NIGERIA: MAINSTREAMING TRADE POLICY INTO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

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I INTRODUCTION

In defining the terms of reference of this study, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s (UNECA) background paper draws an apt characterization of the state of the development challenge facing sub-Saharan Africa. It notes that four years after 147 Heads of State and Government made a commitment in the Millennium Declaration to work towards the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger in poor countries, a rather gloomy prospect for Africa is still in evidence, as recent economic performance appears to be on the downward trend. The conclusion was that in spite of the strides that have been made by a few African countries, the overall picture is that it is not likely that many of them will meet the targets and goals set in the Millennium Declaration. The objective of this project, according to the terms of reference, is to gain a better understanding of how trade policy (and the trade policy formulation process) has effectively been streamlined into overall national development strategy. In this regard, the questions perhaps raised by this approach are the following:

- Is there adequate machinery for trade policy formulation?
- What is the shape and focus of the trade policy formulation mechanism?
- How is trade policy being factored into the national development plan, so as to produce the tangible results that can significantly impact on the greater majority of the population, to achieve widespread alleviation of poverty and expansion of production and growth?

Why has there been so much hope and faith in the capacity of trade to pull the economies of Africa out of the woods? The general perception is that trade holds the remedy. It is often referred to as the engine of growth, and the reasoning is not far-fetched. Empirical evidence of the economic prosperity of many successful economies today has been mainly driven by the volume of trade, interpreted as the volume of exports traded and the level of export competitiveness. It is also for this reason that the issue of mainstreaming trade into national development strategies has increasingly gained currency since the mid-1990s. The apparent rationale behind this thinking is that trade has not been able to play a significant role in African economies because trade policy has not been given the desired prominence in overall development strategy. Therefore, for trade reform to unleash its catalytic potential, it should be designed as part and parcel of the overall development plan, where its role will be given due cognisance and the necessary facilitating infrastructure, adequately provided, to make trade policy perform.

Against this background, our task in this paper is to examine the Nigerian trade policy and the trade policy formulation processes, and also to see how trade policy has been embedded in the mainstream of national development strategies.
II. LINKING TRADE POLICY TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND POVERTY REDUCTION

Charles Gore puts it succinctly when he states that the logic behind the efforts towards ensuring that trade occupies an important place in poverty reduction strategies is that international trade is essential to economic growth and economic growth is essential to poverty reduction. He goes on to argue that bringing trade into the picture is undoubtedly welcome, but that it would be wrong to assume that mainstreaming trade is the same thing as mainstreaming trade liberalization. The relationship between trade, trade liberalization and poverty reduction is complex. This anecdotal starting point sets the tone for discussing the issue of mainstreaming trade policy or strategies in development plans with poverty reduction as an objective. Interesting debates have indeed been evoked in the literature on trade and poverty reduction in national development. Olaniyi points to a strong theoretical support for liberal trade policies. He cites Krueger (1998), Stiglitz (1998), Fischer (2000), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1998) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1997) among the literature which has touched elaborately on this critical issue -- certainly critical in the context of developing economies as well. It has been argued that greater liberalization or openness and outward economies consistently outperform countries with restrictive trade and foreign investment regimes. (Olaniyi 2005: 3),

A counterpoint to this view is one advocated forcefully by Dani Rodrik and Rodriguez (cited in Olaniyi: 2005: 4). They argue that against the backdrop of arguments in favour of openness, it is tempting to conclude that all nations should dismantle trade restrictions and open their doors to untrammeled trade relations. In the light of the foregoing literature and in relation to the question of linking trade strategy to national development and poverty reduction, Olaniyi has raised three specific questions, which touch at the heart of the matter; does growth in trade volumes always lead to economic growth; does the causal link between openness and growth translate into growth of incomes; what are the reasons for promulgating restrictive trade policies?

Alan Winters (2002:25) makes the point that trade liberalization aids growth, which in turn aids poverty alleviation, but adds that trade policy should not none the less, be manipulated too closely with an eye to direct poverty consequences. He argues that it should rather be set on a sound basis over-all. The primary way to deal with poverty is through cross-cutting anti-poverty policies. His conclusion is that given the different accounts given in the literature, there is difficulty in establishing an empirical link between trade liberalization and growth. In other words, openness brings advantages not only on its own but also as part of a constellation of policies designed to ensure efficiency and competition in markets, and transparency
and predictability in policy-making (Winters, 20002:31). Consequently, and notwithstanding the fact that a number of pressing research questions remain, a liberal trade regime almost certainly boosts poverty alleviation in the long run. Liberalization should therefore be part of the armoury of a poverty-conscious government, but this does not imply a call for the immediate dismantling of all trade restrictions. Neither does it imply that opening up the borders is all that is needed, although it does advocate for a serious commitment to openness in the foreseeable future.
III  NIGERIA’S CURRENT TRADE POLICY

Thus, as observed above, the Nigerian government like many other developing countries, considers trade as the main engine of its development strategies, because of the implicit belief that trade can create jobs, expand markets, raise incomes, facilitate competition and disseminate knowledge. (WTO 2005: 15). The main thrust of trade policy is therefore the enhancement of competitiveness of domestic industries, with a view to, inter alia, stimulating local value-added and promoting a diversified export base. Trade policy also seeks (through gradual liberalization of the trade regime) to create an environment that is conducive to increased capital inflows, and to transfers and adoption of appropriate technologies. The government pursues the liberalization of its trade regime in a very measured manner, which would ensure that the resultant domestic costs of adjustment do not outweigh the benefits. The reforms which accompany this policy direction are also aimed at re-orientating attitudes and practices towards modern ways of doing business. However, the instruments of trade policy such as the tariff regime is designed in a manner which allows a certain level of protection of domestic industry and enterprise.

While this is the main trade policy framework to guide economic growth, the trade expansion, employment generation and poverty alleviation dimensions are now subsumed in a new overarching economic development policy blueprint adopted in 2003, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS).
IV NATIONAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (NEEDS)

NEEDS is a medium-term economic strategy covering the period 2003 – 2007. It has been described as Nigeria’s plan for prosperity, the vision for a greater tomorrow. Within that perspective, NEEDS focuses on four key strategies: reorienting values, reducing poverty, creating wealth and generating employment. These key visionary goals are, in turn, built into three major macroeconomic frameworks, namely, empowering people, promoting private enterprise and appropriately reordering approaches to governance. The overall long-term vision of NEEDS includes social and economic transformation of Nigeria on a sustainable and competitive basis.

In the trade policy area, NEEDS seeks to deepen Nigeria’s integration with the rest of the world and to maximize the benefits of strategic integration. Accordingly, regional integration and trade are the two instruments identified by NEEDS for maximizing the benefits of globalization. The trade policy objective under NEEDS is to lay a solid foundation for fully exploiting Nigeria’s potentialities in international trade. While aspiring to the above, NEEDS has by no means overlooked the challenges which have so far hampered the realization of these potentialities. A number of constraints are identified, namely: the high cost of doing business; inadequate infrastructure; poorly implemented incentives, especially in regard to fiscal and tariff regimes; widespread smuggling, counterfeiting and dumping; lack of standardization, required for products to compete internationally; and unfavourable international trade rules.

Under NEEDS, the trade policy thrust is to drastically reduce the uncertainty and unpredictability of the trade policy regime; harmonize trade practices with those of other Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries and hence facilitate full integration; respect obligations under multilateral and regional trading systems; and create a conducive and competitive environment in which Nigerian enterprises can thrive and effectively compete in the global and regional economy. The following are therefore the strategies and instruments for achieving the NEEDS objectives:

- Drastic reduction in domestic cost structure especially infrastructure cost, to enhance a competitive investment climate necessary for production and exports;

- Aggressive promotion of exports and “economic diplomacy”;

- Harmonization of tariffs with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and others to create the common external tariff (CET);

- Continue to use specific systems of import restrictions in particular circumstances to protect industries and critical sectors against unfair competition;

- Rationalizing and strengthening institutions responsible for trade facilitation;
Co-operation with other African and developing countries to ensure that the WTO trade negotiations address the concerns and interests of Nigeria and Africa, including leadership in the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs);

- Reform customs and ports to drastically reduce turnaround time and transaction costs at the ports, enhance the prompt collection of government revenues and ensure customs clearance within a 48-hour time frame;
- Develop deep-sea port facilities, inland container depots, Free Trade Zones, and shipbuilding capacity to enhance coastal shipping, international trade and regional integration.

The policy instruments outlined above, which the government has identified for pursuing its trade policy objectives, are indeed far-reaching, although it has been said that trade policy in itself would not be enough, without a sound macroeconomic policy underpinning and effective implementation mechanisms. We now turn to the performance of trade policy under the NEEDS regime in the following section.
V DYNAMICS OF TRADE POLICY SINCE 1960

An assessment of Nigeria’s trade policy since the 1960s reflects a trend which has been known to characterize uncertain and unpredictable trade regimes the world over. Trade policy since the 1960s has witnessed extreme policy swings from high protectionism in the first few decades after independence to its current more liberal stance (Adenikinju 2005:113). Tariffs have at various times been used to raise fiscal revenue, limit imports to safeguard foreign exchange or even protect the domestic industries from competition. In addition, various forms of non-tariff barriers such as quotas, prohibitions and licensing schemes have on various occasions been extensively used to limit imports of particular items. The overall pattern portrays the long-held belief that trade policy can be used to influence the trade regime in directions that can promote economic growth. Attempts were made to use trade policy to promote manufactured exports and enhance the linkages in the domestic economy, to increase and stabilize export revenue, and scale down the country’s reliance on the oil sector (Olaniyi 2005: 7). Trade policies were accordingly directed at discouraging dumping; supporting import substitution; stemming adverse movements in the balance of payments; conserving foreign exchange; and generating government revenue (Bankole and Bankole: 2004).

TRADE POLICY TRENDS BETWEEN 1960 - 1970s

During the first decade of independence, Nigeria pursued an import substitution industrialization strategy. This involved the use of trade policy to provide effective protection to local manufacturing industries, through such measures as quantitative restrictions and high import duties. Many items were accordingly placed on import prohibition. During this period, all imports from Japan were placed under import license. Machinery and spare parts imports were restricted and exchange controls on the repatriation of dividends and profits were enforced. Restrictions were also applied on capital goods, spare parts and non-essential imports.

Although the import substitution industrialization strategy continued even after the Nigerian civil war in 1970, trade policy between 1970 and 1976 assumed a less restrictive stance, ostensibly because of demands necessitated by the post-war reconstruction. Thus, only items that were regarded as non-essential consumer goods were restricted, while tariff rates on raw materials were reduced and quantitative restrictions on spare parts, agricultural equipment and machinery were relaxed. Similarly, the reconstruction surcharge on imports was reduced from 7.5 percent to 5 percent and later completely eliminated, while exchange controls and profit repatriation were also relaxed. The 1960s and early 1970s also saw the application of export duties ranging from 5 to 60 percent on agricultural exports such as cocoa, rubber, cotton, palm oil, palm kernel and ground nuts. In 1973 however, these duties were eventually abolished, as a result of the oil boom and the need to promote agricultural exports as part of the export diversification strategy.
However this spurt of liberalization ended in 1977, when a wide range of imported finished goods requiring licenses came to be placed on very high duties or were banned outright. This renewed restrictive trade policy culminated in the banning of 82 items in 1979, while a further 25 items were placed on import license.

TRADE POLICY TRENDS BETWEEN 1980 - 990s

From 1981, there was a policy shift towards exports promotion and a move to intensify the use of local raw materials in industrial production. However, the increase in the value of imports led to a worsening of the balance of payments (with, in addition, the backdrop of the collapse in world oil prices), which forced the government to promulgate the Economic Stabilization (Temporary Provisions) Act in April 1982. Under this Act, tariffs on 49 items were raised, while a prohibition was imposed on gaming machines and frozen poultry. Further, 29 commodities were removed from the general import license regime and placed under specific license, while the use of pre-shipment inspection became widespread. During 1983 - 1985, 152 items were brought under specific import license, and foreign exchange regulations became more stringent. The central objective of trade policy was to provide protection for domestic industries and reduce the perceived dependence on imports; a corollary to that objective was a desire to reduce the level of unemployment and generate more revenues from the non-oil sector. Accordingly, tariffs on raw materials and intermediate capital goods were scaled down.

THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ERA

From 1986, there was a significant shift in trade policy direction towards greater liberalization. This shift in policy is directly attributable to the adoption of the structural adjustment programmes. The Customs, Excise, Tariff etc (Consolidation) Decree, enacted in 1988, was based on a new Customs goods classification, the Harmonized System of Customs Goods Classification Code (HS). It provided for a seven-year (1988 - 1994) tariff regime, with the objective of achieving transparency and predictability of tariff rates. Imports under the regime thus attracted ad valorem rates applied on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis. A new seven-year (1995 - 2001) tariff regime, established by Decree No. 4 of 1995 succeeded the previous (1988 – 1994) regime. The tariff structure over the period 1988 - 2001 increased import duties on raw materials, and on intermediate and capital goods, while tariffs on consumer goods were slightly reduced. This was aimed at reducing distortions in resource allocation and combating smuggling. Both the 1988 and 1995 tariff schedules had provisions for reviews and amendments. However, they maintained the familiar mixed trends in tariff regimes. Three types of changes were subsequently common, namely, reduction in rates; increase in rates and/or removal from or addition to the import prohibition list.
TRADE POLICY UNDER THE NEEDS ERA (1999 - 2006)

As pointed out above, Nigeria’s trade policy regime as currently contained in the NEEDS and trade policy documents, has been geared to enhancing competitiveness of domestic industries, with a view to, inter alia, encouraging local value-added and promoting as well as diversifying exports. The mechanism adopted to this end is gradual liberalization of the trade regime. Thus, the government intends to liberalize the trade regime in a manner, which will ensure that the resultant domestic costs of adjustment do not outweigh the benefits. This is the fundamental basis on which to gauge the direction and implementation of policy. The clarion call is "gradual liberalization". This addresses the question as to what is the kind of trade strategy the government has adopted in furtherance of its development agenda. Current reform packages are therefore designed to allow a certain level of protection of domestic industries and enterprise. Concretely, this has translated into tariff escalation, with high effective rates in several sectors and lower import duties on raw materials and intermediate goods unavailable locally. This policy perspective has also led to the application of relatively high import duties on finished goods which compete with local production.

Measures affecting imports

The tariff structure (shown in Table I), indicates that Nigeria’s bound tariffs taken together, are in the range of only 19.2 per cent. In the period since 1998, the average applied MFN tariffs have increased from about 24 per cent to 29 per cent, with applied MFN tariff rates on agriculture and non-agricultural products averaging 50 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively. A general assessment of the tariff structure reveals that tariff rates are widely dispersed, ranging from 2.5 per cent to a maximum of 150 per cent, with a total of only 19 bands applied. Thus the overall picture reveals mixed escalation, and this is attributable to the high tariffs on agricultural commodities. This seems to indicate a policy bias in favour of agricultural protection. A number of industries are also protected through positive tariff mechanisms, while several industries benefit from tariff exemptions and concessions on imports of inputs of raw materials.

Sectoral distribution of tariffs

Table 2 shows the sectoral distribution of tariffs; the overall picture is one of wide dispersal, but with significantly higher levels of protection for agricultural products. The average MFN rate for agriculture (going by WTO definitions) was 50.2 per cent, as against 32 per cent in 1998. There was an even sharper rise in tariffs in 2002, particularly on several agricultural products. Indeed, tariff amendments introduced in 2002 led to tariff rates of 100 per cent on several products, which fall under agriculture classification. The lowest recorded average agricultural rates are on cut flowers and plants (20.3 per cent); oil seeds, fats and oils (34.1 per cent); and animals and animal products (34.5 per cent). The highest rates apply to fruits and vegetables (98.2 per cent); tobacco (89.4 per cent), with rates of 150 per cent on cigars and other
manufactured tobacco products; and beverages and spirits (75.3 per cent), with rates of 150 per cent on water. Given the relatively high level of protection for agricultural products, the overall tariff structure has displayed a mixed escalation, showing negative from the first to the second stages of processing and positive from the second stages to the third stages. In food processing and beverages, there is pronounced positive escalation from stages one to three of processing. This implies a high effective rate of protection to these industries, thus increasing the profitability of production in the sector and hence influencing the pattern of resource allocation in their favour. The most protected areas (subject to a tariff of 100 per cent) include butter, cheese and curd; edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible fruits and nuts; vegetable oil, margarine; processed meat products; confectioneries; and various food preparations containing chocolate, pastry and rice.

Figures on non-agricultural products for 2003 indicate that manufactures attracted an average applied MFN rate of 25.3 per cent, up from 23.1 per cent in 1998. Average MFN applied duties by product category range from 2.5 per cent to 100 per cent, with the lowest average rates on petroleum (11.3 per cent); non-electric products (13.9 per cent); and chemicals and photographic imports. The highest rates are textiles and clothing (42.7 per cent), followed by mineral products, precious stones and metals (28 per cent), fish and fish products, leather, rubber, footwear and travel goods (30 per cent) respectively. Interestingly, in industrial products too, there is a wide dispersion of tariffs within each product group. Some chemicals attract tariffs of 2.5 per cent, while others attract rates as much as 100 per cent. (See Table 2)

Duty exemption and concessions

Duty exemptions and concessions also remain some of the quantitative policy instruments for affecting trade policy in favour of domestic producers and to achieve the aim of diversification. Exemptions on import duties have been put in place for a number of goods. There are tariff concessions which have been put in place to attract investment and boost production. These concessions apply to certain raw materials used by manufacturers. Tariff concessions are also applied to fertilisers, in order to support agriculture, while tax concessions have been extended to exporters under the Export Expansion Grant (EEG).

Import prohibitions

Import prohibition continues to be a major non-tariff tool for pursuance of trade policy. Comparison between 1998 and 2005 has seen the addition and withdrawal of items on the prohibition list. Since 1991, several items had been removed from the list. These include vegetable oils; processed wood; textile fabrics, furniture; fluorescent tubes and lamp bulbs. Imports of motor vehicles over eight years from date of manufacture, were also banned, but again re-authorized in January 1998. In 1993, imports of all types of meat were banned. In 1998, products under 23 HS four-digit codes were subject to import restriction. However, in line with the government’s desire to scale down prohibitions, a number of prohibitions were
replaced with high tariffs between 1999 and 2001. Since 2002 however, there has been a sharp reversal of policy. Thus, as at November 2004, agricultural and non-agricultural goods under some 218 HS four-digit codes, have been subjected to import restrictions, mainly for purposes of protecting domestic industries (See Table 3). Under the Export Prohibitions Act, certain agricultural products have also been placed under prohibition to enhance domestic food security and support local processing. These include raw hides and skin; timber (rough and sawn); unprocessed rubber latex and rubber lumps; rice; yam; maize and beans.

Although opinions differ as to the impact of the measures taken on local production, there are indications that the aggregate index of agricultural production registered an increase of 6.1 per cent in 2003, over the preceding year, with all sub-sectors contributing to growth. This upward trend has shown some measure of consistency between 2003 and 2005. It is noteworthy that in addition to various other measures initiated by the federal government, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has attributed the success partly to the imposition of bans in the sector. Similarly, the CBN report cited sub-sectoral growth of livestock by 5 per cent in 2003, up from 4.2 per cent in 2002.

There seems not to be a clear certainty that tariff protection measures, including import bans, have led to very salutary results in the manufacturing sector. A 2005 trade policy review document indicates that import bans and lower tariffs on inputs for growth of businesses appear to have declined since 1999, in spite of the increased use of prohibition measures. The conclusion is that the manufacturing sector appears to have fundamental problems, which cannot be addressed by merely increasing effective rates of protection.

**Other macroeconomic trends under needs era.**

In assessing the performance of trade policy, the view has often been expressed that trade policy in itself may not be able to accomplish the desired policy objectives, in the absence of appropriate complementarities. Studies of trade liberalization since the 1980s have shown that trade liberalization has failed in many instances due to lack of appropriate accompanying measures, and not so much as a result of faulty design of the trade policies themselves. Such associated policies are macroeconomic policies, pro-growth regulatory and competition policy, investments in infrastructure, human resource development, governance and the rule of law. (Chiedu Osakwe and Rajapatirana Sarath (2001); Supachai Patnitchpakdi (2002).

Under the NEEDS regime, fiscal policy has continued to be influenced by developments in the oil sector. Petroleum-related taxes account for over 70 percent of public revenue. Increases in crude oil prices in recent times have led to improvements in the fiscal balance. Between 2003 and 2005, federal revenue increased by 48.7 percent on account of increased production and higher world market prices; another
contributory factor was the removal of subsidies on domestic crude oil sales to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

Public revenue from company income tax, customs and excise duties and value-added tax (VAT) also increased over the same period while aggregate public expenditure rose by 20 per cent on capital items. Concomitantly, the public deficit diminished from 5.0 per cent in 2002 to 1.3 per cent in 2003.

While the aim of monetary policy continues to be fiscal and macroeconomic stability, inflation rates have in recent times remained above the single-digit mark, due mainly to excessive money supply, with adverse effects on the competitiveness of the economy. The growth in money supply was attributed largely to an increase in net foreign assets, and to a lesser extent, on overall banking sector credits. The inadequacy of stabilization policies has meant sustained high inflation levels, partly also accentuated by a reduction in the minimum discount rate between 2003 and 2005.

Overall, the nominal exchange rate appears to be adjusting to the misalignment of the local currency, the naira, vis-à-vis the currencies of the major trading partners, largely due to persistent depreciation and devaluation. Unfortunately however, high inflation rates appeared to have dampened the impact of depreciation on the competitiveness of non-oil export products in particular. At the same time, restrictions in the exchange-rate market have widened the gap between the official and non-official exchange rate, which thus constitutes an indirect tax on non-oil exports, and hence a disincentive to export-oriented activities.

The trade account balance, largely affected by world market prices and domestic production of oil, remains mixed, with improvements during years of favourable oil prices as occurs presently. Fiscal policy has also shown a similar trend due to a high import content of expenditure.

Management of the external debt burden still represents a heavy drain on government resources. The external debt stood at 75 per cent of GDP around 1995. The debt burden has seriously challenged the government’s resolve to sustainably manage the overhang. Quite recently though, the government’s resolute campaign for the cancellation of Nigeria’s bilateral foreign indebtedness, eventually yielded results in mid 2005, when the Paris Club of creditors agreed to the cancellation of Nigeria’s debt. This is of course assorted with certain conditions to be met by government. It is expected that this welcome move will go a long way in helping the government’s poverty reduction agenda.
VI. EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION AS A KEY COMPONENT OF TRADE MAINSTREAMING

It is perhaps safe to argue that export diversification has always been recognized as a key strategy for economic growth since the early 1960s, even when trade policy was geared towards import substitution industrialization. But it became more visible as a trade policy tool under the structural adjustments programme in 1986 and has since then assumed a growing dimension in trade policy. Nigeria's current export drive is underpinned by a strong desire to make the country a major player in the global market. It also draws on a deep-seated desire to move away from dependence on oil as a dominant source of revenue generation. Accordingly, there has been a determined effort at diversifying the export base from the traditional oil exports towards giving impetus to the non-oil export sector and bolstering value-added. The current policy framework is part and parcel of the overall trade policy, whose objective is to encourage the production and distribution of goods and services, in order to satisfy both domestic and international markets, essentially for the purpose of accelerating economic growth. Within this broad framework are embedded specific objectives which deal with export-oriented measures. The aspiration here is to integrate the Nigerian economy into the global market through the establishment of a liberal market; promote and diversify exports in both traditional and non-traditional markets; and stimulate the transfer, acquisition and adoption of appropriate and sustainable technologies to nurture competitive export-oriented industries.

Thus in addressing the question of whether export diversification is a key component of the government’s mainstreaming agenda, it is necessary to see how this has been amply captured in the core development plan, the NEEDS. It goes without saying that NEEDS, under the dimension on trade policy and development, specifically acknowledges the role of exports. As a key strategy, NEEDS aims to pursue an export-led growth strategy through the aggressive promotion of exports and engagement with partners. To give impetus to this objective, a comprehensive export strategies project was unfolded in the last quarter of 2004. The project, which was the result of a Commonwealth technical assistance programme for Nigeria, was undertaken by a consultant, engaged by the Geneva-based International Trade Centre (ITC), to develop a comprehensive export strategies package.

Sectors such as agriculture, industry, services and minerals other than fuels are to be emphasized. A number of institutions, notably the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC), the Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority (NEPZA), the Nigeria Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) and the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), will be pivotal in this process.

The NEPC was established in 1976 to ensure the vigorous promotion of Nigerian exports and administer related export promotion incentives. With the introduction of export processing zones (EPZs), NEPZA
was established in 1992, as the administrative instrument for the EPZs. It has the mandate to approve new zones, modify existing ones, grant permits and approvals for operators in the EPZs, and manage the zones. NEXIM was established in 1991 as an export credit guarantee and insurance corporation, to provide a range of financial facilities, including short-term supplier credit, buyer credit and external-trade facilities. The NIPC was formally established in 1995 to replace the Industrial Development Coordinating Committee (IDCC). Its mandate is to co-ordinate, monitor and backstop the establishment and operation of enterprises in Nigeria. The NIPC thus serves as a one-stop agency for the registration of companies, acquisition of business permits, management of expatriate quotas and a host of other investment incentives (WTO 1998; 2005).

The incentive schemes for export promotion comprise the Export Development Fund (EDF) the Export Expansion Grant Fund (EEG); the Duty Drawback Scheme; the Investment Tax Credit Scheme; the Export Credit and Guarantee Insurance Scheme; the Manufacture-in-Bond Scheme; and buy back schemes. Additionally, there are other incentives such as Pioneer Status, tax relief on interest income, rediscounting short-term bills, retention of export proceeds, the Free Trade Zones, and the Export Processing Factories (EPF), all of which are designed to attract foreign direct investment, and to further production for export.

The EPZs are designed to facilitate the establishment of industries in specific customs enclaves that are principally designated for export purposes. An accompanying objective is to use the EPZs as a means of addressing infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, which have been identified as a drawback to export-oriented enterprise in the country. Incentives in the EPZ include exemption from Federal, State and local-government taxes, and repatriation of capital and profits. The pioneer zone was established in Calabar, Cross River State, in 1992; there are now several EPZs, while others are in the design stage.

Interestingly, and typical of the oil and gas sector of the economy, the Onne Oil and Gas Free Zone as at 2005 generated investments worth well in excess of US$1.0 billion and created employment opportunities for around 20,000 people. This EPZ has attracted major multinational oil exploration and production companies and a wide range of support firms (FMC: 2005). In contrast, only 30 companies (out of an expected number of 100 companies) had established themselves in the Calabar EPZ, which mainly deals with non-oil exports, as at the end of 2005. The Zone has attracted investments worth N282million¹ and generated about 2000 jobs (WTO 2005:42; FMC 2005). In 2003, exports from the zone amounted to US$50million, while N286million was collected as revenue on goods produced in the zone and traded in the domestic economy.

Apart from the EPZs, the government also pursues export diversification through the Export Processing Factories (EPF) facility, and more recently the Export Processing Villages (EPV). The EPVs aim to encourage specialization in the production of agricultural commodities, provide employment opportunities, and

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¹ 282 million naira
hence help in the fight against poverty. They are also engaged in co-ordinating efforts towards production of export goods in commercial quantities. So far, two export processing villages have been launched. The one for horticulture is located in Jos (Plateau State) and the second, for arabica coffee, is located in both Jos and Taraba. A total of 26 companies have already been granted EPF status, while plans are under way to convert some EPF companies into free trade zones.

Within the framework of boosting non-oil exports, Presidential initiatives, such as the rather popular Cassava Export Initiative, have been introduced; it has proved popular due to its huge potential as a veritable foreign exchange earner. Indeed, the government has already projected the realization of the sum of US$5 billion from the export of cassava and other non-oil exports by the year 2007.

Given the high protective tariffs, the perception of the government has tended to be that the various export incentives may somewhat reduce the anti-export bias of trade policy measures. It is noteworthy that the impact of the incentive packages on non-traditional exports is limited by their accessibility to exporters; and even if the anti-export bias can be eliminated through the incentive schemes, the supply-side response of non-oil exports is severely constrained by other domestic factors such as infrastructure deficiencies, decrepit financial and labour markets, embryonic export-related institutions, macroeconomic instability, and budgetary constraints (WTO 2005: 40).

Another issue that has been raised relates to the multiplicity of overlapping schemes and institutions charged with administering the incentive-schemes. The incentive packages administered by the NEPC, the NIPC and the NEPZA are all geared towards the same end and therefore need streamlining if there is to be effective administration. In response to this problem, the government has taken some steps to streamline the Export Processing Factories and the Manufacture-in-Bond schemes by merging them into the Manufacture Export-In-Bond Scheme (MEIBS). Similarly, following discovery of unwholesome practices in the administration of the Export Expansion Grant Fund, the government had had to suspend it, with a view to sanitizing its operations, although it was reinstated in 2005.
The main thrust of Nigeria's trade policy is the integration of the economy into the global market system. This entails progressive liberalization to enhance competitiveness of domestic industries; effective participation in trade negotiations to harness the benefits of the multilateral trading milieu; promotion of transfer, acquisition and adoption of appropriate technologies; and support for regional integration and co-operation. Within the broad framework of macroeconomic policy, trade policy formulation cuts across a broad spectrum of stakeholders. Following the reinstatement of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, Nigeria's economic policy-making processes, including trade policy, are now formalized through the institutional law-making process. Bills emanating from the executive branch of government have to be passed through parliament. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature composed of the Senate (the upper house) and the House of Representatives (the lower house). Both chambers of parliament pass bills by a simple two-thirds majority of the votes cast, before the bill is presented to the President for assent. Ministries, as necessary, may initiate, draft and propose bills, which are required to be presented before the Federal Executive Council for approval. The Federal Executive Council comprises the President, the Vice President, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Ministers and other top presidential aides.

The Federal Ministry of Commerce is statutorily responsible for all trade-related matters. This makes it the primary establishment that is vested with trade policy formulation and implementation, including bilateral and multilateral agreements. As with every other Federal Ministry, the structure rests on three Service Departments, namely Personnel Management; Planning, Research and Statistics; and Finance and Supplies. It further comprises four major operational departments, which run the main statutory functions of the Ministry. These are the Departments of External Trade; Domestic Trade; Commodities and Export Trade; and Commercial Law.

Beyond the Federal Ministry of Commerce however, are several other line Ministries, whose activities bear on trade policy formulation and implementation. For example, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources formulates and implements policy matters for marketing of petroleum and petroleum products. None the less, responsibility for export permits remains under the Federal Ministry of Commerce. It should also be noted that the Federal Ministries of Finance and Transport, the Nigeria Customs Service and the Central Bank of Nigeria have significant roles in the overall development of Nigeria's trade policy. Under the framework of trade policy formulation, there is an overarching Trade Policy Advisory Council (TPAC), which is responsible for co-ordination of policy formulation and implementation among Ministries. The Trade Policy Advisory Council comprises the Ministers of Foreign Affairs; Commerce; Finance; Co-operation and Integration in Africa; Agriculture; and Communications. They are expected to meet at intervals to review developments, especially those concerning negotiations and agreements.
There is also the Economic Policy Co-ordinating Committee (EPCC). This is a marked departure from previous practice under the former regimes. The EPCC closely monitors macroeconomic and related developments, including trade policy, in collaboration with senior officials of relevant Ministries and other public institutions, including the Office of the Secretary to the President, Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and the Federal Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Agriculture.

As major stakeholders, private-sector entities also offer inputs into the trade policy-making process. Among the private-sector entities are the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), the National Association of Chambers of Commerce, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) the Association of Nigerian Exporters (ANE), the National Association of Small Scale Industrialists (NASSI), various banking institutions, labour unions and professional associations such as the Nigeria Economic Summit Group (NESG). Their inputs are made through their membership of Ministerial Committees; through pre-budget memoranda (which have become the hallmark of the “organized private sector” (OPS); and ad-hoc policy advice.

Effective formulation and implementation of policy thus entails collaboration among various government Ministries and agencies as well as continuous dialogue with major stakeholders; more so given that economic liberalization has modified the balance of power between the State and the private sector, bringing the latter more into the limelight. Of late, the Nigerian government has repeatedly stressed this shift in the operational equilibrium. In this view, the initiative of driving the economy shifts into the hands of the private sector, with the government assuming the role of facilitator. The view has also been expressed, however, that the role of the private sector is still peripheral (Afeikhena: 2005). It is felt in some quarters that even though the private sector may be fairly vocal in defending its interests, only a few civil society groups represent the interests of consumers and the large masses of rural dwellers. This implies that trade policy measures may not adequately reflect the interests of the greater percentage of the populace. Indeed, in this regard, according to the WTO, trade policy formulation processes may be limited to serving the interest of the vocal minority (WTO 2005: 14).

CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES

In spite of the aforegoing, assessments of the consultative process indicate that there are limitations in this area. This again, is in spite of the fact that the frontiers of trade policy formulation have been greatly expanded by Nigeria’s membership of global organizations such as the WTO, whose activities cover a broad spectrum of trade-related issues, and hence beyond the immediate purview of the Federal Ministry of Commerce. This therefore calls for greater consultation and co-ordination among relevant Ministries and agencies and other stakeholders, including the private sector and the civil society.

The National Council on Commerce (NCC) serves as the overall trade policy-making mechanism; it considers policy proposals of the various non-State actors, which are relevant in trade policy formulation. Feedback on outcomes of dialogue and policy formulation is reported back to the NCC on a yearly basis.
(at succeeding meetings), as "Reports of Implemented Trade Decisions". There is a need, however, for an effective monitoring mechanism and more frequent feedback.

The National Focal Point on Multilateral Trade Matters (NFP)

A critical objective of Nigeria’s trade policy is to engage actively in regional and multilateral trade negotiations, so as to harmonize Nigeria’s economy with the global economy. As a way of achieving this objective, government has established the National Focal Point on Multilateral Trade Matters (NFP), to respond rapidly to the developments taking place in the multilateral trading system. This is in terms of meeting implementation obligations and providing policy guidance to Nigeria’s participation in the multilateral trade negotiations, particularly the current Doha Round. The NFP was first established in August 1995, mainly to respond to the implementation challenges that the new WTO agreements, which came into effect in January 1995, had unleashed. Given the scope of the Agreements, it was realized that the capacity of the Federal Ministry of Commerce was limited in the sense that the Ministry could not make policy which affected the domains of other Ministries and agencies. The NFP was therefore constituted as a standing Inter-Ministerial policy advisory mechanism, drawing membership from all relevant economic Ministries and agencies, whose statutory functions have a bearing on the WTO agreements. The NFP also sought to bring on board various private-sector entities.

The NFP continued to face some difficulties in its policy co-ordination efforts, mainly having to do with lack of human, institutional and financial capacity. The government has therefore made efforts to reinvigorate the NFP. With this renewed emphasis, it was also expected that funding for the NFP was going to be improved. On 16 June 2001, the NFP was renamed the Enhanced National Focal Point on Multilateral Trading Matters (ENFP). It brought on board a broad spectrum of representatives from the private sector, civil society and academia. The ENFP also established an elaborate operational structure, reflecting the various bodies in the WTO (the Councils of Trade in Goods, Services and Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and their various subsidiary committees).

It was also expected that the ENFP would begin to meet more frequently than its predecessor in order to respond effectively to developments taking place in Geneva, Brussels and elsewhere around the world. A salutary innovation is the requirement for the establishment of Commercial Desks in all Ministries and Agencies represented on the ENFP. The Commercial Desks are expected to address the high turnover of representatives of the relevant establishments. In spite of the seeming reawakening of the ENFP and hence the expectation of a vibrant framework to assure the active formulation of policy and effective engagement in multilateral trade negotiations, the enthusiasm that greeted the re-launch of the Focal Point soon died down. This was essentially because the government did not provide the necessary funding for the ENFP, as had been anticipated. In recent times the ENFP rarely met and even when it is compelled by circumstance to meet, as for instance in the preparation for the Sixth WTO Ministerial
meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005, the Focal Point was still plagued by the familiar problems of funds to host the meetings.

**TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE REQUISITE HUMAN, INSTITUTIONAL, RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL BASE**

Trade negotiations are becoming increasingly complex and hence even more challenging for trade policy formulation. This is because the scope of multilateral trade activities has expanded tremendously since the WTO replaced GATT. The WTO itself, as a global trade regulatory body, is a permanent negotiating forum, which means that efforts must be made by all members, to stay abreast with developments. This requires having permanent missions and representatives in Geneva, as well as possessing the requisite skills and institutional capacities for effective policy formulation and implementation. Thus, to enhance participation, it is imperative particularly for developing countries like Nigeria, to improve skills and the necessary institutional capacity to analyse, follow up, and manage the workings of the agreements, which are regarded as preconditions for designing adequate positions in the follow-up negotiations. The need for each country to do its homework in following up on issues, attending meetings and having teams in various world capitals doing extensive background research and providing adequate instruction on all matters cannot be dismissed. Tussie and Lengyel (2002) note that the acquisition of knowledge about how the international trading system works, the technical skills required and adequate institutional capacities, are distinct imperatives. Other critical elements identified for the enhanced participation of developing country members are co-ordination among government agencies and between government and the business community.

Perhaps a salutary innovation in this regard is the clause in the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs), which has enshrined the participation of non-State actors (NSAs) as part of the ACP negotiating machinery at the regional level. The participation of the NSAs in the EPA negotiations is a new awakening in the public-private sector relationship for trade policy formulation, especially in terms of the consultative process in preparing for negotiations. Be that as it may, even at the WTO level, the realization of the far-reaching nature of the Agreements and further negotiations has compelled several countries to take initiatives to improve the situation, yet the results are regarded as incipient and still having a long way to go.

The challenge of institutional and human capacity is daunting. The trade Ministry which has statutory responsibility for external trade relations lacks the requisite level of skills to effectively engage in the trade policy negotiation process. There seems not to be any standard programme designed for training and skills acquisition in trade negotiations, research and analysis. Training for trade policy-making and trade negotiations requires specially designed programmes - not ordinarily available in the government-owned Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON), which provides training mostly in the administrative sphere. Perhaps, the only regular source, which the Federal Ministry of Commerce has relied on for
training of its staff in the trade policy area, are the regular trade policy courses offered by the WTO. While this remains a viable option and has consistently been utilized by the Ministry, it cannot be regarded as the most optimal. This is so because the selection for the course is highly competitive, given that the vacancies are often limited and open to all developing-country WTO members. The system of recruitment, which currently operates in the Federal Civil Service, does not also seem to help matters either. Officers are recruited into the Commerce Ministry, which implies that they are specialists. Commercial Cadre appointees, though not in the Civil Service pool, can still be moved around the operational departments of the Ministry, namely Domestic Trade, External Trade and Commodities and Export Trade, which makes them, primarily, general practitioners within the Ministry. In some other developing countries, there is a system of “commercial diplomacy”, in which officers, while in the Commercial department, can still build their careers in external trade relations. With the operational structure of the Commercial Cadre officers in Nigeria, there have arisen situations in which officers who had undergone the trade policy course, have been moved to departments other than where they would have been most usefully engaged. What is at issue is the very essence of building a corps of skilled and knowledgeable officers in trade negotiations.

The same trend occurs when officers who are posted to the Trade Office in Geneva, are required to return home at the end of their tour of duty, even when it is apparent that their continued stay in Geneva, would be of greater utility to the Ministry. An argument that have been advanced by senior Ministry officials is that such officers are needed more at home to bolster the “home” capacity, while giving an opportunity to new ones to improve themselves. While this is quite a plausible argument, the problem perhaps is the timing of such recalls and whether it is wise to train people in the thick of negotiations, or to actively engage skilled hands to ensure better results.

In the institutional sphere, the Ministry remains ill-equipped, owing to lack of infrastructure and lack of a conducive environment for effective operations. This is partly due to poor funding for the Ministry. Although government acknowledges the key role of trade in the economy, this has not translated into a concrete commitment to enhance the capacity of the Commerce Ministry. The position of the Federal Ministry of Commerce, in the governmental hierarchy should be evaluated, so as to elevate it to the status befitting the role of trade in the global economy.

Co-ordination, a critical element in the process, is also a major problem, in spite of the elaborate mechanism already put in place. There is lack of co-ordination among government establishments and between government and non-State actors. Although there is increasing awareness of the need for all-inclusive participation of stakeholders, co-ordination has not been very effective. Given the fact that Nigeria is currently engaged in negotiations at various levels, there is expected to be co-ordination of positions at all these levels to ensure streamlining of positions. Although the ENFP’s mandate is to deal with all multilateral trade matters, it appears to have been basically consigned to addressing only the WTO. The ACP-EU EPA negotiation, which is supposed to fall within its purview, has been kept away
from its scrutiny. This stems partly from the co-ordination problem, which has been the bane of policy formulation. With the introduction of the Ministry of Integration in Africa, the co-ordination of regional initiatives like the ECOWAS and NEPAD systems, have simply fallen on the laps of the Integration Ministry, which has set up a negotiating machinery separate from the ENFP. Furthermore, non-State actors have not been able to rise to the challenge of participating effectively. Civil society tended to be more marginalized even in the consultative processes than the private sector.

Another critical element in the trade negotiation process is the requirement for a solid research base. This has so far been identified as yet another weak link in the Nigerian trade policy formulation process (Afeikhena 2005:7) No formal structure exists so far for undertaking research to support negotiations. The Enhanced National Focal Point was expected to fulfill that role; but the ENFP, by its very nature, cannot be regarded as the right body to undertake research and analysis. It would have been able at some point, perhaps, to address the lacuna in the research and analysis, especially when it came to commissioning impact studies. At present however, the only viable source through which some support has been derived is in the organization of occasional national seminars; but the Ministry of Commerce does not organize even the seminars in a consistent manner, again partly because of the ineffectiveness of the NFP and inadequate funding for such purposes. The Ministry has had to rely on such agencies like the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), OXFAM, and the Toronto-based International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty (ILEAP), for funds to organize such events for capacity-building purposes.

Indeed, compared to other areas of national policy formulation, the trade sector remains about the only sector without the necessary knowledge support base for critical analytical backstopping of policy formulation. There are, for example, the Nigeria Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) in macroeconomic research; and the National Centre for Economic Management (NCema), dealing with administration and management, while Foreign Affairs has the Nigeria Institute for International Affairs. The Federal Ministry of Commerce secured approval from the last military government, for the establishment of a Foreign Trade Institute, which would have come in handy to play the urgently needed support role for trade policy research and analysis. That institute, several years on, has not been operational. Another arrangement which should have served as a stop-gap measure in the absence of any viable research based framework, was the arrangement between the ILEAP, the Ministry of Commerce, the Geneva Trade Office of the Ministry and the Trade Policy Research and Training Programme (TPRTp), University of Ibadan. That initiative, which was to be funded by ILEAP would have seen the TPRTP play the role of interim research base for the trade related issues, on which the Federal Ministry of Commerce might need studies. Sadly, the Ministry is not exploiting that opportunity to its fullest advantage.

In spite of these limitations, there is abundant local capacity for the collation and dissemination of vital information and research to support trade policy and trade negotiation in Nigeria. Apart from the TPRTP, expert skills and knowledge are also available in academia and in the private sector. One major
drawback, however, is the wide gulf between academics and practitioners. The linkages between research and policy have been observed to be tenuous, and as a result, trade policy-making and negotiations have been unable to draw maximum benefits from existing studies outside the trade policy-making circles in Nigeria (Agbaje and Afeikhena 2005: 335).

Some new development which might come to the rescue, is the initiative by the current Chief Economic Adviser to the Nigerian President, who soon after the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Commerce, has called on his colleagues with major stakes in the ongoing negotiations to do impact assessment studies in such areas to help guide the formulation of Nigeria’s positions in the negotiations. Being also the Head of the Nigerian National Planning Commission, he has established a core team comprising intellectuals and government functionaries, to first brainstorm and identify areas where research and analysis are necessary, determine how early such research and analysis should be conducted, and identify individuals capable of undertaking such studies. At the time of compiling this study, the initiative, which is being co-ordinated by officials of the National Planning Commission, had identified such researchers and sent invitations requesting them to send in proposals on the areas already identified by the core team for study. It is interesting to note that an initiative such as this, coming from the Chief Economic Adviser, and based on the challenge thrown by the Minister of Commerce, has already caused some discomfort, both within and outside the Federal Ministry of Commerce, under whose responsibility such initiative lies.
Nigeria's current trade policy clearly acknowledges the role of international trade in the nation's economy and therefore makes a strong reference to vibrant engagement in both bilateral, regional and multilateral trade negotiations, as a way of boosting trade and achieving full integration into the global economy. Thus, the government of Nigeria has at every opportune occasion reiterated its continued commitment to the principles and objectives of the multilateral trading system (WTO 2005: 19). Under NEEDS, the policy vision is to drastically reduce uncertainty and unpredictability in the trade policy regime, harmonize trade practices with ECOWAS countries, respect Nigeria's obligations under multilateral and regional trading systems, and create a conducive and competitive environment for Nigerian businesses to flourish and compete in the regional and global economies. The goal of policy here is to lay a solid foundation for fully exploiting Nigeria's potential in international trade and in helping it become the gateway to West and Central Africa.

The principal strategies and instruments for achieving this goal under NEEDS include harmonized tariffs with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and other countries and adopting the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET); it also entails cooperation with other African and developing countries to ensure that the WTO trade negotiations take into account the concerns and interests of Nigeria and Africa (NEEDS: 83). Indeed, given the phenomenal pace of globalization, with the multilateral trading system acting as a major catalyst, it has become imperative that trade policy critically recognize the role of the WTO and the need to actively participate in the process so as to take advantage of the benefits it offers. This is equally true of Nigeria's participation in such schemes as the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS), the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

Nigeria became a founding member of WTO with the coming into effect of the Marrakech Agreement, establishing the Organization, in January 1995. However, Nigeria's involvement in the multilateral trading system dates back to 1960, when the country formally joined the then General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), after gaining independence from colonial rule. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations however, GATT was succeeded by WTO, the key objective of which is continuous liberalization of global trade through the harmonization of global trade rules, aimed at greater reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. WTO is guided by such principles as non-discrimination, amplified under such concepts as the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status and national treatment, transparency, coherence and predictability; and increased tariffication or tariff bindings. All
of these, taken together, guarantee the achievement of WTO’s overall goals and objectives of a secure, stable, predictable rules-based multilateral trading system.

Nigeria’s commitment to these principles and objectives of the multilateral trading system, in itself implies that Nigeria is bound by the obligations she has undertaken under the WTO Agreements. It can therefore be easily inferred that the multilateral trading system must have impacted significantly on Nigeria’s trade policy, given the WTO’s role of harmonizing global trade rules. WTO obligations enjoin its members to commit to implementing the specific requirements contained in the Agreements, which therefore confer at once privileges, benefits and obligations. This therefore poses various challenges, mainly to developing countries, especially given the Principle of "Single Undertaking". A positive side of membership of the WTO, apart from extending the immediate benefits of market access through lower tariffs and the MFN principle, is that the Organization also assists members in undertaking trade policy reforms. Although for developing countries, such reforms can be very painful and costly, it is often considered that in the medium to long term, such reform agenda would enable affected countries to reap the benefits, as they would be able to engage more effectively in global trade. Thus, as recommended by McLinden (cited by Newfarmer 2006:23), "high-income countries should make disciplines flexible enough to accommodate countries that have low capacity to implement accords, and developing countries should view the WTO negotiations as an opportunity to advance their domestic reform agenda".

Similarly, Dani Rodrik (2002), while assessing the linkages of institutional reform and membership of WTO, notes that membership requires the adoption of certain sets of institutional norms such as non-discrimination in trade and industrial policies; transparency in the publication of trade rules; and WTO-consistent patent and copyright protection. Further buttressing this linkage, Rodrik cites membership in the European Union (EU), which entails a set of wide-ranging legal and bureaucratic requirements. While not totally accepting its utility for all times, Rodrik agrees that one way the government can use institutional arbitrage to good effect is by enhancing the credibility of domestic institutions. In this regard, new disciplines imposed on developing-country governments by the WTO, especially in the area of tariff bindings, quantitative restrictions, services, subsidies, trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), and intellectual property, can be viewed as helping governments overcome traditional weaknesses in the style of governance. This is because the disciplines ostensibly impose a certain degree of predictability, transparency and rule-bound behaviour, as well as non-discrimination in areas of policy often subject to discretion and rent seeking. Consequently, perhaps the greatest contribution of the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA) to the Mexican economy was the element of irreversibility and cementing, which represents a contribution of the NAFTA Agreement to Mexico’s reforms. In Europe, the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the EU, has made return to military dictatorship in these countries virtually unthinkable.

Against that backdrop, we may note Oyejide’s characterization of contexts in which trade policy reform can take place, namely: unilateral/autonomous reforms; opening up markets in the context of reciprocal
regional trade agreements; and multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO. Oyejide (2002) has argued that Nigeria's trade liberalization agenda has been characterized by a unilateral/autonomous reform mechanism and has, as a result, been fraught with a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. The alternatives of regionalism and the WTO would therefore engender the necessary "locking-in of policy" and so forestall policy reversals and the uncertainty and unpredictability that has so far obnubilated Nigeria's trade policy.

Turning now to Nigeria's level of implementation of its WTO obligations, it is noteworthy that a cardinal objective of a rules-based multilateral trading system, is the streamlining of trade policy through tariff bindings, and this ensures that levels of tariff reductions already attained are not reversed. Under this specific obligation, the government, both in the trade policy roadmap and the NEEDS document, acknowledges that trade policy had lacked consistency, certainty and predictability. Thus, the current policy posture subscribes to the need for certainty and predictability of the tariff regime. Indeed, it is noteworthy that prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, only one item (stockfish) was bound in Nigeria's tariffs (WTO 1998:39). Under current WTO obligations, Nigeria has bound all her agricultural tariff lines at the ceiling rate of 150 percent, although applied MFN rates are somewhat lower. The wide margin between the level of agricultural bound rates (though in consonance with the requirement of binding all agricultural products) and applied rates, and the high level of unbound industrial tariffs, makes Nigeria's tariff profile highly opaque. Further, the government's decision to retain high tariffs and the continuous imposition of import bans makes trade policy highly uncertain and unpredictable. It nonetheless has to be measured against the WTO tenet of a consistent, transparent, certain and predictable policy. There thus appears to be a policy disconnection and contradiction; on the one hand, the government states as a policy objective, the attainment of policy coherence, certainty and predictability and yet, on the other hand, affirms the retention of prohibitions, exemptions, exceptions and high tariffs, for purposes of protection of domestic industries.

It is noteworthy, however, that the government has taken some bold reform measures, aimed in part at complying with WTO obligations as part of specific trade policy measures and also as part of overall macroeconomic institutional reform, to boost capacity: These measures include:

- The abolition of general import licenses;
- The abolition of state trading enterprises otherwise known as Commodity Boards;
- No-local-content requirements legislation in line with the TRIMS Agreement, even though local-content inputs are encouraged through the provision of certain incentives on a non-discriminatory basis;
- Reform of the customs administration and customs procedures, leading to the modernization of practices, through computerization of procedures to improve efficiency, transparency and accountability. Customs Procedures through the implementation of Automated System Customs Data (ASYCUDA), and as a result, the processing of documents by one computerized unit;
• Port reforms: as part of the drive towards deregulation and privatization, but also aimed at trade facilitation; the ports concession exercise, already under way as at mid-2005, has almost been concluded, with the major ports in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Calabar, Warri, and Onne, already conceded to private operators.

• Trade defense measures: draft legislation is under way for the establishment of an anti-dumping authority - the Nigeria Trade Complaints Commission (NTCC). The establishment of the new body will not only meet a major WTO obligation, avoiding arbitrary recourse to import prohibitions not based on evidence of dumping or subsidy, but also the benefit of claiming trade remedy/trade defence rights as provided for by the WTO Agreements on Anti-dumping, Safeguards and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The new bill when enacted will also repeal the current legislation the Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidized Goods) Act, enacted in 1958. Under the Act, a special duty can be imposed on any goods deemed dumped in Nigeria or subsidized by any government or authority outside Nigeria. The new legislation would also cover subsidies and safeguards measures in line with WTO provisions.

• Customs Valuation: Nigeria currently uses the Brussels Definition of Value for the purposes of customs valuation. However in compliance with WTO obligations, plans are under way to change to the WTO customs valuation, with preference for the transaction value for valuation purposes.

• Intellectual Property Rights: a draft bill is under way on the establishment of a body to be known as the Intellectual Property Commission of Nigeria (IPCON), which will bring together all intellectual-property-related agencies under a single administration. It is also geared towards compliance with WTO obligations i.e. to streamline domestic intellectual property legislation with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, with renewed focus on the enforcement aspects which are considered weak at present. Furthermore, as part of the transparency and implementation obligations, Nigeria conducted the TRIPS review in 2002. The review thus afforded both Members and the government the opportunity to assess the level of implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, but more so, the strengths, weaknesses and challenges in undertaking implementation obligations, with a view to making improvements and seeking technical assistance where necessary.

• Trade Policy Review: the trade policy review is a major activity of the WTO aimed at fulfilling a major objective, namely, transparency of trade policy, so as to be able to measure the level of compliance of domestic trade rules. While not aimed at any punitive sanction against a member under review, it affords members the opportunity to take a critical assessment of trade policy and make suggestions for improvements where necessary. Nigeria has undergone the trade policy review exercise for the third consecutive time in 2005. The trade policy review is also a mark of a country’s commitment to the multilateral trade rules.

• Commitments in the services sector: as part of the obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Services, Nigeria has undertaken specific commitments in four major sectors of services, namely, financial services; transportation; and communications and tourism and related services.
IX ROLE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION ON TRADE POLICY

At the regional level, Nigeria subscribes to the view that regional integration can serve as a building block to attaining economic growth and development. Indeed, regional integration schemes can play a very useful role in reform and further liberalization of policy. In this regard, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme and attendant Common External Tariff (CET) are noteworthy. The advantages of the Common External Tariff in integration schemes are well known. They are first and foremost a measure of the degree of integration among contracting parties. An obvious advantage of the CET is that adopting it is a way of reducing asymmetry in the distribution of gains and losses. The CET thus helps lessen potential tensions between members by lowering external tariffs, which helps to generate the classical gains from trade. The ECOWAS CET as agreed to by members would consist of four bands: 0 per cent; 5 per cent; 10 per cent; and 20 per cent, similar to those already being applied by the UEMOA member-States. Although Nigeria has missed deadlines in the past, it has remained committed to implementation of the CET. In line with this commitment, Nigeria commenced implementation of the first stages of the CET on 1st October 2005. By applying the CET, Nigeria will reduce the number of tariff bands from the 19 bands hitherto operated to the four that are operational under the ECOWAS regime. This implies that about 65 per cent of Nigeria’s total imports (capital goods, raw materials and essential goods, such as medicines, will be subject to duties of 0 per cent – 10 per cent. Indeed, before the reform, 83 per cent of Nigeria’s tariff lines were higher than UEMOA rates. Thus, Nigeria’s average tariff rate has declined by more than 50 per cent following harmonization with the UEMOA rates. (Briggs 2005)

Another body which can help consolidate regional initiatives, is the proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). Efforts are presently aimed at meeting the "pre-condition", otherwise referred to as the convergence criteria, for establishing the West African Monetary Zone, namely 5 per cent or lower inflation rate over at least a six-month period. Other conditions that need to be addressed include the central banks’ ability to finance public deficits not exceeding 10 per cent of the previous year’s tax revenue; and ratios of GDP (excluding foreign grants) not exceeding 4 per cent. On the WAMZ initiative, the questions have arisen about the suitability of the time of implementation and the risks involved, given Nigeria’ oil-driven exchange rate (WTO 2005:121).
X ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

In assessing the challenges of capacity constraints currently facing Nigeria, Oyejide (2000); Butegwa (2004); Bankole (2005); and Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 351) have summarized some of the critical features namely:

- Limited knowledge base: the absence of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the rules, and technical issues;
- Limited research, analysis and evaluation capacities;
- Lack of access to up-to-date information on global developments and their potential impacts, including policy formulation by trading partners;
- Lack of attention to strategic and tactical planning, especially on a long-term basis, and non-anticipation of possible future developments, with the result that pre-emptive positions or appropriate policy alternatives are not formulated.

According to Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 350), the impact of these constraints negatively affects the capacity of Nigeria to participate effectively in the WTO negotiations or even in the multilateral trading system in general. However, the Uruguay Round, which ushered in the WTO, has brought along unprecedented obligations not only in relation to reducing tariff barriers but also towards the implementation of far-reaching reforms. Such reforms affect both trade procedures and many areas of regulation, which lay the basis for basic business environments in the domestic economy, for example, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, and TRIPS. (Finger and Schuler 2002:493).

In realization of the challenges brought about by this development, especially on demands for trade liberalization and the subsequent impact and implications for development, WTO embodies perhaps the most far-reaching impact of the international community on Nigeria’s trade liberalization since the advent of the SAPs. Additionally, the WTO also has a key objective of providing technical assistance, mainly focused on training and dissemination of information. In this regard, Nigeria has participated in several workshops and seminars aimed at capacity-building, especially in the understanding of the WTO Agreements.

Apart from the WTO, other multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the World Customs Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), UNCTAD, the Commonwealth and other bilateral donors like the DFID and USAID, has on occasion assisted with enhancement of the
trade policy process, either through targeted human capacity-building programmes or institution building, to improve administrative or regulatory frameworks. In relation to trade policy, USAID was active in supporting the Nigerian Trade policy review exercise, which was adopted in 2002. The outcome of that process, which stands as the current trade policy road map, provided the basic frame for mainstreaming trade into the NEEDS. DFID has also provided assistance, which led to the organization of a high-level brainstorming seminar on mainstreaming trade into National Development Strategies in August 2004. That exercise provided the opportunity to reassess the role of trade as a development strategy. The exercise eventually produced what came to be known as the "Trade Policy Action Plan".

In August 2005, the Federal Ministry of Commerce again approached USAID for assistance in the area of Services, with the objective of providing basic understanding on the Services Agreement and in responding to the obligations of making requests and offers, in the ongoing negotiations on Services. Furthermore, USAID is engaged in assisting the Commercial Law Department of the Ministry of Commerce in capacity building, through the Commercial Law Programme of the United States Commerce Department. The Commonwealth Secretariat has also been active in the TBT and SPS areas, recruiting Consultants to undertake studies on the Nigerian food safety and quality control processes. The aim is to increase the ability of the country to meet the requirements of WTO Agreements on TBT and SPS, while the focus of the study is to review the regulatory framework for food safety and quality control of specified agricultural products. The bias of the assistance is to improve the export quality of Nigeria’s agricultural products, in order to take advantage of markets access opportunities, and thereby fulfill the objective of export diversification. The Geneva-based International Trade Centre (ITC) is in the process of engaging consultants to undertake an assessment of the Nigerian services sector. This is with a view to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the sub-sectors, their performance so far and therefore what sub-sectors might be further opened up under current negotiations. The findings can also play a significant role in the negotiations, especially in identifying specific interests and priorities, where negotiating capital can be more beneficially utilized. The study is being done under the auspices of US government technical assistance, administered through USAID.

An assessment of these capacity-building programmes indicates that they have not been rendered in a very co-ordinated manner to achieve the desired objectives. It can be seen that in the area of services alone, three programmes have been conducted, all aimed at assisting the preparation of Nigeria’s request and offers in the services negotiation, yet those requests and offers have not been prepared. Thus, apart from the Commonwealth study, aimed at improving export quality of agricultural produce as well as meeting WTO obligations, other assistance programmes which have been geared to the human capacity area, have not been well co-ordinated or effectively streamlined. In this regard, Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 353) after doing an assessment of a list of technical assistance programmes in which Nigeria has benefited from the WTO and other agencies, conclude that they fail to sufficiently take into consideration the institutional inadequacies and structural deficiencies that prevent optimal deployment of financial assistance to support activities that could use these results in a more profitable and creative manner.
While the above criticism may be right, it also opens up a fundamental question of the government’s ability to co-ordinate these assistance programmes in a more effective manner. In order to address the problem of co-ordination and streamlining of assistance programmes, some recommendations made by Andrea Spear (2005) on adopting a more strategic approach to trade-related capacity-building can provide a very useful guide to the government. One of the recommendations is to approach donors more strategically with good proposals, which seek to address priority needs, and that also take into consideration time-frames and costing. Second, is to evolve stronger co-ordination by first assessing needs and then seek out donors at specific intervals to express interest ahead of following up with formal proposals.
XI  CONCLUDING THEMATIC ANALYSES

One question that has featured in this study appertains to the capacity of trade to make a difference in poverty alleviation efforts. We have attempted to show that trade and appropriate design of trade policy can set the economy on the path to expansion and growth, employment and income generation, and hence poverty alleviation. Still, the literature is not always explicit on whether there is a concrete causal linkage. There is a discernible corpus of concurrence as to the need for trade reform in the direction of liberalization but usually with the caveat that trade policy cannot on its own achieve the desired result without being supported by complementary policies at the macroeconomic level.

In the case of Nigeria, there is ample evidence that as part of the overall development strategy, the NEEDS, trade policy has been assigned a major role with quite explicit strategies to achieve the goals of wealth creation through employment generation, expansion and diversification of the export sector.

TRADE POLICY AND MAINSTREAMING

The approach of the Nigerian government may be described as a gradualist approach to trade liberalization, as expressed in its NEEDS document. A critical assessment of the dynamics of the country’s trade policy since the 1960s shows a persistent element of uncertainty. There has been a movement from import substitution strategy in the 1960s and 1980s, to the relaxation of protectionist measures and enhanced openness during the structural adjustment era. Trade policy has witnessed a series of swings in relation to the use of high tariffs, prohibitions and exemptions, especially between 1986 and 2001. There have been sharp policy reversals, with a rise in the use of import ban and high tariffs as well as other non-tariff measures geared towards the protection of the domestic sector. Unfortunately, this policy of protection has led to inefficient allocation of resources. This rise in consumer prices has undermined the government’s efforts at poverty reduction, apart from encouraging smuggling. The heavy reliance on prohibitions and other non-tariff measures, including the wide gap between bound and applied rates, raises credibility issues in trade policy. Policy reversals and policy mortality, particularly as concerns the two consecutive tariff schedules (1988 - 1994 and 1995 - 2001), has been compounded by the trend since 2002 which has been characterized by the continuous imposition of prohibitions, in spite of the avowed concern for the eradication of uncertainty and unpredictably under the NEEDS. The implication of this according to Oyejide, is that the uncertainty surrounding government tariff policy affects private-sector initiatives to commit themselves to long-term investment and production decision, for fear of potential losses that could result from such reversals (cited in Adenikinju 2005:144). Indeed, the National Economic Intelligence Committee (NEIC), in its report for 2005, assessed the implication of concessions for revenue collection and noted that it impacted negatively on revenue for the period under review. The
NEIC expects that this situation should be alleviated when the intended harmonization of the tariffs with those of the ECOWAS tariff regime eventually commence materializes (NEIC 2005).

It is interesting that a positive trend has been observed in the performance of the agricultural sector following the reversal, in 2002, of policies which had tended to impose higher protective tariffs on agricultural products. It is still debatable though, whether high tariffs and in particular import prohibitions have generated the positive growth or whether it should be attributable to other government interventions in the sectoral policy measures on agriculture. Given that agriculture engages a majority of the poor, improvements in the sector can go a long way in helping the poverty alleviation efforts of the government. This is by helping to stabilize the price of food staples, generate income for the poor and bolster the downstream linkages to industrial production. It is noteworthy that the NEIC has attributed the relative stability in the prices of major consumer goods from the end of 2004 to the first quarter of 2005, to the reasonably good harvest season and renewed government efforts to encourage domestic production.

Export diversification, a key component in the trade policy strategy for harnessing growth and expansion, has registered a measure of progress in the development of schemes such as Export Processing Zones (EPZs), Export Processing Factories (EPFs) and Export Processing Villages (EPVs). The impact of these schemes is yet to be significantly felt as they are still very much in their early stages. Diversification initiatives had not made much headway until recently; they were mainly hampered by the trade policy strategy of protecting domestic industry through high tariffs. The resultant distortions in the allocation of resources was tantamount to an anti-export bias favouring inefficient domestic sectors. Incentive schemes for the promotion of exports have been beset by poor administration by implementing agencies among others. There is a need to streamline the operations of the implementing agencies.

**MACROECONOMIC CHALLENGES**

The economic profile over the past few years shows relatively stable exchange rates and fairly stable inflation trends (down from 18.6 per cent to 11.6 per cent in the last quarter of 2005). Fiscal deficits declined from 8.4 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 2.8 percent in 2003, reflecting a measure of public-sector belt-tightening. In spite of huge receipts from crude oil exports, an element of instability has more recently been observed in the exchange rate, which in itself is a disincentive to investments in export-oriented sectors. The uncertainty that has appeared to characterize macroeconomic policy has led to the erosion of confidence within the ranks of the international investor community. Frequent policy changes and weak regulatory and institutional frameworks have not helped matters.

The steady rise in the price of crude oil has had its positive side, which is to help build a sizeable foreign-exchange revenue base; it has also proved to be a critical factor in the successful negotiation of the repudiation of Nigeria’s huge external debt. The flipside to this conjuncture is that Nigeria being a net
importer of a raft of commodities, and also unable to meet the demands of domestic consumption of petroleum products, has had to contend with increasing import prices, translating into negative impacts on the poor. In the face of rising crude oil prices, the government has consistently pursued a policy of deregulation of the oil sector, leading to periodic hikes in the price of refined petroleum products. This has typically generated a domino effect on commodity prices generally, i.e. foodstuffs, transport, housing, and other basic necessities.

The Nigerian government is yet to evolve a mechanism of adequate social-sector safety nets, to mitigate the adverse circumstances generated by price increases; which when they target the poor, increase rather than reduce poverty levels in the country. Given the dominance of crude oil in Nigeria's exports, oil price fluctuation presents challenges to macroeconomic policies, with consequences on the competitiveness of non-petroleum exports.

Inadequacies in infrastructure (notably roads, transport logistics, and the ports system), have consistently raised the cost of doing business. Critical among them is the serious deficiency in the supply of electricity, which persistently defies solutions. A study on the cost of infrastructure failure in Nigeria has indicated that respondents had ranked power outages and voltage fluctuations as among the major obstacles to their operations. The huge cost of production means that Nigeria's manufactured goods do not have the desired competitive edge in the international markets.

As part of the broad policy reforms especially in the area of privatization, port reforms are already under way with the "Port Concessioning" exercise. The bottlenecks bedeviling Nigeria’s port system are persistent, and the government’s directive for goods to be cleared within forty-eight hours after landing at port, is infrequently realized. In recent times, government has been constrained to set up a task force to decongest the ports.

Access to finance is known to be hindered by high interest rates and collateral requirements. Long-term access to finance is scant, and so it is only the large multinational firms that are likely to receive loans, while the small-scale entrepreneurs are marginalized. Nonetheless, one of the NEEDS objectives is the enhancement of the capacities of the SMEs. Although microfinancing schemes under the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and the Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme (SMIEIS) have been introduced by government, these programmes have not only been bogged down by inadequacy of funds, bureaucracy has also undermined them. However, it is expected that with the recent bank consolidation exercise aimed at making it easier for the financial institutions to play a catalytic role in supporting investment and production, the situation will change for the better. It is hoped that there will be greater access to finance, interest rates rationalization, and a situation where banks would be more forthcoming in supporting investment ventures.
TRADE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESSES

Trade policy formulation processes are increasingly assuming an institutional character, with the idea of consultation amongst government, private sector and civil society becoming more acceptable as a way of doing government business. However, the consultation process still needs strengthening, and stakeholders like the private sector and civil society continue to display some degree of reticence, partly owing to the lack of skills and resources to remain actively engaged. There is increasing awareness though, and an eagerness to participate in the policy formulation processes, in spite of the handicaps.

The Federal Ministry of Commerce, the pivotal agency around which all trade-related activities should revolve, has not been given the needed boost, in regard to its elevation in the hierarchy of the governmental establishment. This situation appears to stem from the fact that, though there is a recognition of the role of trade as a major avenue through which to stimulate and expand growth, its track record had been that of a somewhat marginalized sector, perhaps due to the dominance of the oil sector in the economy.

Another noteworthy drawback is human capacity in the relevant government establishments involved with trade, such as the Federal Ministry of Commerce. This constraint is exacerbated by the yawning gap between trade policy processes and the necessary research and analytical base to provide vital inputs that can assist in effective policy formulation, including identification of appropriate priorities and strategies for engagement in multilateral negotiations. At best therefore, Nigeria’s engagement in multilateral trade negotiations has mainly been on the side of reaction rather than pro-activity. Yet, as noted earlier, the requisite research-based institutions are available but have not been fully taken advantage of, due to a somewhat tenuous relationship between policy-makers and researchers.
XII THE POLICY VISION

It may be necessary to undertake a strategic review of the NEEDS, with a renewed focus on trade mainstreaming. There have arisen concerns that the trade agenda under the NEEDS does not seem to go deep enough, even though the formulation of the NEEDS is known to have benefited from a wide range of participation and consultations. The idea of the high-level meeting organized by the Ministry of Commerce in collaboration with DFID, appeared to have aimed at that direction, leading to the drawing up of the Trade Policy Action Plan; yet, it is very doubtful whether that action plan is being implemented, as even within the Federal Ministry of Commerce, only few know of the existence of such an "Action Plan".

Tariff policy reform is clearly called for, particularly for the purposes of transparency, certainty and predictability, and to reduce as much as possible, the wide use of non-tariff measures, such as prohibitions and exemptions. The reasons for this have already been highlighted in earlier sections of the paper. Part of the objective of further tariff reforms should also be aimed at closing the wide margins between the applied rates and the bound rates, as this has contributed to the uncertain and unpredictable nature of the tariff regime. A review has also become necessary in the face of the recent adoption of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff, which is believed to have brought tariffs down by about fifty percent. In the face of the ongoing negotiations on various fronts, especially the WTO and the ACP-EU EPA, a clearly simplified tariff structure would lead to better grasp of the issues by negotiators and further facilitate coherence of Nigeria's positions in all these fronts. As part of the means of achieving predictability, there is the need to consider significantly increasing the scope of tariff binding, from the current level of only 7 per cent at HS six digit lines. The essence of binding is to ensure "locking in" of policy to forestall the wanton reversal of policy.

There is need to add more impetus to the trade facilitation process. It is expected that the reforms in the ports system, leading to the current exercise of "Port Concessioning", would help reduce the bottlenecks currently experienced in the port system. In addition, the Customs administration and procedures should consistently strive for modernization, in line with modern-day business practices.

At the macroeconomic level, there is no overstating the fact that the challenges are enormous. Clearly, trade policy can only do well when the appropriate supportive macroeconomic polices are effective. In particular, the exchange rate stability has remained a recurrent decimal. The need to stem the rates of inflation and rein in interest rates as part of fiscal policy and stable monetary policy can only continue to be re-emphasized. This has been coupled with the imperatives of infrastructure development. It is expected that the government will live up to its promise of committing funds (occasioned by the recent reprieve from the huge external debt burden) into the social sectors, to address the problems of poverty.
Targeted sectoral policy measures are also necessary as general anti-poverty objectives, as it is clear that trade policy alone may not achieve anti-poverty goals.

At the trade policy formulation level, there is need to review the standing of the trade Ministry in the scheme of hierarchical importance, as this will afford it the necessary capacity to discharge its functions more effectively. One way to address its human capacity needs is to change the pattern of recruitment into the Commerce Ministry by developing a cadre of Commercial diplomats whose career path would be in external trade relations. This is to avoid the current situation in which Commercial Officers within the Ministry are seen as “generalists” who could be moved from one department to another, which undermines the objective of nurturing a crop of skilled negotiators and policy-makers. In addition, the government needs to systematically design targeted training programmes (currently lacking in the trade-related areas), in order to facilitate the consistent building of capacities.

The Enhanced National Focal Point (ENFP), the main policy think tank for multilateral trade matters, would need to be revived and funded adequately, if it is to live up to its task of fulfilling the role of a co-ordination mechanism among government establishments and between the government, the private sector and the civil society.

There is also a need to harness all available research-based resources, with a focus on accessibility and affordability; this will appropriately reflect the crucial role of research in sourcing inputs for better policy formulation and for trade negotiations. As a stop-gap measure, the initiative of the Chief Economic Adviser in the Presidency on the establishment of a Core Team of individuals drawn from a wide spectrum of society, to brainstorm and identify the priority areas where urgent studies should be conducted to guide the positions and aspirations in multilateral trade negotiations, should be sustained. It is perhaps also opportune to revisit the idea of the Foreign Trade Institute, whose establishment will go a long way in meeting the requirements for research, policy advocacy and capacity building.

There is a need also to continue taking advantage of the technical assistance and capacity building programmes provided by multilateral and bilateral donors and agencies. However, programmes have to be co-ordinated and delivered in a consistent manner, so that they achieve the targeted goals. Here, the Federal Ministry of Commerce, would need to reassess its own plans and strategies for capacity-building (if any at all), with a view to taking maximum advantage of the assistance offered. In this regard, the Ministry should shed the patent notion which perceives technical assistance programmes, particularly, those organized outside the country, as opportunities for rewards and gratification of functionaries. A comprehensive but very targeted capacity-building programme could address these sentimental considerations and ensure that the right officials are given the right training, to respond to the capacity needs of policy processes.
Notes

1. The countries are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco and Tunisia. See the work by OECD Development Centre and African Development Bank titled "Growth Trends and Outlook for Africa: Time to unleash Africa's huge energy potential against poverty". [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/43/7228562.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/43/7228562.pdf).

2. The several mainstreaming initiatives in the WTO under the Integrated Framework (IF) for Technical Assistance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which began following the successful hosting of the first LDC Seminars in this respect, held in 1997, at the WTO secretariat in Geneva.

3. Items on the prohibition list were reduced from 72 to 17 broadly defined product groups.

4. Existing restrictions are the following: prohibition of transferability of funds between the Dutch Auction System and the inter-bank market; requirements for repatriation of proceeds from non-oil exports, within 90 days from the day of shipment, and cumbersome documentation procedures. See WTO: 2005, p.4, foot 8.

5. The EDF helps financing certain activities of private exporting companies such as in training courses, symposia, seminars, workshops; advertising and publicity campaigns in foreign markets; product design and consultancy; participation in trade mission, buyer oriented activities, overseas trade fair exhibitions and sales promotion, collection of trade information; organization of export groups; and studies in respect of setting up export-oriented industries. Maximum grants allowed per company for each activity is 50% of the total direct cost, up to the maximum of N200,000.

6. The EEG provides cash inducement to exporters who have exported a minimum of N500,000 of processed products. The objective is to stimulate exporters to expand the volume of exports and diversifying their export and market coverage. Exporters of processed products are entitled to a 4% grant on their total annual export turnover, subject to receipt of confirmation of repatriation of exports proceeds from the Central bank of Nigeria and presentation of a performance bond from any of the recognised financial institutions.

7. Some of the new Free Trade Zones are owned by State Governments. Examples are Maigatari, Tinapa and Lekki. Ondo and Ogun States jointly own the Olokola Free Zone. Others in the pipeline and for which consultations are under way between NEPZA and the respective state Governments are Idiroko Border Free Zone Ogun State, Egbeda and Saki Free zone and Border Free Zone respectively (Oyo State), Koko Free Zone (Delta State), Gelegele Free zone (Edo State) Ibora Ikom Free zone (Akwa Ibom State) and EPF (Osun State).
8. In the Kano Free Trade Zone, four Companies are currently operating, with an investment worth the total sum of over US$200million. In Lekki, three companies have already been admitted into the Zone, with a planned investment of about US$650million, US$1.3billion and US$11.6million respectively for the companies.

9. The NESG, in recent times have raised its profile and diverted attention to itself, largely through its annual summits on the Economy. The NESG was established in 1993 and largely consists of top bankers and oil industry operators. It is said to have evolved out of the enabling Environment Forum (EEF), which was largely sponsored by the Aga Khan foundation and the UNIDO, and seeks to forge a good rapport between government and the Private Sector. (Adigun Agbaje and Afeikhena, 2005: 334)

10. It is necessary to clarify that when we refer to Ministries in the paper, we refer mainly to federal Ministries, and particularly so for the Federal Ministry of Commerce.

11. In addition to the 150 per cent ceiling rate, a maximum 80 percent is imposed as other duties and charges. Similarly for industrial goods, 80 per cent is imposed as other duties and charges.

12. DFID is also reported to have organized a programme of capacity building on services, preparatory to the Cancun Ministerial Conference. See Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 351). The ILEAP in collaboration with UNCTAD also provided assistance in services, in September 2005, in a move aimed at helping Nigeria prepare her requests and offers on services.

13 The Final Report of the Commonwealth study on food safety and quality control review was submitted to the Federal Ministry of Commerce in March 2006.
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Table 1: STRUCTURE OF MFN TARIFFS (1997/98 - 2003) (Per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997/98</th>
<th>99/00</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>UR*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Duty free tariff lines (% of all tariff lines)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Non-ad valorem tariffs (% of all tariff lines)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tariff quotas (% of all tariff lines)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Non-ad valorem tariff with no AVEs (% of all tariff lines)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Simple average tariff rates</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>118.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural products (WTO Definition)**</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural products (WTO Definition)***</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, forestry &amp; fishing (ISIC, Div.1)</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; quarrying (ISIC, Div. 2)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (ISIC, Div.3)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>109.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Domestic tariff &quot;spikes&quot; (% of all tariff lines) +</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. International tariff &quot;Spikes&quot; (% of all tariff lines)++</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Overall standard deviation of applied rates</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. &quot;Nuisance applied rates (% of all tariff rates) +++</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. Not applicable
* Based on the total number of Bound tariff lines
** WTO Agreement on Agriculture
*** Exclude Petroleum
+ Domestic tariff spikes are those exceeding 3 times the overall simple average applied rate (indicator 7)
++ International Tariff peaks defined as those exceeding 15%.
+++ Nuisance tariffs are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2%
### Table II: Summary analysis of MFN Tariff, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>No of lines*</th>
<th>No. of lines used</th>
<th>Simple Ave. tariff (%)</th>
<th>Tariff range (%)</th>
<th>Std-Dev (%)</th>
<th>CV</th>
<th>Imports 2000 (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>5,124</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>2.5 – 150</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>5,804.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By WTO Definition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>5 - 150</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>954.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live animals &amp; products Thereof</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Products</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>136.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee &amp; tea, cocoa, sugar etc</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>318.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut flower and plants</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>5 - 65</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits and Vegetables</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>45 - 100</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>379.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil seeds, fats oils &amp; their products</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>10 - 100</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages &amp; spirits</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>5 - 150</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>15 - 150</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agricultural Products</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Agriculture (Excl. Petroleum)</td>
<td>4,467</td>
<td>4,445</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2.5 - 100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>4,782.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish &amp; fishery products</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>257.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral products, precious stones &amp; Precious metals</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>2.5 - 100</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>495.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>5 - 65</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>552.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals &amp; photographic supplies</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>2.5 - 100</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>969.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather, rubber, footwear &amp; travel goods</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>5 - 50</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood, pulp, paper and furniture</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>2.5 - 100</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>298.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles &amp; clothing</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>5 - 65</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Equipment</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>10 - 55</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>724.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-electric machinery</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.5 - 45</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>710.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Machinery</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2.5 - 45</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>511.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural articles n.e.s</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>127.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By ISIC Sector***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, forestry &amp; fishing</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>296.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; quarrying</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>4,725</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>2.5 - 150</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>5,477.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Stage of processing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw materials</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>5 - 100</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>741.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-processed products</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>2.5 - 100</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1,930.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully-processed products</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>2,815</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>2.5 - 150</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>3,132.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total Number of lines listed. Tariff rates based on lower frequency (number of lines) since no rates were provided for 22 lines
** Two tariff lines excluded from WTO non-agriculture definition (essentially petroleum products)
*** International standard Industrial Classification (Rev. 2) Electricity, gas and water are excluded (1 line)
Note: CV = Coefficient of variation
Source: WTO, Nigeria Trade Policy 2005
Table III: Import prohibition list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>HS Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Textile Fabrics of all types and articles thereof, but excluding the following:</td>
<td>Chapters 50 – 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Nylon tyre cord</td>
<td>5902.100 - 5902.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multifilament chafer fabric and tracing cloth</td>
<td>5112.200; 5112.200 and 5909.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Mattress ticking</td>
<td>5903.100 - 5903.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Narrow Fabrics</td>
<td>5806.100 - 5806.4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Trimmings and linings</td>
<td>5909.0000; 6117.9000; 5808.9000;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Made-up fishing nets</td>
<td>6003.0000; 6307.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Mosquito Netting Materials</td>
<td>5608.1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Gloves for Industrial use</td>
<td>5608.1900 and 5608.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Canvas Fabrics for manufacture of fan belts</td>
<td>6116.1000 - 6116.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Molding cups lacra</td>
<td>5907.0000; 5908.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Elastic bands</td>
<td>6212.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Motifs</td>
<td>5604.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Textile Fabrics and articles for technical use</td>
<td>5810.1000 - 5810.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Transmission or Conveyor belt or belting of Textile materials</td>
<td>5911.1000 - 5911.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Polypropylene primary backing material</td>
<td>5910.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Fibre rope</td>
<td>5911.1000 - 5911.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Mutilated rags</td>
<td>5512.1100 - 5512.9900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r. Sacks and bags</td>
<td>5607.1000 - 5607.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6310.1100 6310.1000 and 6305.2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Men's footwear and bags of leather and plastics</td>
<td>3926.2000; 6401.1000 - 6405.9000; 4202.1100 - 4202.9900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Soaps and Detergents</td>
<td>3401.1100 - 3402.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Furniture</td>
<td>9401.1000 - 9401.9000; 9403.1000 - 9406.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assembled Bicycles (excluding CKDs)</td>
<td>8712.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flowers (Plastic and Fresh)</td>
<td>0603.1000 - 0603.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fresh Fruits</td>
<td>0801.1100 - 0814.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Cutlasses, axes, pick axes, spades, shovels</td>
<td>8201.1000 - 8201.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Wheel Barrows</td>
<td>8716.8000.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pork and pork products, beef and beef Products mutton, lamb, and goat meat</td>
<td>0201.1900, 1602.4900, 0202.2000, 1602.5000, 0204.4200, 0204.4300, 0210.7900, 0208.9000, 0210.9900 and 1602.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Toothpaste</td>
<td>3306.1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Pencils</td>
<td>9609.1000 - 9609.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ball point pens</td>
<td>9608.1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Plastic plates, knives, spoons, forks, cups, buckets, bowls, bins, containers and hangers</td>
<td>3924.1000 - 3924.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Barites and bentonites</td>
<td>2508.1000.11, 2508.1000.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Corrugated boards and cartons</td>
<td>4808.1000, 4819.1000 - 4819.6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Frozen poultry</td>
<td>0207100002073600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Online. www.nigeriacustoms.gov.ng/Prohibitions%20List.htm
Table IV: Export Prohibition List

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Timber (rough and sawn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Raw hides and skin (including wet blue and all unfinished leather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Scrap metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Unprocessed rubber latex and rubber lumps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Artifacts and antiquities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Wildlife animals classified as endangered species and their products e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Crocodiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Elephants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lizard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Zebra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lion, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Online. www.nigeriacustoms.gov.ng/Prohibition%20List.htm
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