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THE RELEVANCE OF UNCTAD TO AFRICA'S TRADE PROBLEMS

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1. The purpose of this paper, within the limits of time and information available, is to appraise the relevance of UNCTAD to African trade problems. In the context of present discussion and concern African trade problems are to be construed largely in terms of the relationships between international trade and economic growth. Economic growth, in turn, is to be construed as a continuing increase in income per capita. In the post war world the general concern to achieve economic growth on a world-wide scale has been accompanied by growing doubts as to the appropriateness for this purpose of existing trade policies and institutions. Partly as a result of these doubts and partly as a confirmation of the importance of trade in the growth process, particularly for the developing countries, the UNCTAD met in Geneva from 23rd March to 16th June 1964. The Geneva meeting ranged widely over current problems in visible and invisible trade - from, for example, the prices of primary commodities to a host of questions on access to markets and the financing of economic development - and resulted in the establishment of continuing machinery to tackle the problems it defined.

2. In a broad way, the appraisal of this machinery from an African point of view requires essentially two things: a sympathetic grasp of the UNCTAD structure and performance; and a perceptive understanding of the structure of African economies. Neither of these things is easily acquired. In particular the necessary understanding of the African economies should properly begin at the level of individual countries and should comprise a detailed awareness of existing resource allocation, a clear-headed view as to the nature and timing of plausible structural transformations required to promote economic growth, and an awareness of the present and potential rôles of international trade. From the country studies (and *ipso facto* commodity studies) should come indications of conflicts and complementarities in the African economy and the consequent possibility of elaborating a coherent and co-ordinated African position on the continent's trade and growth problems. Thus elaborated, this co-ordinated position should provide the basis for appraising the helpfulness of extra-African institutions.

3. In the circumstances, the present study does not seek to be comprehensive and definitive. Instead it focuses on African primary commodity exports and from this base seeks in an illustrative way to describe and analyse African trade problems in the contexts of economic growth, the world economy and UNCTAD. The initial concentration on primary commodities may be justified partly on the grounds of brute fact - they presently constitute the bulk of African exports; and partly on the grounds of logic - proposals for change must realistically begin from a thorough understanding of the existing situation.

4. The remainder of the paper is in six sections. The first discusses in general terms the trade problems of the developing countries; the second outlines proposals for tackling international commodity problems; the third offers and discusses statistical data on African trade; the fourth summarizes African attitudes to trade problems; the fifth is devoted to UNCTAD and the sixth discusses outstanding problems and draws conclusions.

I. THE TRADE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

5. One of the most striking aspects of the development of the international economy in the post-war period has been the continuing efforts to meet the general aspiration for economic growth and the ultimate eradication of poverty. In the early part of the period too much emphasis was probably placed on the role of capital formation as the instrument par excellence of growth. Later, without detracting from the importance of investment, it was recognized that the process of economic growth was altogether too complex to be a function of a single determinant; and among the wider range of identified determinants emphasis was placed on technological progress, education and training, appropriate social and economic attitudes and institutions, and (harking back to Adam Smith, the first growth economist) the extension of markets.

6. Even yet the nature of the growth process is but imperfectly understood. Enough, however, is known to make one thing clear: that although the developed countries - by generous aid and sympathetic trade policies - can do much to promote the growth prospects of the developing countries, the burden of achieving growth rests on these countries themselves. It is for them to formulate and apply the policies necessary to achieve the required growth, transformation and development of their economies; and it is for them to have a reasoned, cogent view of the kind of international economic environment that would best serve their central purpose.

7. In general the developing countries have open economies and the formulation and application of growth policies must recognize this fact. Even where national policy objectives are consistent and clear, the search for optimal growth decisions in an open economy encounter serious difficulties of both principle and fact. In point of principle the major question which arises is as to the criteria to be used in the allocation and mobilization of economic resources for the purpose of promoting growth; and in point of fact the most serious drawback is frequently the lack of

relevant statistics. The need for allocative criteria has led to a searching reappraisal of the doctrine of comparative advantage in both its opportunity cost version and in the Scandinavian version associated with the names of Heckscher and Ohlin. There is widespread agreement that, as earlier formulated, the doctrine of comparative advantage does not provide a ready-made indicator for the optimal allocation of resources. Indeed there is widespread fear that the use of comparative advantage based on market prices and current opportunity costs may even be at odds with the objective of maximizing growth over some specified period of time. This view is based on such considerations as the fact that, because of market distortions, factor prices do not reflect opportunity costs accurately; the fact that over time factors are not fixed in either quantity or quality; the importance of economies of scale relative to the size of existing markets; and the importance of both demand and supply complementarities in the growth process. It has been persuasively suggested that the requirements of growth and comparative advantage - broadly and dynamically construed - can be reconciled by means of modern programming techniques.[1/]

8. Partly because it would lead too far afield and partly because, from lack of data, it would be an academic exercise, it is not the purpose of this paper to examine in detail the full range of considerations which would determine the dynamic allocation of resources in growing and open African economies. To attempt this would be a most intricate exercise in general equilibrium analysis; and enough has probably been said to emphasize the complexity of the process of decision-taking involved. It should, at least, be clear that anything approaching a definitive evaluation of existing or projected trade problems and policies from the point of view of a country or a continent would be an exacting and very lengthy undertaking.

1/ Chenery: <u>Comparative Advantage and Development Policy</u>, American Economic Review, March 1961.

9. Short of a fully comprehensive analysis, however, it is still possible usefully to describe and discuss some major issues among the trade and growth problems of the developing countries. In essence the current, widespread concern derives from the fact that, in contrast to the experience of the 19th century, the international mechanism is failing to transmit economic growth from centre to peripheral countries on an adequate scale; and much of the present discussion focuses on the course of exports from the developing countries. A number of reasons have been adduced to explain the relatively sluggish growth of such exports including the low demand elasticities for many primary commodities, the commercial and domestic policies of the developed countries, the increasing proportion of income in the developed countries allocated to the purchase of services, the relative decline in the materials content of certain manufactured products and the development of synthetics.[1/ 2/]

10. Whatever the causes, there can be no doubting the consequences. Notwithstanding a general buoyancy in world trade in the post-war period, expansion of trade has been unevenly distributed over the constituent parts of the international economy; and exports from the developing countries have grown more slowly than either those from the developed market economies or those from the centrally-planned economies. Whereas, for example, exports from the developed market economies grew in value terms at an annual rate of 8.0 per cent between 1950 and 1962, exports from the developing economies increased in the same period by a mere 3.4 per cent. As a result of the different rates of growth, the share of the developing economies in world exports has declined from nearly one-third by value in 1950 to around one-fifth in recent years.

1/ Nurkse: Patterns of Trade and Development, Stockholm, 1959

2/ Prebisch: Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, American Economic Review, March, 1959.

11. The slow growth in the value of exports from the developing countries since 1950 compared to exports from the developed countries in the same period was due partly to a slower rise in export volumes and partly to contrasting trends in export prices - those of developed countries increased and those of the developing countries declined. At the same time the price of imports into the developing countries increased and the net barter terms of trade of the developing countries deteriorated by some 11 per cent.

12. What for the most part makes the sluggish export performance and the deterioration of the terms of trade serious problems is the legitimate determination of the developing countries to promote economic growth. Their consequent development efforts have induced a significant increase in their import requirements; and, at an annual rate of 5.0 per cent, imports of the developing countries grew more rapidly than did their exports between 1950 and 1962. Implicit in these trends is the danger that, to the extent that economic development cannot be otherwise financed, the slow growth of export earnings will constrain the over-all economic growth of the developing countries, particularly since the developing countries additionally and generally run a deficit in invisible trade. In fact a recent United Nations study[1/], based essentially on trends in the 1950's, suggests that by 1970 the initial gap on current account of the developing countries will rise hypothetically from an observed US $4.9 billion 1960 to a projected US $20 billion (in 1960 prices). For Africa alone the projected change is from US$2.0 billion in 1960 to US $6 billion in 1970. Other studies, with different methodologies and objectives, have arrived at somewhat different estimates of the likely future gap; but all have agreed that, if successful policies are not implemented in the meantime, the gap will be substantially higher than it now is.[2/]

1/ United Nations: World Economic Survey, 1963, Part 1.

2/ For a fuller discussion of these aspects of the developing countries' trade problems see the United Nations document cited in the previous footnote and : Maizels: Trade and Development Problems, National Institute Economic Review, May, 1964.

13. In these circumstances it is wholly right that the developing countries should be concerned, from the point of view of financing their economic development, at the inadequate levels of their export earnings. It is also wholly right that in consequence they should seek by their own efforts and through international action to secure a more favourable world environment in which to trade. This is especially so given the present tendency for aid from the developed countries to stagnate. It is, however, of the utmost importance in all of this not to overlook a second aspect of the relationship between exports and economic development; and to realize that, in the 19th century, the then peripheral countries grew at a satisfactory pace not merely because their exports (of primary products) increased pari passu with world production of manufactures, but also because growth in their export incomes induced, through a multiplier-accelerator mechanism, income growth throughout the entire economy.[1]

14. This point is sufficiently vital to justify illustration by means of a brief historical digression. In the early 1890's, Canada was an excellent example of a peripheral country. It was small in relation to the world economy and some 70 per cent of the labour force was engaged in primary production, partly for subsistence and partly for the market and export. In the course of the subsequent twenty years, although, interestingly enough, primary production continued to play a very significant role in Canadian economic activity, the Canadian economy was largely transformed; real income per capita rose from \$295 in 1890 to some \$475 in 1913, and the foundations were laid for the continuing increases in per capita income which have to-day given Canada one of the highest standards of living in the world. Now, it is true that exports expanded greatly - by 226 per cent, in fact, in real terms between 1891 and 1913 - in this crucial period of Canadian economic history. It is also probably true

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1/ For details of the trends in production and trade see: Lewis: World Production, Prices and Trade, 1870-1960, Manchester School, May, 1952.

that this expansion was a necessary condition of the general economic expansion which took place. It was not, however, a sufficient condition; and the growth of incomes resulted as much as anything from the character of wheat, Canada's leading export staple of the time. The expansion of wheat production dictated a vast input of capital and labour which had important ramifications in the rest of the economy. In terms of capital formation alone, for example, the expansion of wheat induced greatly increased investment in wheat itself, in industries servicing wheat and industries processing wheat, in facilities for transporting wheat and in industries supplying goods and services to the high income factors of production working in the wheat industry. Thus because of wheat and its linkages with the other sectors of the economy, a whole series of new secondary industries arose and existing industries expanded greatly.

15. Historical parallels are notoriously dangerous and too much should not be made of the above digression. In particular it has to be recognized that Canada began its "take-off" into sustained economic growth in circumstances much more favourable than those now facing the developing countries.1/ Nevertheless, when all the necessary qualifications have been made an important moral remains. Growth will be transmitted from the export sector to the rest of the economy only if the linkage effects are sufficiently strong and the resultant distribution of incomes sufficiently conducive to appropriate patterns of consumption and savings.

16. All of this means that the presently developing economies should be concerned not only to increase their export earnings, but also to examine critically the capacity of their exports, as they are currently constituted, to generate general domestic growth. It is not impossible that, because of

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1/ Not least of the Canadian advantages was access to very large amounts of foreign capital. Whereas, between 1891 and 1913 Canadian exports increased four-fold, imports increased six-fold and by 1913 were, absolutely, almost twice as great as exports. A willingness and ability on the part of the present developed countries to provide external finance on this scale to the present developing countries, would relieve the latter of much of their burden.

weak linkage effects, considerable increases in export earnings, although they may relieve pressures on the balance of payments, will do disappointingly little per se to promote growth. To the extent that this is so, the developing countries confront a considerable dilemma. They are stuck, at least in the short-run (which is certainly to be counted in years), with their existing pattern of resource allocation. They must, consequently, do what they can to boost their export earnings from their existing primary production. To the extent, however, that such production can be shown to be inadequate historically as a generator of economic growth, development requires that resources be transferred from primary production to other more efficient activities. The full implications of this problem deserve separate and extensive study. In the meantime two suggestions may be made. The first is that the existence of the problem gives the developing countries an interest in ensuring that whatever the arrangements made internationally to solve their trade problems, they should be flexible enough to avoid any danger of freezing existing resource allocations. The second suggestion flows from the thought that the most convenient and most efficient transfer of resources will frequently be from primary production to the further processing of primary products. This fact gives the developing countries additional reason to complain of the present impediments put up by the developed countries against the import of processed goods from the developing countries. It also gives the developing countries incentive to ensure, by regional economic co-operation and otherwise, that where they do establish processing industries they make them as efficient and competitive as they can be.

II. PROPOSALS FOR TACKLING INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PROBLEMS

17. It is a matter of current controversy, especially in academic circles,[1] as to how far instability in their export earnings impedes the economic growth of the developing countries. The issues at stake are complex and this is not the place to discuss them in detail. Two things, however, may be remarked. The first is simply to suggest that the fact that countries grow in the face of instability does not preclude the possibility that they might have grown even more in its absence. The second is to point out that even if there are growth elements other than in the export sector which cushion the economy from fluctuations in export earnings, such fluctuations can still have troublesome effects on export producers and the planning of export production. There is thus still some presumption that instability should be reduced as far as possible.

Possible contradiction!

18. Since the prices of primary products, especially if these products are freely traded, are notoriously subject to quite violent fluctuations, in face of short-run inelasticities of both supply and demand, the desire to induce price stability and thus stability of export earnings is the first reason for wishing to control the operation of the primary commodity markets. The second reason, particularly in view of recent experience, is to protect the developing countries from the effects of downward trends in their export prices. Such trends have an adverse effect on the balance of payments of the developing countries, threaten real incomes and, apart from their general impact, fall heavily on the primary producers. Rising prices of primary products, it is true, affect the developed countries in similar adverse ways. It is possible, however, to justify a greater concern for the developing countries on welfare grounds and on the fact that the adverse impact is much more

1/ McBean: Commodity Instability, Economic Growth and Economic Policy
Aboyade: A Note on External Trade, Capital Development and Planned Development in African Primary Products and International Trade (ed. Stewart and Orde), 1965.

concentrated in their case. As Professor James Meade has it in a graphic illustration of the latter point: "the producer, whether he be poor cane-cutter or the rich estate owner, may rely almost 100 per cent on the price of sugar for his income; there is no family in the importing countries which spends the whole of their income on sugar".1/

19. It may, of course, be argued that the price mechanism should be allowed freely to function and that a downward trend in the prices of primary products should be accepted as a signal for producers to move into an alternative line of production. Apart from the fact that in some cases the only alternative to production for the market would be subsistence agriculture, it may be said against this view that an early, continuing and pertinent criticism of the price mechanism has been that it frequently takes a long time to achieve its effects and that it unequally distributes the burden of the transition. Moving from a position in which resource allocation is distorted (according to current market indicators) to one of optimum allocation may well produce net gains. But the very notion of net gains implies the balancing of gains and losses and it is by no means clear why the losers should bear the whole burden of a transition which on balance is for the communal good. The need to spread the burden of the transition has long been recognized domestically in the developed economies. Recognition of the need is equally important in the international economy.

20. There is general agreement, for these reasons, on the need to cushion the developing economies against the adverse payments and income effects of falling primary product prices. Agreement is much less general on how this should be done. In the past much faith has been placed in commodity arrangements which have in general taken one of two forms or contained mixtures of both. The first form is a buffer stock scheme which applies to particular commodities and which, essentially, involves a managing authority possessed of funds. The authority buys when prices are low and sells when prices are high. The operation of

1/ Meade: International Commodity Agreements in UN Trade and Development, Vol. III.

such a scheme clearly places a high premium on the sagacity and independence of the managers. It is, further subject to two major limitations. It may be constrained by storage costs; and it is properly applicable to the smoothing of fluctuations but not to the diversion of trends.

21. A second possible arrangement is government intervention in the national markets and imposition of export quotas. If, at any given level of prices, a surplus in world supply threatens, the restriction of supplies will maintain price at a higher level than that at which it would otherwise settle; and if, as is usually so - at least in the short run - demand for the primary product is inelastic, export revenues will be higher than if all exportable supplies were marketed. In many situations export restriction will obviously be an attractive expedient. It is also, in practice, subject to some obvious difficulties. Not least of these is the sheer difficulty in maintaining quotas. General restriction and a consequent high price level offers inducement to individual producing countries to abrogate restrictive agreements and to seek to enjoy the high price on an unrestricted output. Attempts to prevent producer desertion by embroiling the importing countries may provoke would-be deserters among producers to sell at something less than the restricted price; and this in turn might undermine the loyalty of the importers to the agreement. Even if the solidarity of producers is maintained, restrictive agreements may still be threatened by the fact that demand is normally much more elastic in the long run and the consequent dangers that artificially high prices long maintained may provoke the development of substitutes. Restrictive agreements, finally, tend if they endure to result in inefficient production. Quotas are usually based on past performance and if they remain unaltered over time this precludes the possibility of the more efficient producers making relative gains both within and as between countries.

22. In deciding on how best to protect developing countries from fluctuations and declines in their export earnings a range of possibilities is available. Although they are by no means mutually exclusive, price

compensation agreements and arguments for extending the coverage of more directly organized commodity agreements may be used dramatically to illustrate the nature of the choice required. Price compensation agreements are based on the recognition of the fact that the price mechanism simultaneously allocates resources and distributes income. There is no reason to believe that an efficient allocation of resources achieves an optimal distribution of income. And what is claimed for price compensation agreements is that by separating the efficiency from the welfare function, they enable resources to be efficiently allocated and income to be satisfactorily distributed. In its simplest form a price compensation agreement need involve only two countries - a primary producer and exporter and an importer of primary commodities. Agreement would be reached on (i) a normal volume of trade in a particular commodity between the two countries over a specified period of time and (ii) a standard price governing the exchange of the commodity in question. If then, for example, the world price were to fall below the standard price the importing country would compensate the exporter in full or in part, on the difference between the two prices on the normal volume of trade. Agreement could also be reached to have compensation flow in the other direction if the standard price is above the world level. A strong feature of such an agreement is that it would leave the two governments concerned quite free as to the manner in which they raised or disposed of the compensatory funds.

23. More directly organized commodity agreements can be neither so simply arranged nor described. The normal aim of commodity agreements is to maintain price above the level at which it would settle if market forces were allowed to operate unimpeded. This requires changing some of the determinants of supply and/or demand; and since demand is ultimately diffuse and difficult to manage, commodity agreements invariably involve production control. The difficulties of achieving this and the other difficulties which can attend attempts to maintain high prices have already been discussed above. It has now further to be recognized that, from the point of view of concluding commodity

agreements there are markets and markets. The importance of this point may be illustrated by stating briefly a by-now conventional classification of markets and considering some implications of this classification for market organization.

24. The market classification referred to comprises the following four categories, the markets for:

(a) Commodities produced exclusively or very largely in the developing countries, without close substitutes in consumption - e.g. coffee, tea, cocoa and manganese;

(b) Commodities produced only in developing countries but subject to competition from industrial substitutes - e.g. natural rubber and industrial diamonds;

(c) Commodities produced in the developing countries which have near substitutes in some primary products produced by the developed countries - e.g. groundnuts, copra and other tropical oilseeds for which butter and other temperate oils and fats may be substituted; and

(d) Commodities from the developing countries which are also produced in the developed countries - e.g. zinc, lead, iron, petroleum, wheat, sugar, soya, beans, citrus fruits, tobacco and cotton.

25. It has already been remarked that the usual objective of commodity agreements is to keep the price of the commodity higher than it would be in the absence of agreement. From the point of view of maintaining export earnings to seek higher prices is good economic logic only if the demand for the commodities in question is inelastic. This is likely to be unequivocally so only in the first of the above markets - and even then it is prudent to repeat the caveat on the differences between short and long-run elasticities. In the second group of markets it would be necessary to know the relevant elasticities of substitution before coming to any firm conclusion. There must, however, be some presumption

that the presence of synthetics makes substitution likely in the face of sustained high prices for the natural product. The situation in the third and fourth market groups is complicated by the protectionist policies of the developed market economies. Even, however, if all the barriers to exports from the developing countries in these two categories were removed, it is evident that in face of substitutes the best prospect for export earnings lies in low-cost production and competitive pricing.

26. Enough has now been said to indicate that commodity proposals should be based on commodity studies and that prescription may vary according to the particular circumstances of the case. To demonstrate this further existing commodity agreements and the problems of one or two other selected commodities are examined in appendices. In the meantime, to revert to the general discussion, it may be noted that the choice between price compensation and more highly organized market management should turn to some extent on an assessment of the efficiency of the price mechanism as an allocator of resources. In some markets world prices are so distorted by the effects of domestic policies in the developed countries that they are virtually useless as indicators to desirable resource changes. In other, less distorted markets, long run price movements may be more meaningful, though it still has to be recognized that in primary production the process of adjustment may be slow even in the long run; and that in the interim, in the likely case of slow decline, the adjustment may also be painful. It has also to be recognized, however, that even if current market prices are inadequate indicators, questions of efficient allocation still arise and have to be faced particularly in developing countries where inefficiency can only detract from already low levels of <u>per capita</u> income.

27. The alternatives discussed so far do not exhaust the proposals made for compensating the developing countries for their unfavourable trading conditions. There have been suggestions that the developed countries should transfer to the developing countries any gains that accrue to the former from improvement in their terms of trade with the

latter; that schemes should be devised, like variants of the Development Insurance Fund proposal, to compensate the developing countries for short-run fluctuations in their export earnings due to either volume or price changes; and that, in the longer run arrangements should be made to ensure that the development programmes of the developing countries should not be placed in jeopardy by unexpected short-falls in their export earnings. Partly as a result of these proposals the International Monetary Fund instituted in 1963 special drawing arrangements for developing countries with balance of payments problems. More recently the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has reported favourably on a British-Swedish proposal, made at the Geneva Conference of UNCTAD, for the provision of supplementary financial measures to protect longer term development prospects.[1]

28. It is important in considering the growing number of proposals for dealing with the trade problems of the developing countries not to become so immersed in their details of operation as to overlook the purpose of their existence. In proximate terms the objective is to protect the export earnings of the developing countries: more fundamentally the aim is to protect and enhance their growth prospects. It is from this point of view that any country or group of countries should assess the various proposals; and such assessment must begin from awareness of existing patterns of resource allocation and understanding of the timing and pattern of desirable transformations. From the development point of view the more flexibility international arrangements and proposals offer the developing countries the better.

1/ For a useful summary and analyses of the proposals see Lovasy: Appraisal of Compensatory Finance Schemes, IMF Staff Papers, July 1965.

III. SOME STATISTICAL DIMENSIONS OF AFRICA'S EXPORT TRADE

29. The discussion of the trade problems of the developing countries has thus far been largely conducted in general terms. It would, however, be dangerous to think that all developing countries or all commodities of importance to the developing countries could be fitted into the same mould. Underdevelopment has undoubtedly many general features; but it has also particular characteristics in particular countries and regions of which it is important not to lose sight. Thus in considering African export problems - even where such consideration is largely confined to primary commodities - it is useful to define in some detail the extent of export dependence of the African economies; the commodity composition of African exports; the degree of country involvement in the various export commodities; the nature of competition and impediments the African exports confront; and the extent to which African economies are plagued by fluctuations in their export earnings. In the present context it is clearly desirable, where possible, to present these details in comparative terms.

(1) Export Dependence

30. The export dependence of the developing economies is a problem which has many facets and is a pheromenon which is difficult definitively to measure. From the point of view of economic development, an economy may be said to be export dependent if exports form a leading sector in the economy in the sense that, their own fortunes autonomously determined, they are a major source of induced growth in incomes in the economy as a whole. The multiplier-accelerator mechanism by which increases in exports may generate increases in income throughout the economy turns largely on the linkage effects between exports and other sectors and its impact will be largely conditioned by the production functions of the export sector. It follows from this that any strict measurement of export dependence presupposes a detailed knowledge of the quantitative relationships between the export and other sectors in the economy.

31. In general such detailed knowledge is not available for African economies. In its absence, enough is probably known impressionistically about the structure of African economies to support the belief that export dependence is widespread; and one way in which to offer some further support for this belief would be to examine the shares of exports in African gross national products. Unfortunately, the data available for such examination are scarce. Such information as is available is given in table 1.1 of Appendix A. From this table it may be seen that, in recent years, the ratios of exports to GNP in Tunisia (13.4 per cent), Ghana (16.7 per cent), Kenya (19.6 per cent), Uganda (31.0 per cent), Mauritius (35.2 per cent) and Tanganyika (40.0 per cent) were in all cases sufficiently high to make export dependence, in the sense defined above, more or less plausible.1/

32. Given that African exports are strategically important to African economic growth, it is of interest to have some indication of the extent to which exports from the various African countries are concentrated in one or more commodities. A convenient measure of concentration in this context may be had from consideration of the number of commodities required in each country to account for at least 50 per cent of the value of total exports. Detailed information on proportionate shares of individual commodities in export totals is again given in table 1.1 of Appendix A; and this information is summarized in Table 3.1 below. As may be seen from this table, the export trade of African countries was heavily concentrated in 1963. Among the 37 countries covered by the table the largest group was that of countries which derived 50 per cent or more of their total export earnings from a

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1/ Since, strictly speaking, what is required of a leading sector is not that it be of any given magnitude in relation to GNP, but that it have a recognizable strategic influence on growth, examination of export-GNP ratios are not conclusive. The higher these are, however, the more likely exports are to form a leading sector.

TABLE 3.1

Concentration of African exports, by commodity and country, 1963

Country	Commodities accounting for at least 50% of total export values
(1) One-Commodity Countries:[a/]	
Libya	Petroleum
Mauritius	Sugar
Gambia	Groundnuts
Mauritania	Iron ore
Zambia (1964)	Copper
Reunion	Sugar
Chad	Cotton
Ghana	Cocoa
Zanzibar	Cloves
Niger	Groundnuts
Sierra Leone	Diamonds
Dahomey	Oilseeds
Sudan	Cotton
Guinea	Aluminium oxide
Upper Volta	Live animals
United Arab Republic	Cotton
Uganda	Coffee
Ethiopia	Coffee
(2) Two-commodity Countries[a/]	
Liberia	Iron ore and rubber
Somalia	Bananas and live animals
Central African Republic	Diamonds and cotton
Congo (Rep. of)	Diamonds and wood
Senegal	Groundnut oil and oilseeds and nuts
Ivory Coast	Coffee and cocoa

Gabon	Logs and manganese
Mali	Groundnuts and fish
Angola	Coffee and diamonds
Tanganyika	Sisal and cotton
Cameroon	Coffee and cocoa
Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	Copper and diamonds
Nigeria	Oilseeds, nuts and kernels and cocoa
(3) Three-commodity Countries a/	
Togo	Cocoa, phosphates and coffee
Morocco (1961)	Fruit and vegetables, phosphates and non-ferrous ores and concentrates
Kenya	Coffee, tea and vegetable fibres
Tunisia	Wine, vegetable oils and phosphates
(4) More-than-three-commodity Countries:	
Madagascar	Coffee, sugar and honey, sisal and spices
Mozambique	Cotton, cashew nuts, sugar and sisal.

Source: Table 1.1, Appendix A.

a/ Ranked (in descending order) according to the proportion of total export value.

single commodity. These countries accounted for some 48 per cent of the countries covered, and this obviously indicates a high degree of concentration, particularly since there is some duplication among the commodities exported from the various countries. In the two-commodity group there were 13 countries - or 35 per cent of the total - and again there was significant duplication among the leading commodities. The third and fourth groups comprised 4 and 2 countries respectively and between them they accounted for 16 per cent of the countries covered.

33. As measured by the present criterion the concentration of exports from African countries probably does not differ greatly from that of the developing countries as a whole.1/ Thus Mr. Alfred Maizels, using a somewhat broader classification of commodities - which puts, for example, both Cameroon and Madagascar among the one-commodity countries - found that for a sample of 99 developing countries in 1960-61 some 57 per cent were dependent on one commodity group for at least 50 per cent of their export earnings.2/ Allowing for the fact that Mr. Maizel's classification will, in comparison to that used here, exaggerate the degree of concentration, this result does not differ greatly from the findings of table 3.1.

(2) Commodity Composition of African Export Trade with Industrial Countries

34. It has already been pointed out that for the present and for some time to come what progress the developing countries make through trade is and will be in large part a function of their export of primary commodities (broadly construed to include very slightly processed goods) to the developed market economies. What is true of the developing countries as a whole is no less true of Africa. Thus, in 1962 African exports of primary commodities to the developed market economies accounted for more than 74 per cent of the value of African exports of all commodities to all countries and for almost 76 per cent of African

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1/ It should be remembered that there are other measures of concentration. In particular the degree of concentration of African exports is in a sense higher than is suggested merely by considering commodity concentration. This is because exports from African countries are frequently concentrated in a limited number of markets. See the discussion below of African exports to individual countries.

2/ Maizels: Trade and Development Problems, National Institute Economic Review, May 1964.

exports of primary commodities to all countries.[1] The commodity composition of African exports to the developed market economies together with other relevant information is shown in table 1.2 in Appendix A; and attention may usefully be drawn to certain features of this table.

35. The first thing which the table makes clear is the high degree of concentration in Africa's primary export trade with the developed market economies. This is true both in terms of commodity composition and in terms of markets. In terms of commodities, forty-seven leading commodities are listed in the table and in aggregate they accounted for 92.3 per cent of the total value of African primary exports to the industrial countries in 1962.[2] Petroleum, the leading export, was responsible for almost 14 per cent of the total export earnings accruing to Africa from the sale of primary products in the developed market economies. Copper and petroleum together accounted for more than 25 per cent of the aggregate value; six commodities - petroleum, copper, coffee, cocoa, wine and wood-were responsible for more than 50 per cent; and sixteen commodities - those already mentioned plus

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1/ The choice of year and range of countries included under the rubric of developed market economies was made in order to facilitate convenient comparison with the developing countries as a whole. This is most easily done using material prepared for the Geneva Conference of the UNCTAD. As far as the choice of year is concerned, the current commodity proportions would probably not differ greatly from those discussed in the text. Although the relative share of petroleum - which accounted for 10.4 per cent, 14.1 per cent and 18.0 per cent of the f.o.b. value of African total exports in 1962, 1963 and 1964 respectively - would certainly now be higher. As far as the range of countries is concerned this is somewhat larger than usual and covers Canada, Japan, Belgium - Luxembourg, Denmark, France, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Austria and Finland. In calculating the proportions of total African exports accounted for by imports of primary commodities into these countries from Africa it was necessary to adjust for the fact that such imports are generally recorded c.i.f. Thus the proportions are subject to an unknown but probably small margin of error.

2/ A basic assumption of this section is that proportions derived on the basis of c.i.f. import totals will hold for f.o.b. export proportions.

cotton, groundnuts, fresh vegetables, citrus fruits, tobacco, phosphates, iron ore, sugar, palm kernels and rubber - provided more than 75 per cent of the relevant export earnings. It is worth noting that when the forty-seven commodities are ranked by value no single commodity beyond the eight is responsible for as much as three per cent of the total value.

36. The concentration of Africa's primary export trade may be compared with that of the developing countries as a whole. As with Africa, crude petroleum is the leading export of the developing countries. Whereas, however, it accounts for almost 14 per cent of the African total, it provides more than one-quarter of the export earnings the developing countries derive from the sale of primary commodities to the developed market economies. Similarly, whereas the leading four and the leading eight African commodities account for some 40 and 58 per cent respectively of the total, the corresponding proportions for the developing countries are 46 and 62 per cent. There is thus some suggestion in these comparisons that the commodity concentration is somewhat weaker for Africa than for the developing countries as a group.

37. It is, nevertheless, also evident from the comparisons that the primary commodity trade of both the developing countries as a whole and of Africa is largely concentrated in relatively few commodities. There is, thus, an inference that, at least the global terms, much would be done for the developing group and Africa if improvement were achieved in the market conditions of their respective leading commodities. In this circumstance it is of interest to examine the extent to which the leading commodities of the two groups of countries overlap. It has already been mentioned that crude petroleum is the most important single export from both groups and, in fact, the interests of the two groups run generally parallel.1/ Thus, of the six leading

1/ To some extent this is to be expected since Africa is part of the developing world. But the weight of Africa in the developing world is far from being overwhelming. Thus Africa accounted for about one-quarter of the imports of the developed market economies from the developing countries in 1962.

African commodities, all but wine are included in the first ten leading commodities of the developing countries at large; and only fresh vegetables and citrus fruits among the ten leading African commodities do not rank in the first twenty for the developing world.

38. In terms of market concentration, it may be noted that France (29.2 per cent) and the United Kingdom (19.4 per cent) were the leading importers of African primary commodities in 1962, accounting together for almost half of the imports from Africa into the developed market economies in that year. If two further countries - West Germany (12.2 per cent) and the United States (9.3 per cent) - are added, then more than 70 per cent of the imports from Africa are accounted for. The remaining fifteen countries provided markets for about 30 per cent of the imports from Africa; and apart from Belgium - Luxembourg (6.3 per cent) no single country was responsible for as much as 5 per cent of the total value of imports in 1962.

39. The second thing which emerges from table 1.2 is that there is no clear relationship between the rank of primary commodity exports in the African total and their relative global importance in either the imports from all sources into the developed economies or the exports from all developing countries. Details are given for the eight leading African primary exports in table 3.2 below; and even in this small sample there is evidence of considerable diversity. The figures showing African shares in the imports from all sources are probqbly the most interesting in the table. From them it is possible to obtain a quick and approximate indication of the extent to which, in promoting the export of its main commodities, Africa must consider, confront or co-operate with other interests. The additional information in the table offers some guidance as to the extent to which competition for African exports came from the developed and developing countries respectively and some indication of the relative importance of Africa among the developing countries.

40. Understandably, African shares in imports from all sources are generally lower than either African shares in the total for developing countries or the shares of the developing countries in the overall import totals; and, indeed, only for two commodities - cocoa

TABLE 32

Relative importance of eight leading African commodity exports in imports of the industrial countries, 1962

	% share of the African Total	African percentage share by value of imports into the industrial countries a) From all sources	b) From developing countries	% share of developing countries in imports into industrial countries from all sources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Petroleum	13.8	11.5	12.4	92.7
Copper	11.9	33.5	63.5	52.8
Coffee	7.6	20.9	21.1	98.8
Cocoa	7.1	65.8	77.1	85.3
Wine	5.6	48.3	99.0	48.8
Wood	4.4	9.4	40.7	42.9
Cotton	3.9	12.9	21.2	49.3
Groundnuts	3.6	80.1	86.4	92.7

Sources: Table 1.2, Appendix A and Table 1B-3, Trade and Development, Vol. III, (UN E/CONF.46/141).

(65.8 per cent) and groundnuts (80.1 per cent) - are the African shares of imports from all sources in excess of 50 per cent.1/

1/ In table 1.2 there are six further commodities of which Africa provides more than 50 per cent of total imports from all sources. In aggregate these commodities account for less than 7 per cent of the Africa total.

41. For four of the commodities of particular interest to Africa – petroleum, coffee, groundnuts and cocoa – the share of the developing countries in the imports of these commodities into the developed market economies from all sources is in excess of 85 per cent; for three more commodities – copper, wine and wood – the relative weight in the respective totals is in the region of 50 per cent; and the relevant proportion for cotton is 61 per cent. In turn, the shares of African supplies in the various commodity imports emanating from the developing countries as a whole vary widely, ranging from 12.4 per cent for petroleum to 99.0 per cent for wine.

42. The structure of trade normally changes slowly and, as a consequence, data for any recent year will in general resemble data for any other recent year. It is, however, important to remember that the cumulative effects of slow change can be considerable; and it is of interest to examine in the context of the present discussion some of the changes which have taken place over time in the African export trade with the developed market economies. To facilitate such examination table 1.3 of Appendix A reproduces as far as possible the data of table 1.2, but for 1955; and table 1.4 records the relative value changes between 1955 and 1962 in the leading commodities exported from Africa. Comparing table 1.3 with table 1.2 suggests that the commodity concentration of African primary export trade increased somewhat between 1955 and 1962. Thus although the leading four commodities accounted for about 40 per cent of the total in both years, the respective shares of the leading eight commodities were about 51 and 58 per cent and for the leading twelve commodities were about 61 and 68 per cent. In terms of market concentration the change was in the other direction. Thus the proportion of exports marketed in France and the United Kingdom declined from 54 per cent in 1955 to 48.6 per cent in 1962;[1/] and whereas in the earlier year the addition

1/ This was entirely due to the decline in the relative importance of the United Kingdom – from 26.0 per cent to 19.4 per cent. France actually increased its share from 28.0 per cent to 29.2 per cent.

of West Germany and United States increased the proportion of exports accounted for to 77.4 per cent, in the later year the share of exports accruing to the four countries was just over 70 per cent.

43. Behind these aggregate changes lie the different fortunes of individual commodities between 1952 and 1962. In this respect the most spectacular change was undoubtedly in the value of petroleum, exports of which in absolute and relative terms increased enormously. The relative increase was of more than 5000 per cent and was sufficient to promote petroleum from a negligible position in African commodity exports in 1955 to the leading rank in 1962. Copper, which was the most valuable African export in 1955 increased by almost 14 per cent between 1955 and 1962 when it ranked second only to petroleum. The value of cocoa exports declined by more than 9 per cent over the period in question and partly as a consequence this commodity slipped from second to fourth place among African primary exports to the developed market economies. Coffee exports, on the other hand, increased by more than 7 per cent, and maintained its relative standing in third place. From ranking fourth in 1955 cotton exports dropped to sixth place partly as a result of a decline of some 38 per cent in value. By contrast wood exports increased by 88 per cent and improved in rank from 12th to 6th.

44. There is strong suggestion in tables 1.2 and 1.3 considered together that African competitiveness generally increased in the industrial markets between 1955 and 1962. Because of differences in coverage it is not possible directly to compare the relative importance of African exports of wine and groundnuts in the two years. It is, however, significant that of the remaining six leading commodities in 1962 all but cotton were a higher proportion of the total imports from all sources into the developed market economies than they had been in 1955. African cotton was some 18 per cent of cotton imports in 1955, but by 1962 the relevant proportion had fallen to less than 13 per cent. African petroleum on the other hand, which had been negligible in relation to total petroleum imports, accounted for almost 12 per cent of such imports in 1962. Among the other leading

commodities cocoa and coffee both improved their position by 5 percentage points, wood by almost four points and copper by 0.5 points.

(3) <u>The country concentration of African primary export Commodities:</u>

45. Given that a limited number of commodities account for a relatively high proportion of the value of African exports to the developed market economies it is of interest, in considering the policy implications of this fact, to know something of the African country concentration of these African exports. One crude measure of this concentration may be obtained by listing specified leading commodities and simply counting the number of countries significantly[1/] engaged in their export. Thus in table 1.5 of Appendix A the forty-seven leading African primary exports to the developed market economies in 1962 are listed together with the names of the African countries significantly engaged in exporting these commodities. The results of this table may be conveniently summarized by considering the number of countries participating in the export of the commodities required to account for 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent respectively of the total value of African primary exports to the developed market economies.

46. Two commodities - petroleum and copper - account for more than 25 per cent of the value total and engage eight African countries in their export. It requires six commodities to provide 50 per cent of the total and the unduplicated involvement in their export comprises twenty three countries. Of these countries, four export three of the commodities in question and two export two of the commodities. Thirty eight countries are engaged in exporting the sixteen commodities which in aggregate provide 75 per cent of the value of primary

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1/ The definition of significant in this context is that of any particular commodity obtaining a specific mention in the individual countries exports as recorded in the <u>UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics</u>.

exports to the industrial countries. Again there is multiple involvement: one country exports eight of the eighteen commodities; one country six commodities; two countries five commodities, two countries four commodities; eight countries three commodities; and eleven countries two of the commodities.

47. The above results are clearly not conclusive and they do not provide any precise measure of the extent to which trade in the leading African primary products is spread among the African countries. They do, however, create a strong presumption that concentration on the problems of the leading primary exports would not only cover the greater part, by value, of Africa's aggregate export trade but would also involve a very wide range of African countries. There is, further, reason to believe that country involvement is generally significant in the sense that the leading commodities account for a sizable proportion of the country export totals. Thus the minimum impact of the eight leading commodities on the export trade of twenty-two selected African countries is measured in table 3.3.[1] Perhaps the most significant aspect of this table is that it certainly understates the importance of the eight commodities for African economies. Although the minimum importance can also be the maximum, particularly where country exports are concentrated very heavily on one or two commodities, there is no reason to doubt that more exhaustive examination would increase both the number of countries included and the relative weight of the eight commodities in country totals. As it is, twenty-two countries represent a respectable coverage and the range of minimum importance - from 17.2 per cent to 98.7 per cent - indicates that the eight commodities in question are undoubtedly of considerable importance to all the countries covered.

1/ The commodities are petroleum, copper, coffee, cocoa, wine, wood, cotton and groundnuts. The impact is minimum because it measures only the importance of each country's leading exports - defined as those required to account for 50 per cent of total export earnings - also included among the continent's leading exports. Thus the total impact of the eight commodities in Nigeria is certainly greater than shown above. For Nigeria petroleum and wood, for example, have not been included.

TABLE 3.3

Minimum importance of eight leading African exports in total exports of selected African countries, 1963

Country	% of total exports	Country	% of total exports	Country	% of total exports
Libya	98.7	Cameroon	52.4	Madagascar	29.0
Zambia	91.3	Ethiopia	50.5	Togo	26.1
Ghana	73.5				
Niger	66.2	Congo (DR)	42.8	Kenya	25.2
Ivory Coast	62.9	Angola	40.1	Tunisia	19.3
Sudan	59.5	Gabon	40.0	Mozambique	18.1
UAR	53.3	Mali	39.3	Nigeria	17.5
Uganda	52.8	Senegal	32.4	Tanganyika	17.2

Source: Table 1.1, Appendix A.

(4) The nature of competition and impediments confronting African primary exports

48. It has earlier been suggested that the strategy to be devised for promoting the exports of particular African commodities should be influenced *inter alia* by the nature of the competition the commodities face. This is a matter which requires detailed consideration. In short compass useful guidance may be obtained by classifying African commodity exports according to the four market categories already discussed. On the assumption that primary commodities from Africa will not differ from similar commodities from the developing countries as a whole, table 1.6 in Appendix A sets out in some detail information on the competition facing African commodities; and the results of this table are summarized in table 3.4. It may be seen from the latter table that depending on whether or not petroleum is included, something between one-fifth and one-quarter of African exports by value have no close substitutes in the industrial markets; 6 or 7 per cent of the exports have to compete with close industrial substitutes; 9 to 10 per cent contend with natural

substitutes, and 63 to 57 per cent compete directly with the output of the industrial countries themselves.

49. The corresponding percentages are given in brackets for the developing countries as a whole in table 3.4; and there clearly is a marked similarity between Africa and the whole developing world in the extent

TABLE 3.4

Imports of the industrial countries from Africa and the developing countries classified according to the competition they face, 1962

Nature of Competition faced by the export	Value of imports (US$ 000's)	Percentage including petroleum	Distribution excluding petroleum
No close substitute	941,993	21.6 (18.0)	25.4 (27.0)
Close industrial substitute	274,867	6.3 (9.0)	7.4 (13.0)
Close natural substitute	398,383	9.1 (5.0)	10.7 (8.0)
Production of industrial countries	2,754,537	63.0 (68.0)	56.5 (52.0)

Source: Table 1.6, Appendix A on Table 1-2, UN Trade and Development, Vol. III, E/CONF.46/41.

to which their respective exports are subjected to the different kinds of competition. The inclusion or exclusion of petroleum makes a bigger difference to the results for the developing world than for Africa, and African commodities face more competition from industrial and less competition from natural products; but otherwise the patterns are very similar.

50. In addition to competition primary products also encounter other impediments in the industrial markets. The most important of these are tariffs, quantitative controls and fiscal charges on the domestic markets of the developed countries; and it is useful to have some notion

TABLE 3.5

Imports from Africa into selected industrial countries according to trade barriers, 1962

Type of Impediment	Value of Imports: In millions of dollars			Value of Imports: Percentage of total	
Tariff					
Total			1,261.2		31.4 (34.0)
Quantitative Control					
Total	1,079.1			26.9 (26.0)	
Also subject to duty		594.1			
Entering duty free			485.0		12.1 (9.0)
Fiscal Changes	1,446.3			36.0 (43.0)	
Subject to duty or quantitative control		354.4			
Free of other impediment			1,091.9		27.2 (18.0)
Without restraint			1,178.4		29.3 (39.0)
All primary commodity imports			4,016.5		100.0

Table 1.2 Appendix A.

Sources: Trade and Development, E/CONF.46/141, Vol. III – Tables 1B-6, 1B-7 and 1-5.

of the incidence of such barriers. Table 3.5 provides some basic information in the context. The value of commodities covered in the table is less than that in table 1.2 of Appendix A. This is because the industrial country coverage is more limited in table 3.5. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the results of the table are representative of the total African experience.

51. From the table it may be seen that almost 30 per cent of African primary exports enter the industrial markets without restraint. A somewhat higher proportion - 31.4 per cent - is subject to duty, almost 27 per cent is liable to quantitative restriction and 36 per cent attracts fiscal charges. Some African commodities are clearly subject to more than one kind of barrier and, avoiding double counting, more than two-thirds of African primary exports are subject to trade restrictions. Figures for the developing world as a whole are again given in brackets, and it may be noted that the proportion - 61 per cent - of the total exports from the developing countries subject to restriction is rather less than that for Africa.

(5) Fluctuations in export earnings:

52. Mention has already been made of the fact that the relationship between export instability and economic growth in the developing countries is a matter of current controversy. The suggestion has also been made that there is still a presumption in favour of regarding instability as a serious problem. The purpose of this section is briefly to discuss some quantitative measures of the problem for Africa.

53. Table 1.7 in Appendix A sets out details of the fluctuations in export earnings of the world, developing countries, Africa and selected African countries between 1952 - 1964. The method used to measure fluctuations in this, and subsequent tables is the relatively crude one of averaging the annual percentage changes over the whole period under consideration. On this measure, and somewhat surprisingly perhaps, world fluctuations are - at 6.0 per cent - somewhat above those

in the export earnings of the developing countries and Africa, both of which averaged 5.4 per cent. There is evidence of considerable diversity in the experience of the individual African countries both on a cross section and a time series basis. One feature of the table worth noting is that all countries covered are individually subject to greater fluctuations than those recorded for Africa as a whole. In so far as instability is a problem this feature of the table might be regarded as yet another argument for wider economic groupings among developing countries.

54. Fluctuations in export earnings may result from volume or price fluctuations or some combination of both. It would be useful to know for a sample of representative countries the relative importance of volume and price changes in the fluctuations of export earnings. Short of such knowledge, Table 1.8 of Appendix A provides some information on movements in world unit values of selected commodities of interest to Africa. Again what is perhaps most significant about the table is the strong suggestion of diversity. The range of average annual changes (signs ignored) runs, for example, from 3.5 per cent to 25.6 per cent; and in any one of the years covered the magnitude and direction of price changes for the different commodities varies widely.

55. Much more information (and work) is clearly required before any significant analytical conclusions may be reached about fluctuations in country and commodity export earnings. Even the modicum of information now available, however, shows clearly that the very considerable diversity of country and commodity experience makes analysis on an aggregate level an extremely hazardous undertaking.

IV. AFRICAN ATTITUDES TO TRADE PROBLEMS

56. Like other developing countries African countries are fully conscious of their trade difficulties. Ample evidence of this consciousness was given at the first meeting of the UNCTAD in Geneva in the spring of 1964 and it may serve useful purpose to recapitulate here some of the main points that were made then. In the Geneva interventions all the African countries expressed their growing uneasiness at increasing disequilibrium in their external trade. They placed this uneasiness squarely in the context of their development aspirations: deplored the downward tendency of the prices of their staple exports and main sources of foreign earning; regretted the deterioration in their terms of trade; and expressed concern at their consequent difficulties in supporting the necessary level of imports for growth, particularly of capital goods. All African countries expressed the hope that the UNCTAD would seek remedies for these various difficulties.

57. African countries did not content themselves with statements of their problems. They also proposed remedies and many countries insisted that the numerous proposals should not be considered individually and in isolation, but should be regarded as a coherent group of actions which needed to be implemented simultaneously in order to right the existing imbalances in international trade. Among the specific proposals for action much emphasis was placed on the importance of international commodity agreements; and some African delegations took the view that it was necessary to extend the coverage of such agreements to include more commodities and more producing and consuming countries. The general view of such agreements was that they should take account of African productive potential as indicated in the development plans; that, by means of systematic organization, they should assure the developing countries of stable prices sufficiently remunerative adequately to compensate the primary producers and to make some contribution to general development.

58. African argument was also made that freer access should be assured to the developed markets for exports from the developing countries. This could be done by removing customs, quantitative and fiscal barriers confronting these exports. Beyond this, there was some African feeling that preferential treatment should be extended from the developed to the developing countries without any requirement of reciprocation on the part of the latter. Concern was also expressed at the growing competition afforded to certain primary products from the developing countries by synthetic or natural production in the developed market economies. African countries suggested that the developed countries should not push the manufacture of synthetics or the export of products competing with those from developing countries too far. It was further suggested that the costs to the developed countries of restraint in these directions would not be excessive.

59. All African countries expressed themselves in favour of compensatory financing. Some countries sought the establishment of some form of development insurance; others the imposition of a tax on the developed countries based on their importation of primary products. One form such a tax could take would be to have it consist of the difference between a reference and world prices (on the assumption that the former is higher than the latter) and to transmit revenues thus raised to the countries in which the primary products originated.

60. African countries wishing to promote their industrialization by processing domestically their own primary products sought increased aid from the developed countries on more generous terms than those hitherto available. They stressed also the need for preferential treatment for their exports and protection for their infant industries.

61. Enough has been said to indicate that African countries at Geneva were concerned about a wide range of problems and were ready to entertain a wide range of remedies. Perhaps inevitably in the circumstances, much of the African representation was couched in general terms. Thus

although particular commodities were mentioned to illuminate particular problems, no specific proposals were advanced by African countries to deal with the problems of specific commodities. In light of the details of African exports given in the previous section it is of interest to note the frequency with which particular commodities were in fact mentioned. Coffee, which received eight mentions, was most often cited, followed closely by cocoa which was invoked seven times. Cotton, wood, iron ore, rubber, groundnuts and oils, minerals and meat were all mentioned twice. A wide range of commodities were mentioned once, including petroleum, the leading African export by value.

V. UNCTAD

62. It has already been mentioned that the first meeting of the UNCTAD was held in Geneva in the spring of 1964. The 1964 meeting ranged widely over trade and development problems and adopted 60 resolutions concerning these problems. The resolutions included principles intended to govern "international trade relations and trade policies conducive to development", principles concerning the transit trade of land-locked countries, recommendations concerning primary commodities, manufactured goods, the financing of trade expansion, invisible trade, special problems, and a programme of work; and recommendations on an institutional framework for continuing consideration of the problems discussed at the Conference.

63. The UNCTAD was established as a permanent organ of the United Nations by resolution 1995 (XIX) of the General Assembly. The organizational structure of the new organ is illustrated in Chart 1; and excellent detailed and summary accounts of the Geneva Conference are readily available elsewhere. 1/ 2/ The purpose of the present section is consequently to provide a very brief account of UNCTAD activities subsequent to the Geneva meeting.

64. As may be seen from the organizational chart, the principal instrument of the UNCTAD, apart from periodic meetings of the whole, is the Trade and Development Board. This Board has now met three times and has established four major committees: the Committee on Commodities; the Committee on Manufactures; the Committee on Invisibles and on Financing Relating to Trade; and the Committee on Shipping. The present discussion may be conveniently organized by considering each of these Committees in turn.

(a) The Committee on Commodities

65. The terms of reference of this committee are to ensure the implementation of integrated general policies for primary products and to co-ordinate the activities of all the organizations concerned with primary products. (FAO, GATT, etc.). It is requested to study and

1/ UN Trade and Development, 8 volumes
2/ UN Office of Public Information, A Review of Action Taken by the Conference

Chart 1


The Organization of UNCTAD
General Assembly
UNCTAD
Trade and Development Board
Advisory Committee (ex-Interim Co-ordination Committee for International Commodity Arrangements)
Committee on Commodities
Committee on Manufactures
Committee on Invisibles and Financing related to Trade
Committee on Shipping
Permanent Sub-Committee on Commodities
Special Committee on Preferences
Sub-committee on Invisibles
Sub-committee on Financing related to Trade
Ad Hoc Working Party on the International Organization of Commodity Trade
Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes

make recommendations on short and long-term stabilization measures, commodity agreements and other measures required in the field of primary products. In addition, the Committee is required to appraise the Board and member governments of the Conference of government and inter-governmental action which it thinks necessary on the problems it examines. The Committee has established a permanent sub-committee to ensure its functioning on a continuing basis.

66. At its first meeting (19 July - 7 August 1965) the Committee decided that recent improvements in the prices and earnings of primary products were temporary interruptions in the longer-term trend and that special measures to protect export earnings were still necessary. Such measures should be devised on a commodity-by-commodity basis; and in studying the commodity situation the Committee paid particular attention to products for which the current market situation gave special cause for concern. Three commodities were judged necessary of immediate attention: cocoa, sugar and coffee; and a larger number of others - copper, cotton, iron ore, lead, zinc, rice, rubber, tea, tobacco and vegetable oils - were thought to demand particular attention also, if rather less urgently. An appendix to the present paper examines some particular commodity problems of interest to Africa and takes account of the relevant UNCTAD discussions.

(b) Committee on Manufactures

67. The main task of the Committee on Manufactures is the promotion of measures designed to lead to the expansion and diversification of exports of semi-finished and manufactured goods from the developing countries. As part of this task the Committee is empowered to make recommendations, in collaboration with the regional economic commissions, concerning industrial diversification in the developing countries.

68. The first session of the Committee on Manufactures was from 10 to 19 August 1965 when the meeting adjourned; it will be resumed at the end of February 1966. In the course of its first session the Committee considered a report from its special Committee on Preferences.

The brunt of the discussion bore on the problem of whether, in seeking preferences without reciprocity for the developing countries, a general approach was to be preferred to special arrangements, on a temporary basis, for particular countries or groups of countries. Many of the developing countries favoured a general approach both in terms of country involvement and in terms of commodity coverage.

(c) Committee on Invisibles and Financing Relating to Trade

69. The terms of reference of this Committee include the formulation of appropriate general policies, the examination of the adequacy of growth rates in the developing countries, the study of resource mobilization in these countries and of their import capacity, and the study of measures designed to improve their balance of visible trade.

70. The first session of the Committee was held from 6 to 22 December 1965 and established three sub-commissions: one to consider procedural questions, one to consider invisible trade and one to consider finance. The latter sub-group considered the question of rates of growth and concluded that, if the objectives of the development decade were to be met, greater international effort would be required, and that in particular the developing countries would require more aid. The sub-committee received three reports: two from the IBRD and one from a Group of Experts on International Monetary Problems.

(d) The Committee on Shipping

71. This Committee was created partly in recognition of the importance of shipping in the balance of payments of the developing countries, partly in recognition of the large number of questions confronting the Committee on Invisibles, and partly, consequently, to be sure that shipping received the attention it deserved.

72. The Committee met for the first time between 8 and 23 November 1965, and examined the following points: the creation of consultative mechanisms on the national and regional levels; the level and structure of reight rates, the practices of maritime conferences, and the maintenance of adequate maritime services; the improvement of port operations and installations; the establishment or extension of merchant fleets in developing countries; and the current and long-term problems of sea transport.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

73. With an account of the trade problems of the developing countries, an examination of some general principles which bear on commodity agreements, a statistical description of African exports, an account of African attitudes to trade problems, and a short description of the operations of UNCTAD post-Geneva, this paper at least provides an appropriate framework for an examination of the question of the revelance of UNCTAD to African trade problems. Even though there are many excluded questions, a first and firm conclusion of the paper must be that, in a basic sense, there can be no doubting the relevance of UNCTAD to the African problems. The general description of the trade problems of the developing countries must be recognizably familiar to any African reader; the comparisons made in section III of this paper come close to suggesting that Africa in many respects represents the developing world in microcosm; and the juxtaposition of African attitudes and UNCTAD activities reveal how much these have in common. UNCTAD, in fact, is an instrument fashioned largely at the insistence of the developing countries and focusing exclusively on their problems. As such it could hardly fail to be relevant to Africa.

74. Among individuals and countries, wealth and poverty are largely the product of historical accident. The poor have thus a moral claim on the rich to help in the eradication of poverty. This is a claim the rich are always slow to acknowledge; and, as the historical experience of the developed countries shows, the necessary re-distribution of wealth and opportunity requires the formulation of appropriate objectives and the formation of appropriate institutions by the less privileged. In this context the UNCTAD is undoubtedly the best institution the developing countries have got, and it consequently behooves every developing country and every group of developing countries to do what they can, in a general way, to strengthen and encourage UNCTAD.

75. None of this is to say, of course, that the African States must automatically endorse every study and every proposal emanating from UNCTAD. Such passive acceptance would be the death of any would-be virile organization. The proper attitude of African states towards UNCTAD is probably one of sympathetic criticism. Every African state has an overriding duty towards its citizens - to promote growth in per capita incomes as quickly and as securely as possible. This means that the most important single question the African states can ask of anything UNCTAD does (or, indeed, of anything Africa demands) is: is this policy or proposal better calculated than any alternative to promote growth? This is never an easy question to answer, particularly since much pertinent information will probably be missing at the moment of decision. The question must also be considered in a general setting: one developing country should presumably not wish to promote its own growth at the expense of that of other developing countries. Notwithstanding the difficulties, however, the question is a necessary one.

76. What above all this suggests for the African states and for the ECA is the need for further and more detailed studies. Such studies could at one and the same time permit more reasoned appraisal of UNCTAD and help UNCTAD in the prosecution of its functions.1/ Thus to offer one specific example, a study of cocoa processing in Ghana, say, could by showing the relationship between such processing and Ghanaian growth and assessing the importance of trade barriers in the developed countries to the export prospects for processed cocoa - enable at least one African state to appraise UNCTAD's priorities to some extent and might help UNCTAD in applying pressure to have trade barriers reduced. A series of such studies would permit the formulation of a reasoned and reasonable African position.

1/ UNCTAD is after all still in its infancy and it would possibly be unfair to offer appraisal in too much detail at this early stage.

77. On balance, however impressionistically, UNCTAD offers African countries cause for hope. It is important, nevertheless, not to forget that, however generous and substantial external aid and however effective international institutions, the solution of Africa's development problem remains in the last analysis a task for African peoples and governments. It is, in this connexion, appropriate to end this paper with a quotation from the Secretary General of UNCTAD who once remarked that: "In many developing countries....attention is often centered on the external obstacles; the problems seem more urgent there, perhaps because they are more conspicuous. But it would be dangerous self-deception to imagine that, once those external obstacles are overcome, the way will be wide open for spontaneous economic development".

APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1.1 Concentration of African[1/] exports by country, 1963

Country	Value of total exports (in US $ million) (1)	(1) as % of GNP (2)	Proportion of the value of exports Accounted for by the leading exports (%) (3)	Commodities accounting for at least (a) 50% of export values[2/] (4)		(b) 90% of export values (5)
Ghana	273.3		73.5	Cocoa	(73.5)	Cocoa and wood
Cameroon	118.0		32.2	Coffee & cocoa	(52.4)	Coffee, cocoa, aluminium, cotton, oils and oilseeds, wood and fruits
Angola	164.5		40.1	Coffee & diamonds	(56.3)	Sisal, diamonds, coffee, iron ore, maize, palm oil, fish, crude petroleum, wood, cotton, coconuts, manioc, sugar, beans
Central Afr.Rep.	22.0		48.4	Diamonds, cotton	(73.5)	Cotton, diamonds, coffee, rubber
Chad	22.7		77.0	Cotton	(77)	Cotton, live animals, meat
Congo(Brazza)	41.9		46.3	Diamonds, wood	(70.5)	
Congo(Leo)	324.4		42.8	Copper, diamonds	(51.7)	Copper, diamonds, coffee, rubber, non-ferrous ores, palm oil, palm kernel oil, zinc and alloys, cobalt
Ethiopia	89.9		50.5	Coffee	(50.5)	Coffee, hides & skins, oilseeds & kernels, fruits and vegetables, leaves, fodder, sugar
Gabon	73.2		40.0	Saw & veneer logs and manganese	(58.8)	Saw and veneer logs, manganese, petroleum, uranium & thorium & plywood
Gambia	8.7		95.5	Groundnuts	(95.5)	Groundnuts
Guinea	55.1		59.8	Aluminium crude	(59.8)	Aluminium crude, bananas, palm nuts & kernels, coffee, iron ore, diamonds
Ivory Coast	230.3		43.1	Coffee and cocoa	(62.9)	Coffee, cocoa, wood and fruits and vegetables
Kenya	142.7	19.6	25.2	Coffee, tea, and veg. fibres	(55.5)	Coffee, tea, vegetable fibres, pyrethrum, meat and meat prep., cereals, chemicals, fruits, vegetables, sodium carbonate, butter, hides and skins, oilseeds and nuts
Liberia	81.0		47.9	Iron ore & rubber	(85.8)	Iron ore, rubber, stones, diamonds
Libya	377.6		98.7	Petroleum	(98.7)	Petroleum
Madagascar	82.1		29.0	Coffee, sugar & honey, sisal, spices	(57.0)	Coffee, sisal, spices, sugar & honey, rice, tobacco, vegetables, oilseeds and nuts, live animals and meat, hides & skins, crude vegetable and essential oils, tapioca and sago, fodder, natural graphite
Mali	33.8		39.3	Groundnuts & fish	(57.9)	Groundnuts, fish, live animals, cotton, fruits & vegetables, hides & skins
Mauritania	16.1		95.3	Iron ore	(95.3)	Iron ore
Mauritius (1962)	60.7	35.2	97.9	Sugar	(97.9)	Sugar
Morocco (1961)	342.6	19.4	24.2	Fruits & veg., phosphates and non-ferrous ores & concentrates	(57.0)	
Mozambique	100.7		18.1	Cotton, cashew nuts, sugar, sisal	(54.5)	
Nigeria	517.4		33.5	Oilseeds, nuts & kernels, cocoa beans	(51.0)	Oilseeds, nuts and kernels, cocoa beans, petroleum (crude), rubber, wood, vegetable oils, cotton, tin and alloys, hides and skins
Niger	27.4		66.2	Groundnuts	(66.2)	Groundnuts, live animals, vegetables and groundnut oil
Reunion	38.1		84.3	Sugar and honey	(84.3)	Sugar and honey, essentials
Senegal	110.5		35.3	Groundnut oil, oilseeds and nuts	(67.7)	Groundnut oil, oilseeds and nuts, oilseed cake and meal, fish & preparations, wheat meal and flour, metal containers
Sierra Leone	81.1		63.5	Diamonds	(63.5)	Diamonds, iron ore, palm kernels
Somalia	31.8		44.7	Fruits & veg., live animals	(80.6)	Fruits & vegetables, live animals, hides & skins, wood, charcoal
Sudan	225.9		59.5	Cotton	(59.5)	Cotton, oilseeds and nuts, crude vegetable materials, fodder
Tanzania (a) Tanganyika	178.8	40.0	36.4	Sisal and cotton	(53.6)	Sisal, cotton, coffee, diamonds, fruits & vegetables, oilseeds and nuts, meat, canned, fodder and tea
(b) Zanzibar	14.4		71.3	Cloves	(71.3)	Cloves, copra, coir , clove oil

Table 1.1 Concentration of African[1] exports by country, 1963 (Cont'd)

Country	Value of total exports (in US $ million) (1)	(1) as % of GNP (2)	Proportion of the value of exports Accounted for by the leading exports (%) (3)	Commodities accounting for at least: (a) 50% of export values[2] (4)		Commodities accounting for at least: (b) 90% of export values (5)
Togo	18.3		26.1	Cocoa, phosphates, coffee	(67.6)	Cocoa, phosphates, coffee, oilseeds & nuts and cotton
Tunisia	125.2	13.4	19.3	Wine, vegetable oils & phosphates	(52.5)	Wine, vegetable oils, phosphates, fruits and vegetables, cereals and preparations, chemicals, crude animal & veg. materials, metalliferous ores & scraps, non-ferrous metals and fodder
Uganda	152.6	31.0	52.8	Coffee	(52.8)	Coffee, cotton, copper and tea
UAR	521.6		53.3	Cotton	(53.3)	Cotton, textile yarn fabrics, mineral fuels and lubricants, rice, vegetables, sugar, printed matter, lime and cement
Upper Volta	9.3		55.5	Live animals	(55.5)	Live animals, oilseeds & nuts, hides & skins, cotton, textile yarn & fabric, non-ferrous ores & concentrates, vegetables, vegetable oils & fats, fruits, beverages and tobacco and meat
Dahomey	12.8		63.5	Oilseeds & nuts	(63.5)	Oilseeds & nuts, palm oil, cotton, coffee, beverages and tobacco, fish
Zambia (1964)	457.5		91.3	Copper	(91.3)	Copper

Source: UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1963; UN Yearbook of National Accounts 1964

1/ Excluding South Africa.

2/ The figures in brackets indicate the percentage accounted for by the leading commodities listed.

Table 1.2

Imports of Primary Commodities into Industrialized Countries from Africa[1] - 1962

Commodity SITC	Canada	Japan	Belg-Lux	Denmark	France	West Germany	Iceland	Ireland	Italy	Nether-lands	Norway	Portugal	Sweden	Switzer-land	Turkey	United Kingdom	United States	Austria	Finland	Total	Rank	% share of total	African % share	Africa's[1] share by value of: From all sources	Primary exporting countries	Developing countries
Petroleum 331	567	-	31785	-	282667	82183	-	-	74289	62354	-	3949	305	-	-	103823	18406	-	-	660328	1	13.8	13.8	11.5	12.4	12.4
Copper 682	116863	6513	116863	-	45580	48142	-	-	58769	571	-	1207	12142	8219	-	151568	-	585	3617	570639	2	11.9	25.7	33.5	61.2	63.5
Coffee 671.1	4575	2238	4258	295	103860	27942	-	158	17834	12819	1907	4793	2980	5356	-	24810	145678	1494	2667	363664	3	7.6	33.3	20.9	21.1	21.1
Cocoa 072	4242	7883	4242	2247	35177	56413	-	4292	16120	42214	2252	696	4086	4820	-	54712	94915	5019	412	339742	4	7.1	40.4	65.8	76.6	77.1
Wine 112.1	90	-	654	-	266167	1113	-	-	-	124	-	-	285	1519	-	25	-	-	18	269995	5	5.6	46.0	48.3	96.6	99.0
Wood 242 & 243	5796	520	6228	3899	46786	62402	-	680	25087	10254	1106	2390	2139	5109	-	33560	3413	1099	595	211063	6	4.4	50.4	9.4	39.9	40.7
Cotton 263	8272	15869	8272	1710	-	39937	-	166	30364	4645	-	22790	288	4896	-	33304	12363	1640	170	184686	7	3.9	54.3	12.9	21.2	21.2
Groundnuts 221.1	891	260	12561	668	72076	15407	-	233	14184	5427	981	5778	-	6940	-	35430	-	200	263	171299	8	3.6	57.9	80.1	61.7	86.4
Vegetables, fresh 065	105	450	2631	646	74246	18365	-	171	3965	5792	315	534	48	1589	-	21889	257	884	188	132075	9	2.8	60.7	15.2	61.1	62.6
Citrus fruits 051.1-051.2	-	-	218	95	82874	22253	-	77	224	2640	377	306	658	274	-	4593	-	261	314	115164	10	2.4	63.1	23.0	48.8	60.9
Tobacco 121	135	4541	2583	1575	7446	17841	-	331	139	2829	942	1326	829	674	-	68168	392	523	454	110701	11	2.3	65.7	13.9	45.9	46.5
Phosphates 271.3	153	7357	9268	3503	29156	14320	-	3528	9778	4999	1102	3703	4437	473	350	14994	-	2684	882	110687	12	2.3	67.7	58.7	91.0	91.0
Iron ore 281	237	1641	237	-	-	32825	-	-	12325	12113	-	-	-	-	-	43471	6447	428	-	109724	13	2.3	70.0	7.8	15.5	15.8
Sugar 061	265	4871	265	-	37631	-	-	-	198	636	-	15738	-	-	-	32657	3916	-	-	96177	14	2.0	72.0	8.4	9.6	10.9
Palm kernels 221.3	-	-	4003	1627	10696	15435	-	465	-	15502	-	1779	-	6500	-	27668	-	115	300	84090	15	1.8	73.8	100	100	100[1]
Rubber 231	3059	-	3059	137	6445	8240	-	-	1227	1255	164	-	1991	-	-	18217	39202	-	-	82996	16	1.7	75.5	8.2	10.9	10.9
Sisal	1749	4974	4141	3450	7257	5954	166	1336	2241	5798	462	6503	1415	-	-	18410	7581	1107	271	72815	17	1.5	77.0	63.2	68.2	68.3
Bananas, fresh 051.3	-	-	910	-	24083	657	-	167	19249	-	196	251	367	-	-	12881	-	772	-	59532	18	1.2	78.2	15.8	16.5	16.5
Oilseed, cake meal 081.3	-	-	3956	2325	11541	10846	-	433	-	3667	4694	155	1514	146	-	15863	-	868	-	56008	19	1.2	79.4	11.7	21.2	21.8
Groundnut oil 421.4	1353	-	123	-	40824	221	-	198	-	124	-	-	291	100	-	10581	114	1846	-	55775	20	1.2	80.6	82.6	87.9	88.8
Palm oil 422.2	-	-	7449	1048	6466	12986	-	205	3864	525	-	2474	245	-	-	17075	1822	-	-	54159	21	1.1	81.7	61.1	72.9	72.9
Crude veg. matters neas 292	122	1967	1426	551	9190	6753	-	-	4432	2180	275	133	699	431	-	14333	9690	268	471	52921	22	1.1	82.8	11.3	33.3	42.0
Hides & skins 211	-	92	119	-	13709	3052	-	-	13422	1477	191	1683	187	185	-	7751	5985	182	221	48256	23	1.0	83.8	9.2	16.9	30.5
Tea 074	-	1454	-	-	108	219	-	1034	-	2031	-	187	-	-	-	33574	5308	-	-	43915	24	0.9	84.7	0.9	1.0	1.0
Manganese ore 283.7	1792	1392	3207	18	-	6131	-	-	1953	632	-	-	1	191	-	3474	19716	-	-	38507	25	0.8	85.5	25.4	28.6	34.3
Cobalt 689.5	-	2854	24853	-	657	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2916	3902	-	-	35288	26	0.7	86.2			
Olive oil 421.5	-	-	-	-	12067	-	-	-	17236	-	-	-	291	121	-	-	1154	-	-	30869	27	0.6	86.8	30.6	88.1	88.1
Maize	-	3587	697	-	804	3908	-	-	3650	742	-	2647	-	71	-	10807	-	290	-	27203	28	0.6	87.4	3.1	12.9	16.1
Ores & concentrates of non-ferrous b.m. 283.9	495	1315	2259	-	3293	677	-	-	29	54	636	-	226	-	-	1834	11606	-	-	22424	29	0.5	87.9	12.7	21.1	33.1
Aluminium 684	144	-	144	-	20791	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21079	30	0.4	88.3	3.3	92.0	92.0
Tin (unwrought) 687	1904	-	1904	-	119	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16827	-	-	-	20754	31	0.4	88.7	7.8	10.5	10.5
Diamonds 275.1	-	86	7328	-	467	59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12637	-	-	20577	32	0.4	89.1	22.2	61.9	87.6
Tin ore 283.6	-	-	18186	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	537	-	-	-	1075	-	-	-	19798	33	0.4	89.5	23.4	26.9	27.3
Cottonseed 221.6	-	2946	-	-	-	1979	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14268	-	-	563	19756	34	0.4	89.9	64.8	66.9	67.2
Spices 075	202	209	-	-	2642	1360	-	-	160	144	-	-	-	196	-	1103	9995	-	-	16011	35	0.3	90.2	20.0	24.5	24.5
Bran, pollard etc. 081.2	-	842	310	434	7702	1024	-	-	-	625	-	602	-	-	-	1794	-	-	-	13333	36	0.3	90.5	12.8	19.5	23.3
Fish 031	-	-	-	-	6669	-	-	-	684	137	-	335	-	-	-	51	4263	-	-	12139	37	0.3	90.8	1.9	6.9	8.6
Asbestos, crude 276.4	-	336	393	121	480	1229	-	24	5249	116	432	93	833	320	102	40	1315	116	-	11199	38	0.2	91.1	6.5	23.1	69.5
Non-ferrous metal scrap 284	-	1843	1220	-	3190	1384	-	-	2616	-	-	-	164	-	-	345	104	-	-	10866	39	0.2	91.3	4.9	29.4	38.7
Lead ore 283.4	-	-	1262	-	6524	899	-	-	480	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	9166	40	0.2	91.5	13.7	19.8	32.0
Palm kernel oil 412.8	-	-	-	-	151	2642	-	-	1678	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4071	-	-	8592	41	0.2	91.7	52.1	95.5	95.5
Lead 685	-	-	-	-	6056	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	376	-	-	-	6432	42	0.1	91.8	4.3	8.3	15.9
Nuts, edible, fresh or dry 051.7	-	-	-	-	2285	1401	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	543	1224	-	-	5453	43	0.1	91.9	2.1	6.1	6.1
Bauxite 283.3	924	-	-	-	-	489	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3255	-	-	-	4668	44	0.1	92.0	2.1	2.4	2.4
Live animals 001	-	-	-	-	4007	190	-	-	148	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4345	45	0.1	92.1	0.7	6.8	6.9
Wool and animal hair 262	71	9	273	-	1091	218	-	-	563	12	27	34	3	-	-	1495	481	-	-	4277	46	0.1	92.2			
Copper ore 283.1	77	1702	77	-	-	1127	-	-	-	-	-	-	352	-	-	-	-	-	-	3335	47	0.1	92.3	2.6	3.5	4.5
Other primary commodities	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	370271		7.7	100			
Total	154083	77724	287364	24349	1292980	528319	166	13498	342157	202438	16059	80623	36776	48276	452	889560	425958	20380	11406	4792753						
% Total	3.2	1.6	6.0	0.5	27.0	11.0	-	0.3	7.1	4.2	0.3	1.7	0.8	1.0	-	17.9	8.9	0.4	0.2							

Sources: UN Statistical Papers, Commodity Trade Statistics, 1962.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Commodity Trade Vol.III.

1/ Excluding South Africa.

Table 1.3

Imports of Primary Commodities into Industrialised Countries from Africa, 1955

Commodity	SITC	Canada	Japan	Belgium & Luxem.	Denmark	France	West Germany	Ice-land	Italy	Nether-lands	Norway	Portugal	Sweden	Tur-key	United kingdom	United States	Austria	Finland	Ireland	TOTAL	% share of total imports by individual countries from Africa	African share by value of imports from: All Sources	Primary Countries	Developing Countries
									US $ '000															
Copper	682	-	-	139,785	-	48,302	18,534	-	15,658	-	-	649	14,247	-	200,658	62,765	-	-	-	500,598	13.0	32.8	77.8	82.0
Cocoa	072	2,365	42	4,196	21	38,686	53,254	-	11,718	45,229	3,625	549	6,550	-	111,555	86,718	6,878	632	4,978	376,996	9.8	60.8	70.6	70.6
Coffee	071	4,183	196	10,837	105	109,872	20,684	-	20,145	10,424	2,314	7,724	1,930	-	24,937	122,041	1,138	240	231	337,001	8.7	15.3	15.5	15.5
Oilseeds, etc.	221	57	2,683	4,743	29	111,032	23,224	-	15,154	17,795	4,563	7,671	552	-	109,160	154	-	221	853	297,891	7.7	34.5	49.6	49.6
Cotton	263	-	24,395	16,430	159	71,888	45,840	-	31,016	5,565	48	23,876	3,343	-	48,202	21,492	4,885	1,037	-	298,176	7.7	18.3	29.6	29.6
Beverages, alcoholic	112	46	-	237	17	226,608	105	-	-	41	59	-	239	-	32	-	14	100	-	227,498	5.9	37.8	90.2	92.2
Ore, B metal n.e.s.	283	5,668	615	44,753	-	41,249	11,302	-	502	944	4,189	-	720	-	29,410	63,270	196	-	-	202,818	5.3	20.2	27.4	31.1
Fruits (nuts, fresh)	051	12	-	1,889	142	93,147	5,238	52	1,679	47	142	17	2,428	-	22,631	1,476	1,962	1,949	1,158	133,969	3.5	12.4	23.2	27.0
Iron ore	281	217	5,850	1,584	-	3,452	41,190	-	5,177	8,028	-	-	-	-	42,775	8,093	702	-	-	117,068	3.0	6.4	8.6	8.6
Sugar	061	7,841	11	-	-	22,579	-	-	123	135	-	9,030	-	-	58,792	161	-	-	-	98,672	2.5	9.1	9.5	10.4
Phosphates	271	-	8,158	4,153	-	24,269	10,613	-	16,618	5,660	1,097	3,840	4,322	-	16,726	298	483	1,177	1,903	99,317	2.5	40.2	59.0	59.0
Vegetables, fresh	054	324	233	1,275	183	44,013	5,654	-	475	1,978	243	356	383	-	37,344	690	160	121	1,033	94,465	2.4	19.8	67.2	69.3
Wood	242	-	-	2,338	876	17,689	36,966	-	3,852	5,127	413	800	1,069	-	16,953	3,603	363	75	55	90,179	2.3	20.0	56.2	56.3
Tobacco	121	-	-	653	121	17,096	695	-	-	1,584	308	267	869	-	50,632	-	332	13	127	72,697	1.9	12.3	43.5	43.6
Rubber	231	18	-	7,534	-	5,772	5,151	-	236	1,603	-	2,382	61	-	11,272	36,920	82	12		71,063	1.8	5.8	6.3	6.3
Crude vegetable materials	292	111	623	1,952	216	11,389	9,030	-	2,850	1,694	263	208	915	-	22,367	8,217	523	299	131	60,788	1.6	15.1	35.1	36.9
Fodder, n.e.s.	081	-	202	1,972	740	7,032	8m714	-	304	3,121	1,244	1,066	3,342	-	22,759	1,579	3,047	359	1,197	56,678	1.5	11.8	29.1	30.1
Sisal	265.4	822	742	3,347	-	8,439	4,914	-	1,280	4,656	360	1,010	963	19	16,338	7,015	485	-	840	51,230	1.3	23.3	36.4	36.4
Hides and skins	211	14	-	647	-	8,402	3,871	-	5,286	1,076	16	1,742	167	64	8,680	10,471	22	115	12	40,585	1.0	11.1	18.3	20.0
Base metals, n.e.s.	689	-	-	125	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,968	24,685	-	-	-	29,778	0.8	26.0	75.6	77.4
Tea	074	905	-	-	-	-	242	-	-	64	-	125	-	-	23,170	2,486	-	-	-	26,992	0.7	5.4	5.6	5.6
Wood, shaped	243	297	11	955	38	2,483	706	-	506	830	628	90	360	-	12,996	1,891	-	-	292	22,083	0.6	1.7	22.0	22.1
Maize	044	-	340	1,697	-	8,261	3,708	-	1,299	2,549	-	1,228	71	-	4,273	-	965	-	-	24,391	0.6	6.8	17.6	26.0
Lead	685	-	-	-	-	13,651	-	-	168	20	-	-	144	-	473	2,103	-	-	-	16,559	0.4	7.4	12.1	19.6
Spices	075	81	85	24	17	2,069	750	-	83	100	34	55	94	-	1,457	5,849	22	-	15	10,735	0.3	16.0	19.3	19.3
Wool & animal hair	262	-	13	1,096	-	5,068	478	-	1,464	86	-	32	-	-	2,275	16	-	-	-	10,528	0.3	0.5	0.7	3.2
Non-ferrous metal scrap	284	-	-	598	67	3,229	1,339	-	989	455	-	44	40	-	2,443	278	-	-	-	9,482	0.2	5.4	48.5	67.1
Fish	031	-	-	-	-	4,760	-	-	397	63	-	103	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,323	0.1	1.8	8.5	10.5
Tin	687	-	-	4,279	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	655	-	-	-	4,934	0.1	1/	1/	1/
Live animals	001	-	-	-	-	2,005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,005	0.1	0.8	47.7	54.2
*All others																					12.8			
GRAND TOTAL		22,961	44,199	257,099	2,731	952,442	312,202	52	137,164	118,874	19,546	62,864	42,829	83	903,278	472,926	22,259	6,350			3,857,960			
% share of total		0.6	1.3	7.6	0.1	28.1	9.2	-	4.0	3.5	0.6	1.9	1.3	-	26.6	13.9	0.7	0.2						

1/ Negligible

Sources: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March, 1961.
UN Commodity Trade Statistics, Jan-Dec. 1955.

*Petroleum, crude	312	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	125	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	125		1/	1/	1/
Aluminium	684	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		60		1/	1/	1/

Table 1.4 Export of the leading African[1] commodities and percentage change 1955 and 1962
(US. $ '000)

Commodity	SITC	1955	1962	% change
Cocoa	072	376,996	339,742	- 9.3
Coffee	071	337,001	363,664	7.3
Tea	074	26,992	43,915	62.7
Tobacco	121	72,697	110,701	52.2
Sugar	061	98,672	96,177	- 2.5
Maize	044	24,391	27,203	11.5
Rubber	231	71,063	82,996	16.8
Cotton	263	298,176	184,686	-38.1
Iron ore	281	117,068	109,724	- 6.3
Copper	682	500,598	570,639	13.9
Aluminium	684	60	21,079	350.3
Lead	685	16,559	6,432	-61.2
Tin	687	4,934	20,754	320
Petroleum, crude		125	660,328	5,281.6
Wood	242	90,179	176,318	95.5
Beverages, alc.	112 [2]	227,498	270,018	18.7
Oilseeds, etc.	221 [3]	297,891	333,662	12.0
Fruits, etc.	051 [4]	133,969	174,696	30.4
Phosphates	271 [5]	99,317	110,687	11.4
Ore B metals nes	283 [6]	202,818	121,763	-40.0
Base metals nes	689 [7]	29,778	35,090	17.8
Fodder nes	081 [8]	56,678	76,363	34.7
Fish	031	5,323	12,139	128.0
Vegetables, fresh	054	94,465	132,075	39.8
Spices	075	10,735	16,011	52.1
Hides & skins	211	40,585	48,256	18.9
Non-ferrous metal scrap	284	9,482	10,866	4.0
Crude veg. materials	292	60,788	52,921	-12.9
Wool & animal hair	262	10,528	4,277	-59.4
Wood	242 & 243	112,262	211,063	88.0
Sisal	265.4 [9]	51,230	72,815	29.8
Live animals	001	2,005	4,345	116.7

Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics 1955 and 1962.

Footnotes to Table 1.4

1/ Excluding South Africa

2/ Includes the whole SITC 112 group, i.e., wine, cider and fermented fruit juices, beer, etc.

3/ Includes the whole SITC 221 group, i.e. oilseeds, oil nuts and kernels, groundnuts, copra, palm kernels, linseed, cotton seed, castor seed, flour and meal of oilseeds, oil nuts and oil kernels, non-defatted.

4/ Includes oranges, other citrus fruits, bananas, apples, grapes and edible nuts, other than nuts chiefly used for the extracting of oil.

5/ Includes crude fertilizers and crude minerals, i.e. natural fertilizer of animal or vegetable origin, not chemically treated, natural sodium nitrate, natural phosphate, crude potash salt.

6/ Includes ores of non-ferrous base metals and concentrates, i.e. ores and concentrates of copper, nickel, aluminimu, lead, zinc, tin, manganese and ores and concentrates of non-ferrous base metals, n.e.s.

7/ Includes other miscellaneous non-ferrous base metals, i.e. magnesium, tungsten, cobalt, and other base metals n.e.s.

8/ Includes feeding stuff for animals, i.e. hay and fodder, bran, pollard, oilseed cake and meal and other vegetable oil residues, meat meal and fish meal, food waste and prepared animal feed.

9/ Refers to group 265 - vegetable fibres n.e.s.

Table 1.5

The distribution of countries significantly engaged in exporting leading African primary products, 1962

Commodity	Rank	% Share of Tota l	Accumulated % Share	Countries significantly engaged in exporting the various commodities
Petroleum	1	13.8	13.8	Algeria, Libya, U.A.R. Nigeria and Gabon
Copper	2	11.9	25.7	Zambia, Congo (Leopoldville) and Uganda
Coffee	3	7.6	33.3	Ivory Coast, Angola, Uganda, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Kenya, Congo (Leopoldville), Ruandi, Burundi, Cameroon, Tanzania
Cocoa	4	7.1	40.4	Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Togo
Wine	5	5.6	46.0	Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia
Wood	6	4.4	50.4	Cameroon, Congo (Brazza), Congo (Leo), Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Nigeria
Cotton	7	3.9	54.3	U.A.R. Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania, Congo (Leo), Mozambique, Chad
Ground Nuts	8	3.6	57.9	Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Niger
Vegetables - fresh	9	2.8	60.7	Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Upper Volta and U.A.R.
Citrus Fruits	10	2.4	63.1	Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
Tobacco	11	2.3	65.7	Cameroon, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Rhodesia, Malawi Senegal, Tunisia.
Phosphates	12	2.3	67.7	Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Togo
Iron Ore	13	2.3	70.0	Liberia, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola, Guinea and Mauritania
Sugar	14	2.0	72.0	Mauritius, Reunion, Mozambique and Madagascar
Palm kernels	15	1.8	73.8	Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Dahomey
Rubber	16	1.7	75.5	Nigeria, Liberia and Congo (Leopoldville)
Sisal	17	1.5	77.0	Angola, C.A.R. Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania
Bananas - fresh	18	1.2	78.2	Ivory Coast, Somalia, Guinea and Nigeria
Oil seed, cake and meal	19	1.2	79.4	Cameroon, Conga (Brazza), Congo (Leo), Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda
Groundnut oil	20	1.2	80.6	Senegal, Nigeria.
Palm Oil	21	1.1	81.7	Congo (Leopoldville), Nigeria
Crude vegetable materials	22	1.1	82.8	C.A.R. Chad, Congo (Brazza), Congo (Leo), Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia.
Hides, skins	23	1.0	83.8	Angola, Cameroon, C.A.R. Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Malawi, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, U.A.R.
Tea	24	0.9	84.7	Kenya, former Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania.
Manganese ore	25	0.8	85.5	Ghana, Morocco, Gabon, Ivory Coast, former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Congo (Leopoldville)
Cobolt etc.	26	0.7	86.2	Congo (Leopoldville)
Olive Oil	27	0.6	86.8	Libya
Maize	28	0.6	87.4	Morocco, Rhodesia & Malawi, Tanzania
Ores	29	0.5	87.9	Congo (Leo), Madagascar, Rhodesia, Malawi
Aluminium	30	0.4	88.3	Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania
Tin (unwrought)	31	0.4	88.7	Nigeria, Congo (Leopoldville)
Diamonds	32	0.4	89.1	Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo (Leo), Congo (Brazza), Tanzania, Central African Republic and Ghana.
Tin ore	33	0.4	89.5	Congo (Leo), Nigeria and Uganda
Cotton seed	34	0.4	89.9	Dahomey, Sudan
Spices	35	0.3	90.2	Ethiopia, Madagascar, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia.
	36	0.3	90.5	
Fish	37	0.3	90.8	Algeria, Angola, Chad, Cameroon, Dahomey, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta.
Asbestos	38	0.2	91.1	Former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Non ferrous metal scrap	39	0.2	91.3	Kenya, Libya, Rhodesia, Malawi
Lead Ore	40	0.2	91.5	Morocco, Tunisia
Palm Kernel Oil	41	0.2	91.7	Cameroon, Congo (Leo), Nigeria

TABLE 1.5 (continued)

THE DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES SIGNIFICANTLY ENGAGED IN EXPORTING LEADING AFRICAN PRIMARY PRODUCTS, 1962

Commodity	Rank	% Share of Total	Accumulated % Share	Countries significantly engaged in exporting the various commodities
Lead	42	0.1	91.8	Rhodesia & Malawi
Coconuts, Nuts, edible	43	0.1	91.9	Angola, Dahomey
Bauxite	44	0.1	92.0	Ghana
Live Animals	45	0.1	92.1	Chad, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta
Wool, Animal Hair	46	0.1	92.2	Kenya, Libya, Mali, Morocco
Copper ore	47	0.1	92.3	Congo (Brazza), Rhodesia, Malawi, Senegal

SOURCES Tables 1.1 and 1.2, Appendix A, and UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics

Table 1.6

Imports of industrial countries from developing countries and Africa 1/ classified according to kind of composition, 1962

Commodity	% age Distribution of Exports from developing countries				African Exports, Value in '000 U.S.$			
	No close substitute	A close indus.sub.	A close nat. sub.	Prod. of ind.countries	No Close substitute	A close indus. sub.	A close nat. sub.	Prod. of ind.countries
Petroleum				100				660,328
Copper				100				570,639
Coffee	100				363,664			
Cocoa	100				339,742			
Wine				100				269,995
Wood				100				211,063
Cotton		69		31		127,433		57,252
Groundnuts and oil			76.6	23.4			173,938	53,135
Vegetables, fresh				100				132,075
Citrus fruits				100				115,164
Tobacco				100				110,701
Phosphates				100				110,687
Iron Ore				100				109,724
Sugar				100				96,177
Palm kernels and oil			100				92,682	
Rubber		100				82,996		
Sisal	34.6	32.7	32.7		25,193	23,811	23,811	
Bananas fresh	100				59,532			
Oilseed, cake and meal			61	39			34,164	21,843
Palm oil			100				54,159	
Crude vegetable matter n.e.s		66		34		34,928		17,993
Hides and skins				100				48,256
Tea	100				43,915			
Manganese ore	100				38,507			
Olive oil				100				30,869
Maize			55	45			14,962	12,241
Ores & concentrates of non-ferrous base metals				100				22,424
Bauxite & Aluminum				100				25,797
Tin, Ore & metal	100				40,552			
Diamonds	72.3	27.7			14,877	5,699		
Cotton seed & Oil				100				19,756
Spices	100				16,011			
Bran & Pallard			35	65			4,667	8,666
Fish				100				12,139
Asbestos				100				11,199
Non-ferrous metal scrap				100				10,866
Lead ore and metal				100				15,598
					941,993	274,867	398,383	2,754,537

Sources: Table 1.2 Appendix A, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - Commodity Trade Vol. III.

1/ Excluding South Africa.

Table 1.7

World, developing countries, Africa 1/ and African countries: Export earnings fluctuations 1952-1964

Year	World	Developing Countries	Africa 1/	Libya	Liberia	Togo	Congo(L)	Sudan	S.Leone	Gambia	Mauritius	Algeria	Ethiopia	Tanganyika	Cameroun	Fed.Rhod. Nyasaland	Madagascar	UAR	Angola	Uganda	Kenya	Tunisia	Reunion	Mozambique	Ghana	Nigeria	Morocco
1952	- 2.8	-13.3	- 3.1	0.0	-28.8	-20.0	+ 1.0	-41.4	+ 7.1	+22.2	+ 6.0	+ 8.4	-13.0	+17.1	- 3.1	+22.7	+22.1	-27.6	-13.5	+ 0.8	+ 9.2	+ 7.5	+11.1	+ 4.5	- 7.1	+ 8.0	+ 8.7
1953	+ 2.5	+ 0.5	+ 1.3	-23.1	-16.2	+33.3	+ 1.8	- 3.8	+10.0	-27.3	+ 9.4	- 4.3	+44.7	-25.4	+19.0	+10.6	- 9.6	- 5.1	+28.1	-29.9	-22.9	- 3.5	+ 3.3	+21.7	+ 4.7	- 4.1	- 1.6
1954	+ 4.3	+ 5.2	+ 8.8	+10.0	-16.1	+50.0	- 0.3	- 9.4	- 3.0	+12.5	- 3.4	+ 1.0	- 4.4	+ 6.2	+16.0	+ 4.1	+ 8.2	+ 1.0	-16.3	+22.3	0.0	+13.5	+16.1	- 1.8	+30.7	+20.4	+ 6.6
1955	+ 8.9	+ 7.2	- 4.9	+18.2	+65.4	- 8.3	+14.9	+25.0	- 9.4	-22.3	- 5.4	+15.5	0.0	- 1.0	+ 3.2	+17.8	-10.9	+ 1.5	- 4.9	+ 2.6	+21.9	-15.9	- 8.3	- 1.8	-17.3	-11.7	+14.1
1956	+ 0.5	+ 5.1	+ 6.2	- 7.7	+34.9	-40.9	+17.3	+32.4	+27.6	0.0	+18.9	- 7.3	- 6.2	+25.5	-21.1	+ 5.2	+13.4	- 2.4	+16.3	- 1.7	+17.9	+ 5.7	+ 9.1	- 1.9	- 8.7	+ 1.9	+ 3.7
1957	+ 7.4	+ 2.0	+ 0.9	+25.0	- 6.9	- 7.7	-11.8	-22.9	+40.5	-71.4	+ 7.9	+ 7.5	26.2	-11.7	+ 8.0	-14.1	- 7.5	+20.5	+ 2.6	+12.9	- 5.4	+28.6	0.0	+22.6	+ 3.4	- 5.3	- 0.8
1958	- 4.7	- 2.8	- 1.9	- 6.7	0.0	+25.0	-14.4	-15.5	+ 5.8	0.0	-11.8	+ 5.9	-18.2	+ 7.1	+43.2	-13.0	+11.6	- 3.2	+ 9.4	- 0.8	+ 6.3	+ 6.3	-11.1	+ 9.2	+14.9	+ 6.4	+23.0
1959	+ 5.6	+ 4.5	+ 5.2	-14.3	+24.1	+20.0	+21.0	+53.6	- 1.8	-33.3	0.0	-25.0	+14.3	+ 6.6	- 6.9	+27.6	-20.8	- 3.4	- 2.3	- 6.9	+15.1	- 7.2	- 9.4	- 7.0	+ 8.7	+20.5	- 0.4
1960	+11.4	+ 5.8	+ 8.4	- 8.3	+23.9	-16.7	-31.1	- 5.2	+53.7	0.0	-35.0	+52.5	+ 8.3	+20.2	-10.2	+10.1	- 1.3	+23.2	- 0.8	-0.8	+ 4.7	-15.5	+24.1	+10.6	+ 2.7	+ 3.7	+24.0
1961	+ 4.5	+ 1.5	+ 2.7	+100.0	-25.3	+26.7	-65.0	- 1.6	- 1.2	+12.5	+59.0	+21.0	- 2.6	-11.0	+ 1.0	+ 0.5	+ 4.0	-14.6	+ 8.9	- 3.3	+ 3.6	- 8.3	+ 2.8	+21.9	- 0.5	+ 1.5	- 3.1
1962	+ 5.0	+ 4.3	+ 3.3	+540.9	+ 9.7	-10.5	+189 8	+26.8	-30.5	+11.1	- 1.6	+18.5	+ 5.3	+ 5.8	+ 5.1	+ 1.4	+20.5	-17.7	+ 9.6	- 1.7	+ 6.9	+ 5.5	-10.8	+ 2.2	- 0.6	- 3.1	+ 1.7
1963	+ 9.1	+ 9.0	+11.0	+167.4	+19.1	+ 5.9	- 5.3	- 0.4	+42.1	-10.0	+37.7	-12.5	+12.5	+22.6	+14.6	+ 6.0	-12.8	+30.8	+11.5	+34.2	+15.3	+ 7.8	+15.2	+11.0	- 6.0	+10.7	+10.3
1964	+11.2	+ 8.6	+13.0	+88.1	+60.5	+66.7	+ 7.1	-13.3	+17.3	..	- 7.1	+11.4	+16.7	+10.1	+ 3.4	-	+12.2	+ 3.3	+23.6	+21.6	+ 4.9	+ 1.6	- 2.6	+ 5.0	+ 7.2	+94.7	+13.0
Average annual change (%)	6.0	5.4	5.4	70.7	25.5	25.5	24.8	19.3	19.2	18.6	15.6	14.7	13.3	13.1	12.4	11.9	11.9	11.9	11.4	10.7	10.4	9.8	9.5	9.3	8.7	8.6	8.5
No. of annual declines	2	2	2	5	5	6	6	3	5	4	6	4	5	4	4	2	6	7	5	7	2	5	5	4	6	4	4
Export increase 1951-1964(%)	83.6	41.9	78.6	5353.8	150.0	100.0	-10.3	-13.7	239.3	0.0	56.0	103.7	94.4	77.5	87.7	113.7	19.5	-9.4	83.8	39.8	97.4	18.7	37.0	140.9	25.9	76.5	149.3

Sources: UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1958, 1961, 1963
UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March 1961, August 1964, May 1965
ECA Statistical Bulletin, November 1965

1/ Excluding South Africa. +21.6 +

Table 1.8

Annual fluctuations of world average export unit value of selected export commodities of interest to Africa 1/

%

	Tobacco	Bananas	Tea	Oranges & Tangerines	Cotton	Groundnuts	Sugar	Wine	Maize	Groundnut Oil	Oilseed cake & meal	Palm kernels	Palm oil	Coffee	Palm kernel oil	Sisal	Olive oil	Wool	Jute	Cocoa	Rubber
1949	+ 0.3	+ 5.0	- 7.3	+ 9.0	- 6.9	- 2.2	- 0.5	-14.5	-31.1	- 1.4	-32.4	+12.1	- 9.1	+13.8	+ 3.6	- 2.5	-22.3	+13.3	- 8.1	-34.8	-17.4
1950	- 2.0	- 1.2	-11.3	-14.7	+ 5.0	-28.7	+ 5.6	-20.0	- 5.9	-19.6	- 6.4	-18.8	-18.9	+65.2	-21.4	- 6.6	-25.9	+31.2	-19.1	+20.9	+93.7
1951	+ 2.7	- 4.8	+ 5.8	- 4.5	+39.6	+40.7	+11.3	+ 9.7	+28.6	+27.7	+28.0	+44.0	+50.3	+12.1	+24.5	+55.5	+43.1	+69.5	+34.5	+27.5	+64.5
1952	+ 3.3	- 3.4	- 9.2	- 0.2	-14.3	+ 7.3	- 5.3	- 5.2	+22.4	-20.3	+ 1.5	-10.1	-21.2	- 5.7	-31.5	-11.5	-25.4	-45.4	-23.6	- 3.2	-38.5
1953	+ 5.7	+ 2.8	+ 5.3	- 6.5	-23.0	- 6.7	-11.5	- 3.7	-18.3	+ 6.3	- 4.0	- 2.4	-22.7	2.5	+17.9	-45.5	+ 0.3	+12.7	-29.7	- 4.0	-27.9
1954	- 0.4	0.0	+33.0	+ 9.5	+ 7.4	0.0	+ 1.6	-10.8	-12.8	- 3.6	- 1.0	-10.3	- 2.1	+22.8	-10.1	-13.7	- 9.7	- 2.8	+ 5.2	+62.0	- 7.0
1955	+ 3.5	+ 0.2	+ 6.5	- 2.9	- 2.8	-11.7	- 3.9	- 2.9	+ 1.2	-21.0	+ 1.9	-10.8	+ 8.3	-23.2	- 9.6	-11.0	+ 6.0	-12.4	+ 2.3	-23.6	+55.9
1956	- 3.1	+ 2.7	-11.2	+21.9	- 8.1	+ 5.0	+ 0.3	+ 8.7	- 2.6	+24.5	- 7.6	+ 1.6	+ 8.7	- 2.6	- 1.6	+ 1.0	+28.6	+ 1.6	- 2.9	-28.1	- 9.7
1957	+ 8.9	- 0.4	- 2.1	+ 8.3	+ 0.3	+ 4.6	+22.1	+ 9.3	- 8.0	+ 2.0	- 8.7	- 2.4	+ 1.6	- 2.2	+ 2.5	-11.0	- 7.6	+16.0	+13.9	- 3.1	- 4.8
1958	- 4.3	- 9.1	- 1.6	- 5.1	- 8.3	-15.8	-14.3	+27.3	- 8.2	-10.8	-11.5	+ 3.8	- 9.3	-10.4	+ 4.5	+ 2.6	-10.0	-16.7	- 6.8	+50.0	-14.0
1959	+ 0.9	- 6.8	- 1.2	-18.0	-12.8	- 4.1	- 5.3	-19.4	- 0.8	- 9.9	+23.9	+27.3	+ 1.9	-18.7	+25.0	+19.2	-14.7	-18.7	- 9.1	-12.5	+27.5
1960	- 0.4	- 9.3	+ 1.7	+ 4.3	+ 6.3	+10.7	- 5.3	+ 2.2	- 0.2	+ 7.3	+ 0.1	- 0.4	- 6.2	- 3.6	- 6.3	+24.0	+ 1.5	+ 7.3	+26.0	-19.7	+12.6
1961	+ 5.1	+ 6.7	- 1.7	+10.0	+ 2.7	- 1.4	+ 4.2	+ 1.6	- 3.2	+ 0.2	- 5.9	-19.8	+ 6.3	- 5.7	-22.3	- 9.9	+ 3.0	- 1.5	+37.6	-20.1	-26.5
1962	+ 0.4	+ 1.7	- 4.0	- 4.6	- 4.3	- 6.0	+ 0.9	+ 4.3	- 1.6	- 5.7	+10.2	- 4.3	- 7.0	- 4.1	- 7.5	+ 1.1	+ 7.7	- 0.9	-28.8	- 4.5	- 6.4
1963	+ 9.3	- 9.4	+ 1.5	+10.6	- 2.9	- 0.2	+53.3	+10.9	+ 9.4	- 5.1	+11.9	+13.7	+ 4.2	- 1.8	+39.2	+50.5	+36.5	+16.7	- 4.3	+ 7.2	- 2.1
1964	- 5.3	+ 0.4	+ 3.2	- 6.3	+ 0.5	+ 0.3	- 1.4	+ 6.2	+ 4.4	+ 0.3	-16.1	+ 0.7	+ 7.8	+20.8	+ 8.1	- 2.6	-27.9	+ 6.9	+38.1	- 2.1	- 0.9
Average annual rate	3.5	4.0	6.7	8.5	9.1	9.1	9.2	9.8	9.9	10.4	10.7	11.4	11.6	14.1	14.7	16.8	16.9	17.1	18.1	20.2	25.6
Number of declines	6	8	9	9	9	9	8	7	11	9	9	9	8	10	8	9	8	7	9	11	11

Source: FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 1965

1/ Excluding South Africa. +22.5 & +24.0 +4. +40.7

Table 1.9 Africa[1/]: Annual rate of change of commodity export earnings (%)

	Cocoa beans	Palm Kernels	Gound-nuts	Sisal
1949	-21.2	+25.9	+15.7	+10.4
1950	+17.2	-14.4	-36.8	-10.1
1951	+24.1	+29.0	- 4.0	+77.4
1952	- 6.8	- 7.4	+52.3	- 6.7
1953	+ 6.8	+ 3.1	+ 4.0	-40.5
1954	+44.4	- 7.9	+24.3	-14.0
1955	-21.9	-15.3	-17.8	- 3.4
1956	-22.0	+ 2.3	+36.2	+ 4.8
1957	+ 5.6	-13.6	- 1.4	- 6.8
1958	+15.8	+16.9	+ 8.1	+11.4
1959	+10.0	+20.4	-14.1	+28.0
1960	- 5.0	- 3.3	- 9.1	+21.9
1961	- 2.1	-22.8	+29.7	- 9.8
1962	- 0.1	-11.0	- 1.2	+15.5
1963	+ 2.6	+18.4	+ 7.3	+38.2
1964	+ 1.3	..	..	..
Average Annual change (%)	12.4	14.1	18.1	19.9
Number of annual declines	7	8	7	7
Volume of export's increase 1948-1964 or 1948-1963 (%)	93.9	- 3.3	129.7	111.6
Value of export's increase 1948-1964 or 1948-1963(%C	30.3	1.2	77.3	98.2

1964 - preliminary data
1948-1958, 1964 - calculation based on world's average export unit value.

Sources: FAO Trade Yearbook 1952, 1955, 1959
ECA Statistical Bulletin for Africa, November 1965
Cocoa Market Report, 14 August 1965

1/ Excluding South Africa.