


# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT

THE HUMAN DIMENSION  
AS THE TEST OF AND A MEANS OF ACHIEVING  
AFRICA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT

*Reweaving the social fabric,  
Restoring the broken pot*

by

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**Khartoum, Sudan**  
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UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother 'It got broken'. Not 'I broke the pot' but 'It got broken'... And who did this? We did. We broke the pot.

- Jerry John Rawlings  
President of Ghana

Adjustment programmes which rend the fabric of society cannot be sustained.

- E.V.K. Jaycox  
Vice President for Africa  
World Bank

We seem at present to be backing into the future one crisis at a time.

- G.K. Helleiner  
Political Economist

To plan is to choose.  
Choose to go forward.

- Julius K. Nyerere  
Past President,  
United Republic of Tanzania

## A. WHAT DO YOU WANT TO BE WHEN YOU GROW UP? ALIVE

1. That question and that answer from a young African girl on a 1985 UNICEF poster set out the stark reality of the human condition confronting millions of souls in Africa today (and yesterday, and tomorrow). The fabric of many societies - national, regional and local - has been rent apart. The cooking pots of millions have been broken. To pretend otherwise is to deceive ourselves and to betray the poor and vulnerable people; the women, the children, the displaced victims of drought and of war, the poor peasants and the equally poor urban slum dwellers.
2. The record of economic and social development in Africa since 1979 is written in grim statistics and in human tears. To date there is no foreseeable end to it for many countries and many millions of people. Despite relatively good weather 1985 and 1986 at best saw relatively stable per capita output - at levels brutally reduced to those of the early 1970s or even, in some cases, 1960s, by widespread output stagnation and decline over 1980-1984. The projections of the World Bank and of ECA give little cause for optimism. If the world economy and the northern economies perform moderately better than expected, 1987-1995 per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa might remain constant. But it would not recover and on less roseate external economic context assumptions it would fall further.
3. To recite the figures - or at any rate the main macro-economic figures - in detail would be somewhat pointless. They are only too well known and can be found in the publications of the OAU, ECA, ADB and the World Bank. Doubtless African statistics are poor, but there is little reason to suppose they make the trends look radically worse than they are.
4. The human condition data are rather less well known. This is partly because they are even sketchier than the economic and are available less frequently. Partly, but not primarily, the underlying reason is that the human condition is too often seen as something apart from economics. Even acceptance that human condition improvement is the purpose of economic growth and development does not guarantee that they are seen as integrally linked in terms of process and dynamics. Too often the operational credo appears to have been: seek ye first a rising gross domestic product (GDP) and all else will be added on (or follow after). Unfortunately that was far from happening even in the 1960s and the second half of the 1970s, when in most African economies constant price GDP per capita was rising.
5. Table 1 presents an array of human condition indicators for low income sub-Saharan Africa and the change over time of those same indicators in Ghana. One thing which stands out starkly in relation to Ghana is that the progress of two decades has been imperilled since the mid-1970s and that the battle to regain what was won and lost again begun in December 1981 is still problematic as to its outcome. Another is how low the average levels for low-income sub-Saharan Africa are.
6. Table 2 presents some of the indices for the Southern African States and for Somalia. The impact of South Africa's destructive engagement with Angola and Mozambique can be seen most starkly in their infant and child

Table 1. Selected quality of life indicators: 1960 - mid-1980s <sup>a/</sup>

|  | <u>Ghana</u> |             |                             |  | <u>Low income sub-</u>                 |
|--|--------------|-------------|-----------------------------|--|--|
|  | <u>1960</u>  | <u>1970</u> | <u>Late</u><br><u>1970s</u> | <u>1980s</u>                             | <u>Saharan Africa</u><br><u>(1982)</u> |
| Average life expectancy at birth                               | 45           | 49          | 55                          | 53                                       | 48                                     |
| Infant mortality rate  | 132          | 107         | 86                          | 107-120                                  | 118                                    |
| Child death rate   | 27           | 21          | 15                          | 15-30                                    | 24                                     |
| Access to health facility <u>b/</u>                            | -            | -           | -                           | 30                                       | 45                                     |
| Public health facility visits per person per year              | -            | -           | 0.7                         | 0.4                                      | 2(f)                                   |
| Health budget as % of GDP                                      | -            | 1.2         | -                           | 0.26                                     | 0.95                                   |
| Access to pure water <u>c/</u>                                 |              |             |                             |  |  |
| Rural  | -            | 14          | 14                          | 48                                       | 14                                     |
| Urban  | -            | 86          | 86                          | 75                                       | 62                                     |
| Total  | -            | 35          | 35                          | 60                                       | 22                                     |
| Access to excreta disposal <u>d/</u>                           |              |             |                             |  |  |
| Rural  | -            | 40          | 40                          | 30                                       | 25                                     |
| Urban  | -            | 92          | 95                          | 65                                       | 69                                     |
| Total  | -            | 55          | 56                          | 44                                       | 32                                     |
| Average calorie availability as a % of requirements            | 92           | 97          | 88                          | 68                                       | 91                                     |
| Child malnutrition (moderate/severe)                           | -            | -           | 36                          | 50-55                                    | 40                                     |
| Primary education enrolment ratio <u>e/</u>                    | 38(46)       | 64(75)      | 69(80)                      | -(80)                                    | 69(-)                                  |
| Adult literacy   | 27           | 30          | -                           | 35-45                                    | 44                                     |
| Education budget as % of GDP                                   | -            | 3.9         | -                           | 0.85                                     | 2.81                                   |
| Proportion of population below absolute poverty line <u>f/</u> |              |             |                             |  |  |
| Rural  | -            | -           | 60-65                       | 67- $\frac{1}{2}$ -<br>72- $\frac{1}{2}$ | 65                                     |
| Urban  | -            | -           | 30-35                       | 45-50                                    | 35                                     |

Sources: World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division, Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF Ghana: Situation Analysis of Women and Children (July 1984).

mortality and life expectancy figures. For Somalia the collapse of the State's real revenue base and, therefore, of basic services is written in the illiteracy, educational enrolment proportion and access to health facilities and to safe water columns.

7. Table 3 may seem out of place. Ecology as a human condition? In sub-Saharan Africa it is - for two reasons. Environmental degradation at its present rate is passing sentences of life imprisonment in poverty and/or of death by famine on millions of Africans in the rising and future generations. The continuity of generations with each other and with the land is being shattered. Further, most of this degradation of the environment, this slow suicide, flows from need not greed. Inadequate technologies (adapted to long rotations not permanent cultivation), increasing person/land ratios, decreasing tree and bush cover, the need to grow and to cut more to survive - this is the road to ruin many areas are embarked upon. It is perhaps clearest on earth satellite pictures on which ruined land shows up in the white of bleached bones. They sweep across from the Sahel's parched, degraded and desertifying savannahs to the eroded highlands of Ethiopia. And in the south the marks of need created by settler greed and land theft are clear on the verges of the Karoo desert, in the bantustans, in Lesotho, in many of the southern communal areas (ex-"native reserves") of Zimbabwe. The colour of bleached bones is all too appropriate - these are dead and dying lands and to bring them back to life will take massive efforts over decades - vide the real afforestation and reclamation successes in Ethiopia but also that to date they still do not claw back land as fast as it is being lost.

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Footnotes to table 1

a/ 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between 1969 and 1971; late 1970s between 1975 and 1980; 1980s to 1982, 1984 or 1985.

b/ Defined in terms of location within a 5 km radius. May overstate for urban population when facilities available are small.

c/ 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated by failing to relate number of water points to population.

d/ 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed user population.

e/ Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana has a shorter primary cycle than most sub-Saharan Africa countries.

f/ Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.

Table 2. Selected quality of life indicators - Southern Africa 1984 and Somalia

|   | Angola     | Botswana | Lesotho | Malawi | Mozambique | Swaziland | Tanzania | Zambia | Zimbabwe | Somalia d/ |
|---|------------|----------|---------|--------|------------|-----------|----------|--------|----------|------------|
| Population (millions)                                     | 8.5        | 1.1      | 1.5     | 6.9    | 14.0       | 0.6       | 22.0     | 6.5    | 8.5      | 5.5        |
| Under-5 mortality<br>(per 1,000 births)                   | 325-375 a/ | 100      | 145     | 280    | 325-375 a/ | 185       | 185      | 135    | 120      | 174-210    |
| Infant mortality (0-1)<br>(per 1,000 births)              | 200 a/     | 75       | 110     | 160    | 200 a/     | 125       | 110      | 85     | 75       | 146-180    |
| Infant and child<br>malnutrition (%)                      | NA         | 32       | NA      | 31     | NA         | NA        | (50)     | 28     | NA       | 16         |
| Average calorie intake<br>relative to<br>requirements (%) | 87         | (94)     | 100     | 97     | 79         | (108)     | 101      | 89     | 89       | (105)      |
| Access to health services                                 | (30)       | (89)     | NA      | 80     | (30)       | NA        | (70)     | 75     | 71       | (20)       |
| Access to safe water                                      | 21         | (76)     | (14)    | (41)   | (13)       | 48        | (47)     | 46     | (52)     | 33         |
| Primary enrolment<br>(%) (1982) c/                        | 66         | 76 b/    | 71      | 46     | 46 b/      | 84 b/     | 87 b/    | 94     | 131      | 15         |
| Adult (over 15)<br>literacy (%) (1982)                    | 28         | 61       | 70      | (36)   | 27         | (61)      | 85 b/    | 69     | 69       | 16         |
| One-year-olds fully<br>vaccinated (%) TB                  | 40         | 70       | 91      | 72     | (46)       | 95 b/     | (84)     | 87     | 88       | 31         |
| DTB   | 8          | 82       | 59      | 66     | (56)       | 79 b/     | (58)     | 49     | 68       | 22         |
| Polio   | 55         | 77       | 64      | 68     | (32)       | 60 b/     | (56)     | 47     | 63       | 22         |
| Measles   | 62         | 75       | 63      | 64     | (32)       | 51 b/     | (82)     | 56     | 55       | 36         |
| Life expectancy at birth                                  | (41)       | 55       | 50      | 46     | (45)       | 54        | 52       | 52     | 56       | 45-49      |
| GNP per capita  | 490        | 960      | 530     | 180    | (230)      | 790       | 210      | 470    | 760      | (350)      |

Source: Statistics on children in UNICEF assisted countries, UNICEF, 1986, The State of the World's Children 1987, Oxford for UNICEF, 1987, except for GNP per capita taken from World Bank World Development Report 1986, OUP. WED/FAO Rural Household Survey, 1983.

8. The figures depict the trends in food supply and selected country child nutritional levels or, more accurately, trends of food shortage and levels of child malnutrition. The first pair show grain and overall food per capita food production trends respectively. They demonstrate that the drought years of the middle 1970s and early 1980s are not the cause of decline - they are swings below a declining trend line. Similarly, 1985-1986 recoveries are only too probably oscillations above the trend not evidence that it has changed; a suspicion sadly confirmed by 1987 results in perhaps a dozen countries in the Horn of Africa, East, Southern and West Africa. The second strongly suggests that the failure of per capita food output to keep pace with population began - at the latest - in the mid-1960s, i.e., it is now a trend which has endured for over two decades.

9. The second pair of figures show 1980-1984 clinical malnutrition levels among children in Ghana and Botswana. They demonstrate three things: droughts matter - vide 1983 in Ghana (1984 harvests began in April) and 1983-1984 in Botswana; availability of resources to provide emergency employment and other basic services matters - vide the significantly lower levels in Botswana; even with resources and a priority to ensure nutritional security there are very real problems in achieving that goal - vide the fact that even the Botswana figures are in the 24 to 33 per cent range (vs 34 to 52 per cent for Ghana).

10. That then is the broad context against which the welfare of human beings in the process of economic recovery can be viewed in Africa today.

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Footnotes to table 2

( ) = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances.

a/ Re-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under-5 mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate post-independence period gains.

b/ 1983.

c/ Net ratios except for the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

d/ Includes estimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 through 1986.




TABLE 3  
RATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

| Countries            | Sand dune encroachment | Deterioration in rangelands | Forest depletion | Deterioration of irrigation | Rainfed agricultural problems | General assessment |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| Benin                | 0                      | *                           | *                | 0                           | *                             | *                  |
| Burkina Faso         | 0                      | *                           | *                | *                           | **                            | *                  |
| Cape Verdi           | *                      | *                           | 0                | *                           | **                            | **                 |
| Chad                 | **                     | **                          | *                | **                          | **                            | **                 |
| Djibouti             | *                      | **                          | *                | *                           | NA                            | **                 |
| Ethiopia             | *                      | **                          | **               | *                           | *                             | **                 |
| Gambia               | *                      | *                           | **               | **                          | *                             | **                 |
| Ghana                | 0                      | *                           | *                | 0                           | *                             | *                  |
| Guinea               | 0                      | 0                           | *                | *                           | **                            | *                  |
| Guinea Bissau        | 0                      | 0                           | *                | *                           | *                             | *                  |
| Kenya                | 0                      | **                          | **               | *                           | *                             | **                 |
| Mali                 | *                      | **                          | **               | *                           | *                             | **                 |
| Mauritania           | *                      | **                          | **               | *                           | *                             | **                 |
| Niger                | *                      | **                          | *                | **                          | *                             | **                 |
| Nigeria              | 0                      | *                           | **               | 0                           | *                             | 0                  |
| Senegal              | *                      | **                          | *                | *                           | **                            | **                 |
| Somalia              | *                      | *                           | *                | **                          | *                             | *                  |
| Sudan                | **                     | *                           | *                | *                           | 0                             | *                  |
| Tanzania             | 0                      | *                           | *                | 0                           | *                             | *                  |
| Uganda               | 0                      | **                          | 0                | 0                           | *                             | *                  |
| United Rep. Cameroon | 0                      | *                           | *                | 0                           | *                             | *                  |
| Zimbabwe             | 0                      | *                           | *                | 0                           | *                             | *                  |


KEY: 0 = Stable, \* = Some increase, \*\* = Significant increase, NA = Not applicable  
 Source: (Adapted) "Desertification Control Bulletin", United Nations Environment Programme, Number 10, May 1984, p. 26 and national data.

**Figure 1** Grain production per capita in 24 African countries affected by drought, 1970-1984



Source: World Bank, *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action* (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 14, based on data of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), except that the 1984 figure is a projection using data from FAO, the United States Agency for International Development and the United States Department of Agriculture.



Figure 2 Index of food production per capita, 1961-1965—1983  
(1961-1965 average = 100)



Source: World Bank, *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action* (Washington, D.C., 1984) provided by the United States Department of Agriculture

Figure 3

MALNUTRITION AMONG CHILDREN IN BOTSWANA AND GHANA 1980-84



Source: UNICEF, *Adjustment With A Human Face*, 1985.

## B. THE ROOTS OF POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY

11. Poverty, vulnerability, inequality and threats to the social fabric in Africa are not a product of the 1970s or 1980s much less of the Fund and the Bank's proposed, accepted or imposed prescriptions for stabilization and adjustment. Nor are they purely imported colonial phenomena. Africa before the Europeans came was not a continent of anarchy, violence and sudden death (albeit these were not unknown). There were social fabric and state building, productive force and commercial channel development, certain types of education and health care, modest prosperity or security for many people in most years. But life on average was short and precarious; food security was frequently lost; diseases were frequently uncontrollable; social inequity and inequality were not notable by their absence; women were subordinated; poverty and vulnerability were widespread.

12. The colonial era had quite uneven and problematic results in respect to poverty and vulnerability. It did not in fact destroy the social fabric of most peoples in most colonies, albeit it destroyed or seriously warped African state structures. To a degree it increased food security albeit productive force enhancement was heavily externally oriented except in settler colonies. Late in the colonial period most colonial policies (not that of Portugal) began to build towards broader education and health systems and re-skilling re-professionalizing of Africans. But poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy, inequality, subordination of women and vulnerability primarily changed their forms not their existence nor degree.

13. From 1960 through the late 1970s a majority of African States did make some progress in respect to material social condition indicators, e.g., life expectancy, infant mortality, access to health and education, literacy, nutrition, drought relief. The productive force base, while still precarious, was strengthened; while inequality increased so did safety nets against actual death from famine or famine-follower diseases.

14. But that progress was partial at best and unequal among countries. Madagascar and Zaire have never had a period of sustained economic success in their independent lives; Ghana's decline to disaster began - at the latest - in 1972; Zambia's economy has been dead in the water since the mid-1970s' breaking of metals prices and Uganda's since the Amin coup of 1971.

15. Since 1979 few sub-Saharan African - indeed few African - economies have made economic or social progress. The poor have become poorer and more numerous; the vulnerable more at risk more often. The gains of up to two decades have, with exceptions in some social condition indicators, been largely or wholly wiped out. What remain are at risk.

16. The three main catalytic factors have been terms of trade (external economic environment) deterioration; drought and war (lack of resources and lack of security). But Africa has proven unable, with a handful of exceptions, to cope effectively with these shocks over 1979-1986 (which most States did over 1974-1975) raising doubts as to the basic soundness of economic structures and political and socio-economic policies.

17. Adjustment and stabilization are frequently used as if they were trade marks. This is misleading: in the face of persistent imbalances any economy, society or polity either adjusts or is adjusted and by that dynamic either regains a sustainable stability or disintegrates. National policies - or non-policies - to stabilize and adjust will have costs because stabilization and adjustment are about living with (avoiding dying because of) lower resource levels than expected or previously attained and regrouping/reorganizing to achieve recovery and regain a forward dynamic. The social impact questions do not relate to whether there are costs, but to how effectively these are contained and how they are shared.

18. The challenge to Fund and Bank stabilization/adjustment programmes is often put in a form suggesting the programmes themselves raise inequality, poverty and vulnerability and do so with deliberate intent. The last is not the case. The Bank and especially the Fund do often find the poor and vulnerable to be invisible and/or design programmes without actually checking their social impact, but malice aforethought is simply not evident. Indeed they genuinely (if often naively or erroneously) believe that a stronger economy is a necessary (quite possibly true) and virtually a sufficient (frequently false) condition for enhancing the welfare of the poor and reducing the vulnerability of the vulnerable.

19. Whether on balance Fund and Bank programmes have made poor people poorer is unclear and will remain so. In the first place the comparison has to be not with pre-crisis years, but to what would have happened with the crises but without an internationally backed programme. Counter-factuals are always hard to prove but the record of "go it alone" rehabilitation and recovery efforts is not particularly satisfactory - Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and the United Republic of Tanzania (1980-1985) did regain growth but with very precarious sustainability and at trends below population growth so that, at most, selected social services could be expanded slowly and, at worst, even these faced cuts. Second, the answer depends on which poor people, what social indicators, where (nationally and regionally), how (e.g., by higher incomes or higher prices, more drugs or more user charges, added basic consumer goods supplies or less public services?). It is clear that some poor people are excluded even more from the economy and from full social participation - but not all. Similarly new groups of vulnerable are created - but others are placed less precariously. On balance, it is fair comment that the Fund (until recently and partially) simply abstracted from social and political issues in programme drafting and the Bank, resiling from its "absolute poverty eradication" rhetoric (and partial reality) of the 1970s, played up production at the expense of all other considerations in its early 1980s work on and in sub-Saharan Africa. But the basic parameters of poverty and vulnerability do not flow from their actions, nor are those negatively affected by elements in Fund and Bank programmes which were/are arguably avoidable the majority of the poor and vulnerable.

20. But is that the real point? Does not that approach distract and trivialize the basic issues concerning poor people, vulnerable groups and the social fabric in the context of stabilization and adjustment?

## C. WHO TORE THE FABRIC AND BROKE THE POT?

21. At one level it is quite valid to say that external forces, ranging from the inventors of alternatives for copper in message and power transmission cables through the forces determining the weather through the neo-liberal economic advisors and activists of the North to the members of the State Security Council of the Republic of South Africa, broke the cooking pots and the writing slates of the poor people of Africa.

22. In that sense "They broke the pot", "They tore the fabric of society". As will be argued, that is too simple to be a complete answer. Nonetheless it is true to say that had the external economic (and Southern Africa military) context of 1980-1987 been as good as (no worse than) 1975-1979, then Africa as a whole would not be facing a tidal wave of human and economic crises but growing at about 4 to 5 per cent a year with social or human condition indicators moving slowly but fairly steadily upward. Some countries would be better than this and some much worse, but a substantial majority of national boats would be floating higher.

23. However, simply to make that point is not very useful; 1980-1987 is a fact. The external contacts were worse. The shocks have fallen on Africa. The crises are with us - and even more with millions of poor and vulnerable people. Not only can the lost years not be redeemed retrospectively, but the global economic context of the 1960s or late 1970s cannot be called back to life. Africa must face the world that is, not the one that ought to be. As retired President Olusegun Obasanjo put it, Africans "must come to accept that an unjust international order will not change simply because of the euphony of their own rhetoric or the indignation accompanying their moral pressure".

24. Over 1979-1983 many African States tried to await the return of the lost world (misled by northern "expert" opinion which - with UNCTAD the lone dissenting voice - said it would return) and/or sought to bring it back by rhetorical exhortations to the north rather than devoting priority to achieving stabilization and adjustment to maintain development in the new context. The hopes were not, at least at the start, irrational. The year 1973-1974 had been followed by 1975-1978. Nor was the rhetoric wrong at the normative level, the stillborn volumes of the Brandt Commission did make a reasoned as well as a moral case for very different north-south economic relations than transpired. But common prudence counselled action to reduce growing national vulnerability; to batten down the hatches and change course to ride out or make progress against the rising gale. Rarely was that done fully or fast enough. It is unfair that such a burden should have fallen on politics, societies and economies as fragile as those of Africa, but it is a simple fact that the world, and especially the world economy, is not fair. To assume that it is, or soon will be, is to be well on the road to national suicide.

25. But that said, the fact that much of Africa's and Africans' plight is not of their own making and that they cannot - or, at least not with any pretence at speed or avoidance of agony - escape solely by their own efforts is a real and a relevant one. It is relevant because there are human,

geopolitical, moral and economic reasons why many northern governments, institutions, enterprises and people are unwilling to see Africa and Africans descend further into an economic and human abyss. At the most cynical, the bankrupt and the starving, the incomeless and the sick are poor markets, poor outlets for investment, poor sources of materials, undependable allies and hopeless payers of debts. The fact of the present situation and of the external causation elements in it is therefore important.

26. The fact of a major external component in crisis causation is, at macro level, widely accepted. It needs to be articulated, not to cast blame, but because knowledge of causes is relevant to devising attainable cures and because detailed evidence is of some use in achieving augmented external resource transfers and, perhaps, economic policy alterations beneficial to African economies.

27. But the buildup to crises in Africa began - at least in most countries - long before the late 1970s. The advance of basic social services toward universality was very uneven. Rural as well as national inequality was increasing. Serious pockets of extreme urban poverty were growing. Vulnerability was not being addressed systematically - indeed the lagging food production growth rate and growing pace of ecological damage were steadily increasing it. Economic structural transformation was too easily seen as copying northern models (whether north-western or north-eastern). The poor and the vulnerable were not given room or resources to enhance their participation in production, in society or in the political process. Even where, at least in aspiration, some of these faults were less serious, major economic policy errors were made and, perhaps more serious, persisted in.

28. The shocks thus fell on a fragile edifice and one that (even allowing in full for the colonial legacy) was more fragile than it need have been because of African as well as foreign action and inaction. The African response to crises over 1975-1985 was, on average, neither creative, adequate nor self-reliant. Nor, with notable exceptions, were the poor and vulnerable prominent among those to be protected and assisted to strengthen their economic, social and political positions. Initial attempts to ride out the storm (often a return of the 1974-1976 success in doing just that) gave way to desperate crisis management (or almost coping), with cuts made at random or where they would be least seen (not a good selection basis for the poor whether rural or urban slum residents) rather than being succeeded by more purposeful strategic recalculations. Pleas to the international community without such reasoned, articulated strategies looked very much like begging (whatever their intent) and they certainly gave the IMF and the World Bank a nearly blank sheet on which to write many of the earlier stabilization and adjustment programmes.

29. Therefore, there is a real sense in which Flight Lieutenant Rawlings' answer, "we broke the pot", is correct. This is particularly so in respect to defining what is to be done. In whatever way the pot came to be broken, it is broken and the only people primarily concerned with whether and how it is to be made whole are the peoples of Africa.



30. But before looking to re-glueing or re-kilning there is a prior question - what breaks matter most?

31. The loss of economic momentum, of the ability to produce enough to eat and of the capacity to meet minimum import requirements (especially to do so self-reliantly with export earnings) are priority breaks. They clearly do matter. But that does not necessarily mean that they matter more than poverty or vulnerability or of rips and tears in the social fabric. For one thing, there is no evidence those breaks cannot be addressed in ways facilitating recovery of real resource, and especially food production, growth and lessening of external imbalance.

32. If reduction of poverty and of the numbers in absolute poverty combined with providing safety nets for the vulnerable in the short and reducing their vulnerability in the long are top priorities, then it is beside the point to debate how they came to be poor and vulnerable and quite inadequate to articulate policies only to offset harmful effects of other stabilization or adjustment policies - the way in which the World Bank seems to perceive the issue.

33. If a person is brought to a hospital suffering from acute appendicitis no one would argue that radical steps (surgery) were unnecessary. But if he was also suffering from severe malaria, delaying its treatment and justifying subsequent permanent crippling or death from cerebral malaria by saying the appendectomy and recovery therefrom had priority would not be accepted as reputable. It would be seen to be malpractice. Why should applied economic practitioners, academic, official or political, not be held to similar standards? If poverty and vulnerability matter and their worsening is an integral part of the crisis, then no stabilization and adjustment programme which does not treat reversing that worsening as integral to its strategy is adequate.

34. That is not, to date, the way the Fund and the Bank look at the issue, although some of their senior personnel seem to be moving towards such a perspective, perhaps primarily because social and political unrest is, after all, exceedingly damaging economically and because malnutrition, illness and illiteracy are bad for productivity, but also for broader reasons. ILO and UNICEF are the chief international organization advocates of this position - in ILO's case a continuity from the World Employment Programme and its employment, growth and basic needs strategy and in UNICEF's a development from its long tradition of rather more narrowly defined and targetted concern with the welfare and survival of infants and children.

35. However, it is an open question whether all African Governments agree with the priority as stated. If they do, their present resource allocations and programme designs seem rather ill-suited to reaching it - indeed in some cases less consistent with it than World Bank proposals. That is a question which the citizens of individual African States must ask - and act on their answer. Nor the Fund and Bank nor ILO and UNICEF nor external voluntary agencies and individuals can do much if an African State practises a preferential option against the poor and does so by intent to preserve the interests of other sub-classes or interest groups.

## D. RUBBISH TIP, GLUE OR KILN AND LOOM

36. There are three basic ways to face poverty and vulnerability. The first is to dump the poor and the unlucky vulnerable onto the rubbish tips of society, preferably out of sight in urban or exurban slums and outlying rural areas. Anyone who has visited - e.g., the Pekine exurb of Dakar, the successors to Mathare Valley outside Nairobi, the northern suburbs of Lagos, Accra's Nima-Mamobi, the isolated villages of northern and upper Ghana, the parched west of the Sudan, the collapsing Touareg societies of Mali or the debt-ridden sharecroppers of several Senegal basin irrigation schemes - knows that many human beings are (even if not by intent) being thrown on to economic and social rubbish tips to eke out survival or to perish. To say they will be succoured when the economy revives is naivete or cynicism. To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes - in the very short run most of the poor are dead.

37. The second approach is to try to glue together some shards to ensure survival and to ease the pain. Doubtless this is preferable to the first approach, but its adequacy, practicability and sustainability are all open to serious question.

38. There is likely to be a combination of selective consumption support (e.g., drought and other disaster relief); patching up a few basic services (e.g., rural clinics and primary schools with fee clawbacks); token attempts to restore damaged livelihoods (e.g., anti-desertification); or raise productivity (e.g., standard extension advice or craft training). These are seen as "add ons" to a basic production boosting strategy and as rather low on the resource allocation queue except for external contributions specifically earmarked for them. That is hardly adequate.

39. Even this level of provision is fairly expensive if it is not linked coherently to enhanced production by poor and vulnerable people. Therefore, unless their participation in production is seen as central, neither the resource growth nor the political and economic strength of the recipients needed for practicability are likely to be achieved.

40. Further, the glue approach pre-supposes that the 1960-1978 models were basically adequate. Yes, such approaches accept that production structures may need altering and greater national (or subregional or continental) self-sufficiency should be sought. But there is no basic rethinking of socio-political, political economic or participation (especially in production) strategies. Given the slow, uneven progress of 1960-1975 and the much more unfavourable present and prospective external economic environment, such strategies are not sustainable.

41. The last alternative is back to the kiln. Genuine strategic rethinking of goals and priorities but even more of means, targets and sequences is needed. To the extent poor and vulnerable human beings (the majority of whom are women and children) are the subjects and justification for the strategic reformulation, it will necessarily be redistributive.

42. However, it will not and cannot be based primarily on tertiary (consumption) redistribution. Primary (present command over resources needed to produce, e.g., by land reform, labour intensive works programmes instead of food relief) and secondary enhancing productive capacity of human beings via investing in their health, pure water supply, education) redistribution needs to be central if the new strategies are to be either economically, socially or politically sustainable.

43. Such rethinking is likely to require major changes. To take a concrete example let us consider life expectancy and mortality in Africa contrasted to northern economies. Evidently the former is lower and the latter higher. But in what ways?

44. The largest single cause of the difference is infant and under-five mortality. Over 30 per cent of all deaths in sub-Saharan Africa are of under-5's (up to 45 per cent in war ravaged Mozambique and Angola) versus 2 to 3 per cent in industrial economies.

45. The main causes of infant and young child deaths in sub-Saharan Africa are neo-natal tetanus, five epidemic diseases (including measles, tuberculosis and polio), malaria, impure water-related morbidity including diarrhoea, malnutrition-related diseases or loss of resistance to disease. Similarly, malnutrition and impure water-related and epidemic diseases and accidents treatable by first aid are the main contributors to higher adult mortality. In certain contexts, yellow fever, snake bite and a few other mortality causes need to be added.

46. Curative urban hospital care is largely irrelevant to combatting these causes of mortality. Yet it absorbs 60 to 70 per cent of most African health budgets (voluntary agencies as well as governmental). Primary health care (including first aid), basic drug lists and supplies, mass immunization, pure water, supplementary child feeding, oral rehydration and simple health education are all proven to be highly effective in combatting the causes of death cited. Yet they usually receive 10 to 15 per cent of health budgets.

47. Not merely the case for strategic rethinking, but a warning that its redistributive conclusions might be very radical (and antagonize some very powerful beneficiaries of the present allocation patterns) stand out from this capsule summary. A consequential point is that redistribution will be politically, socially and professionally easier if it can be within a context of overall resource growth so - e.g., urban hospital expenditure can be frozen and all additional resources devoted to the new priorities, a rough description of 1980-1986 health strategy and policy in Zimbabwe.

48. Before exploring further what some strategic elements for kiln building might be, it is appropriate to review why crises and stabilization/adjustment efforts (whether or not the Fund and Bank are involved) are likely to bear most heavily on the poor and vulnerable and among them most heavily on infants, young children and women.

E. CRISES AND POOR OR VULNERABLE PEOPLE

49. The post-1979 (and earlier) crises in Africa have left few unscathed other than "entrepreneurs of adversity" (or wingless vultures in mercedes in the pungent words of a Ugandan). However, they have affected the poor and vulnerable most severely for two reasons: first, these groups have had limited ability to influence the formation of government policy or to take advantage of it once formulated; second, and perhaps more crucial, the margins above misery were negligible and above survival narrow to start. As an African proverb puts it - give a rich man less food and he becomes thin; give a poor man less food and he dies.

50. The hardest hit fall into seven subgroups:

(a) Victims of sustained drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous sources of income (including herds, seed stock, land improvements) have been wiped out;

(b) The (usually poor, often female-headed) households pushed by land hunger onto more marginal (in terms of soil, weather, ecological fragility) land - i.e., the pioneers of the "rural sponge" effect which has to date limited the rise of open unemployment;

(c) Households in isolated or peripheral (to main urban centres) areas who tend to be physically and institutionally (including for private enterprise) at the end of the line for all goods and services and to suffer first and most severely from decreased flow levels;

(d) Small producers - usually primarily engaged in self provisioning but also selling food, even if in nutritional terms they have a deficit, because it is their basic source of cash income - who are unable to increase or even sustain output in the face of static applicable knowledge and declining access to inputs;

(e) Victims of war, dislocated like those of drought, with similar losses, including loss of access to health, education and water, in a context of physical insecurity and of government resources and physical capabilities debilitated by war bills and destruction;

(f) Many members of the urban "informal" sector whose numbers have increased even as the incomes of the formal sector they served and supplemented declined and whose slum or exurban areas have become steadily more crowded and less well (or more ill) provided with basic services;

(g) Urban wage earners - formerly above the absolute poverty line - the real purchasing power of whose wages has fallen so sharply that it is clear both that they and other household members have had to enter "informal" sector activities to survive and that their living standards have nevertheless declined precipitately.

51. Effective food prices have risen relative to wages and usually to prices, but even for the rural groups cited this does little or no good because of stagnant or falling output. Non-food crop prices have tended to fall in real terms, often dramatically, partly relating to terms of trade internationally, partly to currency overvaluation and partly to rising marketing costs. This has probably affected poor peasants less severely for two reasons: many non-food crop producers are not among the poorest peasant households; and switches from non-food to food crops by poor peasant households have been particularly marked (at least in some areas). However, there are poor peasant households presently or formerly primarily dependent on non-food crops for cash income who have been severely affected including (e.g., in northern and upper Ghana) by having to sell more of their already inadequate food production.

52. Formal recorded wage employment in the region as a whole has been nearly static since 1979. Meanwhile real wages have fallen sharply, often to the point at which second and third incomes are essential to household survival. As open unemployment is not common - only those who are not absolutely poor or can depend on relatives can afford to be unemployed - this implies a rapid growth in informal sector self and non-recorded wage employment. Here too there was clearly a "sponge effect" in the 1970s, but one which appears to be running into productivity and market limits in the 1980s, at least for most young, uneducated and female informal sector members.

53. Public service provision has fallen. The basic reasons are budgetary stringency (with falls in real expenditure levels on health, education and water common and draconic ones not uncommon) and foreign exchange shortages (leading to missing drugs, pump spares, textbooks, transport, etc.). In some cases, quantity of services has fallen markedly, e.g., rural health in Zambia and Ghana. In more, quality has declined, e.g., generalized shortages of school and medical service materials and maintenance. Supply and/or useability of nominally available services is severely constrained (e.g., on average 25 per cent of rural water supply units in the Republic of Tanzania are out of service at any one time because of missing spares or fuel).

54. The decline in services has pressed particularly hard on end of the line areas - isolated rural districts and urban slums - and on those with rapidly growing populations, again especially urban slums but also some resettlement schemes. Or, more accurately, it has pressed particularly heavily on the poor people living in them. The rise of private primary schools and clinics in poor urban areas does indeed indicate that poor Africans value these services, but also that the state-supplied ones are less and less available and/or more and more unsatisfactory.

55. Raising or reintroducing fees for basic services has had a negative effect on access of the poor to health and education, but how much is unclear. This is true because there is no uniform pattern of fee levels (in some cases they are probably progressive relative to income but not in others), waiver possibilities and collection levels and because their supposed use to restore or sustain service levels is not to date very evident.

56. The most recent life expectancy and mortality data suggest that the health service cuts may, in several cases, have halted or reversed the slow improvement of life expectancy and decline of infant mortality trends which characterized sub-Saharan Africa over 1960-1979. More dramatically, diseases nearly eradicated in the late 1950s and 1960s (e.g., yaws and yellow fever in Ghana) have erupted at epidemic levels and remained endemic because lack of funds and transport have limited counter campaigns. Moderate and severe child malnutrition has reached levels of 30 per cent or above in most countries for which data exist and is approaching 50 per cent in some, even excluding famine crisis years.

57. Meanwhile traditional security systems have been eroded, probably a trend well established in the 1960-1979 period but much more nakedly evident since. Kinship and locality or origin groups are less able to support poor members/relatives, especially in urban areas and rural areas affected by natural or other disasters. This is not simply a result of shifts toward less extended families and urban residence, relevant as these are. With economic contraction, fewer and fewer group members have resources (especially of cash or food) to spare - all boats are sinking lower. Similarly higher cost, less available transport reduces urban/rural kin and migrant contacts. Reciprocal exchange - food for manufactures - has probably risen, but this is not an avenue accessible to the very poor. To exchange one must have something above day-to-day subsistence (including the cost of a trip) to start.

58. The pattern and balance of absolute poverty have continued to shift. The worst declines, excluding drought/war-related famines, appear to have been among urban poor (including for the first time a high proportion of recorded wage employees). In consuming power terms they are now clearly worse off than the majority of peasants and their former advantages in respect to access to basic services and to chances of advancing to higher real incomes are increasingly exiguous. Rural absolute poverty has grown unevenly, with the general rule of thumb being that households in peripheral areas - geographically, politically, in absolute agricultural potential or in perceived commercialized production - have fared worse on production and service access quite apart from being particularly prone to drought and civil government collapse and war debacles.

59. It is still true that the majority of sub-Saharan Africa's poorest of the poor are in refugee camps and peripheral rural areas, but there is now a rapidly growing urban household category which is almost equally immiserized. In most of the region's economies the net resource flow, at existing prices, is urban to rural, as much in States with an urban bias as in the minority with a rural policy bias. Oddly, the clearest exceptions are two stabilization/structural adjustment cases, Ghana and Uganda, which are almost alone in having very high export crop taxes. In respect to non-food crops, it can be claimed that price distortions hide a true rural-to-urban flow, but with both the trend and the post-1979 realignment of food crop prices in favour of producers over wage earners it is hard to argue the same for that subsector. This does not, however, mean equal access to basic services for rural areas, because state revenues from rural households and producers are much lower than from mineral and urban so that expenditure proportional

to revenue results in substantially higher per capita spending and service provision in urban areas (and for both rural and urban elites).

60. Table 1 set out the present levels of several human condition or quality of life indicators for low-income sub-Saharan Africa as of 1982 and their evolution in Ghana over 1960-1984. The absolute levels are appalling enough but their evolution in Ghana is even more dispiriting. Moderately rapid real gains in the 1960s slowed down in the 1970s and have now gone into reverse. Two immediate basic causal inadequacies stand out: food production and the budgetary base for health and education. While Ghana's period of economic unsuccess dates to the early 1960s, not 1979, the record of change on the human condition front does not appear atypical. What was hard won over two decades has been undermined, eroded and threatened with being totally swept away in seven years. The stifling scent of despair is there in many countries - though less so in Ghana today - not universally, not unconditionally but widely and increasingly.

#### F. STABILIZATION, ADJUSTMENT - TUNNEL VISION?

61. Neither stabilization nor structural adjustment is an economic approach usually asserted to attack poverty directly. On the other hand, proponents argue each is an essential step to create the conditions within which poverty reduction is attainable and, less uniformly, that by reducing economic distortions and scarcities taken together they will automatically alter income distribution in favour of poor people. Experience to date neither contradicts nor supports the first contention but raises severe questions as to the second. Logic does, at least for sub-Saharan Africa, support the first but in no general sense the second proposition.

62. Conceptually, and indeed in practice, stabilization and structural adjustment are not the same thing. Stabilization necessarily comprises restoration of internal and external economic balance but may or may not include changes in the structure of production or distribution and may or may not imply future growth (steady contraction was the hallmark of the 1975-1979 Rhodesian stabilization policy). Indeed, one criticism of many IMF stabilization programmes (not only in sub-Saharan Africa) has been that they achieved "stabilization without adjustment" through cutting resource use to regain balance but leaving economic structures unchanged so that attempts to restore output and restart growth more or less automatically "restored" imbalance.

63. Structural adjustment relates to basic alterations in the patterns of production and resource allocation. In practice, it is seen as being linked to restoring or sustaining economic growth. There is no reason why structural adjustment should be undertaken only after severe economic imbalance has built up - sensible policy would be to adjust structurally to avert such imbalance.

64. Setting aside some serious technical questions about the design of short-term IMF stabilization programmes in the context of longer-term structural

imbalances requiring physical structural adjustment, stabilization/structural adjustment as preached to and in sub-Saharan Africa has had three main features:

- (a) Enhancement of production, exports and productivity;
- (b) Reduction of government financing requirements (recurrent deficit plus investment financing) relative to gross domestic product; and
- (c) Liberalization in the specific sense of reduction of public sector directly productive and commercial activity and redirecting market intervention in favour of "efficient" enterprises and sectors.

65. Enhancement of production, especially food and basic consumer manufactured goods production, is necessary if absolute poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is to be reduced rapidly. Quite apart from social, political, ecological and incentive limits to redistribution, even present levels of per capita output, however distributed - much less a continued trend decline - would not allow all sub-Saharan Africans to escape from absolute poverty. Increasing exports, which have fallen secularly relative to GDP, is essential both to operate and to maintain existing productive capacity and to finance structural adjustment of production patterns as well as (via general increases in consumption and incomes) to restore real government revenue to allow basic service restoration. Raising productivity is critical to enhancement of real incomes (and/or to avoiding state subsidies which indirectly comes to the same thing at macro- though not necessarily at micro-economic level), not least for poor peasant farmers and non-agricultural informal sector workers.

66. But structural adjustment as preached and, slightly less uniformly, as practised either abstracts from issues of distribution or views present above-average production/productivity as evidence of high potential for enhanced production, justifying preferential resource allocations (including by relative price shifts). These two features do create a bias against the poor and one not necessarily consistent with economic efficiency narrowly defined.

67. Distribution patterns, spatially, sectorally, by social group and by sub-class, are primarily determined by who produces what, where, by what technology, under what production relations. This is not a new nor a radical economic proposition. It is as central to the analysis of Adam Smith and David Ricardo as to that of Karl Marx. It is particularly true in poor economies such as those of sub-Saharan Africa in which fiscal redistribution in the form of state social security or other consumer transfer payment is, necessarily, very much smaller both absolutely and relative to GDP than in middle or high income economies. If most of the poor people of sub-Saharan Africa are to become less poor they need to be enabled to produce more - i.e., in peasant agricultural and informal (small-scale) non-agricultural activity. In general, there is no evidence that such a concentration of resources would reduce growth rates at micro or sectoral levels - on balance au contraire - and it would almost certainly reduce the incremental import/output rates which should allow greater growth at macro-economic level.



68. If potential for increased production, particularly in respect to peasant agriculture, is identified on the basis of above-average present individual or area performance, then a clear bias against the poor is introduced. It is also one not necessarily consistent with economic logic - incremental resources should yield higher returns when added to initially particularly resource deprived units and/or complementing existing inputs (e.g., labour) unless the point is that to allocate broadly will result in such small incremental resource flows to any one unit as to be below the minimum critical size for any output gain at all.

69. Reducing government borrowing requirements is not a goal in itself. It is a means to bringing resource demand and supply into balance. Imbalance, at least extreme imbalance as existing in many sub-Saharan Africa economies whether defined in terms of inflation, absolute poverty or capacity underutilization, does create distortions which tend to weigh particularly heavily on poor, politically weak and vulnerable groups (or sub-classes). Reducing government borrowing requirements can be achieved by increasing revenue and/or cutting expenditure not beneficial to the poor (e.g., some aspects of administration and security services or subsidies oriented to upper or middle income groups).

70. However, in practice most structural adjustment programmes, whether nationally designed or based on IMF and World Bank advice, have tended to concentrate on reducing borrowing by cutting real government and public enterprise recurrent and capital expenditure. Within that frame expenditure cuts have not necessarily been biased against basic services sectors but have not in general been designed to protect them. And within those sectors the mechanics of cutting have left capital-intensive limited-access units with disproportionate levels of staff so that those services most critical to the poor have suffered disproportionately.

71. This bias is increased by cost-recovery approaches concentrating on basic services. It is not clear that user charges to deter overprovision are needed in sub-Saharan Africa - nobody really contends that either quality or quantity of basic services is adequate. Nor, on standard treasury grounds of certainty, ease of collectability and/revenue ratio, are primary school fees, charges for anti-diarrhoeal salts and vaccinations nor standpipe water superior to either general or amenity consumer goods sales tax increases - quite the reverse in most cases. Nor, given the rather tenuous observable connection between imposition of such charges and improvement of services, are they likely to be a very acceptable form of tax unless locally controlled and earmarked as to use - an approach which may have some potential, but has not figured prominently in stabilization or structural adjustment programmes.

72. If such charges are at low levels and can be waived at point of service provision for those too poor to pay, they may not be a major factor in restricting access. The Christian medical services in Ghana and state primary schools in the United Republic of Tanzania do appear to have achieved that type of fee pattern (at the price of very erratic and unpredictable collection in the Tanzanian case) but it is by no means clear that access constricting effects are in general equally limited.

73. Charges on services going largely to higher income groups or which carry direct and rapid economic benefits to recipients may need examination with a view to increasing charges if collection procedures and costs are manageable. Examples include above-average room and board in hospitals; specialized high-cost medical services; household piped water connections; passenger car licences; drivers licences; university and other tertiary education (if largely on a loan basis, though that creates an administrative nightmare).

74. In some of these cases, (e.g., water) higher charges for above-average income (piped house) users are practicable and can be used to cross-subsidize low income (e.g., standpipe or communal tap) users. However, in others, (e.g., higher education) higher fees and lower bursaries are not necessarily a preferable solution to restraining salary levels or increasing the progressivity of income taxes.

75. This bias against providing physically and economically accessible basic services to poor people, like that in distribution of production, is open to challenge on production as well as human grounds. The sick, the illiterate and those tired from long hours collecting water are not able to work long, hard and productively. Those physically or mentally handicapped in infancy, childhood or youth by lack of medical care and/or malnutrition, as well as those unable to develop their productive skills through lack of access to education, are a drag on future productive potential.

76. Liberalization in stabilization and adjustment does not mean laissez faire for three reasons: first, nobody really believes that sub-Saharan Africa economies could move to, for example, free floating exchange rates and no import licensing at one go, nor that there is no role for public enterprises to play; second, selective and phased reduction of "distortions" requires monitoring to prevent the net result being greater distortion, not less. The debate is over which distortions, what monitoring, which controls; third, stabilization and structural adjustment policies are selectively interventionist quite as much as the policies their architects criticize. Deliberate holding down of nominal wages (reducing real wages) while raising agricultural prices and interest rates does not constitute neutrality nor is it even an approximation of allowing unregulated market price determination. Nor does advice to raise salaries sharply and minimum wages marginally constitute reliance on the market. Market forces might or might not produce similar results, the point is that what structural adjustment is doing is to intervene directly not to allow market determination, presumably on the same assumption of market imperfections as previous policies, though with different goals.

77. Reduction in the scope of public sector enterprises is argued on mixed grounds of over-extension leading to generalized inefficiency justifying cutbacks whether the private sector steps in or not, specific greater private sector efficiency in particular cases and general assertions of public enterprises' 'inherent' low economic efficiency.

78. Liberalization, in the sense of reducing bureaucratic regulation and market intervention in favour of or against specific sectors, sub-classes, groups, enterprises or individuals, is not necessarily against the interests

of the poor. African government departments and public enterprises clearly are spread too thin; selective cutbacks on non-essentials could increase the efficiency of basic service and commercial service/basic goods production. Preferential resource allocations often favour the rich, the powerful and those close to decision takers (by location, kinship or sub-class). Regulations are harder for the poor to comprehend and follow (or to bribe their way around) and distortions harder for them to exploit than for the non-poor. Many interventions are now, whatever their intent or pre-1980 impact, clearly ineffective, cross cancelling or counterproductive.

79. But the specific liberalizations proposed do tend to be biased against the poor as, more generally, are markets under the conditions of rigidity and structural imbalance which characterize sub-Saharan Africa. Compressing real wages, cutting government services, concentrating public (or successor private) enterprise activity on the most profitable bits of business ("picking the eyes out of it" in, e.g., transport or crop purchasing) are most certainly not neutral between poor peasants and workers and less poor farmers and businessmen. There is no equally general counter case that they are efficient in production enhancing terms.

80. These comments do not apply equally to all nationally designed programmes. For example, in its 1981-1982 stabilization and more particularly in subsequent adjustment to drought programmes, Botswana has kept the needs of the poor and drought vulnerable squarely in focus and has had the resources to pursue secondary and tertiary redistribution albeit continued increases in employment or raising productivity in agriculture have proven exceedingly hard to achieve given the resource base, ecology and six years of bad weather. Similarly, Tanzania's pre-international backing 1980-1986 adjustment strategies and stabilization efforts sought to (and to a degree did) limit cuts in services to and incomes of poorer strata of society and especially of low income, outlying area peasants while its 1986-1987 and 1987-1988 Bank Fund-backed programme context budgets provide real increases in basic service expenditure and the latter perhaps includes a real wage increase for minimum and other low wage formal sector employees. Unfortunately these cases to which Zimbabwe and - up to a point, especially in 1987 - Ghana could be added are exceptions and incomplete exceptions at that. Adjustment does not by and large make absolute poverty and vulnerability reduction a top priority; stabilization does so still less often, at least as these are now usually practised.

#### G. TOWARD REDEFINING STABILIZATION AND ADJUSTMENT?

81. That narrowness of definition - tunnel vision to use a physical analogue - has not always characterized approaches to structural adjustment. "Absolute poverty eradication" and its somewhat more cautious albeit economically clearer articulation as "redistribution with growth" were about development through primary and secondary redistribution and place the poor centre stage (albeit too often as objects rather than subjects). They were more than the slogans of Robert McNamara, a handful of his Bank colleagues and like-minded intellectuals - resources were allocated, projects were carried out, results were attained.

82. Even more broadly conceptualized was ILO's perhaps unfortunately styled "employment, growth and basic needs" strategy - one that ILO argued as relevant in the north as well as the south albeit the actual articulation done was virtually all southern both in orientation and in inspiration. Unlike the McNamara change of pace in the Bank, ILO's approach flowed from a long history of concern with poor people and their ability to produce and to earn and built on a decade of country studies within the World Employment Programme.

83. Both of these approaches were washed away in the tidal wave or dam burst shocks which washed over Africa from the late 1970s. This is bitterly somewhat ironic since their premise that standard modernization and growth could not involve poor people or give safeguards to the vulnerable within development in poor countries surely became more, not less, relevant as resources available declined and the visibility of standard modernizing growth became more and more dubious even within its own terms,

84. There is now a rethinking. It is in part based on the perception that Africa must adjust or be adjusted and that African initiatives backed by international support are more likely to be fruitful than external initiatives imposed on Africa. The first fruits of that realization at continental level are Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) and its substantial approval by the 1986 special session of the United Nations General Assembly as a quasi-compact or contract (unfortunately a non-binding one) between Africa and the international community.

85. That summary is too stark and appears too dismissive. It does make the main point but does not reflect the survival process and the struggles that lie behind it.

86. In 1981 there seemed to be two alternative approaches, the OAU's Lagos Plan of Action and the World Bank's Agenda For Action. Seemed is the operative word since the two were non-complementary, parallel approaches rather than genuine alternatives. The Lagos Plan is a strategic sketch of priority areas with no particular claim (except in respect to continental free trade) to attempting to set out sequences, short-term mileposts or detailed articulation. It came at the end of sub-Saharan Africa's (on average) most economically successful four years 1976-1979 and represents discontent with the pace of change more than lack of faith in its continuity.

87. Agenda (the Berg Report) is a rather different document. It begins from a presupposition of uniform failure across the 1970s and across the continent, apparently projecting 1980-1981 backwards. It then sets out a neo-liberal short-term model for economic recovery coupled with a call for doubled resource inflows. Oddly it criticizes nearly every major policy initiatives of the Bank in sub-Saharan Africa over 1960-1975 but manages to imply that these were all African in origin and that its presuppositions were those the Bank had held throughout. Neither volume integrates women (who appear only in the Lagos Plan of Action), education (other than technical training) or health into the main stream of its economic analysis and prescription. Neither really articulates in context; this was not the Plan's purpose and the Agenda actually deduces specific policies applicable in almost all contexts from general presuppositions tenuously linked to examples and

general statistics, rather than articulating seriously. Both are remarkably ahistorical and narrowly economistic. The Plan however, is an African manifesto by and for Africans and Agenda a missionary tract preached at them.

88. Over the next five years the main struggle in Africa was for survival, a reasonable priority as dead governments, institutions, communities and persons have no future to win and no time or space to stabilize and to adjust. Some of the means were discreditable, e.g., Amin, parasitical marketing boards which engrossed more crop income than farmers received, the mafuta mingi oligopolists of Uganda's magendo system (and their analogues elsewhere), the armed robber bands of various cities and rural areas. Many were unsuccessful - millions of Africans have died prematurely (in terms of pre-crisis trends) since 1979.

89. But most were successful and as exercises in survival alone far from negligible. The adaptations of poor households (especially poor urban ones) to collapses in previous basic real incomes and of producers and merchants to lack of traditional (or at any rate usual) inputs, spares and profits show a great deal of determination, of innovation and of entrepreneurial ingenuity. However, it is as dangerous to be romantic about survival, often bare survival, as to be dismissive of the magnitude of the achievement. In only a small minority of cases was a base laid for recovery and progress forward on new lines.

90. There were exceptions, islands of progress amid a sea of stagnation and whirlpools of disaster. Botswana and Zimbabwe stand out nationally. The Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (in retrospect founded at the least propitious moment imaginable) does so regionally. Even in more shaken economies and politics there were exceptions - e.g., primary health care in Mozambique until the Rhodesian/South African bandidos armados (the self-styled NMR) made it a key target, the petroleum sector in Angola, reforestation and eroded hill land reclamation in Ethiopia, community health worker-based primary health care in Somalia. But even taken together these were not and showed few signs of becoming enough to achieve a turning of the tide and indeed lived in perpetual peril of being swept away by it.

91. By 1985 there was a growing determination to reassert an African strategy and African leadership to overcome Africa's problems as perceived by Africans. At the governmental level that led to the 1985 OAU Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), its articulation into the United Nations special session submission and the substantial acceptance of that frame-setting exercise by and in the special session resolution.

92. APPER is a strategic overview with sectoral sketches and specific, sequenced priorities (including resource requirements broken down into national, external flows and debt relief - roughly one-third each) backed by national requirement annexes of uneven comprehensiveness and detail. At that level it is a significant advance on the Lagos Plan of Action (or for that matter the Agenda). But by its nature it does not aspire to contextuality and by concentrating on macro and sectoral resource requirements its linkage of human, poverty and vulnerability issues with the dynamic of recovery is almost totally implicit and subject to divergent interpretations. Certainly,

for example, it does concentrate on agriculture and on producing a route back to food security and views the peasant (or small-scale or family) farmer as the chief means to that goal. But it does not address food entitlements (as opposed to physical availability), the differential roles of women and their rural production implications, the ways forward for the most vulnerable (beyond reference to irrigation) or the poorest (usually the most isolated geographically and/or economically). It is not adjustment with an inhuman face (the presumptive counterpart to UNICEF's Adjustment With A Human Face). But how it views poverty and vulnerability reduction, production by the poor, universality of basic services and similar issues in terms of priorities, production impact, social stability and sequences is not clear; more accurately the time-pressed drafters did not really address those issues in this context.

93. A second element flows more directly from the survival strategies and struggles of poor Africans, the evident limitations of disaster relief and the need to rethink strategically if the rent social fabric is to be restored. A forceful presentation of it was made by Cheik Amadou Kane of Senegal in 1985:

"Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not immediately summon the courage to revise the ways we think and take action ... Saving hundreds of thousands ... who are at risk of dying ... is an immediate imperative. But it must be only one stage in the progress toward other activities, and one element in the truly comprehensive approach".

94. Eight further elements towards such a comprehensive socio-economic and political economic approach can be set out:

(a) Recognition that people matter and are the subjects and ends but also the main means to stabilization, adjustment and renewed development;

(b) Realization that throwing away much of Africa's chief plentiful resource - human labour - as modernization and narrow stabilization strategies do by excluding the poor and allowing the exclusion of the vulnerable, is economically wasteful and inefficient, especially in the medium and long term;

(c) Understanding that marginal rates of economic as well as social return from assisting poor people to produce more are often high, as exemplified by a 1987 Ghanaian study. The real problem is in making small, contextual, poor people centred projects visible to central decision-takers and credible to analysts and bureaucrats;

(d) Comprehension that health, education and pure water are not merely human and social goods (basic as that point is) but are important to maintaining present and raising future economic productivity and to making possible the fuller participation of women who are the chief victims of illiteracy and those on whose backs falls the burden of fetching water and caring for the sick;

(e) Focusing on employment and production, not subsidies and relief, e.g., Zimbabwe's drought work programmes, the potential for transforming

many of Ghana's unproductive Coccoboard employees into productive own account farmers, the spin-off of improved fish smoking and weaning food preparation by poor Ghanaian women from nutrition improvement into commercial activities which augment their incomes;

(f) Articulation of short-term priorities to encompass initial action to lay the foundations for longer-run sustainability, e.g., in applied, field-tested, user friendly, producer cost-effective agricultural research begun now to achieve (or rather make achievable) 5 per cent annual growth in 10 years after input restoration, infrastructural rehabilitation and generalization of best-known farmer or (more rarely) off-the-shelf research techniques growth potential has worn out;

(g) Political as well as economic awareness that participation in production by the poor is crucial to underpinning their survival and advance - without it, social and political participation by them will remain at risk;

(h) Comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency of rending the fabric of society - strikes and riots, go-slows and loss of morale, steadily growing grinding poverty and disasters with no road back are economically devastating as the persistent collapse of stabilization and adjustment efforts in the Sudan and Zambia demonstrates.

95. There is a sense in which this is employment (productivity), growth (to provide the resources to sustain employment and basic needs) and basic needs (to make productivity growth possible) revisited. What is equally important is that most of these points, even if partially, selectively and in terms of initial steps only, are open to consideration by most African Governments and social groups, by the World Bank and, to date less clearly or fully, by the IMF. Certainly they can be planned, articulated and programmed (as well as monitored) no less rigorously than more narrowly defined approaches.

96. The concept of basic needs has frequently been challenged as neither precise nor universal. This suggests a certain naivete or professional blindness on the part of the critics. At one level it is not true - life expectancy, access to basic health care, annual average clinic attendance, primary school enrolment, per cent second and third degree malnutrition, average distance from dependable water point are rather more precise and unambiguous concepts and rather easier to measure than GDP or GNP per capita.

97. At another level it is rather beside the point. True, some things are more basic to some peoples than to others, e.g., a decent funeral has been listed in the five basic necessities by China and most Africans would agree whereas many Europeans would not. What constitutes basic adequate housing is to a degree culturally and climatically determined - a Swahili house which would pass that test in Dar-es-Salaam certainly would not in Scotland, nor for that matter in Addis Ababa. But - so what? If the standard to be applied can be determined nationally or provincially, it is an operational test or goal or tool. That international comparability problems arise is secondary. In any case, GDP's per capita converted over official exchange rates are

notoriously non-comparable and if each country had a reasonable contextual housing adequacy test then an international statistic on percentage of basic adequate housing would be meaningful even if the exact physical embodiments varied.

98. One cannot but suppose that, at least in respect to human condition material indicators, the critics have gone wildly astray or have shown a hankering after a single unambiguous number analogous to GDP per capita without recalling just how inadequate and ambiguous that number, if taken by itself, is even for economic representation or comparison.

99. Non-material elements in human welfare are hard to measure quantitatively. Security (absence of vulnerability/presence of safety nets), participation in production, in civil society, in a political decision-taking/influencing process, ability to hold others accountable, classic civil liberties - these surely are identifiable, at least ordinally specifiable and assessable as to the direction of change. To claim otherwise, whether at conceptual or applied level, is to mystify. In any case, basic needs as presently used in dialogue on and analysis of development does not purport to measure these. Its claim is to measure and reveal more than narrowly economic statistics and analysis and therefore to provide a fuller and better basis for political economic policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and analysis.

#### H. KILLING THE DREAM: THE MACRO-ECONOMIC AND HUMAN COST OF WAR

100. This study is not an appropriate place for a general exploration of war and militarization in Africa. Nor is that its purpose. Rather it seeks to bring out six points.

101. First, the total macro-economic consequences of war in asset destruction, defence spending, loss of export earnings and overall loss of production for many African countries are massive. For the worst affected, they are larger than the total costs of drought and of terms of trade deterioration. This has simply not been included in any systematic way in economic analysis or programming.

102. Second, resource allocations and both fiscal and external balance (imbalance) targets and strategies cannot be viewed in abstraction from the presence or absence of war and/or abnormally high military spending because of the threat of war. States at war simply do not achieve recurrent budget or external current account surpluses. For Fund stabilization and Bank adjustment programmes not to take that fact on board (together with the consequences of drought and/or terms of trade shocks which they do factor in) is distinctly myopic.

103. Third, the ultimate human costs of war (deaths) go far beyond direct casualties (military and civilian). Indeed, these may be (indeed in a majority of cases are) a small fraction of those who die as a result of war. Loss of food supplies, health services and transport combined with large-scale displacement of people can lead to up to 10 times as many deaths (most from higher infant and young child mortality) linked to malnutrition, exhaustion, epidemics and lack of health services as are killed in fighting.



104. Fourth, a large proportion of the poor and vulnerable people in war-stricken countries and war-debilitated economies are poor and vulnerable because of the physical and financial impact of war. This is most obvious in the case of external refugees and internal displaced persons who, taken together, probably approach 25 million souls in Africa today - up to half in Mozambique and Angola. But because war destroys the fiscal capacity to maintain basic infrastructure and to provide basic services (in practice particularly in rural areas), many who are not displaced are also more vulnerable and poorer as a result of this aspect of war.

105. Fifth, to fight the economic and social fronts of a struggle in isolation from the military is to raise the risk of losing both. This is perhaps most evident in the case of transport, but it applies with almost equal force to all major economic facilities, to resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons, to rural health-education-water programmes. Sound strategic planning requires that civil resource allocations be defended and that where defence is impossible, allocations (beyond those to ensure survival) are not made because they cannot bear fruit.

106. Sixth, the costs of war do not end when the fighting, or even the excess defence budget, is a thing of the past. Rebuilding assets, production, social services and lives takes years whatever crisis debilitated, damaged or destroyed them. Where, as in Mozambique, national output has been cut to half and national exports to a fifth of what they would have been in the absence of war, full rehabilitation can hardly be won in less than a decade after the end of the war.

107. The most obvious war zone is Southern Africa. Even there systematic calculation of total costs, as set out in UNICEF's Children on the Front Line, is fairly recent. For Angola and Mozambique, they are of the order of 1,000,000 lives (half infants and young children), up to 13,000,000 refugees and displaced persons, \$US 25,000 million cumulative loss of production, national output (excluding the hydrocarbon sector in Angola), about half what it would have been in the absence of South Africa's aggressive destructive engagement with its neighbours. Here much of the fabric of society has very literally been torn in shreds and the cooking pots of millions broken.

108. There are of course other cases of long-running violent conflict. Chad, Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, the Saharaoui Arab Democratic Republic come to mind. These are even less analysed than Mozambique and Angola but the same six points clearly are valid.

109. But even countries who have not had major fighting on their own soil have had to bear massive macro-economic and human burdens, including sharp increases in poverty and vulnerability above what they would otherwise have been. In the case of the United Republic of Tanzania, about \$US 1,200 million import costs of war have probably caused a cumulative output loss of \$US 4,500-6,000 million. By eroding fiscal capacity and thus preventing strengthening of health and water services they may have caused 100,000 infants and young children who would otherwise be alive today to have died. They are a major explanation of why Tanzania's economy was able to recover rapidly after 1974 but has struggled to regain even a 2.5 to 3.5 per cent growth rate since 1978 and is probably producing 20 to 25 per cent less now than it would have in the absence of war costs.

## I. TOWARD AN ARTICULATION

110. To outline an alternative adjustment cum stabilization strategy for Africa here would be arrogant, impossible and undesirable. Arrogant because concrete strategies should be primarily the work of Africans, including poor and vulnerable African women and men; impossible because neither the space nor the data are available to do so competently; undesirable because only programmes which are empirically based in specific contexts of time and space and socio-politically founded on a broad national consensus have much chance of success. What can be done is to set out a number of the building blocks toward articulation.

111. First, the production/productivity focus of the present World Bank structural adjustment approach is crucial. Production is important, and stripping programmes of biases against production by poor people neither should nor need mean blurring that goal.

112. Second, the achievement of less severe external imbalance by a combination of higher exports, genuine import substitution and more concessional resource transfers is also necessary. Structural adjustment and growth of output are, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, totally inconsistent with neo-autarchy. Import strangulation is a fact weighing heavily on poor people in at least half of the region. The true dialogue is on the nature of relationships to the world economy, balance of instruments, phasing and practicable timing.

113. Third, unless government fiscal and monetary imbalances and continuous resultant pressures for cuts can be reduced, the chances of providing basic production support (extension, research, infrastructure, credit) and basic services to small peasant and/or non-agricultural informal subsectors are negligible. Prudent fiscal and monetary management is as integral to "economic adjustment with a human face" as to any other variant.

114. Fourth, because government resources (financial, human, physical, and foreign exchange) are limited, priorities, i.e., choices as to what not to do as well as what is to be done, are necessary. For example if primary health care is to be expanded to universal access in sub-Saharan Africa, then its share of health resources relative to limited access, high unit cost curative treatment must be expanded, which may require absolute cuts in the latter. Similarly, if production enhancement by low income peasant farmers is a priority, then the research, extension, input supply and other requirements to make such an increase possible must be made available, even though this means reducing allocations to large-scale, mechanized, import-intensive farming (an alteration of balance likely to have a positive effect on production and external balance as well as on poverty reduction).

115. Up to this point what is proposed is not simply consistent with, but based on the same priority themes as, conventional structural adjustment strategy and programming. At least at applied level (possibly not at philosophical) the differences are secondary. However, as argued above, this is not enough if human beings, and especially poor human beings, are seen as the subjects and the justification of development. Production growth plus manageable external and public finance balances are virtually always

necessary conditions for significant improvement of the incomes and lives of poor people; they are rarely sufficient conditions. Therefore, a number of additional guideposts are needed.

116. Fifth, increased food availability to poor people is a central goal. Given the external balance position, this means either enhanced production or balanced regional trade expansion in all but a handful of cases. But food availability to the majority of ill-nourished Africans who are members of poor peasant households requires that they be enabled to produce more.

117. This is economically feasible, indeed much more cost-efficient than most large-scale agricultural programmes and in the present food crises context probably politically and intellectually feasible as well. The problem is partly technical - articulating contextually relevant programmes based on collecting reasonably accurate data and testing/adapting new techniques for application. It is also partly institutional and partly resource management - actually giving priority to hoes and field testing, effective extension and availability of seasonal inputs on time. None of these technical and institutional problems are inherently any harder to solve than those of other agricultural production promotion strategies. Similar considerations apply to enhancing poor peasant cash income which in most cases will come primarily from achieving a genuine food surplus above household self-provisioning requirements. This is not to argue against increasing non-food crop production for industrial inputs (e.g., cotton) and for export. Sub-Saharan Africa's problem is one of low agricultural growth, not substitution of non-food for food crops. With rational agricultural prices, peasants can judge what balance of crops to produce for self provisioning and for sale and whether to seek saleable surpluses of food or grow non-food crops in addition to self-provisioning food production. For example, in some drought-prone areas, small peasant farmers are well advised to grow both cotton and food crops, with the former an anti-famine safeguard because low rainfall affects cotton far less (indeed in some areas an optimal cotton weather year results in partial food crop failure and vice versa).

118. Sixth, effective food availability for poor urban (or other non-agricultural) households turns on price/income relationships. Attempts to hold food prices down by squeezing growers are counter-productive (especially if growers are actually squeezed, less so if they simply use parallel markets) because they reduce supply and either result in higher effective prices to low income consumers or in unmanageable import and subsidy bills. Higher rural productivity and larger supplies are much more likely to reduce real urban food prices. Therefore, the concentration must be on raising incomes through more, and more productive, employment/self employment. How to do so is the basic question and one needing data (on what is produced how and on what the actual income sources of low income sub-Saharan African households are, as well as on technical and institutional production/employment/productivity possibilities), plus a coherent approach (not treating "appropriate technology" or "the informal sector" as isolated, homogenous artifacts which they are not) linked to a systematic attempt to treat employment/distribution and production/productivity issues as joint goals and programming exercises, not separate or alternative ones.

119. The World Employment Programme and subsequent African basic needs mission studies to provide a foundation for devising contextual approaches on these lines. The main obstacles, once better data bases are built, would appear to be political (the urban poor in sub-Saharan Africa are neither represented in enough governing sub-class coalitions nor enough of a threat to their survival to receive priority attention in many countries) and intellectual (the depth and extent of urban poverty are still not fully comprehended; the limits of modernization approaches are only beginning to be perceived; the somewhat faddy, sloppy and romantic approaches of some "intermediate technology" and "informal sector" true believers have created a climate of scepticism). The key crisis forcing rethinking is the growing realization that with 3 to 4 per cent annual economically active population growth to the end of the century, employment growth outside peasant agriculture and the large-scale, capital-intensive enterprise sector is essential. Enhanced productivity and greater production on the one hand give the possibility of having effective urban consumer access to food and basic consumer goods, and on the other rural producer access to basic consumer goods and agricultural inputs. Both non-agricultural workers and peasants need to become less poor and to have incentives for raising productivity (and working longer) to raise marketed output of goods and services.

120. Seventh, universal access to basic services (health, education, water and production support such as research and extension related to the two preceding priorities) within a finite time period (even if that must be up to 20 or 25 years) needs to be seen as a priority. Poor people, especially women and indigenous minorities, do benefit disproportionately from broadening access because when access is constricted they are the ones excluded. Literacy, nutrition, health and reduction of time spent collecting water are critical to enhancing the ability to work harder and more productively now and over time. To articulate such priorities into costed, sustainable programmatic form is not impossible if: (a) non-essentials are cut out (e.g., via basic drug lists); (b) there is a real priority in personnel and policy allocation given to doing so. The obstacles are, especially for health and water, intellectual and political. Low-cost/universal access services are only now building up a cadre of professionals, a body of literature and a degree of respectability even remotely resembling that behind "state of the art" approaches whose costs are such as to render them largely non-functional or practical only on a limited access basis in sub-Saharan Africa. Piped water to houses and high-quality curative medicine do appeal directly to political decision takers and civil servants (who use and - reasonably enough - want to have them). The balance in the intellectual dialogue is shifting toward low-cost/universal access; the political self-interest obstacle is very real and often very intractable in most of sub-Saharan Africa.

121. Eighth, basic survival and support mechanisms are needed because emergencies will continue to arise. People matter, and the view of Nassau Senior that the Irish famine would not kill enough people to achieve adequate structural adjustment of population to land is not an acceptable political economic position today. Again, there is a perfectly respectable production case, the reduction of dislocation caused by unforeseen and unprepared for emergencies could have a high payoff in reducing their immediate and subsequent negative impact on growth. The problem is in devising approaches which do

meet survival and preservation of self-rehabilitation potential needs while being financially and institutionally feasible in specific sub-Saharan African contexts. A crucial set relate to food. Pre-planned food-for-work programmes (urban as well as rural) operating at some level continuously but capable of being stepped up nationally or locally when required are an example. So, where technically and financially feasible, are food reserves linked to minimum buying price safety nets for peasant producers in bumper crop years. Such an approach would also avert the danger of food aid so depressing domestic crop prices in good years as to reverse the production revival; a danger which is exacerbated by the long lag between need and supply of food aid usually resulting in large deliveries in the six months after domestic supplies have become adequate. A related approach applies to sub-marginal agricultural/pastoral area residents. Here production returns to combined input and emergency relief (including food-for-work) programmes may well be low and the potential for sustained productivity increases problematic. However, in practice there is often nowhere else the human beings in these areas can go. If any value is placed on their survival and welfare, cost-efficient programmes to ensure it are needed. Economic growth alone cannot proceed fast enough to end chronic food insecurity for these people. Both because their lives do matter and because chronic food insecurity reduces their productivity yet further, specific interventions in their favour, including improving their production capacity, providing additional income generating possibilities (e.g., seasonal works programmes) and emergency food and production input distribution, are needed.

122. Ninth, environmental and ecological protection should be rescued from its European/North American upper-middle-class origins and related to the struggle against poverty and for sustainable production. Need can be as damaging environmentally as greed, but cannot be dealt with by the same instruments. For example, deforestation (more accurately denudation by stripping all tree and bush cover) is disastrous in its impact on productivity and in its contribution to desertification (loosely defined), erosion and dust bowls. It also increases the burdens on women and girls (and reduces their ability to grow crops, attend school, secure medical attention, improve environmental sanitation). If it is caused by land mining farmers, e.g., Western Sudanese mechanised sorghum farming, or forest ravaging loggers, then financial and criminal sanctions are relevant. But if, as in a majority of the most critical sub-Saharan African cases, it is caused by an increasing population practising shorter rotations and needing to collect (for household provisioning or sale to urban areas) fuel and building materials, such measures are both normatively inappropriate and certain to fail. Imprisoning or hanging every bush cutter from Timbukto to Gao or Mwanza to Shinyanga is hardly a plausible answer to neo-desertification in Mali or dust bowl development in the United Republic of Tanzania. Tree planting (encouraged by extension services but basically carried out by rural residents and/or urban fuel-oriented producer co-operatives) and alternative fuel development would appear to be the only practicable basic answers even if both require time and patience to build up an adequate, self-sustaining basis.

123. Tenth, budgetary balance should be restored primarily by increasing revenue, not cutting services. In sub-Saharan Africa, revenue to GDP ratios vary but some are almost incredibly low even for very low income countries.

Universal access basic services cannot be provided primarily on a profit-making basis, both because large portions of them can operate only at a "loss" and because external economies are large. Within revenue augmentation, attention should be focused toward selective (progressive to well above the poverty line) indirect taxes and to progressive direct taxes which are in practice at least mildly redistributive on both the revenue and, more particularly, the expenditure side. Fees on limited access, high-cost services (e.g., household water connections, above-average use household electricity and water bills, above-average health facility space and diet provision, specialist medical treatment) are at least as justifiable on this basis as luxury consumer goods taxes and are often fairly easy and low cost to collect. Charges for basic services are more problematic. Unless a quick, effective waiver system at contact point can be devised and operated, poor people, and especially their children, will be excluded. If fees can be seen to relate to services they can help mobilize resources, increase community support and reduce net central government cost. For example, a biannual borehole overhaul fee raised communally and paid when - and if - the overhaul takes place or local contribution of agricultural work or food to allow a primary health care worker to do health work without destroying the family nutritional base may pass this test. Otherwise they will be very unpopular in a context of fragile and often interrupted services. Large numbers of small charges have high collection costs, not least in skilled personnel time if, for example, nurses are expected to collect hundreds of small oral rehydration salts or vaccination fees as part of their daily work.

124. Eleventh, without participation by poor people no anti-poverty programme will be fully successful even in material terms. The case for participation in production and resource mobilization (e.g., self-help inputs of labour, materials, even cash into basic service and infrastructure provision) is presumably self-evident. What is less accepted is that poor people need to participate in programme design, ongoing management and monitoring/evaluation. The reasons are not romantic - poor people do have knowledge about their own needs and capabilities which experts do not; participation in production and "takeup" of services is related to whether they do correspond and are responsive to users' needs and preferences; participation can create incentives for officials to be more responsive to poor people (a not inconsiderable factor in programme success, however good or weak the initial design); self-help resource mobilization is practicable only if those who are to mobilize the resources believe their use is appropriate, for their benefit and at least partially under their control. The political and institutional obstacles to participation (and the real, if partial and limited, successes in overcoming them) do not need rehearsing and are not limited to sub-Saharan Africa. They need to be seen as conflicts to be contained, circumvented or overcome, not as given and immutable barriers to action.

125. Participation, and accountability, pose special problems for external bodies including multilateral, bilateral and voluntary aid or development agencies. This is true even when they are intellectually committed to participation and to accountability to intended beneficiaries. First, almost by definition their personnel are "outsiders" usually with fairly brief country experience and broad perception gaps or distance from host government officials

and intellectuals, let alone African peasants, urban slum dwellers, women and children. Second, their structures of accountability run (usually hierarchically) through their own institution to its policy makers and those to whom it is accountable, not to host governments and through them to ordinary Africans, much less directly to the latter. In a sense these tensions are not fully soluble. However, facing them squarely is a necessary first step toward reducing tensions to manageable levels, improving host-agency relationships and avoiding the escalation of tensions into antagonistic contradictions and the deterioration of solution-oriented dialogue into accusatory rhetoric.

126. Twelfth, while any strategy for overcoming poverty must be based on the actions of poor people and poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa, if it is to have a real chance of sustainable success, external support is crucial. The resources available domestically are too limited and the exogenous shocks too great for any strategy depending wholly on domestic resources to be more than problematic in results or more than excruciatingly slow in paying off (especially for its intended beneficiaries and participants). The need for real resource, including knowledge, transfers (from other developing countries as well as from industrial ones) is as great in respect to the broader as to the narrower aspects of structural adjustment.

127. One "resource" of which less is needed is pre-emptive or coercive advice. Imposed programmes rarely survive the initial crisis stick or the resource carrot, even if they are inherently sound. Only Africans are primarily concerned about and able to achieve the development of Africa. The record of expert model solutions to African problems is, to put it mildly, not very good, at least partly because these models almost always lack contextual, temporal and technical knowledge Africans (often poor Africans) possess and their expert designers did not.

#### J. A QUESTION OF METHOD

128. It is rarely very effective to specify aims and objectives, goals and targets without identifying ways and means. If a river is to be crossed then a ford, a canoe, a ferry, a footbridge or a heavier structure needs to be identified before articulating how to reap the benefits of having crossed the river. Unless how can be answered, what will remain unfulfilled.

129. However, development policy and practice in general and in relation to poor people and vulnerable groups in particular has tended to rush into ways and means without asking by whom and for whom and without consulting them. As Vice-President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya has put it:

"In defining what development is all about, we must avoid the danger that we have noticed, usually after we have fallen into it, in the last twenty years on this continent - the danger of talking about development as if it were something which was to happen to the people almost despite, or regardless of, themselves. Somebody was to plan, somebody was to finance, somebody was to define the meaning of development, somebody was to declare what was the social good that we are pursuing ... and then set out to plan and improve what was to be carried out on, and perhaps for, the people as objects, not by them as subjects."

130. Means need to be looked at in new contexts to see whether pre-suppositions about them are correct and whether they can be retooled or transformed to serve new ends. Indirect taxes and the interaction between local government and user charges are two examples.

131. Indirect taxes are usually thought to be regressive and to bear particularly heavily on the poor. This is not necessarily the case.

132. The most lucrative form of indirect tax usually practicable in Africa is a point of import or manufacture graduated sales tax. For administrative reasons if no other, unprocessed foodstuffs, handicrafts and small-scale services will be zero rated (as by definition is household self-provisioning). But this means that of the order of 50 to 70 per cent of poor urban and 70 to 80 per cent of poor rural household consumption (including household self-provisioning) is not subject to tax. The higher the income level, the lower this percentage so that there is in fact a built-in progressive element.

133. To that element can be added multiple rates, e.g., basic on such products as utility cloth, pots and pans, perhaps cooking oil, sugar and wheat flour; intermediate on, e.g., bicycles, cement roofing sheet, soft drinks, simple radios, printed textiles and made-up garments and high on, e.g., saloon cars, electronic apparatus, alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Such a tax is likely to be progressive to around five to eight times the minimum wage (about to the university graduate initial civil service salary level in a 1970 Tanzania study), i.e., over about 95 to 99 per cent of all households. For the top income households it can easily be augmented for revenue and progressivity reasons with a personal income tax.

134. Such a tax yields very substantial revenue (easily up to 5 to 7.5 per cent of GDP), grows automatically as real consumption and/or prices rise, tends over time to grow as the share of manufactures in consumption rises, is rural biased (i.e., it taxes urban incomes more than comparable rural ones). Since getting together the domestic finance for basic service provision, rehabilitation, extension and upgrading is a priority need of poor people and vulnerable groups, dismissing instituting or raising such a graduated sales tax on the asserted ground of protecting them suggests either inadequate examination or disingenuousness.

135. Local government in Africa, at least as organized nationally, has usually been highly derivative from British or French models. There are exceptions - e.g., village level government in the United Republic of Tanzania, mixed modern/traditional councils in Ghana - but they are just that, exceptions. In practice the derivative approach has proven to be subject to severe limitations. This has frequently been notable in mobilizing community resources and efforts.

136. User fees are usually (not least by the World Bank) seen as centrally set, uniformly administered de facto taxes analogous to import duties or electricity tariffs. That approach often has appalling administrative and cost inefficiency drawbacks as well as a built-in bias against the poor and vulnerable.



137. That said, basic services frequently require more resources than the government is able/willing to allocate. And many communities would be willing to mobilize and to provide resources (often in labour or goods rather than cash) in support of establishment, maintenance or operation of such services if they could be assured they would benefit promptly and significantly from their efforts (as they rarely can in normal user fee systems).

138. The need is to identify more systematic, decentralized but co-ordinated joint ventures of government - community and possibly external NGOs or donor agencies to mobilize these potential resources to help fill these actual gaps. Traditional community self-help approaches, at least in countries where they are large (e.g. Ghana, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania) are certainly part of the answer but rather more can be done. For example, in some rural areas contributions of food, farm labour time, house repairs to field-level teachers and medical staff could have significant impact on their standards of living, morale and - indeed - continental presence. Such approaches do exist - e.g. health post workers in some districts of Ghana, Koranic teachers in Somalia - but the potential for more would seem to be high.

139. Objective correlatives - concrete examples of what has been done or designed and proposed - may be useful. One set appear as the boxes in UNICEF's Within Human Reach: A Future For Africa's Children and others among the boxes in the annual State of the World's Children reports. The three annexes to this paper are designed to offer more examples (and some illustrations on how they can interlock to mount serious assaults on significant aspects of poverty and vulnerability).

140. Annex I relates to projects and programmes to augment specific poor or vulnerable group's earning capacity and to strengthen basic services. The examples are drawn from existing projects and those proposed a few months ago by the Government of Ghana. Annex II is a set of projects and programmes concentrating on strengthening a very weak basic services system and strengthening a vulnerability alleviation process which has repeatedly been characterized by too little, too unco-ordinated, too late. It draws on partial projects and proposals for their expansion in Somalia.

141. Annex III is an exercise in taking a well known instrument and viewing it afresh in the context of development serving poor and vulnerable people. The instrument selected is, in this case, food aid.

#### K. WOMEN: EXCLUSION, INVISIBILITY, ISOLATION AND BEYOND

142. The history and present reality of exclusion, domination and subordination of women in Africa is not in doubt. To call it traditional is far too simple; colonization and modernization have eroded traditional safeguards and status, e.g., the de facto secure access to time and land for household self-provisioning that used to be integral to many African land tenure systems. Equally in no sector is it less appropriate to view Africa or sub-Saharan Africa as homogenous - the status and participation of women and the direction, degree and pace of change over the past quarter century show dramatic differentiation.

143. Development conceptualization, policy and practice has tended to fall into two opposite errors: to treat women as invisible or to ghettoize or isolate them in particular "women's programmes". Neither approach is satisfactory to women, for development or intellectually.

144. Much literature, policy and practice does not mention women whether at macro, sectoral or micro level. They are either invisible or subsumed as an undifferentiated category (of poor people or peasants or households or men). A striking example of invisibility was an early 1970s study of extension in the United Republic of Tanzania's lake zone. Extension workers said they talked to men 90 to 95 per cent of the time and women 5 to 10 per cent. Observation showed they spoke to women farmers alone about 5 per cent, men farmers alone about 20-25 per cent and to both male and female farm household adults about 70-75 per cent of the time. While it can be argued that in this case invisibility did not deny women access to extension advice, the area is one with a complex male-female division of labour of which extension advice took no account so that one must wonder how appropriate the communication was.

145. The opposite approach is to seek to set up women's co-ops, women's community development bodies, home economics, etc., and to create enclaves of jobs for women (feminizing primary education, nursing and clerical work in some cases but also creating female agricultural extension posts - almost all in home economics not production). Apart from the fact that such programmes in practice are treated as low priority in allocation of resources and their institutional bases (even - or especially - when a separate ministry exists) are low power/low status, they suffer from a series of conceptual errors.

146. Women - especially in Africa - do not live primarily outside households nor are there separate, comprehensive male and female parallel economies and societies. There is little evidence any appreciable number of women would wish to see changes in that isolationist direction. What exists is a complex (and often contextually specific) set of divisions of labour, command over resource streams and obligations to provide. No programme which does not take account of that reality (which is presumably best discovered by interviewing and observing women, and their interactions in these areas with men) can hope to be effective beyond narrow limits.

147. For example, it is now almost conventional wisdom to say "The African farmer, she..." and/or to say 60 per cent to 70 per cent of agricultural labour time and 67 per cent of domestic food production is accounted for by women. In most rural areas and on average this is true. But it conceals. The division of labour by gender varies from task to task rather more than from crop to crop. Bush and ground clearing for self-provisioning cropping tends to be male; sorting of cash crops after picking (e.g. cotton) female. Table 4 illustrates some of these complexities in a rainfed agricultural area in Somalia. Similarly the proposition that males control cash crop income can be both true and misleading. In many cases surpluses from household provisioning units, processed food and local (or even longer distance) food marketing are largely female and the income accruing from them is the women's - not her male head of household's - to use. Table 5 illustrates this point for a Somalian pastoralist area.

148. Articulation, implementation and monitoring of women's development of productivity, income, status and participation therefore needs to be approached with special care. The data are not well known and much of what we think we know turns out on closer inspection to be incomplete, misleading or simply not so.

149. One evident implication is to involve women - at all levels and from all strata - more fully in these processes as well as in the design and monitoring of all aspects of development. However, a few guideposts do appear to stand out from African experience.

Table 4. Division of agricultural task labour by sex

|                               | Male head<br>of<br>Household<br>N=85 | Women<br>in<br>Household<br>N=84 | Female head<br>of<br>Household<br>N=10 |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Land Clearance                | 53<br>(62.5)                         | 49<br>(57.7)                     | 7<br>(70.0)                            |
| Land Preparation              | 47<br>(55.2)                         | 48<br>(56.4)                     | 7<br>(70.0)                            |
| Planting                      | 63<br>(74.1)                         | 66<br>(77.6)                     | 9<br>(90.0)                            |
| Fertilizing                   | 9<br>(10.5)                          | 10<br>(11.7)                     | 1<br>(10.0)                            |
| Weeding                       | 59<br>(69.4)                         | 60<br>(70.5)                     | 8<br>(80.0)                            |
| Irrigation                    | 32<br>(37.6)                         | 11<br>(12.9)                     | 5<br>(50.0)                            |
| Bird Scaring                  | 33<br>(38.8)                         | 30<br>(35.2)                     | 4<br>(40.0)                            |
| Harvesting                    | 58<br>(68.2)                         | 67<br>(78.8)                     | 8<br>(80.0)                            |
| Transport                     | 20<br>(23.5)                         | 36<br>(37.8)                     | 5<br>(50.0)                            |
| Threshing                     | 9<br>(10.5)                          | 64<br>(75.0)                     | 8<br>(80.0)                            |
| Digging pits/<br>storing      | 56<br>(65.8)                         | 34<br>(40.0)                     | 7<br>(70.0)                            |
| Marketing large<br>quantities | 42<br>(49.4)                         | 26<br>(23.5)                     | 6<br>(60.0)                            |
| Marketing small<br>quantities | 13<br>(15.2)                         | 50<br>(58.8)                     | 5<br>(50.0)                            |

Number in ( ) is a percentage.

Source: WED/FAO, Rural Household Survey, (1983).

150. Universality of access to basic services is disproportionately beneficial to women because they tend to form a high proportion of those left out at lower coverage levels. Primary, technical (broadly defined) and continuing adult education are examples as are extension services (in - e.g., forestry, fisheries and craft/processing sectors as well as agriculture proper).

Table 5. Female levels of market participation

| Marketing item  | Male H/H<br>N=86 | Wife<br>N=86 | Female H/H<br>N=10 |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Large livestock | 38<br>(44%)      | 8<br>(9%)    | 5<br>(50%)         |
| Small livestock | 21<br>(24%)      | 30<br>(35%)  | 7<br>(70%)         |
| Milk products   | -                | 21<br>(24%)  | 3<br>(30%)         |
| Meat and eggs   | 1<br>(1%)        | 35<br>(41%)  | 6<br>(60%)         |

Source: WED/FAO, Rural Household Survey (1983).

151. Nearby access to safe water has a major positive impact on the status of women. Its collection is often very time consuming (see Table 6 for an example) and falls quite literally on the backs and heads of women and girls. Overwork, time not available for direct production, problems with cleansing and washing, added ill people to care for because of poor sanitation and/or impure water - these are the costs of impure and/or distant water to women. In designing water facilities and in training persons in how to maintain them the typical division of labour needs to be borne in mind: men taking a leading role in building but maintenance as well as water collection is seen as on the female side of the gender division of labour.

152. Improved primary health care (especially immunization, first aid, oral rehydration, basic drug availability, midwifery) is also of key importance to women. They are the ones who care for the sick (and for sick children in particular). The greater the incidence of illness and the further the nearest health service point, the greater the work overload and the less the time to produce for household self-provisioning or augmenting cash income.

153. Food processing is both a major user of women's time and in many areas a major source of female income. Time saving processing methods and ones reducing spoilage are very important. So are improved techniques - e.g., of fish smoking, weaning food production - that allow both better household self-provisioning and a related cash income from additional production for sale.

Table 6. Time spent in water provision in the bay region

| Village          | Wet season<br>Roundtrip | Dry season<br>Roundtrip |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Sarman Dheere    | ½ hour                  | 6 hours                 |
| Hareero Jiifo    | 1½ hours                | 6 hours                 |
| Shabelle Dugsilo | ½ hour                  | 8 hours                 |
| Warta Jaffay     | ½ hour                  | 4 hours                 |
| Buulo Hawo       | ½ hour                  | 8 hours                 |
| Bootis           | ½ hour                  | up to 6 hours           |
| Robay Gaduud     | ½ hour                  | 3-6 hours               |
| Gaduudo Dhunte   | 1 hour                  | 6 hours                 |
| Buulo Fur        | ½ hour                  | 1½ hours                |
| Durei Ali Galle  | ½ hour                  | 5 hours                 |
| Buulo Gaduud     | 1 hour                  | 3 hours                 |
| Kurman           | 1 hour                  | trucked from Diinsoor   |
| Dodole           | 10 minutes              | 10 minutes              |
| Shiidalow        | ½ hour                  | ½ hour                  |

Source: Bay region exploratory report; socio-economic section, water development agency, (Mogadishu, 1983), pp.6-51.

154. Fuel collection is a burden on many rural women's time and many urban women's cash budgets. This (together with erosion and moisture loss control) makes identifying and acting on technically feasible and socially desired reforestation (including bushes and shrubs) important. How, what, etc., vary - orchard trees are often preferred by women as giving an additional income; large plantations of trees are little help to rural women who cannot afford to use scarce cash to buy fuel. Fuel technology, e.g. improved three stone fires and stoves can at times do something - especially if women's experience is that it both saves fuel and produces a flame/heat pattern appropriate to their cooking needs.

155. Productivity raising and - especially in urban areas - saleable skills are a self-expressed goal of many poor women. What they are in any context needs study, e.g. in Somalia, women study home economics in adult education because it provides skills needed to get jobs as cooks in the two Yemens.

156. Poor women - more than their well-intentioned supporters, male or female - are conscious of great time and tiredness pressure. This is frequently less true of poor men - especially in rural areas during off-seasons - who may have time they wish to be able to employ productively rather than an already overwhelming workload. Relieving that female burden (e.g. via greater accessibility of basic services) is often a necessary condition for attending other skills acquisition activities, participating more fully in civil society or raising their productivity and earning capacity.

157. In short, women should neither be seen as indistinguishable in needs from men in the same group nor segregated into separate "women's programmes". Some broad sectoral approaches are of special value to women, but virtually all need to involve both men and women. Involve both but with regard to differences in gender division of labour, actual cash earning opportunities, workload, special needs, etc. It would be seen as very odd not to distinguish at programmatic level between urban and rural poor or pastoral and crop oriented vulnerable groups; much the same point should apply in relating to women's efforts to overcome poverty and vulnerability.

#### L. THE SMALL MATTER OF POLITICAL PRACTICABILITY

158. As Vice-President Kibaki of Kenya remarked "more and more papers seem to presume that the correct social system is one conducive to the achievement of the type of recommendations which they make, with very little concern about whether such a system would inspire or even be acceptable to the men and women their recommendations are supposedly intended to benefit".

159. The proposals of this paper are made with such concern and - at micro level and in a few cases where a test can be made at national - there is evidence that poor and vulnerable women and men do find at least many of their components things they do seek, for which they would (and do) mobilize, in support of which they would be (and are) willing to commit work and other resources.

160. Certainly they do address - much more directly than standard stabilization or adjustment models and, indeed, than standard high investment/low consumption models (capitalist or socialist alike) - his searing criticism against those who ask the poor to sacrifice their lives in the hopes their grand children would benefit. "But let us not be told about the long term because in the long term we shall all be dead. Indeed, the 1985 UNICEF poster which poses the question to an African girl "What do you want to be when you grow up"? and is answered "Alive" captures an even bitterer reality: many of us, our relatives, our workers, our peasants, our children, are dead in the short run".

161. Whatever else can be said of it, the approach articulated above does give priority attention to real gains for real poor and vulnerable people now for normative, political sustainability and production/productivity building reasons. But unfortunately to make a case that the main intended beneficiaries of a set of articulated strategic proposals do or would support them is not enough to prove their actual political practicability here and now. The same case could, after all, have been put to - say - President Marcos and his inner circle in 1985. It could almost certainly - if properly communicated - have been embraced (and doubtless modified) by a broad spectrum of the Philippine People's Power movement components. But to suppose Marcos would have accepted or acted on it in any serious way is to fail to face reality - he would not. Nor would many national leaderships far less corrupt, conniving and self-centred than his. Governments do depend on support coalitions not all of whom are poor or vulnerable. Even if some are, those who are not may press their claims to resource allocations more effectively

- not out of malice, not even always from greed but nonetheless in ways which reduce what can be devoted to overcoming poverty and vulnerability as well as to restoring macro-economic stability and growth.

162. Retired President Obasanjo has warned: "Africans ... will need to dispense with myths they hold dear ... It is the Africans who need urgently to shed their blinders about the essential challenges of economic, social and political development". One of those myths is that there are no real sub-class or interest group distinctions in African States other than fading regional (or pre-colonial State) ones and that African Governments all give primacy to the well-being of all of their people in a way analogous to an extended African family. While rarely put quite that starkly, variations on this theme are very common, among analysts and intellectuals as well as politicians. It might well be a good thing if such a characterization were uniformly valid; the reality is that it is not.

163. The problem does not lie in identifying the truly evil regimes, e.g., of Macias Nguema, Idi Amin or the Emperor Bokasa, albeit even that is somewhat easier to do after they are gone. Nor is it only seeing fraudulent, self-serving elite cabals wrapped in false populist rhetoric with no policy. - e.g., General Acheampong's regime - for what they are. Again that is easier later than sooner. No, the real problem is in facing the realities of perfectly decent governments which do have a real concern for their poor and vulnerable citizens, but do not give that concern concrete embodiment in strategic priorities and in resource allocations.

164. For this there can be one or more of several reasons. Perhaps the real possibility of linking employment generation, economic growth, productivity increases by the poor and vulnerable, universality (or a drive towards it) of access to basic services to economic stabilization and adjustment has not been made clear to decision-takers. That is a job for intellectuals, technocrats, communicators, and primarily, one may add, for African ones. Second, while accepting the possibility, they may doubt either its technical feasibility or its cost in terms of what they perceive as northern resource transferrer opposition. That too is a job primarily for intellectuals, technocrats and communicators and, to the extent the fears as to northern response are not out of date (and they are by no means wholly so), it is a job for northern as much as for African ones.

165. Third, there may be very real political barriers to reallocating resources as proposed. Because they are poor and vulnerable, poor and vulnerable people are rarely dominant political forces. Governments cannot afford to alienate basic support groups to the point of being turned out, or even turned under in a nearby graveyard on behalf of a future constituency which cannot defend their survival (or that of their strategy) now.

166. Any strategic adjustment does result in losers as well as gainers. Economic imbalance and production regression certainly do not generate "work and happiness for all". But they do provide the context in which some can win power, prestige and profit. The same evidently holds for any very unequal resource allocation system, e.g., 50 per cent of a national health budget

on one capital city hospital or 100 times the services and subsidies to one mechanized farmer as to a typical peasant household. Losers do not welcome the strategic shifts which lead to the losses and, if they are clever, will seek to mobilize larger, more humanly attractive people than themselves to shout - or riot or stage a coup - on their behalf. To take an extreme example, if to institute a comprehensive primary health care service a government sought to dismiss three-quarters of its armed forces at once, the likely verdict of posterity would be "suicide through sought martyrdom", and there would still be no primary health care system.

167. However, there are two ways to reduce the political problems inescapably flowing from the fact that there will be losers. The first is to make clear who will gain what - many who fear or suppose they will be losers will, on balance, break-even or gain. Trade unionists and small to middle sized business people are among those likely to be open to considering whether they will, after all, gain. Basic service extension benefits both as - in different ways - does overall economic recovery. Somewhat slower wage increases (especially if accompanied by a prospect of less inflation) and more serious tax collection (especially if turnover rises because there are more goods to sell to people more able to afford them) may well be seen as a reasonable price to pay for these gains.

168. The second way flows from the first - in a context of moderately rapid growth the number of absolute losers can be kept low consistent with actually giving priority to the needs of poor and vulnerable people. That does have the implication that devising and presenting an alternative economic stabilization, adjustment and growth strategy centred on restoring the fabric of society and re-baking the shattered pot is of importance. Rapid growth in total resources available does for most (not quite all) African economies require an increase in net foreign resource inflows. Never a sufficient condition for rapid economic recovery, such an increase is often a necessary one.

169. But losers are not the only politically problematic groups. There are claimants for resources, including increased resource flows, who are not in terms of their own economies (though by the standards of the north they are) poor and vulnerable. Some, let it be said at once, have claims which, taken by themselves, are perfectly reasonable and equitable. The Ghanaian trade unionists who argue that 1983-1986 doubling of the real minimum wage is not enough are not inherently mad or greedy - counting allowances, 1983 levels covered about a quarter of a poor family's actual rock-bottom monthly spending and in 1986 had risen to one half. Who are we to say wanting another doubling is unreasonable? At another level, the middle and lower upper grade civil servants and managers (including professional intellectuals) are demonstrably much better off than the average peasant or average wage-earning household. But many have experienced 50 per cent falls in their standards of living to a situation many northern unskilled workers would see as grounds for immediate industrial action. Is a desire to restore their fairly modest standards of 1978 really fairly characterized as greed?



170. The two groups are chosen deliberately. Large productive unit workers and middle officials and managers matter politically and productively. If they are dispirited and alienated, raising productivity and avoiding creeping repression are virtually impossible.

171. Here the main answer can only lie with political leaders having the courage to lead and to state unpalatable realities clearly and convincingly. Resources are limited. Reasonable demands on them are far larger. Universal access to public services benefit all and progress towards them can benefit many or most, visibly and soon. So does the rise in the demand for goods and services (including employment) resulting from the poor and vulnerable becoming less poor and less vulnerable. The poor and vulnerable are in danger of dying and, without priority changes, nearly certain to be unable to win their way clear to a less overworked and under-rewarded way of life. They do have a right to expect a large chunk of additional resources be devoted to them. But trade unionists and professionals have legitimate claims too as do administrators and managers. They cannot receive full satisfaction, but a halt in the erosion of public service quality and accessibility, a halt or partial reversal in the fall of their real wages or salaries and rather more food and manufactured goods availability can be provided and will be tangible, short-term gains.

172. This is not an impossible message for a credible political leadership to put across - some have done so. Nor in this context are appeals to solidarity, to the needs of the poor and vulnerable within almost every extended family, to the need for nationhood to mean concern for sister and brother citizens either empty rhetoric or slogans without force. Taken alone they are just that, but in the context of a humanly defensible, convincingly attainable, equitable and consensus-seeking strategy they can be real symbols of and calls to mobilization.

173. Mobilization points to another political reality. Poor and vulnerable people are politically weak in large measure because they are unorganized. It is rare (albeit not absolutely unknown) for them to have a major share in the leadership of a dominant party or movement at any level. If they were organized they could of course articulate their needs more clearly and accurately and play a larger role in meeting them; that is the efficiency/productivity side of mobilization. The present point is rather different, organized interest groups of poor and vulnerable people can give effective political support to governments they perceive to be committed to serving their interests, acting in ways which can give reality to that commitment and producing some initial results.

174. Very few such groups exist. The argument against them can hardly be that interest groups as such are improper or truly subsumable in single, democratic parties. Trade union, co-operative, business, religious and women's groups are common at local, district and national levels. Of these, only some religious, some women's groups and unions in the economies marked by the greatest real wage collapses and/or destruction of previously existing formal sector wage posts are representative of, or at least sympathetic auditors of and voices on behalf of, the poor and vulnerable.

175. This is not intended to denigrate trade unions. Indeed, in South Africa and Namibia they do speak and act for the poor and vulnerable. But in most African contexts, most trade union members are well into the top half of the income distribution and their (wholly proper) concern for members' welfare can, however unintentionally, clash with priority to resource allocations to those who are poorer and more vulnerable.

176. Why should there not be small peasants groups? Urban self-employed bodies? Neighbourhood leagues in slum quarters? And in poor, isolated (as well as other) villages? Why should these not exist at local, district and national levels to allow exchange of experience, mobilization of resources, solidarity and presentation of views to holders of political and administrative/managerial decision-taking posts? Certainly it would be politically prudent for any government or party seeking to give priority to poor people and vulnerable groups to encourage them to mobilize in precisely these ways.

177. Why that rarely happens and why genuine commitments to the poor are watered down, obstructed and eroded until they lose the name of action (and also the support of the disillusioned people in whose name they were first uttered) needs reflection. As the last work of Aquino da Braganza stresses, outside observers, African scholars and African political leaders are too ready to read texts uncritically, to relate all failings to technical mistakes or exogenous events, to read social and political history in terms of official pronouncements and programme documents. He wrote in the context of an embattled transition to socialism, but the critique is more broadly applicable. Critical evaluation of political processes, of social dynamics, of contradictions and of the root causes of unsuccess in political development (as in economic) is painful. But it is necessary if the process is to mobilize or, in many cases, even to survive. It can be done with a view to improvement within the process only by political leaders who listen and look to learn (not simply to justify what they said or did before and still less to identify critics to repress them) and by intellectuals (not necessarily professional ones) in critical solidarity with them. To attempt even to begin that process in this paper would be impracticable as well as unwise; to suggest that it is urgently needed in many African States may be impolitic but also valid.

178. Political development in many African States - like social and economic - has not been satisfactory, however evaluated. The main losers from this fact are Africans, especially poor and vulnerable Africans who particularly need a participatory, accountable, mobilizing and efficient (in considering, adopting, articulating, achieving and monitoring goals) political system. A variety of systems can have those characteristics (a fact doctrinaire proponents of one model or another often forget); indeed, the reasonable effective and dynamic political systems in Africa are diverse. But a number of present African political systems do not know them. The warning of Vice-Chancellor Rui Balthasar Santos of Eduardo Mondlane University is relevant: "We must look our mistakes squarely in the face lest we fall into repeating them".

M. TAKING THE FIRST STEPS

179. The basic steps needed, and the ones within direct African control, are on the African side. To argue for the Fund and Bank to take the initiatives rather than to show openness toward African initiatives and to offer dialogues not confrontations over their specifics is unrealistic. It is also rather inconsistent. Self-reliance is not about Bank and Fund platonic guardianship even on behalf of the poor and vulnerable; self-respect and self-development cannot be tele-guided from outside Africa. Seven steps (logically sequential but in practise overlapping or iterative) can be set out schematically:

(a) Rethinking goals and priorities on the basis of a dialogue including people who are poor, vulnerable, women and peasants as well as those sensitive to their concerns rather than limited to technocrats, managers, abstract intellectuals and harried, time-pressed senior politicians;

(b) Building a coherent, practicable macro-political economic strategy from the new (or reaffirmed) goals and priorities together with rough sectoral, programmatic and sequencing parameters;

(c) Identifying the data needed to articulate and implement the strategy: e.g., harder, more regularly available social indicator data; credible, detailed agricultural output returns based on sample crop cutting; both urban and rural low income household budget and social condition surveys inter alia, to identify actual sources of income and patterns of economically productive activity including household self-provisioning);

(d) Using the data to articulate the strategy down to policy and project level and to initial, medium- and longer-period phasing, sequencing and co-ordinating with projected outcomes cross-checked against priorities and goals;

(e) Mobilizing and deploying (redeploying) own resources plus existing external resource flows (which are usually not insubstantial) in accordance with the articulated strategic priorities;

(f) On that basis, moving to parallel dialogues and negotiations with the Fund, Bank and key bilaterals (as well as if possible with key creditors) to achieve stabilization, rehabilitation and structural adjustment programme support relevant to, rather than contradicting, the national strategy, policy and resource allocations;

(g) Monitoring results (quantitatively and qualitatively including consulting poor and vulnerable people, peasants, women, urban slum dwellers) on an ongoing basis and feeding the results back into the policy and implementation process and doing so within structures which increasingly hold managers, officials, politicians and, to the extent possible, external co-operators, including the Fund and Bank, accountable for their actions and inactions.

180. This is not an easy agenda nor are the changes its adoption, in practice as well as in words, would require marginal. But it is practicable; it puts the emphasis where it ought to be - on what Africans need, formulate and do; it does (at least in the present climate of Bank, Fund and other agency attitudes toward and perceptions of Africa) provide a potentially viable way to make Fund/Bank endorsement of stabilization and adjustment something other than the establishment of a platonic guardianship.

181. African States, with their own stabilization and adjustment strategies plus articulated programmes to implement them, can make substantial progress without formal Fund/Bank endorsement. If their approaches are seen to produce results they can secure significant external co-operation (including from the Bank). Botswana's 1981/1982 stabilization and 1982/1988 adjustment to drought (poverty reduction/vulnerability alleviation) is a clear case in point.

182. Zimbabwe has pursued its own priorities - on defence, on temporary employment creation to alleviate drought costs to the poor and vulnerable and to reduce future vulnerability and poverty, on bolstering exports and managing imports, on increasing real expenditure on primary health care and primary education, on accompanying subsidy reduction with parallel low wage increases. Certainly it can be argued that it has been too cautious and that its post-1981 economic record suggests precarious stabilization, incomplete adjustment and a vulnerable growth rate. But Zimbabwe has weathered a very severe crisis; it has held society, polity and economy together; progress has been won toward each of the priorities. Zimbabwe is in a position to formulate its strategy, articulate it and seek international support for it from a position of some strength and with reasonable expectations of some success (at least in respect to bilaterals on projects, on sectoral World Bank lending and, perhaps, even to the Fund via a no-planned drawings standby).

183. The United Republic of Tanzania has posed several alternative strategies - the first in 1980, the second over 1981-1982, the third (which was really an odd "splitting the difference", Wisemen's report which satisfied neither the United Republic of Tanzania nor the Bank) in 1982 and the fourth from 1984. All laid very heavy stress on the supply side and on articulated ways to regain growth to meet social, distributional, production and fiscal balance targets. The monetary and fiscal basics were in fact austere, but with clear preferences to poor peasants, to minimum wage earners, and to basic services. From 1983 these programmes did stabilize domestically; indeed, given the weakness of national accounts it is possible that 1984-1986 output growth was comparable to that of population (in food it was higher once good weather returned in 1985).

184. The unbridgeable gap in these strategies was external imbalance. That gap could not be closed nor import strangulation loosened without substantial adjustment finance and debt rescheduling. Until 1984, there was no viable consensus on how to manage exchange rates or to promote exports. On the former, a Fund "devaluation is good for your soul" line in favour of large one-off cuts had produced a "no devaluation now or ever" mirror rhetoric crowding out phased foreign exchange price management (as favoured by the

Treasury from 1982) until 1985 in principle and early 1986 in practice. Similarly, a curious concentration on largely irrelevant domestic food official procurement prices (which had moved to a buyer of last resort position for outlying zones at least until good weather returned) delayed (and still delays to a degree) articulation of overall agricultural strategy.

185. Nonetheless in 1985-1986 the United Republic of Tanzania was bargaining from a position of some strength (as well as extreme vulnerability). It had a set of reasoned strategic goals and articulated means. In many respects these were working. For three consecutive years (1983-1985) real output had risen. As a result, the 1986 and 1987 agreements do not in fact change any basic Tanzanian priorities (and creeping conditionality attempts in 1987 were repulsed). The exchange rate per se after all was not a priority - higher real grower prices for export crops; stabilizing the minimum wage in real terms; raising real recurrent spending on basic health, education and water provision; securing operating and rehabilitation inputs to restore non-serviceable capacity and to enhance capacity utilization; containment of the rate of inflation were and are real priorities. They were protected in the agreements; to a large extent they were (even if less than planned in the rehabilitation and utilization case) achieved over 1986-1987 and should be again in 1987/1988. Doubtless mistakes have been made and the future remains problematic, but the present point is that the 1986 and 1987 agreements do not compromise Tanzanian goals, were not on offer over 1980-1984 and do represent substantial changes from prior Fund and Bank proposals.

186. However, a cautionary note is needed. Saying "no" or "not so fast" should not be confused with presenting alternatives. Doubtless it is part of that process but not the whole. Certainly some Fund and Bank proposals in some programmes are wrong and some do need to be rescheduled and restructured. But a purely negative or delaying response is not adequate if there really is a crisis and the status quo (or rather the deteriorating modus descensus of decay and decline) is not adequate.

187. Simple nay-saying - e.g., Ghana 1973-1982 - is no answer. Indeed, it reduces bargaining power and makes it harder to present alternatives at a later date. Further, delay for its own sake (with no revised sequencing or alternative course of action) is little better. It results in creeping conditionality with the Fund and/or Bank "upping the ante" at each round and with the time "gained" not used so that the final shifts are far more traumatic and far less contextual than they could have been, e.g., the delayed 1987-1988 liberalization of import control, tariff protection, foreign exchange licensing package in Ghana is in one sense the price of inadequate Ghanaian designed and implemented policy (presumptively along rather different lines) over 1984-1986.

#### N. A MATTER OF TIME: THE HIGH PRICE OF DELAY

188. To act without first thinking and to set out with little idea where one is seeking to go or how to get there is dangerous. Mindless activism is not a unwarranted critique of a good deal of the content of some stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. But there is no time

to wait for perfectly accurate data, completely adequate and agreed analysis, articulation down to the last detail - a detailed blueprint of and Michelin road map to the New Jerusalem.

189. In the first place there is much more agreement on the direction of first steps than on those that will follow - and very little indeed on the cosmography of the various New Jerusalems. But if the initial desired route and topography can be agreed and identified, then dialogue on next steps can parallel taking the first ones. The Confucian/Maoist proverb is relevant: "Even the longest journey begins with the first step".

190. Further, applied political economy, and recasting the broken pot and reweaving the fabric of society is very much applied political and social economy, is not primarily a matter of exactitudes and certainties. Simple certainties and general answer may be precise but in most cases it is the precision of being precisely wrong. One of the earliest writers on this field - Aristotle - had one of the wisest comments: "Such being the nature of our subject and such our way of arguing in our discussions of it, we must be satisfied with a rough outline of the truth ...".

191. The social fabric, poor people, vulnerable groups, displaced persons, infants and young children, women are not merely statistical and intellectual categories. They are human beings who cannot live on dialogue, even on dialogue in which they participate, and many of whom are needlessly dying or being handicapped for life by delays in action. For them the poignant words of Omar Khayyam apply:

"The bird of time has but a little way to fly  
- and, lo, the bird is on the wing".

192. That is not a counsel of despair. It was Pliny who said (as his futurology went wrong): "Out of Africa there is always something new". The people of Africa and their Governments can again confound the futurologists - they, and they alone, can restore the wholeness of the broken pot and the torn fabric.

193. Or in the terminology of Southern Africa and especially of the embattled people of Mozambique:

The dream lives!  
A lotta continua!

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Annex I

Production by, services with poor people: programme notes

The purpose of this annex is to illustrate the possibility of building up a potentially financeable, cost effective, interlocking programme whose components add up to a significant assault on poverty and vulnerability. The actual projects are actual or proposed ones from Ghana and the overall programme is based on that presented to a Consultative Group meeting by the Government of Ghana but the presentation and interpretation are those of this paper and should not be seen as necessarily representing those of the Government of Ghana.

Components: Toward interaction and critical mass

The programme includes nine components:

(a) Strengthening and expanding primary health care with particular priority to rural areas and urban low income neighbourhoods;

(b) Reinforcing primary and adult education through improvement of textbooks and basic furnishings supplies and improved building maintenance;

(c) Sustaining the borehole rural water programme serving up to a third of the rural population through creating an ultimately self-financing maintenance programme;

(d) Augmenting peasant productive capacity by restoring national availability of basic agricultural and related implements (machetes, hoes, picks, shovels, sledge hammers, crowbars and wheelbarrows) through providing adequate secure intermediate input supplies to existing, efficient domestic manufacturers;

(e) Reducing seasonal and drought vulnerability through a selective, largely seasonal, labour intensive rural and urban works programme;

(f) Increasing women's ability to increase household provisioning and income earning capacity via improved fish smoking, weaning food production/grain grinding, vegetable growing and shea nut collection and marketing;

(g) Creating a focus on the people of the most deprived and vulnerable regions (the Upper West, Upper East and Northern) within the previous project clusters and by their use to support/facilitate land and water reclamation (pond desilting);

(h) Improving basic service provision capacity by augmenting mobility via improvement and parts stock restoration for vehicle maintenance and repair workshops (initially in support of primary health care);

(i) Data stock and flow reinforcement through a poor rural household income/expenditure/social and human condition survey and establishment of an early warning system for nutrition and health going beyond purely meteorological and technical agronomic data.

The components are intended to generate a critical mass, i.e., to assist a substantial proportion of poor and vulnerable Ghanaians to reduce their vulnerability and to raise their productivity, incomes and human conditions. Within it are elements directed to basic services, agricultural productivity, income, peripheral-poor-vulnerable geographic zones, opportunities for enhanced production by women, environmental protection and data generation - the main areas identifiable as directly affecting poor and vulnerable Ghanaians, especially women, children and residents of the northern and upper regions and of urban slums.

Costings: substantial, manageable, sustainable

Over three years the programmes would require of the order of \$US 100-125 million in external support. Set beside a total of \$US 2,000 million odd external concessional resource transfers (of the order of \$US 50 per Ghanaian per year) that 5 to 6 per cent appears perfectly reasonable as a social fabric and human condition restoration, production by the poor now augmentation and future productivity boosting investment.

A substantial proportion of the funding, (i.e., metal for implements, paper for texts, pump spares) will generate counterpart funds useable within the overall programme. This is necessary because in several cases the most binding constraint on effective action is that on foreign exchange imports). Beyond that government resources are primarily ones already devoted to the sectors in question primarily personnel (not very productively at present because of lack of working capital or complementary resources).

Ultimately the cost of the programmes will be met largely by the taxpayers (which may be progressive) and those participating in them (basically proportional). Some, e.g., borehole maintenance, implement production, can be fully or largely self-financing in local currency terms from the start and others, e.g., the women's production and pond desilting can quickly become so.

Benefits: estimation and significance

The benefits to be derived from the programme can be described as speculative, subject to wide errors of estimation or "soft". It is prudent to admit that fact. But the same applies with only a little less force to more conventional projects and programmes. Many rural projects' payoff estimates depend on net gain from new technique estimates and farmer take-up rates which are rather less based on even rough surveying, a consensus of informed opinion and cross checking results for plausibility than is the case in this programme. Because of price uncertainties, and others affecting actual as opposed to nominal capacity output, most project benefit/cost ratios should be seen as ranges not points. Social cost/benefit analysis is widely accepted but by its nature uses "soft" estimates.

That said, reasonable first approximation gains projections are substantial. By the end of the three year period the annual gains should be of the order of:

(a) 60,000 lives saved (5 per 1000 reduction in overall and 10-20 per 1000 in infant mortality) by strengthened primary health care;

(b) 135 to 172,500 person years of time from reduced illness (at 10 days per patient over 4 to 5 million patients), relating primarily to basic drug supply, immunization and first aid;

(c) Rehabilitation of northern and upper region primary schools allowing 50,000 more primary and 200,000 more adult education students plus 2,000,000 primary and adult education students nationally receiving better education, and therefore increasing their future productivity, because of enhanced textbooks supply;

(d) Averting loss of access to nearby pure water by about 3,000,000 Ghanaians now served by boreholes with no assured servicing backup (basically because of lack of spares). If the loss occurred, about 1,000,000 women and girls would have to spend 1½ to 4 hours a day trudging to (often polluted) water sources and back - an annual cost saving from the boreholes of 250,000 woman years;

(e) Valuing production gains from implements is hard under conditions of extreme scarcity leading (especially in the northern and upper regions), to use of totally worn out (say 1 to 2 inches metal remaining) hoes or even wooden substitutes (a local but most inappropriate technology) and to inability unable to clear bush, remove stones or desilt ponds for lack of shovels, crowbars, pickaxes and machetes. An estimate of five times the retail price in output gained (by raising labour productivity and work which can be done) - implying an annual gain in agricultural production of \$US 40 to 50 million is not unreasonable;

(f) The northern and upper region productivity enhancement (shea nut) and rehabilitation (pond desilting) projects could involve up to 125,000 households and yield a shea nut, grain and vegetable output gain of \$US 9.00 to \$US 12.5 million plus a presently hard to quantify gain from reduced livestock losses as a result of dry season water supply enhancement;

(g) The labour intensive public works programme could employ up to 150,000 persons (from, say, 100,000 households), valuing its output at cash cost plus locally provided labour and inputs (which may be an underestimate given the backlog of economically as well as socially desirable small maintenance, rehabilitation and construction projects) gives a figure of the order of \$US 6 to \$US 6.5 million;

(h) While most of the gains of the mobility project can be treated as subsumed in the health and education ones, by extending the serviceable life of vehicles a saving of the order of \$US 5 million a year should be realized.



Valuing the person years made available by reduced illness and reduced water collection time poses special problems. The average incremental value of a working day is probably of the order of Cedi 200 (say \$US 1.33) albeit this varies over both location and season. Assuming that 45 per cent of the time is used for production the rough order of magnitude of economic gains would be of the order of \$US 55-65 million. The other 55 per cent time use would include a high proportion of socially useful activities, e.g., childcare, cleansing and washing, food preparation, adult education (now often constrained, especially for women by workload). It is somewhat arbitrary not to value these, largely but not wholly female, activities, but GDP statistics do not do so, unless they are performed by a waged employee not by a household member.

In summary the potential annual gains came to:

- (a) 60,000 lives saved;
- (b) \$US 115-135 million additional production and vehicle savings;
- (c) 150,000 additional primary pupils and adult students and improved quality of education for 2,000,000 pupils and students;
- (d) Reduction of social and human costs of ill health plus additional time for housekeeping and environmental sanitation activities.

The three items to which no monetary value is attached clearly do have economic as well as social or human value.

The \$US 115-135 million represents a gain of the order of 2½ per cent of GDP. This is not negligible at the macro level especially as it is a buildup over three years which would presumably be extended thereafter. Further, the programmes are designed to relate to identifiable groups of poor and vulnerable people. About two-thirds of all cash or self provisioning gains would go to them, especially because their water, health posts, schools and tool needs are "end of the line" ones which suffer first from cutbacks. \$US 77.00 to \$US 90.00 million would represent a 15 to 18 per cent increase in their cash and kind income (plus the non quantified benefits). This can hardly be dismissed as trivial.

#### Brief programme notes

Primary health care expansion and upgrading would center on a national essential drug supply programme requiring about \$US 5 million a year in external support. Partial cost recovering (drug cost excluding distribution, up to 25 per cent of patients given local level waivers) could yield Cedi 500 million counterpart funds to support rehabilitation of buildings, an honorarium to the (now voluntary) health post cadre, transport and training.

Additional external support of up to \$US 5 million a year would be needed for basic supplies, technical assistance (strengthening local manufacturing capacity and quality), primary health care unit equipment

(e.g., refrigerators), additional cycles and vehicles to enhance mobility and strengthening central medical stores delivery and cold store capabilities.

Primary and adult education's key external input is \$US 4 million a year in paper to allow printing of 10,000,000 odd primary and adult education texts and pamphlets. This would need to be complemented with pencils, erasers, chalk, a limited number of vehicles, bicycles (incentive to and mobility for teachers), and spares. The first year total might be \$US 7 million with under \$US 5 million a year (including paper) thereafter.

Partial cost recovery on texts and pamphlets could yield perhaps Cedi 630 million a year to cover printing, adult education tutor honoraria (basically to primary school teachers for extra work) and training and northern and upper region school rehabilitation and refurnishing. The enrolment (especially of girls) in these regions is well below the national average and many schools are both in a state of disrepair and with no furniture. Funding should go to parents' groups for wood and tools to be used with community labour to construct furniture and to carry out repairs, probably to teachers' houses as well as school buildings proper.

Borehole water maintenance focuses on the 7,500 borehole pumps needing refits every other year with a backlog of 2,500 now overdue for refit and a desirable stock level of 3,750 kits. The cost of 17,500 kits (for three years plus basic inventory) would be about \$US 6 to \$US 6.2 million. In addition 2,000 new pumps (1,500 replacements, 500 inventory) would cost \$US 1 million. Beyond the initial year, CIDA backed buildup of local kit building capacity should reduce import requirements (and change some of them from parts to steel).

If user communities were charged when (and if) refits or replacements were provided, there is little doubt they would be willing to pay the full cost of the spares and pumps in Cedis. This would be much more cost effective (and acceptable) than attempting monthly household level user fee collection. The proceeds could be of the order of Cedi 350-375 million per year, perhaps 20-25 per cent of which would cover the water corporation's local cost on repair and replacement leaving 75-80 per cent to bolster its precarious general finances.

Basic tool availability (more accurately non availability in much of the country) is a significant barrier to enhanced peasant productivity. The bottleneck is not lack of serviceable domestic capacity with proven ability to produce acceptable tools. Rather it is of foreign exchange to import steel and fittings to use in the manufacturing process.

Approximately \$US 3.75 million a year could provide the imports to manufacture - say - 3 million machetes (cutlasses), 1,000,000 hoes, 200,000 each shovels and axes and smaller numbers of pickaxes, hammers, chisels, adzes and wheelbarrows. These could be sold at a profit to the enterprises so that counterpart funds of the order of Cedi 550-600 million should be generated.

Of that amount perhaps one half could be used to finance northern and upper region production rehabilitation and expansion (in large part by initial tool provision) and the balance toward local costs of selected research and extension and of road rehabilitation and maintenance in these regions and in the more isolated parts of the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions.

During droughts and the normal dry season in rural areas and in urban low income areas there is both a need to raise incomes and "involuntary leisure time" (no or only very low productivity farm or "informal sector" tasks or work available). Labour intensive small scale works schemes could provide such income augmentation consistent both with social strengthening and human dignity enhancing of the persons and households involved. If well designed (including a project reserve to cope with needed rapid employment level augmentation in dry years) they could also be efficient means to maintaining, restoring or extending economic and social infrastructure. Detailed identification from village and neighbourhood level up could produce an extensive, articulated list relatively rapidly.

Seasonal (or drought period) rural employment concentrated in the northern and upper regions and urban in low income neighbourhoods could be targeted at 150,000 persons (2/3 rural, 1/3 urban), 50 per cent female, 50 days per person per year maximum, at Cedi 100 for a six hour day (probably well above opportunity cost in these specific contexts although this would need to be verified) would cost about \$US 5 million for wages.

To be cost effective, perhaps \$US 1.5 a year million a year in tools, simple equipment (e.g., for rock crushing, block moulding, ground compacting), and building materials (wood, cement, metal sheet) would be needed as complementary inputs. The total cost of \$US 6.5 million a year would initially need to be externally financed given the fiscal position.

Commodity aid (e.g., wheat, milk powder, sugar, rice and cotton), would be a suitable medium for financing. However, it should be fully monetised and the proceeds used to pay wages and to buy the complementary inputs locally. Even in the northern and upper regions, except in the worst drought years, food is physically available so that to use a literal food for work programme would raise transport needlessly interfere with functioning local food markets and gratuitously add all of the problems of running a long distance food wholesale/retail system to the necessary ones of identifying and implementing projects and of hiring and remunerating workers.

Increasing women's ability to provision their households - through direct production for household use and/or augmenting cash incomes, is a priority both because of the overall need to augment poor household incomes and because women's cash and kind income is crucial in respect to child nutrition, cleansing (soap), clothing and health (clinic fees and drug charges). Women's income, as is typical in Africa, is not usually pooled into a common household budget, nor is male earner's income generally freely available for expenditure on behalf of children (with the apparent exception of school fees and related costs).

Two projects carried out by community based women producers assisted by the national women's council and UNICEF may serve as examples of what could be done over a wider range of activities and participants.

The first is improved fish smoking. Standard techniques have waste, spoilage and quality problems. A simple improved technology was used at a village called Chorkor. This has now been extended to over 50 villages augmenting both protein and calorie availability for the households of women engaged in smoking and significantly increasing their cash income from food processing which contributes a significant to dominant share of poor women's cash income in urban and some peri-urban or closely settled rural areas.

The second is production of improved weaning foods. The direct impact on child nutrition is significant because malnutrition rises sharply at the cessation of breast feeding. To afford the raw materials for the food and to cover maintenance and ultimate replacement costs of the adopted grain mills used, the women have built up "contract" grinding of other households' grain.

At present these two projects are of value to perhaps 2,500 to 5,000 poor women and their households. That by itself is arguably trivial, albeit not to 2,500 women and probably 7,500 children! But the numbers are steadily growing, especially as natural extension from word of mouth information followed up by visits to present fish smokers and weaning food grinders has begun. Further these are very cost efficient programmes which appear to recover full capital costs (initially often donated) in less than a year.

The need is not simply to expand these two - which are basically coastal and forest zone - but to identify other opportunities, especially in the poorer upper and northern regions. Two such potential projects are sketched in the next section.

Poverty and vulnerability reduction usually requires special attention to certain regions, in this case the poorer, drier, more isolated, higher transport cost (on sales and purchases), more drought vulnerable northern and upper regions. Several of the projects covered above either have such a component or would benefit these regions disproportionately because present basic service provision is the most exiguous or deteriorated. However, additional initiatives focussing on removing barriers to increased peasant agricultural productivity are needed.

Three such are pond desilting (for livestock protection, grain output augmentation, vegetable cultivation), shea nut collection expansion and small scale, labour intensive rice cultivation probably combined with additional training and use of animal power.

Approximately 1,000 ponds (natural or behind checkdams) in the upper east and northern Regions have silted severely to totally. This reduces dry season water availability as well as traditional irrigation capacity around the pond and downstream. The costs are increased livestock mortality, reduced grain crop production and limited ability of women to utilize free seeds and advise to establish or expand vegetable garden cultivation. The

reason villagers (who in fact see the problem and wish to reverse it) cannot act is that outside the provincial capitals there have been virtually no pickaxes, shovels or wheelbarrows making silt and rock clearing impossible.

Assuming 1,000 ponds over three years and initial tool stock (30 shovels, 15 pickaxes, 2 wheelbarrows per pond) the annual cost would be of the order of Cedi 60 million - if the agricultural tools project had been begun to increase local supply. From the third year replacement tools could be sold - or if the supply had become adequate could be acquired by villagers through normal commercial channels.

Vegetable gardening by women, especially during the dry season, could substantially augment nutrition (including during the hungry season). Free initial seed plus advisory services through the women's council should result in markedly increased takeup once ponds were desilted and garden irrigation water available. The advisory service cost should not exceed Cedi 12.5 million annually and the seed \$US 200,000.

Reasonable output gains would be 10,000 tonnes of grain (Cedi 200 million at local, 375 million imported cif Accra, or 525 million imported and transported to Tamale) and 20,000 tonnes of vegetables (200 kilos times 100,000 likely participants) nominally worth of the order of Cedi 375 to 450 million at local prices. Both the grain and especially the vegetables would be used largely for household self provisioning in these regions which have very severe nutritional shortfalls.

Shea nut production (primarily gathering from groves of wild trees) is concentrated in the upper west region. Of the order of 20,000 tonnes are marketed largely via the Cocobod for export as an input into skin friendly soaps and cosmetics. Output is hampered by poisonous snakes. Groves in areas infected by them cannot have trees pruned, undergrowth cut down or nuts collected resulting (according to collectors' estimates) in a loss of a third of collectable output, say at least 10,000 tonnes.

The requirements for achieving collection are: rubber boots (for protection of collectors), cutlasses (for slashing bush, pruning trees, "cutting" snakes) and snake bite serum in local health units. About 30,000 women collectors are involved.

Initial free distribution of (imported from Cote d'Ivoire) boots and (domestic) matchets (cutlasses) with subsequent replacements sold plus, via the primary health care project, ensuring refrigerator and vaccine supplies would overcome the barriers to increased production and higher women's income. The women's council could serve as delivery and advisory agent. It could also advise the women on using traditional or modern credit unions to raise working capital for bags to sell nuts by the bag to Cocobod rather than by the pan for half as much to middlemen who then bulk them.

The costs would be of the order of \$US 300,000 a year and Cedi 2.7 million (cutlasses, including delivery of cutlasses and matchets). An output gain of 10,000 tonnes would be worth Cedi 300 million at Cocobod prices and 500 million at fob export level.

Traditionally Ghanaian rice was northern upland (dry) in seasonal water courses or below ponds planted at the end of the rains. The new mechanized, large scale irrigated sector is high cost (perhaps three times cif prices) and import intensive (almost as much forex to grow a tonne as to import and more counting fuel to transport to Accra).

An intermediate approach, oxen plus small scale (e.g., archimedean screw) lift irrigation around ponds, permanent water courses and Lake Volta is technically feasible and likely to prove financially attractive to peasant growers.

The inputs required would be ploughs, water lift devices, oxen and training, all domestically purchaseable or fabricatable. These could be provided on loan but with a three year grace period given the newness of the approach in most of the area.

For 2,500 peasant households trained and provided with initial capital equipment (oxen, plough, water lift device) the annual cost could be of the order of Cedi 75 million with expansion thereafter less costly as loan recovery began. The output gain by the third year 2 to 3 tonne per hectare yields times 2 to 2.5 hectares per holding should yield 10,000 tonnes worth about Cedi 300 million at northern and upper region local prices and Cedi 450 million cif (imported) or Cedi 500 million wholesale transported to Accra.

For this trio of projects the local costs could be financed from the counterpart funds generated through the sale of steel and fittings under the agricultural tool project. If they were not then \$US 1.5 to 2 million a year additional finance would be required.

Delivery of basic services is severely hampered by lack of mobility. Some of the previous projects include vehicles and spares components but they do not, by their nature, address the underlying maintenance problem. For example in 1985 of 2,000 odd nominal health and education vehicles about 500 were "runners", 700 off the road for repairs and 800 physically defunct or economically life expired.

The keys to overcoming this position of more repairable but awaiting repair vehicles than ones actually operational are: systematic spares acquisition (including as a component of vehicle aid), training of mechanics (again partly in vehicle provision packages) and restoration of the capacity of the existing, but run down, ministerial regional workshops.

Direct import requirements would probably be of the order of \$US 4 million a year including vehicle rehabilitation, spares inventory establishment and normal maintenance, workshop replacement equipment and technical assistance in respect to programme design and/or training. Given the fiscal limitations - which are especially acutely felt by these ministries - Cedi 150 million a year out of local costs of Cedi 200-300 million a year (rising as the programme builds up momentum) would be needed from donor counterpart funds (or additional commodity aid, e.g., 500 tonnes cotton to be sold to the fibre constrained textile industry).

Local materials (wood and metal for vehicle rehabilitation and workshop repair plus some spares, e.g., tyres) would be about two-thirds of Cedi costs. The balance would include training, an extra duty allowance of say \$US 500 per year to hold artisans once trained and general overhead expenses.

Data in relation to poverty, vulnerability and especially on how to link reducing these to enhancing production is inadequate. The standard statistical system does not and realistically for some years will not be able to provide it on a timely basis or within present programme capacity. Two pilot efforts have been begun:

(a) An urban low income area (neighbourhood) household sample survey to identify income sources and levels, expenditure patterns and other basic social condition indicators;

(b) Ways and means to create a rapid warning system combining morbidity, malnutrition, local market price and rainfall data for the closed month by the end of the current month fed to a contingency monitoring unit feeding into the executive offices as an input into policy response with reference to pre-disaster avoiding or disaster containing and reversing action.

The results from these are expected to give indications as to priorities for further "quick and hasty" but broadly correct data collection on more specific topics to alter, extend coverage of or add to the projects/programmes sketched above. Total costs of the two initial endeavours are of the order of \$US 50,000.

## Annex II

### Basic services rehabilitation and vulnerability reduction

This set of programmes relates to a context of modest adequacy of normal year household income and nutritional standards but of disintegration (under fiscal constraints) of basic services and of very high (drought) vulnerability. The cases are ones under discussion by various concerned agencies (including in one or more cases the World Bank, UNICEF and several bilateral and voluntary agencies) with departments of the Government of Somalia and except for existing programmes cited are at dialogue rather than firm project proposal levels. They are nonetheless illustrative of three way community, government, external agency co-operation to meet needs no one of them could meet by itself or with only one of the other two parties.

The most critical socio-economic problems are the absence of a national primary health care or basic veterinary drug delivery system, the low access to pure or reliable water sources in rural areas, the precipitate decline in primary school enrolment and the high vulnerability to drought. These cannot be addressed effectively by the Government of Somalia out of its own resources because after 1980 the earlier 12½ per cent to 15 per cent tax revenue to GDP ratio collapsed to under 5 per cent and rebuilding it (which has begun) is a medium to long term goal. Substantial community action and support exists, but cannot by itself provide imported items (e.g., drugs, veterinary drugs, pump spares, textbooks, etc.) or the full cost of the personnel needed (especially for primary education). Nor can local communities provide a national stocking, delivery, training and co-ordination structure. Therefore, the efficient way forward appears to be via a government - community - donor partnership. In fact the existing incomplete primary health care system is precisely such a community health worker (remunerated by the community), provincial government personnel, donor provision of inputs, transport, finance approach.

### Health - toward a community health care system

In 12 provinces a full or partial donor and community financed system exists. It should be extended to the remaining eight provinces, including Mogadishu where clinic/outpatient facilities are also far from adequate.

The elements of such a system include:

(a) Donor agency provision of drugs, supplies, transport and distribution points to community health workers;

(b) Somalia Ministry of Health personnel at provincial and district level to store, transport, distribute and monitor with a responsibility allowance from the agency;

(c) Agency/Ministry personnel training (from 6 to 24 weeks) of village or nomadic community selected community health workers and traditional birth attendants who then operate in their communities without direct supervision;



(d) Collection through their community health workers of full or partial cost of drugs from the communities served;

(e) Limited field monitoring and followup by agency/health personnel;

(f) Links to the mass immunization and tuberculosis projects (strongly backed by the Government of Somalia and by Italy and UNICEF and by Finland respectively); and

(g) Community payment of community health workers and traditional birth attendance on any mutually agreed basis (not on a centrally set or fully monetised one).

Development should be planned with full involvement of the Somalia Ministries of Health and of Planning and of all major supporting agencies. The three main requirements are:

First, mobilizing sponsors for the eight provinces not now covered at all. The Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom, whether directly or via voluntary agencies are among those who might be interested.

Second, expanding existing programmes which are partial. For example the oldest and largest has 120 community health workers of whom 30 are nomads in a pair of regions where the optimal number is probably of the order of 700 i.e. one per 500 nomadic persons and one per 1,000 settled community members.

Third, co-ordinating training perhaps using the six very underutilized nomadic education centers as bases. As the implied numbers required are 2,000 traditional birth attendants (1 to 2,500-3,000 persons) and 7,500 community health workers (1 to 500 nomadic, 1,000 settled rural, 1,500 urban) and the numbers trained and in post now do not exceed 10 per cent of those levels this will require careful planning and phasing over several years.

The expanded immunization programme under Somalia, Italy, and UNICEF auspices should, where possible, work through the community based primary health care system. Where this is not possible, the initial programme can be on a campaign basis. However, regular follow-up on new young children and pregnant women can only be secured through an ongoing institutionalized structure.

Tuberculosis care - now covering five provinces with 2.5 million people - is handled at diagnostic and referral level by a Finnish project with staff, diagnostic and hospital facilities. It operates initial sample collection (for diagnosis) and distribution of drugs for home treatment via community health workers in four provinces and uses its own clinics in Mogadishu. Expansion to national coverage is dependent on extension of the basic primary health care system.

And primary veterinary care?

Animal health is rarely grouped with human. In a dominantly agro-pastoral and nomadic economy/society such as Somalia's a re-examination may be in order.

Neither public veterinary facilities nor private commercialization of veterinary drugs reach the bulk of the nomadic and agro-pastoral populations. This leads directly to high, preventable animal losses from disease, especially in drought years.

Pastoralists are able to diagnose many of the diseases and effective drugs for most are known. What is lacking is a cadre of personnel able to relate diagnosis to drugs and above all to supply the drugs.

The community health worker cadre would appear to offer a viable solution to these problems. Indeed in one or two districts a similar system survives, apparently from the former British administration of the then Somaliland Protectorate. Community chosen personnel collect veterinary drugs, distribute them, collect fees, report back for more drugs.

With minimal additional training (largely in drug recognition and poster related disease identification as most members of this cadre will not be literate) the community health workers could be used to collect, distribute, receive and return payment for veterinary drugs. The value in cattle, sheep, goats and camels saved would be high, perhaps of the order of \$US 20 million in normal and \$US 60 million in drought years. These are 20 per cent and 60 per cent respectively of Somalia's recorded exports. The export comparison is relevant because livestock are Somalia's dominant export and the domestic meat market is relatively well supplied. To nomadic households the gain could amount to up to one third of their cash income plus additional supplies of their basic food - milk.

Water and sanitation: extending narrow bases

Pure or even reliable access to water in rural Somalia is - except for the four riverine provinces - the exception. This is most true of the nomadic provinces and districts but at least in the dry season also characterizes the rain fed agricultural provinces and districts.

Community based action cannot be expected to deal with the building or even major maintenance of deep boreholes, a key element in water supply especially in the central rangelands. That could be achieved within present aid flows to water by redesigning their makeup. The new pattern would include spares, transport, training, equipment and salary supplements for maintenance. This would replace the present pattern of expensive boreholes going out of service in as little as five years with resultant costly total overhaul and rehabilitation or yet more costly replacement. Even over the first five years of such a policy, it is likely that the net boreholes added (total constructed or rehabilitated, less those going out of service) would be higher than with the present pattern of spending almost entirely on new or replacement deep boreholes.

In four fields community, donor government joint action could play a major role. For the first two the main initial emphases should probably be on reliability and quantity. Long distances to fetch water are a heavy burden on women and girls and reduce the water available for washing, cleansing, bathing and even cooking. More water, even if not of optimal quality does mean better health, especially if drinking water is boiled before use.

First, more shallow wells can be dug. There are two types: normal and underground dams (in "dry" watercourses) which back up underground flows. These then percolate into a punctured plastic pipe and are pumped up at the bank. Limited assistance with material supply, technical advice, design and training of community members has had a significant impact in some districts.

Second, training Somalians (probably women given the gender division of labour) to do simple borehole and borehole surround/drainage maintenance. In addition they could be trained to identify warning signs of impending serious problems and given identifiable offices or officers to contact when such signs appear in order to allow major maintenance to be carried out before total breakdown.

Third, simple spring and stream protection and offtake in the riverine provinces. In this case the emphasis will frequently be on purity, the overall accessibility situation is not bad, but pollution is common.

Fourth, rehabilitation and increasing the number of birkets (artificial miniponds) and ponds in nomadic areas and also providing training on ways of improving quality (e.g., by providing animal watering points to keep the beasts out of the water and separate human and animal offtake).

Ideally training and input supply (including handpumps and spares) plus technical advice would be provided in any province by the same agency working in the primary health care area. This is in fact, the case with well established programmes in two regions and is developing in a third.

Access to sanitation is very low in Somalia even by Sub-Saharan Africa standards. The obvious means (pit latrines) and methods of promoting it (adult education and community participation linked to primary health care and community health workers) have frequently been dismissed as inappropriate because of lack of water.

This is puzzling. Water is not uniformly scarce in settled areas. It certainly is in others, especially during the dry season. But parts of the United Republic of Tanzania, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Ghana in which extension and adult education have led to widespread household and communal building of latrines are just as dry.

Therefore a restudy of actual techniques proposed and used, or rejected, in Somalia is needed. It should be paralleled by study of techniques and extension methods in the United Republic of Tanzania, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Ghana to see why they work there so that a revised programme can be

prepared for use by Somalians. This is especially urgent in respect to the densely settled areas of the four riverine provinces and for urban areas where the dryness problem is less but the pollution danger (or reality in some cases) significantly greater than in the sparsely settled central rangelands and northeast.

#### Fuel: problems requiring answers

The fuel problems are threefold: rising wood and charcoal prices weighing heavily on low income urban budgets; forest (wood) cutting beyond natural regeneration for urban areas and the same plus bush (acacia) cutting endangering the ecology in riverine and dry range areas; the increasing fuel collection burden on rural women as the number of trees and bushes diminishes and they have to walk further and further to fuel their households.

What is to be done is less clear. Studies and pilot projects are needed before any full scale campaigns. Improved meerscham stores do exist but do not seem to have been tested for fuel saving/stove cost ratios nor for whether the type of heat/flame produced is actually suited to Somali cuisine. Improved three stone fire technology is believed to have been tested successfully, but with very limited subsequent extension. Some pine and eucalyptus varieties - as well as some acacia varieties - are suitable for many areas of Somalia. But under what circumstances households, communities or urban charcoal co-operatives would plant and tend them appears not to have been explored to date.

#### Education: reversing a Debacle

In 1975/6 Somalia won the UNESCO prize for the best adult education campaign and had begun a drive which, if it had continued, would have achieved almost universal entry into the first year of primary school and a 75 per cent primary school enrolment to age group ratio in a decade. From the late 1970's rising debt service costs and the erosion of the revenue base turned the forward momentum first into stagnation and then into accelerating decline. By 1986 barely 15 per cent of the primary age group was enrolled, literacy was falling and adult and women's education were so penniless that their relatively wide range of programmes could not be operated on any significant scale.

To revive primary education will require six elements:

First, community support to pay a portion of teachers' salaries (whether in cash or in food and house repairs) and to help build and maintain schools and basic furniture. This already exists in several districts, is now officially endorsed and could be expanded into a base for a national primary education rehabilitation thrust. Certainly almost all systematic or ad hoc surveys indicate that lack of educational opportunity (both as to school access and quality) is a major concern of Somalians.

Second, substantial external support for teachers' (and supervisors') salaries, inputs into textbook production and transport and for teacher training and retraining as well as capital assistance for rehabilitation

(including desks, chairs, book cupboards, blackboards) and construction is needed. Until Somalia can loosen its fiscal constraints adequate government funding will be unattainable. And until teachers are paid much more than \$US 6.00 to \$US 10.00 a month they will frequently be absent and drift away to less ill-paid employment, including teaching "across the water" in Saudi Arabia and the Yemens.

Third, completion, printing and distribution of new textbooks. Curriculum development has made progress but: there is not a complete run of primary texts; resource limits have delayed printing of some which are ready; transport constraints have meant that many, perhaps most of those printed have not been distributed. This requires specialized dedicated printing capacity for primary (or primary and adult/women's) education not reliance on the Government Printer which has too many other demands on its capacity.

Fourth, rehabilitation and re-equipment of schools many of which are decrepit and with no furniture whatsoever.

Fifth, an increase - perhaps 10 fold - in teachers salaries (to the \$US 60.00-100.00 a month range) including community and external contributions.

Sixth, a supervisory monitoring distribution system to provide a framework for individual schools and teachers and a comparable salary boost for officers at these levels.

There have been discussions along these lines among potential donors and among them and the Government of Somalia. It is understood that the World Bank has produced a think piece articulating such an approach for use in discussions and negotiations toward bringing it into being.

Adult (including women's) education faces a similar challenge which can only be met in the short and medium term along similar lines. Four operational principles can be identified:

(a) Finding out which programmes are wanted by which adults where and beginning a participatory process with users in programme and course design as well as in fee (or tutor payment in goods) collection;

(b) Articulating and testing new programmes and delivery systems with built in feedback and monitoring (probably first for basic literacy, agricultural adult education and technical and artisanal education in adult education proper and in women's education);

(c) Co-ordinating adult/continuing/women's education with primary education, primary health workers and water education to achieve economies of scale, e.g., by utilizing primary schools and teachers outside normal hours and paying a part time honorarium to tutors (after a training course); and

(d) Identifying and programming a package of potentially sustainable sources of finance (especially recurrent finance) before launching new or sharply extended programmes.

The areas for initial action are probably: basic literacy (where the clearest need for a primary school and teacher link exists), agricultural adult education (to expand the courses, radio programme and newspaper from one to all four riverine provinces and to develop a related package for dry land farming and agro-pastoral zones), vocational and artisanal (where of six centres only one has both premises and installed equipment, one more premises and uninstalled equipment and four equipment only, in addition to only one having recurrent cost funding) and women's education (whose present two year course apparently lays too much stress on literacy and home making skills and too little on income generating skills as perceived by its potential poor female clientele).

While Adult and Women's education have personnel at upper levels and capacity to design programmes, their operational funding is even more exiguous than that of primary education. Realistically the Government of Somalia will need to concentrate its limited short-term capacity to increase the education budget on secondary education to complement adult and primary so that the latter two educational sectors are likely to need up to a decade of substantial external recurrent finance support.

Koranic education, which is followed by twice as many pupils as primary, demonstrates the real potential of community support. Virtually all finance is from parents usually in the form of food plus limited cash payments. Unlike the formal system, writing materials (wooden slates and pens using ink made from soot and milk) do exist and nomadic Koranic schools do move with their pupils.

However, even in this area, assistance from a Muslim state with an Islamic education system through university level would be of value. Most teachers are not literate in Arabic and teach memorization of, rather than reading of and lectures explaining the contents of, the Holy Koran. Only a limited number of classes include literacy in Arabic and numeracy. Advice on curriculum development and support for teacher training from an Islamic education system would probably be welcomed by Somalia's Islamic leadership and teachers.

#### Disaster relief: toward effective vulnerability reduction

Somalia experiences severe droughts in several provinces and districts about every third year. These follow at least two semi-annual rain failures or near failures in the affected district. When that has happened, a drought disaster is almost inevitable if the next rains fail or (as in 1987) are delayed. Thus drought loss reduction programming in Somalia has the advantage of being broadly predictable (e.g., in 1990 or 1991 on past experience there will be a drought in several districts and provinces) and specific early warnings are available at least six months in advance. Further 1987 was the fifth drought for which substantial international assistance within an internationally co-ordinated exercise was mounted.

Unfortunately the 1987 drought was coped with as late as and with the same mistakes as in the 1973-1974 and intervening droughts. Human deaths were limited, albeit severe malnutrition including nutrition related causes of morbidity in children increased markedly. Livestock losses to a substantial extent as a result of diseases carrying off weakened beasts in the absence of veterinary drugs - remained very high probably 50 per cent in the severely affected districts and up to 20 per cent nationally. Relief missions in many cases arrived over a month after the drought when the delayed rains had come and left without serious attention to rehabilitation of drought stricken households or the steps to make future responses more effective. This pattern of reacting to disaster after it happens despite prior warning of its arrival is a disaster for Somalians and, unlike drought, a preventable one.

A nine point programme could significantly reduce human suffering and livestock losses. It would not necessarily cost significantly more than present lagged, after the event, reactions since these entail high transport costs which could be averted by preplanning response and prepositioning reserves of human and veterinary drugs, water equipment and vehicle spares and food.

First, a disaster co-ordinating committee could be set up on a permanent basis chaired by a senior Somalian official and including relevant government departments and international co-ordinating agencies. As demonstrated in Botswana, this approach allows effective preplanning and prepositioning as well as timely response; none of which are characteristics of most ad hoc, episodic drought relief structures.

Second, early warning system reports would then be sent to the Committee to assess drought danger and, if an impending drought disaster seemed likely, the probable affected districts and provinces. On this basis a standby programme could be planned and co-operating agencies warned of likely calls on them at least 4 to 6 months in advance of the actual disaster.

Third, permanent stocks of basic drugs (existing under FAO/UNICEF auspices as a community health care basic stock) for human use, veterinary drugs, pump and borehole spares, vehicle spares and tyres should be prepositioned, certainly in Mogadishu, probably in Hargeisa and Kisumayo and possibly in one or two additional zonal centres.

Fourth, similar supplementary feeding and grain stocks should be prepositioned. In respect to grain, adequate maize and other coarse grain stocks exist. Because of fiscal constraints, the Government of Somalia cannot purchase them to distribute free. Therefore a prepurchase of up to 50,000 tonnes to allow immediate use when needed would appear to be appropriate.

Fifth, ensuring that existing water points as well as health, veterinary, water (tanker) and food transport fleets are in working order. Each drought has resulted in the discovery that many nominally available pumps and vehicles were in fact non-functional and could not be repaired promptly because spares were not available in Somalia.

Sixth, building up community based operational and delivery systems to ensure that resources can in fact be distributed to all parts of affected districts. Given limited government resources, pre-authorizations of finance for transport, releasable by Somalia based donor representatives, would be of significant value in ensuring immediate response.

Seventh, as soon as a drought develops, pinpointing its location, nature and evolution and the specific needs of each affected district to allow prompt dispatch out of the prepositioned stocks to avert or reduce, rather than to respond after, the disaster. This means using reports from designated up-country officials (and the community network) fed to the Disaster Committee, not waiting for reports from ad hoc survey teams sent out from Mogadishu.

Eighth, following up assessments of needs and initial dispatches out of stocks with specific requests to co-operating agencies both for additional resources to use during the drought and for restoration of the reserve stocks.

Ninth, identifying rehabilitation needs in general terms under the auspices of the Disaster Committee during an inter drought period and in detail during a drought. Following up with specific requests for rehabilitation inputs (e.g., food to bridge the gap to herd recovery or harvest, seeds, water supply restoration equipment, funds to buy and feed beasts during the drought to be allocated on deferred loans to nomadic or agro-pastoral households whose herds have been completely wiped out) during the drought.

The veterinary drug input is particularly important. Probably at least half of the 5,000,000 odd beasts which perish in a normal drought do not die literally from lack of food or water, indeed up to a third die after the drought has been broken (except in the unusual two year disasters like 1973-1974's "long tailed" drought when even the long tailed antelope died). They die because their resistance to disease has been weakened - a situation directly comparable to human famine deaths which are largely from lowered disease resistance, not literal starvation. The post drought deaths result from diarrhoea (on eating new, high water content grass) and pulmonary diseases associated with the relative coolness during the rains. The former is, as for people-treatable by oral rehydration and many of the latter with well known low cost drugs.

A baseline nutrition survey of nomadic, agro-pastoral, riverine, urban and fishing populations would be of great value to nutritional programming generally and vulnerability reduction during droughts in particular. No such systematic, articulated national survey has ever been conducted and one could be justified as part of preplanning to reduce vulnerability to (or costs of) drought.

#### Financing, problems and potential

The financing requirement of the basic service programmes is of the order of \$US 54.00 million a year, excluding Somalia Government existing



staff input and community support. Of this perhaps \$US 18.00 million represents support already provided by external sources primarily to community health care and tuberculosis projects. That leaves \$US 36.00 million to be found in addition to the community support already projected. The costs by sector are summarized in the following table.

Summary of cost estimates (\$000,000)  
Programme costs

| Programme area   | Gross cost | present support | Reallocable support to same sector | New wet resources needed |
|------------------|------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Health           | 30 a/      | 15              | 5                                  | 10                       |
| Education        | 15         | 2               | 8                                  | 5                        |
| Veterinary       | 2 b/       | -               | ?                                  | 2                        |
| Water/sanitation | 5          | 1               | 2                                  | 2                        |
| Fuel             | 2 c/       | negl            | ?                                  | 2                        |
| Total            | <u>54</u>  | <u>18</u>       | <u>15</u>                          | <u>21</u>                |

a/ Includes tuberculosis programme.

b/ Initial year cost higher to establish basic veterinary drug revolving stock.

c/ Pure guess estimate as to possible small scale forestry (including bush) and fuel efficiency promotion programmes which might be developed.

All estimates exclude community contributions which in total are likely to be of the order of \$US 25 to \$US 30 million.

Reallocation out of present funding levels from capital projects which when completed cannot be operated for lack of recurrent finance could provide perhaps \$US 15.00 million leaving a bottom line annual requirement of \$US 21.00 million more aid to Somalia annually.

The financing will continue to be needed beyond the third year. It can be reduced only as the Government of Somalia succeeds in restoring its real revenue base and/or a major debt writeoff or rescheduling with ten years grace is secured. While serious efforts to restore the pre-1980 tax to GDP ratio of 15 per cent were put in hand in 1985 (after it fell to under 5 per cent in 1984) these will take time to produce revenue flows allowing substantial takeover of basic service costs.

Present and projected annual grant and soft loan ODA to Somalia is of the order of \$US 400.00 million annually. In that context \$US 21.00 million additional to restore basic primary health care; establish first line veterinary care; double primary school enrolment to 30 per cent of the age group and to augment rural access to pure water should not be an unattainable target.

The cost of the vulnerability reduction/disaster relief programme are not estimateable on an annual basis because droughts are not annual. The initial basic drug reserve already exists under WHO/UNICEF auspices. To add reserves of veterinary drugs, pump spares, vehicle spares and tyres would cost \$US 2.00 to \$US 2.05 million. Reconditioning existing vehicles (after the end of 1987 drought rehabilitation work) might cost another \$US 1.00 to 1.5 million. The cost of a standby disaster response institutional structure - basically office equipment and communications connections should be under \$US 0.1 million. However, a detailed nutritional survey by zone taken in both normal and drought years (requiring about 21,000 households in seven zonal samples with hungry and harvest season observations in a good year plus a drought year one) would cost another \$US 0.05 to \$US 1.00 million. It would provide the first nutritional baseline from which to assess vulnerability and margins in responding to early warning information. Thus, core set up costs that would appear to be \$US 3.5 to \$US 5.00 million.

However, this excludes food reserves. At present domestic grain reserves are adequate to meet physical requirements. However, Somalia Government fiscal limitations do not allow free distribution so that pre purchase of, say, 50,000 tonnes (\$US 12.5 million) to be called on when needed would avert delays in financing distribution of grain already in the country. Arguably another \$0.25 to \$0.05 million reserve of supplementary feeding items should be established.

In non drought years the cost after the initial setup (\$US 16.00 to \$US 18.00 million including pre-purchase of grain) would be low. In drought years it would be substantial; how substantial depending on the extent and severity of the drought. Initial survival requirements might in a "normal" drought year come to \$US 15 to \$US 20 million for human and veterinary drugs, grains and supplementary feeding items, water pumps and tankers, and transport. Both the initial and the typical drought year (say one in three) levels would appear manageable if priority emphasis is placed on them by the Government of Somalia and donors especially as the present ineffective drought relief's cost may well be of the same order of magnitude.

The human and social benefits of both the basic services and vulnerability redirection programmes are evident. The long term economic benefits of strengthening the education and health base are also clear. Short-term economic benefit calculation is more difficult. If the veterinary programme could reduce animal losses by 500,000 beasts per normal year (out of 25 million odd) and 1,500,000 beasts per drought year the average value saved for domestic consumption or higher exports would be not less than \$20.00 million in normal (non-drought) and \$60.00 million in drought years assuming \$US 25.00 for a goat, \$30.00 for a sheep, \$100.00 for cattle and \$200.00 for camels and that 80 per cent of beasts saved were small ruminants and 20 per cent cattle and camels. As drought year losses can easily be up to 5,000,000 small ruminants and 1,000,000 cattle and camels the targeted reduction by one quarter appears plausible.

Annex III

Food aid reconsidered

Food aid is a substantial source of resource transfers to Africa. It is a recognized tool for survival support. Can it be viewed as a strategic input into reweaving the social fabric? If so how?

Food aid globally and to sub-Saharan Africa has been on a slowly rising path. From 8.9 million tonnes of global cereal shipments in 1979/1980 it rose to 9.8 million in 1983/1984 and 11.8 million in 1984/1985. Sub-Saharan Africa was the recipient of a rising share - over half in 1984/1985.

Food aid is not homogenous. Its three broad categories are: emergency/disaster relief, balance of payments (and recipient government local currency resources) support and project. Prior to the 1983/1985 rise in emergency aid, the division in sub-Saharan Africa was about 30 per cent, 60 per cent, 10 per cent. Evidently the categories are not watertight, indeed the argument here is that they should become less so. If used as food (or cash) for work, emergency aid can finance income maintenance and rehabilitation or development projects. Any food aid reduces pressure on national foreign exchange resources for any given level of food availability. The local counterpart funds of any balance-of-payments support food aid (unless they are sterilized in a blocked account) are likely to sustain some rural service programmes and finance some rural development costs. However, the division has been a very real one especially between project and other food aid.

Criticism of food aid as negative in its impact on future (or even present) agricultural production has centred on five themes or contentions that it:

- (a) Lowers prices and therefore reduces incentives to producers;
- (b) Reduces government priority to developing agricultural and especially food production;
- (c) Creates a budgetary dependence on food aid by generating local currency through open market sale;
- (e) Is a pure consumption transfer often to above-average income urban residents, and is therefore non-developmental; and
- (f) Is inferior to other forms of aid, especially when the food source is tied.

Each criticism may be valid in particular cases but none is either universal or inevitable as indicated by the following points:

- (a) Food aid may well lower food prices. But since in most of sub-Saharan Africa these prices have been rising faster than average prices

or wages, this is not necessarily socially or economically unsound. If food aid is sold at prices at or above full cost or is given to starving or destitute beneficiaries the danger of rendering local food prices uneconomic is small. Emergency aid to the starving or virtually destitute has limited direct effect on prices, as their effective market demand is negligible. It may well have a much stronger positive effect on production by rendering such people physically and materially able to restore production after the emergency (e.g., because they are not forced to eat seed, sell all livestock and tools and abandon homesteads). Two special problems are ensuring that late (post crisis arriving) food aid does not unduly depress grower prices and that food aid does not shut out third world food surplus countries from their natural export markets (e.g., Zimbabwe and Malawi in Southern Africa, Kenya in the Horn). The former may imply increased use of food aid to rebuild strategic reserves and the latter does imply increased triangular aid, using rich country funds for procurement in poor countries. An additional problem does arise in the context of overvalued or split exchange rates. If food aid is sold at the local currency equivalent of a general or special overvalued (forex underpriced) rate, it does depress domestic, usually domestic urban, prices. This can directly deter local production and/or increase urban/rural inequality. Perhaps even more serious it can induce a shift to semi-non traditional grains which cannot be produced locally and thereby reduce the volume domestic growers can sell whatever the price. Sale of massive rice and wheat food aid in Somalia at not over 60 per cent of the real (i.e. the Jeddah bazaar or the domestic free) rate has clearly had that result with the order of staple grains in the Mogadishu market probably wheat, rice, maize and (negligible) millet versus maize, millet, rice wheat as recently as the late 1970's. In this case devaluation would benefit poor peasants and - if the demand shift is not irreversible - not necessarily harm urban workers. The aid volume could be maintained by shifts to sugar, vegetable oil and cotton in which there are structural deficits at least for a decade. None of these special cases constitutes a general case against food aid;

(b) Government attention to food production could be reduced if the amount of food aid provided were large and certain in relation to consumption requirements. Most sub-Saharan Africa governments do not perceive food aid as having these characteristics. In any case, the overall terms and conditions of food, and associated rural-development ODA can reduce or reverse any such effect where it exists;

(c) The danger of budgetary dependence is real especially when food aid is sold at market or near market prices. In one East African State, the restoration of food self-sufficiency in maize in 1985/1986 could, in principle have increased the recurrent budget deficit for 1985/1986 by up to \$US 100.00 million or 30 per cent, since the food marketing corporation could have had to procure much of the amount previously supplied from food aid and then sold to the corporation with the proceeds augmenting treasury revenue. If food aid is tied to one product, is annual and is not linked to alternative balance-of-payments support finance, this problem can be a very real one, albeit one more likely to increase government deficits and inflation than to reduce food production;

(d) Food aid is no more necessarily a pure consumption transfer than any other kind of ODA. In fact, emergency aid that preserves the physical and material ability to produce, and balance-of-payments support linked to food for work, to agricultural imports, or to infrastructure development and wage goods production can have a more positive developmental impact on local production than most ODA. Inappropriate subsidies to middle income consumers and in particular to urban patterns of consumption are possible but by no means universal; and

(e) In general it may well be true that cash aid to poor countries to buy food, or other priority imports, would be more efficient if it were available at least as promptly (in terms of food arrival) and at least in the same amounts as food aid. Unfortunately there is little to suggest that it would be. The question therefore is one of limiting diseconomies. Food aid is fungible, i.e., foreign exchange not spent on food imports can be reallocated. Food aid can be complemented by ODA linked to the import cost of related elements of food production development programmes.

Balance-of-payments support food aid can be highly positive in its rural development and food production impact. In many of the African economies import strangulation has meant a lack of agricultural inputs (including even hoes and cutlasses), deterioration of rural infrastructure, inadequate private and public capacity to procure food (related to fuel and transport shortages), massive deterioration of rural health, education and water services, general unavailability and high prices for incentive (i.e., basic manufactured) goods. Any aid which is used to ease these constraints is conducive to enhanced rural development welfare as well as and in particular to increased food production. This is true even if the imported food is sold and the local proceeds used largely to finance capital projects and basic service programmes while the saved foreign exchange is reallocated to production and basic service operations and to rehabilitation import requirements.

Project food aid has a mixed record. Some supplemental feeding programmes, e.g., Botswana and Zimbabwe are successful and cost efficient. Many projects are neither. Effective project aid tends to have high organizational and personnel requirements to set up and unless built into an existing programme (e.g., supplementary feeding at schools or clinics) to operate. Therefore its expansion does need to be treated with caution. Massive, multiple conditionality by several donors which converts the local proceeds of balance-of-payments support food aid into de facto now fungible project support hampers efficiency of resource allocation and, in practice, is not particularly efficient in promoting the donors' pet projects either.

#### Toward more effective food aid

At least ten criteria or guidelines toward making food aid to sub-Saharan Africa more effective in increasing food production and peasant incomes and decreasing hunger and poverty in the medium term as well as saving more lives in the short can be identified.

First, forward planning and organization is needed. This is true for emergencies both because some happen somewhere each year and because in most of sub-Saharan Africa recurrence over time in the same country is predictable. It is even more necessary for integrating emergency survival aid into medium term rehabilitation recovery restructuring for renewed development aid. To be effective the planning needs to be backed by designed programmes, at least skeleton organizations (especially units in recipient governments which are designated to and can take an identification, distribution and monitoring functions) in being as well as early warning systems (primarily national and as in the SADCC area regional) and prepositioning of initial supplies of some key inputs (e.g., grain but perhaps also vehicle spares, tyres and fuel). This pattern simply does not exist: in Somalia in 1987 international drought relief (despite at least six months warning) made all the same mistakes (including lateness) as in 1973/1974 and the three intervening droughts.

Second, quick response to changing circumstances is crucial and to date rarely achieved. Part of this relates to absence of early warning; part to failure to pre-plan and part to logistical and financial problems of stepping or starting up programmes. If emergencies, for sub-Saharan Africa as a region are seen as an ongoing situation (not one off events) all of these constraints can be substantially reduced. Because the margin between a short and a disastrous crop often turns on rains in the two to three months before harvest and the logistics of grain movement are such that up to 180 days may be physically necessary to reach isolated areas (which are often the most drought prone) building up national and regional reserves to reduce response time is a logical food aid use, e.g., via counterpart fund purchases in good crop years (which will also help stabilize grower prices) and via use of "late" food aid arriving after the emergency has passed (because the pipeline takes time to shut down). The latter point indicates a less stressed face of flexibility - shifting rapidly from food supply to food production/reserve building food aid to other resource flows when domestic production recovers.

Third, avoiding physical fetishism is needed. The purpose of food aid is to relieve hunger, rehabilitate stricken households, create a base for increasing the productivity and incomes of poor people, especially poor peasants. These goals are not necessarily well served by insisting that imported food aid be distributed literally and physically to rural areas:

(a) Often rural areas (or at least most) have adequate food supplies for themselves, the real deficit is in the urban areas because there is not an adequate overall rural surplus to meet urban requirements;

(b) As the urban areas are usually cheaper and easier to reach, and suffer more from physical food shortages than from lack of purchasing power, selling food aid there and using the proceeds to fund rural income support/productivity enhancement programmes (so peasants are able to avoid having to sell food from sub-normal harvests to meet non-food needs) can reduce cross haul transport costs (and absolute physical overloads on scarce vehicle, fuel, spares supplies and weak roads) and speed up response;

(c) Where physical food is needed (for free distribution or to validate payments in a food for work or a cash to buy food for work programme) in hard-hit rural areas, it should when practicable be purchased in nearby rural areas with more normal crops again bolstering their incomes and reducing overall transport costs and physical requirements.

Fourth, food aid should be so structured as to maintain self respect and household productive viability. This implies first providing support that allows peasants to stay on their holdings. Once they are forced off at least half the battle is lost, rehabilitation of their ability to produce is harder and may prove impossible. Whether on the farm or at worst in another rural setting, income in cash for productive work should be provided to sustain ability to meet basic non-food needs and self respect. Further, these aspects of the programme should continue during rehabilitation to allow use (whether purchased or provided free) of seeds, tools, inputs, and core livestock replacements.

Food or (where practicable) cash to buy food for work programmes can be central both to maintaining income and self respect and to rehabilitation and vulnerability reduction. The volume of labour intensive projects which are of ecological, production, basic service provision and social value in rural sub-Saharan Africa is very high. So, in most drought prone areas is the volume of seasonal unemployment. This undesired leisure is usually high just before and at the beginning of the harvest, in West Africa called pre-harvest "hungry season".

If work can be provided then food purchases (or lower food sales from inadequate household supplies) will be possible increasing welfare and in some cases capacity to produce because of better nutritional status and greater energy.

While the need for such employment is greatest during bad weather years and the subsequent rehabilitation period, it remains albeit at a lower level as part of the "silent crisis" even in "good" years. Thus, while programmes should be stepped up in emergencies they should not be halted as soon as the "loud crisis" is over. This implies, as does the need for complementary tools and materials that cash as well as food aid inputs will often be needed.

Such programmes are not overly hard to design or administer. Zimbabwe in 1984 and pilot ILO labour intensive work projects (e.g., in the United Republic of Tanzania) are examples of success. Participation, decentralization, careful design and pre-planning are needed all are possible, especially if ongoing programmes rather than the one off operations are established.

Fifth, food aid should be used to reduce future vulnerability to natural and person promoted (e.g., ecological degradation) disasters. The requirements or possibilities under this head are numerous and vary from context to context. Tree planting and protection, erosion control bunding or terracing, small (or medium) scale irrigation (especially with labour intensive cultivation) are fairly obvious examples. All can be promoted

via food or cash for work programmes in the context of food aid. An apparently evident example, wells for human and livestock use requires closer scrutiny on a case by case basis. These may be crucially positive. But if, as in the Sahel in the 1970s they encourage clustering of people and livestock in areas with inadequate poor year vegetation to support the stock, they can make a major contribution to exacerbating the next crisis and enhancing cumulative environmental degradation. A less self-evident positive example of projects in this category is rural road (or motorable track) rehabilitation, improvement or construction. Poor access to markets lowers peasant income in good years and greatly exacerbates the problems of food delivery in bad. In much of rural sub-Saharan Africa environmental damage results from need, not greed. Peasants know they are damaging the land but have no choices but to do so or to starve. Thus better terms of trade can be environmentally positive. Again, if planned in advance such programmes can be highly labour intensive.

Other suitable projects in some contexts include resettlement, storage/reserve stock capacity enhancement and maintenance, and restoration or creation of basic health and health-related services in rural areas. Irreversible ecological degradation or gaining a breathing space for land to be rehabilitated may require resettlement. Nomad projects in Mali are examples of successful, desirable resettlement. Greater problems and harsher criticisms have faced certain other programmes. In the context of civil war, or of externally funded and teleguided aggression, there will inevitably be political aspects to resettlement as well as ecological and human survival ones. There are also likely to be problems relating to adequacy of forward planning, of supporting resource provision and of a range of non-voluntarism from overenthusiastic promotion to plain coercion. Not all of these are amenable to solution by physical or financial resource inputs. In so far as the weaknesses relate to inadequate planning, personnel, transport, interim food supply, site preparation and production inputs, food aid and associated aid could radically increase its effectiveness in production terms. They could also improve the human acceptability/reduction of suffering/voluntary entry into the programme aspects.

Storage improvement is needed for several reasons. First, increases in total and especially urban population have not in general been matched by increased off farm storage capacity. Second, modern sector storage capacity tends to be too concentrated maximizing seasonal and emergency calls on scarce transport and entailing back and forth haulage which raises costs. Third, for these and other reasons modern sector storage losses are in many cases appallingly high recorded cases run to 20 per cent a year versus a 2.5 per cent global "norm" and a 1.5 per cent achieved level in Zimbabwe. Further, more storage is required to build up emergency reserves regionally, nationally and sub-nationally. These are needed to allow prompt response to emergencies. They can have other benefits if built from local (or regional) purchases in good crop years. In that case they help maintain food prices, rural incomes and plantings in good years all of which contribute to reducing vulnerability in subsequent bad ones and also reduce national/regional medium term dependence on staple food imports.



Health and health related (including pure water) services are relevant to vulnerability reduction. The disease ridden cannot work long or hard. Women tending sick family members have less time to produce crops (setting up a vicious circle of illness, hunger, malnutrition). Women and girls worn out by up to 6 hours and 30 kilometres a day fetching water have neither the time nor the energy to sustain agricultural productivity especially in years of unfavourable climatic conditions. Ancillary aspects of health programmes (e.g., structures, furniture) and rather larger proportions of some rural water projects (shallow wells, spring protection, pipeline trenches, maintenance) are suitable for labour intensive, seasonal, rural work programmes. However, in some cases cash (or kind) inputs including basic drugs and medical supplies will need to be associated with the food aid/work components.

Sixth, some forms of project food aid are human welfare and cost effective. Supplementary feeding in Botswana, Ghana and Zimbabwe appear to be examples. In such cases it is desirable to seek to integrate the supplemental feeding with other priority programmes. If for example the feeding is at clinics, it can be linked with immunization and nutrition, environmental sanitation, childcare education for mothers (or older siblings) who bring their children. The point is not simply that they are a captive audience trips to clinics cost time and money which poor women can ill afford so that multiple service provision on each trip is desirable. Successful project food aid requires pre-planning, decentralized delivery, participation or at least attention to recipient needs and constraints, supporting resources (e.g., utensils, cooking facilities, fuel for supplemental feeding). Including these in programme design and funding (whether from food sales or otherwise provided) can be crucial to project success.

Seventh, there should be no a prior assumption that all food aid should be in the form of grain. At the simplest level this may mean that local purchases would include staple root crops and/or plantains depending on availability, transport possibilities, costs and recipient preferences. More generally, it implies that if food aid is to be seen as saving and rehabilitating lives, it needs to be related to overall nutritional and energy needs and may well include proteins, fats, sugar, e.g., oilseeds, vegetable or butter oil, fish, milk and sugar. Except for the last, all have been moderately frequently included in some project food aid plus occasionally and marginally in balance of payments support food aid. The potential for and payoff from their more general use deserves exploration. Sugar is an overly maligned food (or in sub-Saharan Africa drink, as the bulk is consumed in tea or coffee). It does provide quick, cheap energy which especially during rehabilitation and in the context of food aid financed work programmes is needed, not least when (as is common in sub-Saharan Africa) breakfast is frequently a cup of a hot beverage with or without sugar, and the main meal (often the only full one) is taken after the working day is over.

For that matter to limit the scope of agricultural commodity aid to food aid is slightly unreal given transfer or perspectives and sub-Saharan Africa needs. If an African country has a structural inadequacy of cotton

or paper production which blocks utilization of textile or textbook production capacity, but also a relative balance between food supply and needs, then a strong case exists for seeking to substitute paper and/or cotton for grain - a case which the USA, Canada, Norway and Finland (only the USA in the cotton case, and the others for paper) might well accept.

Eighth, effective food aid programmes require cash as well as food. This is true in respect to local purchases, work programmes, non-food inputs into rehabilitation (whether household tool, seed, fertilizer inputs or wells or health support work), transport of food or other inputs. In some cases these costs can be financed by supplying and selling food. In two they cannot: first, when key associated inputs have a high foreign exchange cost which cannot be met from the country's own resources (e.g., in some cases steel to produce hand tools, basic drugs for rural medical programmes) and second for third country procurement (e.g., Zimbabwe and Malawi for Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Ghana for Burkina Faso and Mali, Cameroon for Chad) and/or local/regional purchase buildup of national and regional reserves. A similar situation can arise during rehabilitation if food output recovers so that no or low food imports are needed, but sustaining that rehabilitation and recovery still requires programme inputs beyond domestic foreign exchange or fiscal capacity, e.g., agricultural inputs or imports to produce them and seasonal, income support/environmental upgrading rural works programmes.

Ninth, more participation both by intended beneficiaries and by recipient governments/organizations is needed. This is particularly true in respect to design, adaptation and monitoring of rehabilitation and productivity enhancement/vulnerability reduction programmes as well as of decisions to initiate a major emergency programme. Participation - or rather its absence - is a very common and serious failing of public sector programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. It is especially marked in the case of large aid financed programmes and projects and in some cases reaches its apogee in food aid programme determination, operation and evaluation. The practical case for participation of users knowing what they need where, when and how better at least in some respects than experts applies to food aid as do the general reasons why aid agencies (including NGO's) find it difficult to be responsible (let alone accountable) to recipients.

Tenth, political aspects of food aid must be faced, not forcefully ignored. This is particularly true because the main loss of life from drought in sub-Saharan Africa since 1980 has been in cases in which civil war and external aggression interacted with weather to devastate production and with initially poor transport to hamper food movements. The cases are well known: Angola, Chad, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Mozambique and the Sudan. In such cases it is not possible to be politically neutral, providing food aid saves lives and bolsters the authority of the political institutions through which it is provided. Not providing it kills human beings and erodes the political strength of those who are therefore unable to feed their people. In Mozambique, many if not most of the probable 100,000 deaths from starvation in 1983 could have been averted had food aid bodies which knew of the situation been willing either to risk their personnel and vehicles in South

African proxy force infested areas or to provide food to the Mozambican Government to deliver. When they became willing to do both in 1984, despite a security position which was, if anything, worse deaths were sharply reduced.

A related pair of political issues are open criticism of recipients and provision of household productive capacity rehabilitation aid (including associated infrastructure, e.g., wells, roads, resettlement capacity) to governments whose overall rural programmes are open to very serious criticism. There are no easy answers to these questions. But to remain virtually silent in public on what are at best horrendous implementation weaknesses and insensitivities to human suffering while denying rehabilitation "development" aid for local infrastructure and household level productive inputs to lessen the hardships of resettlement and facilitate household return to self sufficiency (whether resettled or not) would appear to be a profoundly unsatisfactory answer. It may provide a quiet life for donors but also unquiet deaths for those people not assisted.

If significant improvement in terms of these criteria can be reached and there appear to be no basic donor or recipient interests utterly inimical to such changes food aid in sub-Saharan Africa can become more effective in saving lives and markedly more so in helping people and communities rebuild their lives and productive capacities and countries their agricultural production and economies.