

51151



Economic Commission for Africa

ECA/ESPD/Ad-Hoc/Exp./Civil Conflicts/04/2000

Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting on the Economics of Civil Conflicts in Africa

Case Study of Burundi

.....

*Floribert Ngaruko
J. Nkurunziza*

7 - 8 April 2000
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

I. Introduction

Burundi is a small country, landlocked between Tanzania from the East, the Democratic Republic of Congo from the West and Rwanda from the North. With a population of about 6 millions people living over 27834 square km, Burundi has one of the highest population densities in Africa. Unlike countries where civil conflicts have been contests for the control of strategic natural resources such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone or oil in Nigeria, Burundi has no known strategic natural resources. Despite this, the country's post-independence history has been marred by a series of some of the deadliest civil conflicts that have claimed about 500,000 lives. In this respect, whereas control of wealth has been at the heart of many wars in rich African countries, this paper argues that it is poverty coupled with poor governance that have been the main motives behind Burundian conflicts. The most important reason for Burundi conflicts has been the control of the country's institutions governing the allocation of its the meagre resources. We argue that ethnicity has been used as a means to reach these objectives and not the cause of conflicts per se. From the outset, it should be noted that despite the seriousness of Burundian conflicts, research on the topic has remained scanty. The few existing studies are so biased towards one ethnic group that one doubts of their credibility. This study is therefore coming at the right time to contribute to the debate on understanding the root causes of Burundi conflicts. As far as we know, this will be the first ever study of Burundian conflicts from an economics perspective. The few existing credible sources will be used as much as possible but the main source guiding our investigation of the problem remains our own life experiences since we have lived these conflicts and bore their consequences since their very beginning in the 1960s.

2. Burundi's population comprises three ethnic groups¹. From a colonial census carried out in 1956, it was concluded that, like in Rwanda, 85% of the population were Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa, a group that is usually ignored in the debate on ethnicity in view of its marginal importance. We will do the same and focus on Hutu and Tutsi groups in the paper. Of course, these figures need to be taken with caution in the light of footnote 1. However, in the absence of more acceptable figures, these ones have been widely cited as representing the composition of Burundian population. Nevertheless, even accepting these figures as a benchmark, it is possible that the events that have occurred in Burundi's post-independence era have altered this statistical ethnic composition.

3. Since Burundi's independence in 1962, the country has experienced not less than 5 civil conflicts, the latest one being the 1993 civil war which has become the longest, the

¹ It is difficult to define an "ethnic group". The concept normally refers to groups with different identities usually defined by clear distinguishing features such as language, culture, geographical space or physiological distinguishing features shared by members of the same group (refer, for instance, to Horowitz, 1985). Despite widespread clichés about Burundi's ethnicity, it should be agreed that Burundi's case is particular. Burundians speak the same only language, Kirundi, share the same culture, are intertwined within the same geographical spaces and do not present any clear distinguishing physiological features. It should be noted that, unlike in neighboring Rwanda where people's ethnic groups were recorded in their identity cards until 1994, Burundi has never had a clear cut and formalized policy of distinguishing individuals according to their ethnic origin. The objective here is not a denial of differences among Burundians, since genocide and other horrendous crimes have been committed in the name of such differences. It is just a note of caution that these differences are not clearly defined.

deadliest and the costliest in terms of economic loss. Following the definition usually adopted to differentiate wars from crimes (Singer and Small, 1982; Stewart et al., 1997; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998), there have been 4 civil wars in Burundi. These were in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993-to date, in the sense that: (i) the government in power at the time of the breakout of hostilities has always been a primary actor either through repression (1965, 1972 and 1988) or through engaging directly rebel fighters (1993-to date); (ii) both sides of the conflict have had the ability to inflict death upon each other, with the stronger forces sustaining more than 5% of the number of fatalities suffered by the weaker forces²; (iii) military action has taken place with more than 1,000 battle related deaths in each of those conflicts, even though the numbers of victims are often controversial³; (iv) wars have been internal to Burundi, though the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC--ex-Zaire) helped Burundian government repress the Hutu rebellion in 1972, while DRC and Zimbabwe have been accused of involvement in Burundi's current conflict by either harboring or training Burundian and Rwandan rebels fighting in Burundi. Adding the relatively minor but bloody conflict of 1991, the country has experienced not less than 5 episodes of civil conflict.

4. The essence of the numerous civil conflicts in Burundi cannot be grasped without understanding the specific political contexts within which they occurred. Section II discusses conflicts and their economic causes putting them in their political context. Section III attempts to model predation and its impact on economic growth. Section IV discusses briefly the role of external agents in Burundi's conflicts. Section V concludes.

II. Conflicts and Political Equilibria in Burundi

Since independence until the on-going civil war, Burundi has had two stable and one unstable political equilibriums. The first stable equilibrium prevailed during the early years of independence, while the second was from 1972 through 1988. The 1993 crisis is viewed as a result of the break-up in 1972-1988 equilibrium following political liberalisation implemented since 1988. The unstable equilibrium, which can be viewed as critical in regard to its impact on the future of the country, can be dated around 1965-66.

1. Conflicts And Political Equilibriums in Burundi

(a) A Stable Equilibrium Promising Democracy and Reconciliation

6. The first stable equilibrium outlived two main shocks. The first shock was the bloody "social revolution" in Rwanda in 1959, so called because it brought Hutu to power for the first time in the country's history. Many Tutsi were massacred and those fortunate fled the country. Burundi hosted a large number of them. Despite some ethnic activism by Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Burundi in the early 1960s, the democratic and nationalist party

² This condition is disputable in the case of the first 3 conflicts in which the death toll was primarily the result of army repression, targeting civilians. However, there is no question that the condition is satisfied with respect to the 1993 conflict which is a conventional war between the government army and rebel groups.

³ It is difficult to know the death toll because international media are not allowed to investigate the issue.

UPRONA (*Union pour le Progrès National*), which included Hutu as well as Tutsi leaders, emerged as winner in the September 1961 competitive legislative elections. This gave the party and its influential Hutu leaders the prerogative to rule the country for four years. The second shock was the continuous harassment, including imprisonment, of UPRONA leaders, Hutus as well as Tutsis.

7. These could appear to be minor shocks but, looking 40 years back, they were crucial episodes in Burundi's history. In a country where the colonial power had tried its utmost to divide Burundians over the previous 30 years, and considering the current extent of these divisions 40 years since the 1960s, it was not obvious that the struggle for independence would be a guaranteed success, uniting both Hutu and Tutsi around the same political ideal. Unfortunately, 40 years of history after the country's first political victory that led to its independence have shown that no other project has been as successful in uniting Burundians. It was this unity that helped Burundians, especially UPRONA leadership, not to succumb to provocation and all sorts of harassment by the colonial power, terribly biased against UPRONA during the political struggle for independence. The reason is that UPRONA was a pro-independence party while some of the parties favored by colonialists opposed the country's independence. It was also the same unity that had kept Burundians together and not bend under the horrendous Rwandan "social revolution", as it was advocated by extremist Hutu in Burundi as the model to follow and, in the eyes of the Tutsi, the anti-model to avoid by all means even if it meant discriminating or even killing Hutu. Now history has taught us that this stability was essentially due to the charisma, determination and other personal qualities of UPRONA party leader, Prince Louis Rwagasore. Unity among Burundians did not survive his assassination in October 1961.

(b) A Series of Civil Conflicts from 1965-66 Onwards

8. There is no doubt that the assassination of Prince Louis Rwagasore constituted one of the biggest shocks that have seriously destabilised the country. The period between the assassination of the independence hero and the year 1965-66 was characterised by a number of political contradictions which, if properly addressed, would have maintained the political system in equilibrium. Instability was the result of a number of incidents and the way they were handled. For instance, the assassination of 5 Hutu labor unionists in January 1962 and that of a Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe, in January 1965, remained unpunished, causing some strong suspicions within the Hutu. Even the then King Mwambutsa IV fell victim of ethno-political intrigues initiated by a group of extremist Tutsi. This became apparent, for instance, when the King and some Tutsi politicians maneuvered to ignore nominating an expected Hutu prime minister despite the fact that Hutu led party UPRONA had won 23 seats out of 33 in May 1965 legislative elections. Some Hutu politicians resorted to a coup d'état that was foiled. As a result, a number of Hutu leaders were summarily executed. During the same period, around 500 Tutsi civilians were massacred in Muramvya province by Hutu backed by a Rwanda based exiled Burundian politician. The subsequent army repression claimed thousands of Hutu lives (United Nations, 1996).

9. This was the last in a series of factors that poisoned the relationship between the two ethnic groups, especially among the leaders. At the same time, Burundi lost its opportunity to return to democratic institutions that had characterised the first few years of independence. It is then that an extremist Tutsi wing of the army which took control of power. As shown by Reyntjens (1994: 23-36), the year 1965 marked the end of Hutu participation in political power. Progressively, UPRONA, which was de facto single party

starting from 1966, became, together with the army, the instrument of power monopoly in the hands of Tutsi in general, then of Tutsi-Hima from Bururi in particular, ...,who ended up excluding the Tutsi-Banyaruguru from any important political responsibility following condemnation of their leaders after their sham trial in 1971. Intrigue, monopolisation of power and the catastrophic leadership of those in command led to the 1972 tragic events.

10. The year 1972 saw the most tragic and most dramatic events of post-colonial Burundi. 1972 events have crystallized ethnic tensions in Burundi in such a way that all subsequent crises have been, in a way or another, their consequence. The crisis started as a big number of Hutu trained abroad and coordinated by some Hutu from the army, massacred thousands of Tutsi essentially in the Southern part of the country. Very quickly, the army and security services moved in to halt the killings. However, their intervention went well beyond stopping the bloodshed since most Hutu businessmen and those having any level of responsibility in the civil service and the army were killed, not only in the parts of the country where the rebellion had struck but throughout the country [Reyntjens (1994), p. 38]. It is estimated that about two hundred thousand people, almost exclusively Hutu, were killed in what the United Nations called a "genocidal repression" (United Nations, 1996, paragraph 85). Moreover, large numbers of Burundians fled to neighbouring countries. Army severe repression is thought to have affected at least 15 percent of the population if refugees are included. A quick computation shows that based on these figures, and under the hypothesis that the victims were almost exclusively Hutu, the ethnic composition in the country was changed to the following: the Hutu would represent 81% $[(84\%-15\%)/(100\%-15\%)]$, the Tutsi 18% and the Twa 1%.

11. Another crisis erupted in 1988. During this year, Hutu insurgents killed Tutsi families in two communes in the North of Burundi, Ntega and Marangara. As in the past, the army intervened strongly, sending masses of refugees across the border to Rwanda. This came as a shock to the new president, Major Pierre Buyoya, who had come to power through a bloodless coup d'état less than a year earlier. The crisis provoked an outcry from the international community, forcing Buyoya to initiate substantial changes in Burundi's political institutions. This political opening was also the result of geo-political changes in international relations, especially the fall of the Berlin Wall and the *La Baule* speech by President Mitterand of France⁴. Political liberalisation led to multipartism in 1992 and, a year later, free and fair elections were organised culminating in the swearing-in of the first civilian elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, on 10 July 1993.

12. Once in power, the president and his cabinet started taking measures, sometimes too quickly, that threatened traditional privileges of some interest groups, especially the army. The new government created also an atmosphere of suspicion and a genuine sentiment of insecurity, especially among the Tutsi leaders and civil servants. In the night of 21 October 1993, members of the army killed the president in an attempted coup d'état. The country plunged into the longest, deadliest and costliest mayhem of its history. Thousands of Tutsi were killed by their fellow neighbour Hutu, in what was later acknowledged as a genocide (United Nations, 1996).

13. The intervention by the army failed to stop the killings of civilian innocents which has gone on to date. Unlike in previous crises where the army was able to carry out its repression in a relatively short period of time, the current crisis is in its 7th year. It is a real

⁴ This is the historic speech that triggered national conferences, multipartism and national elections in most of Francophone Africa.

war where fighters from both sides die. It has been estimated that 200,000-250,000 lives have been lost in this conflict alone.

14. In order to find a political settlement to the war, the country's leaders have agreed to negotiate with the rebellion and other opposition groups. Under the initiative of the regional heads of state, the so called "Arusha Negotiations" were launched in June 1998 under the mediation of the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania. After the death of Nyerere in October 1999, the former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, took over as new mediator. 19 political parties and groups representing the rebellion meet regularly in Arusha where they will eventually reach an agreement that will bring back peace to Burundi. So far, after almost two years of negotiations, no agreement has been reached but Burundians continue to die in the war opposing rebels and the army.

2. The Role of Special Interests

15. In 1965, Burundi's political landscape changed. Subsequently, the army became an instrument of stabilisation of a bureaucracy almost entirely purged of its Hutu elements. The administration became an institution within which power was shared among different factions of the Tutsi elite, with some implicit rules on redistribution of economic rents. It is these implicit rules that stabilised the political game of the parties involved. These rules illustrate how important are special interests in the management of the country. As this section shows, special interests appear not only in the process of sharing economic rents, but also in the process of preparing the country's future élite.

(a) Some aspects of the Process of Rent Collection and Sharing

16. The literature on civil wars in Africa proposes various hypotheses on the economic and non-economic causes of civil wars. Economic hypotheses, such as the ones developed in Collier and Hoeffler (1998) include heavy dependency on primary commodity exports, high inequalities in income distribution, high poverty and illiteracy rates among young men, and overall economic decline. Non-economic factors include the size of the country, lack of democratic institutions, ethnicity, population density, unemployment, foreign third party influence, etc. Post-colonial Burundi fits perfectly this picture. Burundi is over-dependent on the export of coffee, which accounts for more than 80 percent of the country's exports. As a result, the coffee sector which is dominated by small holder growers, has become one of the targets of government predation.


17. Hence, in a country like Burundi which is overpopulated and so heavily dependent on agriculture, it is surprising to note that resource transfers to the sector to increase agriculture productivity and revitalize the sector have never been a priority of Burundian leaders. For instance, fertiliser use in 1992 was marginal at 3.7 kg/ha, compared with an average of 14.9 kg for Sub-Sahara Africa. Ngaruko (1993) shows that, in 1988, 11% of agriculture production was used as input in the industrial sector, representing 21% of industrial production and 63% of non-imported intermediate industrial consumption. During the same year, only 0.4% of industrial production was used in agriculture in the form of intermediate consumption, amounting to 0.2% of agriculture sector production and 5% of non-imported intermediate agriculture consumption. The high dependency of agriculture on the industry market, and of industry on agriculture as a supplier, without having a similar relationship in reverse direction, is the result of a price system and a

distribution policy put in place during the colonial period with the objective of generating rents⁵.

18. By contrast, the amount of total assets invested in 37 fully state-controlled firms, which are easy targets for bureaucratic predation, represented 48% of the country's GDP in 1996. If all parastatals are considered, the ratio increases to 77% of GDP. A large number of these firms are precisely industrial firms that have benefited from favorable agricultural price policies. The management of these firms sheds some light on the use of economic rents that they help generate and distribute. For instance, depending on prevailing political games and intrigues and on the actors concerned, a number of ministers who lose their posts in the volatile political situation have often been appointed as managers of state companies, independently of their managerial skills. Recently, one such "politician", a former minister now converted state-owned corporation manager and head of an opposition party, was threatening to "cause war in the country" if he was not given what he was crying for. These are the so called "rational entrepreneurs of violence" (Herbst, 2000, p.2). Causing war has, unfortunately, become a way of increasing bargaining power. Another example of distribution of rents to members of the élite group has been the pattern of foreign currency allocation by government institutions which has privileged these state firms as well as a few opportunists turned businessmen who take advantage of their closeness to power holders⁶.

19. In addition to these findings, Ngaruko (2000) shows that public employment and wages constitute another way through which rents are collected and distributed.

Figure 1: *The relative public wages and employment:
Comparison between
Burundi and other African countries*



Source: Data from Lienert and Modi (1997).

20. As figure 1 shows, Burundi stands out as a prominent case of bureaucratic predation. In this sample, Burundi is the country with the highest civil servants' average relative income. One civil servant costs the equivalent of 15 Burundians average income. This is high by any standard. However, to understand the role of the civil service as an instrument used by power holders in the distribution of rents generated from the economy, one should note the relatively small size of the group of beneficiaries. Another striking evidence is that the public sector obsession to control everything, combined with rent seeking character of the system have suffocated any development of the private sector. Despite the small size of

⁵See Bates (1983) for an analysis of similar agriculture policies in Africa.

⁶On an analysis of foreign exchange allocation in Burundi, see Nkurunziza, 1997.

Burundi's civil service as shown in figure one, public employment represents 80 percent of full time employment in the modern sector and, as such, the public sector represents the major source of accumulation⁷.

(b) Are Burundian conflicts ethnic?

21. This question seems simple, especially in view of the way the Burundian conflicts have been depicted by some Burundians and by the international media in particular. In addition to the fact that the notion of ethnicity is not very clear in the case of Burundi, as already discussed, the distribution of rents is far from benefiting all the Tutsi. Rather, rent sharing in Burundi has been used by different governments as a political tool to calm down opposition, to buy out potential trouble makers or to pay for the loyalty of fellow politicians. On the other hand, the experience of conflict in the country has shown that those who start and coordinate rebellions as well as those who control the government that rebels are supposed to fight are both motivated by narrow personal or sectarian ambition rather than national or even ethnic group's interests.

22. In Burundi, ethnicity appears, at most, to be coupled with regionalism. As Ndikumana (2000) remarks, the prime cause of civil conflicts in Burundi appears to be the attitude by "the minority Tutsi elite from the south" to cling to power that they have controlled since 1966 in order to keep under their control the rents associated with it. Guichaoua (1991) also notes with surprise that the Fifth Five-Year Plan allocated 98% of Gross fixed capital formation to a geographical area made of Bujumbura, the capital city and its surrounding areas, and the southern province of Bururi out of the 15 provinces of the country. This disparity is also noticeable through discriminatory access to education, the most effective form of exclusion from future participation in all forms of opportunities the country offers. Table 1 presents the results of our analysis of regional inequalities in terms of access to education. A "Privilege Index" (PI) was computed for each province to capture this reality⁸.

Table 1: Classification of Provinces according to their Privilege Index

	Number of Pupils	Number of Classrooms
Privileged	Muramvya (0.25), Cibitoke (0.33), Makamba (0.46), Karuzi (0.50), Bubanza (0.73), Cankuzo (0.78) and Rutana (0.83)	Muramvya (0.25), Karuzi (0.37), Cankuzo (0.43), Makamba (0.61), Rutana (0.74), Bururi (0.80), Bubanza (0.91)
Consistent	Bujumbura (1.00), Bururi (1.00)	Bujumbura (1.00)
Underprivileged	Ngozi (4.52), Kayanza (2.34), Kirundo (2.00), Gitega (2.00), Muyinga (1.86) and Ruyigi (1.40)	Ngozi (2.51), Kayanza (2.34), Kirundo (2.00), Gitega (2.00), Muyinga (1.86), Cibitoke (1.56) and Ruyigi (1.10)

Source: Based on data from Caviezel, L and Fouga, P. (1989), see Annex

⁷Observers have noted that in Burundi, almost all large private firms belong to former high ranking civil servants; it has also been noted that in general, every change in the country's leadership provokes changes in firms profitability: a whole fringe of businessmen go bankrupt with the arrival of new leaders while a new class of businessmen emerges with the new team. Government employment has traditionally been the major source of accumulation in Burundi through direct benefits such as relatively high wages and more indirect ones such as "subsidized credit and housing, free transportation, frequent international travels and other rents extracted through corruption and patronage" etc.

23. Briefly, the table confirms the fact that there are large disparities across provinces in terms of access to education. Excluding Bujumbura which is a special case, we find that Muramvya is the most privileged province while Ngozi is the least privileged. Broadly speaking, the figures show that all provinces in the South of the country belong to the privileged category; these are Makamba, Rutana, Cankuzo and Bururi. On the other hand, all provinces in the North are underprivileged; these are Ngozi, Kayanza, Kirundo and Muyinga. These findings seem to confirm Ndikumana (2000) assertion that the structure of power in Burundi may be benefiting an elite group of Tutsi from the South relative to people from other provinces, especially those in the North, Tutsi and Hutu alike. Practiced over a long period, this policy has probably contributed to violent conflicts in the country. One reason to this is that the policy has provided a credible excuse rebel leaders could manipulate to motivate their potential uneducated followers to fight. This illustration also conforms to Ndikumana (2000), when he writes that "the causes of violence in Burundi are complex and go beyond the alleged 'age-old' animosities between the Hutu and the Tutsi... An important cause of the conflicts is the struggle for equal participation in fair competition in economic activity".

III. Modeling Predation and its Impact on Economic Growth

This section explores the ways in which conflicts have resulted from predatory policies pursued by Burundian bureaucracy. Predation by power holders who share its rents has led to rebellions by those excluded triggering, in turn, repression by the army whose primary role has appeared to be the defense of the predatory equilibrium. The role of the civil service in this game is central. We show that bureaucracy is the structure through which predation is effected. After a brief overview of Burundian bureaucracy, we present a model articulated around three variables, namely predation, rebellion of the victims of predation and repression which, in peace time, acts as a deterrent force against any rebellion; this is indeed how Burundi's case can be best presented. Indexes of predation corresponding to the period from 1965 are empirically derived from the theoretical model. These indexes are compared to the trajectory of per capita GDP over the same period to show that an increase in predation increases poverty measured by the decrease in per capita GDP.

1. The status of Burundian bureaucracy

25. In recent years, several contributions have attempted to establish that in many African countries, the Weberian assumption that civil servants behave according to public interest may not be appropriate. Civil servants are driven by personal interest. In this context, Varoudakis (1996) proposes a typology of African regimes. He distinguishes, on the one hand, the democratic and the "benevolent dictator" regimes and, on the other hand, bureaucratic and predatory regimes. In bureaucratic regimes, public authorities maximize public expenditures, especially by supporting an overwhelmingly large bureaucracy. In predatory regimes, public authorities maximize the gap between public revenue and expenditures. This gap represents the extent of embezzlement by public officials. The distinction between bureaucratic and predatory regimes has been questioned

⁸ The methodology for computing this index is outlined in the Annex.

by Azam (1995) and Ngaruko (1998), who suggest that African bureaucracies include systems through which predation and distribution of rents are carried out.

26. The suggestion that several African bureaucracies pursue predatory policies is supported by recent work. This work highlights the bargaining power of civil servants and how this power and the bargaining process relate to political instability and conflicts. Hence, Calipel and Donsimoni (1994) find that public expenditures on secondary education are the most important determinant of political stability in African and Caribbean countries. Azam et al. (1996) find that in Africa, public education expenditures behave like a variable of predation⁹. As figure 1 has shown, countries differ by the modalities of implementation of those policies. Between the extreme cases of countries which pay high wages to an elite group of civil servants (such as Burundi) on one hand, and those in which low wages are paid to a plethora of bureaucrats, on the other hand, there is a *continuum* of situations. This may shed some light on predatory and bureaucratic interface underpinning the public sector, and why the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy is hard to define.

27. Particularly, Burundi's position in the figure shows what is at stake and suggests why individuals may choose to fight in order to control the state and hence the sources of rent. In this regard, the analysis of Burundian bureaucracy, the entry barriers to the main public professions, the means by which individuals bypass those barriers, the upstream policies of education which are implemented to prepare or block the way to future pretenders to civil service positions, etc., shed light on several factors that have been at the heart of Burundi's civil wars. Box 1 proposes a brief historical overview of the Burundian bureaucracy.

⁹ Recent research has established that returns to education in Africa increase with the level of education (see for instance, Bigsten et al. 1998)

Box 1

The Particular History of Burundian Bureaucracy

Since the colonial period, Belgian colonization in Burundi conceived the political and administrative professions as a prerogative for only one ethnic group, the Tutsi. Since the 1920s, the Belgian colonial authority implemented reforms whose objective was to eliminate Hutu from political and administrative functions. In the early '30s, 27 regional administrators out of 133 were Hutu, 30 were Tutsi, and 76 were Ganwa, the members of the royal family who later were regarded as Tutsi. In 1945, there were no more Hutu administrators (Reyntjens: 1994, 20-21).

The elimination of Hutus from political and administrative functions was also implemented in the training of the Burundian elite. In 1932, among the students of the university of Astrida, the only institute of training of Rwandan and Burundian elite, there was one Hutu student for 5 Tutsis. In 1945, there was 1 Hutu for 15 Tutsis (Lemarchand: 1970). In the '50s, the discrimination in the education system was somehow alleviated, especially for Burundian students. In 1954, among the students of the university of Astrida, there were three Tutsis out of four students, and among the 19 registered Hutu students, 13 were Burundian. Nevertheless, in the late '50s, most of the Hutus who were educated had benefited from other education channels of the Catholic church. In the early '60s, the access of Hutus to political positions increased, but declined dramatically between 1965 and 1972.

During the 1972 pogrom, most Hutu with 4 or more years of high school education were either killed or left the country. As a result, this was the last year in a long period when Hutu had any significant political and administrative power. As Manirakiza (1992) notes, between 1972 until the late 1980s, despite two coups d'état which have brought Tutsi militaries at the head of the state, there were just cosmetic co-optation of some Hutu in power. For instance, in 1985, there were 4 Hutu out of 20 members of the cabinet; 17 Hutus out of 65 members of parliament, 2 Hutus out of 52 members of the Central Comity of the then state Party, UPRONA; 2 Hutus out of 15 governors of province; 1 Hutu out of 22 ambassadors; 10 Hutus out of 90 University professors; nearly 20% of Hutus among the university students; no Hutu among prosecutors; no Hutu among education inspectors, while reliable documents tell that discriminatory techniques were used to eliminate Hutus from entering secondary and tertiary education [Reyntjens (1994: 41)].

The year 1988 saw notable progress in terms of including more Hutu in the country's institutions. Some observers note that this came as a result of a new civil conflict, the Ntega-Marangara crisis, and the outcry it provoked from the international community. In the 1987 coup d'état, qualified by some as another "palace revolution", a Supreme Council was instituted, composed of 31 military officers, all of them Tutsi. Out of 20 ministers, 15 were Tutsi; there were 11 Tutsi province governors out of 15. However, by the end of 1988, a Commission created to study the question of national unity was composed of 12 Hutus and 12 Tutsis. Also, for the first time in a long period, a Hutu was appointed Prime Minister by president Buyoya and half the members of the new cabinet were Hutu.

Starting from 1989, the machinery put in place to restrict the number of Hutu entering secondary and tertiary education were relaxed [Reyntjens (1994: 68-73)]. In 1990 the Economic and Social Council and the National Security Council had a balanced composition. During the same year, the Central Committee of the single party, UPRONA, had 41 Hutus, 38 Tutsis et 1 Twa. An important number of Hutu entered state institutions, including in high ranking administrative jobs. Only the army, the real institution controlling and regulating power in the country since 1965, did not open up in contrast to other political and administrative institutions [Reyntjens (1994: 73)].

28. Box 1 illustrates a non-linear trajectory of the interaction between bureaucracy and politics. The changes in those trajectories have taken place in bloody tragedies. The box also confirms that the control of government institutions, provides access to the most important source of rents: civil service employment. However, the control of rents has not just been limited to the public sector since, in the private sector, ethno-regional monopolies have been established while barriers to entry have been erected against the Hutu and the non-Southern Tutsi mostly by the same groups controlling administration and political power (Ndikumana, 2000). This high concentration of power and the way it has been exercised, essentially through predation, have been important dimensions of civil conflicts in Burundi as we attempt to show in what follows.

2. A Theoretical Model of Political Equilibriums in Burundi

29. It has been argued earlier that civil wars in Burundi usually erupt within political equilibriums articulated around predation, rebellion and repression, with bureaucracy as the instrument of that predation. We have also remarked that these factors have interacted to define 3 main political equilibriums in post-colonial Burundi, 2 stable (the early 1960s and 1972-1988) and one unstable (1965-66). To describe these equilibriums, we assume that public authorities maximize predation over the economy subject to potential or actual rebellion by the victims of predation. As a result, the government keeps in place a dissuasive and repression machinery without which their predatory policies would not be implemented [Azam et al (1996)]. In this line, recent work has highlighted that behind the name of "national armed forces" lies an army that essentially carries out missions of domestic political regulation [Azam et al (1996)] and partakes in the repressive violent competitions for the control of the state and public resources (Collier and Binswanger: 1999).


30. As the history of Burundi shows, the expression "repressive machinery" should not be just understood in its strict sense which relates to the role of the police and the army, because there are important relays in what appears to be the civil society. Moreover, following Hirschleifer (1994), the understanding of the notion of rebellion and repression should not be limited to their "armed" form. Taking into account all forms of contestation, the rebellion appears as an extreme of a continuum of forms of political contestation, including strikes and other forms of civil disobedience¹⁰. With regard to repression, physical elimination is an extreme form of a continuum including sacking from jobs, imprisonment, etc.

31. Assume, on one hand, an increasing relationship between taxation (P) and repression (R), and on the other hand, a decreasing relationship between predation margin (p) and the cost of repression that it necessitates. To simplify, we consider that the cost of repression is deductible from the amount levied. One first consequence of these hypotheses is that for given levels of taxation, there exist levels of repression that cancel out the amount of gross predation. In figure 2, the curve representing this equilibrium at different combinations of (P , R) is curve $p=0$. A second consequence is that there exist combinations (P , R) that cancel out the level of effective rebellion (r). These combinations are represented by curve ($r=0$) in figure 2. The form of the latter curve, first convex then concave, gives the threshold levels in the propensity of the opposition to engage in

¹⁰For instance, in the early 1990s in Burundi, the destruction of cash crops by some peasants who replaced them with food crops was a form of political contestation.


rebellion, and in the efficiency of the deterrence and repressive government machinery. Increasing with non violent forms of expression of contestation, the efficiency of repressive government machinery decreases when it has to deal with a structured and determined rebellion movement, as well as other violent forms of political contestation.

Figure 2: Equilibriums Between Predation, Rebellion and Repression



32. A quick look at the multipliers of these two curves at the 3 fixed points shows that A and C are stable and B unstable equilibria. A is assimilated with democratic and "benevolent dictator" regimes, like the one that prevailed in Burundi in the early 1960s but which was seriously disturbed between 1961 and 1965. C represents a predatory bureaucratic regime which resembles the one that emerged in Burundi from the 1965 shock and which lasted until 1988. According to this representation, the margin of predation, which depends on the form of curve ($r=0$), reaches its maximum in the point where slope of the tangent to the curve is equal to 1. The following figure 3 shows the optimal size of corresponding government repressive machinery.

Figure 3: Organisation in a Predatory Bureaucracy Equilibrium



33. The predatory margin is arrived at from the above size of the repressive machinery, as well as by the coefficient ω that measures the angle between the line linking points B and C in which a tangent of slope 1 cuts across the curve ($r=0$). Predation is, therefore, given by:

$$p = R(\omega - 1) \quad (1)$$

where $(\omega - 1)$ is a measure of variable "organisation" and is represented by the concentration of power and knowledge within the hands of a clearly identifiable group, with:


$$\omega_t = \frac{E_t}{V_t} \quad (2)$$

where E_t represents the share of decision and power centres held by a group at date t , and V_t the share of the group in total population at that date.

3. Trajectories of Predation and Per Capita GDP


34. The simple theoretical model detailed above allows to derive an empirical curve of power concentration using dates corresponding to key events in Burundi. Moreover, it is also possible to derive an index of predation for each date over the period of analysis by multiplying the power concentration index to the ratio of military expenditure over GDP at each of those dates. Comparing these indexes of predation with GDP per capita at these different dates shows the relationship between predation and economic growth, establishing a direct link between governance, conflict and economic performance. The index of power concentration covers the period from 1930 to 1992. Its trajectory is compared to that of military expenditure from 1960 to illustrate the strong correlation between power concentration and a strong military which is the instrument of repression used by those in power to maintain the status quo. These results are presented in figures 4 and 5.

Figure 4: Power Concentration and Military Expenditure



35. Just looking at the slopes of these curves, it is clear that power concentration is positively correlated with military expenditure, confirming our hypothesis. However, the most interesting results are those regarding the relationship between predation and economic growth. The index of predation is calculated starting from 1965, the year from which the military have taken control of political power in Burundi. Given the shape of the curve representing the index of predation, the curve showing GDP per capita is divided into two periods: the first period covers the years 1965-1983 while the second covers 1983-1990. This way contrasts clearly economic growth and predation by direct observation of the slopes of the two curves¹¹. It is clear from this figure that the periods of increasing predation correspond to declining GDP per capita. This can be taken as an empirical confirmation that predation has contributed to poverty increase in Burundi. Figure 5 shows the results.

Figure 5: Predation and Economic Growth



36. This figure establishes a clear negative relationship between predation and GDP per capita. Not only do they evolve with opposite slopes until 1983, but their slopes also change at the same time, although the change in the index of predation appears to be strongest. The reduction in predation starting in 1983 due to a decline in military spending

¹¹Data for the computation of per capita GDP are from Summers et Heston, Penn World Tables. Data on economic growth are from BARRO and SALA-i-MARTIN (1996): op. cit., 394-395.

does not seem to be matched by an equal increase in per capita GDP whose curve is flatter. Relative to our model, we can deduce that starting from 1983, the behaviour of Burundian politicians has progressively compromised the equilibrium between predation, rebellion and repression, as it had prevailed before. In other words, they have failed to adjust their predatory policies to the high and under-estimated political risk caused by the disequilibrium between predation, rebellion and repression. This could explain the bloody events of 1991 and 1993. It may also explain why there was no bloody conflict between 1972 and 1988, a period that was characterised by draconian rule, regionalism and large scale violations of individual freedoms (Manirakiza, 1992). Finally, we note that the indexes of predation are more correlated to economic growth than series on military spending or those on power concentration taken separately. This, in our view, is confirmation that the simple theoretical model underpinning these indexes is robust.

IV. External Agents in Burundi's Conflicts

As presented in the preceding section, the predatory system has been subjected to a number of shocks. Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, the different shocks led to the breaking-up of the 1972-1988 equilibrium, leading to the 1993 conflict. Most of these shocks were due to external agents. It should be noted that external intervention in Burundi's civil conflicts is not very clear for the conflicts prior to Ntega-Marangara in 1988. Killings had been committed by both rebel groups and the army without causing any serious reaction from the international community. It seems also that, apart from some references to the role of Rwanda in the events of 1972 and marginally in 1965, it appears that the different conflicts before 1988 were started and carried out by Burundians without any intervention of third parties from the outside. The period post-1988 saw the entry into the game of external agents either in trying to stop conflicts started by Burundians, or in fueling them. In 1988 for example, it was early condemnation by the international community of the killings in Ntega and Marangara that foiled the use of the same mechanisms the government had used before to solve previous crises, namely through terrible repression. Indeed, as already discussed, the role of this condemnation was far-reaching since the president was compelled to initiate important political reforms as a result. In the following developments, we focus our attention on the 1988 and 1993 conflicts.

1. The 1988 and 1993 Conflicts and the Role of External Agents

38. The collapse of the equilibrium founded on bureaucratic predation as it had existed in the period 1972-1988 was due to a series of external shocks, combined with political and diplomatic blunders. We review some of these shocks. As figure 4 shows, the change in equilibrium followed a decrease in military spending resulting from an increasing economic crisis which, in the end, forced the government to implement a structural adjustment programme in 1986. However, the most direct factor that exposed Burundi's policies to the international community was its conflict with the powerful catholic church. Presented by the government as a problem of church meddling in Burundi's politics beyond its mission, the problem was profoundly political. For a regime that had been too suspicious of private initiatives, the objective of the government was to suppress the parallel and private structures of socialisation (schools, church meetings, etc.) put in place by the catholic church but not controlled by the state; such mechanisms were more favorable to Hutu than

government structures (Darbon: 1990). The government decided to close down a number of schools managed by the church, issued decrees limiting drastically the freedom of prayer in a country where Christians were the majority, and expelled a number of foreign missionaries who, for the first time, called the attention of the international community on the organisation of Burundi's society, as well as its political and economic systems.

39. Therefore, when the civil war started in August 1988, the world was focused on Burundi. It is not that the crisis was more important than the previous ones but rather it is that it came at a time where the international community was already focused on the religious conflict in the country. Burundi's donors, firmly and in unison, denounced the conflict and called upon the government to immediately put an end to the killings of civilian innocents. They went even further to call for the opening of Burundi's political system. The immediate consequences of this opening are summarised in Box 1. Another external shock that hit Burundi's political system was the 1990 condition made by France, a main donor of Burundi's, to condition its aid to democratic progress in the country¹². The combination of these shocks produced a heavy pressure on Burundi's system which could not manage them in the traditional way (predation, rebellion, repression). On the contrary, these shocks revived an opposition that had been repressed over 20 years. In 1993, the opposition won democratic elections but less than four months in power, the new president was assassinated, plunging the country in another bloodshed.

40. Generally speaking, external intervention in the 1993 conflict followed two main routes: for the government, the reduction in aid has had a devastating impact on poverty, human rights and the credibility of the government. On the other hand, condemnation of the international community, especially imposition of an economic embargo in August 1996 put enough pressure on the government which finally accepted to engage into negotiations with the opposition to reach a long-lasting settlement. However, one should not ignore the dramatic consequences these measures had on innocent civilian populations. The World Bank (1999) estimated that as a result of the war and especially the embargo, poverty doubled in the country from 1994 to 1998. Regarding the rebellion, these measures were more profitable because they were weakening the position of the government without affecting them. It should also be noted that countries have helped the rebellion by hosting the rebels and their leaders, but also by training them and helping them materially. The DRC, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have been named many times in the media and by Burundian government.

2. The Role of External Agents in Finding a Solution to Burundi's Conflict

41. The international community is already active in trying to help Burundians reach negotiated peace. The main framework for this intervention is the so called "Arusha Peace Negotiations" already mentioned. Started as a regional initiative by leaders within the region, the negotiations have seen the participation of many donor countries who have financed the different phases of negotiations. They are keen to see Burundi succeed in this endeavor because, as president Clinton recently suggested, this would set an example to other cases of conflict all over the world. The negotiations have had a boost recently with the appointment of the former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who went up to the Security Council to plead for a more implication of the international community in Burundi's conflict.

¹²This French new policy to link aid to democracy had a devastating impact on a number of Francophone African countries.

42. Observing what has been the strategies of the different negotiators so far and considering the depth of the problem, Africans and other representatives of the international community who genuinely want peace in Burundi should help Burundians solve a very difficult problem. On the one hand, there is a group of negotiators, mostly Hutu, who democratically acquired power in 1993 after a long period of exclusion; these will not be giving up the power, knowing what losing it could mean (going back to the predation, rebellion and repression equilibrium where they no doubt losers). On the other hand, there are Tutsi representatives, who had enjoyed the monopoly on power and lost it in 1993, with what the world experienced as a consequence: their genocide which, in their minds, could be repeated if the Hutu controlled the power as it happened in Rwanda in 1994. These are two extreme positions, and genuine as they appear. The mediator is a man of high morality, well experienced, and well respected who understands the seriousness of the matter and what would be the gravity a wrong outcome. The challenge facing him, the negotiators and the international community is to come up with a win-win solution that all groups concerned and Burundians in general will find acceptable.

V. Conclusion

Burundi's conflicts are complex. They are a combination of economic factors, political, governance and governance opposing groups whose common identities are not clearly defined. The numerous conflicts that have rocked the country since its independence in 1962 were molded by the political contexts within which they occurred. However, a clear pattern of all of them is that they started as Hutu rebels, probably driven by some kinds of frustrations, attacked and massacred innocent and defenseless Tutsi civilians. This has called for brutal army repression, killing thousands of Hutu and sending masses of them in exile. In this light, the paper argued that three elements explain conflicts in Burundi: predation by a "closed" government eventually leads to rebellion of those excluded; rebellions target innocent civilians since they are not strong enough to confront the army (except the 1993 conflict). As a result, the army moves in and carries out horrendous repression, that sends signals to future rebellions, hence acting as a deterrent.

44. Now that the international community is taking the crisis seriously, Burundian leaders will understand, we hope, that they need to behave in a more responsible way; the international community is watching. One measure that will help Burundi have peace and for which the international community can help is to put to book all those who are responsible for causing wars in the country, starting from the first conflict in 1965. It is, indeed, disturbing to note that people responsible for some of the bloodiest acts committed in the country are free and have never been prosecuted. Helping Burundians deal with the problem of impunity will be a good service to the country and will increase the chances of long-lasting peace.

References

- Azam, J. P. (1995), L'Etat Autogéré en Afrique, *Revue d'Economie du Développement*, n°4.
- Azam, J. P., Berthélémy, J. C. et Calipel, S. (1996), Risque Politique et Croissance en Afrique, in *Revue Economique*, n° 3, mai.
- Bates, R. (1983), *Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa*, University of California Press.
- Bigsten, A., Collier, P., Dercon, S., Fafchamps, M., Gauthier, B., Gunning, J. W., Isaksson, A., Oduro, A., Oostendorp, R., Pattillo, C., Soderbom, M., Teal, F., and Zeufack, A. (1998), *Rates of Return on Human and Non-Human Capital in Africa's Manufacturing Sector*, mimeo, University of Oxford, Centre for the Study of African Economies
- Calipel, S. et Donsimoni, M. (1994): Ajustement et Développement: l'Expérience des Pays ACP, *Economica*.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A (1998), "On Economic Causes of Civil Wars", *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, 563-573
- Darbon, D. (1990), De l'Ethnie à l'Ethnisme: Réflexions Autour de Quatre Sociétés Multiraciales: Burundi, Afrique du Sud, Zimbabwe et Nouvelle Calédonie, in *Afrique Contemporaine*, n° 143.
- Herbst, J. (2000), *The organization of Rebellion in Africa*, mimeo.
- Manirakiza (1992), "Burundi, de la Révolution au Régionalisme 1966-1976", *Le Mât de Misaine*, Paris-Bruxelles.
- Ministry of Planning (1999), *Table Ronde des Bailleurs de Fonds: Document de Synthèse*, Genève, Octobre.
- Ndikumana, L. (2000), "Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi: A Case for Political and Economic Liberalisation", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, forthcoming
- Ngaruko, F (1993): "L'Industrie et l'Accumulation au Burundi", *Revue Mondes en Développement*, vol. 21, n° 92.
- Nkurunziza, J. (1997), *Determination of Efficiency, Exchange Rate and the Premium of the Parallel Market for Foreign Currency in Burundi*, MSc Thesis
- Sambanis, N (2000), "Ethnic War: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry Into Its Causes", The World bank, mimeo.
- Small, M. and Singer, J.D. (1982), *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980*, Beverly Hill, Sage.

Stewart, F., Humphreys, F.P., and Lea, N. (1997), "*Civil Conflict in Developing Countries Over the Last Quarter of a Century: An Empirical Overview of Economic and Social Consequences*", Oxford Development Studies, vol. 25, n° 1.

United Nations (1996), *Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete Internationale Chargee d'etablir les faits concernant l'assassinat du president du Burundi, le 21 octobre 1993, ainsi que les massacres qui ont suivi*, document S/1996/682, Aout.

Varoudakis, A. (1996), Régimes non démocratiques et croissance, théorie et estimation, in *Revue Economique*, n°2.

Annex 1

Table 1: Relative Ranking of provinces by Population, Pupils and Classrooms

PROVINCE	PERANKPO	PERANPUP	PERANKCLAS	RANKPUP	RANKCLAS
Bubanza	0.785	0.571	0.714	0.727389	0.909554
Bujumbura	0	0	0	1	1
Bururi	0.357	0.357	0.285	1	0.798319
Cankuzo	1	0.785	0.428	0.785	0.428
Cibitoke	0.642	0.214	1	0.333333	1.557632
Gitega	0.071	0.142	0.142	2	2
Karuzi	0.571	0.285	0.214	0.499124	0.374781
Kayanza	0.214	0.5	0.5	2.336449	2.336449
Kirundo	0.428	0.857	0.857	2.002336	2.002336
Makamba	0.928	0.428	0.571	0.461207	0.615302
Muramvya	0.285	0.071	0.071	0.249123	0.249123
Muyinga	0.5	0.928	0.928	1.856	1.856
Ngozi	0.142	0.642	0.357	4.521127	2.514085
Rutana	0.857	0.714	0.642	0.833139	0.749125
Ruyigi	0.714	1	0.785	1.40056	1.09944

Source: Computed based on data in Caviezel, Lothar and Fouga, Patrick (1989), L'Ajustement structurel, l'emploi et la pauvreté au Burundi: Annexe de Statistiques

The table presents indexes of inequality in access to education and in distribution of schools in the 15 provinces of the country. Indexes are derived as follows:

- (1) Ranking provinces according to their population, number of pupils and number of classrooms as of 1986. The ranking is from 1 to 15 in decreasing order. For instance, Bujumbura has the highest population and it is ranked 1. Following the same logic, Cankuzo is ranked 15.
- (2) Computation of the percentage rank of each province for the 3 variables (population, number of pupils and number of classrooms). This is to evaluate the relative standing of the provinces in order to make comparisons possible.
- (3) Computation of the relative ranking of provinces in terms of the number of pupils and the number of classrooms on the basis of the population percentage rank. In other words, we compute the ratio of the percentage ranks of the variable of interest over the population percentage rank. In an egalitarian system, all provinces should have the same ranking for the population size, the number of classrooms and the number of pupils, meaning that they should have rank ratios equal to one. This is true for Bujumbura which has zero percentage rank for each variable. Provinces that are "privileged" have a rank less than one, while those underprivileged have a rank greater than 1. Therefore, the lower the rank, the more privileged the province.

Some Caveats

These measures are based solely on ranking and do not give any information on the depth of inequity in infrastructure distribution. Also, the index does not give information on the quality of the schools available (the number of classrooms may be dominated by higher education schools in some provinces and primary schools in others). Moreover, it should be noted that pupils can study outside their provinces of origin, especially in a context of centralised education policy where decisions are not made at the provincial level but rather at the central government level in Bujumbura, in which case the indices above could be slightly altered, but we think, not in any substantial way if not in a way that would strengthen the above results. Furthermore, these results are based on 1986 information which some may consider a bit dated. However, we used these data to avoid statistics that have been very much affected by conflicts in the 1990s (schools have been destroyed, pupils have been killed or displaced when others have joined rebel movements, etc.) In this regard, 1986 was considered a "good" benchmark especially in view of the fact that the last disruptions were 14 years earlier. In any case, these results seem to confirm the idea shared by many Burundians and those who know the country, that there are regional imbalances in education infrastructure, suggesting that people do not have equal access to education.
