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## Background Paper 1

### ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

#### **MULTI-TRACK TOOLS INDICATORS AND MEANS AND SOURCES OF VERIFICATION FOR PROGRAMME SPECIFIC MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

**BY**

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**Paper prepared for the Workshop on the theme "Indicators for  
Monitoring Progress Towards Good Governance<sup>2/</sup> in Africa",  
20-22 September, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

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<sup>2/</sup> Governance, State and "Civil Society" are defined by their paradoxical relation to each other. Hence, political and economic governance and their role in sustainable human development have been seen as contentious issues with the expansion of civic space in the period now popularly known as the post-Cold War. While every effort has been made to avoid judgmental prescriptions, the views expressed in this resource paper and keynote address are not necessarily those of the UNDP or any UN organisation the author is affiliated to.

## IS GOVERNANCE EVALUABLE?

### *Concepts, analytical limitations, and tools, indicators and means and sources of verification in evaluating political and economic governance*

Berhe T. Costantinos, PhD

*Multi-track tools, indicators and means and sources of verification for programme specific monitoring and evaluation presented to the workshop on governance indicators organised by the Development Management Division, Economic Commission for Africa. September 21-23, 1999, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*

### **Summary**

Political transitions are initiated at three levels: state led transitions, civil society initiated and led transitions and combinations of state led and society led transitions. Three main strategic and processual issues are usually considered in the study and analysis of democratic transitions. These are marked by (1) the presence of "objective conditions for political transition" in the socio-economic structures; (2) contingent political dynamics and (3) democratisation depends upon the emergence of supportive set of rules and political institutions. The monitoring, criteria, and indicators including their means and sources of verification therefore become uncommonly complex. Hence, the paper does not prescribe indicators for monitoring governance. Neither does it profess that governance is monitorable or lends itself to conventional log-frame evaluation in the first place. The complexity of issues to be monitored in governance make it practically impossible to pin down indicators for an entire society. This is tantamount to designing a social engineering programme never heard of since the Bolshevik revolution.

Notwithstanding the above, this work articulates the concepts, analytical and operational limitations, tools and protocols for monitoring political and economic governance as perceived from the trimolecular economic, security, and development agenda of the 1990's. It examines economic and political governance monitoring from the angle of the conscious management of regimes with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of political authority. It is the applied realm of politics, in which political actors seek mechanisms to convert political preferences into the management of regimes. While the governance-democracy interface and *continuum* is underpinned, democratisation is uniquely distinguished as a process of rule making in which citizens obtain opportunities for political contestation and political participation.

The proliferation of governance indicators is more of the duplicitous 'academic' thirst for one rather than a feasibility to meaningfully evaluate governance. The paper is focussed on multi-track communication<sup>3</sup> tools for national protagonists to be able to develop indicators themselves reflecting local political, social, economic and cultural conditions. In this sense, indicators must fulfil the following criteria: they must be *validity, reliability, relevant, sensitive, specificity, cost effective, timeliness, simplicity, measurability, and verifiability*.

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<sup>3</sup> Costantinos, BT (1996) Multi-track communication for sustainable livelihoods programming manual for SL programme in Malawi. UNDP.

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#### Section I

### *A conceptual underpinning of governance and democratic development*

The complexities of political transition to good governance and the assumptions that are made based on perceived necessities or demand of societies and states are well beyond the scope of this paper. However, it would be necessary to deal briefly in trying to identify capacity building targets, the modalities, and sources of political transitions. Two aspects need to be considered.<sup>4</sup> Political transitions are initiated at three levels: state led transitions, civil society initiated and led transitions and combinations of state led and society led transitions. Three main strategic and processual issues are usually considered in the study and analysis of democratic transitions.<sup>5</sup> The first is the presence of *objective conditions for political transition* in the socio-economic structures. The second is contingent political dynamics -- good governance is installed as a result of the conscious reform initiatives of individual leaders, elite factions, and social movements. Thirdly, it depends upon the emergence of supportive set of rules and political, social, and economic institutions. This becomes a problematic to governance monitoring at the national level.

1. Because rules and institutions are recurrent and valued patterns of political behaviour that give shape and regularity to politics and society, their complexity cannot be captured at the national level unless of course one has to resort to the regimentation of society into 'manageable' units.<sup>6</sup>
2. In designing a monitoring system, indicators, means, and sources of verification for political and economic governance, an objective understanding if good governance can be evaluated and the extent or outcome of the process is important. If at all it is possible, it should focus on political rules and political institutions.<sup>7</sup> In this regard, it is also important to understand the complexity role of organised groups in civil society, the public sector, the press and media, external bilateral, multilateral agencies in supporting or constraining institutional development conducive to greater

<sup>4</sup> Global Coalition for Africa / Africa Leadership Forum. (1993). P. 9 The classification of the 'Trajectories of Political Transition' has been taken from ALF/GCA. "Research Design and Methodology". Paper prepared by Bratton, van de Walle.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> The relevant rules are those that promote democracy (political competition and political participation) and governance (administrative accountability, transparency and predictability). The required regulatory and administrative procedures to facilitate pluralistic expression and mobilisation, especially by institutions of civil society and non-governmental organisations. The need for, and nature of, electoral codes, and constitutional reform and legislative requirements include provisions and legislation to improve the quality of governance and reduce opportunities for corruption. In addition cultural and traditional dynamics, and the development of a political culture which takes cultural and traditional factors into account; and the origin and nature of the process of change and attitudes of political leadership, and consequent implications for the negotiation, design and management of the transition process;

openness and adherence to the rule of law. The question is then how could the state be accountable to its people and the international community consistently in varying contexts, but do so without resorting to a self - defeating, overly scripted and stage-managed political "play"? How could current governance transitions combine immediately programmed intentionality with a more open process-based purposefulness?

In presenting conceptual analysis to help answer this involved question, one needs to start by distinguishing between governance and democracy. Thus, in the absence of a widely open political space in which opposition parties of various ideological permutations are allowed to exist legally and to compete freely and peacefully for state power, free democratic elections cannot be held. Nor can formal constitution writing and satisfying efforts led by incumbent regimes and their intellectual supporters attain broad and deep legitimacy as democratic activities. Governing elite backed by foreign governments and

international agencies may lead political transitions in their countries by deploying particular strategies and organisational mechanisms. Yet, they often identify their particular democratisation goals, policies, and programmes with entire transition processes. One often finds also strategy undifferentiated from process in studies of democratisation in Africa. As against this must be maintained that any analysis of political reforms in Africa that takes the problems and potential of democratic change in the continent seriously must distinguish between strategic and processual dimensions of the change.

*A key distinction, which runs through much of in the history of political theory since Plato is between the stewardship and guiding/steering responsibilities of the state. Over centuries, these two images i.e. the shepherd and the helmsman - have been at the heart of many political controversies.*

It is easy to follow the current trend in Africa and within the international community and advocate good political governance as a desirable form of government for Africans. Nor is it difficult to make normative judgements about how African ruling strata should behave if democracy is to grow in the continent: *the state must be accountable to and controlled by the people.* But it is not so easy to conceptualise good governance as a working process which is balanced against strategy, to determine what makes for real, as opposed to vacuously formal, democratic process. This is particularly the case where ruling strata tend to view the relations of their particular political agendas with their broader governing roles and responsibilities as relatively simple and direct, unproblematically reducing the latter to the former.

As a way of contributing to the overcoming or lessening of these difficulties, we may theorise democratic transition as the dynamic interaction of strategy and process. It is possible to see state - civil society interaction as the playing out of objective and critical standards, rules and concepts of political conduct in the activities of all participants. Those of public officials who make and administer the rules as well as those of ordinary citizens whom will have to abide by the law. The issue here is not simply one of "application" of rules to particular activities, it is rather the production or articulation of process elements and forms within and through the strategic (and non-strategic) activities of various participants. Highlighting the mutually constitutive and regulative articulation of strategy and process, we shift the centre of analysis away from the two as separate formations that enter only as external relations with each other. This shift of analytical focus serves to emphasise the critical point that the task of broadly structuring governance as a political management system is more important. In other words, we should not promote it within the specific political programme of a particular government or ruling party; which may manifest itself in various of efforts ranging from constitution drafting efforts to convening elections.

operation field and affect the detailed articulation and implementation of aid policies by bilateral and multilateral development institutions.<sup>10</sup> The following may serve as useful guides in our understanding of democracy, democratisation, and political liberalisation.

1. Political liberalisation occurs when a governing elite grants or extends civil and political rights that had previously been denied. These rights may benefit individuals (such as rights of privacy, speech of movement) or social groups (such as freedom of association or assembly). Liberalisation is often deemed a political "opening", since it marks an important departure from the usual practices of an authoritarian government to liberalise the rules of the political game marks the onset of a political transition.
2. Governance is the conscious management of regimes with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of political authority. Governance can be thought of as the applied realm of politics, in which political actors seek mechanisms to convert political preferences into managing society. Good governance involves improvements in the technical competence and efficiency of the public sector as well as measures to make public policy more accountable, transparent, and predictable to society at large.
3. Democracy is a regime in which the authority to exercise power derives from the will of the people. At minimum, a democratic regime maximises opportunities for both political contestation and political participation. Political contestation refers to open rivalry and competition among diverse political interests. Political participation refers to the entitlement of citizens, considered as political equals, to be involved in choosing governmental leaders and policies. Democratisation is a process of rule making in which citizens obtain opportunities for political contestation and political participation. While no single set of rules by itself defines democracy, there is a procedural minimum which participants can agree upon as necessary elements.<sup>11</sup> Onset of democratisation, as opposed to mere liberalisation, is distinguished when the incumbent government calls competitive elections of genuinely uncertain outcome.

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The use of these definition is not a great leap of imagination into the different forms of societal change; but simply what's coming is the twisting the familiar slogan in terms that betray little in their meaning -- such as *governance*. Possibilities and problems of human development can be grasped in terms of the related domain of ideology. Ideological elements and constructs might be seen as the very constitutive structure of governance. Ideology will commonly be characterised by a number of distinctive and shared additional elements, including *concepts and rules of government, national and cultural values, traditions of political discourse and arguments, and modes of representation of specific interests, needs and issues*. These elements, or complexes of elements, will tend to assume varying forms and to enter shifting relations of competition, co-operation, and hegemony during political reform. Generally, the broader the range of ideological elements at play and the more varied and uncertain their relations, the greater the possibilities of process-oriented vision definition.

Obviously there would be a transition period to which the major foundations to which they are often tied more or less closely, transitional ideological constructs tend to be unsettled and, at times, unsettling. Particularly at the initial stages of transition, they are more likely to be uncertain rather than stable structures of ideas and values. This has the effect of opening up the reform process, of freeing the process from simple domination by any one organised stakeholder or coalition of them. Yet such elements and relations take shape and come into play within a hierarchy of global and local agencies and groups. A

<sup>10</sup> International Idea. "Democracy and governance: the actors and the agendas". Manuscript 1998

<sup>11</sup> These include regular elections with universal adult suffrage, partisan competition and a secret ballot, as well as procedures for ensuring popular participation and executive accountability between election.

determinate order of institutions, powers, interests and activities operate through complexes of ideas and values, filling out, specifying, anchoring and, often short-cutting their formal content or meaning.

Moreover, this may impose ideological as well as practical limits on the extent to which and how reform processes in Africa can be opened up or broadened.

The attention for *governability* and *governance* is based on the concern about the abject poverty in the world and the sustainability of development supported by international financial institutions. If sustainable development is to happen, a predictable and transparent framework for policy design and all enabling environment for citizens' participation and private initiative, must exist. The institutional setting and the decision-making process in which this process takes place is essential, together with the norms and values on which they are based. Democracy and governance hence connect the norms, procedures, and institutions that must exist for effective, efficient and open public policies. Good governance is seen in the context of economic and social development.<sup>12</sup> In other words, the essence of functioning democracy is in good governance. The missing link between the concepts of governance and democracy can be traced when they are applied. In theory, governance may be about exercise of power irrespective of a political system. In practice, good governance involves accountability, transparency, and participation, predictability (rule of law). These are precisely the working conditions of democracy. Competition for power through elections is meaningless unless those elected are accountable to those who elect them. Accountability is impossible without transparency. Formulation of laws in legislatures and constitutional guarantees of freedom only be paper unless the rule of law is respected and applied. In addition, a political system can only be said to be open if people have a possibility to participate in decision-making processes.

*The attention for GOVERNABILITY and GOVERNANCE is based on the concern about the sustainability of programmes and projects financed by The IFIs. For Sustainable Development, a predictable and transparent framework for policy design and all enabling environment for citizens' participation and private initiative, must exist.*

External promoters or supporters of governance in Africa often do not efficiently realise in practice the potential of the ideas and goals they promote and that the volume of their interventions is not nearly proportional to their impact. This raises the issue of whether the ideas in question are fundamentally constrained at the moment of their conception and implementation by the very institutions and technocratic structures that ground their articulation. The explicit concepts capacity building for good governance that current international initiatives operate in Africa may be consistent with goals of "empowerment" of indigenous communities and individuals, of enhancing local institutional and human capacities. The initiatives, nevertheless, tend to work toward these goals in narrow economic and technocratic terms. The initiatives seem to equate technocratic rationality and capacity with totality of institutional purposefulness and strength. However, as important as it is, this is only one context or level of analysis on the breadth and depth of process on the terrain of self-directed governance. There is another level of analysis. This is concerned with the extent and nature of openness of distinct ideological constructs, with modes of articulation of given sets of ideas and values and of representations of specific issues relative to others. The concern here is not so much of the number and diversity of ideas, values, and opinions allowed to gain currency as to modes their competitive and co-operative articulation. For example,

<sup>12</sup> According to the standard World Bank definition, governance encompasses the form of political regime, the process by which authority is exercised in the design, formulation and implementation of policies and management of a country's economic and social resources for development. The Asian Development Bank follows the World Bank concept. The Inter American Development Bank places special emphasis on the modernisation of public sector and the participation of civil society in public issues. The African Development Bank has introduced the notions of macro-, meso- and micro-governance, suggesting that authoritarian regimes committed to development might exhibit good governance at middle and lower levels.

- ◆ does governance enter societal processes in Africa as **an external ideology, constructing and deploying its concepts in sterile abstraction from the immediacies of indigenous traditions, beliefs and values**? Do ideas of governance come into play in total opposition to, or in co-operation with historic national values and sentiments?
- ◆ in the struggle over the establishment of new gubernatorial norms and procedures, do leading donors equate the articulation of their ideas and agendas with the production of broad-based concepts, norms and goals which should govern their participation in national governance initiatives?
- ◆ does self-reliant and self-directed governance signify change in terms of the transformation of the immediate stuff of partisan politics into a new kind of political activity - an activity mediated and guided by objective and critical standards, rules and principles?

In the light of these questions, it is possible to draw a conceptual distinction between two levels of articulation and to note the implications of their relations for process openness. There are first, representations of specific interests, identities, needs, wishes, goals, claims, and demands, distinct in different individuals, groups and communities: to be distinguished from a second level of production and circulation of governance ideology where broad-based concepts, principles and rules take shape and come into play. Explicit general forms of futures talk refer to systemic categories and institutional mechanisms: they objectively, mediate and generalise particular representations.

A broad consensus is emerging on a coherent model for sustainable development, stressing "that there is a vital connection between open, democratic, accountable political systems, individual rights and the effective and equitable operation of economic systems. Good governance, as it relates to its social equity comprehensiveness, participation, and subsidiarity and gender equity, has gained pace in criteria for conditional lending of the major international financial institutions and bilaterals. UNDP has also mainstreamed democratic governance.<sup>13</sup> The first principle of good governance is 'comprehensiveness' which recognises the need for actions in not only the executive branch, but also in legislative, judicial and other institutions where economic, social and political activity takes place. It accords a higher role for public participation in policymaking than suggested by others and it is emphatic in its mention of "gender". One can and should draw a conceptual distinction between political openness and democracy.<sup>14</sup> The former would relate in part to various conditions or developments in government and civil society.<sup>14</sup> The latter might refer to an entire distinctive form of political thought, discourse and practice which underlies popularly elected and controlled government. Political openness may or may not lead to full-fledged democratisation, but the two are better understood as overlapping, possibly mutually supportive, processes rather than self-contained phases of democratisation.

### III

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#### *Analytical limitations in the treatment of transition politics* **THE GOVERNANCE DIMENSION**

When it is not dissolved into the immediate reality of peoples' livelihoods, governance is likely to be represented as "pure" principle that needs only proper "application". Practitioners and analysts in the field tend to quickly pass over the particular nature of the governance mission in fragmentary presence (as we

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<sup>13</sup> Refer to Inter-American Development Bank, *Modernisation of the State and Strengthening of Civil Society*. Strategic Planning and Operational Policy Department. Washington, DC: IDB. Moreover: DPP/MOS: Projects Approved 1994-1997 and Projects Under Preparation. Washington, DC: IDB, 21 February 1997. Internal Document.

<sup>14</sup> only some of which may be necessary for or comparable with democratisation decline or liberalisation of authoritarian regimes and/or ideologies resulting in increased opportunities for political competition and popular participation, transformation of state-society relations and so on

have witnessed from our country reports), "adjusting" it against an ideal-general conception of what it might be. On the implicit, theoretically complacent assumption that formalistic, rhetorical modes of circulation of the governance mission, ideas, and values nearly exhaust their articulation there, one often rushes to matters of "implementation". Consequently, critical problems concerning the philosophical and practical entrenchment of the governance organisational systems and processes receive scant attention because

1. The fundamental issues of how the concepts, standards and practices of empowerment could be generated and sustained under historically hectic conditions. In addition, the manner in which they are likely to gain systemic integrity and autonomy as well as broad social currency are inadequately addressed in the development of governance indicators.

2. This relative inattention leads analysts and practitioners to make internal observations and assessments in terms of the sustainability litmus test and performances of process, effect and impact without raising the question of setting up or securing these as given within adaptive systems in the first place. For example, in the face of the fact that past governance strategies had never actually been effectively established, they are criticised for failing "to protect people from political vulnerability." Good governance must actually exist, take definite shape and structure, and become a working process, before particular criticisms, claims, and demands can be based on it. Even at the level of application alone, it is largely overlooked that known models may enter societies through a proliferation of programmes and mechanisms that hinder the growth of open and effective evolutionary (or even revolutionary) process. They may even retard the development of existing indigenous knowledge system and capacity.

*The fundamental issues of how the concepts, standards and practices of empowerment could be generated and sustained under historically hectic conditions, and the manner in which they are likely to gain systemic integrity and broad social currency, are inadequately addressed in the development of governance indicators.*

3. Governance can be defined in terms of the evolution of methods and tools, government policy or citizen action, private value or public norm. Nevertheless, the upshot of the relative inattention to problems of articulation of participatory systems and processes is to make the governance mission at once the most concrete and reified of idea systems in participating stakeholders. Within current proposals of reform, the governance mission is either conventionalised or sterilised on terrain of theory and often vacuously formalised on the ground of practice. It enters society in relatively abstract and plain form, yet is expected to land itself to immediate and vital social and political experience. It suggests itself and seems within reach only to elude, appears readily practicable only to resist realisation.

As indicated in previous sections, multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental external agencies have, in recent years, taken a large number initiatives aimed directly or indirectly at helping poor nations and their communities develop their way out of chaos and instability. In doing so, they rely on a variety of programmes, institutional mechanisms and policies. Indeed, growing external involvement in such projects has resulted in increasingly challenging problems of conceptualising and understanding the role and function of international agencies. The growth of foreign interventions seem in marked contrast to the limited thought and effort exerted by developers of Third World politics to put the interventions such as governance in coherent theoretical or strategic perspective. In relation to governance one can ask:

- ♦ What is the overall rationality or significance of the great traffic of international programmes, the proliferating activities that seem to show little regard for economy of co-ordination?



- ◆ How far and in what ways do various international agencies, programmes, mechanisms, forms of knowledge and technical assistance feed on one another in helping set the boundaries of the governance mission reform?

The important issues that these questions suggest are not sufficiently addressed, or even raised, in much of the current discussion of the governance monitoring systems development. Insofar as the activities of external agencies are not understood and engaged in partly as indigenous societal potentialities developing gradually into actual structures, functions and characteristics of societies, their developmental impact may diminish with their proliferation. This can mean little more than a weakly co-ordinated multiplication of programmes and projects which have immediately recognisable or measurable effects in limited areas, but which seem to suspend rather than serve the ultimate goals of self-reliance that the governance mission are supposed to underpin.

The strategic co-ordination of diverse international activities supportive of governance can become a challenge both for the international agencies involved, including ECA and UNDP and the bilateral donors. This is in part because of limitations in the individual characteristics of the activities - for example, their narrowly technocratic orientation. It is also because of shortcomings in the relational and contextual articulation of external programmes and projects, their limited generalisability and variability, within the global context. These, then, are some of the analytical limitations that characterise existing perspectives on development and diffusion of the governance mission that need to be raised, discussed and agreed upon on a process strategy.

### Section III

#### *Governance indicators, means, and sources of verification:* CRITERIA AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

##### Introducing indicators

Indicators are defined as specific (explicit) and objectively verifiable measures of changes or results brought about by activity. In other words, indicators are designed to provide a standard against which to measure, or assess, or show, the progress of an activity against stated targets, towards delivering its inputs (input indicators), producing its outputs (output indicators) and achieving its objectives (effect and impact indicators)<sup>15</sup>. Indicators may be **direct, such as those cited above (usually monitoring indicators), or indirect (proxy), usually impact indicators used where direct measurement is not feasible or cost effective.**

Depending on scope, content, and operational circumstances, impact measurement may be feasible, and all opportunities to do it should be exploited, given existing resource and time constraints. However, it cannot, and should not, be treated as an automatic or standard objective of evaluation.

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<sup>15</sup> Such as the efficiency on agricultural package delivery (input), yield in farms (output), technology adoption rate (effect), and change in livelihood security (impact).

In all cases where proposals for effect and impact measurement are made, particular emphasis must be placed on the assessment of practical requirements. What may be interesting and stimulating conceptually may not be feasible at the implementation level.

Information collection for "general", but not clearly specified, purposes is not justified. Table one shows the genesis of indicators as far as they are designed to address in a systematic way the relationship to objectives, outputs, effects and impact. In this regard, they are defined as<sup>16</sup> *variables that help to measure changes in a given situation and tools for monitoring and evaluating the effects of an activity.*

Assumptions about Indicators		Criteria for choosing and design Indicators	Indicators
OBJECTIVES			
Assumptions about relationships between objectives and impact indicators	Criteria for choosing impact indicators. Design criteria: accuracy, levels, timing		Impact indicators
IMPACTS			
Hypotheses about how effects produce impacts			
EFFECTS			
Assumptions about relationships between impacts / effects indicators	Criteria for choosing effects indicators. Design criteria: accuracy, levels, timing		Effect indicators
Hypotheses about how outputs produce effects and external factors			
OUTPUTS			
Assumptions about relationships between effects / output indicators	Criteria for choosing output indicators. Design criteria: accuracy, levels, timing		Output indicators
Implementation hypotheses			
INPUTS			

Governance monitoring and evaluation requirements can best, and most cost-effectively, be satisfied if undertaken on a combined and integrated basis<sup>17</sup> to meet effect and impact assessment requirements. In this regard, input and output measurement, although essential, is not sufficient, and objectively verified information on process and effects should, as a minimum, be obtained during the time span considered for study.

### *Principles of Indicator Development*

When designing such systems, a specific selection of the most pertinent process issues and measures of effect must be made before a project is implemented. A clear and deliberate distinction must be maintained between what is "useful" and what is "essential" in individual cases. The **substantive link between evaluation and policy analysis** should, in this regard, be fully exploited by assigning the examination of selected policy issues and equations, or particular aspects of them, to individual M & E systems, thereby usefully drawing policy, evaluation, and project design together. The *burden of proof* for the generation, collection, and recording of data lies with the data users. They must be identified and must provide a justification for such activities based on clearly defined information requirements, an analysis plan, and established information flow for feedback purposes. The fact that donors and beneficiaries (including recipient government and other organisations) have essentially the same information requirements should, in this regard, be emphasised. Requirements should not, therefore, be treated as extemporaneous, unique, or externally imposed on the people to "satisfy the needs of external agents".<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> UNICEF (1985). *Food Aid and the Well-being of Children in the Developing World*. New York.

<sup>17</sup> Op cit. UNICEF, 1985

<sup>18</sup> Governance monitoring as a whole should take full advantage of other on-going data collection efforts and local institutional capacities. Since they are by nature and design integral to larger national processes and data requirements. Supplementary data and needs for externally provided technical support should be kept of a minimum. When provided, such support should meet not only specified technical requirements but should also aim at the institution-building purposes. Statistical rigor and interference, although desirable, may have to be relaxed in view of cost and time constraints, and the need for practical and useful results.<sup>18</sup> Indicators are not targets, and neither indicators nor targets should be confused with objectives. Targets are specified results in terms of quantity or timing (usually both), but these results may relate to inputs, outputs, effects or impacts. Indicators are used as markers of progress towards reaching intermediate or long-term objectives. They are not numerical targets in themselves. Indicators should, in the ultimate analysis, be determined by the nature of the

While the choice of indicators is a matter of common sense, or of experience and knowledge of statistical data source, certain rules of thumb can be applied. Thus, ideally, indicators should be **validity, reliability, relevant, sensitive, specificity, cost effectiveness, timeliness, simplicity, measurability and verifiability.**

Few indicators can fulfil all these criteria. Choice of appropriate indicators is a task that requires experience and skill. It is an art rather than a science. It also requires thorough understanding of the information needs of management at the various levels, knowledge of how best to obtain the data for the indicators and of the limits imposed by both costs and techniques<sup>19</sup>. A few other more technical considerations in the choice of indicators may be noted:

1. An important factor affecting the cost of data collection and the method of analysing it is the level of the data collected. Indicators may be aggregate at national level, derived from national sources, and only applicable at this level. A second category of aggregate indicators is derived at the local level (community, village, and district). A third category of indicators is derived from households or individuals, usually through census or sample survey. Largely, aggregate indicators are simpler to collect than household indicators. However, because they cannot readily be disaggregated and therefore no distribution data can be obtained from them, they have limited utility. Hence, we cannot use the GNP to arrive at the gross product for a district or for the poor (though regional estimates are sometimes calculated). On the other hand, household data can be disaggregated, but it is generally costly to collect.
2. Not all concepts lend themselves to relatively simple, quantitative construction of indicators. Examples are the degree of popular or organisational structure. Rather than trying to squeeze these complex concepts into a small set of numbers, descriptive statements might be prepared with indications of the direction of change. Implicit in the points above, the number of indicators must be limited to keep information requirements and costs of collection to a minimum and to ensure focus on the most significant issues.
3. Both indicators and related information requirements should be periodically reviewed to take into account changing needs or refinements in data quality. In this connection, present indicators, or indicators used in other projects, should be reviewed before new ones are considered. Finally, as far as possible the indicators, or at least some of them, should be divisible by gender, income group, etc., in line with objectives. The rural poor and women cannot receive equitable benefits from development projects unless they are specified as beneficiaries, with strategies indicated whereby their disadvantaged position can be overcome and their conditions monitored.

Governance indicators may be classified into **accountability** of junior officials, and of appointed officials to elected representatives, **transparency** by which governmental transactions are visible to the press and the people, and **predictability** by which decisions, large and small, are governed by a rule of law. GCA<sup>20</sup> identifies the rule of law,<sup>21</sup> budgetary policies and priorities, administrative and bureaucratic

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objectives and intended effects and impact. The first step, therefore, is a clear and unambiguous statement of the objectives, short-term, intermediate, and long-term. These may pertain to increased outputs.

<sup>19</sup> To give an example, household income data as an indicator of living standards is notoriously difficult to collect and highly unreliable. For this reason, if it is used at all it should be supplemented with related data, of which ownership of visible assets—such as a house and consumer durable—may be examples.

<sup>20</sup> GCA, (1996) "Indicators for measuring good governance" GCA, Washington DC

<sup>21</sup> Macro indicators include if there is legal protection of constitutionally defined rights. Is the judiciary independent, with a range of legal expertise? Is there a functioning court system staffed by trained professionals? Does a system of civil security and a professional police force exist? Are people generally informed of their rights and have access to the legal system? Is the enforcement of contracts by the courts immune to political interference? Are all budgets and public expenditures made public? Is there an independent auditor general's office, staffed with trained professionals? Are there legal and regulatory frameworks to control corruption and rent seeking? Are all revenues accruing to the government or the central bank entered into official accounts? Are all government expenditures on budget? Is government spending on military and security greater than spending

consistency, political openness and tolerance. Rules when formalised are codified as **constitutional, legislated, and administrative rules**.<sup>22</sup>

- **Constitutional rules:** constitutions provide the meta-rules that frame political relationships among political actors. Key aspects include the rules that govern relations between the state and individual (e.g. as embodied in bills of rights or in traditional law) and the rules that govern the distribution of powers among branches of government.<sup>23</sup>
- **Legislated Rules:** There are laws outside of the constitution that govern the political relationships between state and society and hence are at issue in transition struggles. These include laws regulating public security, association life, and the mass media.
- **Administrative Rules:** Administrative rules may impair political contestation and participation.<sup>24</sup> Public officials may also enjoy considerable discretion to make and apply rules pertaining to election campaigns and the administration of elections. Administrative rules are particularly important in addressing governance issues in the pre- and post-transition periods. Between elections, political accountability can only be guaranteed if there are procedures to allow oversight of executive decisions. In addition, political transparency requires rules to ensure public access to information and free and balanced expression in the media.

An important aspect of governance monitoring is the assessment of organisational resources will be conducted in stages. First is to compile an inventory of basic background data on all organisations. The resulting data set will contain information on the number, age, size, structure, functions and goals of relevant organisations. The inventory includes information on the position taken by leaders and members of organisations on rules for political contestation and participation. It will also identify which is (are) the "lead" organisation(s) in each sector taking initiatives to promote democratisation. Second comes the organisational context. In order to set the context, the research will provide a brief narrative the country's distinctive institutional history. This account will focus on the power between the interactions of civic, state and international organisations was established. Finally, we have the organisational characteristics. In order to compare organisations, the research will focus on four key organisational characteristics. These generic characteristics apply to state and non-state organisations in any country setting. These are organisational **autonomy, capacity, complexity, and cohesion**.

In combination, these characteristics determine the relative strength or weakness of an organisation. An organisation that selects its own leaders, raises its own revenues, has a popular base, has adequate staff and budget, is organised for specialised tasks, and puts forward a common front to the world is

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on social sectors? Does the executive branch have discretionary use of funds that escapes accountability? Are all government departments and ministries responsible for developing own budgets? Is there decentralisation of resource generation and allocation? Is there a civil service, with appointments based on merit? Are governmental officials subject to the rule of law? Is the compensation for civil servants comparable to that of other sectors? Is civil service career development independent of the political party in power? Are the military and security forces under civilian control? Are political parties allowed to exist legally and constitutionally? Is there constitutional provision for freedom of speech, media, assembly and association? Is there an elected legislature, which is responsible to the electorate? Does the legislature have oversight over governmental policy? Do opposition groups have legitimacy, and do they play a role in the political process?

<sup>22</sup> Global Coalition for Africa / Africa Leadership Forum. (1993). Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Is there a bill of rights in the constitution? Which universally - recognised rights are included/ excluded? Which rights were enforced/ violated under the old regime? Which rights did the opposition demand before and during the transition? Did these demands result in changes in rules about particular rights and actual rights protection?<sup>23</sup> Did the incumbent government make use of state of emergency legislation to suspend individual and group rights at any stage in the process? Among essential indicators are: are checks and balances available on executive power? Does the constitution provide mechanisms for the transfer of governmental power after an election?

<sup>24</sup> In some countries, civil servants are prohibited from taking part in political activity; elsewhere, the ruling party or the state-sponsored trade union receives funding from the government budget, even after a *de jure* return to multi-partyism. In all cases, the police continue to receive instructions from the incumbent government during successive stages of the transition.

devolve surveys to a central agency or an external body. Even then, sample size should be kept to a minimum by one or more of several techniques now available, such as stratification (i.e. dividing the population into groups as homogeneous as possible with respect to the main variables examined and sampling a small number from each group) or sequential sampling. Actual sample size is determined by an estimate of the likely rate of change in the major variables and by the desired degree of probability that the survey results reflect reality rather than the chance effect of sampling. This can effect is expressed in terms of the "sampling error". The smaller the error, the more precise the estimate is said to be. Reducing the error, however, generally requires enlarging the sample, thereby increasing the cost. It has been pointed out, that for purposes of monitoring, estimates need not be "precise"<sup>27</sup>.

### Case study One

## UNDP Support to Governance in Malawi

# MONITORING ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITIUS -

### A UNDP Case Study

GOAL: To create an enabling environment for sustainable human development					
Strategic areas of Support	Outcomes		Outputs		Partnership
	Outcomes	Indicators	Outputs	Indicators	
Contribute to national policy dialogue and analysis e.g., National Human Development Report, NLTPS	Awareness building on the status of governance from the SHD perspective	Quantity of appropriate disaggregated data on SHD	First National Human Development Report for Mauritius published	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International expert mission in June 1999</li> <li>- First national workshop organised to discuss first draft - 8/99</li> <li>- Final Report produced and published 12/99</li> </ul>	MEDPRD will coordinate the national consensus building on the NHDR. UNDP will assist
Promote trade and foreign investment	Policy and institutional framework for foreign direct investment established	Increase in number of companies investing in Mauritius.	Review of existing investment policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Terms of reference for the study approved by Government - 6/99;</li> <li>selection of Consultants 8/99</li> <li>Letter of Agreement signed with UNCTAD 8/99</li> <li>One-day workshop organised for national experts, government and private sector 9/99</li> </ul>	UNDP will provide funds under TRAC.
Strengthen TCDC	Strengthen south/south cooperation through the TCDC modality	Number of technical experts recruited from Mauritius	Strengthening of the National TCDC Focal Point Information Base through the launching of the TCDC Web site and database on technical experts, best practices and consulting firms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Report compiled and recommendations presented to the Commission on Investment Technology and Related Financial Flows 9/99</li> <li>- Number of experts registered in the WIDE database</li> <li>- Number of consulting firms registered in the</li> </ul>	Ministry of Industry will cost-share with UNDP. UNCTAD to finalize the TOR. UNDP will identify opportunities for TCDC

<sup>27</sup> To give an example, if the expected rate of change in a given variable over a given period is 15 % it may be sufficient to know that the sampling error is less than 15 %, so we can be sure that a positive change has occurred, whatever its actual size. In other case, management may wish to know not the exact figure (the absolute size), but whether the magnitude is, say, above 10 or above 50 percent. The less the desired precision, the smaller the required sample. There is another argument against the use of large samples. No formula exists to determine the size of the non-sampling error, but it is likely that a large sample, increases the work load, is associated with a large non-sampling error. The balance between the two kinds of exigencies-to reduce the sampling error through larger sample size and to reduce the non-sampling error through a smaller sample-can only be struck in the light of local conditions.

database

<b>Goal : governance and public resources management<sup>28</sup></b>					
<b>Sub-goal: Strengthen capacity of key governance institutions for people-centered development ; and foster social cohesion</b>					
Strategic areas of Support	Outcomes		Outputs		
	Outcomes	Indicators	Outputs	Indicators	Partnership
Develop institutional capacity of parliamentary structures, systems, processes, and train parliamentarians	National workshop for parliamentarians conducted and integrity systems built at parliamentary level	Number of parliamentarians trained in fighting corruption by July 1999	Organization of national workshop	Workshop for parliamentarians held in July 1999 to provide for checks and balances in fighting corruption	UNDP will identify international resource persons together with World Bank. National Assembly will provide logistical support for organization of the workshop World Bank and Laurentian Centre
Reform judicial and legal structures, and legal procedures, and train Judges, and lawyers	National Office for Court Services set up and appropriate funds allocated from national budget	Number of posts created and funds allocated for the Office for Court Services	Three months training programme for court officers	Number of parliamentarians trained	UNDP and MEDPRD will finalize training project and allocate resources for the recruitment of trainers.
Develop capacity of ombudsman offices, equal opportunity commissions and other human rights oversight bodies	Establishment of Human Rights Commission	Report on human rights abuses compiled by national authorities by 12/99	Implementation of recommendations of the Human Rights Mission report	Number of training manuals and operational guidelines for the Office of Court Services produced Number of court officers trained Recommendations of Human rights mission reviewed and provided to national authorities for implementation by 9/99	MEDPRD will prepare TOR and training programme in consultation with the Supreme Court Attorney General's Office and Ministry of Justice Government, MEDPRD and Ministry of Justice and Office of Ombudsman
<b>Goal : governance and public resources management<sup>29</sup></b>					
<b>Sub-goal: Promote an efficient and accountable public sector that serves all citizens</b>					
Strategic areas of Support	Outcomes		Outputs		
	Outcomes	Indicators	Outputs	Indicators	Partnership
Promote an efficient civil service system that improves (economic) management	Launching of civil service reform process	Restructuring of the civil service for efficient delivery of public services by 6/2001	Training for Governance Programme implemented.	Project approved and signed by Government and UNDP by 5/99 Number of activities approved and financed under the Governance project by 6/2001	UNDP and MEDPRD will approve the training applications received from the other ministries.
<b>GOAL: To achieve gender equality and advance the status of women, especially through their own empowerment</b>					
<b>Sub-goal: Gender equality in decision-making process at all levels<sup>30</sup></b>					

<sup>28</sup> Situational indicators: (1) Strengthen capacity of essential governance for people-centered development. (2) Reform of legislative processes is slowly being carried out. Reforms include training of court officers, introduction of Administrative and Judicial Provision Act, which will simplify the rules and procedures of the Supreme Court and thus make justice more accessible. (3) The efforts of Transparency Mauritius have resulted in the passing of a Public Procurement Law and a Transparency and Equity Act which makes governmental corruption more difficult. (4) The Legislature of Mauritius will in the near future deal with the proposal of setting up independent courts as well as an Appeal Court. (5) Mauritius has an autonomous electoral management body.

<sup>29</sup> Situational indicators: (1) The Public Sector staff will receive regular training in meeting the demands of the public as well as providing a better service. Staff is, furthermore, expected to think in terms of quality. The Civil Service also expects staff to work independently in groups and encourages that problems are solved within each group. (2) In recognising that the public sector is over staffed, the Civil Service has started to "tidy up" in the public sector by offering staff recruitment elsewhere.

<sup>30</sup> Situational indicators: Women parliamentarians: 8.1%. Women in local government: municipal and village council elections: 8.7% and 2.7%, respectively. Percentage of registered voters who are women: app. 50 % of the voters is believed to be women (statistical records are not available). GDI: 0.752 and GEM index: 0.419 (Sources: the Electoral Commissioner's office and the Human Development Report 1998). HIV/ AIDS infection rates by sex: males: 149, females: 68 (WHO statistics as at April 1999 (includes people that have passed away)).

- Tracks in stakeholder participation: Formal (Government). Informal (NGOs). Private (Business). and popular organisations. Tools and technology production.
- Channels: decision-making structure and process. stakeholder participation- organisations. structures, policy. strategy, and partnership.
- Content: Physical. psycho-social. political. organisational. economic. spiritual adaptation.
- Message articulation capability: Community organisational characteristics referring to *capacity* - skill. aptitude; *autonomy* - power; *cohesion* - unity of purpose; *complexity* – degree of bureaucratisation – organisation and leadership
- Levels of communication: Community, Local, National

More specifically, MTCS has the following attributes: it maps out stakeholders and analyses stakeholder information needs, defines stakeholder message on sustainable development that needs to be communicated to other stakeholders clearly, and identifies tracks of communications at the official, governmental, non-governmental, informal, private sector, civil society organisations and community and interpersonal levels. It further establishes levels and types of interaction among stakeholders - national, provincial, district, and local levels. It defines the cross cutting thematic areas of interests of stakeholders, with gender taking the overriding arena. It develops tools that would facilitate the communication process. It establishes "doses" of stakeholder information entitlement. It establishes mechanisms for recording, collating, compiling and dissemination of local knowledge using agreed upon indicators. Indicators in this regard must attain, to a large degree the following criteria: validity, reliability, relevance, sensitivity, specificity, cost-effectiveness, timeliness, simplicity, and verifiability.

MTCS is, therefore, the combination of these concepts. Its purpose to raise the process of communication management from the level of piecemeal spotty information, intuitive guesswork and isolated problem solving to the level of systems insights, system information, database management, and systems problem solving. Since information sources are always available to the main stakeholders, such a strategy provides a system of information. It is a powerful method of aiding stakeholders in solving problems and decision making vis-à-vis stakeholders identification and mapping, process systems and information; attracting both internal and external data and transforming them to decision making tools. As such, the framework is fostered using the following areas. (1) Identifying opportunities for cost-effective systems development. (2) Developing an integrated strategy for systems development. (3) Analysing the decision-making environment for which new systems must be designed and providing estimates of the benefits that will result from new systems.<sup>34</sup>

The SHD construct has emerged as "the integration of population, resources, environment and development in four aspects: stabilising population; reducing migration; fending off core exploitation; and supporting long term sustainable resource management. Adaptive strategies and capacities generate and maintain means of living and enhance well being and that of future generations."<sup>35</sup> They represent permanent change in community strategy, and structure, organisational processes. These capacities are contingent upon availability, stability and accessibility of options, which are ecological, socio-cultural,

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
<sup>34</sup> The approach to be used in the management of the MTCS follows the basic premises that stakeholder information taxonomic base is developed into several levels where each levels reflects the distinct characteristics of its use. This approach is a comprehensive approach that argues the scope of the analyst should encompass all stakeholder and organisational systems. It includes taxonomy, flow charting scheme, and a procedure for developing computer stimulation models. This process of designing system is a very heuristic process. We have underlined the basic definition of the MTCS that it enhances the capacity of all stakeholders to articulate their perceptions and value systems, vision, mission and objectives. This enables them to make decisions based on good access to and analysis of relevant information through functional channels and media for information exchange. Let us now see its relation with the SHD construct and try to develop immediate objectives for using MTCS as a tool. (Wu, FH, "Accounting Information Systems" McGraw-Hill Book Company, N.Y., 1983).

<sup>35</sup> Titti, V. and Singh, N. (1995) "Adaptive strategies in Arid and Semi-arid lands" IISD Resources Paper.

economic and political. They are predicated on equity, ownership of resources and participatory and wise decision-making -- notions of sustainable human development and sustainable development that incorporate the idea of change and uncertainty. Fig 2 relates the interface between the various elements that contribute directly to the synergy that enhances livelihoods sustainability. The can be clustered under the following categories

- ♦ Capital formation and accumulations encompassing human capital, natural capital, physical/material capital, and social capital, which in turn refers to its element - socio-political, psychosocial, organisational, and cultural and spiritual capital;
- ♦ The SHD benchmarks: Resilience, ability to recover from stresses/shocks, economic efficiency, social equitability, ecological sustainability;
- ♦ Processual and strategic elements that determine the nature of agency and ideology are preconditions and preparedness participatory and wise decision making, production and availability of livelihood resources, access and control of livelihood resources, and stability and sustainability
- ♦ The tools for planning: Multi-track communications for participatory assessment and planning policy, institution and strategic analysis and programme review. It is these categories of the SHD construct that will enable us to proceed to develop the following immediate objectives and outputs for the MTCS tool.

Fig. 2. Synergy in sustainable development programme planning



The basic tools in MTCS are clustered around the following: identify and define stakeholders. Articulate stakeholder messages for sustainable development that need to be communicated to other stakeholders clearly. Identify tracks of communications at the (1) official, governmental, (2) non-governmental, (3) informal, private sector, (4) civil society organisations, and community and (5) interpersonal levels. Establish levels and types of gender-sensitive interaction among stakeholders. Map out and analyse stakeholder information needs. Define the thematic areas of interests of stakeholders. Develop tools that would facilitate the MTC process. Establish the levels of stakeholder information entitlement. Establish mechanisms for recording, collating, compiling and dissemination of local knowledge using agreed upon indicators. Indicators in this regard must attain, to a large degree the following criteria: validity, reliability, relevance, sensitivity, specificity, cost-effectiveness, timeliness, simplicity, measurability, and verifiability.



## Epilogue

Although the term "governance" has entered the policy discourse recently in the international arena now that its reforms are externally driven, the idea has a long intellectual history. A key distinction, which runs through much of the history of political theory since Plato is between the *stewardship/guardianship* and *guiding/steering*<sup>36</sup> responsibilities of the state.<sup>5</sup> Over the centuries, these two images i.e. the *shepherd* and the *helmsman* - have been at the heart of many political controversies. Although neither *guardianship* nor *guiding* can be discharged effectively in isolation, some writers advocate one and others the other as the primary responsibility of the state. Developmentalists emphasise stewardship while liberals and neo-classical economists are concerned primarily with the discharge of its guiding functions. However, these are not only differences in political theory. At their heart lie different perceptions regarding the relation between knowledge and power.<sup>6</sup> In the modern economic system, guiding often refers to policies and institutions that maintain the economic system and enable it to function effectively. Its underlying philosophy of governance, claiming its heritage from Adam Smith, is that since the state can never have enough information to undertake detailed guidance of economic activity, it should be prevented from doing so. Guiding is restricted to

- ◆ macro- economic policies (fiscal, monetary, trade, and financial).
- ◆ macro processes (trade and financial flows, including development aid), and the
- ◆ international institutions that determine an influence such policies and processes (e.g. WTO, IMF, the World Bank, and national finance and trade ministries).

In the development literature, the guiding functions correspond roughly to free market policies, structural adjustment and aggregate macro- management. In contrast, guardianship generally refers to actions and institutions that provide detailed attention to specific individuals or areas: it evokes such images as protection, conservation, nurturing stewardship. It corresponds more closely with the human agenda: poverty eradication, environmental conservation, and empowerment, gender, Human development, and even education and health service provision. Welfare is a guardianship function: it requires targeting and detailed information. Pasquale Pasquino (1991) draws attention to the intellectual heritage of this approach, in particular the German literature on *Polizeiwissenschaft* (variously translated as the science of police/policy/government happiness) that emerged between the 17<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. This literature advocated the collection of detailed information by and for the government to enable to discharge social welfare functions.

If governance monitoring and evaluation has to succeed, it needs to invoke and experiment with alternative models of learning. The model proposed here is based on a successful policy intervention (albeit with a number of quite significant drawbacks). These models were phenomenal exercise in knowledge transfer, social change and prosperity. This was made possible by a unique and very fortunate combination of institutions and individuals. However, the heart of the models is that it was divided down the middle. On the one hand was a universal theory of liberation and self-determination. On the other hand was the knowledge that this knowledge could not be applied universally. It had to be applied in a local context to produce systems that could survive in local conditions. This tension between a universal meta-theory and contextual practical theories was used to mobilise contextual research and action.

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<sup>36</sup> In Plato's *the Statesman*, a stranger questions Socrates on the ideal qualities of the political leader. Socrates begins by saying that the ruler is like a shepherd, who cares for each individual sheep in the flock. But he quickly dismisses the idea as impractical: a ruler's knowledge and attentiveness could never extend so far as to minister to each individual: 'only a god could act thus'. In another dialogue in the *Republic*, Socrates introduces another metaphor, of the ruler as helmsman, guiding a ship safely and efficiently and preserving passengers and cargo from reef and storm.

<sup>5</sup> According to Foucault, Greek Politics abandoned the pastoral game for the game of citizens and laws. While the pastoral game was later calibrated by western Christianity, and absorbed together with the city game in to the modern Western state.

Governance monitoring and evaluation is an attempt at creating a universal Meta theory, which can only be applied in a context. It has to be based on the qualities and attributes of the local communities themselves, a form that is communicable to poor to enable them to use it properly. It should seek to integrate technology with national policies, and place these at the service of local communities. The process has to be voluntary, if a policy intervention is to be in the interest of the local community. Hence, the programme to be based on an interlocking set of institutions: local research institutions, education, policy, inputs, credit, and extension. However, and this is central to the approach, it has already sought to integrate factors that might be a cause of problems in the future.

The complexities of governance, empowerment, and sustainable development has quite a few similarities to the green revolution process. As in the green revolution, we know the broad outlines of a Meta-theory, but it has to be implemented differently in every context. The implementation process requires the involvement of the people themselves. It has to be based on solid research, which must be accessible to beneficiaries. The local level research should be complemented by macro-level research in actions and processes that will create the environment in which these actions can take place. The governance monitoring and evaluation approach already uses two successful models from the past. The first is the model of participatory community development, and the second is the model of participatory strategy development. The institutional complex that forms the backbone of the social capital does not have to be built from scratch; much of it is already there. All that is required is for incentives to link these institutions together. CSOs and CBOs in many countries are already focused on credit, incentives, education, and research. These must be linked to conventional educational, research, financial and policy institutions.