

DAKAR

BUREAUCRACY, POLICY MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN AFRICA:
REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION IN A CONTINENT OF HOPE AND DESPAIR

By .

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1. INTRODUCTION

No discussion of Bureaucracy, Policy Making, Development Planning, Public Administration or Development Administration can be complete or even meaningful without an assessment of the forces and processes that must provide these areas of action and research with their agenda, and determine the relevance of the agenda.

The established agenda of the African bureaucrat, policy maker, development planner and development administrator as well as those who purport to give them intellectual guidance or support - is no doubt a function of particular readings of these forces and processes, as they are conventionally fed into the definition of African poverty and, therefore, the definition of the requirements of African development. The major thesis of this paper is that the agenda established in these research and action areas around the time of independence and still active today, as well as the premises that provided their intellectual and ideological foundations, were very much a product of their time; that that time harboured a number of misconceptions about the nature and causes of our underdevelopment, as well as illusions about the recipe for African development; and that African bureaucrats, policy makers, development planners and development administrators need to join in the general review of the misconceptions and illusions about causes and treatment of African underdevelopment now going on in several circles as part of the process of shedding those misconceptions and illusions and preparing action and research agenda more firmly anchored to the scale and structure of our underdevelopment and more liable to contribute to the universally accepted but often ill-defined goal of development.

2. PERCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE ERA OF ILLUSIONS.

Within the widely accepted post-independence definition of development as the process of reproducing the consumption patterns of North America and developing the means of extending and underwriting those patterns, and the equally widely accepted notion that the "development problem", as far as Africa was concerned, was the problem of a continent "deprived of experience of the routine management of state political and economic affairs", the post-independence illusion of knowing what should be done in order to develop - the importation of foreign private and public capital and the training of nationals to manage these resources - seemed at once logical and comforting. That the massive investments in education and training; the mock and sometimes passionate battles between the exponents of Public Administration and Development Administration and the quick surrender of the former; and the dominant or at any rate prescribed tendencies in African economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and ideological activity all reflected this "development focus" is verified by both the nature of the detailed explanations offered for African poverty and the manner in which African responses to the challenge of poverty were organised to meet the diagnoses contained in those explanations.

In that miscellany of explanations a quick review of the pronouncements of African bureaucrats, policy makers, development planners, development administrators and their intellectual and ideological companions and fellow travellers reveals the following as the most famous or most ubiquitous bêtes noires:

- a) Inadequacy or lack of communication between planners and administrators, resulting in the absence or inadequacy of cooperation and coordination between planning agencies and administering or executing agencies at plan FORMULATION level;
- b) the fact that WITHIN planning agencies there is often inadequate integration in the thinking and action of units with different sectoral responsibilities. In this connection fragmentation is also alleged, and often validly alleged, at the level of the organisation and activities of sectoral units on the one hand and sector-support units like manpower forecasting, counselling and planning units on the other, with the result, so it is alleged, that organisational barriers are put in the way of sectoral linkages;
- c) the absence or inadequacy of coordination among executing agencies, a disease said to be symptomatised by conflicting actions by different agencies at instrument level, at the intra-departmental level and at the interdepartmental level. The favourite example is that of the category of cases where plans that ostensibly promote Agriculture also allow, command or expect a Ministry of Finance to deny or restrict the provision of the funds needed to obtain fertilisers, say, or agricultural machinery. Also cited and deplored in this connection are situations that are said to allow or oblige different Government departments or even different units within the same department to make conflicting demands on a given section of a population or, perhaps, simply make

demands that cannot simultaneously be met; as also are situations where a powerful Ministry of Health, for instance, secures relative pay and other advantages for its doctors and thereby makes it difficult for a Ministry of Agriculture, say, to attract men and women into veterinary medicine or forces it to attract and retain veterinary doctors at a financial cost that swells up recurrent expenditure and put new projects of a "developmental" kind financially out of reach;

- d) Scarcity of trained manpower to formulate realistic and operationally valid plans and for scarcity of adequate manpower at executing level to implement and administer plans formulated by local personnel or hired expatriates. In this connection the "vicious circle of poverty", bad planning and/or execution by Ministries of Education; the "brain-drain"; and the alleged failure or inability of Governments to make their countries safe and attractive to their supposed geniuses have all been cited as part of the problem;
- e) Inconsistency of planning objectives at conceptual, target and/or instrument level;
- f) Communication and interest barriers between politicians and other political executives and the civil servants who do or are supposed to do the technical planning and execution of plans for development, growth or stabilisation;
- g) A seventh bête noire comes in the form of the traditional issue of political and personal corruption that is pointed to as resulting in departures from planned activities or cost overruns which leave little or no resources available for other planned activities and projects.

Other factors in the rather long list of "development problems", as the traditional "development community" sees it include:

- h) Lack of serious political commitment to plans, resulting from a supposed tendency among politicians to use "plans" merely as political totems or from the erosion of any such commitment that may have existed by the sort of survival and day to day pressures that tend to undercut seriously planned activities for economic growth, development or stability;
- i) The poverty of statistical and other data base for planning, which is said to show in the routine falsification of planning assumptions and expectations by facts previously in existence but undiscovered and by new, unpredicted, facts regarded as statistically or otherwise predictable;
- j) Ineffective control of plan implementation resulting from the same poverty of data base, from a cybernetic breakdown of control mechanisms (or the absence of such mechanisms), or from the perverseness of politicians and other political factions;
- k) The category of "other factions" cited under (j) is regarded both in the literature and by aggrieved politicians as including the bureaucracy, and those who seek the sorts of explanation for African failure to develop under review cite the bureaucracy as either lacking in the flexibility needed for development planning and development administration by virtue of its allegedly bureaucratic nature or lacking in the African situation in the rigidity and consistency favoured by Weberian and neoWeberian idealists and incapable, for that reason, of providing the respectable and professional services allegedly required and found in "development-oriented" bureaucracies;

- 1) Paradoxically (in view of the fact that inadequacy of supervision and control arising from cybernetic and data inadequacies is often cited as a development problem for Africa) those who seek technical and pseudo technical explanations and remedies for African underdevelopment also cite as an African development problem the issue of overcentralisation and excesses in the control of plans and projects. Among those who see the problem this way are those of the partisans of project planning in the "project planning versus macro planning" pseudo debate who see the alleged qualitative data and statistical problems of "macro planning" as the major problem in development or development planning in Africa and as an overwhelming problem that justifies the virtual abandonment of "macro-planning" or, more accurately, attempts in that direction. Also in this group are the political ideological salesmen of the "planning from below" concept; the "decentralisation for development" lobby; and technocrats and academics of a certain cast of mind whose overwhelming concerns are "chains of command" and the complexities of reporting, accountability and responsibility mechanisms perceived as bureaucratic phenomena and processes;
- m) Another crop of issues of a bureaucratic-technocratic nature figuring in the traditional list of Africa's "development problems" concerns the use, nonuse or abuse of available planning and implementation techniques like costing and other accounting devices; Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems (PPBS); Rationalisation du Choix Budgetaire (RCB); Network Analysis or Critical Path Method (CPM) etc;

- n) Since the agenda of the traditional development circles takes for granted the perpetuation of dependency and therefore the overriding importance of "external" factors like the dispositions of foreign investors, balance of payments accounts, official "aid" etc, the notoriously "whimsical" character of these factors - as evidenced by the failure of foreign investors to rush into particular countries to take advantage of institutionally cheap labour, expensively laid out infrastructure, investment codes that virtually offer our countries and their resources on a silver platter etc. - and the normally predictable deterioration of our positions when these factors are not being erratic have held the attention of traditional development thinkers and activists, although usually as narrowly defined "economic" problems on what would otherwise be a smooth, if long and tiresome path to "development".

Of a different order of "externality" but falling, no less in the category of "development problems" for Africa that spare us inconvenience of looking at the structural characteristics of African poverty and thus the African development problem are:

- o) Acts of God - often invoked to assign responsibility for lack of development or obstacles in the path of development to too little or too much rain, poor resource endowment, etc;
- p) The People (with a capital P) - for their failure to respond according to some standard of rationality to the prescriptions, exhortations, incentives and disincentives device or administered by politicians, planners, administrators, extension officers etc;

- q) "The People", or a variant of the "People Problem", whose contribution to underdevelopment or the obstacles to development consists in their alleged indolence or conservatism. The citation for "the People" here - and more particularly the peasants - alleges that by their indolence or conservatism they are prevented from working hard enough or diversifying their products or taking the necessary risks to achieve the improvement in their material well-being predicted for them by their economic and administrative gurus or to help achieve the production and consumption targets required or planned or hoped for by their bureaucrats, policy makers, planners and administrators and equated by them to development or to some allegedly critical step to development;
- r) The People - meaning the same section of the masses identified for the purposes of problem (q) or a different section of the masses - have received dishonourable mention in traditional "development" circles for yet another crime against "development". Here the concern is not exactly about a mass of conservative and indolent creatures content to live in a state of notable savagery and consequently unresponsive to stimuli created to revolutionise their lives for their own good and the good of their national economies. The picture, instead, is one of an impatient mass of people pushing a so-called "revolution of rising expectations" and threatening planning or development planning by "queue jumping" and a general stampede for the benefits

of development before carefully devised plans, and planned development rations, have had a chance to usher in prosperity and happiness for all. In this "spoiling role" the People are particularly offensive to those members of the traditional "development community" who believe that the secret of development is the careful husbandry of a local and comprador bourgeoisie but will play in the contemporary underdeveloped countries the developmental role played by the bourgeoisies of Europe and North America. These, and their fellow travellers, are generally the most impatient with demand from below that are credited with preventing and stifling the assiduous cultivation in the underdeveloped countries of such a bourgeoisie. Equally impatient with "the spoiler role" of the People are the Growth Pole and Trikle down theorists and ideologues of development;

- S) By their alleged responsiveness to irresponsible, subversive, perverse, selfish, frustrated or sectionally-minded leaders, demagogues and subversive elements the People are also sometimes held to account for underdevelopment or obstacles of development for allegedly encouraging and transmitting the political dissensions that are held in the traditional "development community" to be serious enemies of development. Often this is a reference to the fact that competing elite groups sometimes use mass mobilisation techniques which threaten the political and social stability of the dominant but perpetually threatened power groups, thus undermining the continuity that is held by many as a precondition for successful planning, and by a somewhat illegitimate extension, for successful development planning and development itself. Often, however, this particular item is used to mask or ignore the fact that the stability that is thereby implicitly or explicitly defended requires the victims of the status quo

in a given situation to accept continuing peripherisation within a socio-political order that gives them a structural disadvantage and limits their access to the good things of life, or controls such access in a manner that merely serves to confirm their marginality;

- t) Also within "the People as a constraint on development" category of accounts, in the traditional "development community", of underdevelopment in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World is, of course, the recently invented "People Problem", also known as the Population Problem or the Demographic Factor and under several other aliases which refer, more or less politely, to the Peoples' breeding habits;
- u) Rural-urban migration - openly encouraged as the way to solve the problems of disguised unemployment in Africa's rural areas, parasitism and reluctance to enter the modern sector of Africa's economic life at the time when the traditional "development community" was preoccupied with the problems of recruiting labour into the extractive, service and import-substitution industries once developing or sought all over Africa - is now, of course, a number one item on most of the lists of Africa's "development problems" now coming out of the same traditional "development community";

Apart, of course, from the fact that this last item constitutes a variant of the larger "People Problem" (to be distinguished from the narrower "People Problem" which is a direct reference to the preoccupations of the neoMalthusians in the "development community") it is also, clearly, in the category of "the real problems," as well as pseudo problems that figure in the traditional lists of "development problems", that fail however, to distinguish between the causes and symptoms or effects of underdevelopment. Also in this category are:

- v) A so-called paucity of entrepreneurial talent or entrepreneurial capacity, resulting from lack of education or miseducation, a so-called "cultural lag" and/or the paucity of a so-called "achievement motivation" caused by our weather or our Africanness of the way Africa's mothers and fathers bring up their children;
- w) The paucity of a demand base for the products of the import substitution industries that dominate Africa's efforts in the field of industrialisation.

From the fact that Africa's "terms of trade" with the outside world are definitely to Africa's disadvantage, some among the traditional "development community" have identified as Africa's "development problem" not the structure of Africa's dependency relationship with Europe and North America, with which Africa carries out virtually all of its "trade" either directly or indirectly but a strange entity called:

- x) "the late development effect", which is supposed to determine that Africa cannot be competitive in anything except its raw materials and labour, which commodities can only be sold, following supply and demand, on the basis of values and therefore prices placed on them by the structure of demand. This "late development effect" is also said to further determine that Africa will look to Europe and North America for her consumption patterns and, again following supply and demand, pay whatever it takes - in monetary and nonmonetary terms - for quality, sophistication and an advanced notion of the good life which are, of necessity, European and North American exports;

And from the "vicious circle" school of traditional "development" thinkers there is, of course, the view that poverty is a cumulative process and that the fundamental problem of African poverty is:

y) African poverty.

Finally, and again from among the ranks of the traditional "development community" comes the discovery that a major, if not the major problem of African underdevelopment is:

z) the coup d'état, a factor which particularly engages the attention of those with a vested interest in an existing regime continuing in existence or being dismissed from power only under constitutional and political rules that do not strain or threaten the status quo they favour and inevitably feature as a guarantee of economic arrangements, understandings or projects favourable to notion of development.

3. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
IN THE ERA OF ILLUSIONS.

i) The Context

Few people will deny, and many people in the field of what has been called Development Administration actually boast that Development Administration is like a phoenix that rose from the "ashes" of Public Administration and/or Colonial Administration. In that sense Development Administration has had, with respect to the administration of development, so called, the same claims and pretensions that the traditional "development community" has assigned to Development Economics with respect to the so-called "economics of development" from "underdevelopment": and Development Economics is nothing if not a phoenix, risen from the "ashes" of Colonial Economics. In that same sense Development Administration, like Development Economics with which it is, of necessity, in partnership in fact as well as in logic, involves a critique, of its predecessor and a promise of more effective, more rational, more developmentally relevant and developmentally effective tools and behaviour. In the middle of the so-called "second development decade", against the background of the state of play in the "development-underdevelopment" game and in the light of the African score in this critical game, the crucial question for African members of the "development community" is the extent to which Development Administration and Development Economics fulfilled or did not fulfill their initial promise to Africa, the philosophical and empirical content of that promise in relation to the development needs and development performance of Africa. The necessary follow-up to this, of course, is the question of where we go from here. But the exploration of these questions and their implications - which amounts to an enquiry into the legitimacy, no less, of what has been introduced to us as Development Administration - necessarily involves us in another and equally basic question: Is the transition from Colonial Administration, with its peculiar brand of Economics, to Development Administration,

and the particular brand of Economics it partners and serves in the name of development, a genuine transition or merely a nomenclatural one, another case, perhaps, of presence coloniale masquerading as presence Africaine?

One has to admit, of course, that any change - even a change of nomenclatures - necessarily says something about its courses and necessity. To that extent, even a conclusion that the change from Colonial Administration to Development Administration was merely nomenclatural would not mean that it was completely devoid of meaning and significance. The question would remain, however, of what significance one attaches to that change without recourse to reification, without becoming victim to the pernicious verbalism that proclaims a new era merely on the basis of changes in the designation of an old era.

The attempt to face the more basic question of the factual or agenda meaning of the transformation of African bureaucracies from colonial to developmental concerns can, however, begin with a number of admissions; and by disposing of some of the spurious arguments that "brought down" Colonial Administration and proclaimed the birth of Development Administration merely by pointing to the lowering and raising of flags on certain prearranged dates. The more frivolous of those arguments ought, in principle, to retreat in the face of the fact that although "independence", like the "Development Administration" that followed in its wake, was accompanied by varying degrees of the variety of bureaucratic Africanisation that simply points to the number of hitherto excluded Africans who were subsequently incorporated or coopted, neither the proclamation of the former nor the emergence of the latter necessarily signified the Africanisation of Africa or, in more precise terms, the

Africanisation of that alienated Africa that also unfortunately is the dominant Africa - or at any rate the Africa that serves as an encapsulating instrument of the culturally unalienated by economically alienated Africa. Once this fact is noted and the nature of the encapsulating, marginalising, peripherising, bantustanising or socially alienating processes is analysed and understood, however, the second - less frivolous, more influential and more technocratic - set of arguments for proclaiming the emergence of a new species of Administration with an agenda and mission different from the colonial variety becomes untenable on the basis of the arguments and myths woven into that proclamation.

The weak ground on which that proclamation was based, and Development Administration was cultivated, is as easy to delineate as it is to expose. Briefly, the arguments came down to the proposition that Colonial Administration was, in Africa at any rate, an Africanised version of Public Administration and that, therefore, (after Public Administration has been given a definition as essentially about "law and order" "tax collection" and other "house-keeping" functions of civilised society), Colonial Administration had the overriding agenda of "housekeeping". From this proposition the citation was drawn for Development Administration that when it is true to its calling it is concerned not with "housekeeping" but with development.

Apart, of course, from the implied acceptance in this argument of the vicious self-serving colonial propaganda that colonialism was about the civilising of bands of Hobbesian savages, critiques of Colonial Administration obtaining from this source and offered as the differentia that distinguishes that species of Administration

from its supposedly iconoclastic substitute are so demonstrably false that one must wonder whether distinctions between Colonial Administration and Development Administration based on them really establish a difference. Nor it seems, can the enquirer look to the agenda proclaimed for Development Administration by its exponents in the traditional "development community" for satisfaction. At best such answers as came from that source are ruthlessly ambiguous. For it is an argument that wipes out the history of our dependency through colonialism. It turns a blind eye to such monuments of our colonial heritage as the conversion of some segments in Africa what Samir Amin has called "training economies"; the metamorphosis of others into "plantation economies", whose economic *raison d'être* seems to be the production of agricultural raw materials for North America and European industry; the reduction of still other clusters of African humanity into labour reserves whose main purpose in the international division of labour is to supply masses of unskilled labour of the dangerous, mindless and scavenging type at inhuman prices for the sanitary services of European cities and, more importantly, for European industries and plantations located either directly in Europe or in South Africa of the cities and industrial and extracting enclaves in what has been called black Africa which produce mainly for export to Europe; and the assignment of several conglomerations subsequently called "States" in Africa of a role in the international division of labour as mineral enclaves for the world capitalist economy. By ignoring these important developments whose cumulative and collective effect is the "bantustanisation" of Africa in the service of European and North American interests every bit as economically alienating and fundamentally marginalising as the process which the Republic of South Africa is attempting to reproduce in its own small but possibly expandable corner of the world the argument ignores, or suggests that we ignore the phenomenon of dependency whose structural characteristic is the reduction of Africa to a continental

specialist in the production of goods she does not consume and the consumption of goods she does not produce and a continental sufferer from the twin evils of unequal exchange and structurally unfavourable "balance of payments" and "terms of trade", conditions which, while contributing to capital accumulation in Europe and North America, together ensure for Africa in the present phase of world capitalism perpetual "indebtedness", chronic balance of payments crises and the perpetuation of that very dependency which created these causes and symptoms and guarantee the current generation of African poverty.

But the argument is doubly untenable. It violates historical reality by treating "pacification", which was a means of and incidental to the colonial "development effort" in Africa and thereby leaves itself unable to account for those colonial artifacts that had a straight forward economic character and rationale (even the claim that Colonial Administration was "public administrative" in that its aim, apart from "pacification", was tax collection is subject to that same charge in that it fails to see what colonial tax collection manifestly was - only one of several means, in company with land expropriation and the land reserve system that destroyed the traditional guarantees of subsistence for whole populations, the colonial version of the tributary mode of production, of which direct taxation was merely one of several expressions (the others included the imposition of crop production quotas on communities), and the glorification of "cash crops" i.e. crops needed for European industry or European threats at the expense of "food" or "subsistence crops" (i.e. crops, mainly foods, needed by the masses of Africa - of getting reluctant natives to work for settler plantations in those areas where there was settler colonialism or in mines or to "encourage" reluctant or already "sold" native farmers in areas where the production of "cash crops" could conveniently be left to native enterprise or even simply to induce the natives to participate in the construction of the instrudtural necessities of "colonial development" by working for the cash which the tax collector demanded) for one thing. And the argument under review is

also ahistorical because it treats as a product of Colonial Administration, when it treats it at all or alludes to it, the process of the peripherisation of continents and peoples - a process that is historically antecedent to colonialism, however much it did to give that process institutional stability and is logically and, in most of its phases empirically, independent of it. But the ahistorical view of the history of Africa's peripherisation on which the argument under review for distinguishing Development Administration from Colonial Administration is founded is doubly unwarranted: the facts on how Europe underdeveloped Africa are relatively accessible (see, for instance, Walter Rodney's book under that title, Dar es Salaam, 1972); and the living example of Liberia, a rice consuming and formerly rice exporting country that was never formally the victim of Colonial Administration but became a plantation economy dependent on rubber and on the rubber dollar for some of its food needs and non food fancies as surely as Ghana for instance, matured as a colonial economy putting its best efforts in the production of cocoa, which Ghanaians normally do not consume, in the hope of securing enough cocoa pound to finance the importation of food, such machine tools and expertise as its ruling elite determines must be imported for its import substitution industries and, of course, to finance the direct importation of consumer commodities other than food should have long served to prevent the formalistic fallacy.

But if all this does not mean that the distinction affirmed by the traditional development community between Colonial Administration and Development Administration is entirely without foundation it surely means that the argument just reviewed does not establish a qualitative difference and that the case for claiming that the difference does, indeed, exist is, to say the least, unproven. Nor, it seems, can one get

it seems, can one get much satisfaction on the matter by ignoring the argument thus far presented as a basis for the differentiation and focussing on the political roots from which Development Administration as we know it is supposed to have emerged, by begging for clues, in other words, from the political imperatives that determined the retirement of Colonial Administration and the recruitment into service - never mind for the moment into whose service - of Development Administration.

The most direct clue in this direction - certainly the most obvious - is African "independence". With everybody celebrating the rebirth of Africa "freedom" and "independence" it would have sounded ill-mannered, it seemed, to have referred to the bureaucratic nerve centres, and the activities of these concerns, in the "new states" as Colonial Administration. Simple courtesy definitely required a new designation and description of that concern, and political wisdom suggested that even if the "civilising mission" had to continue - and affirmation of the readiness of the most "westernized" or "westernizable" Africans to assume the cynically defined and cynically designated "white man's burden" was a prime affirmation, though not necessarily in so many words, of all the various strains of "African nationalism" - the well-earned contempt for that most cynical and sinister of ideological smokescreens necessitated the coinage of new phrases to suit the new times. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the ideological mints of the world were conscious of minting dubious currency when they produced phrases like Development Economics and Development Administration.

But it does mean that, particularly in the light of history, currencies such as these must be closely examined for vintage and, since they carry Development on their foreheads, for developmental value. This calls, in turn, for an assessment of the African

"independence" whose seal is taken in the traditional "development community" as the authentication of currencies like Development Economics and Development Administration and guarantor of their novelty and value. What is the guarantor worth?

The claim that Africa is independent - that much of Africa is, anyway - is essentially a claim about the Africanisation or re-Africanisation of Africa. In contrast with the vulgar definition of Africanisation in which independence ends up as a game of musical chairs, the assertion of the reAfricanisation of Africa that deserves to be examined associates independence with the negation of the direct and indirect economic and cultural alienation (peripherisation or bantustanisation) of Africa and affirms Africa not as a collection of so many bantustans of Europe and North America but as a distinct collection of autonomous sociocultural entities responsive to its own development requirements and organised to be such and no longer obedient to the international division of labour originally imposed upon it by European mercantile capitalism and subsequently institutionalised by the imperialistic phase of European centred monopoly capitalism. The latter is what one might call "the emergence of an Africa for Africans" thesis. The crucial test, therefore, is whether the "independence" in question broke or led to the process of breaking the chain of African dependency, peripherisation, marginalisation or bantustanisation.

But it is precisely on this crucial test that the meaninglessness of what Africa has so far obtained behind the label of "independence" is so profound and so glaring and the developmental significance, therefore, of that phenomena so conspicuously illusory. The point here is not just that the structural continuity of Africa's dependency and peripherisation shows, in "postcolonial" as in colonial Africa, through the continent's structures of production (which are still overwhelmingly externally oriented) and its mode of production

(which is still essentially tributary and, mainly through the mechanisms of "trade" and "unequal exchange", at the service of Europe and North America and their institutions, corporations and allies) as well as in the structure of its consumption, although this is serious enough. Nor, even, is one simply referring to the fact that for all Africa's so-called "development efforts" the continent is still essentially the continent of plantation economies, mineral enclaves, trading economies and labour reserves into which it was cast by paleocolonialism and in which status contemporary world capitalism wants it to remain, although this, obviously, must be a cause for concern among those who affect commitment to African development. The point of emphasis here is that the siamese twins of Development Economics and Development Administration were, and have been, active participants in the processes leading to the perpetuation and even deepening of Africa's dependency and are, to that extent, not only contaminated by the original sin of their colonial forebears but guilty in their own right as accessories after the fact and providers of false alibis to the processes, still unarrested, marginalising and impoverishing the peoples of Africa.

The evidence for this indictment lies partly in the politico-economic and ideological context - only partially of their own making, to be sure - in which the twins accept to operate. It also lies, partly, in the action and research agenda for which they claim full credit.

The ideological and politicoeconomic context is, of course, summarised by the lumpen bourgeoisie of Africa's offer of itself as the new bearers of the "white man's burden" and its corresponding acceptance of the world view which says, in effect, that development is north-western and underdevelopment African and that, this

being so, development consists in the dual process of deAfricanising and "westernising" Africa from this "development" context and this definition of development or the development process it clearly follows, of course, that the cultivation and preservation of western tutelage becomes developmentally desirable - a logic and posture so preponderant in "postcolonial" Africa as to cause the late President Nkrumah, regarded in some circles as a leading African apostle of anti-imperialism, to invoke the spirit of Luggard and to declare for Luggardism, as late in his anticolonial and pro-development career as January 1966, in the following words:

"The (United States) is the leading capitalist power in the world today. Like Britain in the heyday of its imperial power, the United States is, and rightly so, adopting a conception of dual mandate in its relations with the developing world. This dual mandate, if properly applied, could enable the United States to increase its own prosperity and at the same time assist in increasing the prosperity of the developing countries".

Nor should anyone unduped by the myth of African independence be surprised by this sort of statement from a representative - a "radical" representative at that - of the African "nationalism" that heralded the African "independence" that is said to have authorised and commissioned Development Economics, Development Administration and similar products of what has become a veritable "development" industry. If this representation of the political and ideological context in which the development industry has sought and - obtained - a role is so reminiscent of the posture of a "worker controlled" factory in the capitalist world which finds the cultivation of "external" capitalist goodwill an agenda question, or of the "nationalised" industrial plant in an African country that defines and seeks "viability" through continuing integration with and acceptance by the multinational corporation formal

secession from which was the object of the "nationalisation"; or again if the situation exposed by the above quotation from Nkrumah reminds one of the "freed slave" after "emancipation" who begs to have his slavery - at least in some form - back, or of the peasant in some of these "land reform" countries who finds the capitalist world he is "freed" into sufficiently daunting to make him wish for a return of the "good old days", when masters were masters and peasants were guaranteed the basic necessities for the reproduction of labour power, the parallel should surprise us less than the surprise of those who are surprised, given the nature of the African "emancipation" brought about by African "independence".

But lest anyone be still confused by it all, Sir Charles Arden Clarke's boast should settle the matter. Reporting on the translation of "the model colony" into the "independent state of Ghana" that was to serve as a model and inspiration to other "independences" the indiscreet Governor (see his "Eight Years in the Gold Coast", African Affairs, January 1958) told it all with this account:

"We learnt, for example, how effective the device of changing names could be. It is, I suppose, true that 'a rose by any other name would smell as sweet', but we learnt that if we changed the name of Leader of Government Business to Prime Minister and Executive Council to Cabinet, without in any way altering their functions and powers, or the name of Chief Commissioner to Regional Officer, or District Commissioner to Government Agent, they all seemed to smell much sweeter in the public nose. That device certainly helped us to get over some difficult periods".

It remained, of course, for the Governor, who became the first Governor-General of "independent" Ghana as a mark of Ghanaian gratitude for his role in ushering in "independence", to add, though he obviously did not find it necessary to add, that "the device" also helped "dying" colonialism to retain power without its more visible responsibilities.

ii) The Agenda

A look at the action and research agenda of Development Administration, as we know it, shows the extent to which, when it was not being totally irrelevant to the challenge of underdevelopment, it became partly a victim and partly a contributor to the ideological and political context, outlined above. The agenda, of course, is an encyclopaedic one; but they may be summarised as partly irrelevant, partly misguided, partly opportunistic, partly naive and partly pregnant, and well-informed as well as "noised-up", if also partly well-intentioned responses to the a to z of "development and underdevelopment" outlined above. It also is an agenda which responded to the myth, or at any rate dubious proposition, that Africa's "developmental problems" are as technical as the opportunistic sociology, obscurantistic economics and the "amorphous" politics of developing countries" that arose to service the development industry claimed that they were by supplying a specific "technical" subagenda to meet every "technical" definition of the "development problems" until it became an unmanageable "do-it-yourself" conformity kit comprising the administration and administrative problems - and searches for or guides to solution - of everything that is at all administerable or that is represented as "developmentally crucial".

The agenda is, of course, a compound of items directly plucked from gardens traditionally regarded as the administrators and issues imported from other peoples' gardens. But the development associations of all these items are never far behind and it is these associations that are used to legitimise Development Administration and its agenda. A more detailed survey of the items on this agenda, and of the traditional "development community's" list of "development problems" to which the agenda items are attached, should serve to detail and specify some of the numerous charges, not excluding the charges of naivety and opportunism, herein levelled against Development Administration, as we know it.

A) In response to (a) above administrative scholars have, of course, written numerous dissertations on the subject of communication and coordination between planners and administrators. And practitioners have followed up with numerous devices, such as: the training of "planners" in the techniques of administration and the training of administrators in the techniques of planning (on the hope of giving both a common language and therefore a facility for mutual communication); the appointment of "planners" in administrative posts or administrators in planning posts (in the hope that the problem will thereby be resolved); the elevation of planning boards, secretariats or departments to offices of the President or Prime Minister (with the obvious idea that if the administrator will not or cannot understand or cooperate with the planner the latter should be made to talk down to the former in the language of authority which the administrator respects); the organic integration of finance Ministries with Planning Ministries or, in the absence of such integration, the assignment to Planning Ministries of responsibility and authority for ordering or approving "development expenditure" (with hopes similar to those invested in the immediately preceding device); committees of planners and administrators (based on the obvious hopes for committees as coordinating devices); and political and administrative reminders to planners that they are, after all, technicians who must submit to administrative instruction. A supplement or substitute to these devices is, of course, the device of exhortation, the calls on each group to understand the pressures on the other and exercise discretion, sympathy or leniency. "Administrative Reform" in this context becomes a problem of how to copy some European model or the other regarded as effective; how to minimise the inconveniences of previously instituted "reforms"; or how to dismantle the institutions of previous "reforms".

The definition of that game is, of course, one measure of its futility even at its level. More to the point, however, is the fact that this "administrative problem" usually only serves to mask the fact that at issue is not a question of administrative organisation or professionalism but competition between two sets of professionals for power and final authority on the allocation of resources; that it is not necessarily an issue about development (since the history of Africa does not show up one group or the other as more (or less) developmentally oriented); nor even, in the African context, about planning (except in so far as it can be said to be an issue about who is better at matrix algebra and other techniques of planning, which it manifestly is not); and that, in any case, no case can be cited of a developed country where development occurred because of the successful resolution of this issue. As for this issue - and the fact that it is by and large still a live issue in the circles concerned by it - as an explanation of African underdevelopment it can equally safely be said that there are better explanations of African underdevelopment than that.

B) It seems possible to take (b) and (c) above together, since the phenomenon of imperfect coordination they decry at two levels is, in fact, generated by the same category of problems. Whatever room there might be for organisational improvement in interdepartmental or intradepartmental communication in the discharge of sectoral responsibilities at the level of conception, forecasting and command within a planning agency or structure or, at the level of implementation between executing agencies or departments it is not at all obvious that **the fundamental** problem in planning and implementation, in so far as it affects the meaning of planning and planning outcomes, is an organisational one.

It seems idle to expect intersectoral harmony in planning or Plan implementation at any but a superficial level, if at all, when the very dependency and external orientation of the economies we are talking about institutionally prevents intersectoral linkages on the ground, as it were. Not all of the cases of operational disharmony that are cited in these connections are direct products of the extroverted character of our societies, of course. But they are, typically, products of the confusions and clashes of interests that are facilitated and multiplied, and sometimes actually decreed, by manner in which our societies are organised and placed at the service of world capitalism and by the limited options for economic and political manipulation and therefore national "concertation that this service allows. Thus when a Ministry of Finance says "thou shall not get the foreign currency thou needest to import fertilisers" and the Ministry of Agriculture says "whither the import liscence and foreign currency to import fertilisers" one can be sure that in the confusions that often arise in the situation one is more often than not faced not with an administrative problem of coordination arising out of somebody's failure to read the relevant chapter in some textbook of Administration but with a real crisis resulting from the fact that different interests acting rationally, that is in the interest of their preservation and satisfaction, are bound to make those demands because their interests within a particular structure of production and consumption demand it and are bound, moreover, to make demands that are mutually contradictory, if not antagonistic. Unfortunately the manner in which the issue is spell out on the agenda of Development Administration as we know it prevents the real developmental dilemna of the situation from emerging and is, therefore, effectively a disservice to development.

C) The scarcity of trained manpower issue, mentioned in (d) above is, perhaps, one of the few issues on which the traditional "development community" is unanimous. As such the obvious solution - "train more manpower for development" - is one that guarantees the "traditional development community" a good deal of industrial base. The conventional Development Administrator has, therefore, understandably responded with a contribution which consists mainly in a) examining various ministries, planning agencies and industrial, commercial and service enterprises for possible lapses in manpower forecasting, planning, training, motivation, etc. etc; and b) organising for the organisation and training of trainers, for the training of the organisers of those who organise the training and organisation of trainers etc; and administrative improvements in the organisation of training organisations.

When all is said and done, however, the question that remains is, where is it all expected to lead us? Two fundamental points can be made here. The first, and negative, point is that the explanation of development and underdevelopment on which much of this training activity is based is useless as an explanation of the development of any developed zone one can think of. The foundation is more disingenuous as an explanation of European and North American development. The scale of its mischievous character is amplified, for instance, when English development is accepted as a tribute to "trade" and latter day "developmentalist" organise themselves and train personnel to reproduce the British pattern of "development through trade" when history tells us that what is called "trade" in this account is a compound of piracy (for which knighthoods and governorships were awarded) and colonial exploitation (which no contemporary African

state can or may reproduce) and that the organisation of this compound to begin the process and pattern of English "development through trade" required gunsboats, deceit and ruthlessness rather than the manpower training currently recommended. Nor is the traditional "manpower explanation" an explanation of African underdevelopment, since the development of Europe and the development of underdevelopment in Africa were and are complementary processes neither of which even begins to be explained by "training". The positive point to make about "development problem" "d", as traditionally formulated, is that it is too deeply rooted in the "catching up" theory of development, a product of the discredited thesis planted by Rostow and his like, to be anything but a prescription for the reinforcement of dependence and underdevelopment. For the Rostowian thesis from which it draws its inspiration is essentially a passport into the "emulation paradox", in that its division of development into "stages" is an incitement to think of development as a process of acquiring western technologies and western consumption patterns; an inducement to import European know-how, European capital and consumer goods and European lifestyles with the permanently devalued currency of African labour as expressed in Africa's tropical and nontropical products in exchange; and, therefore, a direct accessory to industrialisation by substitution and similar antics which collectively marginalise and impoverish the African masses, create indebtedness for African exchequers and further institutionalise the very dependency that initiated underdevelopment in the first place.

D. As for the inconsistency of planning objectives (see "e" above) that has taxed the ingenuity of our traditional Development Administrators, among others, all that can be said about it is that although bad organisation can make it marginally worse "improved" organisation cannot make it substantially better. It is not, fundamentally, an organisational problem, at least where it matters most.

Take, for instance, the strategy of developing local bourgeoisies or putting the state of self into the bourgeois role for the purpose of developing a solid industrial and commercial base for "modernisation" or "industrialisation", which is at the heart of most "development" strategies in Africa. We know or ought to know, of course, that in an underdeveloped country that is hooked on the "catching up" theory of development and essentially subject to the international division of labour (which is not only what virtually all African countries are but the foundation on which they mostly build their "modernisation" strategies complete with dreams of achieving that shy sufficiency in foreign exchange through exporting more of the same tropical products they have learnt to export from colonial times or of diversified products - and lately through selling their sun, their charm, their songs and dances, handicrafts, water resources, a taste or an observation of their poverty, lands or the use of lands and their women in the name of the new magic foreign exchange earner called Tourism - or through finding and exporting their mineral wealth - the only possible bourgeoisie is the comprador type, of the state or private variety, and that the comprador nature of this class, if and when it develops, ensures internal contradictions between its industrial and commercial species; guarantees that any industrialisation resulting from the alliance of the industrial species with foreign interests will be of the importsubstitution variety whose tendency is to prevent domestic capital accumulation and institutionalise stagnation when unhampered and to cause or threaten worse when hampered, and while keeping the industrial and commercial species

of the comprador or lumpen bourgeoisie at loggerheads - or ensuring acute cases of schizophrenia where the state combines where the state combines both roles - keeps both species or both roles underdeveloped, in defiance of official policy. It is some measure of the poverty of Development Administration, as we know it, that in the face of such structural contradictions - which sometimes materialises as a dependence on a means: industrialisation by import-substitution; towards an end; industrialisation by importsubstitution - the most it offers is to place it place on its agenda issues such as training schemes for planners; coordination between Ministries of Trade and Ministries of Industry or Planning; and methods of combining responsibilities for trade and industry in one Ministry.

E. "Development Problem (F) above, which asserts communication and interest barriers between politicians and technocratic implementers as a problem of development is, of course, one of those issues that have been falsified, exaggerated, poorly articulated and given a developmental dimension far in excess of their value.

As an issue, it seems to have entered the development picture in Africa when it was noted, correctly, that politicians and civil servants sometimes differed on resource allocation strategy and practices and the conclusion was extracted falsely (and it has to be false because we know that in interest representation and ideological orientation the two groups, in Africa, belong to the same basket, whatever their secondary and essentially nonantagonistic contradictions) that development would result if they were nicer to each other.

F. Perhaps no issue commands as much passion in Africa as personal and political corruption, not as moral transgressions but as enemies of development. Its place on the traditional "development community's" list of problems (we have itemised it above as "g") has made it the subject of many learned - and not so learned - treatises in traditional Development Administration circles, and the concern of numerous "administrative reforms" and reforms of reforms.

Financial personal corruption has, of course, been universally deplored and attacked, largely unsuccessfully, in serious, mock and opportunistic battles. Expressed in terms of nepotism, however, the world and the community of traditional Development Administrators have not been so sure that the attacks on corruption are not a vicious, futile or just misinformed and impetuous attacks on respected and essentially honourable, if sometimes excessive, native customs. In one notable book the author even wondered whether in those countries - like the "developing countries" - where "corruption" is endemic it might not be tapped for developmental purposes.

Now, although the author in question was somewhat poor in his formulation he was not being as original as it might be supposed. The strategy of "development" that centres itself around the Institutional strengthening of those who thrive on the exploitation of their fellow man at the expense of those who thrive - or used to thrive - on the exploitation of nature and its derivatives, perhaps the oldest and crudest form of corruption, may not be "working" in Africa; but it is central to the "development strategies" of many on African country. And attacks on institutional corruption in this context, with or without the participation of Development Administration, are essentially futile, selfcontradictory and opportunistic. The alternative or diversionary battle against personal corruption, or particular varieties of it, is to that extent no less futile and, in any case, nondevelopmental.

G. "h" above, which relates to a lack of political commitment to plans as a "development problem", would, of course, be developmentally interesting if the plans in question were, indeed development plans. The problem formulation is, in any case, ahistorical, in that it ignores lessons of history which clearly are that if a "plan" formalises decisions, allocation procedures and allocations that are favoured by a particular combination of forces and circumstances then the outcomes that tend to be formalised in plans as "objectives" or something close to them will occur whether or not the "objectives" and the means for reaching them are formalised in officially designated "plans", and that what is called "political commitment" to particular economic ends and means is a product of particular socio-political pushes, not their cause.

H. Apart from organising the training of statisticians and advising on organisational devices digging up statistics and using them - or at least diffusing them to interested bodies, the traditional Development Administrator involves himself in "development problem" (i) above, which relates to the inadequacy of statistical and other data base for development planning or other kinds of planning, by citing the phenomenon in his turn as a serious problem in the planning and administration of the "modern services" - always treated as "development services" - he is called upon from time to time to plan and administer.

Unfortunately, most of the projections, plans, projects and services in whose interest the complaint is filed and investigations and recommendations are made tend to be of the type whose developmental connections are not obvious or of the type whose necessity does not require statistical sophistication to confirm or of the type whose proper planning and administration require statistical and other data that are either available even in the poorest of countries or would be relatively easy to obtain, if given an administration with a more than rhetorical interest in getting the related projects planned and executed.

In developmental terms, therefore, and particularly given the fact that the major constraints on African development are structural and political rather than "economic" (in the narrow sense) and technical, one has the impression of seeing in the "poverty of data base" argument something, if not of a redherring, of an overblown turtle masquerading as a whole.

I. Our response to "development problem" (j), relating to the ineffective control of plan implementation which is said to be caused by the same poverty of data base cited as "problem" (i) above, or by the perverseness of politicians as well as our reactions to the responses it has elicited in traditional Development Administration will be substantially the same as our evaluation of the related problems, formulated in (H) and (E) above respectively. To the extent that "problem" (j) also points to cybernetic breakdowns of control mechanisms as an additional factor in the ineffective control of plan implementation, however, we would add, without in any way detracting from the position that plans in Africa, by and large, have not been development plans but plans that have been used to seek growth within the context of underdevelopment, that the cybernetic breakdowns alleged are, often, not mechanical breakdowns of information transmitting devices but more a matter of various interests feeding noise into or blocking the machine, in the course of advancing, preserving or protecting those interests and are, therefore, not always the technical-administrative issues they are sometimes imagined to be.

J. As far as problem "k" is concerned, it is, of course, undeniable that bureaucrats do act factionally and sometimes get their way, even unexpectedly - as when a government places a punitive tax on petrol to reduce consumption and importation and then proceeds to raise car and transport allowances for its bureaucrats - and that the bureaucracy does in this way impede both growth and development. But even the example cited shows how removed the phenomenon is from an administrative problem and how futile, therefore, are the Development Administrator's rhetorical attacks on it. The growing "Indonesianisation" of many African bureaucracies and other professional groups - re, the tendency of bureaucrats and other paid public officials to turn their nominally fulltime jobs into part-time occupations whose publicly financed infrastructure (telephones, official cars, paid leisure time etc.) are used to subsidise their business activities - is another, and related feature of the institutional corruption before which Development Administration, as we know it, stands like a helpless, pitiful beast occasionally wondering to what all this does to the "Weberian Ideal".

K. "Development problem" (i) above - the issue of political and administrative overcentralisation beloved of "development-from-below" and "decentralisation" activists - is, politically, so reminiscent of the colonial Community Development and Local Government posture designed to fool the people and administratively so lacking in meaning in the context dependency and underdevelopment - and of the ongoing struggles for vantage points among the lumpenbourgeoisies of Africa which makes issues of political and administrative decentralisation and delegation a veritable battle ground on which access to patronage and "kickoffs" - as to make its claimed developmental significance decidedly unclear.

L. On the fetish that is made of PPBS, RECB, CMP and other devices whose non-rise, abuse or misuse is said if not to explain underdevelopment to explain the failure of catching up (see "problem" "m" above), the best that can be said about it is that those miracles postdate the beginnings of development in the countries of their origin; that they have never, anywhere, featured as "catching up" devices and cannot be expected, ever, to become so; and that in so far as their nonuse, abuse or misuse can be held to have reduced the rate at which "modernisation", as we know it in Africa, has taken place, these "sins" are to be congratulated. For preventing the acceleration and more efficient pursuit of processes that are, on the whole, developmentally negative.

M. Since "problem" "n" above, complaining about the shyness of foreign investors, balance of payment problems, "aid" etc, is essentially a variation on the cult of foreign exchange, foreign capital and foreign expertise - and the disappointments of those who indulge in this idolatory - the reader is referred to the appropriate comments above.

N. On the delicate matter of what responsibility God should accept for the hunger, famine and malnutrition in Africa ("problem" "o" above) theologians may, of course theologize. For the more down-to-earth thinker, however, we offer, to begin with, the following foods for thought from Walter Rodney's book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. (Dar es Salaam, 1972):

- i) "In Africa (the) concentration on one or two cash crops for sale abroad had many harmful side effects". Sometimes, cash crops were (after colonisation) grown to the exclusion of staple foods - thus causing famines. For example, in Gambia rice farming was popular before the colonial era, but so much of the best land was transferred to groundnuts that rice had to be imported on a large scale to try and counter the fact that famine was becoming endemic. In Asante, concentration on cocoa raised fears of famine in a region previously famous for yams and other foodstuff."

Using mainly the data from the study of the Brazilian scientist, Josue de Castro, on the phenomenon of hunger on a world scale, but supplementing this with data of his own, Rodney continues, inter alia:

- ii) "The K. Kwashiorkor (of the Oxfam posters) is itself noticeable wherever the African's contact with Europe was prolonged....."
- iii) "In South Africa, white settlement and capitalism transformed African diet from meat and cereal to dependence on mealy-meal (maize). Pellagra or 'rough skin' was unknown in South Africa until about 1914. Subsequently, it became a scourge among Africans, because it derives from absence of milk and meat".
- iv) In Egypt, the peasants or fellahin had always suffered from periodic famines, but under colonialism this deteriorated to become chronic hunger. It was the intervention of the British which upset the balance of the peasants' diet, and comparison with early accounts shows that there was once a much greater variety of legumes...etc.

We might also point out, in conclusion, and in connection with the question of the Sahel zone of West Africa where "God", moving this time in the ways of drought, and where natural catastrophe has been blamed for everything from famine to unbalanced budgets that:

- i) A recent five year drought in China did not "produce" famine or hunger: a similar period of drought in west Africa "produced" famine and starvation. The Chinese, who manage their economies and their land to provide for their own necessities had irrigation networks to protect them from nature. Many of the West African countries that were affected by the drought - countries like Mali, Upper Volta and Niger where the situation was gravest - have economies essentially of the labour reserve type in the international and division of labour where, irrigation is, therefore, an essentially "uneconomic" activity, particularly since the migrant workers from those countries have to look for jobs outside their own countries and the rural areas of the countries concerned are, therefore, not required by the international division of labour to produce cheap food to feed them.
- ii) In at least one known case, water was found, during the period of the drought, to fill and refill a swimming pool in a hotel for tourists while villagers nearby had to watch their farm animals die for lack of water.
- iii) In one country affected by the drought and where famine was experienced, "runaway agriculture" continued to prosper; and it has been demonstrated that acting rationally within the context of poor returns on labour for those who produce food crops many able-bodied young cultivators had either left the land to look for more rewarding jobs in the capital city or shifted from the cultivation of foodcrops (which may be essential but poorly priced) into less essential crops which, however, enjoy marginally better prices for the producer and certainly better marketing facilities - because they are of a more "industrial" kind.

The full or partial responsibility of Development Administration, as we know it, for some or all of these consequences of the "development" and "agricultural development" sponsored, jointly sponsored or endorsed by the colonial and "postcolonial" "development" strategies" should be obvious.

0. "Problems" "p" to "u" - the "people problems" - are, of course, really attempts to dress up the victims of underdevelopment and marginalisation as its causes; and the "solutions" to the range of "people problems, in conventional wisdom, centre, of course, around Rural Development - a solution that is supposed to usher in an era of contented rural folks cultivating their crops according to the advice of Government extension workers and administrators; diversifying their crops for export and for the cheap feeding of urban workers (whom they are, therefore, to subsidise, with their labour, in the interests of comprador Governments, comprador businessmen and comprador industrialists as well as the foreign business and corporations in alliance with these interests); not migrating into towns and cities when they are not needed or wanted; making only those demands on Government that are approved and contributing with their labour and in kind to the satisfaction of demands that are approved; shunning and where necessary denouncing trouble makers; and generally knowing their place and behaving accordingly. These also, of course, are the tasks to which Development Administration, as we know it, suits its agenda. The sobering fact is, however that despite the confidence of those who prescribe and practice Rural Development as a deliverer of these goods Rural Development has never before in human history been assigned the tasks currently assigned to it by the traditional "development community"; and there is no reason in history or in logic to expect Rural Development to successfully perform these tasks now. What we do know is that historically, communities and classes alienated and marginalised by the advance or encroachment of capitalism have been "solved" by i) extermination by direct physical genocide or otherwise (as happened to "Indians" in the Americas); ii) the creation of "reserves" in which the unwanted and unneeded peoples can "do their own thing" (as again happened in the Americas to the Indians but cannot happen to the Africans of South Africa because their labour is needed by white South Africa); a system of Apartheid (of the type that South Africa is in the process of creating in Southern Africa and that Europe and America have collectively created against the interests of to the rest of black Africa); exportation to other lands (as in the peopling of Australia by convicts, the marginalised and the misfits of industrialising Britain); and the creation of even more industries to absorb the proletarianised peasantry (as happened in the now developed countries whose industries have enough domestic forward and backward linkages and enough extractable surplus from

foreign lands to make the process possible); or the accumulation of enough wealth to subsidise the unemployment of those whom capitalist dynamics must leave unemployed (as happened later in the advanced capitalist countries). For reasons which should by now be obvious these historic "solutions" are not, of course, available to the African country that is itself marginalised and underdeveloped. Everything else, including the conventional antics of Development Administration, is, unfortunately, a comedy, in the context of such a country - except when it is a tragedy or just a farce.

P. The problems alluded to when the paucity of entrepreneurial talent is alleged as a "development problem" (see "v" above) does not, of course, raise issues or attract responses that are fundamentally different from those already discussed. The reader is referred, in particular to our reactions to "problem e" and responses to it - as summarised in D above. We may only add here that the pseudoscientific explanations of this "problem" ("cultural lag," "achievement motivation" or the lack of it, "personality variables" etc.) seem to be a particularly disingenuous way of providing alibis for the barriers to African enterprise installed and institutionalised by colonialism like the Association of West African (sic) Merchants - Awam which, in west Africa, was used to ensure white control of big business to the exclusion of Africans some of whom, in spite of the numerous disadvantages inflicted on Africans, were sufficiently enterprising to make inroads into the white man's preserves and colonial credit policy (as administered by the colonial Banks which typically operated on the strength of the black man's labour). They also divert attention away from the more subtle "postcolonial" pressures that effectively inhibit African enterprise at both state and private levels. To that extent, those of the traditional Development Administration community who prescribe and administer devices like courses for the promotion

of entrepreneurial talent, business promotion boards and other devices predicated on the natural lack of enterprise of Africans are equally guilty of deformation and of collaboration in the falsification of history.

Q. "Development problem" "w" - the complaint about paucity of demand for the products of air import substitution industries being a bar to "industrialisation - sounds rather like the tears of a man who does not only want to eat his cake (or his anything) and have it but goes on kill his mother and father and then plead for understanding and sympathy on the ground that he is an orphan. The first point, of course, is that the complementary processes of the development of underdevelopment in Africa and the development of Europe leave very little surplus in Africa for extended consumption as well as capital formation. But additionally and relatedly, the effect of industrialisation by import substitution is to deepen dependency and underdevelopment (royalties and patents must be paid for by monetary transfers of surplus value from the host economy of transplanted factory; imported machinery must be paid for, by a similar process; the amount and quality of labour used in the production of importsubstitution products must be underestimated and underpriced in relation to comparable amounts and quality of labour in the same production processes in the countries of origin of the industries to be "invited" if the invitation is to stand a chance of being accepted - and this means in turn that "unequal exchange" must take place and labour kept cheap and, therefore, commercially uninteresting; profits, where there is direct partnership, must be sent abroad; salary remittances of expatriate employees must be accounted for, and management or technical contracts must be honoured, through transfers from the host

economy; infrastructure must be constructed, at almost invariably high foreign exchange costs to provide a base for the industries to be imported; etc.) and thereby create or further institutionalise the very poverty which is reflected in demand paucity or low purchasing power. The cannibalism of the process of industrialisation by import substitution, a process promoted by Development Economists and Development Administrators alike, is essentially, therefore, the explanation of its inability of Africa to grow beyond the manufacture or brewery of commodities like textiles, cigarettes, beer, coca cola and a few other items that the masses, too, must consume for want of substitutes or will consume and therefore demand because their prices can, somehow, be accommodated.

R. "Problems" "x" and "y" above are, perhaps, the strangest items of a "strange" catalogue. In as far as "x" merely says that the explanation for underdevelopment is that the underdeveloped is that the underdeveloped countries are "late developers" it does not, of course, define a "problem" as much as it suggests a framework for looking, perhaps, at the other "problems" of underdevelopment. But by building its framework around time and time-lags it places itself firmly in the Rostowian school of "stages", although it is not quite clear whether or not it regards "catching up" as a logical or empirical possibility. "Problem" "y" does, however, have the virtue of simplicity: it abandons the search for explanations of poverty altogether or, in its other versions, substitutes a racist or a defeatist tautology for the explanations it cannot provide. Both "x" and "y" do, however, foster attitudes of "catching up" or defeatist "pragmatism" from which emerge responses or nonresponses of one or several of the kinds discussed above.

S. "Development problem" "z", which postulates the fact or frequency of the "coups d'état" in Africa as developmental variable of negative significance is rather difficult to assess concretely either in its own terms or in the wider terms of development, since the literature and pronouncements concerning it make it difficult to determine whether the finger points to coups d'état as such or simply to coups d'état which particular complainants have reason to dislike. Since, however, coups d'état, unlike revolutions, bear no relationship to structural change, it seems safe to state it as a general proposition that both the phenomenon itself and the complaints about it, or its particular occurrences, are developmentally irrelevant; and Development Administration activities, or definitions of concern, which aim at preventing the phenomenon, meeting the wishes of any particular set of coup makers or institutionalising bureaucratic capability for handling coups d'état when they occur are, ipso facto, developmentally irrelevant.

4. TOWARD A DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION.

i. A Summary of the Present Position.

If, as André Gunder Frank puts it, "historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries", relations which, as he says, "are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole"; and if, as he further correctly points out, "the now developed countries were never UNDERdeveloped, though they may

have been UNdeveloped" (Frank, "the Development of Underdevelopment," Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, J.D. Cockcroft and others, eds, New York 1972) it would seem to follow that a Development Movement, which is what Development Administration claims to be, that does not have an agenda for liberation from dependence is either a fraud or hopelessly misdirected. The conclusion becomes even more obvious if the points made by Frank are expressed in the more dramatic language of Charles Bettelheim who writes, in his Planification et Croissance Accélérée (Paris, 1965), that the "poor nations" of the world are not generally "underdeveloped" (in the Rostowian sense) but "oppressed" (in the sense in which Frank talks of "underdevelopment."

But the more damning case against Development Administration, as we know it, is not merely that it flies its flag on the Rostowian mast, proclaiming and working for that growth within the context of underdevelopment which reinforces dependence and underdevelopment. The circumstantial evidence against Development Administration, as we know it, is more than adequately reinforced by the nature of both its structure - as revealed by the agenda that give it concrete existence - and the ideas and projects it consciously, and instinctively, promotes.

It is easy, of course, to catch conventional Development Administration knee-deep in the muddy waters of industrialisation by import substitution; and the point has been made repeatedly that this and other directly incriminating evidence is connected with acceptance and promotion of the Rostowian "development" thesis. But the direct involvement shows even when conventional Development Administration acts instinctively, or leads the way. Thus when it acts independently in the domain of public administration its approach is inevitably bureaucratic and patronising, although it occasionally borrows the rhetoric of populism. In Business Administration its predispositions inevitably lead it to talk of Managing Directors, professional

accountants, personnel managers, industrial relations etc. that do not only imply hierarchy but equally clearly imply bigness. Yet this bigness, in the context of Africa, implies either that these fonctionnaires whose performance, training, retraining, organisational effectiveness etc. are part of the daily diet of Development Administration are destined for roles in our economies as units of the comprador bourgeoisie class of the state or private variety, or that they will be participants in the kind of home grown but technology imperting enterprises - very few, admittedly - that marginalise with scant hope of reintegration the few remaining leftovers of selfemployment and family business hitherto in the African rooted and completely African "technologised" fields of carpentry, soap making, tool making of several kinds, textile manufacture etc. a particularly vicious and nationally suicidal process within the overall marginalising process within the overall marginalising process - since in Africa, unlike developing Europe, the destruction of these custodians of traditional technology is not a function of the development of technology but a function of the development of other peoples' technology and of the encroachments of other peoples' capitalism and in Africa, unlike in Japan, those encroached upon in this way by advancing foreign capitalism or foreign technology have typically no hope of integration into the processes of the new technologies that displace them. The direct and indirect contributions of conventional Development Administration to these very processes, in the name of "modernisation" or "development," is, of course, the most powerful argument against it.

ii. What is to be Done?

If, as we have claimed above, conventional Development Administration is essentially an instrument for the perpetuation of dependence and underdevelopment - which, incidentally, make even some of its own concepts such as planning, development planning and policy-making meaningless in the African context meaningless since they imply the very freedom and possibilities for making choices which the international division of labour which prescribes and institutionalises dependence and underdevelopment denies - then the alternative to it must of necessity proclaim and serve the negation of those forces, processes and institutions that impose and perpetuate what Gunder Frank calls "underdevelopment" and Bettelheim calls "oppression". In more positive terms it must substitute an agenda of liberation - an agenda, that is, of independent development - for the current agenda which either divert attention from issues of liberation or actively serve the forces of economic and cultural oppression.

In contemporary Africa, this requirement has two ideological enemies that aim specifically at it. The first and active enemy, so to speak, is the ideology of "interdependence." Usually dressed as the ideology for global unity, economic realism and international cooperation it is, in its naked and real form, an ideology that seeks to deny to Africa and the Third World generally the independence that Europe and the United States effectively enjoy and to retain the underdeveloped countries, under the international division of labour principally as plantation economies, mineral enclaves, trading economies, labour reserve areas and lately, under the banner of Tourism, as rest and recreation centres for the "developed peoples." For, the fact are that in Europe and the United States production and