

UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL



43001



Distr.
LIMITED

E/CN.14/SDP/10
22 September 1963

Original: ENGLISH

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA
Meeting of Experts on the
Integration of Social Development Plans
with Over-all Development Planning
Addis Ababa, 9-18 October 1963

SOCIAL RESEARCH ON PROBLEMS AFFECTING RURAL AFRICANS UNDER
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

(by Max Gluckman, Professor of Social Anthropology in the
University of Manchester)

SOCIAL RESEARCH ON PROBLEMS AFFECTING RURAL AFRICANS UNDER
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Before I can discuss the set of problems which have been put to me by the organizers of this Conference, I have to deal with three types of fallacies which vitiate discussion of what happens to rural Africans as they become involved in industrial work. These errors are made by many human scientists, as well as by laymen.

I call the first error the fallacy of false comparison. This is committed when the difficulties and worst failures in one society are explicitly, and more often implicitly, contrasted with some ideal of the working of another society. Though many writers give warnings against this error, frequently they do not maintain their caution in practice. For example, though Guy Hunter in The New Societies of Tropical Africa (1962) draws attention strongly to the dangers of false comparison, he fails to guard against it in his discussions of the performance of African workers in factories. This whole topic is treated as if African hands were working in factories under perfect management, attaining ideal organization. There is a reference at p. 216 to poor management, but no analysis of how far imperfections in management planning force on workers various devices which appear to aim at shirking labour, but which are in fact measures taken by workers to protect the stability of their earnings against breakdowns or mishaps in the industrial process. Studies in the United States and Britain show that in addition to the difficulties which arise from human weaknesses, both in individuals and within the relations between members of management, modern production is so complex that inevitably there are obstructions in the flow of productive materials. These may be caused by flaws in design, by shortage of material, by flaws in material supplied, by failure of tools to arrive on time to each worker, and by the difficulty of maintaining a complex process through correct timing of each of its parts. They are inevitable in all management, and are widely accepted. Less ready acceptance is given to the fact that workers work in an environment which contains these built-in uncertainties, against

which they may react by behaviour which appears to be 'restriction of output' (see T. Lupton, On the Shop Floor, 1963). Any study of African workers in factories must use as its measure the realities of the productive process under the existing standards of management, and comparison must not be made with some ideal, which is not even attained in long-industrialized societies. I could cite many instances where the behaviour of workers who are being drawn for the first time into industrial occupations is ascribed to their rural or tribal background, when in fact it is common to factory workers with long experience of industry, even if the latter work to higher standards of productivity under possibly more skilled management. We must be clear then that the behaviour of African workers should not be compared with the ideal of non-existent highly rational and efficient European workers, but with the actual behaviour of European workers. Similarly, Africans are frequently characterized as conservative farmers, as if farmers elsewhere were all progressive and alert to new developments in agricultural science.

I stress this error of false comparison at the outset, because to avoid it we have to ensure that social research on problems of African development does not look too much at the tribal background of most of its subjects, but concentrates on the correct issues with an appropriate background of comparison. This requires that we have research workers who are trained not only on African problems, but also on the general problems of industrial and general sociology and psychology. Furthermore, a similar wide comparative basis for understanding should be given to policy makers and executives, to prevent them from ascribing conflicts and difficulties to the particular weaknesses, or even viciousness, of their men, who come from tribal rural backgrounds, when the 'imperfections' of these men can be often ascribed to the kind of working-group in which they are involved. Some study of the tolerance required for specific situations is essential, for I do not argue that all failures in performance can be passed over. But many unnecessary disputes can be avoided if persons in authority can be brought to accept certain inevitabilities within the industrial, and more general social, process.

I have early in my paper drawn these conclusions from my statement of one major fallacy which persons in developing countries are liable to commit, in order to state the main argument which I should like to be considered by the Conference. I illustrate this theme further by discussing the other fallacies.

The second fallacy flows from the first: it is the fallacy of inappropriate comparison by diverse criteria. This fallacy is committed, for example, when Africans who are using and thinking with the religious and magical beliefs developed in tribal cultures, are compared (perhaps implicitly) with Europeans employing processes of scientific or technological analysis. But scientists think as scientists mainly in their laboratories, or when designing and overseeing technological processes. A scientist's reasoning about political and other social relations may be as irrational, or as rational, as the reasoning of any African concerned with similar situations. It may be that in the sense in which we can speak of European science from the sixteenth century onwards - the deliberate search to extend knowledge of nature -- there was no science in Africa in early times. But there was a fairly highly developed African technology, with implicit scientific observation and knowledge. And to avoid the fallacy of inappropriate comparison we must compare:

African technician (whether in indigenous or modern industrial situations) with European technician;

African judges (for example) with European judges;

African using his supernatural beliefs with European using his supernatural beliefs;

African in a varied social series of social relations, with European in a varied series of social relations.

These different kinds of situations and comparisons must be kept separate. I have little space in which to discuss the social setting of, for example, the magical and witchcraft beliefs which are found in many tribes. But I feel I must make clear to those who do not understand these beliefs, that they do not exclude empirical thinking. Beliefs in witchcraft explain the way in which an imputed mystical power of witchcraft in an individual, or

the use of evil magic, causes particular misfortunes to happen to particular persons at particular times - a problem central to all systems of belief. But believers in witchcraft realize that misfortunes happen through the operation of natural events, evil doers are believed to manipulate these natural events. Since there will always be misfortunes, it is in fact possible to expand understanding of the empirical ('scientific') causes of events such as misfortunes, without touching the problem of why particular persons suffer them. What beliefs in witchcraft do is to ascribe misfortune to the anti-social feelings (envy, hate, anger, spite, malice, jealousy) of a man's enemy. Such beliefs embody one of the highest moralities known in history: for while, e.g. in England, it may be sinful but is not directly harmful to others to have such vicious feelings, in a tribe believing in witchcraft it is thought that such feelings may through witchcraft do considerable harm to others, including one's dearest relatives. In other words, a Western scientist in his dealings with his fellows in small sets of social relations may well be envious and jealous and full of hatred, but he may not believe that he can harm them through magical power: though he may well ascribe some of what he calls his misfortunes, (e.g. lack of advancement), to their machinations. It is easily possible to conceive of a first-class physicist who believed in witchcraft - i.e. who proceeded by standard scientific methods in dealing with his problems in the laboratory, but who believed that his misfortunes, such as illness in his family, were due to the witchcraft of his fellows inspired by their jealousy against him. There are, after all, first-class scientists who operate with beliefs, like beliefs in witchcraft, explain why, and not how, natural events occur.

I have gone at length into this one problem to stress that in social research on the problems we are considering, we have to be careful before we can interpret behaviour by referring it to any particular set of beliefs, through some abstract process of logical connexion, as that: witchcraft and magical beliefs are incompatible with modern scientific and industrial situations; hence a man coming from a background with these beliefs must be influenced adversely by them. I heard one of the world's greatest

economists on the problems of developing countries complain to an Indian sociologist that Indian peasants were so attached to cows for religious reasons that they would not use artificial fertilizers: the Indian pointed out to him that cows could be depended on, while the peasants knew that the drivers of the lorries which delivered fertilizers preferred life in the towns to life in the country, and were liable at crucial periods to break some part of their lorries, and return to town to get it repaired. The peasants would then be left without fertilizers. We need specific studies, in industrial situations and situations of developing agriculture, of the reasons why people appear to resist change (in the West as in developing countries), before we ascribe their actions to stupidity or particular beliefs. Thus, to return to beliefs in witchcraft, we need to examine how far such beliefs actually influence Africans who have moved to industrial work or are being persuaded to develop their agriculture. Since under the system of beliefs any man who did unusually well, was suspected by his neighbours of using evil power to better himself at their expense, while he feared that their envy would lead them to use evil powers against him, it may well be that the performance of people with such beliefs, or their adoption of new techniques, may be prevented by fear of unpopularity and of magical attack. But this has to be established: it cannot be assumed. Having said this, I want to emphasize that it is clear that beliefs of this kind are incompatible with a highly productive, modern industrial and agricultural system: they are beliefs appropriate to small-scale societies organized in groups of kin for production and consumption. But the history of Europe indicates that when societies of this kind begin to break up with the development of industrial organization, we must expect a temporary efflorescence of these beliefs, and planners should be warned of this probability, while its consequences need far more study.

The third fallacy it is important to avoid is the fallacy of the integrated human being. In trying to understand any society - and particularly a changing society - we must cease to think of people as integrated, because each of them is a single organic body, and most of them have some kind of integration of personality. From the sociological

view, every person is a cluster of roles: and each of his roles has its appropriate techniques, and interests, as well as its rights and obligations. In each of his roles, a person is linked to the roles of a number of other people; and his action in each role is largely both dictated by the techniques he has to perform, and by the pressure of his interests, rights and obligations. All these constrain his actions and his performance. He is here influenced also by the way in which he has to deal with appropriate other persons in his actions in that specific role. Hence it follows that as the framework of roles changes, individual action changes. Returning to an earlier example, if witchcraft beliefs are related (as in most tribes, though not all) to disharmonies in a man's relations with his kin, an African factory-hand, working with strangers, may largely cease to operate with witchcraft beliefs: though of course, such beliefs have a vitality of their own and can continue to influence him. But, again, this requires field study which has not yet, to my knowledge, been adequately made.

Because those in authority acted under the fallacy of believing in the integrated human being, major efforts have been made in the past in formulating policy in Africa; and other errors may be perpetrated if planners and policy makers, and other executives, are not warned against it. The fallacy resulted in a failure to see that changes in social situation change roles, and thus change group and individual actions. This led to an explicit argument (by well-wishers as well as by those who had an interest in suppressing African development) that individual Africans had to be educated and changed, before new economic, political and social relations could be established. This idea is also often implicit in many scientific reports. But experience in the last decade has shown that social and economic and political developments can be very rapid, with individuals responding in certain specific roles rapidly to the changing structure of the situations in which they live.

Examination of all these fallacies emphasizes that whatever be the problems raised for psychological research in these situations, it is most profitable to study sociological problems by posing them in a setting of industrial urban relationships, as far as new industrial towns are concerned,

and in a setting of the establishment of industrial enclaves within ancient towns. An extensive programme of research carried out on this basis, by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has yielded good results. Instead of approaching the problem by emphasizing that rural Africans are moving into towns, and hence that their behaviour is likely to be influenced by their rural background and upbringing, research started from the view point that South Africa and Central Africa were industrialized countries with mining and commercial towns, drawing for their labour largely on a rural population still living in tribal societies. This made it possible to separate out the primary effect of urban and industrial situations, and then to see what specific influences were exerted on these 'townsmen' (whether permanently settled or temporary migrant labourers) by their ties with the tribal countryside and their heritage of tribal customs and beliefs. Thus the influence of roles of workers within the urban industrial situation on people could be distinguished from the behaviour of persons in varied sets of roles. Sociological problems were isolated fruitfully from the psychological problems involved in the adjustment of one person to his varied roles; little adequate work has been done on this problem, though clearly operating several roles might appear to involve a man in severe contradictions. In practice, in the sociological analysis it was found that people could separate their actions in various roles: e.g. a man can act in some situations as an industrial worker, neglecting his tribal ties and culture; while in others he is dominated by tribal attachments.

Since my space is limited, and my purpose is to raise problems for discussion, I am going to summarize a series of problems worked out in Central Africa. I consider that these problems will have to be studied, though in somewhat different form, in the more ancient towns of Africa, and in all types of rural situation. I touch also on the relation between sociological research and what appears to me to be economic problems, which require separate analysis.

- (i) I emphasize again the danger of failing to see factories in Africa as factories. Thus in a report on African workers in Southern Rhodesia, Gussman sets out the difficulties arising

between European managers and supervisors in their dealings with African workers, and relates these to specifically African factors: that the workers are migrants engaging in industry for short terms, that higher wages may therefore increase turnover rather than output, that the housing, etc. conditions of Africans in the towns precludes them investing in land and houses, that there are language difficulties, and so forth. This analysis seems set against an implied statement that these difficulties do not occur in long-established Western industry, which by further implication is without conflict. But, as I have said we know from studies of industry in America, and in Great Britain, that these same obstructions occur in relationships between management and workers there, though as the workers are on the whole no longer migrant workers, difficulties appear in different form. Thus the whole problem of the American rate-buster and English job-spoiler arises from a clash between management's expectations and workers' aspirations; and the rate of production of workers, in so far as it is not set by the machine, is clearly partly determined by socially established concepts of an adequate standard of living, on which of course employers and workers may have different points of view. Naturally when African workers are still producing income from their land, as peasants, they take this into account when deciding how long to spend in industry earning cash. I consider it better to approach this sort of problem by first analyzing the situation of Africans as ordinary workers, comparable with workers in Europe and America, i.e. as workers in an industrial system, and to analyze initially how far the industrial situation itself affects their behaviour, before retreating to an explanation in terms of their migration from rural areas, and then further in terms of African culture. Any other procedure tends to support the native judgement of many so-called 'practical men' that all 'misdemeanours and failures' on the part of African workers are explicable by their Africanism, set against some Utopian and non-existent

system involving efficient, rational European managers and workers.

A similar procedure is best applied also to the tribal areas in their modern situation, as, e.g. Fortes and Schapera argued many years ago (Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa, 1938).

- (ii) Again, by following this procedure, we avoid seeing the problems of the South-Central African economic systems, as posing a simple choice for employers between inefficient, ill-paid migratory labour, and more efficient, better-paid, stabilized labour. This takes no account of the fears of depression which must oppress all governments whether rightly or wrongly, and make some of their members hesitate to commit themselves to a fully urbanized and industrialized African labour-force, divorced from the land. These fears require careful study in countries dependent on one, or a few, exports. During the great depression of the 1930's, tens of thousands of Africans - like millions of Americans - retreated on to the land. These fears of the insecurity of industrial employment are also strongly held by Africans: and while the question of whether the fears are justified may be a problem for economists, the nature and the effects of the fears, among all sections of the population, require study by sociologists and social anthropologists.
- (iii) Combined with this ultimate fear of depression, is the problem of the high costs in social services and security for a fully industrialized population. Retreat to the land is an ultimate security for Africans in Northern Rhodesia: and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute analyses have stressed this fact. It is as a result of industrial insecurity that tribal land partly maintains such high value for the migrant labourer; and from this follows the kind of analysis of the survival of tribal organizations as systems under their chiefs. This applies to Northern Rhodesia, though the analysis was earlier worked out

in South Africa. A number of problems flow from this situation. Thus a survey of developments in land-holding throughout South-Central African tribes showed that since migrant labourers still keep an ultimate "investment" in the tribal land, they remit money to these at home to maintain this investment; and that chiefs, who "own" the tribal land in theory, also hold land for their people against this return of money (looking at the economic element alone). Hence in all these tribes, up to the time the survey was made, as land became scarcer, the customary right enforced strongly was the right of every tribesman to some land: chiefs first appropriated allocated but unused land for the landless, then restricted the allowed period of fallows, then limited the area of land any one family could cultivate (in a development series). But what happens when the land becomes too scarce, with increase of population and denudation, to maintain this system at all? Jaspán (reference not at hand) reported a complete breakdown of the system in a Southern Natal reserve. Hence it is important to specify the conditions in which this particular development will occur; and I stress the need for further research into this serial development, and above all development in regions within tribal areas where cropping or fishing or pasturing for cash puts a different value on land. The situation may well change as African governments alter the position of chiefs in national political systems.

- (iv) I consider that the problem needs stating in the way I have outlined because this emphasizes that Africans must have some cash, whether this is obtained by migrant labour, by cash-cropping or from internal sources. This clarifies two sets of problems. First it sets in perspective the range of motives which Africans may consciously give for going out to work. Gulliver has shown for the Nyakyusa of Tanganyika that men go out to work for money mainly, and their need is partly general, partly adventitiously determined at a particular time, and partly influenced by their ability or inability to find their cash-income in other ways

(e.g. by cash-cropping). Garbutt demonstrated this further for the Shona, as Richards and her colleagues did for Uganda. Mitchell has therefore argued that it is here necessary to see the motivations of migrant labourers, as Durkheim saw motivations to suicide: we must distinguish major causes of the cycle and rate of migration for particular tribes, from the precipitating motives which may induce a particular man to go at a particular moment. This leads to the second set of problems: the varying rates of incidence of labour migration in different tribes, which Wilson emphasized so strongly in his study of Broken Hill. For in some tribes constant migration to labour is essential, perhaps because of distance from markets, while in others we find a far lower rate, involving perhaps only young men once in their lives to get a marriage payment before they settle down to cash-farming.

In short, I would like a more detailed specification of these types of problems in which various variables can be set out along two scales to test their association and correlation. I think this is essential before we try to generalize more widely.

- (v) Briefly I indicate the need for a wider comparative basis. In South Central Africa, tribal systems of land-tenure have endured, with barriers to sale, pledging, mortgaging, and leasing of land. These restrictions have not been maintained in, e.g. many West African tribes. Again, no attempt has been made, as far as I know, to specify the conditions responsible for these contrasting developments, save for the "isolated" explanation that migrant labour in South-Central Africa is associated with the maintenance of tribal systems as systems. There are a range of problems of great importance in examining the degrees to which these contrasting developments have occurred, and in attempting to specify their controlling conditions.
- (vi) Many research workers have attempted to establish quantitative criteria by which to assess whether Africans have committed themselves to urban industrial life. The simple form of looking

at how long an African has been in town, and how often he returns to his tribal home soon proved inadequate, especially when it was allied with the thesis that the longer an African was away the more he was likely to be 'detrribalized', with the implication that freed from the restraints of tribal pressure and influences he was deteriorating. A recent study by Mayer (Townsmen and Tribesmen, 1962) shows that under a long history of Christianization even within a tribe there may have developed two categories of people - first, those who have rejected Christianity and schooling, and who continue to move within the kinds of social relations appropriate to the tribal way of life and to keep within the same sets of persons in towns; and second, those who have committed themselves to Christianity and schooling, and in tribal as in rural areas begin to form new networks of social relations. But it is significant that Mayer stresses that it is their leisure and domestic activities which are principally distinguished, while in industrial situations their behaviour may be similar, even though the schooled are likely to hold better-paid and more skilled posts. Nevertheless, these variant forms of behaviour outside the industrial situation are not directly dependent on length of residence in towns. Hence we need (as Professor Mitchell has done) to try to distinguish various processes, stabilization in industry, urbanization, Westernization, and persisting tribalism. This can only be done effectively if we treat an African as urbanized and "industrialized" as soon as he moves into a town, since quite different patterns of behaviour are forced on him (see Gluckman's "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa", 1961). We can then examine in a series how far an African is influenced by the urban situation, by his type of employment, by his experience of town life in terms of years, by Western influence, by the influence of tribal culture and tribal ties. Parallel studies need to be made of employers and other authorities.

(vii) I have already stated, but it is worth repeating, that individuals solve many of these problems by what Evans-Pritchard called "situational selection", and that the new social system works with the maintenance of traditional ties, through the segregation of different types of allegiance (as in allegiance to a tribe in the reserve and to tribesmen in the town) and the segregation of the effects of pressures from the over-all social system in different sets of social relations: e.g. A.L. Epstein's argument that Africans who are deeply involved in trade unions and "modern" political movements, can regulate their domestic life by traditional tribal customs, Politics in an African Urban Community, 1954. I suggest that this type of analysis can be pressed further by seeing that a continuous process of diversification and multiplication of types of social relations is occurring - Eisenstadt similarly formulates, following many American studies, the problem of The Absorption of Immigrants (1954) in Israel. Tribesmen may be now also, at segregated times, industrial workers: tribes are both enduring political units with a tradition from the non-industrialized past, and also systems of security for industrial workers. It is important to stress that there is a major disconnectedness between the sets of social relations in which people are involved as well as some connectedness, and to examine the relation between connectedness and disconnectedness, between the systematic and the haphazard, as a general sociological problem, if we are to illuminate what is occurring beyond the descriptive level.

(viii) This brings me to a major problem which is often overlooked: we must assess how far we are to interpret changes between the respective behaviour of old, middle-aged, and young Africans, as being "real" changes or as being mere incidents in the life-cycle of individuals. Fortes argued as early as 1938 that for the Tallensi of Northern Ghana labour migration was as often an escape from conflicts in traditional life, as the cause of new conflicts. Starting from this point, a whole series of

problems arise. Schapera, in his study of Migrant Labour and Tribal Life (1947) in Bechuanaland, reported that elders complained bitterly of changes in manners and values among younger people who had been to the labour centres, and from some surface indications it might have been assumed that both political and domestic relations were being radically affected. But Schapera pointed out that this might be an optical illusion (if I may take a phrase R.R. Kuczynski used in another, but related, context). For as the troublesome young men attain marriage and children, and thus maturity, their views tend to alter, and many of them turn their interests back to tribal ambitions - elderhood, political status in chief's council, etc. Thus a series of most difficult problems resides in determining how far the reputed changes in younger generations are genuine deviations marking real changes in patterns of behaviour, and how far they are merely newly expressed but continuing conflicts from the past. Here I hope I may be forgiven if I draw attention to my own early attempt to formulate a series of connected problems of this type, arising from my research in Zululand (Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand, 1940, 1958). I think for example, this paper might solve the question of the relation between a reputed increase in accusations of witchcraft and new witch-finding cults. These are probably different phenomena. I suggested to explain the apparent increase in accusations of witchcraft, and in accusations against previously uncharged relatives, that witchcraft and magic are not tied to particular types of relationships and hence can be extended to new ranges of relationship in the new system, and to the open emergence of previously suppressed conflicts in traditional hierarchical kin-relationships. Ancestral wrath cannot be thus extended to relations with unrelated persons, or to act against kin superiors; hence the ancestral cult has tended to become obsolete, even while the relations in which it was involved continued; and I argued that with the coming of Christianity, kin superiors develop an

interest in allowing the cult to fall into desuetude. Magic and witchcraft beliefs are carried into industry. Witch-finding cults are related, on the other hand, to the emergence of communal ties and have to be considered with the emergence of independent African sects as discussed, e.g. by Balandier and Sundkler. Always in tackling these problems we have to move from the situation established by industrialism and the major new social and political structure into the tribal area.

(ix) I draw attention to a further set of problems which have been neglected: a study of the parts of law which are appropriate to an industrial state, but to which Africans adapt or fail to adapt respectively. It is frequently assumed that Africans, who tend to treat their contracts as expansive to the pattern of their kinship relationships, will apply this view to industrial situations; while, on the other hand, European workers take a different view of their relations with their employers and do not try to "expand" the incidents of the working relationship. Here again we need more direct comparison with Western industry itself, and not an implied acceptance that industry is an area where contract law, unalloyed, is supreme. My own experience with Zulu and Barotse working on the mines does not support the view quoted above. In the second place, this view does not draw attention to the capacity for development and absorption which African law has shown, both in tribal areas (my own The Judicial Process among the Barotse, 1955), and in urban areas (Epstein, Juridical Techniques and the Judicial Process, 1953). These studies show how well African law can cope with some new situations, and there is no reason to believe that Africans as individuals cannot also. I mention also specific shortcomings in this law, such as its failure, like all "early" law, to recognize executory contracts, and promises to do things (see my Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property, 1943), and (Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law, 1956, p.154): the reaction of

tribal law to the need to develop new forms and conditions of contract has not been adequately studied.

(x) I have set out the main sets of problems which I feel to be important both for their sociological interest and for practical planning and administration. I must refer to some other problems which were specifically raised in my invitation to this Conference:

(a) 'What is the attitude of people to industrial work?' I hope I have made clear that it is a means of livelihood, which men seek as they do any other. I do not consider that there is any evidence to show a substantial difference here between attitudes of Africans and Europeans. But clearly when men have land to fall on for part of their earnings, they are not as fully committed to this particular mode of earning a living.

(b) 'What clashes are felt by city-dwellers between their present way of life in a situation dominated by Western civilization and their own background of tribal cultures?' This is a psychological problem of importance; but the researches I have quoted emphasize that it is largely solved by choice of behaviour, and segregation of codes. I would argue that the lesson is that the more fully a stabilized economy can encourage full commitment to urban life, the more quickly will this clash disappear, despite homesick memories of an idealized rural life.

(c) 'How far is it possible to stem the strong rural migration to the cities which sometimes endangers agricultural production?' This is, I consider, a problem for economists. Experience in the already developed countries suggests that it is not possible: the drift from the land is occurring still in those countries. I presume that possibilities of earning an adequate living in the country is the only means for reducing the rate and extent of this drift.

- (d) 'What social problems are involved when, and where subsistence farming is increasingly substituted by production of goods for the market?' In my opinion, this is usually more destructive of indigenous social relationships than migration periodically to industrial employment from a rural base still worked on subsistence methods. I consider that this destruction of indigenous patterns of relations has, I am afraid, to be accepted, with all the social problems it brings. There are few other ways to agricultural development allied with social development. This is made clear in a recent study of Economic Development and Social Change in South India (T.S. Epstein, 1962). Her investigation shows that when irrigation was brought to a region, a village whose lands were irrigated was lifted to a higher level of production and living, but maintained its system of superior and subordinate caste relations, while villagers on the fringe of the irrigated area, in order to take advantage of the new economic opportunities, had to differentiate their economic activities. They began to service the irrigated villages, and entered into new types of activity, with the consequences that traditional patterns of social relations between caste were radically altered. Similar lessons are pointed by Bailey's work on Indian villages (Caste and the Economic Frontier, 1957, and Tribe Caste and Nation, 1960). While some villages in some places may develop as co-operative groups at new levels, Bailey's studies indicate that some break-up of indigenous groupings is necessary to involve people adequately, across those vertically divisive groupings, in new types of associations within new nations.

- (e) 'To what extent can tribal organization be utilized to achieve large-scale agricultural production?' It is difficult to answer this problem decisively on present evidence. So far, there has been little evidence of such a development. Some chiefs among the Bechuana did in the last War succeed in getting their people to work tribal lands, to produce stores against tribal shortages and for sale for public works, but this was at current levels of production. And much will depend on the extent to which new nations' policies aim to encourage tribal forms of association, and to support the position of chiefs and tribal councils. Little work has been done on these issues in recent times. But it must be noted that tribal organization does not involve the kind of co-operation which I assume is envisaged by the question. Tribal systems theoretically make land available to all subjects, but production is based on individual allocations of land, and individual ownership of crops, while it is consumption (through mutual insurance against famine as well as mutual hospitality) which is communalistic. Co-operative production, to raise individual standards of living according to modern aspirations, would reverse the system. Much more research on this problem in the situation of modern Africa is required. It may well be that more rapid development would flow from creating new forms of co-operative organization, which would themselves give the advantage of altering the social structures in which people act, and thus altering individual motivation and action. Here again research has not been adequate: but I draw attention to the error of regarding African traditional groupings as having a co-operation built into them which is lacking in modern capitalistic or socialist enterprises. Every factory is a form of co-operative enterprise, as is every modern farm: and all sociological studies indicate that modern production

has to be allied with specific types of co-operation. I draw attention to the plural, 'types of co-operation', since there is some choice here. I can only express the opinion that it does not seem as if tribal groupings are one of these types.

CONCLUSION

I have dealt with mainly, problems in the tribal areas under industrialization, since I have used up my allotted space. I plead for a more detailed breakdown of types of voluntary associations, and a study of the conditions under which trade unions have and have not emerged, as well as those where tribal associations flourish (South Africa, Southern Rhodesia) and where these do not (Northern Rhodesia). But above all, as I stated at the outset, I want the processes involved to be studied from the starting-point of the urban and industrial situation itself, rather than the situation of tribesmen drawn into urban areas and industry. This will focus attention on the importance of direct studies of industry itself, without preconceptions, and of comparison of industry in Africa with industry in Europe, towns in Africa with towns in Europe. For the towns of Europe also have plenty of tribalism and tribal associations, as well as class relations. Here may come the inspiration for new lines of research. For example, Bott showed how the network of ties (their relations with kin, friends, neighbours and workmates) surrounding families in London varied, for in some cases the kin of a family were also its friends, neighbours, workmates, and knew one another, while in others each of these categories of persons was different. She suggested that in the former situation spouses tended to have isolated roles, with relatively little companionship, while in the latter situation husband and wife were thrown together more. The relations of parents and children are probably similarly affected: the more a family lives surrounded with its kin, the greater the isolation of the generations from one another. This problem is important for an understanding of conflicts in rural and urban life: it has not been more than touched on in Africa. This concept of "the network" is a most promising and fruitful line of enquiry: it has already been taken far by Mitchell in research in

Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, on which reports are as yet unpublished. It seems well worthwhile to work out in detail the varying types of network in which Africans in the towns are involved, for these are responsible for many of the alignments which control African behaviour in the towns, and they largely enable the Africans to cope with the vicissitudes of life. Both traditional and modern customs and values operate through these varied networks. Many other illuminating concepts are being worked out in general the study of urbanism.

Work already done suggests that it is important to distinguish 'tribalism' as a category for classifying and interacting with persons in urban and new rural situations, from 'tribal affiliation operating in the organized tribal political systems on the basis of joint ownership of land'. 'Tribalism' is developing in new situations, and like 'castism' in modern India may be a source of new types of political groupings, affecting economic developments. This has to be assessed in relation to the emergence of types of 'class' ties. Again, I stress that tribalism in this sense is still important in towns in long industrialized countries. The maintenance and development of such ties has to be assessed against the inevitable growth of trade unionism, employers associations, government organizations, and other forms of 'secondary power structure' which are appropriate to modern economic and political organization. Recent history in Africa shows that it is the development of this secondary power structure which holds promise of all round economic and political stability; and, as a social anthropologist, I plead for encouragement of these developments to cut across the divisiveness of tribal and other traditional associations. This means that planners and policy makers must accept that there is bound to be major disturbance and conflict, and difficulties for individuals. They must also take into account the conflicts inherent in modern types of organizations. Hence more attention must be given to an analysis of such industrial phenomena as strikes, which appear merely to hold up advances, but which may well be one type of factor destroying 'communalism' in the new states. We need considerably more research on this kind of conflict situation, with a view to examination of political as well as economic gains and losses.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General studies, giving many references to monographic studies, are:

Balandier, G. Sociologie Actuelle de l'Afrique Noire: Dynamique Sociale en Afrique Centrale, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (1963).

Caplow, T. The Sociology of Work, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press (1954)

UNESCO. Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara, Paris: UNESCO (1956).

Moore, W.E. and Feldman, A.S. Labour Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, New York: Social Science Research Council (1960).

The following are references cited in the paper. Most of them refer to work in South-Central Africa, since I have chosen to concentrate my analyses on one region to emphasize interconnexions between problems:

Bailey, F.G. Caste and the Economic Frontier, Manchester: University Press (1957). Tribe, Caste and Nation, Manchester: University Press (1960).

Bott, E. Family and Social Network, London: Tavistock (1957).

Elias, T.O. The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1956).

Epstein, A.L. Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester: Manchester University Press for Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (1958).

Epstein, A.L. Juridical Techniques and the Judicial Process, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper 23, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1954).

Epstein, T.S. Economic Development and Social Change in South India, Manchester: Manchester University Press (1962).

Gluckman, M. Analysis of a Social Structure in Modern Zululand, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 28 (1958) (reprinted from Bantu Studies, 1940, and African Studies, 1942).

Gluckman, M. The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester: Manchester University Press; New York: Humanities Press (1955).

Gluckman, M. Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 10, Livingstone (Northern Rhodesia) (1943).

Hunter, G. The New Societies of Africa.

Lupton, T. On the Shop Floor, Oxford: Pergman Press (1962).

Mayer, P. Townsmen or Tribesmen, Capetown: Oxford University Press (1961).