

UNITED NATIONS
AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING

DAKAR

CS/2528-6

N 3164
(22)

NUMERISE-AGS-RM

CONFERENCE ON

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

(DAR-ES-SALAAM, 29 NOV.-7TH DECEMBER, 1975)

THE AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A PECULIAR RECORD OF
COLLABORATION AND IMPORTANT RAGE, AND A CHALLENGE TO
REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

BY

S.O. OSOBA
Department of History
University of Ife
Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

SEPTEMBER 1975

PAN-AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A PECULIAR RECORD OF
COLLABORATION AND IMPORTANT RAGE, AND A CHALLENGE TO
REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

1. INTRODUCTION

The focus of this paper is on the implications of the economic, social and political problems of Southern Africa for the so-called independent states of Africa, especially since the unfolding of the much vaunted "Decade of Africa" - the period of the 1960s when the European colonial powers, pre-eminently Britain, France and Belgium, scrambled out of Africa, politically, with almost the same frenetic and bumbling haste as they scrambled for Africa's territories in the last quarter of the 19th century. I do not intend to discuss in any detail the unusually malevolent nature of white minority domination in Southern Africa, because this Conference will be considering various papers dealing with this issue in its various dimensions and in anatomical details. My analysis, however, will attempt to place the crisis of Southern Africa squarely in its global context of a complex alliance system between world imperialism (both traditional and neo-imperialism) and white racism in Southern Africa. This is the context in which the forty-two odd "independent" states of Africa, equipped with all the outward trappings and little, if any, of the substance of sovereignty have been engaged in a critical struggle for survival. It is generally recognised in Africa that the way in which the problems of Southern Africa are resolved is central to the outcome of the overall African struggle for survival in a world dominated substantially, but by no means exclusively, by the gargantuan forces of world imperialism. It is also generally recognised that, for reasons of selfish national economic interest, the leading Western capitalist countries (the controlling share-holders in the enterprise of world imperialism) provide the fuel on which the engines of economic and political apartheid and of Portuguese colonialism run in Southern Africa. The same

imperialist power, for the same reasons, are also responsible for the military defence of the unjust and ruthless regimes in southern Africa against forces working for their dismantling both from within and without.

However, a survey of the pan-African scene the past fifteen years or so reveals a chaotically differentiated pattern of responses by the so-called independent states of Africa to the crisis of southern Africa. This pattern of responses, viewed superficially, does not reflect any understanding of the symbiotic relationship between world imperialism and the white racist oppression of the black people of Southern Africa. But a closer examination of this pattern of responses tends to reveal, not so much a lack of understanding of the combined imperialist and racist aggression against the black people of Southern Africa, as a fundamental and multi-faceted disagreement among individual African countries over the most effective strategy of action to adopt in tackling a problem that is, at least in principle, recognised by all as Africa's most serious problem. I am positing in this paper that this dangerous and paralysing disagreement over strategy is derived from, and compounded by, a complex of objective and subjective factors. The most significant of these factors can be subsumed under these two broad categories:

- (i) the substantial amount of residual colonialism subsisting in these African states which makes their leaders, in the formulation and execution of their foreign and domestic policies, amenable in varying degrees to neo-colonialist propaganda and manipulation; and
- (ii) the theoretical and value frameworks within which the political decision-makers of "independent" African states try to grapple with the most critical domestic and pan-African problems confronting them.

II. World Imperialism and the Domestication of the Responses of African States to the Problems of Southern Africa.

The greatest achievement of European imperialism in Africa was not the military and diplomatic defeat of the African politics and the forcible occupation of their territories in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but rather their partial withdrawal in the 1950s and 1960s under the spurious banners of 'decolonization' and 'independence'. The British, French and Belgian colonialists who, before the outbreak of World War II, could not contemplate the idea of independence for their oversea territories in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, were forced in the immediate post-World War II period to play with the notion of gradually bringing the 'natives' up the steep slope of progress and ultimate independence. They were forced into this compromise position by a combination of factors including their own massive domestic problems of rebuilding their war-torn economies and societies, the instincts of a world community chastened by its experience of the colossal destructive capability of a supremacist racialist ideology, of which German fascism was the most absurd variety and one only more virulent than the various forms of European imperialism over the so-called 'inferior' peoples of the world. More specifically, the brutalities of war inflicted by the two warring camps on each other in the full view of colonial troops, press-ganged into participating in this unprecedented savagery, served as a morale booster to the relatively politically conscious and articulate Africans, Asians and West Indians, who were now more able decisively to challenge the validity of the principle of colonial tutelage of the "savage hordes" of yellow and black peoples by the "civilized" white Europeans. Consequently, the attainment of independence from colonial rule by India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Srilanka), Burma, Indonesia in the wake of World War II became for the rest of the colonised peoples of the world, including Africa, a clear proof of the vulnerability of European imperialism.

On the whole, the European imperialists in Africa played the game of 'decolonization' with considerable astuteness and immeasurable profit, carefully avoiding the error of the French who manoeuvred themselves into a situation of confrontation with, and ultimate defeat by, the national liberation forces in Indo China and Algeria. The diplomacy of British and French decolonization in Africa in the late 1940s and 1950s - the gradual recruitment and training of colonial foster elites to whom formal political power would be ultimately handed - was so successful that, apart from Algeria and Kenya, which had relatively substantial European settler populations and where there were liberation wars, the transition from colonial dependence to "independence" in the two decades between 1946 and 1965 was almost without bloodshed. European decolonization strategy was so successful that the British boast of "turning an empire into a family" (made by Harold Macmillan in 1960) would seem to be in full accord with the way in which most of the newly "independent" states of Africa saw their relationships with their former metropolises within the neo-colonial frameworks of the Franco-African Community and the British Commonwealth of Nations. With the exceptions of Sekou Toure's Guinea and Modibo Keita's Mali and the North African states there was no African country that became independent in the 1950's and 1960's from British or French rule that did not join one or the other of these two international clubs.

The all-pervading feeling of euphoria among African leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s concerning the blessings that membership of both the Franco-African Community and the British Commonwealth of Nations would confer on their countries is, perhaps, impossible for us to understand fully now with our advantage of hindsight and retrospective wisdom on the palpably dishonest manner in which these two institutions have been used over time to swindle politically naive African foster elites of their countries' genuine independence.

These African leaders, pathetic victims of systematic brainwashing through the colonial educational system and bought over by the prospect of sharing power with their former colonial masters over the destinies of their peoples, became eloquent spokesmen for the beneficence and generosity displayed by the imperialists in their programme of decolonization. Three examples will suffice at this stage:

(a) In an article published in July 1957 Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President of the erstwhile militant anti-colonial movement, the R.D.A., and leader of the Ivory Coast, identified himself as the "authentic spokesman of the millions of African men and women who have chosen, in preference to the type of independence just acquired by the neighbouring state of Ghana, a Franco-African Community founded on liberty, equality and fraternity". Further explicitly rejecting the "tempting" and "exciting" example of "the young state of Ghana" on behalf of the "Frenchmen of Africa", he concluded his article thus:

In our view, that community is an act of faith in this future and also an act of human solidarity. It enables us to bring our stone to the world edifice without losing either our national identity or the French citizenship which we have earned and acquired worthily. And it constitutes a home we wish to keep, as in the definition which Robert Frost gave of it:

Home is the place where
When you have to go there
They have to take you in.¹

(b) Leopold Sedar Senghor, the apostle of negritude and leader of Senegal, writing about the Franco-African Community in January 1961, was no less eloquently appreciative of the virtues and blessings of the Community:

The French Community, created by General de Gaulle in full agreement with Africa's true representatives, is one of the greatest achievements of our time. Besides being a masterly concept to which I and with me the majority of the leaders of Senegal are deeply committed, it is also one of those ideas capable of catching the imagination of the masses. Sweeping away the contradictions of the colonial system, it enables the former country and its erstwhile colonies to form a friendly cultural and economic union and thus forge a lasting link between Western Europe and Africa.²

(c) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's Prime Minister from July 1957 to January 1966, in a speech delivered to his countrymen on the occasion of Nigeria's accession to "independence" on 1st October, 1961, could not match the poetic excellence of both Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor, but committed his country no less unequivocally to the British Commonwealth association:

I have indeed every confidence that, based on the happy experience of a successful partnership our future relations with the United Kingdom will be more cordial than ever, bound together as we shall be in the Commonwealth by a common allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth.3

It was precisely this kind of unqualified confidence in the goodwill and maternal affection of the imperial powers that the European strategy of 'decolonization' was engineered to achieve. With the vast majority of the African leaders who guided their countries to the spurious 'independence' of the 1960s supplied with this unqualified confidence, the task of the colonial masters in transforming their colonial domination of Africa from a formal-political to a superbly structured cast-iron economic, cultural and psychological one became relatively easy to achieve. The few African leaders who saw the imperialist trap, (like Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Modibo Keita, Patrice Lumumba, Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote) called attention to the futility of formal-political independence unsupported by economic and psychological emancipation and posited effective pan-African unity as the only viable strategy of combat against the forces of neo-colonialism, were quickly isolated by both the imperialist powers and their African colleagues and denounced as 'hot-heads', 'fanatics' and 'communist agents'. Some of them, including Patrice Lumumba, Nkrumah, Modibo Keita and Milton Obote paid very dearly for daring to take the imperialist bull by the horns, and thereby the notion became even more reinforced that any African leader challenged the almighty imperialists at his own peril.4

The ramified nature of Euro-American neocolonialism, its historical antecedents and its implications for the present and future development of Africa have been discussed in detail and with great perception elsewhere and need not detain us here.⁵ What should be of primary concern to us at this point is the way in which the global system of neo-colonial dependence - economic, mental, political and cultural - have had a paralysing influence on the African initiative to act decisively in relation to the racial crisis in Southern Africa. The initiative of independent African countries vis-a-vis the southern African situation, as in many other areas of domestic and foreign policies, has been unusually amenable to manipulation and 'teleguidance' by the neo-colonialist powers. It was not a mere accident, for example, that the British colonial authorities, barely two years before Nigeria attained her 'independence', manoeuvred the Nigerian House of Representatives into passing an amendment to her immigration law which would preempt Nigeria's capability after independence to offer refuge to the oppressed Africans of southern Africa. The Immigration (Amendment) Bill passed into law on 21st November, 1958 severely circumscribed the old law under which a "native foreigner" (i.e. a man or woman from any 'tribe' indigenous to Africa irrespective of his or her country) could enter Nigeria without let or hindrance by making the term "native foreigner" (i.e. a man or woman from any 'tribe' indigenous to Africa irrespective of his or her country) could enter Nigeria without let or hindrance by making the term "native foreigner" applicable only to "a person whose parents were members of a tribe or tribes indigenous to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, the Sudan and the Republic of Guinea". Although a few Nigerian MPs saw the calamitous implications of this legislation in terms of Nigeria's post-independence role in the liberation struggles that were bound to be intensified in East, Central and Southern Africa, the Nigerian Prime Minister remained blissfully unaware of these implications. Responding sensitively to the wishes of British

imperialism, he simply justified the new legislation thus: "under the new conditions in Africa, it would be wrong if we opened our gates to all other African countries near or far from us." Again, on 16th August 1960 (about six weeks to Nigeria's attainment of 'independence'), when the Prime Minister was queried in the Federal House of Representatives about the propriety of the invitation extended by his government to South African government delegation to attend Nigeria's independence ceremony, he confessed to his government's subservience to British Commonwealth neo-colonial control: "It would offend (he explained) the other members of the Commonwealth if the invitation were not sent to the Union, though, of course, all other countries in the Commonwealth condemn South Africa's horrible policy of apartheid".⁸

This position of ambivalence - practical collaboration with the racist and minority regimes in Southern Africa, and rhetorical denunciation of their "horrible" policies - became crystallised in the foreign policy postures of the vast majority of African countries throughout the 1960s and up to the present. This policy of inaction is in perfect accord with the policies of the principal neo-colonial manipulators of most independent African states - the U.S.A., U.K. and France. Since the 1952 Session of the U.N. General Assembly when the issue of South Africa's apartheid policy was first explicitly raised in the world body, these powers and their proteges, especially among the reactionary regimes in Latin America and Asia, have used blatant hypocrisy to manoeuvre most African delegations to the U.N. into a false sense of security and, therefore, into a situation of paralytic inaction. Because of the substantial capital investment and commercial interest which Britain, the U.S.A., France and their major western allies (including Japan) have in South Africa and the renewed strategic importance of the Cape in the petroleum export trade between the Middle-East and the Euro-American world, western

economic, military and moral support for the racist regimes in Southern Africa have become increasingly stronger⁹ at the same time as they are joining African, Asian and Caribbean states in the U.N.O. to vote for General Assembly resolutions which identify apartheid as 'abhorrent' and 'a threat to world peace and security'. In reality, the Western powers have ensured that no effective action flows from resolutions adopted either by the General Assembly or the Security Council. The theoretical and legal underpinning this essentially hypocritical, do-nothing position of the major Western powers vis-a-vis apartheid had already been worked out in outline by the U.S. delegate to the U.N. during the 1952 debate on apartheid. The U.S. spokesman, after expressing the pious wish to avoid "both excess of zeal and timid legalism" in his consideration of the issue of apartheid, and after making the typical Western mealy-mouthed moral condemnation of apartheid, quickly proceeded to draw attention to the legal constraints on the U.N. to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states: "It (i.e. the U.N.) had no power to impose standards but only to proclaim them. It could reaffirm the principles of respect for human rights and call on Member States to orient national policy towards embodying those principles in law and custom as rapidly as local conditions permitted. Such an appeal, in general terms, would avoid the vexing issue of competence and obviate the danger to the stability of the Organisation inherent in singling out for direct action special legislation of a Member State. Moreover, it might be more effective than any recommendation which might injure national pride".¹⁰

It is true that the dramatic increase in the African membership of the U.N. has had some impact on the operation of the U.N. but this impact has not gone beyond influencing the kinds of issues that have come to concern the organisation. It cannot be denied that with the adoption of the Soviet-sponsored Declaration on the Granting

of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N.O. has become increasingly occupied with issues of special interest to Africa like self-determination, economic and social development, the elimination of colonialism and racialism. However, it is equally undeniable, that with the dominant position of the Western capitalist powers on the U.N. Security Council (where they controlled four of the five permanent seats with veto power until the 26th Session when Taiwan was replaced by the Peoples Republic of China), it has not been too difficult for them to domesticate African protest and initiative at the U.N. by ensuring that nothing resulted from African indignation other than pious resolutions, condemning general or specific acts of inhumanity committed against Africans. Even when U.N. resolutions have prescribed specific action; like the ban on arms sales to South Africa,¹¹ or the economic sanctions against the secessionist racist regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, such resolutions like most other U.N. resolutions have become no more than symbolic and futile gestures of protest in so far as the leading imperialist powers of the West - U.S.A., Britain and France - would never give the requisite support for their successful implementation.

The measure of the neo-colonial domestication of African protest over racist and colonial rule in Southern Africa from 1960 onwards is to be found not only in the on-going resignation of most African states to the sponsoring and passing at every session of the U.N. General Assembly pompous and inane resolutions which everyone knows have no chance of implementation, but also in their turning of the Organisation of African Unity, since its inception in May 1963, into a mini-U.N.O., a glorified debating society specialising in passing high-minded anti-racist and anti-colonialist resolutions with little more value than adorning the O.A.U. records. African members of both the U.N. and O.A.U. committed to any action beyond passing conscience-salving resolutions have remained a negligible minority.

The most dramatic presentation of the African states' policy of inaction vis-a-vis the problems of southern Africa was over the issue of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.) on November 11th 1965. The O.A.U. Ministerial Council meeting, summoned to Addis Ababa on the 3rd and 4th of December, 1965 to discuss Rhodesia's U.D.I., unanimously resolved to call on Britain to crush the illegal Rhodesian regime before 15th December, failing which all O.A.U. Member States would sever diplomatic relations with her from that date. Before the O.A.U. ultimatum to Britain expired, thanks to some spurious diplomatic initiatives spearheaded by the Nigerian government, the O.A.U.'s united front and its capability to act collectively had collapsed like a pack of cards. By 15th December, only nine African countries (two from the so-called Commonwealth African countries) had the guts to sever diplomatic links with Britain: Ghana, Tanzania, Algeria, U.A.R., Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Congo Brazzaville and Mauritania. All the others gave one spurious reason or the other (except the real one: neo-colonial dependence) to justify their dishonourable behaviour.

In whatever way we may consider the dominant and recurring pattern of African responses to the situation in southern Africa, it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that these responses have tended to be conditioned more by a sensitive awareness on the part of most African decision-makers of what is permissible in the neocolonial international system than by a firm commitment to the principles of justice and human dignity for all the oppressed peoples of southern Africa. For instance, an African scholar of international relations has identified four significant methods "employed by African states toward the realization of their goal in Southern Africa" - (i) direct appeal to the colonial and settler regimes of Africa, a method inaugurated at the First Conference of the Independent African States held in Accra in 1958 where a special resolution was adopted calling on colonial and settler regimes in Africa to "respect all

human rights as provided in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights"; (ii) litigation against South Africa at the International Court of Justice on the Namibia question; (iii) support for the liberation movements in the region; and (iv) "diplomatic manoeuvres in the United Nations".¹²

Of these four methods three are directly determined by the acute sensitivity of most African states to the requirements of an international legal order largely contrived and dominated by the major imperialist powers. It is not in dispute that without the readiness of the three Western giants on the U.N. Security Council to enforce the provisions of the U.N. Charter and the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, appeals by African states to the settler and colonial regimes in Africa, decisions of the International Court of Justice and U.N. resolutions resulting from the diplomatic manoeuvres of African member states could not have resulted in the realization of the African objectives of completely liberating Africa from all forms of colonial and minority regimes. However, in spite of the axiomatic truth concerning the futility of working for the liberation of Southern Africa by means consistent with the existing rules of the international legal order; these three methods continue to dominate the strategic thinking and moves of most African states on the Southern African question. The one method of struggle which is potentially subversive of the existing international legal order is the support of African states for the liberation movements in Southern Africa. It is also the one method which, if it is pursued with dedication and singleness of purpose, could force the oppressors of our people in southern Africa and their imperialist sponsors to come to terms with the African aspiration for freedom from all forms of oppression.

Ironically enough, even this method has proved colocationally ineffective because most African states subscribe to it in words rather than in deeds. For instance, the Summit Conference of Independent

African States meeting in Addis Ababa from 22nd to 25th May, 1963 (at which the O.A.U. was formally established and the O.A.U. Charter adopted), "considered" (according to the wording of its resolutions) "all aspects of the question of decolonization". On the basis of this consideration it was "unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying their efforts to accelerate the unconditional attainment of national independence by all African territories still under foreign domination". To achieve this "urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying" the liberation movements in Africa, the Summit Conference established by resolution a nine-member liberation committee (styled coordinating committee) with headquarters at Dar-es-Salaam, and a Liberation Fund (Special Fund) "to be raised by voluntary contribution of Member States for the current year, the deadline for such contribution being 15 July 1963". The Summit Conference (apart from banning all diplomatic, trade and communications link with South Africa and Portugal) passed three further resolutions which were consistent with the spirit of the principle 'enunciated in the O.A.U. Charter adopted by that Conference) of "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent" (Article III 6). The three resolutions committed the independent African states represented at Addis Ababa in May 1963 (i) to observe every year the day of 25th May "as African Liberation Day so as to organise popular demonstrations on that day to disseminate the recommendations of the Summit Conference and to collect sums over and above the national contributions for the special fund"; (ii) "to receive on the territories of independent African States, nationalists from liberation movements in order to give them training in all sectors, and afford young people all the assistance they need for their education and vocational training"; and (iii) "further to promote, in each State, the transition of

material aid and the establishment of a body of volunteers in various fields, with a view to providing the various African national liberation movements with the assistance they need in various sectors".

These and other resolutions on decolonization in Africa were reaffirmed at the First Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Cairo in July 1964 and at several subsequent Heads of State and Government Assemblies and OAU Ministerial Council Meetings. However, these unanimous verbal affirmations have not so far been matched by any appreciable concerted action by the O.A.U. In the first instance, the O.A.U. Liberation Committee, saddled with the responsibility of coordinating and intensifying the African liberation struggles, has never been equipped to give the liberation movements more than hortatory and symbolic material assistance. The Committee has no military capability without which it cannot be realistically expected to contribute in more than a perfunctory and symbolic manner to the military campaigns being waged by the various liberation armies. That the Committee was structured ab initio by most OAU members to be ineffective is brought out clearly in the O.A.U. refusal to consider seriously the proposal (first made in The African Charter of Cassablanca adopted at the Conference of seven African Heads of State - Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Libya and the Algerian Provisional Government - held in Cassablanca in January, 1961, and renewed by Ghana in the OAU in 1964) to establish an African Military High Command.¹³ The OAU Liberation Fund has also proved, in operation, to be no more than an ineffectual symbolic gesture, partly because its budget (£800,000 in 1964) has always been financially insignificant and not at all related to the total minimum need of the liberation movements and partly because the rate of default among member states in their contribution to the Fund has been so high and chronic as to receive mention in virtually all the subsequent O.A.U. Summit and Council of Ministers' resolutions on the activities of the Liberation Committee.

The other resolutions on decolonization passed at the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference of African Heads of State and Government have also turned out to be inane gesture at least in so far as the vast majority of African countries are concerned. Apart from a few countries like Tanzania, Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, Ghana (before Nkrumah was toppled), Mali (before Modibo Keita was overthrown), Algeria (under Ben Bella) and Zambia, the vast majority of African states allow May 25th to pass every year without using it, as it was originally decided in 1963, to focus the attention of their people on the urgent task of African liberation and to raise money for the support of the liberation struggles. The result is that the OAU's "absolute dedication" to the total emancipation of Africa has remained the closely guarded secret of O.A.U. summitry and of students of international relations, and is yet to be revealed to the masses of Africans for whom the Heads of State and Government claim to speak at their summit meetings.

Furthermore, most African states have failed to honour their undertaking of 1963 to give sanctuary and "training in all sectors" on their territories to freedom fighters or members of the liberation movements fleeing from oppression and racial discrimination. The relevant 1963 resolution specifically mentions assistance by member states in "education and vocational training". While it is true that some token assistance is made available in various African countries to young men and women from Southern Africa for educational and vocational training, assistance is seldom forthcoming in the greatest area of need - training in military skills for freedom fighters so that they might be more able to prosecute their struggle. Of all the independent African states south of the Sahara only in Guinea, Ghana (in the time of Nkrumah), Tanzania, Zambia, Congo Brazzaville have members of the different liberation movements found refuge, camp and training facilities. Even though, for strategic and logistical reasons these countries (except Ghana), having common borders with one or more of the territories where the liberation struggles are being waged,

are the most suitable for concentrating the freedom fighters and infiltrating them into the theatres of war, it is not possible to exonerate the bulk of African states from their culpable indifference to the military needs of the liberation movements. For one thing, the example of Ghana (under Nkrumah) Egypt (under Nasser) and Algeria have shown that distance from the theatre of war is not strong enough reason not to provide military training facilities for those who are in the front line of Africa's war of total liberation which the O.A.U. claims to be committed to. For another thing, some African states with common frontiers with the "white redoubt" in Southern Africa have opted for collaboration with the white oppressor regimes and for opening new war fronts against the freedom fighters. While one can sympathise to some extent with the helplessness of the puppet states of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which are almost completely economically dependent on South Africa and whose borders are not respected at all by the Republic of South Africa in its running war with the anti-apartheid freedom fighters, it is impossible to have the same sort of sympathy for Malawi which is in league with South Africa. It is even more difficult to sympathise with Zaire which, under Mobutu, gives sanctuary to the Angolan liberation movement, MPLA, but has refused to give its men (according to Basil Davidson) "any facility for the use of Zaire territory in logistic access to central and western Angola, where the 'colonialist heartlands' of that territory lie". Basil Davidson's indictment of Mobutu's treatment of the MPLA to the effect that "he had acted and indeed still is acting as the most useful ally that Portugal could find",¹⁴ may be excessively harsh but it does throw light on how some African countries, wittingly or unwittingly, become tools in the hands of imperialist forces and thereby help to defeat the cause of African liberation to which they pay lip service.

In fact, it is not only by withholding facilities for military training and tactical operations from the liberation movements that most African countries undermine and sabotage the effectiveness of their struggle. The vast majority of African countries, including Nigeria, (by far the largest and, in a situation of oil boom, one of the richest) do not even allow the liberation movements to open offices on their territories and canvas for material and moral support among the masses of independent Africa. On the contrary, some of them, like Nigeria, throw their doors wide open to black South Africans who have professional and academic qualifications and no commitment to their people's struggle. Such black South Africans frustrated with the racial discrimination against them, but unwilling to do anything about it, are to be found as school and university teachers and enjoying the specially favoured working condition of expatriates. In this way, by penalising commitment to the liberation struggle and rewarding inaction and treachery among the oppressed people of Southern Africa some African countries help to reinforce the notion among our embattled and ill-used brothers that revolutionary activism does not pay. The most preposterous and fatuous rationalisation of this kind of treacherous policy that I have come across is contained in the preface of a book co-edited by Robert K. Gardiner, the Ghanaian executive secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.

Discussing the "characteristics of the 'brain drain' in Africa", the editors propose that, "in the circumstances, investigation should be conducted into ways in which full use can be made of refugees from the Republic of South Africa, and in this Organisation of African Unity can play a part".¹⁵

Again, many African countries have failed and still are failing the cause of African liberation by their unwillingness to carry out their own collective decisions in strategic areas of the struggle far more innocuous and far less risky than the military. For instance, even though the African Heads of State and Government unanimously resolved to boycott the foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa at their Addis Ababa Summit Conference of May 1963, and even though the Ministerial Council Meeting of February 1964 decided "to take the necessary steps to refuse any aeroplane or ship or any other means of communication going or coming from south Africa the right to fly over the territories of Members States or utilize their ports or any other facilities", the position today is that many African countries still trade openly or surreptitiously with both South Africa and Portugal and allow ships and aircraft coming from or bound for these two countries to use their port facilities.¹⁶ Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malagasy Republic trade and deal economically with both Portugal and South Africa in an unblushing manner. Many other African countries, particularly in West Africa turn a blind eye on Portuguese and South African wines and other food items imported via Europe and sold in their European-controlled stores. European and American airlines planes going to or from South Africa are allowed to use airport facilities in countries like Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, and Senegal has no qualms about allowing South African ships to berth at Dakar routinely.

III The Dominant Ideological Frameworks Within Which the Political Decision-Makers of Independent African States Operate.

While it is true that the colonial acculturation of the independent states of Africa and the foreign-dependent economies bequeathed to them by the departing colonial authorities constitute a significant factor in the post-independence behavioural patterns and in the decision-making styles of African ruling elites vis-a-vis domestic and foreign policy issues, it will be less than true to assert that

this heritage of neo-colonial dependence is the only, or even the most significant factor influencing the feeble responses of most African countries to the great problems and challenges confronting them at home and abroad. One recognises the monumental constraints that the world capitalist and imperialist system imposes on African political decision-makers in the exercise of their initiative to formulate and execute viable and authentic national policies. One can not also fail to appreciate the extent to which the imperialist forces can go in their use of sabotage and coercion to eliminate or paralyse African political decision-makers who are committed to pursuing policies aimed at promoting the welfare of the masses of their compatriots and at curbing the exploitative activities of world monopoly capital, which is manifesting itself more and more in the form of the notorious "multi-national corporations".

Having acknowledged, however, the reality (even the vicious reality) of these objective constraints on the decision-making initiatives of African ruling elites, one would be falling prey to the notion of crude determinism in the realm of social action if one were to confine one's explanation of the performance of the key African political actors to the operation of these externally generated neocolonialist constraints. That kind of crude deterministic analysis would be indefensible both in theoretical terms and on the basis of available empirical evidence. It would inevitably rest on the unverified and fallacious presupposition that the African peoples, through their leaders, or, perhaps, because of their leaders, have no potential or actual capability for exercising their sovereign right of reshaping their neo-colonised societies in accordance with their own interests, needs, and aspirations. In effect, this would amount to adopting a fatalistic and defeatist position (sometimes taken by some African political decision-makers who are either unwilling or unable, or both, to act decisively to protect their peoples' interest; and often reinforced by imperialist scholar-propagandists interested in

perpetuating African dependence through auto-suggestion and other forms of psychological warfare), which, in essence, means that the African peoples are no free agents in the ordering of their own societal affairs and that options as sovereign actors are closed, or at least severely limited by the reality of the global "interdependence" of nations and peoples.

Now, it is true that this century has witnessed an unprecedented development in the direction of greater interdependence of all the peoples of the world. This course of development has been facilitated by a congeries of factors including the phenomenal growth of technology in communications, which has dramatically shrunken the vast distances separating far-flung regions of our planet, and developments in military technology which, in the era of formal colonialism, made it possible for colonial powers to subject to themselves distant territories and populations which were by far larger than their own. In the era of neocolonialism, collective imperialism and super-power politics, the massive technological power (civil and military), almost exclusively monopolised by Europe, North America and Japan, has become a crucial instrument for the manipulation and exploitation of the teeming populations of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Consequently, there are substantial elements of inequality and injustice built into this world system of interdependence. It is a kind of interdependence that yields escalating material and symbolic profits to those states which, within the system, monopolise technological and, therefore, economic and political power (i.e. the so-called developed countries) and progressively impoverishes, and subverts the human dignity of, two thirds of the world's population variously categorised as "underdeveloped", "developing" and "Third World" countries.

However, there is considerable empirical evidence to the effect that not all the peoples in the latter category of countries and not all their leaders accept the unjust and exploitative structure of a world system of interdependence of nations as a reality fossilised for all time and in relation to which they only have to adopt an attitude of resignation and docility. Most of the oppressed peoples of the world in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa waged a spirited military or political struggle, or both, against the pernicious system of European colonialism and won what might be termed formal-political independence. In the era of post-independence, which coincides with the era of neocolonialism, an admittedly small number of oppressed people have waged a successful struggle against neocolonial dependence or are engaged in active combat with the monster. Examples of the first group include the Peoples Republic of China, North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba, while the second group includes the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, and Zambia. The numerical insignificance of the countries which have successfully engaged or are engaging in a decisive struggle against neocolonial dependence and exploitation can be explained, at least partially, by the fact that it is a far more complicated struggle involving a high level of political consciousness and commitment, ideological clarity, organizational sophistication and effectiveness, moral and intellectual integrity and a large capacity for hard work and for making monumental sacrifices - qualities which most of the colonial foster elites running the affairs of African states do not have and, therefore, cannot help their people to acquire. These attributes are a sine qua non in a people's struggle against neocolonialism whose ultimate objectives are the complete dismantlement of the socio-economic structures of the neocolonial states, rigged by the departing colonial masters to be foreign-dependent, and the building in their places of new structures geared to the fulfilment of the real needs of the whole populace on the basis of the principles of justice and equity.

Experience has taught us that, difficult and risky as the anti-neocolonial struggle may be, it is not a theoretical or practical impossibility. If most African ruling elites have not shown interest in this kind of struggle, it is not because their options are closed, but rather because they have made the choice of acquiescing and collaborating in the neocolonial exploitation and oppression of their people, either because they stand to profit by making such an option or because they lack the intellectual acuteness, moral sensitivity and emotional involvement in the destiny of their peoples to discover the logical alternative course of action. In either case their parasitic and subversive leadership role cannot be extenuated even on the basis of a spurious deterministic analysis. The only path of honour for such 'leaders', if honour still has any meaning for them, is to relieve their people of this kind of infliction and affliction by quitting, failing which their peoples should treat them in the only way that traitors everywhere are treated. The viewpoint of Mr. A.M. Babu, former Minister in the Tanzania Government, is of the utmost pertinence in this context.

17 With all due respect, it is difficult to imagine, apart from one or two honourable exceptions, any of the present leaders (of Africa) who is capable of standing up for the genuine rights of his people, knowing that these rights are of necessity directly opposed to the interests of imperialism. And yet such a stand is necessary if we are to really fulfil our obligation as leaders, otherwise we have no right to impose our leadership on the people. While most of the leaders on the continent have no sense of urgency in solving the problems of the people's misery, since they don't bear the brunt of their misery, the masses, who do, cannot wait.¹⁷

The point that I am emphasising in this section of my paper is that we cannot adequately understand or explain the effete and generally disastrous responses of most independent African states to the colonial and racial problem in Southern Africa solely on the

basis of the objective constraints exerted on their leaders' actions by the global neocolonial economic structure and all the political and social consequences flowing therefrom. An adequate explanatory framework should also embrace an attempt to define and analyse the contextual social setting within which these African leaders act and their subjective intellectual and value orientations to this social setting. This analytical approach has two main advantages to recommend it - one theoretical and the other practical. First, it is consistent with the universally accepted theoretical principle that the foreign policy of any state cannot be usefully discussed or understood in isolation from the dominant issues of domestic policy decision-making in the state, foreign policy being essentially an extension of domestic policy. Second, by focussing attention on the crucial considerations of domestic policy underpinning the foreign policy actions of African states, we recognise that, even in a neocolonially structured world community of powerful and weak states, it is in the area of domestic policy that the ruling elites of weak states have the greater (albeit limited) scope for acting relatively independently to improve their fortune and sovereign control of their affairs, and it is primarily by enlarging this scope for independent action at home that they can establish a firm power base necessary for enhancing their leverage on the international arena. By identifying the areas of domestic policy decision-making where African leaders have reneged in their responsibility to their peoples we might succeed in drawing the attention of the politically conscious and articulate Africans to those areas of their leaders' policy decision-making to which they should apply the greatest pressure and on which African leaders might be most effectively challenged by their followers. Once we succeed in creating an intellectual climate in which African leaders are massively and relentlessly challenged by their compatriots on crucial policy issues, then we

would be launched on a course leading to a situation in which leaders with a genuine stake in their societies will begin to reflect their peoples' needs, interests and aspirations in their decision-making, and unresponsive leaders will become discredited and irrelevant in the eyes of their people and would inevitably be consigned to the "dunghill of history". It is only in a context like this that the African people everywhere can be freed from the intense paralytic feeling of despair, helplessness and uselessness induced by their subordination to, and exploitation by the combined forces of world imperialism and parasitic and subversive leadership at home.

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of most of the African national elites that took over power from the colonial authorities is the vested interest which they have in the continued dependence of countries on the metropolitan countries, which some of them affectionately refer to as "mother countries". To some extent this attachment to the metropolises is attributable to the colonial educational system that most of them underwent, especially in the former British and French colonies - an educational system which was designed for, and largely succeeded in, acculturating the colonials into the bourgeois ethos of grasping individualism and cheap commercial and profit orientation. Hence the myth of shared cultural values and political tradition with the metropolises. Furthermore, the colonial foster elites who replaced the colonial officers in key government and bureaucratic posts and those recruited by the big metropolitan companies as partners and agents were quick in grasping the fantastic profit potentials of their new positions. Because of their sense of gratitude to those metropolitan authorities who made it possible for them to emerge as the political and business leaders of their people, they have been more than enthusiastic in safeguarding the colonially bequeathed social and economic structure within which

they themselves had made such unbelievable progress. These foster elites of government officials (ministers and parliamentarians), military and civilian bureaucrats including academics working in state-financed universities, businessmen and professionals in private employment became the nuclei of the African national bourgeoisie whose ranks have been dramatically increased since independence through a quantitative expansion of the colonial education system at the expense of the peasant and working masses of their people. As Pierre van den Berge appositely noted in a recent book, the 'mandarinate' or the bureaucratic elite has become the kingpin of the emergent African bourgeoisie.¹⁸

Two foreign observers of the African scene - one French and one British - who do not belong to the general run of metropolitan academics whose favourite pastime is to brainwash African leaders, through blandishments and immoderate adulations, into believing that all is well with the ramshackle states they preside over - have produced shocking statistical analyses about the scandalously immoral profits that accrue to the African mandarin class from their dubious leadership roles. René Dumont in an analysis captioned, "Life's work of a peasant equals $1\frac{1}{2}$ months' work of a deputy", writes:

A deputy works (?) three months out of the year, and receives 120,000 to 165,000 francs a month all the year round. In six months of salary, or $1\frac{1}{2}$ months of work, he earns as much as the average peasant in thirty-six years, a whole lifetime of hard labour.¹⁹

Stanislav Andreski making a similar analysis for Anglophone Africa writes:

If we take the wage of an average unskilled worker as the unit of comparison, and express the salaries of the top grades of the civil service as the multiples thereof, we find that in Britain the ratio is about 1:5 whereas in Nigeria or Sierra Leone it is about 1:40. After tax it becomes about 1:4 in Britain, whereas in its former colonies the ratio remains unchanged [or even wider, S.O.O.] because the equalising effect of the less steeply graduated income tax is offset by tax-free allowances for cars, subsidised housing and miscellaneous services received by the higher ranks of the public employees.²⁰

Yet, it is among this over-pampered and largely inept bureaucratic bourgeoisies that one most often comes across eloquent and impassioned demands for increased salaries and fringe benefits, and equally eloquent arguments justifying a wage-freeze for manual labour because of its "low productivity".²¹

Since the appetite often grows by what it feeds on, most African leaders soon discover that their scandalously unjust remunerations, in situations of grinding mass poverty, are not adequate for maintaining the obscenely lavish life-styles that they believe their already overburdened compatriots must provide them with. They then quickly work out an elaborate network of corrupt practices through which they can augment their 'meagre' earnings. In effect, they set up what Stanislaw Andreski characterises as "kleptocracy or corruption as a system of government". This kleptocratic system of government manifests itself in many ways: the widespread peculation and bribery indulged in by petty and medium-grade public officials, the ruthless and heavy financial exactions of the police from the ordinary people, the racketeering surrounding the collection of customs and excise duties, the award of government contracts and licences of various kinds for substantial financial considerations, fiddling with government sales and purchases and,

the simplest and most profitable form of graft: the straightforward transfer of funds from the public treasury to the private accounts [often overseas] of the principal members of the ruling cliques.

It was only the embryonic stage of the development of kleptocracy by the African bourgeoisie that Frantz Fanon saw before his ultimately death in 1961, and yet he was able to write, with such penetrating insight and prophetic precision, a withering indictment of their present and future leadership possibilities. He writes,

In under-developed countries, we have seen that no true bourgeoisie exists; there is only a sort of greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it. This get-rich-quick middle class shows itself incapable of great ideas or of inventiveness. It remembers what it has read in European text-books and imperceptibly it becomes not even the replica of Europe, but its caricature... The national bourgeoisie of under-developed countries must not be opposed because it threatens to slow down the total, harmonious development of the nation. It must stoutly be opposed because, literally, it is good for nothing. This bourgeoisie, expressing its mediocrity in its profits, its achievements and in its thought tries to hide this mediocrity by buildings which have prestige value at the individual level, by chromium plating on big American cars, by holidays in the Riviera and weekends in neon-lit night-clubs.²²

The colossal flair of this caricature of a bourgeoisie for dissipating the meagre resources of their states on mindlessly exhibitionist ventures has increased so dramatically since the 'decade of independence' as to make it impossible for even Fanon's gargantuan imaginative powers to grasp the full extent of its possible growth. For instance, unthinkably large and undisclosed sums of money go into mounting the annual pomp and pageantry of OAU ministerial council and summit meetings, while vital anti-poverty

programmes at home and the liberation movements in southern Africa are starved of funds and attention. The African bourgeoisies from all over the continent sink huge fortunes, even by the standard of the richer nations, on irrelevant mass spectacles like national sports and arts festivals, all-Africa games²³ and World Festivals of black arts and culture (in a situation in which a significant section of black men are living under dehumanising conditions of oppression and repression), and on other forms of national monuments to folly and decadence.

The intellectual and moral bankruptcy of the African bourgeoisie goes much beyond its insatiable appetite for consuming the meagre resources generated by the sweat of its people and beyond its total inability to create any new resources or enhance what is in existence. It is so obsessed with enlarging its profits that it can find neither the time nor the will to address itself to working out a structured and systematic approach to the solution of the society's most critical problems. Consequently its members operate as if the existing neo-colonial structure operating in their societies is perfect, divinely ordained and in accordance with the best interest of their people. In this way, they absolve themselves from the responsibility to try and work out new theoretical frameworks or ideological programmes, that are more in accord with the need for a progressive and just restructuring of their societies. With a few exceptions, they are uniformly allergic to anything that smacks of socialism. Operating under the cover of a spurious kind of African nationalism, they dismiss socialism as a foreign ideology that is inconsistent with African reality, because, as they say, socialist ideology is atheistic and based on the notion of class struggle whereas African societies are inherently and intensely religious, have no classes

and are profoundly egalitarian and communalistic. The vast majority of them never refer to capitalism as a foreign ideology because, I believe, as the class that benefit most, possibly exclusively, from its operation, they have a vested interest in perpetuating it and hope that the masses of their ill-used people can be made to work tamely within it and for it.

When they then discover that significant sections of their people, far from acquiescing in the system that grinds them to the dust, show their restiveness in the form of industrial strikes, peasant riots and oppositional political activities, they bring to bear on their rebellious subjects all the instruments of coercion bequeathed to them by their colonial foster parents (including, sometimes, metropolitan troops stationed on their territories on the basis of fictitious mutual defence agreements). By thus silencing their peoples' voice of dissent, they bring an end to dialogue between themselves and their people, and become increasingly out of touch with the feelings of those on whose behalf they rule. The original physical distance between the vast masses of their people living in remote rural areas and urban slums and themselves living in the few pockets of Euro-American-type suburbia, located in the capital and the major urban centres of commerce and administration, become compounded by a psychological distance. The psychological distance, for the ordinary people, is increasingly manifested in distrust of, anger with, sometimes, outright hostility towards their rulers, and a general attitude of cynical indifference and contempt for anything (usually platitudinous hortatory declamations) emanating from their governments. The leaders, on their part, often compound this problem of physical and psychological distance from their people by barricading (in effect imprisoning) themselves behind the stone walls and iron gates of their presidential and ministerial palaces

policed by armed gendarmes who are under instruction to keep away, by force if need be, all but the few accredited members of the ruling cliques. These leaders, some of whom were popular heroes during the anti-colonial struggle, are now so obsessed with the fear of assassination by their people that they are no longer able to meet their people, except by remote control via radio and television, and they can only travel in their own countries either by helicopters and executive jet planes or in motocades, preceded and followed by a whole contingent of outriders and armoured vehicles.

This physical and psychological isolationism from their people into which most African ruling elites have manoeuvred themselves has proved extremely beneficial to the imperialist powers in their effort to maintain and strengthen their hold on their former colonies. In a situation in which African leaders are unable or unwilling, or both, to mobilize the masses of their people (with whom they cannot even talk!) for a concerted national effort to uplift their societies from their condition of poverty and degradation, the only people they feel at ease with are foreign experts and advisers from the so-called developed capitalist countries. Many of these African leaders are only too happy to entrust these foreign friends of theirs with all the problems of working out and executing the plans of development for their impoverished countries. The result is that what most African governments put out in their propaganda as "development plans" are often totally irrelevant to the needs and problems of their people. In the first instance, these foreign experts and advisers are largely agents of imperialism who, even when they have not been specifically briefed by their home governments, are anxious, through the planning process, to reinforce the neocolonial structure of the economies of their host countries. They ensure that their development plan blueprints are pervaded by concepts and values that would help to enhance the development of local bourgeoisies and compound the foreign dependence of African economies. Almost uniformly,

the allocation of investment capital under the plans is concentrated largely in the extractive mineral industries - petroleum, copper, tin, columbite, uranium, iron ore, bauxite etc - which are dominated by private foreign investment capital, have very low technological input, employ Africans largely at the level of unskilled manual labour, and produce almost exclusively for the international market over which the producer countries have virtually no control. Agriculture which in most African countries employs between 70 and 90 per cent of the adult labour force gets no more than a perfunctory attention from the economic planning experts (except, perhaps, in the area of cash-crop production which is again foreign-oriented and controlled). African political decision-makers and their foreign experts explain away this criminal lack of attention for the agricultural sector of the economy by invoking the palpably dishonest and mystifying notions of the low-absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector and the hostility of the so-called ignorant, conservative and tradition-bound peasant farmers to innovative techniques of cultivation.

Industrialisation, for these bogus apostles of planned national economic development, apart from the extractive industries, does not go much beyond the establishment of motor vehicle and electrical appliances assembly plants and light industries producing textile materials, soft drinks and alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and other luxury items, which require heavy capital imports in form of machinery, technical personnel and even raw materials. The result is that these industries, presented originally in the plan documents as "import-substituting" industries, designed to save the host countries' meagre foreign exchange reserves, result in even more massive drain on these reserves. The following statement in Nigeria's current development plan is tragically true for most African countries:

Most manufacturing industrial activities in the country are still not manufacturing in the true sense of the term, but mere assembly industries. Very often, all the components used are imported and are merely put together behind the tariff wall. Whether one is considering the manufacture of shoes or cosmetics, beer or soft drinks, the story is broadly the same.... All that happens at the breweries is that all the imported inputs are mixed and sealed in imported bottles.²⁴

Further, most African political decision-makers who are themselves crude commercial capitalists, behaving as controlling shareholders in their nations' economies need little persuasion by their foreign experts to endorse their writing into these spurious development plans the crucial importance and indispensability of private foreign investment for the rapid development of African economies. Consequently, according to one expert report, for foreign investment capital to "be sure of its welcome, there should be a reasonably good prospect of attracting it". In other words, the host country must create conditions congenial to the influx of foreign investment capital like an "assurance of free transferability of profits and repatriation of capital," the enactment of generous tax laws and the avoidance by the host government of direct participation in industrial development and, therefore, of competition with foreign investment capital.²⁵

Another major conceptual weapon in the armoury of the economic experts who stage-manage the development plans of most African countries is the false notion of the indispensability of foreign aid - in form of foreign government grants, loans, technical personnel etc. (some African governments have even come to accept foreign capital investment as 'aid') - to the development and survival of the African economies. In spite of the undeniably disastrous collapse of the hopes raised by the U.N. "First Development Decade" launched in 1960 on the basis of this false notion; the continuing frustration by

GATT and UNCTAD of all the developing countries' demand for fair trade between them and the developed countries; and the massive literature on the essentially fraudulent intent of aid donors and the anti-developmental orientation of most aid programmes,²⁶ many African leaders and their foreign expert advisers still believe that their countries' prospect for rapid and beneficial economic development is largely dependent on the inflow of foreign aid.

Most African leaders are very sympathetically disposed to the warning given by their foreign expert advisers and domestic consultants that it is economically self-defeating for their governments to seek to acquire ownership of foreign owned enterprises. One such expert, having dismissed as "irrational" the widespread view that foreign-ownership is "somehow an infringement of the freedom of action of an economy", proceeds to make the pontifical but unsubstantiated assertion that "in any case, nationalisation of existing enterprise is simply a reshuffling of papers".²⁷ The experts, making a spurious semantic distinction, advise their African government employers to seek "control" rather than "ownership" of private enterprise. They are able to make such statements and to be taken seriously in spite of the all-pervading experience of African governments concerning the difficulty in obtaining accurate information from (let alone exercising effective control on) the private sector of their economies "for a variety of reasons including the need to guard business secrets". Consequently there are few African leaders who have formulated policies of nationalisation. What most of them plug for is 'indigenisation' and partnership between foreign and indigenous private entrepreneurs.

One of the major consequences of this neocolonially guided strategy of economic development is to introduce greater distortions into African economies that had already been grossly distorted by the colonial impact, render them more vulnerable to neocolonial manipulation and exploitation, and progressively less responsive to the needs and aspirations of the vast African masses. Some of the most staggering contradictions generated by such a budious strategy of development are considered below.

There is the recurrent transfer of capital resources from the impoverished rural areas for the development of urban centres, where the ruling cliques are based, in such a way that the national bourgeoisie can maximize its consumption of the most modern products of science and technology. In this kind of situation where the major urban centres are throbbing with economic, largely commercial, activity, and peasant farming in rural areas is becoming progressively unremunerative, but back-breaking as ever, the phenomenon of massive rural-urban migration (inaccurately, but prophetically characterised by a colonial labour officer in Nigeria in the early 1940s as "flight to the towns") has become a major pan-African problem. Some of its repercussions are the alarming food shortage with its inflationary implications, the terrible congestion in most African large cities and the dangerous overloading of the limited capability of most of these towns to meet the escalating demands of these mushrooming urban populations for such basic needs as employment, housing, sanitation, transportation and recreational facilities. This overloading has already created for these major urban centres serious social problems that are proving intractable - juvenile delinquency, vagrancy and beggary, a steep rise in the incidence of criminal offences (including crimes of violence), and the sprouting of some of the world's ugliest and odoriferous slums and shanty towns.

Even in the area of urban development, the slummy section inhabited by the vast majority of the urban populations (wage workers, junior government officials and employees of private firms, self-employed craftsmen and petty traders and the armies of the unemployed) are usually totally neglected at the expense of the well-planned, well-sanitized and low-population density suburban government reservation areas and housing estates, where the top-notch bourgeois elites live. Even though some of the urban facilities like electricity, television

and pipe-borne water cannot be totally denied to the slum dwellers, the elitist slant of urban development has tended to result in such ridiculous contradictions as the one dramatically couched by Stanislaw Andreski as "Television without Sanitation".

Perhaps the most serious way in which the elitist and neocolonial management of the African economies has affected the overall well-being and stability of the African states is by exacerbating sub-national ethnic rivalries and antipathies, and, thereby, making the task of establishing viable nations and consciousness of these nations a virtual impossibility. In the first instance, the kleptocratic rule of the national elite, their physical and psychological detachment from their people, their lack of patriotism manifested in their close collaboration with imperialist forces and the proverbial incompetence of most of them create a forceful impression among the masses of Africans that, nationalist and pan-African rhetoric notwithstanding, the leaders themselves have no commitment to the nation from which they profit most. The African bourgeois elites even go a step further to undermine the growth of a national consciousness among their people. In the scramble among the elites to share the limited national cake some members of the national bourgeoisies find it expedient to mobilize support for their claims by appealing to crude sectional ethnic loyalty with the result that, very often, most of the time and energy resources of the central government is dissipated either in the risky business of balancing various violently conflicting parochial ethnic interests, or in attempts by a dominant ethnic group, or a dominant combination of ethnic groups, to suppress the others and exclude them from sharing in the loot. In such a circumstance, national interests and affairs receive scant or no attention, the national bourgeois elite thus compounds its own problem of fragile legitimacy and the national political system crumbles under the sheer weight of its own incompetence and unproductivity.

At such moments of crisis the national armies, where their action is not preempted by the metropolitan armies based on their territories, find little difficulty in dismissing the politicians and appropriating state power to themselves. Of the twenty-two odd military coups d'etat that have taken place in African states since independence, there are very few whose leaders did not give as the *raison d'etre* of their intervention their desire to cure their societies of such ills as corruption, misgovernment, 'tribalism' and nepotism. However, Africa's experience with military regimes over the past twelve years or so is that after the soldiers' rhetoric about their "corrective", "redemptive" "liberational" and other such highfalutin objectives and the initial mass euphoria generated by it, it quickly becomes clear to everybody that the soldiers are not much different from the hated politicians that they displaced. This discovery is often baffling to the ordinary people who have been fed on the myth of the army being specially structured to inculcate discipline, national consciousness and probity into its members. But nobody is surprised who knows that the officer corps of the African national armies passed through the same kind of parasitic Western education as their civilian counterparts. On the contrary, one should expect them to have the same attitudes of grasping individualism and crude commercialism vis-a-vis the national economy, and to be equally infected by the virus of crude parochial ethnic loyalties. Consequently the practice of kleptocracy and ethnic chauvinism under the military is often done in a more open and unblushing manner than under the politicians, because, while the politicians tend to silence their critics and opponents temporarily by putting them in jail or under detention, the soldiers have the capability (which they sometimes use to drive home a lesson) to silence theirs for ever with their guns.

From the foregoing analysis, it should be clear why the ruler of the independent African states, operating severally or collectively on the international scene (whether in the U.N.O. or OAU) have not been able to make any real impact on the southern African situation. National

bourgeoisies who are unable to come to grips with their domestic problems, who, rather than mobilize their peoples for combating these problems, avoid the peoples or generate divisive ethnic loyalties among them, cannot be realistically expected to mobilise these same peoples in the pan-African struggle against imperialist and racist exploitation and oppression of fellow Africans in such "far off places" as South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. Given also their exhibitionist style of government and living, and the limited resources of their countries, it is obvious that they cannot, even if they are willing, recall money, already stolen from their treasuries or dissipated on conspicuous consumption, either for the domestic struggle against the poverty and degradation of their peoples or for the pan-African struggle against racist and minority rule elsewhere.

It is, however, not intended to give the impression, by raising these gargantuan problems (some externally derived and other generated at home by us) that Africa is perpetually doomed to perform at this abysmal level of consciousness of its best interests and with its present type of criminal negligence and incompetence. I agree entirely with René Dumont that "there is no curse on Black Africa" and that "men alone are responsible for the economic backwardness of Africa" and, if I may add, for its present confusion and lack of direction. We know the men who are responsible - our imperialist and neo-colonialist exploiters and their running dogs, our national bourgeoisies. Combined, they are a formidable and forbidding force, but they are not invincible. The concluding section of this paper attempts to draw in outline a pan-African programme of revolutionary action, derived in large measure from the thoughts and experiences of Africa's most patriotic leaders, which, hopefully will add, even in a small way, to the effectiveness of the struggle of all the peoples of Africa to free themselves from the strangle-hold of foreign and domestic imperialism.

IV. The Challenge of Southern Africa to the Rest of Africa and the Necessity for a Revolutionary Pan-African Strategy

The main challenge that the southern African situation poses to the rest of Africa is the basic one of redressing without delay the great imbalance in economic and military power between the "white redoubt" (especially the apartheid state of South Africa) in southern Africa and the ragged ensemble of states that constitute independent Africa. The decisive war for southern Africa, for the restoration of the human dignity of all men in that region can only ultimately be fought and won in the Republic of South Africa where about $3\frac{1}{2}$ million whites have established and are maintaining one of the worst forms of tyranny, known to man, over about 14 million men of colour. Experience has taught us that that war cannot be effectively waged by rhetorical denunciation of apathoid at international conferences or in the world press, neither can the issues of man's inhumanity to man involved there in be resolved by peaceful negotiations or "dialogue" between the champions of apartheid and the leaders of independent African states, the championing of "dialogue" by such African leaders or ex-leaders, like Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Kamuzu Banda and Kofi Busia notwithstanding. It is clear beyond all doubt that the only way in which African political decision-makers can persuade the Boers and other racists in South Africa that their racist oppression of Africans is an outrage against mankind is by inflicting a massive military defeat on the apartheid regime.

Now, I appreciate that this is a herculean task, and many Western scholar-propagandists and some mentally colonised African scholars are ever so prompt in assuring us that a policy of military confrontation with South Africa is suicidal and, therefore, does not constitute a viable option in the African struggle against minority racial oppression in South Africa. Among the considerations that lead them to this

pessimistic conclusion are the massive superiority of South Africa over the rest of Africa in the trained manpower, economic resources and military technology required for prosecuting a modern war,²⁸ and the impossibility of mounting an effective guerilla warfare inside South Africa in view of the fact that the rulers of that country have taken the crucial precaution of making it impossible for black South Africans to own fire-arms or acquire knowledge of their use, and because the "suppression of Africans is eroding away the leadership of the middle class". Some of them then proceed from this premise to assert that the only viable strategy of action for the African states is to give more attention and importance to promoting international collective action. For instance in a book, co-authored by four U.S. scholars, on South Africa, their analyses of the prospect for a change in the situation lead them to the conclusions that: (1) "adequate spontaneous change seems highly unlikely and the ability to change the situation by outside persuasion or intervention appears, on examination, to be pitifully inadequate to the task;" (ii) "in searching for changes within South Africa which might conceivably lead to some more acceptable adjustment among the races.... none of the authors find great hope." However the four distinguished authors have no problem in ending their book on this mystifying and fatalistic note, conveniently forgetting their history and ignoring the superordination of U.S. economic and strategic interests in southern Africa:

Finally, the four authors agree that the United States must continue to stand by its long and deeply held principles and ideals supporting human rights and racial equality. The time factor may have stretched out in South Africa by recent internal and external events and changes, but time is not permanently on the side of racial restrictions and suppressions.²⁹

An African scholar puts the same point in an even more naive, abject and defeatist formulation. He writes:

In conclusion, therefore, the key to the ultimate achievement of African goals and in Southern Africa lies with the Western powers. Thus, in order for the African states to achieve their goals, they must continue to direct their strategies to enlisting the support of the Western powers.

One crucial way in which this African scholar believes, in his naivete, that the African states can win the support of the West is by increasing their material aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa in such a way as to enhance the level to their resistance, resulting in more violent reactions from the colonial and settler regimes of Southern Africa. By thus provoking "more Sharpeville-type incidents", African states "could arouse the concern of the Western powers and more support for African policies on these Questions because the Western powers, particularly the United States, desire to avoid racial conflicts which could endanger the peace and security of Africa and the world at large."³⁰

All these dim and pessimistic views concerning the impossibility of an effective and successful military campaign against South Africa are derived from a complex of theoretical and value orientations which are untenable and are potentially subversive of the meagre efforts (which need to be dramatically increased) being made by patriotic Africans to work out a viable strategy of struggle. First, such views are underpinned by the theoretically false assumption that the African societies do not change in a processual manner and will stagnate for ever as economically and militarily weak and politically and ideologically fragmented societies, whereas the 'white redoubt' in Southern Africa will progressively enhance its economic and military capability. This assumption contains a hidden element of racialist thinking on the basis of which Africans and all peoples of colour, the "inferior races" are written off as congenitally infantile and incompetent. Further, there is in the minds of the scholars who formulate such views the

simplistic and arrogant notion that African societies being primitive and simple are amenable to a theoretical analysis which, in one fell swoop, can provide a complete explanation of their present make-up and a total picture of their future development, if at all they are capable of any development.

Also, because of their own ideological commitment to help keep Africa dependent on the Western capitalist states in a neocolonial system, they are unwilling to consider the possibility of fundamental revolutionary changes taking place in some or all these societies even when there are clear indications of such a possibility. For instance, if the patriotic forces of PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO in Mozambique, MPLA and UNITA in Angola and their host countries and primary supporters (Republic of Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo Brazaville) had heeded the dark warning of such apostles of doom, they could not have succeeded in prosecuting for so long their revolutionary peoples' wars which have helped Europe to get rid of its longest-lasting fascist dictatorship and have forced Portugal, the most obdurate European colonial power, to accept (at least verbally) the right of its African colonial territories to self-determination. The clear lesson for the whole of Africa in the discomfiture of Portugal is that there is no other path to victory against imperialism except that of revolutionary armed struggle. Portuguese colonialism in Africa is tottering on the verge of total collapse, not because its NATO allies have deserted it and cast their lot with African freedom fighters, but because the heroic African freedom fighters by engaging Portugal on several fronts at the same time have succeeded in breaking the backbone of its resistance.

If the loosely structured and integrated assault of the African liberation movements against Portuguese imperialism can yield such high returns, then one can imagine the colossal impact that a concerted and closely-knit pan-African revolutionary offensive can have not only on apartheid South Africa and Zimbabwe, but also on the world imperialist system. One, however, recognizes that such a pan-African revolutionary offensive cannot be merely wished into existence, nor can it be launched

and directed by the OAU as it is presently constituted and structured. Since, on the basis of my earlier discussion, it should be clear that the OAU is, in effect, a caucus of the top representatives of the decadent African bourgeoisies that Fanon appositely characterises as "literally... good for nothing", it becomes a matter of urgent necessity for those committed to the cause of social justice at home and Pan-African revolution to discredit these parasitic national bourgeoisies and dislodge them from the dominant positions that they have usurped from their people. Articulate and committed African revolutionaries should inform themselves thoroughly about the peoples' revolutionary struggles for justice and dignity all over the world, and pay an especial attention to the Tanzanian revolution which is unfolding before our very eyes. Tanzania is, perhaps, the only African country which has fully elaborated and is implementing a programme for the revolutionary transformation of its society for the benefit of all its people. Starting with the Arusha Declaration of 1966 the Tanzanian government has inaugurated a strategy for independent development, underpinned by such principles and policies as the deliberate recapture, through nationalisation, of the control of the national economy from foreign entrepreneurs, the devaluation of foreign aid and foreign investment as significant factors in Tanzania's national economic development, the adoption of a socialist ideology which means that the success of planning for economic development is no longer measured exclusively or largely in terms of such abstract and irrelevant statistical categories like G.N.P., G.D.P., and balance of payments position but by how much improvement in living conditions accrues to the vast majority of Tanzanians who are farmers - hence, the heavy emphasis on the creation of ujamaa villages and the inculcation among the broad masses of the people of a genuinely cooperative production ethos - the emphasis on education for self-reliance and a self-reliant strategy of economic development which constitutes a most effective counterforce to the perpetuation of a neocolonial dependence mentality among

the people, the institutionalisation of a code of ethical behaviour for the leaders of the TANU, the Tanzanian government and bureaucracy, reducing the income gap between the leaders and the led and proscribing the all too familiar African elite practices like corruption, speculation, in business and exhibitionism among the leaders, thereby significantly narrowing the psychological gap that separates most African leaders from their peoples.

While one is not claiming perfection for the Tanzanian social system, Tanzania appears to be one of the exceptionally few African governments that are genuinely committed to the overall interests of their people, are not afraid to learn from their peoples how to help them improve their lives, and are not afraid to admit that they are capable of making errors from which they would be prepared to learn. It is the acme of revolutionary idealism and commitment (which can hardly fail to infect the masses) for a leader like Nyerere to be as ascetic, approachable and willing to work and live among his people, who, in response to his inspiration and TANU's leadership, are building for themselves a new and better life in their ujamaa villages. It is also a measure of Nyerere's intellectual integrity and openness for him not to hide from his people the truth about the difficult path of socialist reconstruction and to be able to say that, "if we tell our friends that we are going to the new going to the new Jerusalem and they still find us in the desert, they should not be surprised".³¹ Consequently, it is not an accident that Tanzania is right in the forefront of the pan-African struggle against racial oppression and degradation in Southern Africa.

A successful and definitive pan-African revolutionary struggle in southern Africa would depend on the emergence, right across the continent, of many more states like Tanzania (and even better than Tanzania) whose leaders, to paraphrase A.M. Babu's words, would not only be capable of, but prompt in standing up for the genuine rights of their peoples, no matter the cost to themselves. For such an authentic revolutionary

atmosphere to be created on a pan-African scale, the best representatives of African humanity would have to wage an extremely tough and relentless struggle (calling for the full exertion of their mental, physical and moral powers) against all the paralysing forces of residual colonialism, neocolonialist machinations and national bourgeois treachery and subversion. It is only then that pan-Africanism will cease to be a hollow slogan and become a living and electrifying ideology of combat for the masses of our people. Then Kwame Nkrumah's dream of a continental African unity against mass poverty and oppression and for prosperity and independence would have become a reality, and the bastions of oppression and exploitation in Southern Africa and everywhere in Africa will begin to crumble away in the face of the united might of the African peoples.

REFERENCES

1. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, "Black Africa and the French Union", in Philip W. Quigg (ed.), Africa: A Foreign Affairs Reader, (New York, Praeger, 1964) pp. 265-271.
2. Leopold Sedar Senghore, "West Africa in Evolution", in Philip W. Quigg (ed), op. cit. p.285.
3. Abubakar Tafawar Balewa, Nigeria Speaks (Ikeja, Lagos, Longman 1964) p.61.
4. See Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, (H.R.D.) 16/11/61, 1961/62, Vol. IV, col. 2987 for one of the very rare cases in which representatives of African ruling elites actually verbalise their fear of imperialist retaliation for espousing any anti-imperialist policy.

The Nigerian Federal Minister for Economic Development, Waziri Ibrahim, in his contribution of an economic debate in the House on 16th November, 1961, said,

"You know very well that if we want to go very quickly in our economic changes, we cannot easily do it without creating a certain amount of trouble in this country because of the inevitable meddling of the imperialists".

Citing the tragic end of Lumumba in the hands of the imperialists, he continued:

"The imperialists have got various means of defending their monopoly. They have got their newspaper and televisions and they go to any extent to tell lies. If we want to really set about improving the economy of our country in a particular way, they may say we are Communists. They can make our countrymen suspect our every move. If they do not succeed by false propaganda by calling us all sorts of names, if they fail to make us unpopular in order to win their case, they can arrange assassination. They can do it by poison or by setting our own people against us. They can go to any extent without discrimination".

5. See, for example, (i) Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism (London, Panaf, 1971) (ii) Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London and Dar-es-Salaam, 1972), (iii) Samir Amin, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa, Penguin, 1973) and R.H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (Penguin, 1968) especially Parts 1 and 2.
6. For instance, an M.P., O.C. Agwuna, operating to the left of the Government, wondered aloud:

"What can we give as our reason for preventing indigenous Africans from East Africa and the Union of South Africa from entering this country? People in those areas are looking forward to Nigeria as their saviour country.... to help them in overcoming some of their problems of race prejudice". (See Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, 21/11/58, 1958/59 Session, Vol. IV, p.30.

7. Ibid. p.29.
8. H.R.D., 16/8/60, 1960/61 Session, Vol.IV, col. 2470-2471.
9. See Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney, The South African Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid (Penguin, 1973) which is the best and the most informed exposé known to me of the labyrinthine network of Western economic and financial interests underpinning the commitment of the Western powers to the vigorous support and defence of the South African apartheid regime.
10. Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid (The University Press of Kentucky, 1970) pp. 235-6.
11. See for example the following Security Council Resolutions on the ban on arms sales to South Africa:

181 of 7th August, 1963, 182 of 4th December, 1963,
191 of 18th June, 1964 and 282 of 23rd July, 1970.

None of these resolutions has stopped France from selling a wide variety of arms to South Africa since 1963 or Britain from renewing the sale of arms to the same regime, under the Symonstown Agreement, since 1971.
12. Moses E. Akpan, "African Goals and Strategies Toward Southern Africa", African Studies Review, Vol. XIV No. 2, Sept. 1971, pp. 248-252.
13. See OAU Council of Ministers Meeting, 2nd Ordinary Session (Lagos 24-29 Feb., 1964) Resolution 23(II).

14. West Africa, No. 2964, 8th April, 1974, p.403.
15. Robert K.A. Gardiner, M.J. Austeo and C.L. Patterson (eds.) Africa and the World, (Addis Ababa, Oxford University Press, 1970) p.3
16. Note, for instance, the following remark made by Dr. John Karefa-Smart, the Sierra Leone Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1964 at the 2nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers Meeting held in Lagos, 24-29 Feb., 1964:

"I have been dealing with certain matters and from the answers given to us both by the people we are dealing with and by the world press, the impression is that while we are here talking our very countries are trading with South Africa and allowing our ports to be used by them. Why must we leave this meeting without dealing with this matter?" [Cited by W. Scott Thompson and Richard Bissell "Legitimacy and Authority in the OAU", African Studies Review, Vol. XV, No. 1 (April 1972) p.36]
17. A.M. Babu, "Postscript" to Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (London, Bogle-L'Ouverture and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972) pp. 315-316.
18. Pierre L. van den Berghe, Power and Privilege in an African University (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) pp. 59-62.
19. René Dumont, False Start in Africa, translated by Phyllis Nauts Ott, (New York, Praeger, 1969, 2nd ed.) p.81.
20. Stanislaw Andreski, The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation (London, Micheal Joseph, 1969, 2nd imp.) p.143.
21. See S.O. Osoba, "Factors-Militating-Against Creative and Socially Relevant Intellectual. Activity in Colonial and Post-Colonial Nigeria", forthcoming in Theory and Practice (Vol.1, No.1).
22. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington, (New York, Grove Press, Inc. 1963) p.141.

Writing in a similar vein, Dumont observes that, "Far-sighted Presidents and Ministers build savings accounts 'for their old age' in Swiss banks, and their wives buy villas on the lake of Geneva", and he concludes that, "a new type of bourgeoisie is forming in Africa, that Karl Marx would hardly have foreseen, a bourgeoisie of the civil service. One day we may look back on the old bourgeoisie of Western Europe with mostal nostalgia and affection, despite the criticisms we have levelled at it". (René Dumont op. cit. pp. 81-82).

23. This madness has been growing steadily in spite of Fanon's most pertinent warning given in 1961:

"The youth of Africa ought not to be sent to sports stadiums but into the fields and into schools. The stadium ought not to be a show place erected in the towns, but a bit of open ground in the midst of the fields that young people must reclaim, cultivate and give to the nation... The African politician should not be pre-occupied with turning out sportsmen, but with turning out fully conscious men, who play games as well... Sports should not be a pastime or a distraction for the bourgeoisie of the towns". (Frantz Fanon, op. cit. p.157).

24. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, p.285.
25. The Economic Development of Nigeria: Report of a Mission Organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1955) pp. 28-30 and 353-354.
26. See in particular the following works:
- (i) Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Penguin, 1971);
 - (ii) Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson, The Myth of Aid: The Hidden Agenda of the Development Reports (New York, IDOC, and Orbis Books, 1971); and
 - (iii) Ann Seidman, Foreign Funds and Self-Reliant Development: Some Lessons from the East African Experience, (1972 mimeographed).
27. W.F. Stolper, Planning Without Fact: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966) p.279.
28. See for example (i) William R. Duggan, A Socioeconomic Profile of South Africa (New York, Praeger, 1973) p.138 where the author claims, albeit on the basis of empirical data, that "no combination of forces, solely derived from the African militarily today. Logistics, fire-power, airpower, and trained manpower are weighted in favour of South Africa"; (ii) Army Vandenbosch, op. cit. p. 284 where the author is categorical in his conviction that "none of the African states nor any combination of them could mount a military campaign against South Africa which would really threaten it". and (iii) Moses E. Akpan, op. cit., 250-252.

29. William A. Hance (ed.) with Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay and Edwin S. Munger, Southern Africa and the United States (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968) pp. 161-167.

This kind of fatalistic attitude of hoping that time, as if it were an active agent, could solve all problems is often adopted by African leaders who are unwilling to act decisively. A typical example is Robert K. Gardiner who, admitting that "the odds are obviously against Africa," then proceeds to warn his compatriots against "the raising of false hopes of quick results", and, borrowing from the language of the U.S. National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples "during its difficult years", asserts that "Africans must be prepared to 'inch' their way towards their goal, if need be". (R.A.K. Gardiner et. al. (eds.) op. cit., p.15).

30. Moses E. Akpan, op. cit., pp. 259-260.

The experience of African diplomatic lobbyists of the U.S. and other Western powers for support in their struggle against racial oppression in Southern Africa makes nonsense of such soap-bubble optimism as is represented by Dr. Akpan's position. For example, in a typical case reported by Dr. John Karefa-Smart of Sierra Leone on U.S. attitude to an African-sponsored resolution, presented by him and Mongi Slim of Tunisia at the U.N. Security Council in mid-1963, he complained that the American government "considered NATO of such great importance... that they said quite openly that if it came to a vote their alliance with NATO was of much more importance to them than their friendship with Africa". (O.A.U., First Regular Conference of OAU Foreign Ministers (Dakar, August 1963) Verbatim Manuscripts, mimeographed, p.22).

31. Africa magazine, No. 35 (July, 1974) p.36.