ECA/RCID/044/01

UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

HARMONIZATION OF SUB-REGIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROGRAMMES

October 2001

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TABLE OF CONTENT

	Chapters	Pages
	ACRONYMS	
I.	INTRODUCTION	1-3
II.	PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PAPER	3.-5
III.	RATIONALE OF HARMONIZATION OF TRADE LIBERALISATION SCHEDULES, POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS	6-12
IV.	TRADE LIBERALISATION SCHEDULES/SCHEMES: SELF-MOTIVATING EFFORTS AND/OR PROPOSALS TOWARDS HARMONISATION	12-26
V.	RECOMMENDATIONS	26-29

ANNEXES:

Annex I: RECs Membership

Annex II: Intra-REC Exports and Imports and
Extra RECs Exports and Imports to rest of Africa

Annex III: African countries trade within and beyond their RECs

ACRONYMS

ABUJA TREATY: The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community
AEC: African Economic Community
APPER: African Priority Programme of Economic Recovery
ASYCUDA: Automated System of Customs Data
AU: African Union
BLS: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa
BNLS: Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa
CEMAC:Communauté Economique et Monétaire des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale
CENSAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEEAC:Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale
CEPGL: Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EAC: East African Community
ECA: Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOC: Indian Ocean Commission
MRU: Mano River Union
MFN: Most favored nation
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development
REC: Regional Economic Community
RCID: Regional Cooperation and Integration Division of ECA
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SACU: Southern African Customs Union
UDEAC: Union Douanière et Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale
UEMOA: Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UMA: Arab Maghreb Union
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNPPARED: United Nations Priority Programme for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development

I. INTRODUCTION

A rapid physical and economic integration of the African continent is crucial to its socio-economic transformation and survival in the 21st century. Lost decades of unfulfilled total integration of the economies of Africa have not helped the continent to position itself favourably to meet the shaping of a 21st century world economy of open trade, technological advancement and an information and communication revolution. The same period has seen policy declarations on Africa's collective development, such as the Lagos Plan of Action/Final Act of Lagos, APPER, UN-PPARED etcetera, come and fizzle out. However, the underlying vision of these attempts is to set the continent free from a vulnerable and marginalized position of sustained under-development into a strong united body of nations, a continental economic power. The vision was further extended and given profound expression of ambition in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. Barely a decade through the Abuja Treaty milestone, the African Heads of State and Government have also declared to establish an African Union. By all intents and purposes, the African Union reaffirms their determined yearning to achieve an integrated African continent in an atmosphere of peace and stability, respect for democratic tenets, for the sanctity of human life, for the rule of law, and for good governance.

The African Union concept is Africa's new integration paradigm. Nevertheless, it does not signify the interment of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) because this Treaty still retains its doctrinal importance in the shaping of this new dispensation. The Africa Union is yet to evolve and mature into its own unique identity and technical depth with its own labyrinth of protocols and related instruments. Until then, the Abuja Treaty will continue to serve a purpose, as long as its provisions remain consistent and compatible with the objectives of the African Union.[1] Therefore, for the purposes of this paper the Abuja Treaty would continue to serve as a significant point of departure.

The AEC and the AU represent the grand continental design, as it were, for Africa's integration. They do, however, recognise the importance of anchoring this design on robust sub-regional building blocs embodied by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Hence, the first order of business of the former was devoted to the strengthening of these RECs and the creation of new ones where they did not exist.

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1 Inference from Article 33(2) of the Constitutive Act.

The concept of building blocs and the call to strengthen the RECs at the outset of the continental integration agenda implies an inevitable necessity for a coordinated and harmonized approach to the pursuit of the integration process. Indeed, coordination and harmonization of the policies, programmes and activities of the RECs is an issue that has been profusely emphasized in declarations and other documents relating to Africa's integration process. The Abuja Treaty and Constitutive Act of the Africa Union are quite unequivocal about its importance as a key policy instrument for ensuring that the eventual unison of the African economies proceeds in a concordant fashion.

Article 6 of the Abuja Treaty mentions about it in relation to the objectives spelt out to be achieved in the second stage of the modalities for the establishment of the Community. The Treaty also devotes a whole chapter (Chapter XIX) to the issue, stressing the importance of establishing the Community "through the coordination, harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of regional economic communities". It goes on to enjoin Member States "to promote the coordination and harmonization of the integration activities of regional economic communities of which they are members with the activities of the Community" (i.e. the African Economic Community). Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union also stipulates among the objectives of the Union the need "to coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union".

In principle, the RECs themselves do recognize the importance of this matter, and this is either manifested by specific provisions in their Treaties on the subject, or through efforts to promote dialogue and consultations aimed at promoting coordination and harmonization of their activities.

The institutional structure for ensuring, monitoring and following up on the issue of coordination and harmonization of the RECs' activities is embodied in the Protocol on Relations between the African Economic Community and the RECs, which came into force in June 1997. A key objective of this mechanism is "to promote the coordination and harmonization of the policies, measures, programmes and activities of the regional economic communities to ensure that the provisions of paragraph 2(a) through (d) of Article 6 of the Treaty are implemented in a harmonious manner to facilitate, at stage five set out in Article 6 of the Treaty, an efficient integration of the regional economic communities into the African Common Market".

At its thirty-fifth Ordinary session held in July 1999 in Algeria, the OAU Assembly of States and Government, reiterated the importance of co-ordination and harmonisation of the activities of the RECs. The leaders decided that the RECs establish within the framework of the Specialized Technical Committees, benchmarks for each sector to enhance assessment of the progress of integration, and regularly provide the OAU Secretariat with their sectoral work programmes in order to facilitate programme co-ordination and harmonization.

II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PAPER

The main purpose of this paper is to examine this emphatic issue of coordination and harmonisation of the activities of the RECs from the angle of trade liberalisation, specifically in respect of the timetables for achieving it. The paper is inscribed as part of the programmed outputs of the Regional Cooperation and Integration Division of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA/RCID) for the biennial period 2000-2001. It is meant to provide an input to the next annual statutory meeting of the ECA's Committee on Regional Integration. The Committee provides a platform for bringing experts from member States to broach on pertinent issues relating to Africa's regional integration process, with a view to making appropriate recommendations for enhancing it. The scope of the paper has focused on the harmonization of timetables of trade liberalization because it is a specific requirement of the ECA/RCID's programmed outputs and also because of the ensuing reasons.

The principal tasks of the first two phases of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community involve three main components: enhancing the sub-regional organizations' institutional capacities in consolidating their integration, rationalizing the myriad of organizations dedicated to integration within each sub-region, and accelerating cross-border liberalization and harmonization in trade. The initial stages of the Abuja Treaty, therefore, give prominence to issues relating to trade in view of the sector's importance as a catalyst of growth, which is further explained below.

International division of labour and trade, which enable every country to specialize and to export those things that it can produce cheaper in exchange for what others can provide at a lower cost, have been, and continue to be, one of the basic factors promoting economic well-being and increasing national income. The more trade there is, the greater can be the rate of growth. Higher levels of trade can also facilitate an escape from the vicious circle of poverty and a take-off into self-sustained growth. Therefore, if trade can help raise the level of income, it can also be instrumental for economic development. Trade has made a tremendous contribution to the development of the world's industrialized economies and can be expected to make a similar contribution to the development of least-developed economies such as those in Africa, provided greater improvements can be made in competitiveness in terms of advancements in technology, entrepreneurship, education, skills, etc. These are among critical trade-enhancing parameters that, in the developed countries, have stemmed from the initiatives of the private sector, but also from conscious government policies. It is in this perspective that the development and facilitation of trade and its ancillary policies and instruments constitute an important dimension of the economic integration schemes of the African sub-regions. In complement with the productive sector, sub-regional/regional trade can be an important transmission of growth, development and dynamic integration.

Free trade policy in the context of trade liberalisation schemes, is, therefore, intended to allow trade to proceed freely and generate a conducive environment for rapid growth and development through the sector. This is not so say that a 100% free trade is always most conducive to accelerated growth and development. Some marginal interferences with the free flow of trade, if carefully selected as a means of, for instance, protecting and nurturing some promising industries from intense competition from free trade, may be justified and even speed up development. Nonetheless, substantially free trade with marginal deviations is a contemporarily good policy for economic growth and development.

The tremendous importance of trade, therefore, underscores measures of the RECs to promote more of it through trade liberalization policies embodied in the attempts to establish free trade areas and customs unions. An important contribution to the clarity of the import of these free trade principles objectives is manifested in the well-known Vinerian theory of trade creation and trade diversion.

So far, the subject of trade thus discussed has implied trade in material goods. However, for developing countries such as those in Africa, it is important to extend it in terms of trade in technical know-how, skills, managerial talents, and entrepreneurship. To the extent that the RECs' free trade processes take account of the free flow of these factors, the effects of trade and its liberalisation as an instrument of growth and development can be greatly enhanced. Increased cross-fertilization of these factors, buttressed by an expanded horizon of free trade in material goods within and amongst the RECs, can increase the impact of the RECs' trade liberalisation schemes. It is from these reasons that coordination and harmonization of the trade enhancing activities of the RECs--through the removal of barriers, tariff and non-tariff reductions, productive rules of origin, etc—derives its importance.

The paper examines this subject from the trade liberalisation angle, with emphasis on the extent of the harmonisation of the time frames being pursued in that regard by different RECs, particularly those operating within the same sub-region. The paper consequently makes appropriate suggestions to strengthen the harmonisation process or efforts underway.

III. RATIONALE OF HARMONIZATION OF TRADE LIBERALISATION SCHEDULES, POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS

The establishment of the majority of the RECs antedates the coming into force of the Abuja Treaty. An organisation such as ECOWAS has been in existence since 1975. Having come only into force in June 1994, the Abuja Treaty, as a continental framework for Africa's integration process, was a relatively recent development, and could, therefore, not have had a major impact in the modelling of the RECs. The RECs' treaties, including even the recent ones (i.e. those of COMESA, SADC, EAC), have not strictly been fashioned according to the timetables and schedules laid out in the Abuja Treaty, though, in principle, their goals and objectives are largely consistent with the continental integration vision.

Some casual criticisms about the Abuja Treaty have focused on its lack of consistency with the realities of the continent's integration landscape characterised by a multiplicity of integration groupings and a tendency to create more rather than less of them. Even granted that the Treaty was intended to be the sole model to be followed by each and every REC, the unfinished business relating to its various ancillary protocols, in many ways, contributed to diminishing its authority as the benchmark by which all had to fall in line. Nonetheless, it is still respected, in conjunction with the new African Union dispensation, as the framework for Africa's regional integration. The fact that the issue of coordination and harmonization among the RECs is so much emphasised upon, as pointed out earlier, is to make an incessant plea to the effect that there should be total unison of purpose and action in the pursuit of the continent's integration agenda. But still, the point has to be made that considering that nothing is couched in brimstone, any design, plan, process or blueprint is liable to alteration in light of dynamic and changing circumstances. All integration treaties, whether at the regional or sub-regional levels, are not expected to be intrinsically immune to change.

The imperfections of any African regional framework as rallying point for its integration notwithstanding, besides the various statutory, political and other pronouncements on the subject, there are other compelling reasons for making co-ordination and harmonisation among the RECs an imperative choice for a successful regional integration in Africa. These include:

- Multiplicity and overlapping of integration groupings and their membership
- Overlap of commercial relations and interests
- Trade diversion effect
- Increased administrative burdens and costs.

They are further explained as follows:

Multiplicity and overlapping of integration groupings and their membership

The creation of multiple integration groupings is a popular phenomenon among African countries. A key justification for it is subsumed under the “variable geometrical” concept, which allows member States to drive their integration processes on several tracks in terms of the implementation of programmes, especially in the area of trade liberalisation. Usually, the intention is that by creating smaller sub-sets within larger blocs, the members States concerned hope to be able to proceed on faster speeds in the integration process. It can also be explained by a desire by a member State to maximise its benefits from integration and insure against adverse consequences by not banking its hopes in only one bloc or putting “one’s eggs in the same basket” as it were.

The tendency to proliferate groupings may also stem from a quest to seek and create “optimal economic spaces” for initiating gradual coordination and harmonization of national policies and strategies towards sub-regional, and eventually, regional convergence, with an implicit hope of generating higher rates of growth for the participating countries individually and collectively. Especially for weaker countries, these reasons may be a strong incentive to hook to several blocs at the same time with a view to maximising perceptible or imperceptible gains from each bloc. It is, however, often the case that member States join these blocs without any clear idea as to what they can expect as potential gains and losses.

It should not be surprising, therefore, that multiple integration groupings dot the African integration arena and a number of countries tend to belong to two or more groupings simultaneously. All the African sub-regions have more than one organisation in charge of economic integration. In West Africa, UEMOA and MRU co-exist with ECOWAS and all their members belong to ECOWAS. In central Africa, three groupings, namely ECCAS, UDEAC/CEMAC and CEPGL, exist side-by-side with one another; in Eastern Africa, IGAD and EAC constitute smaller "RECs" within the larger COMESA REC. SADC and SACU share the Southern African sub-regional space. North Africa used to be the only sub-region with only one integration grouping in the form of UMA. The recent creation of CEN-SAD has altered this rarity. As regards multiple membership of countries to RECs, Annex I depicts a very interesting picture. Only about 15 percent of countries belong to a single REC. The majority, representing over 50 percent of countries, belong to two RECs, while close to 15 percent belong to three RECs.

Although multiple RECs and overlapping membership is an accepted practice in Africa's integration process, it poses a number of difficulties. As noted in UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/1, the co-existence of ECOWAS, UEMOA and MRU in West Africa had resulted to some extent in overlapping functions and duplication of activities. A similar situation prevails in the Eastern and Southern African sub-regions where there is a criss-cross of membership of countries to six different RECs, namely COMESA, IGAD, EAC, IOC, SADC and SACU. Central Africa boasts of three inter-twining RECs namely, ECCAS, CEMAC/UDEAC and CEPGL, in terms of membership. The same political leaders reaffirm each institution in its own identity, goals and objectives, and even when an institution is dissolved, a new one soon replaces it. These overlaps of mandates, objectives, modalities of operations etc. encourage unhealthy multiplication and duplication of efforts and resources. While arguments for "fast tracking variable geometries" may rationalize RECs proliferation, multiplicity of RECs is still bad for developing market unification and trade expansion on the sub-regional scale in particular and on the continental scale in general.

Overlap of commercial relations and interests

The coexistence of different groupings in the same sub-regional space, because of historical, linguistic, economic or geo-political reasons, is likely to persist because of the fact that African countries do not appear willing and ready to abolish one institutional framework in favor of another or merge different blocs.

However, firstly, because there is a certain amount of trade destined beyond the boundaries of the RECs, coordination and harmonization of policies and instruments in the trade area will particularly be important and beneficial for countries having overlaps of trading interests outside their immediate REC zones. Annex 1 provides details of individual countries' trade within and outside their REC borders, which, as can be observed, shows a considerable amount of cross-REC trade.

Secondly, as depicted in the table in Annex II, over the least seven years, trade within a number of RECs has not shown any encouraging trend. Between 1994-2000 intra-REC exports barely exceeded an average of 15 percent of total exports except for EAC, which recorded about 20% in year 2000. Similarly, intra-REC imports over the same period were below 12% with ECOWAS registering the highest average rate of about 10%. On the other hand, in terms of trade with Africa as a whole within the same period, RECs such as EAC, IGAD and UEMOA, had relatively high average rates of exports to Africa of about 25%, while CEPGL recorded average rates well above 30%. What these statistics try to portray is that there is a tendency for countries to look beyond their REC confines in terms of trade, suggesting a certain amount of flexibility for them to maximize trading opportunities wherever they can find them. There is a long-term vision for RECs to capture greater internal trade within their respective Communities, but this is not to suggest that in so doing, they have an intention to monopolize trade flows exclusively between and among their membership. As long as trade can be generated or created between and across RECs, it can only be positive for the creation of the African Union as a whole. The notion of increasing trade flows across all of Africa becomes, therefore, a powerful principle transcending narrow REC interests.

would not want to see is the mushrooming of several bilateral geometries within the Community by countries wanting to emulate the anticipated Ghana-Nigeria fast track example because that can further complicate or even undercut its multilateral agenda.

Meanwhile, UEMOA, constituted by the francophone members of ECOWAS, is already a Customs Union with a common external tariff adopted since January 2000 ranging from 0% to 20%. A trade bloc in which part of its members have formed a Customs Union and others are just on the fringes of a Free Trade area, with both cases having different rules of origin, obviously poses a number of difficulties for the entire group as trading partners. Members of UEMOA apply a common external tariff to imports from the rest of ECOWAS as they would to any other third country. The rest of ECOWAS members will not enjoy the same duty free rates applied within the UEMOA Customs Union. Against a backdrop of transverse trading relations between UEMOA and ECOWAS countries as can be observed in Annex III, such a dichotomy within ECOWAS is not in the best interest of all of its members. Trade statistics between the period 1994-2000 show that a number of UEMOA countries do have quite significant trading relationship with other non-UEMOA ECOWAS states, especially those contiguous to one another (e.g. Togo with Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire with Ghana, Benin with Nigeria etc). The dichotomy thus increases the possibility of trade diversion, particularly from the perspective of consumers, if low cost producers from ECOWAS were now to be replaced by high cost ones within the Customs Union.

Fortunately, both organizations do recognize the fact that they can optimize their common sub-regional market space if they harmonized their programmes, particularly in the area of trade and market integration. To this end, they met in early 2000 to draw up a programme of action, which will make it possible for them to speak and act in common on such issues as the establishment of a common market and convergence of macro-economic policies. Hopefully, their joint determination would bear fruit in terms of the harmonization of the market instruments put in place by both organizations for trade liberalization and a customs union. They have also agreed to adopt new common rules of origin intended to facilitate the free flow of trade between UEMOA and ECOWAS countries. Some commonly agreed parameters to fashion out the new rules of origin have already emerged, which include the adoption of a common basis for establishing new rules of origin, namely the criterion of goods wholly produced locally, the criterion of value-added, as well as common certification procedures. On the value-added criterion, it has been agreed, for instance, to adopt a standard rate of 30% of ex-factory pre-tax cost. The percentages were previously different in the two organizations with ECOWAS having adopted 35% and UEMOA, 40%.

Other important aspects of the trade liberalization spectrum targeted for harmonization are customs declaration forms, which will now be a single document, and compensation mechanisms, which ECOWAS has already agreed to adopt the system being applied by UEMOA i.e. the declining level of compensation calculated as follows:

- 100% compensation for lost revenue from 2000 to 2002
- 80% compensation for lost revenue in 2003
- 60% compensation for lost revenue in 2004
- 30% compensation for lost revenue from 2005 to 2008, and
- 0% as from Ist January 2009.

Besides the trade and market integration cluster, there are other areas such as macro-economic and sectoral policies on which the two organizations are keen to converge. All these unprecedented harmonization drives, including the ECOWAS recent initiative to achieve a monetary fusion with UEMOA by the year 2004, have renewed hopes towards a unified West African sub-region. The growing momentum to speed up the process of Africa's integration embodied in the advent of the African Union, is expected to provide further fillip to the joint and collective determination of ECOWAS and UEMOA to harmonize their activities, and eventually coalesce into a single unified bloc perhaps sooner rather than later.

against a possible surge of competition, while providing a source of revenue for member States. Raw materials were exempted from any tax.

After a period of experimentation, CEMAC has now come to the realization that the "tax unique" is, after all, not a panacea for protection nor has it helped to boost government revenue. This can rightly be so because intra-CEMAC trade was a mere average of between 2-3.5% over the period 1994 to 2000. A new customs and fiscal regime was put in force, which, apart from the CET, consisted of a generalized preferential tax (tarif préférentiel généralisé[TPG]) applicable to all manufactured goods that certified rules of origin requirements without the elaborate process of registering eligible companies as used to be the case under the "*taxe unique*" system; and a turnover tax (*taxe sur le chiffre d'affaire (TCA)*. The TPG was intended to be phased over time to 0%. It is already 0% for raw materials, but 10 percent of the relevant CET rate with respect to the other products. The turnover tax is designed to replace a range of indirect taxes on production, consumption and services and simplifies the internal tax regimes of the UDEAC member States.

During the dormant period of ECCAS, coupled with the virtual inertia of CEPGL, CEMAC had no alternative but to fashion out its trade integration policies and instruments without the benefit of coordination with ECCAS and CEPGL. The resurgence of ECCAS makes it necessary for the member States of the groupings within the sub-region to harmonize their positions because of overlapping membership. ECCAS is currently in the process of studying an appropriate trade regime, which cannot but be fully conscious of the existing arrangements within CEMAC and the geographical overlaps of some of its members that belong to RECs in other sub-regions as noted earlier on.

As regards CEPGL, the trade figures between 1994-2000 suggest that the trading interest of Burundi in CEPGL in terms of exports showed a rising trend from 5.4% in 1994 to 33.3% in year 2000, while that of Rwanda declined from 25% to 1% within the same period. Rwanda seemed to have shifted its interest to the COMESA market which saw the country's trade remain consistently around 25% from 1994-1998 (28.6% in 1998), only to drop dramatically to 3% in 2000. Rwanda's export trade was also fairly the same and consistent in ECCAS, suffering the same slump to 3% in year 2000. DRC,s interest in CEPGL and ECCAS markets are fairly limited, but significant in the SADC zone.

The above tendencies observed in the patterns of trade with respect to two of the three members of CEPGL (i.e. Rwanda and DRC), would lead one to suggest that CEPGL focus attention on other areas such as peace and security, and leave trade liberalization issues to what would unfold between ECCAS and CEMAC on harmonization of their trade regimes.

Eastern and Southern Africa sub-regions

The two sub-regions are discussed together because they have between them a maze of RECs (COMESA, IGAD, EAC, SACU, SADC, IOC) with an intertwined membership to them, with COMESA virtually embracing all of them in terms of country composition. The author will not place too much emphasis on IGAD and IOC because in terms of trade liberalization, they both have declared to follow the COMESA course. The same thing cannot be said of EAC and SADC, which seem to have developed or are in the process of establishing their own assertive identities on matters relating to trade liberalization and market integration vis-à-vis COMESA (albeit with a great deal of goodwill and intentions to embrace harmonization of efforts as an inevitable path to pursue), nor of SACU, which has long existed as a Customs Union.

October 2000 heralded the launching of a Free Trade Area in COMESA, signifying, in principle, the consummation of the internal market in terms of the elimination of all tariffs. However, in practice, as of that date, less than half of COMESA's 20 strong members had affirmed to implement 100% tariff elimination. The rest of the members have given varying signals as to when they want to join the FTA, and have at least, except for one country, achieved 60% tariff reduction. COMESA is currently vying a Customs Union by year 2004, a year, which incidentally or coincidentally, is turning out to be a significant cut-off benchmark, at least for the big RECs, if not for the continent as a whole, in efforts towards trade liberalization and market integration. If there is a flagship achievement that COMESA is renowned for, it has to be in the area of trade facilitation. The measures taking in this regard (ASYCUDA, Yellow Card, COMESA-CD, etcetera) have been quite extensive, exemplary and prominently showcased in many papers and references on COMESA. It is hope that they would serve as a model for other RECs to use.

The recent inevitable rebirth of the East African Community (EAC) because of the strong historical and cultural links among its three member countries is, by all intents and purposes, perceived as a fast-tracking variable geometry within COMESA. It becomes one of the two significant tiers of complications in the harmonization equation within COMESA, the second being the overlapping membership between COMESA and SADC to a large extent, and between it and SACU, to a smaller extent. Two of the three-member grouping of EAC, namely Kenya and Uganda are members of COMESA, while Tanzania is a member of SADC having earlier withdrawn from COMESA. How COMESA and EAC intend to address harmonization between them is expressed in their Memorandum of Understanding concluded in May 1997. Among the key target areas are the establishment of a free trade area, the implementation of a common external tariff, the elimination of non-tariff barriers and the adoption of a common customs document. The MOU is an important framework for achieving closer harmony between COMESA and EAC, although nothing in the MOU prevents the latter for choosing to implement whatever instruments and policies it deems corresponding to the best interest of its member States, bearing in mind that Tanzania, which used to be a member of COMESA at the time of signing the MOU has closed ranks with COMESA and joined SADC. Tanzania's withdrawal thus raises the challenge, but does not significantly alter, the principle to harmonize activities between EAC and COMESA.

Nothing can more signify the perception or conception of EAC as a COMESA fast-tracker than its intention to establish a Customs Union as an entry point to its trade and market integration, bearing in mind that a Customs Union is a much deeper form of integration than an FTA. In accordance with the planned timetable, the CU should formally be in place within four years after the signing of the EAC Treaty, which took place in January 2001, meaning by end of 2004, which by coincidence or design, is the same target date for COMESA. Whether EAC's CU will precede that of COMESA to make it a truly fast-track development remains to be proven. What is certain is that significant consultations to leapfrog EAC into trade and market fusion by this target date are very much underway. A comprehensive study on a trade regime has already been commissioned, which is currently providing the technical basis to determine the structure and content of the CU, particularly in terms of the determination of the common external tariff (CET). But, already there are proposals to peg the CET at a maximum rate of 25%, consisting of 15% import duty and 10% preferential rate.

The encouraging news in the interest of harmonization is that the EAC member States have agreed to, and are currently fully implementing, the tariff reduction schedules inherited from the COMESA trade liberalization programme, i.e.90% by Kenya, 80% by Tanzania and 80% by Uganda. Since the COMESA FTA is still evolutionary because many of its members are yet to reach 100% tariff reduction, the above-mentioned EAC rates represent quite a significant step by EAC towards the creation of its internal market.

Nevertheless, complications still arise for EAC members of COMESA, particularly Kenya and Uganda, as to what rates to apply in terms of trade between them, bearing in mind that in COMESA, Kenya has achieved 100% tariff reduction while in EAC, it is a step backwards, 90%. The rate of 80% is however the same for Uganda in both COMESA and EAC. The dilemma for Kenya will be how to treat Uganda in such a duality in their trade dealings, whether as a COMESA member or as an EAC member. Naturally, for Ugandan producers exporting to Kenya, the COMESA treatment would be more advantageous than the EAC rates. The dilemma will even be exacerbated if COMESA and EAC were to apply non-identical rules of origin, and the latter's rules turned out to be more exigent than those of the former. For the time being, EAC has agreed to adopt COMESA's rules of origin until such time that it is able develop its own. To avoid such problems as illustrated by the

Kenya-Uganda example will dictate that if EAC has to adopt its rules of origin in the future, they should be identical to those of COMESA.

As intimated earlier, the other aspect of the harmonization conundrum within COMESA is the fact that 7 of its 20 strong members (Angola, DRC, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe) also belong to SADC, and 2 members (Namibia and Swaziland) belong to SADC and SACU at the same. Now that SADC has adopted its own trade protocol to achieve an FTA within eight years, the seven countries that astride both COMESA and SADC have to conduct their trade with possible additional administrative burdens and costs, particularly in terms of custom documentation, procedures and nomenclature, differentiated between trade with COMESA, trade with SADC, and trade with the rest of the world. It would have been preferable for these countries to conduct their intra-trade based on only one regime.

Therefore, as SADC moves into gear in implementing its trade protocol, there will no doubt be pressure stemming from the centrifugal force of its overlapping membership with COMESA to closely harmonise its trade instruments with those of COMESA. There are already encouraging moves to this end. It was agreed by the end of the last COMESA summit that COMESA and SADC would set up task forces to deal with common issues. It is also agreed that COMESA and SADC would invite each other to their meetings. This ranges from functional meetings such as those discussing transportation and communication to the more general policy meetings at the head of state and Ministerial levels. COMESA has agreed on the bands for the CET for implementation in 2004 and it is hoped that SADC will adopt similar rates. COMESA is also ahead in trade facilitation with common documentation, one stop border crossings, and similar vehicle requirements, while SADC is yet to address these issues, but can decide to apply the facilitation measures of COMESA.

As regards the Southern Africa sub-region, the situation is almost akin to what obtains in West Africa in which there is a Custom Union, SACU, within an evolving Free Trade Area, SADC, the difference being that in the latter case, one country, South Africa, wields enormous influence in the custom union arrangements both in terms of the share of trade and policy making. The SACU treaty provides for instance that the laws relating to customs and excise duties shall be the same in member countries as are in force in South Africa from time to time. Goods produced or manufactured in the SACU are subject to the same excise duties as prevail in South Africa. Besides, intra-SACU trade SACU does not foresee rules of origin as an issue and therefore there are none other than a consensual understanding for traded goods to have about 25% local content. At any rate, unlike a Free Trade Area, rules of origin should not be an issue in a Customs Union because of the logic of the common external tariff.

The problem with the co-existence of SACU and SADC, and this is also applicable to the case of West Africa, has to do with the fact that you cannot have a situation where countries belong to a Customs Union and at the same time are members of a Free Trade Area. This is because once a country is in a Customs Union that has an established common external tariff and harmonized trade policies, all of its trade with the rest of the world has to be conducted on the basis of this CET. The simultaneous membership of that country also to a Free Trade Area defeats the logic of the CET and puts the country in a real quandary in its trade with the rest of the world including its FTA co-members. This will be the case for all of the SACU members (Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa) who are also members of SADC, and two of whom (Namibia and Swaziland) are, additionally, members of COMESA.

Further complicating the situation is the free trade area agreement between the EU and South Africa with all the possible risks that it entails, especially for SACU members, in terms of dumping, whilst in the EU, no member country can, alone, negotiate a separate free trade agreement with a third party. It has to be done with the EU as a bloc because it is not farfetched to imagine what a chaotic situation it would be if all members within a Customs Union were allowed to engage in a labyrinth of other separate bilateral and free trade agreements with third parties. The active involvement of SACU and SADC in future similar country-EU bilateral free trade arrangements is important to safeguard the collective interest.

Finally, as can be observed, practical intricacies are evident within the Eastern and Southern Africa sub-regions arising from the interlocking membership and differentiated integration speeds and identities involving COMESA and SADC, and by extension, EAC and SACU, particularly in terms of trade and market integration where they all have established programmes, unlike the other groupings such as IGAD and IOC. These complexities can only be resolved through a genuine commitment to pursue at least identical trade regimes and policies.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, it should be said that it was not the purpose of this paper to attempt to rationalize the REC groupings and their membership, but it would appear that some degree of rationalization would strengthen current self drives among the RECs operating within the same or similar geographical boundaries to work closer towards harmonized trade and market integration policies and regimes. The following suggestions are meant to provide some general guidelines for consideration, albeit radical as some of them may seem or be perceived.

1. Countries within a sub-region that have already formed a Customs Union will have to temporarily withdraw from a complete or partial Free Trade Area they belong to simultaneously. Those countries that find themselves outside the Customs Union could then constitute their own Free Trade Area and work assiduously towards convergence with the existing Customs Union within the shortest possible time, with a view to unifying the sub-regional market space. Meanwhile, until the market unification occurs, special preferential arrangements could be worked out between the Customs Union and the complete or partial FTA within the range of the common external tariff or through the MFN principle.

2. Smaller RECs within larger blocs that are not already a Customs Union should adopt tade regimes identical to those of the larger bloc. If they were able to fast track the larger bloc in establishing a Customs Union, then arrangements similar to those proposed above would apply. Alternatively, there could be a renegotiated adoption of a new common trade regime, accommodating both fast track intentions and slow-track realities, such that at a pre-determined commonly agreed target date, all would converge to a unified sub-regional market space.

3. In a geographical zone where is neither a complete or partial Free Trade Area nor a Customs Union, which appears to be the case in North Africa, there can be a fresh beginning to the trade liberalization process anchored on a real commitment to implement it.

4. The emergence of CEN-SAD is a very interesting and a unique development in the integration landscape of Africa, because its membership is no respecter of geographical boundaries. Located in the North African sub-region, it comprises 3 members from UMA (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia), two members of CEMAC (Chad, Central African Republic), four combined members of COMESA, IGAD and SADC (Djibouti, Egypt, Zambia, Somalia) and four combined members of ECOWAS and UEMOA (Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Niger). There is likelihood that other members across the continent will be attracted to it. What CEN-SAD should adopt as a trade regime is a question that begs an answer. Should it be the regime of ECOWAS, of COMESA or of SADC? If CEN-SAD develops a separate trade protocol that is inconsistent with neither of its multiple REC character, it will add yet another layer to the already complicated situation of trade and market integration in Africa. It would be judicious for CEN-SAD to allow the current FTA and Customs Union configurations to play out harmoniously before adopting such a protocol. Conversely, if there is an urgency to do so, it should be in the manner suggested earlier on in this paper.

5. When all of these intricate overlaps are sorted out, there has to be a realistic but time conscious target setting for accomplishing all outstanding, incomplete or partial Free Trade Areas. What constitutes an appropriate target is obviously something difficult to determine. For example, one may legitimately question the ability of a REC to now achieve a total Free Trade Area, and much harder, a Customs Union within the next two or three years, when the same REC has not been able to do so over more than two decades of its existence. This notwithstanding, all indications point to the fact that there is growing impatience for sluggishness in the pursuit of Africa's integration agenda as manifested in the emergence of the African Union and the New African Initiative. African leaders do recognize that to provide an effective response to the unfolding developments in the international economic environment, it is now imperative to move much faster to the goal of an African Union, which by implication means the rapid establishment of an African Free Trade Area and a continental Custom Union. These developments should provide a motivation force for setting targets that are not too distant in the future. The tendency that one foresees emerging is a redoubling of efforts, through the momentum of the African Union, NEPAD, and other fast-track initiatives (such as the ECOWAS monetary union fast track) that by the year 2004, there should be a breakthrough, if not substantial progress, on many important fronts on Africa's integration agenda. This obviously and logically cannot exclude trade and market fusion on which extensive investment in time, experimentation, resources and politics has already been made. For this reason, it will be in order to suggest that year 2004 should serve as a benchmark for completing all partial FTAs, consolidating existing Customs Unions and setting the stage for total market unification within each sub-region by year 2005. The implication of such target dates for all RECs is to eliminate parallelism in the approaches to establishing FTAs because of their overlapping memberships.

6. Accompanying measures are imperative to ensure that such target dates can be met because there cannot be impeccable progress to forming and consolidating FTAs and CUs unless a number of vexing issues that contribute to policy reversals, backsliding and foot-dragging, are addressed. Measures to deal with constraining factors and help enhance the trade liberalization processes have been addressed in another ECA paper.

Suffice to mention that among the key issues deserving due attention are free mobility of factors of production, private sector development, provision of adequate infrastructure, appropriate compensation mechanisms and asymmetries to deal with uneven levels of development within a specified time frame, convertibility of currencies to facilitate intra-trade, promotion of alternative sources of government revenue away from extensive reliance on customs duties, and establishment of competition policies. Above all, a well functioning and efficient coordination and harmonization at the continental level and vehement political commitment to ensure that this happens are *a sine qua non* for success.

ANNEX I

REC membership

Country	UMA	CENSAD	ECOWAS	UEMOA	CEMAC	ECCAS	CEPGL	COMESA	EAC	IIGAD	IOC	SADC	SACU
Algeria	x												
Angola								x				x	
Benin			x	x									
Botswana												x	x
Burkina Faso			x	x									
Burundi						x	x	x					
Cameroon					x	x							
Cape Verde			x										
CAR		x			x	x							
Chad		x			x	x							
Comoros								x			x		
Congo, R					x	x							
Côte d'Ivoire			x	x									
Djibouti		x						x		X			
DRC							X	x				x	
Egypt		x						x					
E. Guinea					x	x							
Ethiopia								x		x			
Gabon					x	x							
Gambia			x										
Ghana			X										

Country	UMA	CENSAD	ECOWAS	UEMOA	CEMAC	ECCAS	CEPGL	COMESA	EAC	IIGAD	IOC	SADC	SACU
Guinea*			x										
Guinea B			x	X									
Kenya								x	x	x			
Lesotho												x	x
Liberia*			x										
Libya	x	x											
Madagascar								x			x		
Malawi								x				x	
Mali		x	x										
Mauritania	x												
Mauritius								x				x	
Morocco	x	x											
Mozambique												x	
Namibia												x	x
Niger		x	x										
Nigeria		x	x										
Reunion											x		
Rwanda						x	x	x					
Sao Tome						x							
Senegal		x	x	X									

Country	UMA	CENSAD	ECOWAS	UEMOA	CEMAC	ECCAS	CEPGL	COMESA	EAC	IIGAD	IOC	SADC	SACU
Seychelles								x			x	X	
Sierra Leone*			x										
Somalia		x								x			
South Africa												X	x
Sudan								x		x			
Swaziland								x				X	x
Tanzania									x			X	
Togo			x	x									
Tunisia	x	x											
Uganda								x	x				
Zambia		x						x				X	
Zimbabwe								x				X	

* Also belong to the MRU.

Annex II

Exports to REC as % of total REC exports

REC	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
CEMAC	24.91	20.66	23.20	26.71	7.70	11.34	
CEN-SAD	4.94	7.25	7.14	7.23	5.56	5.65	
CEPGL							
COMESA	9.55	9.74	11.03	10.34	10.43	10.39	11.06
EAC	51.87	56.89	51.87	52.78	50.78	52.79	60.70
ECCAS	27.27	22.55	24.69	27.76	8.01	11.69	
ECOWAS	24.30	24.30	24.04	8.42	37.51	73.33	
IGAD	21.63	21.63	24.85	29.10	31.61	31.46	20.42
IOC	8.41	8.41	3.71	5.16	5.88	6.24	6.08
MRU							
SADC	14.69	17.52	17.80	17.56	18.55	15.57	1.22
UEMOA	24.92	24.92	24.41	6.99	34.04	91.88	
UMA	7.28	8.36	6.55	6.54	4.15	4.06	

Imports from REC as % of total REC imports

REC	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
CEMAC	1.87	1.56	1.42	1.30	0.82	0.23	
CEN-SAD	1.58	2.49	2.36	2.32	2.09	1.85	
CEPGL							
COMESA	2.62	2.41	2.28	2.46	1.66	1.53	4.07
EAC	6.06	5.27	6.52	6.87	5.38	5.04	5.01
ECCAS	1.95	1.61	1.52	1.39	0.90	0.24	
ECOWAS	2.26	2.26	2.87	2.57	2.66	2.80	
IGAD	5.90	5.12	5.04	4.74	3.30	3.41	4.46
IOC	1.18	1.06	0.59	0.61	0.80	0.54	0.47
MRU	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	
SADC	7.06	6.49	7.32	7.82	7.60	6.35	0.14
UEMOA	2.02	2.02	2.03	2.21	2.34	2.36	
UMA	101.64	102.36	102.15	101.84	101.50	101.32	

Source: Calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics,2001

Exports to Africa as % of total exports

Imports from Africa as % of total imports

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	REC	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
CEMAC	5.02	5.51	4.75	3.87	4.24	3.02	2.29	CEMAC	9.15	13.63	13.09	17.65	14.72	14.17	13.42
CEN-SA	6.83	7.99	8.63	8.15	8.63	7.18	5.42	CEN-SA	7.06	7.56	7.85	7.57	6.18	6.24	6.00
CEPGL	8.88	7.78	8.82	8.02	1.31	1.34	0.77	CEPGL	27.49	29.10	31.99	36.21	37.41	40.90	39.26
COMES	13.06	13.18	14.02	13.50	13.23	12.86	10.01	COMES	14.08	14.37	15.23	15.78	12.17	12.73	10.60
EAC	28.81	30.95	30.77	29.94	31.81	29.66	31.22	EAC	19.90	20.12	20.38	18.68	16.73	18.21	12.88
ECCAS	5.90	6.04	5.51	4.55	3.78	2.77	2.07	ECCAS	16.34	19.32	18.60	22.44	19.94	19.46	19.12
ECOWA	10.79	12.38	12.55	13.54	16.51	15.80	10.36	ECOWA	11.71	12.73	14.80	14.42	13.13	15.36	12.66
IGAD	24.86	27.12	28.14	26.57	26.89	28.09	24.28	IGAD	18.74	16.83	17.77	18.02	11.75	12.80	8.61
IOC	6.56	7.44	7.16	5.76	6.50	10.66	9.70	IOC	9.61	10.14	11.60	14.80	13.88	18.91	17.19
MRU	4.04	4.14	2.19	4.26	5.88	7.14	4.55	MRU	4.27	4.52	10.24	8.50	3.87	10.84	2.39
SACU								SACU							
SADC	10.37	12.96	13.42	13.55	12.56	11.48	8.98	SADC	10.62	10.48	11.81	12.69	11.03	12.34	11.25
UEMOA	24.02	21.61	21.47	25.12	26.01	25.58	20.26	UEMOA	18.94	19.75	22.55	21.77	20.15	21.22	21.10
UMA	5.28	5.62	5.16	4.41	4.30	3.34	2.71	UMA	5.48	5.36	5.70	5.72	3.70	3.94	4.26

Source: Calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2001

		Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)													Annex III
PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	Imp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	Imp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Algeria	CEMAC		3						15	13	1	13	2	2	
Algeria	CEN-SAD	229	199	22	179	123	14	183	329	256	162	52	56	77	99
Algeria	CEPGL								6	1					
Algeria	COMESA	5	5	3	9	1	17	16	71	68	7	48	15	18	16
Algeria	EAC										1	3	3	3	
Algeria	ECCAS		3						21	14	1	13	2	2	
Algeria	ECOWAS	17	14	1	13	3	6	4	11	17	29	62	48	44	47
Algeria	IGAD				4	4	4				15	1	3	3	
Algeria	IOC								3	7	16	14	1	1	
Algeria	MRU	1	14	3						2	2	2	3	3	
Algeria	SACU								2	6	3	22	14	39	
Algeria	SADC								8	8	4	23	14	4	
Algeria	UEMOA	3			11	2	4	4	9	13	27	59	44	4	47
Algeria	UMA	237	211	21	29	164	171	164	264	198	125	25	4	62	83
Angola	CEMAC	3	3	4	12	4	4		9	12	1	11	12	1	
Angola	CEN-SAD								2	3	6	1	4	1	
Angola	COMESA	8	1						13	14	11	1	6	8	
Angola	EAC	8	1								1				
Angola	ECCAS	3	3	4	12	4	4		9	12	1	11	12	1	
Angola	ECOWAS	2	6	9	7	7	8	1	19	15	2	12	14	15	17
Angola	IGAD	8	1								1				
Angola	SACU	5	1	57	45	3	19	22	97	149	38	29	215	28	239
Angola	SADC	5	1	57	45	3	19	22	11	162	39	219	222	216	239
Angola	UEMOA	17	3	5	3	3	3		11	6	9				
Angola	UMA								1	2	4	8	3		
Benin	CEMAC	3			1		1	1			13	17	6	9	13
Benin	CEN-SAD	3	24	3	22	38	11	13	12	26	31	29	25	42	51
Benin	COMESA		1								4	1	2	4	4
Benin	ECCAS	3			1		1	1			13	17	6	9	13
Benin	ECOWAS	18	11	12	1	29	1	12	18	61	71	72	7	189	222
Benin	IOC		1												
Benin	SACU			8	2	2			1	1	2	4	17	5	
Benin	SADC		1	8	2	2			1	1	6	4	17	5	
Benin	UEMOA	6	5	7	9	8	1	11	18	41	45	43	5	158	184
Benin	UMA	15	17	22	16	13	4	5	6	55	7	7	6	8	9
Burkina Faso	CEMAC								1	2	5	5			
Burkina Faso	CEN-SAD	4	2	5	5	7	6	5	2	36	34	26	37	37	27
Burkina Faso	COMESA	4	7	9	3	7	8		1						1
Burkina Faso	ECCAS								1	2	5	5			
Burkina Faso	ECOWAS	3	46	38	35	16	16	18	91	121	144	125	21	221	254
Burkina Faso	IOC	4	7	9	3	7	8								
Burkina Faso	SACU								1	8	6	3	2	2	2
Burkina Faso	SADC	4	7	9	3	7	8		2	8	6	3	2	2	2
Burkina Faso	UEMOA	26	42	33	29	9	8	9	74	88	112	16	189	2	229

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Burkina Faso	UMA	1		1		1	1			2	2	2	15	15	
Burundi	CEN-SAD					1			7	8	4	7	13	7	8
Burundi	CEPGL	4	2	3			1	1	3	3	1	1	1	3	3
Burundi	COMESA	11	8	4		1	1	1	26	26	12	16	25	18	21
Burundi	EAC	8	11	5					16	16	9	8	12	11	13
Burundi	ECCAS	4	2	3			1	1	3	3	1	1	1	3	3
Burundi	IGAD	7	6	1					1	1	5	5	9	6	7
Burundi	SACU				1				7	3	4	5	6	5	6
Burundi	SADC	3	5	4	1	1			29	24	15	18	24	2	24
Cameroon	CEMAC	52	85	111	111	129	97	86	3	34	46	38	14	12	4
Cameroon	CEN-SAD	54	42	63	56	78	68	73	21	13	161	127	157	195	236
Cameroon	CEPGL		3	3	2	2	3	3							
Cameroon	COMESA		3	3	2	2	6	4		2	2	4	6	5	2
Cameroon	EAC									1	1	2	3	1	
Cameroon	ECCAS	52	88	114	113	131	1	89	3	34	46	38	14	12	4
Cameroon	ECOWAS	21	29	4	25	24	13	1	44	168	193	24	179	222	23
Cameroon	IGAD									1	1	2	3	1	
Cameroon	IOC		7	13			3								
Cameroon	MRU	1	1	3	1	1			28	4	3	4	34	34	
Cameroon	SACU	2	4	6	3	3			5	12	12	14	21	16	
Cameroon	SADC	2	7	9	5	5	6	3	5	11	11	14	2	14	
Cameroon	UEMOA	1	2	19	17	11	9	6	15	27	31	67	19	2	2
Cameroon	UMA	26	7	12	13	12	12	15	25	35	23	2	21	15	4
Cape Verde	CEN-SAD				7	1			1	3	5	3	4	2	
Cape Verde	COMESA								2	3	3	3	4	4	
Cape Verde	ECOWAS					1	1		2	5	6	3	4	3	
Cape Verde	IOC		1	1											
Cape Verde	SACU								1		1	4	3	4	
Cape Verde	SADC								3	3	4	7	7	8	
Cape Verde	UEMOA					1	1		2	5	6	3	4	3	
Cape Verde	UMA	1	1		7	1						1	1		
CAR	CEMAC	1	3	4	3				12	16	22	24	22	23	21
CAR	CEN-SAD	2	1	1		1			2	4	2	4	3	4	4
CAR	CEPGL	2	4	6	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
CAR	COMESA	3	4	6	2	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	3
CAR	ECCAS	3	7	1	5	2	2	2	13	17	23	25	23	24	23
CAR	ECOWAS								1	4	29	1	1	1	1
CAR	IGAD	1													
CAR	IOC					1	1								
CAR	SACU			1						1			1	1	1
CAR	SADC	2	4	7	2	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	3
CAR	UEMOA								1	3	28				
CAR	UMA					1						1			
Chad	CEMAC	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	6	8	12	13	34	32	32

															Annex III
		Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)													
PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	Imp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Chad	CEN-SAD	3	4	4	13	6	5	8	11	13	15	17	22	16	2
Chad	ECCAS	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	6	8	12	13	34	32	32
Chad	ECOWAS	2	3	3	3	3	3	4	12	14	16	17	22	17	2
Chad	SACU	19	3	4							1				
Chad	SADC	19	3	4							1				
Chad	UEMOA								2	3	4	3	7	3	2
Chad	UMA				9	1		2		3					
Comoros	CEN-SAD														
Comoros	COMESA								9	1	7	5	6	6	
Comoros	EAC								4	2	3	4	4	4	
Comoros	IGAD								4	2	3	4	4	4	
Comoros	IOC								6	1	6	1	2	2	
Comoros	SACU								12	21	23	6	4	8	
Comoros	SADC								15	24	25	6	5	9	
Comoros	UMA														
Congo	CEMAC			2	2	3	3	4			3	21	27	25	27
Congo	CEN-SAD	5	7	4	6		3	3	11	1	11	2	14	15	21
Congo	CEPGL	4	7	7	8	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Congo	COMESA	9	14	14	17	16	16	2	4	5	5	22	19	17	21
Congo	EAC											2	1	1	2
Congo	ECCAS	4	7	9	1	11	11	14	1	1	31	22	28	26	29
Congo	ECOWAS			1	3	4	6	3	13	22	25	14	16	17	9
Congo	IGAD											2	1	1	2
Congo	IOC	3	4	4											
Congo	MRU				3	4	3								
Congo	SACU	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9		17	36	21	13	16
Congo	SADC	1	14	15	18	17	17	21	13	6	22	56	39	29	34
Congo	UEMOA			1			3	3	12	13	16	3	4	5	5
Congo	UMA	5	7	4	6		1	1	4	5	1	13	6	6	8
Cote D'Ivoire	CEMAC	32	33	54	142	18	73	91	12	24	17	8	14		
Cote D'Ivoire	CEN-SAD	443	461	57	491	57	583	672	349	453	596	468	372	381	461
Cote D'Ivoire	CEPGL	21	29	24						1					
Cote D'Ivoire	COMESA	33	37	33			1	1	34	18	5			3	3
Cote D'Ivoire	EAC		1						1	1	3				
Cote D'Ivoire	ECCAS	53	62	78	142	18	73	91	12	25	17	8	14		
Cote D'Ivoire	ECOWAS	595	68	89	839	98	136	797	324	414	576	463	364	371	437
Cote D'Ivoire	IGAD		1						1	1	3				
Cote D'Ivoire	IOC	1	2						2						
Cote D'Ivoire	MRU	84	1	116	11	71	74		3	8	7	8	11	11	
Cote D'Ivoire	SACU	32	4	43	26	23	21		16	25	17	2	28	42	
Cote D'Ivoire	SADC	63	74	76	26	23	21		32	27	17	2	28	42	
Cote D'Ivoire	UEMOA	314	397	485	534	58	626	72	15	25	31	25	32	42	45
Cote D'Ivoire	UMA	47	52	53	66	81	81	86	21	44	39	31	37	4	24
Djibouti	CEN-SAD	37	45	53	58	66	7		1	1	1	2	4	4	

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)														
PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	mp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Djibouti	CEPGL														
Djibouti	COMESA	41	26	27	5	5	5		39	45	43	54	55	58	
Djibouti	EAC								7	3	3	4	3	3	
Djibouti	ECCAS														
Djibouti	ECOWAS											1			
Djibouti	IGAD	76	71	8	63	71	75		38	44	42	53	51	54	
Djibouti	SACU									1		1		3	
Djibouti	SADC									2	1	1		3	
Djibouti	UEMOA											1			
DRC	CEMAC	2	2	2	2	2	2		13	22	25	21	22	22	4
DRC	CEN-SAD	2	8	15	3	2	1		88	95	117	99	11	15	123
DRC	CEPGL	6	5	5	4	5	6		4	1	1	1	1	1	
DRC	COMESA	7	13	2	7	5	6		86	87	91	85	77	8	9
DRC	EAC	1	2	2	3			1	25	47	39	52	37	4	45
DRC	ECCAS	8	7	7	6	7	8		17	23	26	22	23	23	4
DRC	ECOWAS								67	83	83	64	66	68	82
DRC	IGAD	1	2	1	3				24	45	37	42	32	34	39
DRC	SACU	1	11	115	99	5	5	6	18	214	241	22	214	145	167
DRC	SADC	1	16	127	99	5	5	7	167	257	296	271	263	196	224
DRC	UEMOA								23	32	26			2	
DRC	UMA	7	2		2	1			6	9	8	3			
Egypt	CEMAC		4			2	5		2	2	8	7	2		
Egypt	CEN-SAD	141	146	129	156	119	127	154	72	127	157	151	14	157	191
Egypt	CEPGL				1					1	3				
Egypt	COMESA	34	31	28	36	9	38	37	85	14	13	137	124	14	149
Egypt	EAC	4	4	3	5	3	11	12	57	88	74	77	66	82	94
Egypt	ECCAS		4		1	2	5		2	3	11	7	2		
Egypt	ECOWAS	14	1	5	5	15	11	11	1	2	5	4	9	1	6
Egypt	IGAD	33	3	27	32	9	36	37	63	113	19	116	11	131	149
Egypt	IOC						1								
Egypt	MRU					1								4	
Egypt	SACU	2	5	35	4	11	6		5	18	27	15	2	28	
Egypt	SADC	5	6	37	45	11	9	1	3	47	51	38	45	41	3
Egypt	UEMOA	11	7	3	3	9	5	3	1	1		1	6	2	1
Egypt	UMA	113	126	1	17	118	87	.115	74	123	16	1	115	95	123
Equator	CEMAC		28	38	31	1	8		12	27	36	28	27	14	
Equatorial Guine	CEN-SAD					2				1	2	6			
Equatorial Guine	COMESA					2									
Equatorial Guine	ECCAS		28	38	31	1	8		12	27	36	28	27	14	
Equatorial Guine	ECOWAS	7	5												
Equatorial Guine	SACU								2	2	2			3	
Equatorial Guine	SADC								2	2	2			3	
Equatorial Guine	UEMOA	7	5												
Equatorial Guine	UMA									1	2	6			

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

Annex III

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Ethiopia	CEN-SAD	36	48	39	54	51	59	68	54	37	41	8	21	17	13
Ethiopia	COMESA	33	43	4	71	55	65	72	78	71	74	29	36	27	31
Ethiopia	EAC			1	17	4	4	4	26	36	33	22	21	22	21
Ethiopia	IGAD	31	4	37	62	48	51	58	72	64	62	28	25	26	3
Ethiopia	IOC		1	1											
Ethiopia	SACU		1			1				1	3	3		8	
Ethiopia	SADC		1			1	2			3	3	3	4	12	
Ethiopia	UMA		4									1		6	1
Gabon	CEMAC	1	2	7	9	8	8	1	13	27	13	5	44	27	26
Gabon	CEN-SAD	76	63	21	25	32	22	26	14	13	35	51	53	21	27
Gabon	CEPGL	6	6	6	7	7	7	9							
Gabon	COMESA	8	9	7	8	8	8	9	2						
Gabon	ECCAS	7	8	14	17	16	16	1	13	27	13	5	44	27	26
Gabon	ECOWAS	9	23	31	9	19	7	2	17	18	29	15	133	1	125
Gabon	IOC								1						
Gabon	MRU	4	5	23	3	3	3								
Gabon	SACU	1	1	4	8	3	4		4	6	9	24	16	15	
Gabon	SADC	9	9	11	16	11	12	9	5	6	9	24	16	15	
Gabon	UEMOA	4	18	7	6	16	4	2	14	15	23	143	126	93	115
Gabon	UMA	78	6	22	28	2	24	29	6	8	21	3	3	2	2
Gambia	CEMAC								4					1	
Gambia	CEN-SAD	6	6		1	1	1	1	3	4	9	5	2	5	6
Gambia	COMESA								2	2	1	1			
Gambia	ECCAS								4					1	
Gambia	ECOWAS	8	6		1	3	1	1	39	23	3	15	34	13	6
Gambia	MRU	1				1					1				
Gambia	SACU											1	1	1	
Gambia	SADC								2	2	1	2	1	1	
Gambia	UEMOA	6	6		1	2	1	1	39	23	29	14	33	12	5
Gambia	UMA										1		1	1	1
Ghana	CEMAC		6	7	8	8	8			1					
Ghana	CEN-SAD	44	57	64	74	8	81	8	36	48	459	499	56	54	64
Ghana	COMESA	7	9	12	12	14	15	2	5	5	7	4	4	8	4
Ghana	EAC										2	1			
Ghana	ECCAS		6	7	8	8	8			1					
Ghana	ECOWAS	174	239	268	292	326	346	363	427	512	591	673	797	88	956
Ghana	IGAD										2				
Ghana	SACU	6	4	3	4	5	4	5	25	53	66	93	96	113	13
Ghana	SADC	13	12	13	15	18	17	5	29	57	7	98	99	118	13
Ghana	UEMOA	133	192	216	233	262	283	284	8	124	165	2	31	324	356
Ghana	UMA	1	1	1	4	3	2		13	8	16	11	3	4	
Guinea	CEMAC	25.00	28.00	18.00	24.00	31.00	31.00	31.00	6.00	5.00	14.00	7.00	9.00	7.00	4.00
Guinea	CEN-SAD	13.00	3.00	3.00	9.00	6.00	6.00	7.00	33.00	29.00	23.00	14.00	17.00	16.00	18.00
Guinea	COMESA										1.00		4.00	1.00	

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Guinea	ECCAS	25.00	28.00	18.00	24.00	31.00	31.00	31.00	6.00	5.00	14.00	7.00	9.00	7.00	4.00
Guinea	ECOWAS	3.00		3.00	11.00	20.00	21.00	25.00	82.00	97.00	121.00	49.00	66.00	65.00	75.00
Guinea	IGAD								1.00						
Guinea	IOC										1.00		4.00		
Guinea	MUR			3.00	6.00	7.00	7.00	8.00		1.00					
Guinea	SACCU								4.00		1.00	15.00	10.00	11.00	
Guinea	SADC								4.00		1.00	15.00	10.00	11.00	
Guinea	UEMOA	2.00				8.00	9.00	10.00	65.00	86.00	110.00	45.00	61.00	61.00	71.00
Guinea	UMA	12.00	3.00	4.00	6.00	3.00	3.00		8.00	13.00	3.00	3.00		1.00	2.00
Guinea Bissau	CEMAC	1.00	1.00	1.00											
Guinea Bissau	CEN-SAD					5.00			4.00	5.00	8.00	9.00	9.00	12.00	14.00
Guinea Bissau	COMESA					5.00									
Guinea Bissau	ECCAS	1.00	1.00	1.00											
Guinea Bissau	ECOWAS		1.00			2.00	2.00		7.00	6.00	11.00	11.00	11.00	13.00	15.00
Guinea Bissau	UEMOA		1.00			2.00	2.00		7.00	6.00	11.00	10.00	9.00	12.00	14.00
Kenya	CEMAC				3	3	2			1	1				
Kenya	CEN-SAD	155	143	17	16	22	25	232	12	9	29	22	11	17	2
Kenya	CEPGL	58	83	74	12	77	83	96	2	8	1	6			
Kenya	COMESA	416	516	554	543	558	562	624	51	38	13	43	29	31	3
Kenya	EAC	38	493	545	515	517	546	628	24	29	14	23	11	11	13
Kenya	ECCAS	58	83	74	15	8	85	96	2	9	2	6			
Kenya	ECOWAS	4	4	6	4	4	3	4	9	5	1	3	9	1	2
Kenya	IGAD	317	384	411	38	388	411	469	3	3		24	4	4	4
Kenya	IOC	16	14	32	24	14	13	8	2	4	2	5	1	1	12
Kenya	MRU	1							2	3			8	9	
Kenya	SACU	1	51	42	17	16	9		222	285	29	37	235	226	
Kenya	SADC	228	33	346	329	298	37	326	288	334	23	398	266	254	27
Kenya	UEMOA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	1					
Kenya	UMA	1	3	2	2					1	19				
Liberia	CEN-SAD		17			1	3	4	1	7	1	2	2	2	3
Liberia	COMESA	2	3			8	11	13	1						
Liberia	EAC	2	3			8	8	9	1						
Liberia	ECOWAS	2	5	1	2	3	4	3	6	22	17	21	35	37	43
Liberia	IGAD	2	3			8	8	9	1						
Liberia	MRU	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			4	7	8	8	9
Liberia	SACU				1					4	7	11	4	123	
Liberia	SADC				1					4	7	11	4	123	
Liberia	UEMOA	1	4		1	2	3	2	5	21	12	13	26	28	32
Liberia	UMA		17			1			17	24	23	12	1	1	12
Libya	CEN-SAD	616	73	881	815	44	324	393	342	459	423	484	399	422	494
Libya	COMESA	235	35	321	329	98	54	67	56	67	63	85	135	48	6
Libya	EAC			16											
Libya	ECOWAS	6	1	1	1	29	18						1	1	
Libya	IGAD	191	214	251	261	2	2	2	5	6	6	7			

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)															
PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Libya	SACU								3			4	3	5	
Libya	SADC								5	3		5	15	7	2
Libya	UEMOA	6	1	1	1	26	15						1	1	
Libya	UMA	192	213	342	227	324	252	327	291	391	356	396	276	376	436
Madagascar	CEMAC								1	1					
Madagascar	CEN-SAD	4	1			2			1	1	2	1	1	3	3
Madagascar	COMESA	9	21	14	12	16	1	11	4	4	7	8	9	7	8
Madagascar	EAC		2						3	2	3	2	4	1	1
Madagascar	ECCAS								1	1					
Madagascar	ECOWAS					4				1					
Madagascar	IGAD		2											1	
Madagascar	IOC	31	39	38	12	16	1	11	1	1	1	1	4	1	1
Madagascar	MRU					4			3	4	6	7	5	6	7
Madagascar	SACU		3	2	3	2	2			34	84	55	3	25	
Madagascar	SADC	7	19	15	14	18	11	1	5	39	91	63	35	31	7
Madagascar	UEMOA													1	
Madagascar	UMA	5	6	3	2	3	1		1		1	1	1	2	3
Malawi	CEN-SAD	14	6	2	18	24	1	11	4	6	55	22	25	26	3
Malawi	CEPGL	4	1	1	1	1	1	1							
Malawi	COMESA	22	16	48	34	37	18	2	96	49	132	119	12	115	13
Malawi	EAC	3	7	7	4	3	3	3	6	4	8	12	1	11	13
Malawi	ECCAS	4	1	1	1	1	1	1							
Malawi	ECOWAS	3	1	1	1	1					1				
Malawi	IGAD		2	1	1	1	1		3	2	6	6	6	7	8
Malawi	IOC		1	5	3					1	4	4	2	2	
Malawi	MRU	1													
Malawi	SACU	56	43	68	87	82	74	85	22	16	242	271	239	247	284
Malawi	SADC	71	64	12	114	13	89	14	37	224	372	41	351	364	417
Malawi	UEMOA										1				
Malawi	UMA			1	3	1	1								
Mali	CEMAC									1	1				
Mali	CEN-SAD	12	11	11	13	14	7	9	5	6	66	54	56	55	62
Mali	COMESA	1	2			8	9						2	1	1
Mali	ECCAS									1	1				
Mali	ECOWAS	6	6	8	6	9	7	8	166	22	261	269	288	31	342
Mali	IOC	1	2			8	8								
Mali	SACU	2	3	12	3	7	2	3	3	9	19	17	14	13	14
Mali	SADC	3	5	12	3	15	11	3	3	9	19	17	14	13	14
Mali	UEMOA	4	4	6	4	6	5	5	166	22	261	268	287	3	341
Mali	UMA	8	8	7	11	8	3	4	4	8	1	1	3	4	3
Mauritania	CEMAC	9	19	11	1	13	13	8							
Mauritania	CEN-SAD	1		2	4	1	2	2	17	24	29	3	24	2	2
Mauritania	COMESA	1			2										
Mauritania	EAC														

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	Exp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Mauritania	ECCAS	9	19	11	1	13	13	8							
Mauritania	ECOWAS	18	28	32	3	3	32	16	11	18	23	21	27	5	6
Mauritania	IGAD														
Mauritania	MRU	5	6	7	8	9	9								
Mauritania	SACU									2	2	2	2	1	2
Mauritania	SADC									2	2	2	2	1	2
Mauritania	UEMOA	12	21	24	21	2	22	14	11	18	23	21	27	5	6
Mauritania	UMA		2	4	2	1	1	2	27	32	12	71	64	62	75
Mauritius	CEMAC												5	5	
Mauritius	CEN-SAD								11	12	15	1	22	21	3
Mauritius	CEPGL			1	2	2	1								
Mauritius	COMESA	44	56	74	83	95	32	28	41	54	53	57	55	3	22
Mauritius	EAC	3	4	9	5	1	1	11	2	21	14	13	8	8	1
Mauritius	ECCAS			1	2	2	1						5	5	
Mauritius	ECOWAS						1	1	8	6	13	9	24	23	6
Mauritius	IGAD	3	4	4	4	7	7	7	2	21	14	12	8	8	1
Mauritius	IOC	63	73	89	62	77	16	19	13	21	28	31	34	1	11
Mauritius	SACU	5	7	13	7	8	167	192	229	22	277	278	235	482	547
Mauritius	SADC	13	17	34	27	25	187	21	237	229	286	288	247	487	547
Mauritius	UEMOA						1	1	8	6	13	9	24	23	6
Mauritius	UMA								2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Morocco	CEMAC	1	13	17	29		3	6	128	71	32	39	2	3	45
Morocco	CEN-SAD	161	239	222	28	143	161	199	138	193	376	36	93	179	29
Morocco	CEPGL	5	8	7	3				1	1		1			
Morocco	COMESA	1	17	19	23		7	7	15	4	19	25		17	17
Morocco	EAC		1		1					1		1			
Morocco	ECCAS	15	21	24	32		3	6	129	72	32	4	2	3	45
Morocco	ECOWAS	39	6	77	7	31	5	57	83	148	286	288	68	11	123
Morocco	IGAD		1	1											
Morocco	IOC	4	3	4	2		1		1		2	1			
Morocco	MRU	7	12	7	1				12	24	1	17			
Morocco	SACU	1	1	3	4		2		47	28	32	87		2	
Morocco	SADC	8	13	16	15		2		48	34	36	98		22	
Morocco	UEMOA	17	36	5	49	31	5	57	61	62	58	62		34	39
Morocco	UMA	244	277	228	183	154	153	191	231	198	243	187	12	144	168
Mozambique	CEPGL	1													
Mozambique	COMESA	21	11	11	32	67	51	53	58	33	43	37	4	56	27
Mozambique	EAC			4	2		1	1	2	1	2		3	2	2
Mozambique	ECCAS	1													
Mozambique	IGAD				2		1	1	2	1	2		3	1	1
Mozambique	IOC				1				1				1	1	
Mozambique	SACU	26	41	44	36	52	76		458	213	27	664	332	333	
Mozambique	SADC	46	52	59	66	17	121	52	492	245	311	684	352	354	27
Niger	CEMAC									2	1	1	1		

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

Annex III

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	Imp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	Imp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Niger	CEN-SAD	5	21	49	37	45	47	58	8	38	35	38	44	34	41
Niger	ECCAS									2	1	1	1		
Niger	ECOWAS	6	36	74	54	64	56	68	44	75	71	77	95	96	112
Niger	SACU		1	2	1				1	2		2	1		
Niger	SADC		1	2	1				1	2		2	1		
Niger	UEMOA	1	1	18	12	16	6	7	41	36	37	43	58	65	74
Niger	UMA								1	3	5	4	6	7	9
Nigeria	CEMAC	15	18	142	111	139	178	2	13	11	23	11	17	8	5
Nigeria	CEN-SAD	7	196	329	326	28	217	234	31	58	79	56	69	66	72
Nigeria	CEPGL	1	2	2	2	2	1								
Nigeria	COMESA	4	4	6	6	5	3	3	13	16	17	19	25	26	7
Nigeria	EAC	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	3	3	3	3
Nigeria	ECCAS	16	11	144	113	141	179	2	13	11	23	11	17	8	5
Nigeria	ECOWAS	669	837	117	968	881	888	179	235	23	221	175	244	218	267
Nigeria	IGAD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	3	3	3	3
Nigeria	IOC	1													
Nigeria	MRU	25	17	19	14	14	14	17	1			5	6	6	7
Nigeria	SACU	6	7	9	182	82	89		28	65	55	6	71	94	
Nigeria	SADC	8	1	12	185	84	9		21	58	47	52	62	85	
Nigeria	UEMOA	329	468	61	523	423	435	517	181	151	156	15	167	143	174
Nigeria	UMA	9	56	197	189	63	61	77	12	1	22	8	7	6	4
Reunion	CEMAC								9	12	2				
Reunion	CEN-SAD								5	5	2				
Reunion	COMESA	1	14	4					68	8	92				
Reunion	EAC														
Reunion	ECCAS								9	12	2				
Reunion	ECOWAS								2	4	1				
Reunion	IGAD								9	11	13				
Reunion	IOC	1	14	4					52	56	66				
Reunion	SACU								58	7	66				
Reunion	SADC	3	5	1					86	99	14				
Reunion	UEMOA								2	3					
Reunion	UMA								4	3	2				
Rwanda	CEN-SAD										1	2	2	2	2
Rwanda	CEPGL	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	5	5	8	4	6	6	7
Rwanda	COMESA	1	1	1	5	2	2	3	37	44	51	76	6	63	69
Rwanda	EAC				4				63	79	87	74	55	58	66
Rwanda	ECCAS	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	5	5	8	4	6	6	7
Rwanda	IGAD				3				3	39	4	67	5	54	6
Rwanda	IOC										1	2	1	1	
Rwanda	SACU				1		1		3	3	3	6	13	1	
Rwanda	SADC	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	42	46	57	22	27	23	14
Rwanda	UMA														
SACCA	CEMAC	17	31	35	83				22	11	17	15			

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)															
PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	Imp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
SACCA	CEN-SAD	49	487	575	612				66	161	135	285			
SACCA	CEPGL	18	22	224	214				11	111	126	11			
SACCA	COMESA	1828	276	386	3188				53	599	659	648			
SACCA	EAC	245	456	376	596				12	36	34	23			
SACCA	ECCAS	126	235	26	299				132	122	143	125			
SACCA	ECOWAS	7	154	175	219				59	8	82	256			
SACCA	IGAD	213	291	282	46				9	33	3	2			
SACCA	IOC	248	339	366	389				6	4	6	11			
SACCA	MRU	4	9	16	27							1			
SACCA	SADC	24	3165	3372	3443				519	497	594	621			
SACCA	UEMOA	24	44	56	54				47	69	7	6			
SACCA	UMA	15	37	21	6				3	14	8	28			
SACCA excluding	CEMAC					9	12								
SACCA excluding	CEN-SAD					13	23	31					4	6	1
SACCA excluding	CEPGL							2							
SACCA excluding	COMESA					18	97	157					9	56	83
SACCA excluding	EAC					34	56	32							
SACCA excluding	ECCAS					9	12	2							
SACCA excluding	ECOWAS						1	2							
SACCA excluding	IGAD					14	26	32							
SACCA excluding	IOC					8	11	16					1	1	1
SACCA excluding	MRU														
SACCA excluding	SADC					119	12	126					91	55	81
SACCA excluding	UEMOA														
SACCA excluding	UMA						3								
Sao Tome & Prin	CEMAC										1	1	1	1	
Sao Tome & Prin	COMESA				1	1									
Sao Tome & Prin	ECCAS										1	1	1	1	
Sao Tome & Prin	SACU	1							2	2	1	3	1	2	
Sao Tome & Prin	SADC	1			1	1			2	2	1	3	1	2	
Senegal	CEMAC	11	15	78	72	8	49	4	4	55	22	1	21	13	14
Senegal	CEN-SAD	61	72	82	64	86	81	89	47	85	84	97	11	14	172
Senegal	CEPGL						2	2							
Senegal	COMESA	2				3	2	2		1	2	1	4	5	5
Senegal	EAC	2											1		
Senegal	ECCAS	11	15	78	72	8	51	42	4	55	22	1	21	13	14
Senegal	ECOWAS	86	124	18	155	175	15	11	73	11	17	12	134	166	199
Senegal	IGAD	2											1		
Senegal	MRU	9	9	13	9	14	11								
Senegal	SACU		2	1			1		3	3	3	2	11	16	
Senegal	SADC		2	1		3	3	2	3	3	3	2	12	17	
Senegal	UEMOA	61	84	141	128	136	113	86	34	32	37	31	4	5	58
Senegal	UMA	16	15	33	3	5	29	33	9	6	11	3	17	25	29
Seychelles	COMESA			1					9	1	9	14	12	15	

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Seychelles	EAC			1					5	4	4	6	5	3	
Seychelles	IGAD			1					5	4	4	6	4	3	
Seychelles	IOC			2					4	5	4	7	8	12	
Seychelles	SACU	1	1	1	1	1	1		27	38	41	46	5	46	
Seychelles	SADC	1	1	1	1	1	1		31	43	46	53	58	56	
Sierra leone	CEMAC								1	1					
Sierra leone	CEN-SAD								1	11	14	11	11	11	15
Sierra leone	COMESA								1						
Sierra leone	ECCAS								1	1					
Sierra leone	ECOWAS								39	34	41	39	17	18	23
Sierra leone	MRU								1	1	2	2	2	2	3
Sierra leone	SACU								1	4	8	8	7	7	
Sierra leone	SADC								2	4	8	8	7	7	
Sierra leone	UEMOA								31	25	3	27	5	6	7
Sierra leone	UMA								1	1	2	1			
Somalia	CEN-SAD	1					1	1	4	49	59	65	74	78	87
Somalia	COMESA	1		1			1	1	82	84	12	99	16	112	127
Somalia	EAC	1	1	1					44	38	47	35	33	35	4
Somalia	ECOWAS	1													
Somalia	IGAD								82	84	12	99	16	112	127
Somalia	MRU	1													
Somalia	SACU								1	3			1		
Somalia	SADC	1	1	2					3	6	3		1		
South Africa	CEMAC					48	41	18					8	7	5
South Africa	CEN-SAD					56	557	543					28	284	168
South Africa	CEPGL					211	145	152					5	8	6
South Africa	COMESA					2553	255	273					421	593	591
South Africa	EAC					469	435	244					19	15	9
South Africa	ECCAS					26	188	17					13	15	11
South Africa	ECOWAS					24	392	262					141	131	158
South Africa	IGAD					31	294	244					19	81	9
South Africa	IOC					285	56	489					14	169	19
South Africa	MRU					18	129								
South Africa	SADC					283	2766	2949					374	544	618
South Africa	UEMOA					77	84	54					54	38	42
South Africa	UMA					69	8						2	6	
Sudan	CEMAC								1	1					
Sudan	CEN-SAD	1	13	31	33	18	39	45	23	246	263	295	2	3	3
Sudan	COMESA	3	3	19	26	17	37	43	67	52	51	68	52	79	86
Sudan	EAC				5	2	2	2	35	3	32	37	48	51	58
Sudan	ECCAS								1	1					
Sudan	IGAD	1	1		6	5	5	5	34	25	26	35	48	51	58
Sudan	SACU	1		1			69		16	2	19	6	12	1	
Sudan	SADC	1		1			69		22	8	27	13	16	14	

Annex III

Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	mp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
Sudan	UMA	8	11	12	11	4	5	5	197	218	24	272	7	11	8
Tanzania	CEMAC														1
Tanzania	CEN-SAD	14	25	31	7	5	7	7	12	27	15	6	18	19	22
Tanzania	CEPGL	38	45	51	16	9	14	16	3	6	5	1		1	1
Tanzania	COMESA	76	1	12	81	68	65	68	237	293	37	118	154	155	176
Tanzania	EAC	26	32	23	32	35	37	43	19	24	265	94	17	113	131
Tanzania	ECCAS	38	45	51	16	9	14	16	3	6	5	1		1	2
Tanzania	ECOWAS				1										
Tanzania	IGAD	32	41	33	38	36	38	43	191	241	266	94	18	114	131
Tanzania	IOC	2	1	2	1	1					5	1	1	1	1
Tanzania	SACU	5	5	6	8	7	5	5	62	196	149	114	14	167	192
Tanzania	SADC	12	21	27	43	34	21	18	11	238	184	132	179	195	222
Tanzania	UMA		1												
Togo	CEMAC	1	1	4	2	2	2	1	5	5	4	3	4	4	5
Togo	CEN-SAD	35	34	37	44	48	49	53	26	36	38	33	32	32	4
Togo	COMESA						2	1	4	5	4	4	4	4	
Togo	EAC								1						
Togo	ECCAS	1	1	4	2	2	2	1	5	5	4	3	4	4	5
Togo	ECOWAS	4	42	53	6	67	16	119	191	247	32	331	359	376	434
Togo	IGAD								1						
Togo	IOC						1	1							
Togo	MRU			3								1	1	1	
Togo	SACU	17	17	17	23	18	14		4	6	7	6	7	6	
Togo	SADC	17	17	17	23	18	15	1	6	8	1	9	1	9	
Togo	UEMOA	11	8	13	18	2	59	62	35	57	96	84	81	83	96
Togo	UMA	3	3	2	3	1	1	1	6	8	9	1	9	9	1
Tunisia	CEMAC	8	9	6	17	7	4	3	8	47	12	29	11	7	4
Tunisia	CEN-SAD	29	249	269	39	288	347	358	215	287	345	335	38	366	44
Tunisia	CEPGL			1								1	1		
Tunisia	COMESA	18	25	28	29	24	39	3	35	53	41	57	51	65	52
Tunisia	EAC								1	2	1	3	2	1	
Tunisia	ECCAS	8	9	7	17	7	4	3	8	47	12	3	12	7	4
Tunisia	ECOWAS	12	23	2	33	28	38	8	37	54	32	56	42	28	19
Tunisia	IGAD	2			2		1		5	18	7	7	7	7	
Tunisia	IOC	1	1	1				1	4	3	2	7	2	4	
Tunisia	MRU	1	6				1		1	21	2	3	2	1	
Tunisia	SACU	1	5	9	7	7	6			1	1	4	4	6	
Tunisia	SADC	1	5	9	9	7	6			3	4	12	9	1	
Tunisia	SCCU													4	
Tunisia	UEMOA	8	15	14	26	23	3	8	36	33	3	39	36	24	19
Tunisia	UMA	294	46	331	36	276	34	387	25	344	423	335	293	354	471
Uganda	CEN-SAD	2	6	4	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
Uganda	CEPGL	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1					
Uganda	COMESA	5	1	6	9	3	3	3	239	315	342	312	323	341	386

Annex III

PAYS	REC	Exp1994	Exp1995	Exp1996	xp1997	Exp1998	Exp1999	xp2000	Imp1994	Imp1995	Imp1996	Imp1997	mp1998	Imp1999	Imp2000
		Value of Exports And Imports (US$ Million)													
Uganda	EAC	3	5	2	12	3	3	4	237	314	348	314	324	343	394
Uganda	ECCAS	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1					
Uganda	ECOWAS														
Uganda	IGAD	2	3		7	1	1	1	229	35	337	38	317	335	385
Uganda	IOC								1	2			1	1	
Uganda	SACU		1			2	3		7	27	26	38	58	63	
Uganda	SADC	1	3	3	5	4	5	3	23	44	41	49	7	76	9
Uganda	UEMOA														
Uganda	UMA			8	4	4	3	4							
Zambia	CEMAC				7	8	7								
Zambia	CEN-SAD			2	7						6	6			
Zambia	CEPGL	36	31	45	3	43	4	37		5	12		1		
Zambia	COMESA	65	74	177	92	87	86	6	64	74	118	78	148	92	92
Zambia	EAC	11	25	15	6	17	18	21	5	12	2	5	8	8	1
Zambia	ECCAS	36	31	45	37	51	47	37		5	12		1		
Zambia	IGAD	3	4	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	6	3	4	4	5
Zambia	IOC				1				1	1	1	1			
Zambia	SACU	21	23	53	49	44	44	45	164	269	38	319	43	422	47
Zambia	SADC	86	17	212	131	127	132	122	223	342	413	382	569	55	562
Zimbabwe	CEMAC		1	2	8	5	4	2			1	1			
Zimbabwe	CEN-SAD	68	111	99	133	132	88	12	9	16	17	26	18	19	21
Zimbabwe	CEPGL	23	11	8	12	12	8	9							
Zimbabwe	COMESA	228	192	215	27	243	191	193	36	35	75	85	62	54	35
Zimbabwe	EAC	44	17	17	35	21	13	11	5	5	4	28	17	7	8
Zimbabwe	ECCAS	23	12	1	2	17	12	11			1	2	1		
Zimbabwe	ECOWAS	3	6	5	6	5	8	6	1	1	1	1		1	
Zimbabwe	IGAD	19	7	13	26	12	11	1	4	3	3	14	7	6	6
Zimbabwe	IOC	6	11	12	4	7	6		6	12	14	14	7	6	
Zimbabwe	SACU	358	35	421	48	327	32	331	712	117	194	1312	935	837	94
Zimbabwe	SADC	599	587	652	688	552	52	588	727	154	1147	139	995	873	984
Zimbabwe	UEMOA		1											1	
Zimbabwe	UMA	1	6	2	2		3	4							

Source : IMF Direction of trade statistics

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