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The Poverty Reduction Strategy in Nigeria

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The Views Expressed in this paper are those of the author
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Executive Summary

Given Nigeria's enormous potentials, the deplorable social and economic conditions in the country are a paradox. With per capita income of about \$300 in 2001, Nigeria ranks among the world's 20 poorest countries and has the third highest number of poor people in the world. Corresponding to the poor economic performance are: increased incidence of poverty currently estimated to be 70 percent, up from 65.6 percent in 1996 and 28.1 percent in 1980; highly skewed income distribution; and low human development. Underpinning this poverty, income distribution and human development situation, are structural imbalances (skewed economy dominated by enclave oil sector), weak productive structures, highly distortive and volatile macroeconomic environment and poor international competitiveness.

Post-independence development planning and policymaking as typified by five-year Fixed Development Plans and succeeded by Flexible three-year Rolling Plans were largely predicated on trickle-down hypothesis. They were essentially top-bottom and failed to translate into pro-poor outcomes. The impacts of the planning strategies were undermined by weak implementation and monitoring, and poor link between budgeting, economic policy and plans. Given the shortcomings of previous poverty reduction development plans, dynamic new approaches have become a political and economic imperative if the threat poverty poses to sustainable development of the country is to be averted. There is therefore a large scope for the PRSP process in Nigeria to serve as a vehicle for avoiding planning mistakes of the past through systematic development of explicitly pro-poor policies.

Against the backdrop of the lack of pro-poor stance of traditional development approaches, successive Nigerian governments have implemented, often as a means of gaining legitimacy on assumption of power, several pro-poor targeted programmes and projects. Though systematic and comprehensive impact evaluation of government anti-poverty programmes in Nigeria is not available, the worsened poverty incidence, depth and severity are evidence that these efforts have failed. This is because targeted poverty alleviation policies and programmes have been plagued by trickle-down approaches, institutional duplicity and rivalry, poor implementation and weak coordination and monitoring.

Nigeria has been developing, since February 2001, an Interim Paper on National Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP) as a prelude to embarking on the full PRSP. The latest version of the Draft Interim Paper is dated August 2003. The PRSP process is being administered and executed by the Economic Policy Coordinating Committee (EPCC) in the Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (also called the PRSP Secretariat). Woven around the PRSP Secretariat are institutional arrangements comprising the:

- ☐ defunct National Core Team;
- ☐ Inter-Agency (Technical) Guidance Committee;
- ☐ National Forum on the PRSP process;
- ☐ National Drafting Team; and
- ☐ proposed Zonal Working Groups and their local community equivalents.

A Federal-level PRSP process is executed on a presupposition that a successful national PRSP process will stimulate similar initiatives by state and local governments. The current articulation of a poverty reduction and wealth creation strategy by the Enugu State government is one indication of this hope. Nonetheless, the poor level of participation of state governments and generally low profile of PRSP process in state-level policy formulation give no cause for optimism. It was observed that the memberships of PRSP organs are heavily skewed in favor of government representatives or nominees, thereby raising questions on the credibility of the participatory process. The frequency and timing of interface with civil society, involved rather late in the I-PRSP process, hardly commends the process as genuinely participatory.

The PRSP process seems to have adopted a consultative rather than participatory approach. Stakeholder workshops/sessions were conceived, managed and conducted by the PRSP Secretariat without clear assignments of roles and responsibilities to non-state actors (NSAs). Little scope was allowed to informal segments of civil society and private sector such as community-based organisations (CBOs) and informal sector unions. The evidence of the poor communication is the stereotype of the PRSP process among civil society circles as an initiative of the World Bank and the IMF being done by the Federal Government to secure debt relief and concessional financial assistance from international agencies. Similarly, doubts on the political commitment to and ownership of the PRSP process have been heightened as the government has begun to articulate the Economic Reform Strategy Document - the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS).

The poor role of the civil society in the I-PRSP process reflects the underlying weak capacity of the private sector, NGOs and CBOs to participate effectively in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of economic policies. Related to NGOs weak capacity for economic policy advocacy is a lack of well-articulated demand for and use of social and economic data. Without access to credible updated data and empirical evidence, the private sector and NGOs are unable to undertake informed policy dialogue with government stakeholders. Poor access to and low capacity in the utilization of reliable and updated statistics deny civil society requisite bases for high-quality debate and evidence-oriented dialogue on social development and policy issues. The Nigerian PRSP process has elicited the scope for strengthening civil society capabilities for social dialogue, economic policy advocacy and engagement with the government and other stakeholders.

Quantitative and qualitative poverty diagnostics are reflected in the draft I-PRSP. While incorporating agricultural and rural development as a key element of PRS, the draft I-PRSP anchors on the Nigerian Rural Development Sector Strategy developed in 2001. Other elements included in the poverty reduction strategy are rural and urban infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion, sustained privatization, environmental sustainability and strengthening economic governance. Consistent with the multidimensional nature of poverty, the I-PRSP outlines a social sector strategy to reduce poverty through education and health policies. Gender and HIV/AIDS issues are not given sufficient analysis and treatment in the document, to the extent commensurate with their critical implications for poverty reduction.

The I-PRSP critically reviews Nigeria's macroeconomic performance during 1992-2002. The anchor of the macroeconomic framework is the document issued by the Federal Government during the last quarter of 2002, 'The Framework for Nigeria's Economic Growth and Development 2003-2007'. The I-PRSP envisages an updated and comprehensive medium-term macroeconomic framework for the PRSP; it ascribes a big role for debt relief and concessional assistance from creditor countries and institutions. The document appreciates the challenge of macroeconomic stabilization in the context of Nigeria's fiscal federalism. Hence, it acknowledges a critical role for the Federation Stabilization Account to reduce volatility associated with oil price shocks, and also for the Fiscal Responsibility Law to ensure harmonious fiscal rules applicable across all tiers of government and institutional arrangements to ensure coherent economic management. It provides for regular public expenditure reviews (PERs) for all tiers of government and recognizes the potential positive impact of the government's Due Process on public finance management. It admits the absence of a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) for Nigeria and urges expedited action towards preparing it in the course of the full PRSP. Costing of the strategies outlined is an agenda for the full PRSP.

Capacity building in economic policymaking and implementation is needed at the State Government level to improve data and statistics, economic and sector policy analysis, monitoring, coordination and evaluation. Specifically, it is imperative to strengthen human and institutional capacities of the planning, research and statistics departments of government ministries at both the federal and state levels. The Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) should be streamlined towards coordinating and capacity building roles in the nation's data and statistics system, while data collection should be decentralized or devolved to lower levels of government (State and Local) as a means to promote local ownership, transparency and accountability of the data collection process.

The lack of integration of the PRSP process into mainstream political and economic policy processes, poor supervision and monitoring of the PRSP process by the political authorities and the weak policy coordination contributed to problems with the PRSP process. Other dimensions of the problems include weak intra-governmental collaboration and coordination, especially between the Executive and Legislative arms of the Federal Government, poor mobilization for the PRSP process across government organs, and a very low level of awareness of the PRSP process among top government officials. Inter-governmental policy coordination was further compounded by weak economic policy formulation capacity at the state and local government levels. Addressing fundamental political and policy constraints that negatively impact the PRSP process is a logical imperative if the benefits of the PRSP process are to materialize. This requires highest levels of political commitment.

It has been indicated that the New Strategy Document being developed by the government – NEEDS – would incorporate the draft I-PRSP. But, this is yet to result in the merger of the NEEDS and PRSP Secretariats because at this stage it is unclear which of the two has precedence.. Whatever the case, the ease with which the PRSP process is being replaced with NEEDS reflects the weakness of the current institutional arrangement for the PRSP

and a lack of political commitment and national ownership. Nonetheless, the political, institutional and policy constraints that beset the PRSP process remain valid today and the NEEDS is not immune to them. Effective economic policymaking and development planning in Nigeria will remain elusive if these constraints are not tackled in fundamental ways.

1. Introduction

1.1 The Country Context

With a population of about 120 million, more than 300 ethnic groups, over 500 indigenous languages/dialects and a land size of 923,768 sq. km., Nigeria is a geographically vast, ethno-culturally diverse country having extensive agricultural resources. Nigeria's substantial resource endowments, consisting of 27 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, 173.96 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (equivalent of 30 billion barrels of crude oil), 15 known solid minerals and 13 possible agricultural-forestry exports, underscore the country's enormous potentials. But, given her current deplorable social and economic conditions, and especially in relation to own history and comparable economies in Asia and Africa, Nigeria is a paradox. Reflecting Nigeria's economic stagnation (or even decline) is that the country's GDP (\$43 billion) in 2001 was three times less than that for 1981 translating into per capita income decline shrunk from about \$1150 in 1981 to about \$300 in 2001. In PPP terms, per capita income is below half of the sub-Saharan African average. Nigeria ranks among the world's 20 poorest countries and has the third highest number of poor people in the world.

Corresponding to the poor economic performance is increased poverty incidence currently estimated at 70 percent, up from 65.6 percent in 1996 and 28.1 percent in 1980.

Table 1 reveals some principal characteristics and trends of poverty in Nigeria including regional disparities, spatial (rural and urban) differences and poverty incidence by household size, education, age and gender of household head. The incidence of poverty rose sharply between 1980-85, declined between 1985-1992 and increased again sharply between 1992-1996. While in 1980, no State of the Federation reported poverty incidence of more than 50 percent, by 1996 every State of the Federation except one had poverty incidence over 50 percent.

Spatial (rural-urban) dimension and regional disparity of poverty have critical implications for poverty targeting. Over the 16-year period, the incidence of poverty was higher in the rural than urban areas, but urban poverty rose sharply in the 1992-1996 period. Canagarajan et al (1997) observes that the increase in the severity of extreme poverty was more in the urban than in rural areas between 1985 and 1992, while the rural areas continue to contribute the largest share to all poverty indicators. The incidence of poverty was generally higher in the northern States than the southern part of the country. The 1996 data show that the northwest zone had the highest poverty incidence (77.2%), followed by northeast zone and north-central zone. In 1992, all the six States with poverty levels above 50 percent are in the North. In 1996, only 4 out of 23 states in the South had poverty incidence over 60 percent, the rest being states in the north. Indeed, all the five states where poverty is severest and poverty incidence over 80 percent are northern States---Bauchi, Gombe, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara.

Table 1
Nigeria: Poverty Incidence (% headcount) 1980-1996

Analytical categories	1980	1985	1992	1996
National	28.1	46.3	42.7	65.6
North East	35.6	54.9	54.0	70.1
North West	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.2
North Central	32.2	50.8	46.0	64.3
South East	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5
South West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9
South-South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2
Urban	17.2	37.8	37.5	58.2
Rural	28.3	51.4	46.0	69.3
Gender of Household Head				
Male	27.0	47.3	45.1	66.4
Female	29.2	38.6	39.9	58.5
Household Size				
1 person	2.0	7.0	29.0	13.1
2-4 persons	8.8	19.3	19.3	59.3
5-9 persons	30.0	50.5	51.5	74.8
10-20 persons	51.0	71.3	66.1	88.5
20+	80.9	74.9	93.3	93.6
Education of HH				
No Education	30.2	51.3	46.4	72.6
Primary	21.3	40.6	43.3	54.4
Secondary	7.6	27.2	30.3	52.0
Post-secondary	24.3	24.4	25.8	49.2
Age of HH				
15-24 years	16.2	25.3	28.7	37.4
25-34 years	17.8	33.4	28.5	52.7
35-44 years	26.7	46.0	42.1	64.6
45-54 years	27.1	49.7	45.7	71.3
55-64 years	39.7	55.7	48.2	69.9
65+ years	28.8	49.1	49.5	68.0

Source: FOS, 1999. Poverty Profile Analysis for Nigeria - 1980-1996

The incidence of poverty consistently increased with the size of the household for the four survey years 1980, 1985, 1992 and 1996. Also, poverty gap and severity were positively correlated to size of households for all the years (Ogwumike, 2000). Poverty trends increased for all size groups between 1980 and 1996 and 1985 and 1996. With the exception of the size group “20 and above”, poverty incidence increased for all groups between 1980 and 1985. Poverty incidence increased consistently with the age of the head of the household, reaching a peak and then dropping slightly for the higher ages. The peak was 55-64 age bracket for the years 1980, 1985 and 1992 but 45-54 years age group for 1996 (FOS, 1999). The rise in poverty with the age of the household head seems anomalous since ex ante poverty would decrease with age of household head, at least until the age of retirement. Further exploration of the relationship by Canagarajan et al (1997) provides a clarification for this result. Between 1985 and 1992, the largest decline in headcount was in the 66 and over age cohort, followed by the 36-45 age group. Canagarajan et al explain this large decline in the poverty headcount of the 56 and older heads of households in the rural areas by the fact that most of these persons are retired and returned to rural areas thus helping to reduce poverty in these age groups.

Education can play key direct and indirect roles in reducing poverty in the long run. It improves the productivity and efficiency of the labour force thereby leading to faster economic growth. All the poverty measures indicate an exponential decline with increasing education, in 1985 and 1992. While household heads with no formal education were consistently the major contributors to total poverty in Nigeria for the period 1980-96, their contributions declined slightly but consistently over the years (Ogwumike and Aromolaran, 2000). On the other hand, poverty trends between 1980 and 1996 show that there was a sustained increase of the contribution of households headed by secondary and post secondary school graduates to poverty in Nigeria (Ogwumike, 2000).

Poverty by occupational category of household head showed that 'agriculture and forestry' recorded the highest incidence for all the years except 1996 when it was slightly lower than the poverty headcount in the service industry. Poverty measures, like depth and severity, indicate that the distribution of income changed against household heads in agriculture (Canagarajan, et. al., 1997). However, rural headcount in agriculture declined by 9.2 percentage points, depth by 3.4 percentage points and severity by 1.1 percentage points between 1985 and 1992, a decrease which accounted for the reduction of poverty in rural areas in the period and reinforces the interface of agricultural growth and rural poverty alleviation. Poverty incidence among households headed by administrative workers declined from about 45 percent in 1980 to only six percent in 1996.

In addition to increased poverty incidence, depth and severity of poverty have aggravated over the years. Poverty depth rose from 0.160 in 1980 to 0.358 in 1996 and severity from 0.080 in 1980 to 0.207 in 1996. Over the 16-year period (1980-1996), the depth and severity of poverty in Nigeria more than doubled, increasing with household size and decreasing with the level of education (See Annex 1a). While depth and severity of rural poverty were below urban levels between 1980-1992, the gap has almost disappeared by 1996, indicating that urban poverty is rapidly increasing. The incidence of core poor in Nigeria doubled between 1992 and 1996, rural areas showing higher incidence of the core poor relative to urban areas. (See Annex 1b).

Generally, poverty incidence increased for both male- and female-headed households between 1980 and 1996 (Ogwumike, 2000). Trend in poverty rates by gender of household head showed that incidence was higher for male- than female-headed households. Higher incidence of poverty among male- compared to female-headed households appears curious and requires further clarification through deeper gender disaggregated analysis. An explanation given by the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), the central national agency charged with the collection, analysis and reporting of national data and statistics, is that female-headed households had smaller household size than male-headed households; female-headed households incur less household expenditure than male-headed ones and hence, female-headed households recorded higher per capita expenditure (that is, lower poverty).

Highly skewed income distribution and low human development define the socio-economic landscape in Nigeria. The poverty profile over the period 1980-1996 indicates that by 1992, the top 10 percent of households accounted for over 40 percent of total consumption, double that of 1985. In 1996, the share of the poorest 10 percent in total consumption was abysmal 1.6 percent.

More recent estimates from UNDP/Nigeria (2001) show that 10 percent of the population accounted for 31.4 percent of national income, while the poorest 10 percent accounted for a meagre 1.3 percent. Nigeria's Gini coefficient is estimated at 0.506 (UNDP, 2002), underlining the imperative of income redistribution. Further evidence on inequality in Nigeria showed that the benefits of growth were not shared equally among different regions in the country. Growth of household spending was faster in the southern and middle regions of the country and slower in the North (Canagarajan et al, 1997). The study also found that there are substantial segments of the population, especially those in the bottom decile, who have neither participated nor benefited from the growth since the mid 1980s; and observed that the future growth strategy for Nigeria needs more poverty focus in order to be beneficial to the extreme poor.

The UNDP Human Development Report on Nigeria (2000-2001) reveals a grim picture of human development in the country. Life expectancy is 52 years, infant mortality rate is 77 out of 1000 live births while maternal mortality is 1000 out of 100,000 live births. Under-5 mortality rate, regarded as a principal comprehensive indicator of human progress, is 187 per 1000 live births, for which Nigeria ranks 171 out of 187 countries. While Edo and Delta States (in south-south region) have Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.66, Borno State (in northeast region) has HDI of 0.156. Also, while Edo and Delta States have average life expectancy of about 60 years, for Borno State it is 40 years. Similarly, adult literacy is nearly 80 percent in Edo and Delta States but only 12 percent in Borno State (UNDP, 2002).

Expenditure pattern of the poor is crucial for poverty targeting. Survey data show that food shares in total expenditure oscillated between 63 and 74 percent over the period 1980-1996. Food share in total expenditure was generally higher in rural than urban areas. For instance, in 1996, food share of total expenditure was 68 percent in rural areas compared to 58.5 percent in urban areas. About three-quarters of the total expenditure of the poor went to food compared to 53 percent for the non-poor. The pattern of food expenditure also differed between the poor and non-poor; the consumption of own produce accounted for a higher proportion of total food expenditure among the poor. Educational level of household head corresponded negatively with food share in total expenditure, and with consumption of own produce and positively with food cash (FOS, 1999).

The existing inter-temporal and cross-sectional poverty diagnostics have critical implications for pro-poor policy targeting. Based on two benchmark criteria (additive/uniform and multiplicative/proportional transfers), Canagarajan et al (1997) computed targeting indices to guide policy targeting of poverty. Accordingly, given rural/urban divide, rural areas become a favored choice for targeting. Other targeting choices include households whose heads have no schooling, are self-employed or employed in the agricultural and forestry sector, or are female-headed households.

Underpinning Nigeria's unwholesome poverty, income distribution and human development situation, are structural imbalances (skewed economy dominated by enclave oil sector), weak productive, and distortive and highly volatile macroeconomy. The economy is characterized by a predominant but sluggish primary sector, a small and declining manufacturing sector and a growing services sector. In 2001, agriculture accounted for 41 percent of GDP, manufacturing

8.7 percent and services for about 39 percent. Essentially, the structure of domestic output has remained the same over time - in 1999 agriculture accounted for about 40 percent of GDP, virtually the same proportion as in 1990 and the share of output originating in manufacturing declined slightly from eight to seven percent over the same period. As a share of GDP, the crude oil sector accounted for 12.7 percent in 1999, virtually the same as nine years earlier (12.9%). The relatively poor share of the secondary sector implies scanty value-added from primary sector outputs. This suggests that the bulk of the locally consumed manufactured goods are imported and financed by the earnings of the oil sector. According to Marchat et al (2002), by the end of the 1990s, manufacturing output had dropped to about 92 percent of the level reached in 1990, while the other productive sectors recorded modest growth. Debt burden approximates 70 percent of GDP, notwithstanding huge earnings of about \$300 billion from oil exports since the mid-1970s

Gross fixed capital formation and private consumption grew annually at only 1.4 and two percent respectively, reflecting an decline in per capita terms over the 1990s. National savings rate ranks among the lowest for least developed countries (LDCs), averaging about 13 percent of GDP for 1990s. The average annual investment rate of about 10 percent of GDP falls short of the threshold (30% of GDP) required for poverty-reduction growth rate of about seven to eight percent per annum (AIAE, 2003). In contrast, government consumption grew by about 22 percent annually over the decade. Gross capital formation increased by 53 percent in 2000, up from a growth rate of 4.8 percent in 1999—driven by massive public sector investments. It is estimated that the ratio of wage to value-added (a key correlate of international competitiveness reflecting the unit cost of labour) for Nigeria is 0.26 in 2001 compared with 0.20 in 1983 (Marchat et al, 2002). Hence, Nigeria is less competitive now than it was in 1983 presumably because wages have risen faster relative to productivity over the past 20 years. While export earnings (virtually accounted for by oil) actually declined annually in real terms over the decade, imports continued to expand by almost seven percent annually during 1990-1999.

Nigeria ranks among the world's top 10 countries in terms of macroeconomic volatility (Addison, 2000) which robs the economy an estimated 2.4 percent growth per annum. Despite accounting for about 95 percent exports earnings and over 85 percent of government revenues/expenditures, the oil sector remains essentially enclave, with marginal linkages with other sectors, and impacting deleteriously through the breeding of corrupt and rent-seeking practices. Though a determinant of Nigeria's fiscal outlook, oil revenues have had very little or no direct impact on the incomes or opportunities of a majority of Nigerians (Marchat et al 2002). This is because of decades of inefficient, misdirected and wasteful economic and fiscal management. For the vast majority of Nigerians, the non-oil economy remains the source of their income, indicating that a key challenge in poverty reduction is to accelerate growth of non-oil sector. To engender pro-poor policy outcomes, growth should, therefore, be broad-based, all-inclusive and sustainable. For Nigeria, the key growth challenge is to drive productivity in the non-oil sector – agriculture and manufacturing, and particularly the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through appropriate macroeconomic policies and sound public expenditure framework that creates enabling environment for private enterprise (NESG, 2002a, NESG, 2002b; AIAE, 2003).

1.2 Nigeria's Development Planning and Economic Policymaking in relation to Poverty Reduction: The Institutional Context of the PRSP process

Growth, poverty reduction and improved welfare are usually acknowledged as central goals of Nigeria's economic policymaking and development planning. Understanding past economic policies and development plans in relation to poverty reduction is necessary in order to identify the historical context and institutional landscape that define the potential challenges for the PRSP process.

At independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted five-year National Development Plans (NDPs), based on import-substitution industrialization and agricultural development strategies, to promote social and economic development. Between 1962-1985, the country executed four NDPs. In 1986, a new framework, the short-term economic stabilization policies (SAP) was adopted to broaden the economy's productive base, eliminate distortion, and reduce the role of the government in order to encourage competition. The assessments of the pro-poor impact of the SAP show mixed results. The SAP measures triggered significant supply responses from the rural economy in terms of a substantial increase in food and export crop production. It led to an expansion of rural incomes and a dramatic reduction in rural poverty with the incidence decreasing from 51 percent in 1985 to 46 percent in 1992 (World Bank, 2002). The SAP economic measures were accompanied by several targeted poverty initiatives. The Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure aimed at developing rural infrastructures including roads, agro-facilities, electricity, and so on. It also includes the National Directorate for Employment (designed to execute skills acquisition, job creation and entrepreneurship development), the Peoples' Bank (aimed at easing access to credit among the informal sector) and the Better Life Programme for Rural Women (designed to improve women's productive abilities and incomes).

Despite these positive results, the Government, in 1990, adopted the Rolling Plan in order to ameliorate the shortcomings of post-independence Fixed Five-Year Plans, make planning more flexible and linked to policy and budgeting. It was also hoped that the Rolling Plan would consolidate the achievements of the economic reform programme embedded in the SAP framework. Between 1990 and 2001, the authorities put in place several two- year horizon Rolling Plans. However, the new democratic government, by abandoning the Plan, has shown its lack of confidence in, and lack of ownership. In 1997, the Federal Government appointed a Committee, with members from public and private sectors and civil society, to articulate a new development framework, Vision 2010. The Vision 2010 Document (FGN, 1997) contains goals and targets as well as a timeframe and strategies and institutional arrangements for achieving the national economic and social objectives based on defined roles for the public and private sectors. It envisioned "people-centred, broad-based, market-oriented, highly competitive, self-reliant and private sector-driven economy with government proactively providing the enabling environment". Though the Vision 2010 was not implemented, its provisions include Long-Term Perspective Plan (1998-2010), the Medium-Term (Rolling Plan - 1998-2000), the Annual Budgets, starting with 1998, any short or medium term arrangements with international institutions, and additional special instruments, including legislation (FGN, 1997). The document contains an Action Plan covering four time horizons - Immediate Actions (October-December 1997), Short-Term Actions (1998-2000), Medium-Term Actions (2001-2005) and Long-Term Actions (2006-2010). The abandonment of Vision 2010, following the collapse of the military

regime that initiated it, is a vivid example of policy instability and inconsistency in Nigeria, a situation inimical for economic growth and poverty reduction.

Post-independence development planning and policymaking in Nigeria was largely predicated on trickle-down hypothesis; being essentially top-bottom, they failed to alleviate poverty. The implementation and impact of the planning strategies were undermined by weak monitoring and evaluation systems and apparent disconnect between fiscal/budgeting and planning/policy (misalignment of public expenditures, that is, budget process and execution with economic policies and development plans). In 1992, the National Planning Commission (NPC) was created to act as the central national institution for the formulation, review, coordination and monitoring of development plans and economic policies. On inception, the NPC combined the main functions of planning and capital budgeting, but the capital budgeting function was removed from NPC in 1993. Hence, the weak link between capital budgeting and planning further deteriorated, thereby reducing their impact on poverty reduction. Over the years, the rising profile of annual budget as a key tool in economic management isolated from development plans and economic policies distorted social and economic development. Given the shortcomings of previous development approaches and policies in reducing poverty, dynamic and result-oriented planning approaches for poverty reduction are a political and economic imperative if the threat of poverty to sustainable development of the country is to be averted. There is therefore a large scope for the PRSP process in Nigeria to serve a vehicle for overcoming past planning mistakes through departure from past approaches and provision of new opportunities for pro-poor policy development. Also, by the PRSP approach to poverty reduction, Nigeria demonstrates a national commitment to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing poverty by half by the year 2015.

1.3 Poverty Targeted Programmes and Initiatives

Two principal driving forces underlie the surge of poverty targeted programmes and initiatives especially since the 1980s. Successive Nigerian governments have used targeted poverty programmes to gain legitimacy on assumption of power. Explicit targeting of the poor is also a means to overcome the failures of trickle-down assumptions of traditional development approaches in reducing poverty. Successive anti-poverty programmes and projects include multi-/inter-sectoral, integrated or sectoral (Annex 2). Targeted/sector programmes to alleviate poverty have been implemented in agriculture, health, education/vocational skills, finance and commerce, housing and transport sectors through informal, small and medium-scale enterprises. Some of the programmes targeted specific social groups such as women and children while others targeted designated- or poor- areas.

Though systematic and comprehensive impact evaluation of government anti-poverty programmes on poverty in Nigeria is not available, the worsened poverty incidence, depth and severity is evidence that past efforts have failed. Several interacting factors are responsible for the situation. The poverty alleviation institutional landscape is fraught with duplicity and proliferation of programmes and implementing agencies (sometimes with overlapping responsibilities and even conflicting mandates) leading to waste, poor coordination and unhealthy rivalries (World Bank, 1996; UNDP, 1998; NAPEP, 2001; Eboh, 2003). Poor linkages exist between the National Overtly Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and the Community-Based Poverty Reduction Projects (CBPRP) coordinated

by the National Planning Commission, between NAPEP and the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), between NAPEP and the various poverty alleviation programmes of the state governments. While NAPEP was designed to facilitate, coordinate and monitor poverty alleviation programmes throughout the country and not as an implementation agency, it actually did undertake direct implementation or policy functions already carried out by pre-existing government institutions and agencies. For instance, its employment creation and skill acquisition schemes run parallel to similar programmes of the NDE).

Targeted poverty policies and programmes tended to be largely top-bottom – as government programmes for the people rather than programmes designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated by the people themselves with government as the catalyzing medium. There is a lack of policy and programme coherence and coordination among the three tiers of government - federal, state and local governments (NAPEP, 2002). Anti-poverty targeting programmes are readily politicized for patronage as experienced under the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) implemented between 1999-2001 which was marred by poor, inefficient targeting and distorted implementation leading to high incidence of unintended beneficiaries, corruption and rent-seeking practices that crowded out the intended beneficiaries. According to the UNDP (1998), those who capture the benefits from the various government anti-poverty programmes are not the poor, but the rich and powerful. Assessment of government programmes related to poverty and community-based organizations and initiatives indicate that virtually all the government programmes lack mechanisms for effective pro-poor targeting (World Bank, 1996). The situation is aggravated by inadequate national statistical and data systems and the absence of an explicit rallying poverty reduction framework to galvanise policies and programmes at the three tiers of government in tandem with private sector and civil society.

2. The I-PRSP Process

2.1 Describing the process

Nigeria has been preparing, since February 2001, a draft I-PRSP as a prelude to embarking on the full PRSP since February 2001. Many drafts have been prepared to date: the Background Paper in August 2001; the draft I-PRSP in November 2002; the first revised draft I-PRSP (February 2003); and the second revised draft I-PRSP in March 2003. The March 2003 version was subjected to “Text Review and Information Update” at the Stakeholders’ Workshop held in August 2003. The latest version of the draft I-PRSP is dated August 2003.

The PRSP process is being administered and executed by the Economic Policy Coordinating Committee (EPCC) in the Office of the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (also called the PRSP Secretariat). Woven around the PRSP Secretariat are institutional arrangements comprising the:

- ☐ defunct National Core Team;
- ☐ Inter-Agency (Technical) Guidance Committee;
- ☐ National Forum on the PRSP process,

- National Drafting Team; and
- proposed Zonal Working Groups and their local community equivalents.

The National Core Team: The PRSP process began in February 2001 with the setting up of a 46-member “National Core Team” coordinated by the National Planning Commission. The National Core Team (through its Drafting Group) produced the initial Draft Paper on PRSP in Nigeria dated August 5, 2001. The National Core Team was however overtaken by a reshuffle of the institutional arrangements whereby PRSP coordination was transferred from the National Planning Commission to the EPCC in the Office of the Vice-President.

The PRSP Secretariat: The EPCC is an administrative organ in the Office of the Vice-President and its secretariat is the Coordinating Secretariat for the PRSP process (hereinafter referred to as the PRSP Secretariat). The EPCC is constituted with the Vice-President as the Chairman, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Chief Economic Adviser to the President, the Principal Secretary to the President, and the Macroeconomic Adviser to the Vice-President as member and Secretary of the Committee and the Technical Head of the Secretariat.

The Inter-Agency (Technical) Guidance Committee: The Inter-Agency Guidance Committee is charged with the technical aspects of the PRSP process. The Committee is headed by the Secretary of the EPCC and consists of senior-level officials from the Office of the President, the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Commission, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Debt Management Office and NAPEP Secretariat. The Committee incorporates key Ministries including those of Agriculture and Rural Development, Education, Environment, Health, Science and Technology, as well as government agencies including the Federal Office of Statistics, the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). The Committee represents the Federal Government in the National Forum on the PRSP and interfaces with international development partners on technical issues related to the PRSP.

The National Forum on the PRSP process (NFPP): This is the apex policy organ of the PRSP. It is designed to be the political platform for broad-based, stakeholder participation in the PRSP exercise in Nigeria. The PRSP Secretariat reports to and implements the decisions reached by the NFPP. It is designed to meet frequently to deliberate on anti-poverty strategy issues and programmes, and to contribute to consensus building on the way forward.

Table 2
Composition of the National Forum on the PRSP process

	Institutions or Organizations	Number of representatives
1.	Federal Government	20
2.	National Assembly	4
3.	State Governments (one from each state)	36
4.	State Legislative Assemblies (one from each of the country's six geo-political zones)	6
5.	Local Governments (Two from each of the country's six geo-political zones)	12
6.	Private Business Sector	6
7.	Labour Movement	2
8.	Youth Movement	1
9.	Non-Government Organizations	7
10.	Donor Community (Development Partners)	5
11.	Women's Organization	2
12.	Universities	2
13.	Religious Organizations	2
14.	Disabled People's Association(s)	2
15.	Professional Associations	1
16.	Research Institutions	2
	TOTAL	110

Source: Draft I-PRSP, August 2003.

As shown in Table 2, the NFPP draws members from the federal, state and local governments, the private sector and the civil society. It was created on the understanding that its composition, size, and modus operandi may need to be modified from time to time, based on learning experiences and exigencies.

The National Drafting Team: It is composed of members of the NFPP including members of the Federal Government's Inter-Agency Technical (Guidance) Committee. The composition is given in Table 3. The work of the Drafting Committee is guided by the decisions taken at the NFPP on the PRSP process, with technical and operational support provided by the PRSP Secretariat.

The Zonal Working Groups: The Zonal Working Groups (ZOWOGs) would be structured along the 6 zonal geopolitical zones of the country. They are planned to be the regional platforms on which to carry out stakeholder consultations and elicit participation in the full PRSP process. Local community equivalents of the Zonal Working Groups are also proposed. Both the ZOWOGs and their local community equivalents are the intended vehicles for addressing zone-specific and poverty-related issues such as those relating to the environment, gender, tourism, and cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, civil service reform, security, and culture. The Zonal Working Groups would be constituted from among stakeholder groups or individuals in the respective zones. It is expected that the ZOWOGs will generate ideas and recommendations for consideration by the NFPP.

Table 3
Composition of the Drafting Team for PRSP Documents

Institutions or Designations	Number of representatives
Federal Government, of which:	6
(a) Office of Secretary to the Government of the Federation	(1)
(b) Federal Ministry of Finance (Budget Office)	
(c) Ministry of Agric & Rural Development	(1)
(d) National Planning Commission	(1)
(e) Central Bank of Nigeria	(1)
(f) National Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA)	(1)
State Government Officials, of which: (a) from the North of the Federation:	2 (1)
(b) from the South of the Federation:	(1)
Local Government Officials, of which: (a) from the North of the Federation:	2 (1)
(b) from the South of the Federation:	(1)
Private Sector	2
Civil Society Organizations	2
TOTAL	14

Source: Draft I-PRSP, August 2003.

The Challenge of Nigeria's Federal Structure for the PRSP process

According to the draft I-PRSP, the implementation of a national PRSP presupposes that a successful federal-level PRSP process will underpin and stimulate similar poverty-reduction initiatives by state and local governments. The national PRSP exercise is expected to provide a template for state governments. The underlying reason for this implementation approach is that under the federal system, different tiers of government have some constitutional autonomy in concurrent poverty-reduction responsibilities and functions. The implication of the federal system for the PRSP process is potentially two-edged. While relative autonomy of the lower tiers of government can enhance local ownership, transparency and accountability of poverty reduction policies, inter-governmental policy coordination problems could undermine synergy of national PRSP and pro-poor outcomes. So far, very few States are interested in developing their own PRS. Enugu State is currently preparing a Poverty Reduction and Wealth Creation Strategy (2003-2009), which started in October 2003 and will be finalized in June 2004. Already, the outline of the strategy is divided into Overarching Goals, Strategic Themes, Strategic Objectives and Emergency Goals. The State Government has created a Ministry for Human Development and Poverty Reduction to provide an institutional backbone to its policies. The Enugu State example, though an off-shoot of the demonstrative and stimulating influence of the national PRSP process, does little to douse the concern about the poor level of participation of state governments and generally low profile of PRSP issues in state-level policy

formulation. There is hardly any empirical support for the optimism expressed by the draft I-PRSP that the national-level PRSP would trigger state-level PRSPs. Crucial to state-level PRSPs as evident from the Enugu State example is mobilization of highest governmental and political authorities to provide leadership in poverty reduction. It is also imperative for the national PRSP to establish potential buy-ins by state governments and frameworks to guide federal-state government linkages and synergies on the PRSP.

Given Nigeria's fractious socio-political landscape and inter-governmental policy incoherence and multi-party tensions, the options for implementing the PRSP process are limited. Were there to be a well-coordinated functioning national planning and strategy system, a national strategy led by the federal government and implemented by all federating units would be expedient. The chances are slim in Nigeria due to poor inter-governmental coordination of planning and policy formulation and poor inter-governmental alignment of budgeting and fiscal frameworks. Furthermore, in the aftermath of long military dictatorships which imposed unitary governance and power over-centralization, Nigeria's federating units (particularly the States) are eager to assert their constitutionally guaranteed autonomy – which may constrain inter-governmental policy coherence and synergy required for an effective national poverty reduction strategy.

It seems therefore expedient to have a reasonably decentralized PRSP approach whereby all federating units embark on their own processes. This ensures that federating units adapt strategies to their respective circumstances, constituencies and development challenges. By this, full ownership of anti-poverty strategies and the PRSP will become a reality, with greater prospects that strategies will be translated into budgets, programmes and concrete results. It remains essential for the Federal Government to lead the process and define a broad national framework that guides state governments in designing their own PRSP processes. The Federal Government should also provide incentives that stimulate states to embark on PRSPs, institute effective and dynamic coordinating, consolidation and monitoring mechanism to ensure quality control, standard framework and coherence across the federating units. In this regard, the inter-governmental sectoral coordination mechanisms such as the National Council on Agriculture, National Council on Health, and so on, (consisting of the Federal and State Government policy officials) should be strengthened to consolidate key poverty-reduction programmes and strategies. The National Economic Council (consisting of the Vice-President and the State Governors) is another potential mechanism that should be tapped for effective policy coordination and consolidation across the tiers of government. A national framework should spell out national economic growth, social development and poverty reduction goals with buy-ins by all tiers of government. By this approach, poverty reduction strategies and programmes of the Federal and State Governments can be complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing.

Progress Landmarks of the I-PRSP Process

Since the advent of the I-PRSP process, some progress has been made. Table 4 highlights the major milestones of the process.

Table 4
Summary Outline of Sequencing and Timetable for the I-PRSP and PRSP

Accomplishment	Time period	D u r a t i o n (months)
Production of preliminary draft of the I-PRSP (Background Paper)	February 2001 - September 2001	7
Completion of technical work on the draft National I-PRSP	September 2001 - November 2002	9
Production of Revised Draft Interim Paper on National PRSP	November 2002 - August 2003	9
Production of full Nigerian PRSP following adoption of I-PRSP by Federal Government	*May 2003 – June 2004	12

Tentative. The process for the full PRSP is yet to commence as at November 2003.

Detailed account of the steps undertaken in the I-PRSP preparation leading up to the draft dated August 2003 is presented in Annex 3. The time frame and production plan for the full PRSP is also shown in Annex 4. Some highlights of the I-PRSP process are identified as follows:

- ☐ Inauguration of the initial consultative body on the PRSP exercise - the 46-member National Core Team in February 2001;
- ☐ Completion of the preliminary draft of the I-PRSP in September 2001;
- ☐ Establishment of the Federal Government's Inter-Agency Guidance Committee on the PRSP process;
- ☐ Completion of the technical work on the new draft I-PRSP in November 2002;
- ☐ Publication of the Public Information Handbook on Nigeria's PRSP process in December 2002;
- ☐ Completion of revised draft of the IPRSP in February 2003;
- ☐ Another revised draft of the IPRSP in March 2003;
- ☐ Text Review and Information Update on the Draft of the I-PRSP in August 2003; and
- ☐ Production of the revised draft of I-PRSP dated August 2003.

2.2 Scrutinizing the PRSP Process

The PRSP Organs: How Credible?

The membership of the crucial PRSP organs raises questions on the credibility of the participatory process, considering the disproportionate presence of government representatives and nominees. Out of the 110 members of the NFPP, 78 are government officials (representing federal, state and local governments) while the rest are civil society organizations (CSOs) selected by the PRSP Secretariat. This membership structure does not appear to be adequately representative of the broad policy of Nigeria. Membership of the Technical (Guidance) Committee on the PRSP is drawn

exclusively from the Federal Government, thereby rendering the PRSP process virtually a federal government affair rather than a government-civil society partnership. 10 out of the 14 members of the National Drafting Team are officials of the government; only 2 members each come from private business sector and CSOs, with unclear contributions to the Drafts. Under the circumstances, it is doubtful that the PRSP would elicit adequate participation from civil society – a key principle of the PRSPs.

Sequencing and Time Frame of Activities

The frequency and timing of interface with civil society (stakeholder sessions) hardly commends the process as enabling genuine participation. The sequencing of activities appears rather illogical. Even though the PRSP was flagged off in February 2001 with the inauguration of the 46-member National Core Team on the PRSP, the Federal Government's Inter-Agency Technical Guidance Committee on the PRSP process was established in December 2001, eleven months later. The NFPP was not formed until August 2002, more than 18 months after the PRSP process took off and about 12 months after the completion of the preliminary draft of the I-PRSP. This raises doubts regarding the relevance and impact of the NFPP. The first All-Governors Forum on the PRSP process and the first All-State Governments Technical-Level Forum on Nigeria's PRSP took place in June 2002 and July 2002 respectively, about 16 months after the take-off of the I-PRSP process. This suggests that the State Governments (despite being major stakeholders on poverty) were engaged late in the process. The Information Brochure on the PRSP process in Nigeria was published in December 2002, almost 24 months after the commencement of the I-PRSP process. It is therefore no surprise the very low levels of awareness observed among stakeholders in civil society and even in government circles. What this signifies is the poor preparation of the I-PRSP process.

The civil society seems to have been involved rather late in the I-PRSP process. While the PRSP process started in February 2001, the first all-stakeholders national workshop on Nigeria's PRSP was held in February 2002, a year later. Between February 2001 and February 2002 there were no systematic broad-based inputs from civil society into the PRSP process. The civil society was then involved again about 8 months later (September 2002) via an interactive session with private business community and then in November 2002 via an interactive session with non governmental organizations (NGOs) and labour unions. So, the process of preparing the revised draft of the I-PRSP (September 2001 - August 2003) only provided four fora for civil society inputs and scrutiny. The process of preparing the preliminary draft of the I-PRSP and completing the revised draft of the IPRSP was dominated by circulation of drafts and technical discussions among government officials, individuals and stakeholders as decided by the PRSP Secretariat. This arrangement confers undue discretionary powers on the PRSP Secretariat and increases the doubts on the legitimacy of the eventual I-PRSP document.

Participation of Civil Society: What Manner? How Deep?

The PRSP process seems to have adopted more of a consultative rather than participatory approach. The heavy emphasis on workshops and meetings (and their potential to become talk shops) disguises genuine participation upon which the PRSP process should be ideally

based. Interviews with some of the NGOs that attended the workshops indicate that the agenda for the workshops were vague, and NGOs' roles and expectations were not clearly defined. Hence, attendance at the stakeholder workshops tended to be more symbolic than functional, since it did not, in the opinion of the NGOs, translate into effective participation. Interviews with the PRSP Secretariat and NGOs did not reveal a systematic build-up of participatory events and instruments and parameters/benchmarks to gauge the participatory process. Rather, isolated stakeholder sessions/workshops were held at different times with different segments of society. These stakeholder sessions include the first all-stakeholders national workshop to consider the preliminary draft of the I-PRSP in February 2002, a session with "representatives of the business community" in September 2002, and a similar session with "representatives of civil society organizations and labour unions" in November 2002. Another stakeholder session was held in August 2003 to review, update and finalize the March 2003 draft I-PRSP.

Stakeholder workshops/sessions were conceived, managed and conducted by the PRSP Secretariat without definite measurable assignments of roles and responsibilities to non-state actors (NSAs). None of these stakeholder workshops can be said to have garnered definite formal presentations by NGOs or private sector organizations. In the report of the Interactive Session with representatives of civil society and the labour unions from November 7-8, 2002, mention was not made of any formal presentations by NGOs; it was simply stated that "CSOs and NGOs were fully represented". The implication is that the PRSP Secretariat ultimately makes the decisions regarding what inputs go into the PRSP and what does not. The practice of inviting NGOs to workshops on a rotational basis is inherently flawed since it makes it impossible for attending NGOs to track the extent to which their criticisms and submissions are subsequently incorporated and addressed. While the PRSP coordinating agency sees this technique as a means to ensure inputs from broader segments of stakeholders, it leaves little or no room for systematic and cumulative inputs by civil society into the PRSP. None of the NGOs interviewed indicated taking proactive roles in the preparation of the I-PRSP so far. None of them indicated that it made formal (written) inputs and submissions either voluntarily or on request from the PRSP Secretariat, outside nominal participation in the Interactive Stakeholder Sessions.

The PRSP Process: Links between National Policy-making, Planning and Political Processes

The PRSP process does not seem to be adequately integrated into the country's policy and political processes. In this regard, two weaknesses of the PRSP process are observed. One is the poor coordination and collaboration between different organs of the Federal Government. The other is the poor linkage between the Executive and Legislative arms of the Federal Government. The process has been characterized by weak intra-governmental collaboration and coordination, especially between the Executive and Legislative arms of the Federal Government. Rather than active close collaboration between the Executive and Legislative arms of the Federal Government in the PRSP process, the process has almost alienated the Legislature. This is in spite of the constitutional status of the Legislature as an organ for legitimacy, accountability and transparency. Alienation of the Legislature is revealed from the finding that the EPCC merely briefed a number of Committee members from the National Assembly in May 2002, more than

12 months after the PRSP process started. It is not clear what processes existed to continue collaboration with the Legislature after this briefing. This indicates poor mobilization for the PRSP process across government organs, hence the very low level of awareness of the PRSP process among top government officials.

Poor intra-governmental collaboration and cooperation was also evidenced by the poor interface between the NPC and the EPCC on the PRSP issue. Since the coordination of the PRSP process was transferred from the NPC to the EPCC, there has been meagre interaction between both institutions on the PRSP process. Officials of the NPC attend meetings as mere invited participants, rather than as an active collaborating agency in the PRSP process. The PRSP process appears isolated from (or not adequately integrated with) the core Federal Government's development planning and policy machinery (the NPC) and the existing anti-poverty programming efforts at both the Federal and State Government levels, such as the NAPEP and the State Governments' poverty reduction programmes. The links between Nigeria's Economic Policy (1999-2003) and the PRSP process are not clear, neither is the relationship between the current NAPEP and the PRSP process. The PRSP process does not embed a clear relationship between the PRSP implementing bodies (the National Forum on the PRSP and the Technical Guidance Team) and the NAPEP implementing structures (the National Poverty Eradication Council and the National and State Coordinating Committees). There is, therefore, an obvious need for well-articulated mechanisms to link the different government poverty-reduction development strategy formulation processes and institutions, based on the opportunities provided by the PRSP process, more closely.

The Nigerian I-PRSP Process: Credibility, Legitimacy and Ownership

Shallow and narrow participation: Indicators of the legitimacy of the PRSP participatory process include the adequacy (scope and coverage) of civil society organizations, their representativeness and feedback relationships within the participating CSOs. The NGOs and the private sector that are often invited to take part in the IPRSP process are mostly visible, formal sector organizations such as the apex labour union and the organized private sector. Little scope was allowed informal segments of civil society and private sector such as community-based organisations (CBOs) and informal sector unions. None of the NGOs interviewed indicated that they had convened an independent PSRP-linked civil society forum to generate specific inputs and comments into the I-PRSP. One NGO was found to have a nation-wide poverty eradication project involving research, policy advocacy, capacity building and civil society mobilisation for poverty measurement, targeting and monitoring. But, this NGO is implementing this project outside the I-PRSP process. The private sector and NGOs invited to stakeholder workshops/sessions are drawn from a list compiled by the EPCC.

Communication and information problems: Government's poverty reduction strategies and related programmes are often not adequately and appropriately communicated among stakeholders. There is a generally low level of economic reporting in the print and electronic media. Poor dissemination creates information gaps, hinders and distorts feedback from stakeholders on programme strategies, targeting and impact. In September 2001, the NAPEP published a booklet titled "Understanding NAPEP" directed to refute an uncomplimentary and very critical editorial commentary on the programme in one of Nigeria's daily newspapers. One newspaper editorial

criticized the programme stating that “not many people are aware of what NAPEP is doing”. Both the editorial commentary and the rejoinder by the NAPEP underscore the tensions and communication problems besetting government poverty reduction strategies in Nigeria. A communiqué of the Poverty Eradication Programme Zonal Consultative Forum held on August 28, 2003 in Markurdi, underscored the poor communication of government poverty reduction strategies among stakeholders. It stated among others that “many people, particularly in the rural areas, are not aware of various government programmes on poverty alleviation; those that are aware in the urban areas think that the programmes are meant for politicians because ordinary people do not benefit from the projects” (CDD, 2003).

The evidence of the poor communication is the stereotype of the PRSP process among civil society circles as an initiative of the World Bank and the IMF which the Federal Government is embarking on to secure debt relief and concessional financial assistance from international agencies. This stereotyping is part of a wider popular suspicion of the World Bank- and International Monetary Fund-linked policies in the country, especially since the SAP saga. Such impression is not helped either by statements in the draft I-PRSP: “the Federal Government of Nigeria authorities welcome the additional benefit from pursuit of a sound PRSP process, in the form of commitment by bilateral and multilateral development partners to offer concessional assistance (including debt relief) based on serious commitment by needy countries to country-specific PRSP processes in the respective cases, including countries (such as Nigeria) not internationally classified among the so called Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)” (Nigeria I-PRSP, 2003, p. 6). The importance and merit of the PRSP process is overshadowed by this unsavoury but popular impression that the PRSP is conditionality for debt relief. This image overhang breeds negative attitudes towards the PRSP process. Interviews with PRSP officials confirm the enmeshing of the process in the public cynicism of government policies and governance in general. Reclaiming the process from this national image problem and cynicism, though a difficult feat, would be a sure route to establishing local ownership of the process.

The Nigerian PRSP process faces multiple tests of credibility, legitimacy and ownership. Credibility arises from pervasive public cynicism towards governance - little confidence that government is credible, transparent, accountable and responsive. The draft I-PRSP acknowledges this problem when it refers to lingering scepticism on the part of civil society towards newly announced initiatives by policy authorities. This is a hangover from long years of oppressive and destructive military dictatorship, low incidence of pro-poor policy outcomes over time and current disappointment over delayed gains (poverty-reducing outcomes) from democratic rule since 1999. Feigning a separate identity for the PRSP process (that is, a PRSP divorced from credibility problems of governance) as apparently attempted by the I-PRSP process, failed. Legitimacy is undermined by lack of systematic civic mobilization, narrow and shallow civil society participation.

Low political commitment and little enthusiasm: There appears to be little enthusiasm for the PRSP among the lower tiers of government (state and local governments) based on perceptions that PRSP is a Federal Government programme to which they are not obliged. Even the Federal Government itself has not shown strong political commitment to the PRSP process, as NAPEP is presently gulping government political energies and budgetary resources. Protagonists and

campaigners for the PRSP process, whether at the civil society, private sector and governmental levels, are hard to find. The low level of awareness of the PRSP process observed among many government officials interviewed reinforces concerns about ownership and credibility. According to one viewpoint, “for Nigeria, there is a fundamental issue of weak ownership of the process as it is largely seen as what the donors want ..., the government has its own NAPEP - as the pillar of its poverty reduction strategy and it owns and supports it; on the other hand donors do not support the NAPEP, the government pays lip service to wanting the PRSP but it is not clear who in government is losing sleep because there is no PRSP,..., there is no enthusiasm for it, but the extent to which it is going to influence policy choices in Nigeria is not clear.” (AIAE, 2003).

Similarly, doubts on the political commitment to and ownership of the PRSP process have been heightened due to Federal Government’s commencement of work on the new Economic Reform Strategy Document - NEEDS. This New Economic Reform Agenda, according to the Government, would encompass the PRSP and lay out the short-, medium- and long-term targets/benchmarks, priorities and strategies as well as provide the framework for Government budgeting and implementation. It would focus on poverty reduction, employment creation and wealth creation. The Tenth Nigerian Economic Summit 2003 held from September 10-12, was a platform for take-off stakeholder consultative and participatory processes for the preparation of the NEEDS Document. Ironically, the Government that is embarking on the PRSP process, apparently voluntarily, has begun the articulation of another document encompassing “employment generation, poverty alleviation and wealth creation”. The future of the PRSP process is now uncertain. In fact, the President of Nigeria stated in an opening address at the 10th Nigerian Economic Summit that “the broad outlines of our Administration’s reform agenda have been articulated in the NEEDS, on which a high-level 20 member Drafting Committee, headed by the Chief Economic Adviser, is now working to elaborate the programme by setting targets, benchmarks and implementation framework. NEEDS is already being subjected to stakeholder consultations and participation and would eventually become Nigeria’s own PRSP. The broad reform programme has already been endorsed by the Federal Executive Council and the National Economic Council”. This policy change on the PRSP by the same government that initiated it underlines the poor credibility and political ownership plaguing the PRSP process.

Constraints to Civil Society Participation in the PRSP process

Mobilization of the political authorities (at the federal, state and local levels), government bureaucrats/officials, civil society and private sector to understand and appreciate the economic policy process is necessary for increased participation and ownership. The bane of government policies in Nigeria is lack of shared understanding of problems and solutions. Efforts to win public confidence in governance via social mobilization, public education and civic engagement can alleviate the situation. NGOs and civil society as a whole should identify entry points into the policy process rather than bemoan missed opportunities. This would increase the policy credibility and deepen its participatory processes for pro-poor outcomes.

Government can take confidence-building measures to ensure legitimacy and ownership of the process. These include effective public-private dialogue, civil society engagement with

government, synergies and coordinated actions among key policy organs of Federal Government and between the three tiers of Government. It is imperative to have effective communication, feedback between the Government and civil society through public-private dialogue and public debate of policies. Government needs to demonstrate good faith by undertaking immediate high-impact transparent and responsive steps to allow greater scope for buy-ins by civil society towards scrutinizing, reviewing and reconstructing the process. Civil society would have to become more proactive in order to leverage existing structures and opportunities as well as invent new ones.

The poor role of civil society in the I-PRSP process reflects an underlying weak capacity of NGOs, CBOs and the private sector to participate effectively in the formulation and monitoring/evaluation of economic policies. Economic policy advocacy requires adequate skills and expertise in policy analysis, monitoring and impact evaluation (World Bank, 2002a). Many NGOs lack these requisites, as observed by respondents. Rather, they are often involved with multiple issues, hence they lack adequate concentration needed to engage the wider public and the Government on specialized development and policy matters. Moreover, the bulk of the NGOs do not stay the course; they are easily diverted and their programme thrusts swing too often in consonance with donor shifts. Unhealthy rivalries also hinder networking and collective impact (Egboh, 2003).

Related to NGOs, weak capacity for economic policy advocacy is a lack of well-articulated demand for and use of social and economic data. Without access to credible and up-to-date data and research evidence, NGOs and the private sector are unable to undertake informed policy dialogue with government stakeholders. Many respondents attribute the situation to long years of NGOs' preoccupation with human rights and civil liberties advocacy under the long years of oppressive military dictatorships.

Using the PRSP benchmark, the role of civil society in Nigeria's I-PRSP is far short of expectations. Several factors constrain civil society engagement with government. There is a lack of organized NGOs' rallying agenda for the PRSP, and no organized frameworks or mechanisms for NGOs networking and coalition for the PRSP. Evidence-based policy dialogue and advocacy in relation to the PRSP process is hampered by paucity, outdated nature and poor state of social and economic database. Collaboration in the collection and analysis of poverty data, between government departments (e.g. FOS) and NGOs is very weak and often non-existent. There is no articulate mechanism or platform for collaboration in collection and analysis of poverty data between government and civil society. Hence, civil society is unable to influence the methods and outputs of poverty data collection and analysis and so not able to guarantee the credibility and integrity of government-collected data. Institutionalized mechanisms for public-private sector dialogue on economic, development and poverty reduction strategies are scanty. There is a lack of coherent media agenda and the capacity to sustain public debate on policy issues is low. Poor access to and low capacity in the utilization of reliable and updated data and statistics deny civil society the requisite bases for high-quality debates and evidence-oriented dialogue on development and policy issues, including the PRSP. Civil society-government engagement is fraught with acute public cynicism about government programmes due to paucity of pro-poor outcomes of previous government policies and the systematic alienation of civil society largely owing to long years of military dictatorships.

In recent years, however, the NGO sector in Nigeria has witnessed an inflow of professionals including university academics, private sector operators, retired government officials and public sector workers and labour leaders. This changing human resource landscape of the NGO sector in Nigeria should be leveraged for deeper, more respectable and productive government-civil society engagement and dialogue on poverty and development policy issues. Already, within Nigeria's democratic context, many CSOs are becoming active in policy advocacy through mechanisms of public-private sector dialogue on economic reforms and institutions development.

3. The Content of the Draft Interim Paper on National Poverty Reduction Strategy (Revised August 2003)

3.1 Poverty Diagnostics

Quantitative and qualitative poverty diagnostics are reflected in the draft I-PRSP. Quantitative poverty diagnostics come from the Federal Office of Statistics 'Poverty Profile of Nigeria' covering 1980-1996. The Poverty Profile for Nigeria 1980-1996 (see Table 1) disaggregates poverty incidence by geo-political zones, rural/urban, gender, household size, age of household head, and occupational/employment status, among others. The I-PRSP acknowledges the dearth of detailed statistical evidence on the level and trend of poverty in the country, especially regarding the post-1996 period. It observes several measurement problems in existing quantitative poverty statistics, including lack of hard measures of income poverty, the increasing imperative for expenditure poverty approach, questions regarding the use of two-thirds of total per capita expenditure as poverty line, and the distorting impact of fluctuating and multiple exchange rates (in the case of international comparisons) on the poverty line. The I-PRSP adapts the qualitative poverty diagnostics contained in the findings of participatory poverty analysis carried out in Nigeria as part of the background materials for the World Bank's World Development Report 2000-2001 on Poverty and Development.

The I-PRSP identifies the basic cause of poverty as poor economic growth (with GDP growth rate estimated to be annual average of 2.9 percent between 1993-2001) and sharp volatility of output and employment. Factors contributing to the poverty situation are classified under production factors, distributional factors, economic governance problems (including corruption), social conflicts factor, gender, and inter-sectoral and others. The I-PRSP identifies some specific factors behind poverty which are:

- ☐ limited growth of investments and technological innovations thereby constraining labour absorption of the non-agricultural sector;
- ☐ impact of globalisation on domestic industries – limiting growth of domestic production and employment;
- ☐ low savings propensity and domestic investment growth;
- ☐ non-inclusive economic growth; and
- ☐ bad economic governance and limited effectiveness of past poverty alleviation programmes, corruption; economic and social dislocations caused by internal conflicts.

Other factors are:

- ☐ gender discrimination;
- ☐ shortage of social and economic infrastructure in the rural areas;
- ☐ low productivity of rural (and especially agricultural) production;
- ☐ inconsistent and unstable policy environment;
- ☐ infrastructure deterioration;
- ☐ significant debt service payments;
- ☐ high population growth rate; and
- ☐ rural-urban migration and ageing of the rural population (Nigeria I-PRSP, 2003).

The Draft recognises the multidimensional nature of poverty as observed from its allusions to human development issues such as education, life expectancy, access to health, mortality, HIV/AIDS, risks from environmental disaster, access to safe drinking water, and access to energy sources, among others. It adopts qualitative (participatory) poverty assessments from studies in 1999 as a basis for elaborating the various manifestations and faces of poverty. As reported by the Draft Paper, they include joblessness, over-indebtedness, economic dependence at adult age, lack of freedom, inability to provide the basic needs of members of one's family with respect to feeding, school fees, clothing and hospital bills. Also mentioned are: inability to own valuable assets such as land, houses and financial savings, combined generally with a tendency to live in dirty localities that exert significant pressures on the physical environment and food poverty. This was considered the most important dimension of poverty. Okunmadewa and Williams (2000) gives a country synthesis of the participatory poverty studies. While the knowledge and information on non-income dimensions of poverty particularly vulnerability remain weak in Nigeria, the I-PRSP acknowledges improvements such as the FOS-UNICEF survey of the status of women and children in 2001 which provides a good understanding of poverty in Nigeria.

Poverty data in Nigeria is generally weak, outdated and hence, not surprisingly, contentious. Several challenges and constraints can be identified as characterizing the poverty data landscape. Principal among them are data collection and dissemination problems. Data collection is highly circumscribed by poor staff motivation and orientation, acute funding constraints, poor facilities and institutional constraints (poor data culture). Added to the data collection dimension is the usually long time lag in data processing and reporting/dissemination, poor information sharing between the national data agency and civil society. The I-PRSP rightly acknowledges that additional work is needed to broaden and deepen understanding of the nature, causes and dynamics of poverty in Nigeria. Specific information gaps identified include – additional poverty indicators (e.g. food energy intake and basic needs), units of analysis other than households, data on children and women, labour market participation and income sources, consumption disaggregation, non-monetary dimensions of poverty and panel data to capture poverty dynamics. The Draft I-PRSP ascribes a significant role for the on-going Nigerian Living Standard Survey in overcoming the inadequacies of the National Consumer Expenditure Survey and General Household Survey. The on-going Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Surveys are also ascribed a great role in poverty diagnostics.

The I-PRSP provides very scanty information on studies already undertaken or underway as part of the process of building the knowledge and analytic bases for PRS. The section on “needed poverty-focused studies in the near term” is rather casual and does not provide systematic build-up of knowledge challenges that could be translated into a clear PRSP research agenda. Many key research issues with deep implications for poverty reduction are not adequately reflected in the draft I-PRSP. For instance, no mention is made of the following research needs relating to poverty reduction strategy: sources and drivers of growth, linkages of growth, macroeconomic framework and poverty, benefit incidence of public spending, ex ante and ex post studies of poverty policies, distributive and social impact of policies and links between macro-policies and micro-effects.

3.2 Macroeconomic, Sector and Targeted Policies and Programmes in the I-PRSP

Unlike past economic policies and programmes that merely addressed poverty reduction implicitly, the I-PRSP bears an explicit pro-poor stance including “inclusive development in the context of sustained economic growth with reasonable price stability” and strengthened economic governance as pivotal factors in the poverty reduction strategy. The poverty reduction strategy is structured along four clusters of policies and programmes. They are “economic growth with inclusive development”, “social sector and human resources development”, “strengthening peace and internal security” and “protection from various pressing manifestations of poverty”.

Economic growth with inclusive development: Appropriate macroeconomic policies create an enabling environment for private enterprise that drives growth. According to Canagarajan et al, (1997), a poverty reducing growth strategy will require removal of existing fiscal, regulatory and monetary restrictions that hamper export development and a long term vision based on broad-based export production to provide cash stimulus to move the economy forward. Specific policies and programmes are outlined in relation to economic growth with inclusive development. One is rural/agricultural development (particularly the recent Rural Development Strategy for Nigeria). Growth in economic sectors where the poor are concentrated will have a greater impact on reducing poverty than growth in other sectors. Where for example most of the poor live in rural areas and work in agriculture, agricultural growth reduces poverty because it generates income for the poor farmers and increases the demand for goods and services easily produced by the poor.

In Nigeria, given the interface of agriculture-rural sector and poverty, agricultural and rural development is a key route to accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction. While incorporating agricultural and rural development as a key element of PRS, the Draft I-PRSP anchors on the Nigerian Rural Development Sector Strategy developed in 2001, but omits the New Policy Thrust on Agriculture dated March 2002. An important future challenge is to clarify mechanisms for achieving pro-poor growth in the agricultural and rural sector. Canagarajan et al (1997) observes that a crucial element of growth strategy in the agricultural sector is to move agricultural policy and practices away from a bias towards specific crops to encouraging an environment where producers will shift towards the most profitable crops. It is also important to appreciate the potential conflicts between the goals of food security, export promotion and

poverty reduction as elaborated in Maxell, 1999.

Infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion: Another component of the poverty reduction strategy in the area of economic growth with inclusive development include the rehabilitation and expansion of physical and social infrastructure to ensure growth of output, employment and development of human resources. Essential public utilities including water, electricity and transport are mentioned as key priorities in improving the volume and quality of infrastructure facilities. Participatory approaches based on broad public/private partnerships are to be strengthened to ensure fair distribution of infrastructure and to correct the existing urban bias. The emphasis on rural infrastructure is understandable, given the debilitating infrastructure constraints to market access, productive efficiency, technological transformation and income-earning opportunities in the agricultural-rural sector (Eboh, 2003).

Privatization: Noting the progress being made on the privatization policy, the draft I-PRSP sees a big role for privatization and commercialization in increasing the flow of production of goods and services and freeing up resources for more productive uses. It draws, however, attention to the equity concerns about privatisation, the need to safeguard workers' interests and to ensure that the process does not aggravate the already precarious unemployment problem in the country.

Environmental Sustainability: The two-way links between poverty and environmental degradation is recognized by the Draft Interim Paper. It alludes to federal government efforts to mainstream environmental impact considerations in policies and programmes and the national thematic action plans on biological diversity, climatic change, afforestation, ozone depletion, desertification, environmental health, persistence organic pollutions and integrated coastal zone management, particularly the Niger Delta. It sees a huge relevance for the new national Forestry Policy to enhance contribution of Nigeria's forestry sector to poverty alleviation, food security and environmental protection, in addition to sustainable production of wood and non-wood forest products.

Strengthening economic governance: Identified as a key element of the poverty reduction strategy, strengthening economic governance is seen as indispensable for lowering the unit cost of providing services to the society by the public sector and building a level playing field for all economic and social actors. It is also imperative for achieving resource savings by minimising misappropriations and diversion of public funds, improving transparency and accountability in order to foster internal and external confidence in the economy and hence encourage private local and foreign investment. The Draft Interim Paper outlines the existing measures and institutions by which economic governance is being strengthened. They include the establishment of Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission in 2000 and the setting up of a Budget Monitoring and Project Intelligence (BMPI) unit within the Office of the President. The BMPI would undertake pre-disbursement screening for all large-value capital projects to ensure compliance and due process requirements. For better economic governance, the time lag between the end of fiscal year and the submission to the National Assembly of the Federation's report on the Federal Government's financial dealings during the fiscal year has been shortened to one year. The thrust of the Draft Interim Paper is to build on these elements in order to substantially improve the quality of economic governance.

Social sector and human resources development: Poverty is a multidimensional problem that extends beyond economics to include social, political and cultural issues. Hence, solutions to poverty do not lie only in economic policies but require a comprehensive set of coherent measures. Consistent with the multidimensional imperatives of poverty reduction, the Draft Interim Paper outlines a social sector strategy to reduce poverty through education and health policies. The Universal Basic Education Programme of full compulsory nine-year formal education, the programme of community vocational centres, nomadic education and adult education schemes are some of the interventions emphasized by the draft paper. The health sector development strategy emphasizes strengthening of preventive and curative primary health care services. Elements of the health sector programme include the national programme on immunisation, the roll back malaria, the national TB programme, the programme for the eradication of harmful traditional practices, the programme for the treatment of leprosy, guinea worm and onchocerciasis, the reduction of maternal and mortality and morbidity, and the National Health Insurance Scheme.

Strengthening peace and internal security: The Draft Interim Paper recognises the upsurge in social and communal conflicts since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria. It refers to the establishment of an Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution within the Presidency as imperative to strengthen peace and internal security. The Strategic Conflict Assessment carried out by the institution in 2002 in collaboration with civil society and other international development partners has resulted in a National Action Plan. The elements of the Plan include security sector reforms, early warning and early response, political reforms and mainstreaming conflict preventions and the capacity building in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. One principal focus of peace building and conflict resolution efforts is the Niger Delta characterised by violent conflicts, youth restiveness and communal tensions linked to poverty, political struggle and environmental degradation.

Protection from various pressing manifestations of poverty: Targeted policies and interventions to insulate the poor against shocks and ensure equitable income distribution are desirable elements of a poverty reduction strategy. While sound macroeconomic policies help to reduce a country's exposure to macroeconomic shocks, the Poor still remain disproportionately affected by shocks brought about by crisis, economic reforms and adjustment (World Bank, 2002b). For instance, the Draft points to the on-going pensions reform programme as a measure to prevent serious deterioration in standards of living, but does stipulate the need for an immediate approach to the mounting pension arrears. In recognising that the benefits of economic growth may not accrue uniformly across society, the Draft Interim Paper prescribes a tremendous role for poverty-targeted programmes such as the on-going NAPEP (the Youth Empowerment Scheme, Capacity Acquisition Programme, the Mandatory Attachment Programme and the Credit Delivery Programme) for gainful employment, entrepreneurial development and wealth creation. It is not however clear what strategy would transform the NAPEP to overcome the deficiencies of previous institutional arrangements. Small and medium enterprises are rightly emphasised as potential routes to poverty reduction and employment creation. To create exit routes from poverty, the Draft Paper includes the current SMEs interventions such as the Small and Medium Industries Development Agency, Industrial

Development Centres, export processing schemes for SMEs, and Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme. In an apparent policy assessment, the draft I-PRSP acknowledges the merit of anti-poverty programmes, but the lack of effectiveness of Nigeria's poverty-targeting initiatives, lack of stakeholder participation, programme discontinuity, poor monitoring and evaluation, focus on inputs rather than outcomes, generally inefficient public sector and low level of accountability and stakeholder feedback. By implication, poverty-targeted programmes that avoid these drawbacks have greater chances of success.

While the draft I-PRSP includes sectoral measures for poverty reduction, a detailed treatment of how to harness the nexus between sectors for poverty reduction remains a critical issue to be addressed in the future. It is important to address the nexus between agriculture and health, education and health, environment and health, agriculture and environment. Part of the future challenge is to systematically link policies and programmes across sectors. For example, the Rural/Agricultural Development Policies can be organically related to SMEs development. It is also reasonable to expect that the prioritisation of the policies and programmes is an integral component of the agenda in the future.

3.3 Issues of Macroeconomic Framework in the I-PRSP

The Draft critically reviews Nigeria's macroeconomic performance based on key indicators (real GDP per capita, annual GDP growth rate, sector annual growth rates, inflation, exchange rate, debt burden, gross reserves, current account balance and unemployment) during 1992-2002 in order to give a macroeconomic context of the I-PRSP process. It links macroeconomic instability and poor growth to lack of an enabling domestic policy environment, bad economic governance and external shocks from the oil market, aggravated by the dominance of the oil sector. It appreciates sharp disparities in the distribution of growth benefits across society. The anchor of the macroeconomic framework is the document issued by the Federal Government during the last quarter of 2002, titled Framework for Nigeria's Economic Growth and Development 2003-2007 spelling out in broad terms economic growth and poverty reduction targets in the medium term.

While noting the targets set in this Framework - annual growth rates of 8 and 7 percent in agriculture and the whole economy respectively, the Draft envisages updated and comprehensive medium-term macroeconomic framework for the PRSP. However, it gives broad indications for the anti-poverty macroeconomic policy to include market-based approaches (interest and exchange rates), single-digit inflation and ascribes a big role for ex ante scenario analysis in developing the macroeconomic framework in the course of the full PRSP. Some of the ex ante analysis that have examined the potential impact of economic growth on poverty include Canagarajah et al (1997) and AIAE (2003). In apparent admission of the absence of an articulated macroeconomic framework, the Draft envisages "in terms of specific details, much of the macroeconomic framework will need to be worked out in the full PRSP" (Nigeria I-PRSP, 2003). Meanwhile, macroeconomic projections are that Nigeria needs a minimum annual growth rate of five percent to prevent poverty incidence from rising above the current 70 percent, and an annual growth rate of seven percent to achieve the MDG of halving poverty incidence by 2015. If annual growth remains the same as for the previous 4 years, poverty incidence would rise to 90 percent by 2030 (AIAE, 2003).

International and regional dimensions: Globalization poses both opportunities and risks for economic

growth and poverty reduction in Nigeria. But, the Draft Interim Paper is silent on the domestic policies and programmes needed to respond to globalization and trade. The only indication concerns the potential of debt relief and concessional-terms assistance from creditor countries and institutions for poverty reduction in indebted countries. There is a neglect of the potentially critical impact of sub-regional trade on Nigeria's economic growth, especially given the relative size of the Nigerian economy in the West Africa region. No consideration is given to the implications for Nigeria of ECOWAS march towards the West African Economic Union and the compatibility of Nigeria's trade policies with the West African integration process. The potential impact of the ECOWAS trade policy relating to the liberalization of intra-community trade, establishment of a common external tariff against developing countries and the promotion of intra-regional trade (ECOWAS, 2003) on Nigeria's growth and poverty reduction strategies and prospects is not treated by the Draft Interim Paper.

3.4 Treatment of Gender Issues in the I-PRSP

Poverty, human development and income distribution in Nigeria have gender dimensions, which should necessarily be reflected in a PRS. The real GDP per capita of female population is 42.8 percent of that of male (UNDP/Nigeria 2001). The Draft reflects some gender sensitivity as it provides gender-disaggregated data on poverty incidence, primary school enrolment and human development indicators such as infant mortality, maternal mortality and child immunisation rates. The Draft Interim Paper recognises that women bear disproportionate large burden of worsened economic conditions but enjoy disproportionate low share of any economic improvements. This is attributed to traditional discriminatory practices that deny them access to productive resources and institutions.

It envisions in the full PRSP a gender development policy embedding appropriate instruments and best practices that reflect informed sensitivity to female disadvantages in the social and economic system. Besides identifying women as social groups for anti-poverty targeting, no clear indications are given concerning issues of mainstreaming of gender in economic and sector policies and programmes. The Draft rightly identifies knowledge gaps about women's poverty and the need for more gender-disaggregated poverty analysis to deepen poverty diagnostics and improve targeting. In order to target women more effectively, the gender impacts of social and economic change (structural change in women's opportunities, constraints, needs and priorities in relation to men) must be clearly understood. Studies to elucidate how social and economic dynamics impact on gender distribution of roles/duties and benefits/income are of critical value for poverty reduction and income re-distribution policies and programmes in the PRSP.

3.5 Treatment of HIV/AIDS Issues in the Draft I-PRSP

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is recognised as a potential threat to productivity, economic growth and poverty reduction, not least in Nigeria where there have been almost 850,000 reported AIDS deaths since 1986 and World Bank estimates that HIV/AIDS is reducing growth by 0.5 percent per annum. Current data based on sentinel sero-prevalence surveys in 1995 and 1999 indicate that over 3.5 million people are living with the virus and adult prevalence rates increased from 1.8 percent to 5.8 percent between 1991-2001, with mean rates reaching 16.8 percent in some states. Given Nigeria's huge population, these prevalence rates though apparently low in relative terms and criticised as an underestimation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, translate to huge numbers of people. Current projections suggest that under low and high HIV scenarios, the epidemic will peak at about seven percent prevalence in 2007 (low) or 9.5 percent prevalence in 2012 (high)

and then decline (Heymans and Pycroft, 2003). The National AIDS/STD Control Programme of the Federal Ministry of Health projected that HIV prevalence will increase by almost 90 percent between 1999 and 2003 (that is, from about 5.4 percent to about 10 percent).

The current and potential risks to Nigerian businesses from HIV/AIDS are not adequately researched. The HIV/AIDS data problem is pronounced in Nigeria. Marchat et al (2002) observes that neither the government nor the research community has access to data on HIV prevalence among Nigerian men who are not in known high-risk categories, such as STD patients and soldiers. To ameliorate this information gap, several isolated studies have been carried out or being undertaken to promote understanding of the nature and impact of HIV/AIDS in various sectors of the economy. The Draft Interim Paper is scanty on research evidence on HIV/AIDS.

Though the Government has become more visible in the fight against HIV/AIDS, economy-wide dearth of pro-poor outcomes, poor quality and inefficient public health system and a weakened education sector are blamed for government's lack of coherent and effective responses to HIV/AIDS (Heymans and Pycroft, 2003). There is need to elucidate the HIV/AIDS issues as the PRSP progresses, considering that it constitutes a big risk to the economy and society. A coherent strategy that is comprehensive and multisectoral is imperative to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The role of the private sector in HIV/AIDS prevention and control needs to be incorporated in the strategy. Insights from the RPED survey of manufacturing firms in Nigeria (the HIV/AIDS component) in March-April 2001 provide knowledge critical for targeting and interventions. Less than one third of the firms were found to have discussed or taken any action on HIV/AIDS the previous year. Most of the firms who took actions simply disseminated information through posters, handouts or speakers. These simple measures have been shown in many African countries to have little effect on HIV incidence if not combined with more active interventions such as distributing condoms or training peer educators (Jha et al, 2000). While the study found that businesses are paying little heed to official statistics about HIV/AIDS in Nigeria, receiving information about HIV/AIDS leads firms to take at least some action on HIV/AIDS (Marchat et al. 2002). Hence, there is need for government and non-governmental organisations to intensify the dissemination of HIV/AIDS information to firms and businesses.

4. Public Finance Aspects of the Draft I-PRSP

4.1 Public finance, budgeting and the PRSP process:

Public finance is central to poverty reduction, and the practice of public expenditure management can hinder or promote the achievement of poverty reduction objectives (World Bank, 2002a). Where budgets are fragmented and focus is on inputs rather than on impacts and outcomes, the ability of the budget system to discipline policymaking and ensure pro-poor performance is eroded. In developing and implementing poverty reduction strategy, a number of measures and principles are particularly important. Some of them include improving the quality of expenditure analysis, developing a medium-term perspective to budget making, strengthening public financial management to ensure that scarce resources are being used to achieve priority goals. Others are

focusing on budget performance in terms of pro-poor outcomes and opening up the budget systems to public scrutiny to improve the quality of policy debate and accountability of public agencies (World Bank, 2002). Within the PRSP context, domestic budgeting and public finance have to be aligned with poverty reduction goals.

4.2 Structure of Public Finance and Implications for the PRSP process in Nigeria:

In Nigeria, public expenditure and budgetary processes weigh heavily on pro-poor growth since fiscal policy and budget management constitute the predominant influence on macroeconomic performance. All federally collectable revenues are consolidated into the Federation Account and automatically shared among the federal government, 36 state government plus the federal capital territory (Abuja) and 774 local governments according to a formula enacted by the National Assembly. Until recently, the sharing formula was federal government (48.5%), state governments (24%), local governments (20%) and special funds (7.5%). Since the federal government has powers to disburse the 7.5 percent special funds, it automatically had fiscal powers over 56 percent of the federation account. However, the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) has sponsored a bill to the National Assembly recommending a new revenue allocation formula which reduces federal government share to 46.5 percent, increased state governments' and local governments' shares to 33.0 percent and 20.37 percent respectively.

State governments are heavily dependent on the federation account. For state governments, the federation account shares of total revenues were 46 percent and 70 percent in 1998 and 2001 respectively. For local governments, federation account shares of total revenues were 67 percent and 77.6 percent in 1998 and 2001 respectively. Out of a total government spending estimated to be 52.5 percent of GDP, the state and local governments accounted for 38 percent (AIAE, 2003). Such a public finance outlook mirrors a widening scope for state and local governments to impact on poverty reduction in the country. This scope is poised to widen given the likely increase in states and local governments' share of public spending to about 53.37 percent under the upcoming revenue allocation formula. This echoes the critical role for state and local governments in poverty reduction in the country. Ironically, the prospects of state and local governments for poverty reduction are itself undermined by a heavy reliance upon an oil-sector dominated federation account and a shallow tax base manifested by internally generated revenue. As a result, shocks from a volatile international oil market would easily be transmitted to state and local governments, hence the need for Federation Stabilisation Account alluded to by the Draft Interim Paper as a coping mechanism against fiscal volatility. Besides, higher domestic resource mobilization capacities are imperative at the lower tiers of government in terms of efficient and effective taxation and revenue administration systems.

Implications of public expenditures for poverty reduction: In assessing the state of public expenditure in Nigeria, the World Bank Joint Interim Strategy Paper on Nigeria (2001) surmises the reasons for the disappointing impact of public programmes on development, poverty and welfare as follows:

- public expenditures are not well focused on anti-poverty priorities because of

- continuation of outdated development paradigms;
- shoddy programme implementation capacity; and
- poor distribution of benefits from public expenditures, skewed toward urban areas.

Underlying the public finance scenario in Nigeria are unsustainable trends with critical implications for the public expenditure aspects of the PRSP. One is the oil-sector dominance of government revenue – accounting for over 85 percent of total government revenue and the dramatic rise of the share of public sector spending from 15 percent of GDP in 1970 to more than 50 percent in 2001. Moreover, over 70 percent of the government budget is currently accounted for by recurrent expenditure, with meagre resources available for social infrastructure and development expenditures. Urban bias of public expenditure also reflects lack of a pro-poor stance. For instance, in 1980-98 total federal government urban spending was 31 times more than rural areas, total recurrent urban spending was 194.7 times more than rural areas while total capital spending in urban areas was 12.3 times higher than rural areas (FMARD, 2001). This spending pattern does not reflect pro-poor stance, given the interface of agriculture and rural sector with poverty. Drastic amelioration of these trends is an imperative if poverty reduction goals must be achieved.

Public spending has been characterised by relatively low levels of budgetary allocation to key poverty-reducing sectors. For example, annual capital spending on education and health (two critical sectors with critical implications for poverty alleviation) is estimated to average six percent and four percent respectively during the periods of 1999-2002. During 1985-1987 and 1995-1997, federal government spending on education relative to GDP declined from 1.7 percent to 0.7 percent; during 1994-1998, government spending on health averaged about 2.5 percent of GDP per annum. Though these data excludes education and health spending by state and local governments, they hardly reflect significant direct fiscal priority to social sectors and poverty reduction. A similar assessment was contained in the World Bank evaluation of the 2001 capital budget, which observed that key poverty-reducing areas such as the Universal Basic Education, the National Programme on Immunization, maintenance and rehabilitation of roads seem underfunded. For state governments, the World Bank Public Expenditure Review Study (2002) identified that recurrent expenditures constituted on the average about 65 percent of total expenditures in the states studied. Among the state governments, personnel outlay constituted an unsustainable burden on public spending. Its share of public spending ranged from over 33 percent (in Lagos and Bauchi States) to about 82 percent (in Cross River State), implying that meagre share of public spending is available for development expenditures and poverty-reduction programmes.

Nigeria's revenue and expenditures profile is highly volatile as illustrated by Addison (2002). Government budgeting suffers from difficulty in predicting the direction and duration of revenue shocks, and this uncertainty feeds into the budgetary planning and implementation, with volatility in revenues translating to volatility in expenditures. Marchat et al. (2002) observes that the way the budget is formulated and presented does not facilitate estimation of the likely impact of various programmes on poverty. Concerns are also expressed over Nigeria's weak institutional structure and capacity for efficient and transparent budgetary management and the fact that the country's fiscal federalism constitutes a constraining influence on the macroeconomic stabilisation. The World Bank's Nigerian States Finances study done in 2002 observed that fiscal performance of the state and local governments are not regularly monitored and recorded. "For several states, compilation

of final accounts for the period since the mid-1990 is only now being carried out. In some states, available data on actual fiscal outcomes covers only part of the fiscal year and the assessment of long term trends and their implications is thus not possible. A key imperative is to reform budgeting and financial management at the state government level. According to the World Bank's Nigerian States Finances study done in 2002, the reforms should include strengthening the framework for financial data management and reporting, addressing the vulnerability to oil price shocks through adoption of medium-term expenditure framework), strengthening internal control mechanisms, instituting transparent and competitive procurement processes and building human capacity to prepare, implement and monitor financial operations

4.3 Public expenditure and revenue issues in the Draft Interim Paper

One major challenge of fiscal federalism is the development of a rallying medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) along which federal, state and local governments would tie their public expenditure and budgeting. The draft I-PRSP acknowledges the relevance and value of medium-term expenditure framework (projections of government revenues and expenditures within a medium-term context) as a suitable approach for aligning the budget process with the priorities and programmes under the national PRSP process. While there exists no MTEF for Nigeria presently, concerted efforts are currently made by the relevant authorities (Federal Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Nigeria, National Planning Commission, etc) to prepare fiscal projections to align budgeting, expenditure priorities and programme choices within the context of NEEDS. The draft I-PRSP had already stressed the urgency to carry out an MTEF exercise for the Federal Government, following which the state governments will be encouraged to do so. Also, the Draft Interim Paper envisages regular public expenditure reviews to strengthen budgetary management and performance monitoring in regard to the MDGs. It also provides that existing public expenditure reforms such as the monetisation of fringe benefits, accountability, transparency, observance of due process and cost-effectiveness in public expenditures would be reinforced under the PRSP process. The strategies in the I-PRSP are not yet costed, since it constitutes an agenda for the full PRSP. However, budgetary and costing aspects of the PRSP would have to take into account changes in revenue distribution across the tiers of government likely to be effected with the enactment of the new revenue allocation formula.

5. Alignment of Donor Policies and Resources with the PRSP

Since Nigeria does not yet have a PRSP, it is difficult to assess whether donors are aligning their policies and programmes with it. However, preliminary insights from the technical and financial support given to the PRSP process by multilateral and bilateral donors indicate the donors may be willing to harmonise their programmes with the PRSP policies.

Generally, there has been a renewed donor interest in Nigeria since the return to civilian democratic rule in 1999, as reflected by a resurgence of programmes aimed to reduce poverty. Specifically, donor support for the IPRSP process in Nigeria has been considerable and diverse. They include financial grants to the PRSP Secretariat to organize workshops, meetings and stakeholder interactive sessions. The Federal Office of Statistics – a key institution providing data and information for the PRSP – has been conducting pilot poverty diagnostic surveys

using newer modules such as the Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire and the Nigerian Living Standards Survey. The Nigerian Rural Development Strategy – a key component embedded in the Draft Interim Paper was developed through technical and financial assistance from international development partners. Despite government's avowed commitment to NAPEP, the programme has received scanty donor support. Donors therefore miss an opportunity to buy-in into a nationally driven poverty alleviation programme and boost its impact on the poor.

Harmonizing donor strategies and policies is imperative for effective aid delivery (OECD, 2003). In recognition of this need, the donor community in Nigeria has for some time now pooled resources and efforts in a coordinated and complementary manner to avoid duplication and maximize the impact of international development programmes on the poor. Donor coordination and pooling of resources to achieve complementation are evident in the support for several programmes. Some of them are the policy support facility for Agriculture and Rural Development, the National Working Groups Initiative on Competitiveness and Private Sector Growth, periodic donors' meeting whereby donors interact and share and review information and approaches, discuss cooperation and complementation possibilities and arrangements.

These examples notwithstanding, there remains a large scope for greater donor coordination and pooling of resources in Nigeria. Joint learning, sharing of experiences and co-financing mechanisms and common strategic thinking are coordination imperatives that need to be strengthened. Donor programmes and interventions should be subjected to stakeholder scrutiny and revised accordingly to rhyme with local priorities and needs. Donor programmes should be integral elements of overall global responses to Nigeria's growth and development constraints and opportunities. The constraints posed to donor coordination by differential planning cycles need to be overcome by some flexible approaches.

An important constraint to the impact of donor programmes is the post-intervention sustainability risks. National institutions and capacities are often not adequately mobilised to continue project implementation in the post-donor period. The projects often lose momentum and shape following the end of donor support, thereby undermining gains already achieved. Local funding constraints and institutional capacity problems are blamed for this relapse. Many local authorities link the inability to replicate and sustain the demonstration effects of donor-projects to the inability to match the financial muscle usually associated with the donor projects.

6. Capacity Building

There seems to be considerable capacity in the various government ministries and departments and in the central planning agency – the National Planning Commission – for policymaking, monitoring and evaluation. Existing capacity for economic policymaking at the state government level is much weaker and linked to this is that the State Planning Commissions (SPCs) are not given due visibility and space in policymaking and strategy formulation. Capacity building in economic policymaking, through seminars, workshops, training and orientation is needed at the State Government level to improve upgrade and update skills and competencies and foster understanding and appreciation of data and statistics, economic and sector policy analysis, monitoring, coordination and evaluation.

It is also important to extend capacity building to the Planning, Research and Statistics (PResS) departments of government ministries at both the federal and state levels. The PResS departments occupy a key role in policymaking, monitoring, coordination and evaluation within the parent Ministry and their capacities and abilities impact significantly on policies.

Economic and social data and statistics are indispensable for effective policies, hence the poor state of data and statistics is the principal drawback on the policy process in Nigeria. The capabilities of Planning, Research and Statistics departments in the various ministries are heavily undermined by institutional and coordination problems within the government. Consequently, existing capacities of PResS departments in the various ministries are largely under-utilised. Data collection and reporting by most PResS departments is inefficient and disjointed, thereby weakening their impact on the policymaking and strategy formulation processes in the various Ministries. It is therefore imperative to revamp the PResS departments in Federal and State Ministries through institutional strengthening and upgrading of the human resources. What is needed now is the revitalisation of the PResS departments in Federal and State Ministries to assume their rightful roles in policy-making, monitoring, coordination and evaluation. Staff motivation and re-tooling is needed to update skills in data collection, analysis and reporting and improve organisational efficiency and impact. Institutional space should be opened up to enable PRS departments to function as in-house policy think tanks within the Ministries and provide sound advice to decision-makers based on objective analysis.

The National Planning Commission and the State Planning Commissions are statutory machineries established to undertake policy coordination, monitoring and evaluation at the federal government and state government levels respectively. However, the National Planning Commission undertakes dual policy coordination roles – horizontal coordination among federal government institutions and vertical coordination between federal and state governments. Its vertical coordination role is done on the platforms of the National Economic Council (consisting of the President and State Governors) and the Joint Planning Board (consisting of the National Planning Commission and the State Planning Commissions). Curiously however, this statutory coordination machinery has not been harnessed for the PRSP process. This is because the government body implementing the PRSP process largely marginalized the NPC. Nonetheless, both the NPC and SPCs need to be strengthened to become more proactive in policy development. Mandatory reporting systems can be instituted or enforced to ensure that PResS departments of the various government ministries provide regular policy and programme monitoring feedback to the Planning Commissions. This will help to facilitate the coordination role of the National Planning Commission and make it more effective.

Institutional changes are necessary to make data collection, analysis and reporting for the monitoring and evaluation of poverty reduction policies more manageable, credible and effective. Presently, the Federal Office of Statistics seems overwhelmed by the sheer breadth and depth of functions. This is not surprising considering the acute shortage of resources available in the face of huge nation-wide economic and social data and statistics responsibilities. The FOS should be reformed to streamline and rationalise its roles and responsibilities. It is proposed that FOS focuses on collation, pooling, coordination roles and capacity building for

state and local government data officials.

The reforms should re-position FOS to coordinate and data and statistics through the development of national framework (standardisation, management) for data collection, analysis and reporting and dissemination of data and statistics nation-wide and play a key role in the formulation and implementation of national policies on data and statistics. Data collection should be decentralised or devolved to lower tiers of government (state and local) as a means to promote local ownership, transparency and accountability of the data collection process. Economic management, policy analysis and statistics institutions in the country (e.g. ASCON, NCEMA, FOS Training School, ARMTI, etc.) should be strengthened and re-positioned to provide relevant training and skills upgrading for policy officials of federal, state and local government officials, private sector and civil society. This is inconsistent with the calls by the I-PRSP for intensified efforts aimed at long-term capacity building in statistics compilation, standardisation, management and dissemination, for example the on-going work on the IMF's general data dissemination standard.

7. Lessons from the Nigerian PRSP Process

The PRSP holds great promise to enhance participatory, transparent, accountable and economic policymaking and development planning that are nationally owned, home grown and oriented to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. However, country circumstances impact heavily on the PRSP process, underscoring the need for country-specific adaptations. While the PRSP is justified by its merit as an innovative opportunity to achieve poverty reduction in the context of the MDG of halving poverty by 2015, its empirical state in Nigeria is poor due principally to mishandling of the process. The fact that it has taken two-and-half years (February 2001-August 2003) to produce a draft I-PRSP has not yet been endorsed by Government reflects the unimpressive state of the PRSP process in Nigeria.

Lack of integration of the PRSP process into the mainstream political process, poor supervision and monitoring of PRSP process by the political authorities and weak policy coordination (vertical and horizontal) are some of the factors responsible for the implementation problems of the PRSP process. The transfer of the responsibility for the PRSP process away from the core government statutory economic policymaking, coordination and monitoring institution (the National Planning Commission) to the Economic Policy Coordinating Committee Secretariat created fundamental distortions running the course of the implementation. By virtue of its statutory mandate, the NPC is the technical and organisational hub of the constitutionally enshrined policy coordination platforms for harmonising and aligning Federal and State policies and strategies – the National Economic Council and the Joint Planning Board. This NPC machinery could have easily been deployed for the PRSP process. In contrast, the government office implementing the PRSP process – the EPCC – does not have the statutory mandate and institutional resources to execute the huge coordination challenges of the PRSP process.

The Nigerian experience shows that the potentials of the PRSP vehicle for effective pro-poor policymaking and strategy development can be seriously undermined by vertical and horizontal policy coordination problems. It has also revealed the need to address the weak economic

policymaking at the lower tiers of government and to leverage their constitutional autonomy and concurrent poverty-reduction responsibilities to engender locally owned poverty reduction policies within the national PRSP context. In Nigeria, the PRSP process appears to be largely overwhelmed by a lack of supportive political and policy environment. Lack of close supervision and monitoring of the PRSP process by higher political authorities and poor feedback from the implementing body is perhaps one reflection of the low level of political commitment and poor national ownership. Addressing fundamental political and policy constraints that negatively impact the PRSP process is a logical imperative if the benefits of the PRSP process are to materialise. This requires highest levels of political commitment lacked by the PRSP process.

Nigeria's federal structure portends positive or negative implications for the PRSP process depending on how ingeniously it is handled. On the positive side, the PRSP process can leverage constitutional autonomy and concurrent poverty-reducing responsibilities of state governments to engender locally owned poverty reduction strategy within the national PRSP framework. This has potentials to ensure genuine local ownership, accountability, transparency and effective monitoring. On the other hand, negative impacts can come from the legitimate exercise of political autonomy in poverty reduction policies by state governments, especially when there are run by a political party other than that at the federal level. This potential negative influence can be addressed through extensive preparations for the PRSP process including inter-party consultations and coalitions, social mobilisation, consensus building leading to shared understanding and appreciation of a national poverty reduction framework.

The Nigerian PRSP process has also elicited the scope for strengthening civil society (non-governmental organisations, private sector organisations, community-based organisations) to increase their capabilities for organisation, economic policy advocacy and engagement with government and stakeholders on policy, reform and development issues. One of the criticisms of the PRSP process in Nigeria is the low level of participation of the civil society (the private sector, NGOs, CBOs). The low participation can be traced to two factors. One is the poor capacity of the PRSP implementing body to organise stakeholder participatory processes in economic policymaking and development planning. Two is the poor civil society capabilities for economic policy advocacy, public-private policy dialogue and holding government accountable. To effectively deal with the problem of poor orientation and low capacity of civil society for evidence-based policy advocacy, a systematic capacity building agenda to strengthen them should be integrated into the PRSP process. Such agenda would open up space for genuine civil society participation in policy processes, increase national confidence, reduce public scepticism, enhance public debate and a shared stakeholder understanding of policy and reform issues that underpin the PRSP process. Improving the quality of data collection/analysis and establishing efficient systems for monitoring poverty is necessary. Government stakeholders in private sector and civil society need to establish a demand-driven poverty monitoring system.

The fact that the Government is articulating another development strategy, NEEDS, can be interpreted in several ways. One, the Government is dissatisfied with the handling of the PRSP process and therefore has lost confidence in it. Two, the Government has learnt some lessons from the PRSP process and is determined to embark on a strategy with a separate identity that avoids the pitfalls of the PRSP process. Whatever the interpretation, it is obvious that had the PRSP

process enjoyed high levels of political commitment from within the federal and state governments, it would have been difficult if not politically inexpedient to abandon for another process.

It has been indicated that the NEEDS would incorporate the draft I-PRSP. Yet the PRSP Secretariat has not been officially asked to terminate its work. Also, the ease with which the PRSP process is being subsumed into NEEDS (by the same government that initiated the PRSP) reflects a lack of political commitment to and a lack of national ownership of the PRSP process in Nigeria. Nonetheless, the myriad political, institutional and policy constraints, and weaknesses that plague the PRSP process remain valid today, and the NEEDS process is not immune to them. The lesson from the PRSP process in Nigeria is intuitive and cogent. What seems to be a failure of the PRSP process in Nigeria ironically reveals the strength of the PRSP process – that if not sensitive and adapted to country circumstances, it suffers risks of sustainability, ownership and credibility. Hence, effective economic policymaking and development planning in Nigeria will remain elusive unless the underlying political, institutional and policy inhibitions are tackled in fundamental ways.

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ANNEX 1a

DEPTH AND SEVERITY OF POVERTY IN NIGERIA (1980-1996)

	1980		1985		1992		1996	
	Depth	Severity	Depth	Severity	Depth	Severity	Depth	Severity
National	0.160	0.080	0.352	0.169	0.384	0.202	0.358	0.207
Urban	0.135	0.062	0.319	0.144	0.359	0.180	0.356	0.206
Rural	0.162	0.081	0.367	0.180	0.397	0.213	0.359	0.207
M-headed	0.151	0.071	0.352	0.169	0.380	0.198	0.361	0.209
F-headed	0.234	0.156	0.350	0.167	0.425	0.237	0.329	0.186
Size of HH								
1 nos.	0.076	0.021	0.139	0.034	0.601	0.507	0.214	0.097
2-4	0.077	0.026	0.241	0.091	0.293	0.134	0.286	0.147
5-9	0.135	0.058	0.332	0.149	0.355	0.176	0.369	0.214
10-20	0.175	0.084	0.409	0.215	0.442	0.247	0.431	0.276
20+	0.511	0.421	0.634	0.460	0.649	0.450	0.581	0.425
No Educ	0.165	0.081	0.364	0.178	0.390	0.208	0.376	0.221
Primary	0.142	0.067	0.327	0.148	0.381	0.194	0.328	0.184
Sec	0.183	0.114	0.287	0.123	0.368	0.193	0.320	0.178
Post-Sec	0.108	0.042	0.318	0.154	0.328	0.165	0.308	0.164

Source: FOS (1999) Poverty Profile for Nigeria

ANNEX 1b

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION ACCORDING TO UPPER AND LOWER POVERTY LINES (% HEADCOUNT)

	1980	1985	1992	1996
National				
Non-poor	72.8	53.7	57.3	34.4
Moderately poor	21.0	34.2	28.9	36.3
Core poor	6.2	12.1	13.9	29.3
Urban				
Non-poor	82.8	62.2	62.5	41.6
Moderately poor	14.2	30.3	26.8	33.0
Core poor	3.0	7.5	10.7	25.2
Rural				
Non-poor	71.7	48.6	54.0	30.7
Moderately poor	21.8	36.6	30.2	38.2
Core poor	6.5	14.8	15.8	31.6
Male-headed				
Non-poor	70.8	52.7	56.9	33.6
Moderately poor	19.5	35.1	29.6	36.7
Core poor	9.7	12.2	13.5	29.8
Female-headed				
Non-poor	73.1	61.4	60.1	41.5
Moderately poor	21.2	27.7	23.0	33.5
Core poor	5.8	10.9	16.9	25.0

Source: FOS (1999) Poverty Profile for Nigeria

ANNEX 2

A SAMPLE OF NIGERIAN ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMMES AND STRATEGIES

Sector or Targeting Approach	Programme/Project	Aims and activities
Multi-sectoral	Directorate of Food., Roads, and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) established 1986 but <u>now defunct</u>	Financing construction and rehabilitation of rural infrastructure - roads, water supply, earth dams and rural electrification to improve rural <u>employment, productivity and incomes</u>
	National Directorate of Employment established 1987 and on-going	Responsible for vocational skills development and enterprise development (agriculture, manufacturing, artisans, services) designed to <u>combat unemployment and alleviate poverty</u>
	Family Economic and Advancement Programme (FEAP) established 1992 but <u>now defunct</u>	Provision of credit for enterprise development at the grassroots, development and utilisation of indigenous technology and local raw materials
	National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) established 2000	Implements nation-wide employment creation and poverty eradication schemes covering agriculture and food security, water resources, energy, health care, gender, industry, environment, transport and shelter, communication, education, recreation and public facilities and coordinates poverty-alleviation related activities of all the relevant Ministries, Parastatals and Agencies. It embodies strategies for the eradication of existing absolute poverty in Nigeria through the streamlining and rationalisation of existing poverty alleviation institutions and coordinated implementation and monitoring of relevant schemes and programmes <u>at all levels of government.</u>
	Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC) established 1987 <u>and still on-going</u>	Develop and promote the sourcing and use of local raw materials in various sectors - health, agriculture, manufacturing, etc.
	Community Action Programme for Poverty Alleviation (CAPPA) - being implemented at the state government level, since 1996	Improving the living conditions of the poor through targeted cost-effective demand-driven programmes of skills enhancement, productivity-increasing projects and projects to improve health, food security and nutritional practices

Sectoral (Agriculture)	River Basin Development Authorities established 1976, still on-going but has undergone restructuring	Carry out development of land and water resources, land preparation, irrigation development, construction of dams, boreholes, roads, input distribution, food production and improvements in agricultural infrastructure and <u>technology dissemination</u>
	Strategic Grain Reserve Scheme established in 1988 <u>and still in place</u>	Stabilizes food supplies, ensures food security and safeguards farmer incomes
	Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme established 1978 and still in <u>place</u>	To encourage banks to increase lending to agriculture, reduce creditor risks through guarantees by the Central Bank of Nigeria
	Operation Feed the Nation programme established in 1976 but now defunct	Increase food production through mass mobilisation for and participation in farming, subsidies on fertiliser, livestock inputs, fisheries <u>and seeds, etc.</u>
	The Green Revolution programme - The National Food Production Plan <u>established in 1980</u>	Increased food production and productivity through government direct and indirect involvement in agricultural production using <u>RBDAs as major channels of implementation</u>
	Agricultural Development Projects established in 1975 as enclave models and now covering all states of the federation as state-wide specialised agricultural <u>extension agencies</u>	Carry out agricultural information and technology and dissemination, agricultural extension, capacity building of farmers to improve sustainable agricultural productivity and incomes
	National Agricultural Land Development Authority established in 1992 but its functions now transferred to the Federal Department of <u>Rural Development</u>	Provide land development services, promote optimal soil management and utilisation of rural land resources and support economic-size farm holdings
	Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural Development Bank established in 2000	Provision of credit for production, processing and marketing of agricultural products. It is the product of merger of Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative Bank, Family Economic Advancement Programme and the Peoples Bank of Nigeria
Sectoral (Health and Population)	National Primary Health Care programme established in 1990 and <u>still in place</u>	Provide preventive and primary health delivery at the local community level
	Guinea worm eradication programme established in 1988	Provide services towards the eradication of guinea worm infections
	Expanded Programme on <u>Immunisation</u>	Provides immunisation against the killer child <u>diseases</u>
	Roll Back Malaria <u>established in 2001</u>	Provide malaria preventive and curative services
	HIV/AIDS programme established in 2001	Provide information, advocacy, enlightenment, preventive and management services related to <u>HIV/AIDS</u>
	Population Activities Fund Agency established in 1990	Promote sound population growth and <u>managemenet</u>

Sectoral (Education)	Universal Primary Education established in 1975 but now defunct	Provision of free primary education
	National Commission for Nomadic Education established in 1989 and still in place	Provide basic education for nomadic herdsmen and fishermen
	Universal Basic Education established in 2000 and still on-going	Provide compulsory free basic education up to the junior secondary school level
	National Commission for Mass Literacy established in 1997 but functions now transferred to the Universal Basic Education Programme	Promote and coordinate adult literacy projects and activities
Sectoral (Finance)	Peoples Bank of Nigeria (PBN) established in 1989 but functions now absorbed into the new Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank	Provision of credit at low interest to encourage micro enterprises
	Community Banking Programme established in 1991 and still in place	Provide banking services to the grassroots through community ownership and implementation of user-friendly and low-income adaptable financial intermediation
Sectoral (Transport)	National Urban Mass Transit Programme	Provide services to ease the transport problems of urban dwellers
Group-Specific (Women and Children)	Family Support Programme established in 1994 but now defunct	Provision of micro-credit for women entrepreneurs and to promote women's productivity, incomes and child welfare
	Better Life for Rural Women established in 1987 but now defunct	Improving welfare and incomes of women through enterprise development, productivity enhancement and skills development
Poor area - targeted programmes	Oil Mineral Producing and Areas Development Commission whose functions have been taken over by the Niger Delta Development Commission	Provide services to improve living conditions, employment and reduce poverty in the oil-producing areas of the country devastated by long years of oil exploration leading to loss of livelihoods, resource and environmental degradation

ANNEX 3

NIGERIA—OVERVIEW OF MAJOR STEPS PRECEDING THE COMPLETION OF THE NATIONAL I-PRSP

1. February 2001: Inauguration of the initial nation-wide consultative body on the PRSP exercise (namely, the 46-member “National Core Team”), at the end of a kick-off workshop financed largely by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID).
2. April 2001: Discussions on the PRSP exercise at meetings of the inter-ministerial group of Federal Government senior officials, with senior officials of the World Bank Office in Abuja.
3. April-July 2001: Discussions on the PRSP exercise at meetings of the inter-agency EPCC, of which the Chairman is His Excellency the Vice-President, who is accordingly in overall supervision of the national PRSP project in Nigeria.
4. July-Aug. 2001: Drafting sessions on a preliminary draft interim poverty reduction strategy paper (I-PRSP), by a team of experts from academia, the public sector, NGOs, and the private sector, with overall coordination by the Secretariat of the EPCC.
5. Aug.-early Sept. 2001: Discussions on the preliminary draft IPRSP by an inter-agency (inter-ministerial) body of Federal Government officials in the form of the technical subcommittee of the EPCC.
6. Sept. 2001: Completion of the preliminary draft of the I-PRSP.
7. Sept. 2001: Circulation by the EPCC Chairman, of the preliminary draft of the national IPRSP, to all the Governors of the thirty-six States in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as well as to all Federal Ministers, and other major internal stakeholders.
8. Sept. 2001: A stakeholders workshop on mainstreaming environmental factors in poverty reduction planning, took place in Abuja, under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Environment, with financial support from the World Bank, the DFID, and the IFAD.
9. October 2001: Final revision was done on the preliminary draft of the I-PRSP.
10. October 2001: Circulation of the revised preliminary draft of the I-PRSP to all major internal stakeholders as well as to Abuja-based representatives of the external development partners.
11. November 2001: Discussions and comments on the revised preliminary I-PRSP at an informal donors meeting in Brussels, convened under the auspices of the World Bank and the EU.

12. December 2001: Establishment of the Federal Government's inter-agency Guidance Committee on the PRSP process, led by the Secretariat of the EPCC, the other members of the committee being senior-level officials from the Office of the Principal Secretary to the President, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Commission, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Debt Management Office, and the Secretariat of the NAPEP.
13. December 2001: Commencement of regular technical-level discussion meetings on Nigeria's PRSP process between the Guidance Committee on the PRSP process and Abuja-based representatives of the international development partners.
14. February 2001: Convening in Abuja, of the first all-stakeholders national workshop on Nigeria's PRSP process, based partly on the preliminary draft of the IPRSP, and with financial support by the USAID.
15. April 2002: Retreat (in Lokoja, Nigeria) between Abuja-based representatives of the development partners and senior Nigerian Federal Government officials (including the PRSP Guidance Committee members) and others, to discuss the way forward in the Nigerian PRSP process (with financial support from the DFID and the World Bank).
16. May 2002: EPCC Secretariat provided briefing on the PRSP process for a number of committee members from the Nigerian National Assembly. Similarly for representatives of the news media.
17. June 2002: Presentations in Abuja on PRSP issues, for members of the Guidance Committee on Nigeria's PRSP process, by visiting staff members of the IMF, together with IMF senior resident representative in Nigeria.
18. June 2002: EPCC secretariat's briefing on the PRSP process for State Governors, under the auspices of the National Economic Council, chaired by His Excellency the Vice-President.
19. June 2002: Convening of the first all-Governors Forum on the national PRSP process, chaired by His Excellency the Vice-President (with financial support from USAID).
20. July 2002: Convening of the first all State Governments' technical-level forum on Nigeria's PRSP process, in the form of two-day interactive discussions in Abuja between state governments' permanent secretary-level officials in charge of poverty eradication issues, and members of the PRSP Guidance Committee and others.
21. August 2002: Commencement of submission of nominations for non-Federal Government representatives in the expanded nation-wide deliberations body in the form of the NFPP, consisting presently of 110 members from all the three tiers of government in the federation, as well as from civil society organizations, the business sector, and representatives of the external development partners.
22. Sept. 2002: Convening of an interactive participation session on Nigeria's national PRSP process, with representatives of the business community (with financial support from the DFID), hosted by His Excellency the Vice-President.
23. October 2002: Technical-level discussions in Washington on the new (essentially skeletal) draft national IPRSP for Nigeria, between members of Nigeria's PRSP Guidance Committee and staff of the IMF and the World Bank.

24. November 2002: Interactive participation session (in Abuja) on Nigeria's PRSP, with representatives of civil society organizations and the labour unions (with financial support from the DFID and the UNDP), hosted by His Excellency the Vice-President.
25. November 2002: Completion of technical work on the new draft IPRSP.
26. November 2002: Circulation of the new draft IPRSP to the members of the EPCC, Federal Ministers, State Governors, Legislators, and other stakeholders.
27. Dec. 2002 – Feb. 2003: Inflows and Review of stakeholders' comments on the new draft I-PRSP, including informal comments by representatives of the international development partners.
28. End-Dec. 2002: Publication of Public Information Handbook on Nigeria's PRSP process.
29. Jan. – Feb. 2003: Distribution of PRSP Publication Handbook to various stakeholders nation-wide, in the public sector, within civil society, and in the diplomatic community.
30. February 2003: Mobilisation of I-PRSP-related comments from various stakeholders
31. March 2003: Completion of revised draft of the I-PRSP
32. March-April 2003: Circulation of the revised draft I-PRSP to stakeholders
33. May-July 2003: Inflows from stakeholders of comments on the revised draft I-PRSP
34. August 2003: Stakeholders retreat in Kaduna for review and revision of revised draft I-PRSP
35. August 2003: Completion of new revised draft I-PRSP by the drafting team and submission of the draft to the Government.

ANNEX 4**Nigeria – Plan for the Production of National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), May 2003 - June 2004**

Actions or Activities	Objectives	Participants	Deadline
Establishment of zonal working groups (ZOWOGs) for follow-up work on zone-specific issues in the PRSP process (including zonal public-education workshops)	Have in place sufficiently strong and adequately broad-based arrangements for managing the PRSP process, such that all stakeholders in the 6 geopolitical zones of the country are given the opportunity to be actively involved in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of anti-poverty strategies and programmes.	(Sector experts, PRSP Guidance Committee members, NFPP members, academics, civil society members, and mass media groups, in collaboration with the external development partners.	May 2003
Formation of working groups or taskforces on key issues in the poverty situation in Nigeria -- such as the environment, social conflict, gender, and the informal sector.			May 2003
(i) Detailed identification of information gaps.	To develop a sound and reasonably detailed information base for decision-making on the PRSP process in Nigeria, including performance monitoring and evaluation.	(i) Sector groups, working with PRSP Guidance Committee members, including officials from the Federal Office of Statistics	May 2003
(ii) Convening a National Workshop to discuss and evaluate capacity constraints and skills development programmes, on the monitoring and evaluation of performance under the PRSP & the MDGs.		(ii) NFPP members, sector experts, civil society members, and the external development partners.	June 2003

Actions and Activities	Objective	Participants	Deadline
Developing plans for filling in identified information gaps in the PRSP/MDG process.	To develop a sound and reasonably detailed information base for decision-making on the PRSP process in Nigeria, including performance monitoring and evaluation	Sector groups within the NFPP, and with (i) above	June 2003
Information development (Research, Issues-focused Analysis, etc.)		Sector experts, the NFPP members, (including FOS officials), external development partners, etc	July 2003
Reviewing available analytical outputs on poverty and identifying additional needed research work.		- ditto -	August 2003
Detailed Poverty Assessment on Nigeria, including a household expenditure survey.		- ditto -	March 2004
(Zonal workshops and seminars	Preparation of the full PRSP document.	(i) NFPP members & others other interested parties.	August 2003
(Compilation of findings from zonal and other interactive participation workshops		(ii) NFPP members and the drafting team on PRSP.	August 2003
(Preparation of first draft PRSP and circulation to stakeholder groups (including legislative and judiciary arms of the Federal Government as well as State and Local governments).		NFPP Members & all other interested parties	September 2003
Compilation and review of feedbacks, and preparation for 2 nd All-Stakeholders Workshop on the National PRSP			November 2003

Actions and Activities	Objective	Participants	Deadline
Convening of 2 nd All-Stakeholders Workshop on the National PRSP process.	Finalization of the full PRSP document	NFPP Members & all other interested parties.	December 2003
Revision of the draft full National PRSP in light of comments by participants at the 2nd All-stakeholders National Workshop, and by other interested parties.		NFPP Members & all other interested parties.	February 2004
Review meetings on the revised draft National PRSP with representatives of key stakeholders (including the external development partners).		Representatives of key stakeholders (including the external development partners).	March 2004
Completion of technical-level work on the PRSP		-ditto-	May 2004
Issuance of PRSP by FGN Authorities.		Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)	June 2004

Source: Draft Interim Paper on National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, August 2003.

ANNEX 5a

LIST OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTACTED/INTERVIEWED

Professor Charles C. Soludo, Chief Economic Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chief Executive Officer, National Planning Commission, Abuja.

Dr. F. L. Osunsade, Macroeconomic Adviser and Secretary, Economic Policy Coordinating Committee, Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja.

Mrs. C. Ikpechukwu, Assistant Director (MACRO) – PRSP, Macroeconomic Analysis Department, National Planning Commission, Abuja.

Kenneth O. Kwujeli, Senior Planning Officer, formerly of the Poverty Alleviation Unit, Macroeconomic Department (but presently in the International Cooperation Department), both of the National Planning Commission, Abuja.

Mojisola Babalola, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.

Professor C. P. E. Omaliko, Executive Director, National Biotechnology Development Agency Abuja.

Mrs. V. Agu, National Coordinator, Women-in-Agriculture, Projects Coordinating Unit Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Abuja.

Mr. Francis Aninye, National Directorate of Employment, Asaba, Delta State, Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity.

Mr. Friday Ohuche, National Planning Commission, Abuja.

ANNEX 5b

LIST OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND OFFICIALS CONTACTED/INTERVIEWED

Otite Igbuzor, Center for Democracy and Development, Lagos.

Wisdom Durueke, Centre for Constitutionalism, Peace and Advocacy, Owerri.

Onyukwu E. Onyukwu, Human Security and Peace (HUSEP), Enugu.

Isaac Obasi, Programme Officer, Social Science Academy of Nigeria, Abuja.

Elizabeth Anyakoha, Home Economics Research Association, c/o University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Christian Onyemenam, Nigerian Economic Summit Group Limited by Guarantee, Lagos.

Innocent Azih, Nigerian Economic Summit Group Limited by Guarantee, Lagos.

Peter Okoye, Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria, Enugu.

A. Folorunsho, Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria, Lagos.

Ayodele Olusola, National Centre for Economic Management and Administration, Ibadan.

ANNEX 5c

FOCUS GROUP OF STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DISCUSSING THE NIGERIAN PRSP

S/no	Name	Designation	Address/Station
1.	Renner B. Tiebiri	Perm. Sec	Min. of Fin & Econ. Planning, Yenagoa
2.	J.S. Mayauge	Perm. Sec	Min. of Finance & Econ. Planning, Benue
3.	George Edeh	Perm. Sec	Min. of Women Affairs & Soc. Dev., Makurdi
4.	Bassey Ema	Rep. Perm. Sec.	Min. of WASW, Uyo, Akwaibom
5.	Ukaegbu, E. O	PM [PME]	Abia SPC, Umuahia
6.	Eke, S. E.	Rep. SSG	SSG's office, Umuahia
7.	Chief Hope Onyekwme	Perm. Sec./ES	Abia State planning
8.	Suowari, R.	Perm. Sec	Min. of Women Affairs, Yenagoa
9.	Chibuzo, B. Obinna	Asst. PM, PME	Imo State Planning & Econ.
10.	Chioma Okafor	Perm. Sec	SSG's Office, Enugu
11.	Ezenwa Amanze	SPMA	UNDP, Owerri, Imo State
12.	Mbam P.O	SPMA	UNDP, Ebonyi State
13.	Agbalaka, J. E	Perm. Sec	Office of the SSG, Awka
14.	Nwokeabia, K. B. C	Perm. Sec	Min. of Women Affairs, Awka
15.	Ishmael J. Akpan	PM/PME	External, Coordinating Unit, Uyo
16.	Okenwa C.E.O	Perm. Sec	Min. of Women Affairs, Enugu
17.	Omogo	CPO, SSG	ECA SSG's Office
18.	Amaefule Ben. O.	GAD Officer	Min. of Women Affairs, --- *
19.	Dan Collins	Dir. [Planning]/PM [PME]	Min. of Budget & Econ. Planning, --*
20.	Umeobi, A. O	Head Planning	Min. of Plg. & Econ. Dev., Awka
21.	Azi B.U	PM/PME	Min. of Plg. & Econ. Dev., Awka
22.	Egwu, D. Y	PM/PME	SPC, Calabar
23.	Umah, G. N.	PM/PME	Imo State, SPC
24.	Mgbebu, B.A.	Exec. Sec.	SPC, Ebonyi State
25.	Obichukwu, Ngozi	PM/PME	SPC, Ebonyi State
26.	Otanwa, B. A.	PM/PME	Min. of Finance & Planning ---*
27.	Otuku Oruks	PM/PME	Min. of Fin. & Econ. Planning, Bayelsa State
28.	Uchime, P.C.C	Perm. Sec	Min. of Finance, Anambra
29.	Ohili, P. O.	Ag.D [PRS]	Min. of Finance, ----*
30.	Innocent Adie	Perm. Sec	State Planning, Calabar
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32.	Nwangwu, M. O.	D.O.P Planning Com.	Enugu State Planning commission
33.	Ukwu, B. C.	D.D Statistics	Enugu State Planning commission
34.	Odo, P. C.	PM/PME	SPC, Enugu
35.	Njoku, W. N. C.	C. P. Officer	SPC, Enugu
36.	Eneje, O. Peter	Perm. Sec.	State Economic Planning Comm.
37.	Owo, Esheya	Perm Sec.	M.Owa-SD, Abakaliki
38.	Chukwuocha, C. C.	Director	SSG's office ----*
39.	Inyang, A. Udo	Asst. Dir.	Min. of Finance ----
40.	Ugwu, D. C.	P. Off/EGC	SPC, Enugu
41.	Mbah, J. U.	P.O/Facilitator	SPC, Enugu
42.	Dokubo, A. C.	Per. Sec.	Min. of Bud. & Econ., Rivers State
43.	Ellis Idemobi	Prog. Adviser	UNDP, Anambra State
44.	Ochor, G. O. [Mrs.]	Director Finance	Min. of Finance, Umuahia
45.	Chikezie, N. E	Perm. Sec.	MWASD, Umuahia
46.	Atu, F. C.	Accountant	SPC, Enugu

* These state government officials were attending a UNICEF-sponsored Workshop on Social Sector in Nigeria, held in Enugu.