspective, the Commission recommended, among other things, that "primary school fees to be abolished throughout Africa", that donor "countries and international financial institutions must change their policies to allow recurrent expenditure including teachers' salaries- to be paid for from aid", that salaries of health workers "should be increased to ensure staff are not wooed from their jobs", that "rich nations should support the removal of fees for basic healthcare and basic healthcare should be free for poor people", and that African governments "must take measures to give poor people, particularly women, access to land and secure property rights".

Next consider the "poor policies", under comprehensive planning, designed to address the question of equity, both vertical and horizontal, in the development process. Such development policies were conspicuously absent under SAPs. Only in 2006 was concern expressed about the importance of such policies by a leading international financial institution. Thus, for example, in a recent World Bank report three areas of public policy interventions are identified from an equity focus: investment in human capacity (early childhood development, schooling, health, safety nets, and taxes for equity), expanding access to justice, land, and infrastructure (building equitable justice systems, greater equity in access to land, equitable provision of infrastructure), and promoting fairness in markets (financial, labour, and products) (World Bank, 2006). However, when discussing "greater equity in access to land" the report was quick to note that broader *"access to land does not necessarily have to come through ownership"* (e.g. land reforms), expressing a preference for working through the land market. Similarly, for the equitable provision of infrastructure, it is admitted that while "the public sector will in many cases remain the main source of funds for infrastructure investments aimed at broadening

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<sup>16</sup>The Commission for Africa was established by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in 2004. Mr. Blair chaired the Commission, the members of which included 16 people invited on their "individual and personal capacities" with a majority of Africans. "The task we were set was this: to define the challenges facing Africa, and to provide clear recommendations on how to support the changes needed to reduce poverty" (Commission for Africa (2005: 2); emphasis not in the original). It is perhaps interesting to note that the title of the report of the Commission seems to have been coined as a response to the title of the book by Mkandawire and Soludo (1999): "Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment"!!!



opportunities for those who have the fewest, *the efficiency of the private sector can also be harnessed*".

In the context of comprehensive planning "poor policies" regarding the creation of jobs are integrated in the planning process. Such creation of jobs is entrusted to the public sector in recognition of the embryonic nature of the private sector. Planners were cognisant of the budget implications of such policies. However, the concern was not solely the achievement of static efficiency of resource allocation but the dynamic path of the economy and society. Unfortunately, neither under SAPs nor under the PRSP process, has the development relevance of such policies been seriously considered<sup>17</sup>. In this respect it should be noted that the simple average unemployment rate in Africa is estimated at about 22 per cent of the total labour force, higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in North Africa, and higher than the world average of 9.3 per cent and the average for low income countries of 7.3 per cent. Though problematic, there is evidence that such unemployment rates are increasing over time. More problematic is that there is also evidence that the unemployment rate among the youth (15-24 years of age) is higher than the national average. Despite this state of affairs there is no indication that the advocates of market oriented development, inclusive of the SAPs approach and PRSP process, have concrete policy proposals in this regard. To their credit, however, it is recognized that "achieving productive employment and work for young people entails long-term action covering a range of economic and social policies focusing on labour demand and supply... Such policies need to be integrated in broader development frameworks", that is they are better formulated in the context of planned development (World Bank, 2009: 23)<sup>18</sup>.

## **6. Challenges and Prospects of Development Planning in Africa**

At this stage of identifying the challenges and prospects facing the continent in planning its development, there is a need to emphasize the obvious: that development planning is a continuous process and that a development plan is just one product of such a process. "Development planning is not the same thing as a development plan. Planning as a process is an indispensable precondition for the formulation of effective development policies and measures." (Waterstone, 1965:107).

A careful reading of the evidence on the early planning experience on the continent would show that the major weaknesses have to do with the implementation aspects of development plans. The most important among these sources are the political and institutional factors. Despite the diversity of the continent, however, it can be argued that these two sets of factors continue to define the main challenges facing African countries in returning to development planning to effect meaningful development.

Before proceeding to comment on these challenges it is perhaps instructive to note that from a development perspective the term "institutional factors" can be understood to refer to "a set of rules to organize people into the functional body", as well as to a "functional body organized by a set of rules" (Hayami and Godo, 2005:242). Such an understanding will facilitate the appreciation of the close relationship of the two challenges identified, as well as the organizational nature of the discussion that will follow.

### **6.1. The Challenge on the Political Dimension**

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<sup>17</sup> For an interesting discussion of the issues involved see Toye (1995).

<sup>18</sup> Along such planned development orientation by the World Bank is the recently issued African Regional Strategy ; see World Bank (2011).

A major challenge facing the continent is the commitment of political leaders to development planning. The required commitment is not only expressing verbal announcements on the issues involved, but announcements backed by appropriate action. In this respect it is noted that in many countries of the continent political leaders accord other matters higher priority than they do to development planning. While it is recognized such priority settings are dependent on the socio-economic and political stage of development of various countries, it must be recognized that the relegation of development to a subordinate place in the scale of values of a country's political leaders cannot help but depress development efforts and, hence, the results of development planning, while also sowing the seeds of discontent and potential social unrest (Waterstone, 1965:341).

An obvious example of the importance of political commitment to "development" is given by the Millennium Development Goals. A careful reading of these goals will show that they are based on a broad definition of development as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Five instrumental freedoms that have immediate policy relevance are identified to include *political freedoms*, embracing "the political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest sense"; *economic facilities*, in the sense of the "opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange"; *social opportunities* in the sense of "the arrangements that society makes for education, health care and so on"; transparency guarantees in the sense of "the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity"; and, *protective security* in the sense of the provision of a "social safety net for preventing the vulnerable sections of society from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death" (Sen, 1999: 38).

These "instrumental freedoms tend to the general capability of a person to live more freely, but they also serve to complement one another" (Sen, 1999:38). Such a broad understanding of the development process encompasses almost all of the narrow concerns of various political players in the different countries in such a way as to facilitate the expression of serious minded political commitment to development.

As noted earlier, the MDG process, like the PRSP process, marked a return to development planning albeit at the global level. The overarching objective of development is the reduction of poverty broadly defined and the goals are to be achieved over a 25 year period, with quantitative targets and indicators to facilitate monitoring the achievements made. World leaders, including those from Africa, expressed their commitment to these goals and went about taking action to achieve them in the specified horizon. Since their adoption in September 2000 two Summits were held at the UN for assessing progress made based on national, regional and global monitoring reports.

Along the lines of the above global example, meeting the challenge of political commitment to development can be facilitated by the further pursuit of the principles upon which the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is based<sup>19</sup>. According to its website NEPAD is

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<sup>19</sup> NEPAD was initiated by the Heads of State of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa on a mandate from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The 37<sup>th</sup> Summit of the OAU, held in July 2001, formally adopted the strategic framework document. NEPAD is now a programme of the African Union (AU), the successor organization to OAU. The inaugural Summit of AU was held in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. NEPAD is operationalised through the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), which has been integrated into the structures and processes of the AU and serves as a technical body of the AU, replacing the former NEPAD Secretariat. The NPCA has the mandate to: facilitate and coordinate the implementation of the continental and

a “vision and a strategic framework” for Africa’s renewal. Without getting involved in details, it is interesting to note that the original NEPAD framework document adopted the then International Development Goals (IDGs; which became the MDGs later on), as part of its goals (see paragraph 68). These goals are to be achieved under the long-term objective, stated in paragraph 67, of eradicating “poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus *halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process*, and to promote the role of women in all activities”.

The above objectives and goals came to be formulated after the new political will of African leaders had been expressed in terms of a joint responsibility for, among other things, “*promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions*” (paragraph 49).

To ensure that the above political commitment to development at the regional level is backed by actions, NEPAD created the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as an “instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the AU as an African self-monitoring mechanism”. The primary purpose of APRM is to “*foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building*”. The policies, standards and practices that are to be adopted are supposed to cover the four major priority areas identified in the base document of the APRM and the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance adopted by the inaugural Summit of the AU. The four priority areas are: “*democracy and political governance*”; “*economic governance and management*”; “*corporate governance*”; and, “*socio-economic development*”.

The overall objective of the priority area on *democracy and political governance* is to “consolidate a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and effective, responsive public service are realized”. It is the achievement of this objective that will eventually facilitate the commitment of political leaders to the development of their countries.

## **6.2. The Institutional Challenge**

Most African countries inherited an institutional structure that was largely designed to perform minimalist functions of modern states relating to revenue collection, provision of public services and maintenance of law and order. However, an “organized attempt to plan a country’s development introduces new and unfamiliar entrepreneurial and managerial tasks on an unprecedented scale. Few countries can cope with the administrative problems which development planning brings. These problems are so complex that in most less developed

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regional priority programmes and projects; mobilize resources and partners in support of the implementation of Africa’s priority programmes and projects; conduct and coordinate research and knowledge management; monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes and projects; and advocate on the AU and NEPAD vision, mission and core principles/values. The highest authority of NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) is the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. There is a Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (3 states per region, plus the Chair of the AU) which is a sub-committee of the AU Assembly that provides political leadership and strategic guidance on the NEPAD Programme and reports its recommendations to the AU Assembly for endorsement; There is a steering committee intermediary body to interface between the HSGOC and the new Agency.

countries the limitation in implementing plans is not financial resources, *but administrative capacity*” (Waterstone, 1965:289).

The administrative capacity of the African state, weak as it may have been at the time of independence, has been further weakened over time. It is, therefore, no wonder that there are multiple initiatives, and repeated emphasis on the need for building the capacity of the state on the continent. While these initiatives are commendable, they need to be carefully assessed from the perspective of enhancing domestic capacity compared to substituting it by foreign expertise. In this respect it was noted that sub-Saharan Africa “had about 100,000 foreign technical assistance staff costing about 4 billion USD per annum. In most cases, this staff substitutes for local capacity, but all current assessments of the impacts of this on SSA development are ostensibly negative” (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999:137).

Inevitably, the proliferation of capacity building initiatives on the continent was closely related to the narrow concern with the capacity to implement various policy reform agenda of the donor community as represented by the IMF and the World Bank. Such agenda was not concerned with the long-term development of the continent, let alone being concerned with planning such development. The time of the proliferation of the capacity building initiatives coincided with a policy direction of massive retrenchment of African public servants and a “deluge of foreign advisors, consultants, and representatives of multilateral agencies who took over key policy-analysis and policy-making institutions in many African states” (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999:135). In addition to retrenching African civil servants, a large number of planning ministries and agencies were dismantled.

On the basis of this experience in building the capacity of the African state, the challenge facing the continent in reasserting the importance of planning is to embark on a different path to recreate, and enhance existing, capacity for effecting development. Such a path would include in a fundamental sense reversing the trend of declining government employment with the aim of creating a skilled and efficient government work force. From a planning perspective this will require arrangements for constant retraining of civil servants to acquaint them with the changing development challenges facing their countries and familiarizing them with relevant planning techniques and methodologies. Such training arrangements are not to be confined only to those civil servants attached to planning agencies for obvious reasons relating to the coordination of plan implementation.

From an institutional point of view African countries need to create modernized planning agencies, and/or rehabilitating existing ones. The challenge facing the countries in this respect include vital considerations relating to<sup>20</sup>: (i) clearly defining the priorities for the planning machinery including the creation of programming units at the level of operating government units; (ii) building a consensus that the core responsibilities of the planning agency are the formulation and revision of national development plans; the preparation of annual operational plans; recommendation of policies, measures and modalities required to implement the plan; reporting on the evaluation and implementation of the plan; and, coordination of national efforts relating to plan implementation; (iii) appropriate distribution of planning functions inclusive of responsibility for annual operational plans, relations to the budget office and the statistical agency, coordination of foreign technical assistance, the negotiation of foreign financing, responsibility for foreign loans, responsibility for development projects and programs, and coordination of plan implementation; and, (iv) consensus building on the preferred location of the planning agency with appropriate legal and constitutional safeguards to ensure its efficiency.

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<sup>20</sup> For details and evidence on these, and other institutional aspects, see Waterstone (1965: 371-576).

## **7. Summary and Concluding Remarks**

This paper argues that African countries are now in a position to reclaim the "ownership" of charting the future path of their development by returning to a planning approach. Waterston's 1965 observation, captioned above, is even more true today than it was then. In the context of this position evidence is presented showing first, the highly credible growth performance of African countries during the planning period 1960-1973; second, the superiority of such performance compared to that achieved under the SAPs period 1980-2000; and third, the similarity of the growth performance under planning and under the PRSP process of quasi planning.

A major justification for such a return to planning resides in the recognition that comprehensive planning, meaning planning for the whole economy, should be understood as a continuous process of rational, deliberate, consistent and coordinated economic policy making. Thus, it is argued that a major justification for the return to a planning approach in Africa is the quest to design relevant development policies. Examples of such relevant development policies that need to be rationalized, taking account of the changing world circumstances, include those dealing with relevant components of current government expenditure, those dealing with measures for an equitable distribution of assets and incomes, and, those dealing with the creation of jobs in the economy. This recognition and the need to enhance the role of the state has been captured in the 2010 G20 Seoul Development Consensus. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, the Seoul Consensus allows a larger role for state intervention. Rather than seeking to impose, it argues that policy solutions should be tailored to the requirements of individual developing nations, with the developing countries themselves taking the lead in designing packages of reforms and policies best suited to their needs

On the basis of the above the paper argues the challenges facing African countries in returning to a planning approach to development pertain to the need for a strong vision and political commitment to "development planning" by African political leaders; and to the need for implementing administrative changes that motivate civil servants and increases coordination among government units. In this respect it is insinuated that both these challenges can realistically be adequately met by a deepened commitment to the AU principles and priorities through its NEPAD Programme.

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**Appendix Table A.1: Average Annual Growth Rates by Sub-Periods:  
1960-2007 (%)**

Country	Mean 1960-1973	Mean 1973-1980	Mean 1980-2000	Mean 2000-2007
Algeria	1.6	1.7	-0.1	2.6
Angola	2.2	-2.2	1.0	7.3
Benin	1.8	-0.1	1.6	0.9
Botswana	8.0	7.8	4.1	4.6
Burkina Faso	0.6	0.5	0.8	2.7
Burundi	2.9	0.2	-0.7	-1.5
Cameroon	0.2	5.0	-0.5	0.9
Cape Verde	2.1	-0.8	4.3	4.7
Central African Repu	-0.7	-0.5	-1.7	-0.7
Chad	-0.4	-3.8	0.9	7.1
Comoros	3.0	1.2	-0.1	-0.9
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.3	-3.4	-6.1	0.6
Congo, Republic of	8.0	3.3	2.0	-1.6
Cote_d'Ivoire	3.3	0.4	-0.2	-2.8
Djibouti	-1.2	-4.9	-0.1	-1.9
Egypt	1.7	2.5	3.9	2.8
Equatorial Guinea	3.4	3.5	10.3	17.0
Ethiopia	1.9	-0.1	0.2	3.1
Gabon	8.1	3.1	-0.7	-2.2
Gambia, The	-0.4	1.0	-0.7	1.8
Ghana	8.5	-3.4	0.3	4.3
Guinea	-0.8	0.8	0.3	1.4
Guinea-Bissau	0.1	5.1	1.3	-0.5
Kenya	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.3
Lesotho	3.8	5.6	1.8	3.9
Liberia	2.6	-0.8	-1.4	0.1
Libya	-4.9	4.9	-5.4	4.5
Madagascar	1.0	-2.0	0.4	-1.3
Malawi	3.4	4.8	1.0	2.1
Mali	-1.6	2.3	1.9	1.4
Mauritania	7.3	2.3	-0.2	1.4
Mauritius	0.6	4.0	3.9	4.5
Morocco	5.2	3.3	0.9	2.1
Mozambique	1.8	0.7	-0.4	8.1
Namibia	2.7	-0.2	0.1	2.3
Niger	-1.6	-1.9	-1.9	-0.1
Nigeria	2.6	-0.1	-1.2	9.7
Rwanda	0.0	-0.2	0.6	2.2
Sao Tome and Princip	0.7	4.3	-2.6	1.4
Senegal	-1.9	-0.5	-0.7	1.1
Seychelles	5.2	6.6	3.1	0.2
Sierra Leone	3.6	0.4	-3.7	6.7
Somalia	1.3	-3.9	-2.5	-0.4
South Africa	2.4	1.5	0.4	3.2
Sudan	-3.4	0.5	1.3	6.3
Swaziland	1.4	6.7	2.2	1.4
Tanzania	2.4	0.3	0.2	4.2
Togo	3.9	0.6	-2.2	-1.6
Tunisia	4.3	2.2	2.9	4.1
Uganda	1.3	-4.1	1.6	1.1
Zambia	0.8	-4.8	-2.5	9.6
Zimbabwe	3.3	-0.2	0.6	-10.5

Source: Summers, Heston, and Aten (1999).



**Appendix Table A.2: PRSP's in Africa.**


Country	First PRSP	Last PRSP	Number of PRSP's	Time Span of Latest PRSP (Title)
Benin	December 2002	April 2007	2	2007 – 2009: PRSP - Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08125.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08125.pdf</a> )
Burkina Faso	May 25, 2000	July 2004	2	2004 – 2006: PRSP ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05338.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05338.pdf</a> )
Burundi	September 2006	September 2006	1	2006 – 2009: PRSP ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0746.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0746.pdf</a> )
Cameroon	April 2003	April 2003	1	2004 – 2015: PRSP ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03249.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03249.pdf</a> )
Cape Verde	September 2004	September 2004	1	2004 – 2007: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05135.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05135.pdf</a> )
Chad	June 2003	June 2003	1	2003 – 2015: National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03209.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03209.pdf</a> )
Cote d'Ivoire	January 2009	January 2009	1	2009 – 2013: Strategy for Re-launching Development and Reducing Poverty ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09156.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09156.pdf</a> )
D.R. Congo	June 2006	June 2006	1	2006 – 2009: Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07330.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07330.pdf</a> )
Djibouti	April 2008	April 2008	1	2008 – 2011: National Initiative for Social Development ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09203.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09203.pdf</a> )
Chad	June 2003	June 2003	1	2003 – 2015: National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03209.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03209.pdf</a> )
Ethiopia	July 2002	July 2002	1	2002 – 2005: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/eth/01/073102.pdf">http://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/eth/01/073102.pdf</a> )
Gambia	April 2002	November 2006	2	2007 – 2011: Poverty Reduction Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07308.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07308.pdf</a> )

				<a href="#">df)</a>
Ghana	February 2003	November 2005	2	2006 – 2009: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06225.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06225.pdf</a> )
Guinea	January 2002	August 2007	2	2007 – 2010: PRSP ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0807.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0807.pdf</a> )
Guinea-Bissau	September 2006	September 2006	1	2006 – 2008: National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07339.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07339.pdf</a> )
Kenya	March 2004	March 2004	1	2003 – 2007: Investment Programme for The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0511.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0511.pdf</a> )
Liberia	2007	2007	1	2007 – 2011: Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08219.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08219.pdf</a> )
Madagascar	July 2003	February 2007	2	2007 – 2012: Madagascar Action Plan ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0759.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0759.pdf</a> )
Malawi	April 2002	2006	2	2006 – 2011: Malawi Growth and Development Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0755.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0755.pdf</a> )
Mali	May 2002	December 2006	2	2007 – 2011: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08121.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08121.pdf</a> )
Mauritania	December 2000	October 2006	3	2006 – 2010: PRSP Action Plan ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0740.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0740.pdf</a> )
Mozambique	April 2001	May 2006	3	2006 – 2009: Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0737.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0737.pdf</a> )

**Table A.2 continued**


Country	First PRSP	Last PRSP	Number of PRSP's	Time Span of Latest PRSP (Title)
Niger	January 2002	August 2007	2	2008 – 2012: Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08149.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08149.pdf</a> )
Nigeria	2004	2004	1	2003 – 2007: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05433.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05433.pdf</a> )
Rwanda	June 2002	September 2007	2	2008 – 2012: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0890.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0890.pdf</a> )
Sao Tome and Principe	January 2003	January 2003	1	2003 – 2015: National Poverty Reduction Strategy ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05332.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05332.pdf</a> )
Senegal	May 2002	September 2006	2	2006 – 2010: PRSP II ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07316.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07316.pdf</a> )
Sierra Leone	February 2005	February 2005	1	2005 – 2007: PRSP ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05191.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05191.pdf</a> )
Tanzania	October 2000	July 2010	4	2010 – 2015: National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1117.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1117.pdf</a> )
Togo	November 2009	November 2009	1	2009 – 2011: Full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1033.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1033.pdf</a> )
Uganda	March 2000	March 2010	3	2010 – 2015: National Development Plan ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10141.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10141.pdf</a> )
Zambia	March 2002	December 2006	2	2006 – 2010: Fifth National Development Plan ( <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07276.pdf">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07276.pdf</a> )

**Figure 1: African Growth Performance: Planning vs. SAPs**



Source: Author calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010)

**Figure 2: African Growth Performance Planning vs. Ouasi PRSP Planning**



Source: Author calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010)